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8	BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION
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10	DOCKET NO. UE-010395
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12	REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF KELLY O. NORWOOD
13	REPRESENTING AVISTA CORPORATION
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	Exhibit T (KON-T)

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No. The impacts of the volatile wholesale market prices combined with the record low A. hydroelectric generation conditions continue to have a substantial impact on the costs to provide electric service to the Company's customers. Deferrals for July through September 2001 alone are projected to be \$74 million for the Washington jurisdiction. The \$74 million for the three-month period represents an extraordinary increase in costs over and above those included in base retail rates. The \$74 million represents 31% of the Company's gross annual retail revenue in the Washington jurisdiction of \$237 million. The increased costs are driven primarily by record low hydroelectric conditions and unprecedented high wholesale market prices. Most of these costs are already known because of the commitments made to purchase power at fixed prices to replace the lost hydroelectric generation.

Staff has taken the position in the past that in order to have the opportunity to recover extraordinary costs, it should seek deferred accounting treatment and then address prudence at a later time. That is precisely what the Company has proposed in this filing. Staff Witness Schooley included the following question and answer on page 7 of his direct testimony, in opposing the Company's request for recovery of extraordinary storm damage costs that the Company sought to recover in Docket No. UE-991606:

- Did WWP or Avista attempt to establish an accounting basis for later recovery of this O. cost?
- No. No accounting petitions were filed to capitalize this expense for later recovery. It is A. only now, three years after the fact, that the Company presents a means to increase rates because of this expense.

In its testimony, Staff has acknowledged the extraordinary circumstances in this proceeding, the resulting high power costs, and is recommending an increase in rates, but then is recommending the

One of Mr. Elgin's reasons (page 21 and 22 of his testimony) for terminating the deferral mechanism is to send a signal "to firmly reiterate that Avista does not have an approved Power Cost Adjustment Mechanism (PCA)." Avista is fully aware of the fact that it does not have an approved PCA in Washington. So are investors and bankers as indicated by numerous analyst reports over the past several years. We are also fully aware of the requirements stated by the Commission and have stated repeatedly that they will be addressed should the Company propose a PCA in its promised general rate case filing this November. A proposal to deprive the Company of the opportunity to show that over \$74 million of power supply costs are extraordinary and were prudently incurred, for the purpose of "reiterating" what is already clear to the Company and its investors, is completely without merit and unnecessarily exacerbates the very difficult financial situation facing Avista.

It is imperative that the deferred accounting mechanism continue beyond June 30 to allow the Company the opportunity to seek recovery of the extraordinary costs subsequent to June 30. The deferred accounting mechanism is designed to set aside extraordinary costs for the opportunity for later recovery. The Company has already agreed to make a filing in November 2001 to address the prudence and the recovery of the deferred costs.

Avista has proposed that the deferred accounting treatment and the surcharge be in place through December 31, 2003. As Mr. Falkner explained in his direct testimony, this 27-month period was chosen to provide recovery of the deferred costs over a reasonable period of time, while also reducing the overall impact on customers, as compared to a shorter recovery period. By keeping the

deferred accounting treatment in place during the recovery period, it not only provides the opportunity to capture the continuing extraordinary costs, but also provides the opportunity for power cost offsets to the deferral balance to occur during the period. The 27-month recovery period also provides a plan for the financial community as to how the deferred costs would be reduced to zero.

In Avista's surcharge filing on July 17, 2001, it proposed that at the conclusion of the November 2001 general rate case, the Company would modify the surcharge amount and the duration of the surcharge rate, if needed, in order to reflect the outcome of the general rate case. Therefore, all parties will have the opportunity in the general rate case to address both the duration and amount of the surcharge to be in place at the conclusion of the general case.

- Q. On page 4 of his testimony, with regard to the prudence of the deferred power costs, Mr. Elgin recommends that Avista be ordered "on a September 17, 2001 deadline, to either file a pleading affirming that the evidence it submitted on March 23, 2001 is its direct case on those issues, or file a new direct case on those issues." Do you agree with this recommendation?
- A. No. Major changes in wholesale market conditions and hydroelectric generation conditions have occurred since the March 23, 2001 filing. In addition, the months with the largest deferral entries occur subsequent to the March filing (April, June, and July-September). It was the changes in conditions following the March filing that required Avista to seek immediate rate relief. Therefore, it is important that Avista's prudence filing be updated so that the information provided to the Commission reflects information subsequent to the March 23, 2001 filing.

The September 17<sup>th</sup> deadline would clearly not allow Avista the opportunity to adequately address the issues that would need to be covered in the prudence filing. The deadline is only 11 days

1	following the completion of hearings in this proceeding on September 6 <sup>th</sup> . Furthermore, Avista has
2	hearings in Idaho on September 12th and 13th regarding its proposed rate increase in the Idaho
3	jurisdiction. Between September 6 <sup>th</sup> and 17 <sup>th</sup> , Avista would literally have four business days to
4	complete its filing and express-mail the filing for delivery on September 17 <sup>th</sup> .
5	Q. Staff has also recommended that Avista be directed to file a general rate case by
6	September 28, 2001. Do you have similar concerns regarding the timing of such a filing?
7	A. Yes. The Company has proposed to file a general rate case in November 2001 to
8	address, among other things, the prudence of the deferred power costs. This general rate case filing will
9	cover a broad range of power supply issues, and therefore, it is important that the Company have a
10	reasonable period of time following this proceeding to complete that filing.
11	Q. What are the specific power supply issues that would be covered in the November
12	2001 general rate case filing?
13	A. The Company's general rate case filing in November would address, among other
14	things, the prudence of the deferred power costs, the regulatory treatment of the Coyote Springs II
15	project that is scheduled for commercial operation in June 2002, and a long-term periodic power cost
16	adjustment mechanism.
17	In addition, the general rate case would address the issues raised by the Commission Staff and
18	other parties related to the deferral mechanism, including issues such as:
19 20	<ol> <li>The optimization of Company-owned resources to the benefit of retail customers.</li> <li>The appropriateness of recovery of power costs through a deferral mechanism.</li> </ol>

The issue of cost of capital offsets related to a shift in risk between shareholders and

Whether the mechanism captures all the benefits of operating the Company's system.

Company plans to mitigate the deferred power costs.

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ratepayers.

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1	has allowed Staff and other parties to conduct their own assessment of the Company's need for
2	immediate rate relief under the "interim rate relief standards," and any other criteria that they might
3	choose.
4	Commission Staff evaluated the Company's request under the "interim rate relief standards."
5	Mr. Schooley reached the following conclusions in his testimony:
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	<ul> <li>Q. Given the above analysis, does Avista show a need for interim rate relief?</li> <li>A. Yes. In my opinion, Avista needs cash from its utility operations in the very near future. (Schooley direct testimony, Page 20, Lines 13-15)</li> <li>Q. What is your recommendation concerning emergency rate relief request based on the Commission's interim relief standards?</li> <li>A. Based on my analysis under the interim rate relief standards, Avista shows an immediate need for rate relief. I recommend a rate increase of 32.6%, subject to the other staff recommendations. (Schooley direct testimony, Page 23, Lines 1-6)</li> </ul>
19	Staff has recommended that the surcharge rate relief be terminated after 90 days, and that the
20	Company has the option of seeking to continue the emergency rate relief upon its expiration in 90 days.
21	The Company has demonstrated in this filing that its need for rate relief extends well beyond 90 days.
22	Since that is the case, the Company would be right back before this Commission within one month of its
23	order, with yet another Petition to continue the rate relief.
24	It is imperative that the rate relief continue beyond the 90 day period proposed by Staff to allow
25	the Company the opportunity to access capital under reasonable terms to continue to fund the
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the prudence of Coyote Springs II in the November general rate case. Therefore, there will be opportunity to address the prudence of this project prior to the inservice date of the project.

In any event, the issue of prudence related to the deferred costs, including any capital and O&M costs, will be addressed in the upcoming November filing and it is not necessary to make a ruling in this phase of the proceeding related to these costs.

Q. On page 2 of Mr. Schoenbeck's testimony he states as follows: "So, in essence, the Company is seeking recovery of resources yet to be put into service and short-term power costs that would not be reflected in traditional normalized ratemaking." Do you have any comments on this statement?

A. Yes. The Company has requested the surcharge rate increase to <u>begin</u> recovery of the extraordinary power costs on a subject to refund basis. The deferral balance for the Washington jurisdiction at June 30, 2001 was \$109 million. At the time of this filing, the expected balance at September 30, 2001 was \$186 million, and more current estimates show that the balance will be slightly higher than \$186 million at September 30<sup>th</sup>. The majority of the costs for this period are known because of commitments already made to purchase power at fixed prices to cover resource deficiencies caused primarily by record low hydroelectric conditions.

If the upcoming prudence review of the deferred costs were to occur over a nine-month period, the dollars collected by the Company during the nine-month period, under the 36.9% surcharge, would be approximately \$63 million (9 months of an annual revenue increase of \$84 million). The dollars collected during the prudence review period would be only 58% of the <u>actual deferral balance</u> at June 30, 2001 of \$109 million, and only 34% of the expected balance at September 30, 2001 of \$186

Q. On page 11, line 7, of Mr. Schoenbeck's testimony, with regard to implementing the proposed surcharge, he states that, "If that were to occur, the Company would receive ratepayer capital based upon speculative forecast assumptions, highly questionable power purchase transactions and fuel costs." Do you agree with this statement?

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resource needs of the Company. At the time CSII was selected, the Project was already permitted, and the major equipment such as the gas turbine and generator, and steam turbine and generator, had already been ordered. This removed cost and scheduling uncertainty for major cost components. The Project is also located in a supportive community environment, which is a critical factor in the siting, construction and operation of a generating project such as CSII.

Owning and controlling the operation of CSII would allow the Company to take advantage of short-term market conditions where it may be more cost-effective at certain times to economically displace the plant. At those times the Company would sell off the natural gas and buy cheaper replacement electricity in the market. These opportunities to optimize are either not available in a fixed price electric product, or a premium price is require to get that type of flexibility. In addition, Ownership of CSII would allow Avista to "layer-in" natural gas fuel costs over time to take advantage of the changes in natural gas prices. Some of the alternatives in the RFP to Coyote Springs II were fixed price, flat delivery, electric products. In these products, however, there is no opportunity to change the fixed electric price over the ten or fifteen year term of the market contracts, unless a premium is paid to get it.

We believe CSII will be a valuable resource for our customers in the long-term, and the Company would like to keep the Project if possible. However, if the Company is financially unable to support the Project it would need to be sold.

Q. Mr. Eliassen expressed concerns that Avista's credit rating would be dropped below "investment grade" if Staff's recommendations were adopted by the Commission. Would you please explain the likely power supply related impacts if the drop in credit rating were to occur?

A. Yes. If the Company's credit rating were to drop below investment grade, it would likely place Avista in a similar position to the utilities in California (PG&E and So. Cal. Edison) with regard to its ability to purchase power from the wholesale market to serve its system load requirements. Many counterparties would refuse to sell power to Avista or grant a credit line for money that would be owed related to a transaction. This would force Avista to prepay for power purchases, and/or post cash collateral margins, at a time when the utility would have limited cash available. Several counterparties have already cut off transactions with Avista, or have limited transactions with Avista, as a result of the most recent downgrade that occurred.

Furthermore, the majority of Avista's short-term wholesale market purchases are conducted under the Western Systems Power Pool (WSPP) Agreement. The WSPP Agreement includes a creditworthiness section, that states, in general terms, that should a party's creditworthiness become unsatisfactory to the other party, the dissatisfied party may require the counterparty to make a prepayment of cash, or use some other mutually agreeable method to satisfy the party. Under the Agreement, a downgrade to below investment grade could result in substantial margin calls to Avista that would require Avista to make immediate cash payments or post collateral for existing transactions already entered into by Avista to serve system load requirements. Mr. Eliassen addresses the resulting financial difficulties that would be associated with these margin calls.

- Q. Does that conclude your rebuttal testimony?
- A. Yes it does.