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     BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION
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                         COMMISSION
   In the Matter of the Petition for )
   Arbitration of an Interconnection )
   Agreement Between
                                     )Docket No. UT-003006
   SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LP,)Volume I
 5
             and
                                     )Pages 1 - 29
   U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
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             An oral argument in the above matter
   was held on August 17, 2000, at 9:05 a.m., at 1300
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   South Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, Olympia,
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   Washington, before Chairwoman MARILYN SHOWALTER, and
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   Commissioners RICHARD HEMSTAD AND WILLIAM GILLIS.
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             The parties were present as follows:
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             U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., by MARY ROSE
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   HUGHES, Attorney at Law, Perkins Coie, 607 Fourteenth
   Street Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20005-2011.
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             SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LP, by ERIC S.
   HEATH, Attorney at Law, 330 South Valley View
17
   Boulevard, Mailstop NVLSVB0110, Las Vegas, Nevada
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   89107.
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             Also Present for the Washington Utilities and
   Transportation Commission: Jing Roth, Glenn Blackmon.
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   Kathryn T. Wilson, CCR
25 Court Reporter
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: We are here for oral argument in Docket No. UT-003006, which is a matter of the petition for arbitration of interconnection rates, 5 terms, conditions, and related arrangements between Sprint Communications Company and U S West 7 Communications, and specifically, we have the arbitrators' report, and Qwest, or U S West, has 9 requested a review of some of those conditions. Before 10 we begin, why don't we introduce ourselves; that is, I 11 think you know us. Why don't you introduce yourselves. 12 MS. HUGHES: Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and 13 Commissioners. My name is Mary Rose Hughes. I am outside counsel for Qwest. I am with the law firm of 14 15 Perkins Coie, and I practice mainly in Washington, D.C. 16 My colleague, John Devaney, has been the lead attorney 17 for Owest in the arbitration of this interconnection 18 agreement with Sprint. Mr. Devaney had intended to be 19 here today. He had planned to be here today. 20 looking forward to talking with you today. However, he 21 had a family medical emergency late last week, which, unfortunately, still has not resolved itself, so I'm 22 23 here today in his stead. I am familiar with the issues 24 in this arbitration and specifically with the issues raised in Qwest's petition for review.

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MR. HEATH: Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and the Commissioners. Eric Heath, H-e-a-t-h, for Sprint. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Staff is here in an advisory capacity, not as a party, but we have here with us Glenn Blackmon and Jing Roth. Since Qwest is 5 raising the challenges -- it is appropriate to call you 7 Owest not U S West? MS. HUGHES: 8 Yes. 9 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Qwest is raising the 10 challenges, so I think the easiest thing to do would be 11 to have Owest present the issues for 15 minutes and 12 with a response for 15 minutes, and that leaves us a 13 little time for more questions. Were these 14 simultaneous briefs? 15 MS. HUGHES: Yes. 16 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Which means we do have 17 the briefs, and I think you either hit the highlights, 18 or perhaps this gives you a little chance to join the issues that the other brief has raised. 19 20 MS. HUGHES: Thank you, and I can be brief. 21 I would like to say at the onset that although several terms of the parties' interconnection agreement are in 22 23 dispute, and, of course, that's why we are here, the

vast, vast majority of the terms and conditions of the

agreement are not in dispute.

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When the parties began their negotiation, there were literally hundreds and hundreds of terms and conditions to discuss, and there were many, many terms and conditions about which the parties held differing 5 views. As a result of extensive negotiations, however, and negotiations that continued, in fact, throughout the arbitration process, the parties were able to resolve all but several issues in dispute, and I do not 9 want to underestimate the importance of the achievement 10 that we have an interconnection agreement to present to 11 this commission that is largely negotiated, and despite 12 the fact that there were literally hundreds of terms 13 and conditions originally up for discussion and 14 originally in dispute, the parties have through mutual 15 negotiation and compromise decided between themselves 16 the terms and conditions that will govern their 17 business relationship in the State of Washington for 18 the next few years. 19

Having said that, there are two issues on which the parties were unable to reach an agreement and that are the subject of Qwest's petition for review that's before the Commission today. The issues are whether or not reciprocal compensation should be paid on ISP-bound traffic and whether or not Qwest must combine unbundled network elements in any technically

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feasible manner for Sprint, and as I said, I have very brief comments on both issues as the record and the briefing submitted to the Commission is extensive. With respect to reciprocal compensation on 5 ISP-bound traffic, our arbitrators recommend that reciprocal compensation be paid on this traffic. base their recommendation on the observation that nothing in current law precludes this commission from ordering reciprocal compensation for this traffic, and 9 10 they also, of course, base their recommendation on the 11 prior decisions of this commission, and further, while 12 the arbitrators acknowledge the public policy arguments 13 that Owest has made against awarding reciprocal 14 compensation on this traffic, the arbitrators have 15 concluded that this arbitration is not the place to 16 resolve those arguments. 17

Qwest comes before you today very, very respectful of past Commission decisions on the issue of reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic. Qwest submits, however, that there is new evidence, and there is compelling new experience with reciprocal compensation on ISP-bound traffic that Qwest presented in this arbitration and that provide a new and compelling basis for this commission to reconsider its past view in the context of this new interconnection

agreement between Sprint and Qwest and to decide that no reciprocal compensation should be awarded in the context of this new interconnection agreement, based on essentially the same evidence that was presented here. 5 Both the Colorado Commission and the Arizona Commission have ruled that no reciprocal compensation will be paid on ISP-bound traffic in the new interconnection agreement between Qwest and Sprint that is going 9 forward in the State of Colorado and in the State of 10 Arizona.

11 Now, perhaps of particular interest to this 12 commission is the Colorado decision, because the 13 Colorado Commission, like this commission, had 14 previously ruled a number of times and in a number of 15 contexts that reciprocal compensation must be paid on 16 ISP-bound traffic, but the Commission, looking at the 17 same record as Owest presented here, substantially the 18 same record, the Colorado Commission distinguished its 19 prior decisions by stating that what the Colorado 20 Commission decided in the past was based on the record 21 before it in the past, and that no one, including the 22 Colorado Commission, had appreciated the economic 23 ramifications of ordering call termination payments for 24 Internet-bound traffic.

Qwest respectfully submits today that these

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economic ramifications, as Owest established in the arbitration, provide compelling reasons for this commission to decide that in this new interconnection agreement between Sprint and Qwest, no reciprocal 5 compensation should be paid on ISP-bound traffic. Internet traffic has increased dramatically, almost 7 exponentially. Looking at figures for January 2000 and February 2000 alone, figures that Qwest presented in this arbitration, over 91 percent of the minutes that 9 10 Qwest hands off to CLEC's in the State of Washington 11 are ISP-bound minutes, and Owest's evidence established 12 that there is an enormous, an overwhelming imbalance in 13 the traffic flowing between Owest and CLEC's in the 14 State of Washington. 15

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: If that's the case, does your argument rest on the fact that the payment is imbalanced, or this is Internet, and therefore, not for us to -- what part of your argument rests on this has an interstate quality?

MS. HUGHES: Much of our argument, Madam
Chairwoman, is that this is interstate traffic. It is
not local traffic; therefore, as the FCC ruled in the
ISP order, reciprocal compensation under 251-B of the
Act is not due on this traffic. However, you may
recall, and as our arbitrators correctly pointed out,

in that ISP order, the FCC said, We believe this traffic is predominantly interstate. We believe no reciprocal compensation is owing, therefore, on it, under the local reciprocal compensation provision of the Act. Nevertheless, until we make a final rule on this issue, state commissions are free to decide this issue essentially as they wish.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Then in addition though, that's true, so there is that leeway that the FCC gave, but what about the D.C. circuit opinion?

MS. HUGHES: The D.C. circuit vacated the ISP order and sent it back for more explanation as to how it was or how it was that the FCC arrives at its conclusion using an end-to-end analysis that this traffic is, in fact, predominantly interstate and not local.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But also with some fairly strong analysis, I would say. They didn't say, It's not interstate, but they seem to cast some doubt on rationale. It seems like we have leeway both from the FCC and really a little bit of encouragement maybe from the Second Circuit to find our way that either this is intrastate, or whatever it is, we have the right to make an appropriate reciprocal payment if we find it appropriate.

Was the Colorado order, did it come out before or after the Second Circuit opinion? MS. HUGHES: The Colorado order came out after the circuit opinion, but I hope I have responded 5 to your question. Qwest believes the traffic is interstate and that the FCC will, as it has been quoted 7 as saying, be able to satisfy the circuit court that this traffic is, in fact, interstate, so as I said, we 9 believe that because the traffic is interstate, it is 10 wholly and utterly inappropriate to award reciprocal 11 compensation on it as local traffic, but setting that 12 aside, because we do agree that the arbitrators 13 correctly pointed out that nothing precludes this 14 commission from ordering reciprocal compensation on 15 this traffic if it so desires based on the state of the 16 law right now, but we believe, separate from the 17 argument that this is interstate traffic and therefore 18 ought not to be subject to reciprocal compensation, 19 that there are overwhelming, compelling economic 20 reasons for not awarding reciprocal compensation on 21 this traffic. 22 And as I was saying earlier, the minutes 23 speak for themselves. When over 91 percent of the 24 traffic flowing from Owest to CLEC's is Internet-bound 25 traffic, you can readily see that CLEC's in Washington

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State are specializing in Internet traffic. They are signing up ISP's at a rate that far exceeds their service to local end-user telephone voice customers. Extrapolating out the January and February figures 5 alone and assuming no growth in the use of the Internet, which is an extraordinarily and perhaps 7 unreasonable assumption, but even assuming no growth in the use of the Internet, Qwest projects that in the 9 year 2000 in the State of Washington, it will pay 45 10 million dollars in reciprocal compensation on this 11 traffic. This is an enormous transfer of dollars that 12 will inevitably have consequences. 13 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Can I ask you a 14 question? Supposing we decide, as we have decided in the past, that some kind of compensation is owed, 15 16 either because really it is actually intrastate or it 17 has some kind of mixed quality or it's unique and it's 18 owed, aren't we in the position of this is sort of an 19 all or nothing or it's yours or theirs option so that 20 we don't have any other alternative, do we, or do we? 21 If we decide that reciprocal compensation is 22 appropriate, isn't our only choice what Sprint has 23 offered, because you said none is appropriate, as 24 opposed to the parties could have decided it was

appropriate and come up with some other mechanism?

MS. HUGHES: The parties could have come up with some other mechanism. Owest disagrees that it's an all or nothing proposition. A method of reciprocal compensation, and I think we've kind of been using it 5 as a buzz word, assuming cash reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic, a method of reciprocal 7 compensation is bill and keep, and it is, in fact, bill and keep that the Colorado Commission found to be the 9 most appropriate way to deal with this traffic right 10 now as did the Arizona Commission. Both commissions 11 ordered that there would be reciprocal compensation but 12 that it would be not cash and office voice rate 13 reciprocal compensation, but it would be bill and keep. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I just want to be 14 15 clear on what our options are. What did Qwest in those 16 proceedings propose, nothing or bill and keep? 17 MS. HUGHES: Owest proposed, as it proposed 18 here, nothing. Nothing because for all the reasons 19 we've stated here, it would be inappropriate. 20 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So those commissions 21 did not accept either position? They went ahead and 22 found their own bill and keep? 23 MS. HUGHES: Alternatively, Qwest proposed 24 bill and keep, as we have alternatively proposed here. 25 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So your position is,

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1 if there is going to be reciprocal compensation, then 2 it should be bill and keep.

MS. HUGHES: Correct. As Qwest set forth in its testimony, when reciprocal compensation is paid on 5 Internet-bound traffic, those who don't use the Internet at all are subsidizing those who use the Internet a lot. There are many people who use the Internet for hours at a time, daily. In determining 9 that reciprocal compensation was not appropriate, cash 10 reciprocal compensation was not appropriate to award in 11 this new interconnection agreement in the State of 12 Arizona, the Arizona Commission was especially 13 concerned and troubled by the enormous subsidy that 14 awarding cash reciprocal compensation on this traffic 15 was represented from non Internet users to Internet 16 users.

For these and other reasons that are fully set forth in Qwest's testimony, we respectfully submit, again, with due acknowledgment to this commission's past ruling, that the record created here is a different record, and that on this record, no cash reciprocal compensation is appropriate going forward with this new interconnection agreement between Qwest and Sprint.

The second issue, and I can be very brief, on

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which Qwest has petitioned for review is the issue of whether or not Owest must combine UNE's in any technically feasible manner for Sprint. Here again, Qwest comes before you respectful of your past 5 decisions and respectful of the rulings of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the MCI and MFS cases. Again, Qwest respectfully submits that new developments bear this commissions reconsideration of its past 9 views.

10 After the arbitrators made their decision 11 here, and their decision here was that the parties' 12 interconnection agreement should incorporate Rule 13 315-C, the Eight Circuit issued its decision on remand 14 on July 18th, so that was after our arbitrators had issued a report here, and in its decision on remand on 15 16 July 18, the Eighth Circuit said again that Rule 315-C 17 violates the Federal Telecommunications Act; that Rule 18 315-C is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act 19 when it requires ILEC's to combine and use the CLEC's. 20 This ruling on remand expressly and explicitly 21 considered the Ninth Circuit ruling in the MCI case and in the MFS case, and it expressly and explicitly 22 disagreed with those rulings. 23

What's important here is that the Eighth 25 Circuit has vacated Rule 315-C, and the Eighth Circuit

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has exclusive statutory jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act to interpret Rules 315-C through F, as it has now done twice. Whatever we respectfully submit, Commissioners, whatever ambiguity there may have been 5 before the July 18th ruling as to how the Ninth Circuit's ruling on these issues might be squared with the Eighth Circuit's ruling and which rulings were in control here, the Eighth Circuit has now definitively 9 removed that ambiguity by saying, We meant what we 10 said. Rule 315-C violates the Act. 11 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Has the time period 12 for requesting a stay in that ruling elapsed or not? 13 I'm just wondering what the status of the Eighth 14 Circuit ruling is today. 15 MS. HUGHES: Madam Chairwoman, I don't know 16 the answer to that question, but I can find out. 17 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: If their decision is 18 not stayed, is it your opinion that this commission is 19 bound by the Eighth Circuit's ruling? 20 MS. HUGHES: Yes. It is our position that 21 because the Eighth Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction 22 under the Hobbs Act to interpret these rules, as it has

interpreted these rules twice now, this commission is

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I don't understand.

bound by the Eighth Circuit's interpretation.

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Are you asserting that the Eighth Circuit decision, in effect then, overrules the Ninth Circuit decision in binding other commissions outside of the Eighth Circuit? 5 MS. HUGHES: That's correct, Commissioner. Again, because of the analysis that the Eighth Circuit is the circuit vested with exclusive jurisdiction to interpret these rules, we think that's very clear. Also I would point out that the --9 10 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I guess I'm troubled by that. For that to have a nationwide application, if there is, in effect, a conflict between the decision of 11 12 13 the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, how could 14 another court in another circuit or state commission be 15 bound by that and told there was a definitive ruling on 16 that issue? 17 MS. HUGHES: As I said, our analysis is that 18 because the Ninth Circuit overstepped its authority in 19 reporting to interpret these rules and because the 20 Eighth Circuit has now in its July 18th ruling 21 specifically looked at what the Ninth Circuit said, and 22 specifically said the Ninth Circuit was wrong, we 23 disagree with the Ninth Circuit. We are telling you,

again, Rule 315-C is in violation of the Act.

But Qwest obviously shares your concern,

Commissioner, that this potential split in the circuits our service territory covers, the Ninth Circuit as well as the Eighth Circuit and other circuits, and Qwest has petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari 5 to the Ninth Circuit. Qwest's petition for certiorari was denied. However, the denial came days before the Eighth Circuit's decision on remand on July 18th, so Qwest has now petitioned for reconsideration of the 9 order to deny, and that is now before the Supreme 10 Court, and Qwest is obviously hopeful that the Supreme 11 Court will take this up so we have a more definitive 12 ruling, but in the absence of the Supreme Court ruling 13 on this, we suggest, again, respectfully to this 14 commission, that the better analysis of Rule 315-C and 15 whether it is viable or not resides with the Eighth 16 Circuit and not with the Ninth Circuit, and I would 17 also point out one last point on this and then I really 18 am done, is that the FCC has not sought in any respect 19 to reinstate Rule 315-C. The FCC has said we defer to 20 the Eighth Circuit. It has not said, We defer to the 21 Ninth Circuit, or we think we like what the Ninth 22 Circuit did, so therefore, we are going to allow it. 23 And finally, although it was not the basis 24 for Arbitrators Moss or Berg's decision that Rule 315-C 25 should be implemented here, there has been some

suggestion by Sprint that even if Rule 315-C has been vacated and violates the Act, this commission has independent state authority to order 315-C combinations, and we respectfully suggest that that's 5 not what the arbitrators concluded. They did not address this commission's state law authority at all. However, we believe that this commission does not have state law authority to impose Rule 315-C here when the 9 Eighth Circuit has expressly ruled that 315-C violates 10 the Act. 11 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I'd like to pursue 12 that. Is it Qwest's position that this commission does 13 not have independent state authority to order even any 14 combination; that is, that we are prohibited from doing 15 that? 16 MS. HUGHES: It's Owest's position, 17 Mr. Commissioner, that a rule by this commission that 18 is directly inconsistent with the governing law, as 19 interpreted by the Eighth Circuit, would be 20 preemptable; that this commission has state law 21 authority to order combinations that are not 22 inconsistent with the Act. 23 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I'm trying to 24

remember. This commission has so determined in the 25 past that matter has been litigated and without

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outcome. MS. HUGHES: This issue was not briefed in the context of this arbitration, so I'm not specifically prepared to answer that question. 5 understanding is that when the issue went up to the Ninth Circuit earlier, the Ninth Circuit resolved the 7 matter based on its interpretation of Rule 315-C on reference to what the Supreme Court had done in reinstating Rule 315-B. In other words, the Ninth 9 10 Circuit's analysis was not an analysis of this 11 commission's independent state authority, but it was an 12 analysis of Rule 315-B and 315-C.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: But the Ninth Circuit in its ruling, because it wasn't in front of it, I assume, did not address the question of the states that preempted from an independent state authority to address that question.

MS. HUGHES: That is correct. That issue was not before the Eighth Circuit.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But it seems like your argument is because the Eighth Circuit found that 315-C violates the Telecommunications Act, if we do something that's similar or identical under our state authority, it, according to the Eighth Circuit, also violates the Telecommunications Act, and the problem there is why

00019 are we bound by the Eighth Circuit on our interpretation of the Act if it's not by means of the rule? 4 MS. HUGHES: That's correct. 5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So there is a jump 6 We should move to Mr. Heath. 7 MR. HEATH: Thank you very much. As Ms. Hughes stated, the parties did extensively 9 negotiate and extensively agreed to a large part of 10 this interconnection agreement, and these two issues 11 which Owest has requested reconsideration of are indeed 12 just a very small portion, and I would like to express 13 Sprint's gratitude to the Administrative Law Judges 14 Berg and Moss for their help in getting this moved 15 forward and before you today.

16 With regard to Ms. Hughes' remarks on the 17 issue of reciprocal compensation payments for ISP 18 traffic, the Commission has, in the comments and the questions that were asked of Ms. Hughes, dissected or 19 20 properly bisected the issue, and that is there is a 21 question of whether or not it is legal, and there is a 22 question of whether or not the facts mandate a 23 different outcome. Sprint respectfully submits, as it 24 has in its brief, that this commission's prior 25 decisions on this matter, as well as the District of

1 Columbia Circuit Court of Appeal's decision, reinforces 2 those that reciprocal compensation should be due on ISP 3 traffic.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: But the issue or the argument presented, assuming we have discretion to determine this, the issue is whether we should change our position from earlier based upon the argument of an overwhelming imbalance in the payments here or in the flow, the assertion 91 percent of the minutes to CLEC's are ISP-bound traffic, so what is your response to that?

12 MR. HEATH: In response to your question, 13 Mr. Commissioner, I submit that of the imbalance in 14 traffic, Qwest has proposed or Qwest claims that it's all ISP traffic, and Sprint questions, and does so on 15 the record, whether or not it is verifiable how much of 16 17 that is ISP traffic and whether or not that can be 18 accurately and appropriately segregated and identified 19 as ISP bound, and therefore, despite the imbalance, 20 which Sprint admits does exist, the capability of 21 defining that traffic as ISP bound or tagging it as ISP bound is not there at this point. The Commission, as 22 23 the Administrative Law Judges remark in their 24 recommendation, is considering reciprocal compensation 25 in the generic costing docket, UT-003013, where, as the

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parties stipulated, if the Commission were to order reciprocal compensation should be paid on ISP traffic, that a rate for that should be determined in the costing docket. 5 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: The premises behind reciprocal compensation is that there is some approximate balance of traffic both ways, but if there is a substantial imbalance, why isn't bill and keep a 9 better methodology to apply? 10 MR. HEATH: Mr. Commissioner, Sprint 11 respectfully disagrees with your suggestion in that 12 bill and keep would be appropriate if the traffic were 13 roughly in balance, but when the traffic is imbalanced, 14 which Qwest admits that there is, then there must be some form of compensation to the party terminating the 15 16 majority of the traffic, which, in this case, would be 17 a CLEC, and if that traffic is local in nature, as this 18 commission has determined ISP traffic to be, then 19 reciprocal compensation is due on that traffic. 20 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So some of this gets 21 to either the history or the practice of how the 22 companies are compensated. 23 MR. HEATH: That is correct. 24

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: It's a question of whether that fits the new mode and then further,

whether we should try to resolve that in this proceeding or the broader one.

MR. HEATH: Right. The parties have agreed that the broader proceeding would be a more appropriate venue. It's Sprint's position that an industry-wide solution would be more equitable and nondiscriminatory, and I would also point out that the FCC has opened up a proceeding to reconsider the remand from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and has received comments on this very issue as well, so there is a tandem proceeding going on which will be considering the same issue.

I would also point out that with regard to this new evidence which Qwest has submitted that in answering Commissioner Hemstad's question, as I pointed out, it is not conclusively proved in the record that this traffic is all ISP bound. It's not conclusively proven that Qwest has the ability to identify and segregate this traffic for billing purposes, and it is also, and accordingly, Sprint would recommend that these issues be deferred to the general costing and pricing docket.

With regard to the Arizona and Colorado transcripts of the hearings which are submitted into the record in this docket in order to avoid having a

hearing here, Sprint submits that although those Commissions did rule in Owest's favor on this issue that the importing of those hearing transcripts does not import those commissions' rulings, those states' 5 laws on this issue, and that on the basis of the law and this commission's prior rulings that reciprocal 7 compensation is appropriate for ISP traffic. COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: You are not suggesting 9 that we don't have the opportunity to at least look at 10 those decisions as we address this question? 11 MR. HEATH: No, Your Honor, I'm not. 12 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You are just saying we 13 are not bound by them, which we agree. 14 COMMISSIONER GILLIS: On your previous point, 15 if there were conclusive evidence that the traffic were 16 dominantly ISP traffic, 91 percent, what would be your 17 recommendation to the Commission that would be 18 appropriate in that situation? I would recommend that the 19 MR. HEATH: 20 Commission follow its previous rulings. I believe that 21 the Administrative Law Judges' recommendation addresses 22 your question in that as an interim solution, 23 reciprocal compensation should be paid; that this issue 24 should be addressed generically so that a different 25 compensation scheme or that this question can be

addressed on an industry-wide basis. COMMISSIONER GILLIS: Would the issue then go to the appropriate rate, or would it go to the mechanism set for reciprocal compensation itself? MR. HEATH: Well, I suppose it could go to 5 There are varying proposals out there for how 7 reciprocal compensation should be structured, so I'm not exactly sure that both of those wouldn't be 9 appropriate. Once the decision has been made that ISP 10 traffic should be subject to reciprocal compensation, 11 how that reciprocal compensation is structured, whether 12 it's just a rate, whether it's a bifurcated switching 13 charge or whatever, that could be a subject of the 14 generic proceeding. 15 COMMISSIONER GILLIS: The whole mechanism 16 might be in question. 17 I would agree. MR. HEATH: 18 COMMISSIONER GILLIS: Would bill and keep, in your opinion, ever be appropriate in a situation where 19 20 there is -- just taking the fact situation asserted 21 that there is 91 percent of the traffic being terminated on CLEC traffic that is ISP bound, would 22 23 bill and keep ever be an appropriate mechanism? 24 MR. HEATH: No, sir. Bill and keep, as I 25 mentioned, is only appropriate where the traffic is

1 roughly imbalanced, and that situation is definitely 2 out of balance, and I don't see how a company incurring 3 cost to terminate such traffic could survive for very 4 long if it wasn't allowed some sort of compensation for 5 that.

COMMISSIONER GILLIS: What about the response that the CLEC has the opportunity to recover revenues directly from ISP's themselves as opposed to from the wholesale purchaser in this concept?

MR. HEATH: Well, I guess my response would be it would all determine on who has the margin to reduce their prices to ISP's. I don't know generally how those products are priced. I would surmise that they are very close to or they have very thin margins associated with them.

COMMISSIONER GILLIS: Would those two approaches have two alternatives, one collecting the revenues from the ISP's directly, and the alternative approach is collecting the cost recovery from the wholesale purchase of the network that they be equally acceptable from a competitively neutral consideration, or does it matter? Should we be concerned about that to the competitive implications?

MR. HEATH: I think you should be concerned about the competitive implications because CLEC's don't

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UNE's under the Act.

necessarily have their own facilities if they are leasing them from another provider, and to the extent that facilities-based CLEC's are becoming more and more -- a greater presence in the marketplace, perhaps 5 it really wouldn't matter, but in this stage of things, I think that's it's important to consider that they are 7 fewer in number. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: We should wrap up. 9 you have --10 MR. HEATH: I have some comments on the 11 Eighth Circuit ruling, if I might. 12 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Okay. 13 MR. HEATH: With regard to the Eighth Circuit 14 ruling, I would just point out that while the Hobbs Act 15 does designate the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals as 16 having exclusive jurisdiction over the questions raised 17 on the original IOU board versus the FCC decision, and 18 the Eighth Circuit did vacate FCC Rule 51.315-C through 19 F in its initial order. That vacatur was not appealed 20 to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court did not 21 reinstate those rules because they were not before it. 22 The Supreme Court did reinstate Rule 315-B, the 23 analysis of which the Ninth Circuit reviewed in ruling

that state commissions could require combinations of

I would submit that the Eighth Circuit's most recent order, its order on remand, does not change the legal landscape at all; that 315-C through F remain vacated. The Ninth Circuit decision was made under the same circumstances, and while the Eighth Circuit did 5 disagree with the Ninth Circuit, it did not overrule it, and I will point out that in its rulings on the MFS and the MCI case, the Ninth Circuit did note that the Act does not say or remotely imply that elements must 9 10 be provided only in unbundled fashion and never in combined form. That is a quote from the Supreme Court 11 which the Ninth Circuit -- In fact, that's a quote from 12 the Supreme Court's analysis of the 315-B reinstatement 13 14 that the Ninth Circuit used to justify its upholding 15 the combinations requirement.

16 In light of the static landscape with regard 17 to 315-C through F, I would also point out to the 18 Commission that the California Public Utilities Commission has heard this same argument with regard to 19 20 Pacific Bell, and the draft arbitrator's report which 21 was filed on May 19th, 2000, the arbitrator found in 22 Sprint's favor in this regard that as long as the state commission has independent state authority to require 23 24 combinations that the Eighth Circuit's disagreement 25 with the Ninth Circuit's rulings do not implicate or

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otherwise cause problems or undermine the combinations requirement that this commission has imposed in the past.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: If that was May 19th, why hasn't the California PUC accepted or rejected the arbitrator's report by this state?

MR. HEATH: That's a good question, Your Honor, and I beg your pardon. The application was filed on May 19th. That's in the caption. Apparently, the date of this decision is August 8th, 2000. I apologize.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: It just seems like with those dates that PUC would have acted on this state thing. They probably haven't.

MR. HEATH: Right.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: If you have a burning need to respond, go ahead, and in just a couple of minutes.

minutes.

MS. HUGHES: Just one brief comment on the issue of reciprocal compensation. Bill and keep reciprocal compensation, of course, involves both the CLEC and the ILEC's terminating traffic of the other. Both sides in bill and keep arrangement terminate traffic of the other. However, as I know the

25 Commissioners understand, in that arrangement, each

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side simply does not bill the other for its cost in terminating the traffic of the other, and what bill and keep does in a situation like the one before the Commission, the one presented by ISP-bound traffic is 5 it removes any particular perverse economic incentive to go after ISP-bound traffic to the exclusion of other kinds of traffic, and in a regime, we respectfully submit that the numbers are quite clear that in a 9 regime in which cash reciprocal compensation is paid on 10 ISP-bound traffic, CLEC's overwhelmingly seek out ISP's 11 as their customers in order to reap the benefits of 12 cash reciprocal compensation on this traffic. 13 The bill and keep arrangement does involve 14 both parties terminating traffic, but it removes any 15 particular perverse economic incentive to serve ISP's 16 to the exclusion of other types of traffic. 17 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Thank you very much. Very good arguments, and we will take this under 18 19 advisement and provide an opinion by the appropriate 20 deadline. 21 22 (Oral argument concluded at 9:50 a.m.) 23 24