BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION In the Matter of: CAMELOT SQUARE MOBILE HOME PARK ______________________________________ _ In the Matter of: SKYLARK VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK ______________________________________ _ In the Matter of: BELMOR MOBILE HOME PARK Pursuant to the instructions of the Honorable Marjorie Schaer, Administrative Law Judge, U S WEST Communications, Inc. submits the following statement regarding its position on the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law proposed by Staff and the Complainants. Complainants' Proposed Findings of Fact A. Camelot U S WEST does not object to Findings 1, 7, 8, or 10. U S WEST does not object to the substance of Finding 12, but states that it is irrelevant to the present proceedings. U S WEST objects to all other findings of fact regarding Camelot. B. Skylark U S WEST does not object to Findings 1, 8, or 14. U S WEST does not object to the substance of Finding 19, but states that it is irrelevant to the present proceedings. U S WEST objects to all other proposed findings regarding Skylark. C. Belmor U S WEST does not object to proposed Findings 1, 4, 5, 7, or 10. U S WEST does not object to the substance of proposed Findings 13 and 14, but states that they are irrelevant to the present proceedings. U S WEST objects to all other proposed findings regarding Belmor. Complainants' Proposed Conclusions U S WEST does not object to proposed Conclusions 1 or 3, but states that Conclusion 3 is irrelevant to the present proceedings. U S WEST objects to all remaining proposed conclusions. Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact U S WEST does not object to proposed Findings 1 or 2. U S WEST does not object to the substance of proposed Findings 7 or 8, but states that they are irrelevant to the present proceedings. U S WEST objects to all other proposed findings. Staff's Proposed Conclusions U S WEST does not object to proposed Conclusions 1, 2, or 4. U S WEST objects to all remaining proposed conclusions. DATED this ______ day of August, 1997. PERKINS COIE By Sherilyn Peterson, WSBA #11713 Kirstin S. Dodge, WSBA #22039 Attorneys for Respondent U S WEST Communications, Inc. BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION In the Matter of: CAMELOT SQUARE MOBILE HOME PARK ______________________________________ _ In the Matter of: SKYLARK VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK ______________________________________ _ In the Matter of: BELMOR MOBILE HOME PARK DOCKET NO. UT-960832 DOCKET NO. UT-961341 DOCKET NO. UT-961342 U S WEST'S RESPONSE TO THE BRIEFS OF PETITIONERS AND COMMISSION STAFFU S WEST'S RESPONSE TO THE BRIEFS OF PETITIONERS AND COMMISSION STAFF I.COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS Camelot, Skylark and Belmor ("Complainants" or "Parks") seek to obscure the relationship between the Park residents and the property on which the Parks are located by describing a mobile home lot as a "unit of property." Petitioners' Br. at 2 n.2. However, there are important differences between the mobile home lots referred to in this proceeding and legal parcels of private property. See U S WEST Br. at 15-17. Residents of a mobile home park rent the property on which their mobile home is located and the owner of the park is their landlord. RCW 59.20.030(2), (4). The only purpose served by identification of specific lot boundaries is to set forth the space within the landlord's property to which a resident of a particular mobile home has "the exclusive use." RCW 59.20.030(3) (emphasis added). Temporary use is not the same as ownership and control. See U S WEST Br. at 17. Complainants also allege that U S WEST suddenly stopped providing trenching and conduit to repair service lines to the Parks in 1995. Petitioners' Br. at 3. Complainants' support for this allegation is the testimony of Staff witness Mary Taylor. Id. However, Ms. Taylor merely testified that she could not recall having had a complaint of the nature of these proceedings "[u]p until the last couple of years." Tr. at 418. This merely demonstrates what it says, that Ms. Taylor does not recall having had any similar complaints until the last couple of years, not that U S WEST's interpretation of its tariff changed in 1995, or at any other time. It is simply incorrect that U S WEST has refused to perform repairs at the Parks since 1995. Petitioners' Br. at 3. In fact, as Complainants' exhibits demonstrate, U S WEST has provided a tremendous number of repairs since that time. See Exs. 10, C11, 12, 14-19, C22. U S WEST has only refused to entirely replace the service cables at the Parks with newly constructed cable until it is provided with trenching and conduit to support such new facilities. U S WEST Br. at 2-3. Staff challenges U S WEST's definition of "facilities" as not including "support structures." Staff Br. at 10 n.9. Staff's position that poles are still included within the definition of "facilities" is inconsistent with the plain language of the tariff, which does not include poles or any other support structure. U S WEST Br., Ex. A at 9. It is also inconsistent with the definition of "structure" found in the current tariff at Section 2.1. A "structure" is defined as "pipes, conduits and poles used as support or protection of facilities." U S WEST Br., Ex. A at 19. If poles were included in the definition of "facilities," the definition for "structure" would be redundant and nonsensical. Clearly, the existence of two, different definitions for "facilities" and "structures" demonstrates that facilities and structures are not the same thing under the tariff. As set forth in U S WEST's opening brief and below, this distinction is supported by the substantive sections of the tariff, which refer specifically to "facilities" as something distinct from "structures" such as poles, trenching and conduit. The Complainants repeatedly claim that U S WEST initially installed buried service wire on the Parks' property "without petitioners' input or participation." See Petitioners' Br. at 1, 13-14, 17. However, the evidence regarding initial installation of facilities at the Parks is incomplete, and Complainants' evidence is entitled to little weight. See U S WEST Br. at 22 n.9. In addition, there is no evidence in this proceeding to suggest that U S WEST unilaterally decided to install buried service wire in a trench rather than within conduit. While U S WEST is entitled to demand that a property owner install conduit, U S WEST prefers to work with property owners regarding the type of support structure to be used to support U S WEST's facilities on private property. Jensen Direct, T-43 at 10. Therefore, it is just as likely that the Park owners opted not to install conduit during the initial installation of buried service wire at the Parks. See Tr. at 334-35. Even if true, Complainants' arguments regarding initial installation are irrelevant to the present dispute. U S WEST is not a small business that contracts with particular property owners to provide service according to a property owner's individual opinions regarding the best way to bring telephone service onto the property. U S WEST is a public utility that serves nearly all households within the state. Although U S WEST generally welcomes input from the property owners it serves, under the public service laws and U S WEST's tariff, U S WEST is entitled to provide such service in ways that do not call for the individual "input or participation" of each property owner served by U S WEST. Instead U S WEST conducts its business according to its internal practices and procedures and under the tariff setting forth the conditions under which it will provide telephone service to the public. U S WEST believes that its tariff is consistent with the tariffs of GTE Northwest and Puget Sound Power & Light Company and the evidence supports this belief. U S WEST Br. at 11 n.5. However, even if U S WEST's tariff is not consistent with these other utilities, the only tariff at issue in these proceedings is U S WEST's current tariff, as that is the only tariff that controls a property owner's or customer's obligations vis-à-vis U S WEST. II. ARGUMENT A. The Only Issue Before the Commission Is Interpretation of U S WEST's Current Tariff Staff concedes that "the heart of this case is the interpretation of U S WEST's tariff." Staff Br. at 16; see also id. at 2. However, Staff then asserts that the Commission has authority to order U S WEST to revise its tariff and to issue far-reaching refunds to customers who are not a part of the present proceedings. U S WEST does not contend that the Commission has no authority to interpret its tariff. However, it is quite another matter to argue that such authority extends to issuing any kind of order that Staff may believe is desirable, regardless of the nature of the proceedings that are before the Commission. Any action by the Commission must be authorized under the public service laws that empower the Commission. U S WEST Br. at 5. Although RCW 80.01.040(3) demands regulation in the public interest, that mandate is qualified by the following clause "as provided by the public service laws. . . . " . . . An administrative agency must be strictly limited in its operations to those powers granted by the legislature. Cole v. WUTC, 79 Wn.2d 302, 306, 485 P.2d 71 (1971). Complainants cite Tanner Electric Coop. v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 128 Wn.2d 656, 911 P.2d 1301 (1996), for the proposition that the Commission has generic authority to issue orders. However, in Tanner, the Commission declined to decide whether an electric utility, Puget, had violated an agreement between the utility and Tanner, a rural electric cooperative, on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction to enforce or interpret the Service Area Agreement between these two entities. Tanner, 128 Wn.2d at 663. The Washington Supreme Court later criticized the Commission for its failure to consider whether Puget had violated the agreement. By contrast, in the present case, there is no question that the Commission has jurisdiction and authority to interpret U S WEST tariff, as applied to the present proceedings. However, a complaint regarding interpretation of an existing, approved tariff does not provide the Commission with authority for issuing a broad, declaratory ruling that goes beyond the tariff interpretation question. See U S WEST Br. at 8-9. 1. The Commission Does Not Have Authority to Order U S WEST to Revise Its Tariff to Take On the Additional Burden and Expense of Providing Support Structures on Private Property Staff implicitly concedes that the Commission's power in these proceedings is limited. Staff carefully proposes that the Commission require U S WEST to make a tariff filing that would "clarify" its tariff. Staff Br. at 17. This recognizes that while the Complainants may bring a complaint against U S WEST claiming "violation of any provision of law or of any order or rule of the Commission" (i.e., U S WEST's tariff), individual, private complainants such as the Parks may not bring a complaint as to the reasonableness of U S WEST's tariff or demand that U S WEST change its existing tariff. RCW 80.04.110(l) (emphasis added). A complaint under RCW 80.04.110(1) is a fundamentally different proceeding than a suspension of tariff filing under RCW 80.04.130. In addition to the different inquiries and different degree of authority granted to the Commission, the burdens of proof applied in each type of case are fundamentally different. When U S WEST files a change to its tariff, U S WEST must prove that the change is just and reasonable. RCW 80.04.130(2). By contrast, where a complaint is filed against U S WEST, the tariff is presumed valid and the complainants must prove that U S WEST violated the tariff. See U S WEST Br. at 4-5. Staff and the Complainants also cite RCW 80.36.140 in support of their claim that the Commission has authority to order U S WEST to refile its tariff or to change its practices. However, the necessary, prerequisite "hearing" referred to in RCW 80.36.140 is "a hearing had upon [the Commission's] own motion or upon complaint." Id. As set forth above, the types of complaints that may be brought by private parties are limited by RCW 80.04.110, which permits private complaints only as to violations of law, not as to whether a tariff is "just and reasonable." The hearing that has been conducted in the present proceedings stems solely from a private complaint, not from any Commission proceeding against U S WEST alleging that U S WEST's practices are unjust or unreasonable. Therefore, the Commission's sole authority in the present proceedings is to issue a ruling as to the interpretation of U S WEST's tariff. Complainants bear the burden of proving that their interpretation of the tariff is correct. 2. The Commission Does Not Have Authority to Order U S WEST to Refund Any Trenching or Conduit Costs Staff is incorrect that the Commission is authorized to order refunds to customers in connection with the present proceedings. Staff Br. at 18-19. RCW 80.04.230 provides only that the Commission, after investigation and hearing, may order a utility to "pay to the Complainant the amount of the overcharge so found." (Emphasis added). There is no claim in the present proceedings that U S WEST has overcharged the Complainants. U S WEST has neither charged the Complainants for any trenching or conduit, nor have they retained an independent contractor to provide any trenching or conduit; the work has simply not been commenced by anyone. Thus, RCW 80.04.230 has no application to the present proceedings. Even if the Commission had any authority to order U S WEST to provide refunds to any of its customers related to trenching or conduit, there has not been any investigation or hearing conducted as to the amount of any "overcharge," or whether and to what extent any particular individuals are entitled to any refund. For example, Staff "does not recommend that the Commission order refunds made to customers for maintenance, repair or replacement when caused by the customers' negligence or intentional misconduct." Staff Br. at 18 n. 14. However, without investigation and hearing, there will be no way of determining which, if any, particular trenching or conduit jobs were required due to customer negligence or intentional misconduct. Staff strays even farther afield in arguing that U S WEST should be required not only to refund amounts that customers may have paid to U S WEST for trenching and conduit, but also amounts paid by customers to third-party contractors who provided trenching or conduit. Staff fails to provide any legal authority for the proposition that U S WEST can be ordered to "refund" amounts its customers paid to third parties. Any such a requirement would be nonsensical. To "refund" means to "give or put back." Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1981). By definition, when a customer has paid a third party rather than U S WEST to provide a service, there is no amount U S WEST has ever collected that it could "refund" to that customer. What Staff is suggesting is that ratepayers should fund work done by contractors that was never part of the rate base. Moreover, Staff's arguments on brief concerning customer refunds for third-party trenching go far beyond Staff's position at hearing. In Mr. Spinks' cross-examination, he stated that Staff took the position only that U S WEST should provide refunds to customers in "whatever cases the company can identify where the customer paid the company money for the trenching." Tr. at 431-32 (emphasis added). Mr. Spinks' testimony could not have been more clear on this subject: Q. That then assumes that there has been a charge by the Company for trenching work? A. Well, I understood Ms. Jensen's rebuttal testimony to point out, correctly so, that they offer the Company--the Company offers the customer either that the Company would do it itself or that it may-they may contract independently or done it independently. What I'm referring to cases here are cases where the Company was requested to do it and did do it for a charge and the work was repair and maintenance work. Q. So you're not suggesting that there should be any kind of payment or refund by the Company to anyone who went out and hired a third party to do this kind of work? A. That's correct. Tr. at 432. Staff's abrupt change of position between cross-examination and its post-hearing brief has unfairly denied U S WEST the opportunity to conduct further cross-examination of Staff's witness on this subject. U S WEST will be greatly prejudiced if Staff is allowed now, on brief, to expand the scope of its recommendations to the Commission. B. Requiring Property Owners to Provide Trenching and Conduit on Their Private Property Is Just and Reasonable Even if the Commission were authorized in these proceedings to determine whether U S WEST's tariff requiring property owners to provide trenching and conduit on their private property were just and reasonable, U S WEST has demonstrated that this requirement is in fact just and reasonable. U S WEST Br. at 22-25, 29. Staff argues that it is "unreasonable and unlawful to hold customers responsible for" the costs of trenching or conduit. Staff Br. at 19. Similarly, the Complainants seek to invoke the "unjust or unreasonable" practices language of RCW 80.36.140. However, Staff and the Complainants fail to provide any substantive argument to support their claim that such a requirement is unreasonable or unjust. In particular, in the context of these proceedings, both Staff and Complainants fail to explain why a private property owner who has chosen to operate a business on his or her property should be permitted to demand that ratepayers as a whole or U S WEST's shareholders subsidize that business by being forced to absorb the trenching and conduit costs to hundreds of individual units within the boundaries of the business owner's private property. C. U S WEST's Current Tariff Requires Property Owners to Provide Trenching and Conduit to Support U S WEST's Facilities 1. Section 2.4.2 Is Not Applicable to These Proceedings Complainants' and Staff's discussion of subsection 2.4.2.C. of Tariff WN U-31 is irrelevant to the present proceedings. U S WEST has not made a claim against any of the Parks for the costs of replacing the buried service wire facilities. Instead, U S WEST is seeking to enforce other provisions of its tariff, which require the Parks to provide the support structure in which the buried service wire facilities will be placed. See U S WEST Br. at 3-4. 2. Section 2.5.2 Does Not Limit Customers' Responsibilities for Support Structures to Building Spaces a. The Section Heading Does Not Control Its Interpretation Staff argues that "tariff headings must necessarily limit application of tariff sections to the subject matter of the heading." Staff Br. at 3. However, Staff provides no authority for this assertion. Indeed, one of the standard contract provisions in private contracts is that section headings do not have any substantive effect and do not control the meaning of a particular provision. Similarly, in interpreting statutes, the "heading is a matter which is entirely immaterial, because the body of the act . . . is controlling." State v. Vaughan, 163 Wash. 681, 683, 1 P.2d 888 (1931); see also Miller v. Arctic Alaska Fisheries Corp., 83 Wn. App. 255, 261, 921 P.2d 585 (1996) ("We do not believe that the language of the heading or comment controls interpretation of the scope of the entire rule because it is in fundamental conflict with other comments, with the remaining language of the rule, and with the rule's overall structure.") While tariff headings are a "tool" in reading tariffs, Staff Br. at 3, the length of U S WEST's tariff and the complicated subject matter involved in provisioning telephone service inevitably mean that when disputes arise as to tariff interpretation, it is important to look at the substance of tariff provisions in the context of a particular situation in order to determine the proper interpretation of the tariff. Staff seeks to support its argument by claiming that customers should not be "required to wade through this lengthy document to identify each tariff section that the company could interpret as being applicable to the customer's specific situation." Staff Br. at 3. However, in the present case, the Complainants were not required to wade through the tariff. U S WEST requested that the customer provide conduit and trenching and provided specific tariff citations to support its request. Complainants have simply refused to accept these tariff requirements and have gone to great lengths to try to escape their application. For example, the Parks initially based their complaint on the argument that they should not be required to provide trenching or conduit because "the Park had no control over how the telephone cable was installed, and was not allowed to participate in its maintenance over time, [so] the current problems with the telephone cable was due to causes beyond the Parks' control, if not due to the damage caused by the negligence of others." Camelot Petition dated June 19, 1996. However, once it became clear to Complainants that tariff provisions would control regardless of whether the Parks actually directed the circumstances of initial installation or maintenance of the service cable, RCW 80.36.130, the Parks sought to construct an argument that would allow them to escape the requirements of the tariff. Remnants of the Parks' initial complaint are still found, however, in the repeated objection that the buried service wire was installed "without the Parks' input or participation." Petitioners' Br. at 14. U S WEST strives to make its tariffs accessible and understandable by the general public. For example, U S WEST has sought to clarify over time the customer's responsibility for providing support structures for U S WEST's facilities. U S WEST Br. at 13-15, 19-20. However, just as a party to a private contract may need the assistance of an attorney to interpret and apply the contract, it is neither logical nor the law that customer responsibilities set forth in U S WEST's tariffs are limited to the opinions of members of the general public, unfamiliar with utility regulation or technical requirements, regarding the extent or application of a particular tariff section. Staff's argument regarding the history of the placement of the language in Section 2.5.2 under the heading "Building Space and Power Supply," Staff Br. at 3-4, is consistent with U S WEST's description of the tariff history. U S WEST Br. at 14-15. As Staff concedes, the changes at issue both took place in August 1994. The fact that this section was "deliberately placed" under this title and "did not appear there by accident" is not the point. While U S WEST clearly did not reorganize its tariff by accident, the sole purpose of the reorganization was to attempt to provide greater organization and unity between its tariff across states. U S WEST Br. at 14. Breaking the lengthy "General" section into subheadings was a logical outgrowth of that purpose, even if not accomplished perfectly. There is no evidence or any logical reason for the conclusion that U S WEST ever intended to limit the application of Section 2.5.2 by placing it under the "Building Space and Power Supply" heading. b. Section 2.5.2 Was Not Intended to Be Applied Only to Building Spaces Staff provides only the testimony of Ms. Taylor in support for its claim that the tariff language "was approved with the understanding that it would be applied in three situations." Staff Br. at 4. However, Staff has failed to provide any further description or evidence to support the existence of such an "understanding" between Staff and U S WEST, or any evidence that this "understanding" was ever manifested between Staff and U S WEST. In fact, U S WEST never made any such representation to Staff. Jensen Rebuttal, T-52 at 9. Moreover, the interpretation pressed by Ms. Taylor conflicts with the plain language of the tariff, which refers to support structures including "poles and trenching." Such structures would never be required for work within a building. Id.; U S WEST Br. at 13. Staff also fails to provide any reason for its position that customers or property owners should only have responsibilities to expose U S WEST facilities within buildings, and not to expose facilities that are inaccessible because they are buried in the ground on private property. See Taylor Direct, T-71 at 11. Staff's position as to its "understanding" of the meaning of Section 2.5.2 is irrational, because it would result in customers having no responsibilities from the property line to the building in which service is provided. U S WEST Br. at 13. Staff apparently has recognized this incongruity because it points to other sections of the tariff that it claims "apply for service outside of buildings." Staff Br. at 4 n. 4 (citing Section 4.2 and 4.6.A). Staff's citation to Section 4 in this context is contrary to its arguments elsewhere regarding interpretation of Section 4, namely that Section 4 applies only to new construction. The effect of Staff's interpretation of Section 2.5.2 and Section 4, taken together, would result in a situation in which a customer would never have any responsibility of any kind from the property line to a building after initial provision of dial tone to a property. Staff fails to provide any support or any rational reason for such a narrow interpretation of U S WEST's tariff, or for the proposition that such a situation would be just and reasonable, or that U S WEST would ever propose or agree to a tariff that placed such an incredible burden on U S WEST, in perpetuity. Indeed, as set forth below, Staff's attempt to obtain such a tariff was rejected in the context of the MPOP case. c. Section 2.5.2.C. Was Not Modified Because of the MPOP Case, and the MPOP Case Recognized Customers Would Be Responsible for Support Structures on Their Property Staff states that "nothing in the history of [Section 2.5.2.C] indicates that the Company had ever intended to apply this tariff to maintenance and repair situations." Staff Br. at 14. However, it is equally accurate to say that nothing in the historical language indicates that the Company had ever intended to apply this tariff only to new installations. Staff alleges that U S WEST changed the language in Section 2.5.2 only within the context of the minimum Point of Presence ("MPOP") case, Docket No. UT-920474. Staff Br. at 4. However, although revisions to Section 2.5.2 occurred after the MPOP case, such revisions were not the compliance filing resulting from the MPOP settlement in Docket UT-920474. Jensen Rebuttal, T-52 at 7. The MPOP case dealt primarily with the responsibility for "facilities" up to and beyond the demarcation point. The MPOP case did not change the current tariff language regarding the building/property owner's or customer's responsibility to provide all support structures on private property, as required in the then-existing tariff. Indeed, the MPOP case added further language concerning the property/building owner's responsibility to provide sufficient support structures for U S WEST's facilities. The proceedings in the MPOP case clearly demonstrate that it was never intended that U S WEST be responsible for providing trenching or conduit on private property up to the demarcation point. Staff originally filed testimony in Docket UT-940474 recommending that U S WEST's proposed tariff language "be clarified to make clear that the Company is responsible for the installation, maintenance and repair of conduit, trenches, etc. up to the demarcation point." Jensen Rebuttal, T-52 at 2; Ex. 55. Staff also listed as an issue "whether it is reasonable to require building/property owners to repair and maintain conduit containing U S WEST cable." Jensen Rebuttal, T-52 at 2; Ex. 56. In the Commission's Second Supplemental Order, which resolved the MPOP case by approving a stipulated agreement, the Commission recognized that the tariff it had suspended for investigation contained a tariff revision that clarified the customer's responsibility for providing, maintaining and repairing the trench or conduit used for Company buried network cable and/or Company intra-building network cable or network terminating wire. See Jensen Rebuttal, T-52 at 3; Ex. 57 at 1-2, 5. This proposed language, introduced in Docket UT-920474 at WN U-24, Sheet 9-5, is the current tariff language at WN U-31, Section 4, Sheet 14: The property owner is responsible for the installation, maintenance and repair of the trench or conduit utilized for the Company facilities to provide service within the owner's private property. Jensen Rebuttal, T-52 at 3, 5; Ex. 54 at 1, 11. The stipulated agreement attached to the Commission's Second Supplemental Order in Docket UT-920474 as appendix A does not include any agreement to remove the proposed tariff language referenced above. Jensen Rebuttal, T-52 at 3; Ex. 58. Indeed, the revised tariff attached to the Commission's Second Supplemental Order in Docket UT-920474 as Exhibit A included the tariff language referenced above. Jensen Rebuttal, T-52 at 3; Ex. 59 at 10. As set forth above, and as indicated in communications between U S WEST and Staff at the time, the fact that property owners were responsible for trenching and conduit was fully discussed and resolved in the context of Docket UT-920474. Exs. 60-63. Despite resolution of this issue in the recent past, Staff has apparently seized on the present complaint by the Parks to return to its earlier position that U S WEST ought to provide trenching and conduit on private property up to the demarcation point. Rather than providing any justification for such a drastic change in allocation of responsibilities between U S WEST and its customers, Staff has attempted to revise history in the interpretation of the current tariff in an attempt to force U S WEST to take on these new responsibilities, the effect of which increases the Company's expenses and ultimately will be charged to the ratepayer. d. Section 4.6.A.1.a Does Not Support Staff's Argument Staff argues that because the "language in Section 2.5.2 was intended to clarify the existing language in Section 4.6.A.1.a, therefore it was not intended to hold property owners responsible for repair and maintenance of support structure after service was installed." Staff Br. at 5. However, Staff's position is inconsistent with its earlier claims that Section 2.5.2 also applies to situations where the Company's facilities are inaccessible, such as when they are enclosed within a wall. Staff Br. at 4. Such a situation could only occur after facilities are already ins