

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

**WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,**

Complainant,

v.

**CENTURYLINK COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC,**

Respondent.

DOCKET UT- 181051

**EXHIBIT TO
TESTIMONY OF**

STEVEN E. TURNER

**ON BEHALF OF
CENTURYLINK COMMUNICATIONS, LLC**

CLC RESPONSE TO STAFF DATA REQUEST 27(C)

March 31, 2022

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UTC STAFF DATA REQUEST NO. 27:

CenturyLink's responses to Staff Data Request Nos. 20-25 identify a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- a. Please admit that the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] are similar from an operational perspective. To the extent you do not admit, please explain and provide documents sufficient to show any and all operational differences between these networks.
- b. Did these networks rely upon the same, or similar, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] during the national outage occurring between December 27 and December 29, 2018? Please provide all documents that substantiate your answer.
- c. Did the network(s) used for signaling, ALI database and/or Location database queries, and/or call routing for calls destined to the PSAP remaining on the CenturyLink managed ESInet1 as of December 27, 2018 rely upon the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] during the national outage occurring between December 27 and December 29, 2018? Please provide all documents that substantiate your answer.

RESPONSE:

CLC objects to this data request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome. CLC further objects to this data request on the grounds that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This data request seeks to investigate an outage on CLC's national transport network. The outage did not directly affect CLC's or its affiliates' remaining 911 network in Washington. Instead, it affected CLC's national transport network. More specifically, the outage affected *interstate DS-3 circuits* purchased by a vendor of Comtech on behalf of Comtech (for the provision of SS7 functionality), the responsible Washington 911 provider for the PSAPs that experienced a 911 outage. The interstate and non-regulated services provided on CLC's national transport network, and the facilities utilized to provide such services, are not regulated by the Commission, and the Commission lacks jurisdiction over them. *In Re AT&T Commc'ns of the Pac. Nw.*, No. 04, 2003 WL 23341214 (Wash. U.T.C. Dec. 1, 2003) ("AT&T's proposed language would encompass facilities-access purchased out of federal tariffs over which the Commission lacks jurisdiction.") (citing 34th Supplemental Order; Order Regarding Qwest's Demonstration of Compliance with Commission Orders, *Investigation Into U S WEST Communications, Inc.'s Compliance With Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*; *U S WEST Communications, Inc.'s Statement of Generally Available Terms Pursuant to Section 252(f) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Dkt. Nos. UT-003022, UT-003040, ¶ 22 (May 2002)); *MilleniaNet Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n*, No. 990 C.D. 2008, 2009 WL 9104922 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Apr. 30, 2009) (complaint

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dismissed because the “the PUC does not have jurisdiction over interstate telecommunications services.”). Without waiving its objections, CLC responds as follows.

- a. **Please admit that the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] are similar from an operational perspective. To the extent you do not admit, please explain and provide documents sufficient to show any and all operational differences between these networks.**

Subject to its objections above, CLC denies that the “[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] are similar from an operational perspective.” While Staff is not precise in what it means by “similar from an operational perspective,” the two networks were (as of December 27, 2018) operationally different in meaningful ways. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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- b. **Did these networks rely upon the same, or similar, [REDACTED] during the national outage occurring between December 27 and December 29, 2018? Please provide all documents that substantiate your answer.**

Subject to its objections above, CLC responds that in December 2018 the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] See CLC’s response to Staff DR 27a.

- c. **Did the network(s) used for signaling, ALI database and/or Location database queries, and/or call routing for calls destined to the PSAP remaining on the CenturyLink managed ESInet1 as of December 27, 2018 rely upon the [REDACTED] during the national outage occurring between December 27 and December 29, 2018? Please provide all documents that substantiate your answer.**

Subject to its objections above, because ESInet1 is no longer in service, CLC is unable to identify all equipment utilized for “signaling, ALI database and/or Location database queries, and/or call routing for calls destined to the PSAP remaining on the CenturyLink managed ESInet1 as of December 27, 2018.” However, it is CLC’s understanding that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Because CenturyLink utilized both circuit diversity and carrier diversity, calls traversing ESInet1 were not affected by the Infinera network event.

**Respondent: CenturyLink Legal
Morgan Pofahl, Principal Network Engineer
Drew Groff, Director NOC Compliance
Carl Klein, Manager Public Safety Services**