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March 30, 2007

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING AND FEDERAL EXPRESS

Ms. Carole J. Washburn
Executive Secretary
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission
1300 South Evergreen Park Drive SW
P. O. Box 47250
Olympia, WA 98504-7250

Re:

In re the Matter of the Petition of Puget Sound Energy

Docket No. UE-061626

Dear Ms. Washburn:

Enclosed please find the original and twelve copies of City of Tumwater's Reply to PSE's Motion for Summary Determination and to Staff Response; and Certificate of Service for filing in the above-entitled case. These documents are also transmitted electronically in .pdf format to WUTC Records Center. For confirmation of receipt, I have enclosed additional copies to be date-stamped and returned to us in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.

Thank you for your consideration in this regard.

Sincerely,

FOSTER PEPPER PLLC

Julie Dunham Kelly

Assistant to P. Stephen DiJulio and

William H. Patton

Enclosures

cc:

Parties of Record

CITY OF TUMWATER'S REPLY TO PSE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION AND TO STAFF RESPONSE - 1

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¹ Pursuant to Judge Mace's Notice of Procedural Schedule issued December 14, 2006, the City and PSE are directed to file replies to each other's cross motions for summary determination and to Staff's response on March 30, 2007.

A. A Commission tariff has the force and effect of law

4. "Once a utility's tariff is filed and approved, it has the effect and force of law."

Gen. Tel. Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579, 585, 716 P.2d 879 (1986). PSE cites to this leading case, but for a different proposition, and for one that is not exactly what the court said. ² It is, however, the central holding of GTE v. Bothell quoted above that is critical to the Commission's determination of PSE's petition here. The Supreme Court recognized that the Commission's tariffs have the status of law, and cannot be preempted by a city ordinance³ or, for that matter, by a contract or by a purported property right.

B. No city employee and no utility can alter a Commission tariff

- 5. Because the Commission's tariff has the force and effect of law, no city employee and no utility employee may agree to alter the tariff, either unilaterally or by mutual agreement. A Commission tariff is binding on the utility just as much as on customers or other entities affected by the tariff. "Unless the commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made in any rate or charge or in any form of contract or agreement or in any rule or regulation relating to any rate, charge or service or in any general privilege or facility which shall have been filed and published by a gas company, electrical company or water company. . . " RCW 80.28.060. Published rates must be applied by the utility. RCW 80.28.020. For PSE to apply a different rate, even if a customer agreed, would unlawful rate discrimination. RCW 80.28.100.
- 6. Therefore, no alleged contract or understanding between an employee of the City and PSE⁴ can alter or affect the content and meaning of Schedule 74 and its application to the Tumwater Boulevard Widening Project. "The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or

⁴ PSE Motion at 11:15-33.

² PSE Motion at 13:18-21. "Franchises are contracts – they do not grant proprietary interests," citing *GTE v. Bothell*, 106 Wn.2d at 284. But the issue discussed by the Supreme Court at in that part of the case was not property interests, but whether a Bothell city ordinance takes precedence over the Commission's tariff. What the Court actually said was: "The question therefore becomes which law has precedence over the other. Franchises have the legal status of contracts. The power to grant franchises is a sovereign power that rests in the state, but which may be delegated to cities."

³ "Whether seen as contractual or police power exercises, Bothell's subsequent ordinances do not have the authority to preempt that tariff." *GTE v. Bothell*, 121 Wn.2d at 587.

enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier." *Hardy v. Claircom Communications Group*, 86 Wn. App. 488, 492, 937 P.2.d 1128 (1997)⁵ "The general rule is that specific contracts inconsistent with the terms of tariff schedules are void." *Jones v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.*, 22 Wn.2d 863, 865, 157 P.2d 728 (1945).

C. The Kent litigation preceded the Commission's adoption of Schedule 74

- 7. PSE argues that the *Kent* proceeding should control the Commission's determination of the issues here. What PSE fails to acknowledge is that the *Kent* decision came before the adoption of Schedule 74, and dealt with the prior conversion tariffs Schedules 71 and 72. Following the *Kent* case, the Commission adopted Schedule 74, effective July 1, 2002. The new Schedule 74 included at least three significant changes that relate to this case. First, the new schedule eliminated issues of the zoning and length of road improvement involved in the conversion project. Second, the new schedule standardized the cost split between a city and the utility to a 40/60 percent cost division instead of the prior 30/70 or 70/30 cost split of the prior schedules. Third, Schedule 74 defined "Public Thoroughfare," whereas the prior schedules had not done so, leading in part to the type of litigation involved in the *Kent* decision.
- 8. In defining "Public Thoroughfare" in Schedule 74 the Commission recognized that a public thoroughfare may not only be a typical road, but can be created by other <u>public</u> real property rights allowing for electric utility use. Therefore the *Kent* precedent relied on PSE has no application to the situation in Tumwater. First, the PSE facilities to be converted from overhead to underground are, and always have been, on a public thoroughfare, as demonstrated by PSE's own drawing of the conversion area. Declaration of Jim Shoopman, February 15, 2007, Exhibit 10. Second, even if PSE's facilities are, as PSE argues, located in Tumwater Boulevard under authority of an easement from the Port of Olympia instead of under authority of

⁵ Discussing the "filed rate doctrine" in the context of communication company tariffs and citing *Marcus v. AT & T Corp.*, 938 F.Supp. 1158, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

⁶ PSE Motion at 14:25 - 15:33; referencing City of Kent v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., No. UE-010911.

⁷ "Public Thoroughfare: Any municipal, county, state, federal or other public road, highway or throughway, or other public right-of-way or other public real property rights allowing for electric utility use." Schedule 74, § 10.e.

a franchise from the City, they would still be located in a "public thoroughfare," by definition of Schedule 74.

As a consequence, the issue of an adjacent, private easement decided by the Commission in the *Kent* case does not apply to the facts here. In *Kent* the Commission was dealing with a PSE easement (1) off the public thoroughfare and (2) granted by a private party. Here PSE facilities are (1) located in a traditional public right-of-way and (2), even if they were not, the easement PSE claims to be a private property right was issued by a public agency, thereby establishing that PSE facilities are on a public thoroughfare – by definition.

D. A property owner can agree to use of its property apart from an easement

10. PSE's argument that an easement blocks and invalidates the effect of any subsequent contract or tariff⁸ has no support in law. First, as noted above, the easement PSE claims is one issued by a public agency and therefore is defined to be a "public thoroughfare" by Schedule 74. Second, a property owner can agree to the use of its property by lease or other forms of agreement without relinquishing the underlying property interest. That is in fact the nature of a municipal utility franchise itself – a grant by the municipality of the right to use property either owned or controlled by the municipality for utility purposes. Therefore, even if PSE owns a "dominant interest in the land" as it claims, that property interest can be and has been waived or modified by PSE (1) by proposing and accepting a tariff issued by the Commission in 2002, and (2) by accepting and entering into a 30-year franchise agreement with the City in 1985. 10

⁸ PSE Motion at 13:17-19. "The PSE Easement also represents a dominant interest in the land which cannot be superseded by contract."

⁹ The Supreme Court in *Tukwila v. Seattle*, 68 Wn.2d 611, 615, 414 P.2d 597 (1966), for example, noted that the franchise granted to Seattle City Light by Tukwila authorized City Light's use of the city's property throughout the city. "By the terms of its franchise granted in 1958 under Tukwila ordinance 262, as accepted by Seattle in its ordinance No. 87631, Seattle acquired the right to use the streets and public areas of Tukwila for the transmission, distribution and sale of electrical energy throughout the entire area within the city's corporate limits."

¹⁰ "Franchises, whether statutory or by ordinance, have the legal status of contracts, binding with equal force, according to the terms thereof, upon the granting authority and the granted entity." *Tukwila v. Seattle*, 68 Wn.2d at

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11. PSE submitted a map of the "easement area" covered by the 1981 easement from the Port of Olympia. Declaration of Barry Lombard, February 22, 2007, Exhibit 3. This map shows the entire Olympia Municipal Airport property. It is the same geographic area annexed by the City in 1987. Shoopman dec., Exhibit 2. PSE claims to have private property rights over right-of-way in this entire area. This claim of a private property right over and under the Port's "right-of-way" is not credible. If it were, PSE would have a property right to locate its overhead lines up to 5 feet out into the middle of a public street anywhere in the annexed area.

12. The grant of rights by the Port of Olympia is in fact the type of franchise right described by the Supreme Court in a case cited by PSE in its Motion. Wash. Water Power v. Rooney, 3 Wn.2d 642, 101 P.2d 580 (1940). Even if it is called an 'easement,' a "grant, franchise, easement or other right is subject to the police power of the sovereign . . . and unless expressly agreed to otherwise in the franchise, the company must, at its expense, make such changes as the public convenience and necessity require . . ." State v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Clark County, 55 Wn.2d 645, 649, 349 P.2d 426 (1960); emphasis added.

IV. Conclusion

13. PSE cannot by claim of a private property right, or by claim of an agreement between an employee of the City and PSE, change a tariff issued by the Commission. As both the City and Staff conclude, Schedule 74 requires that the City pay 40 percent and PSE pay 60

^{615,} citing 5 McQuillan, Mun. Corp. § 19.39, 1940 (1949). The 1985 franchise agreement between the City and PSE is found at Declaration of William H. Patton, February 16, 2007, Exhibit 1, Exhibit A.

¹¹ PSE Motion at 3:40-43. The full quote from that part of the case is: "McQuillan in his work on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., § 1740, defines a franchise as follows: 'The term as it is ordinarily used in the decisions and by text writers . . . means the right granted by the state or a municipality to an existing corporation or to an individual to do certain things which a corporation or individual otherwise cannot do, such as the right to use a street or alley for a commercial or street railroad track, or to erect thereon poles and string wires for telegraph, telephone, or electric light purposes or to use the street or alley underneath the surface for water pipes, gas pipes or other conduits."

³ Wn.2d at 649-50.

percent of the cost of converting PSE's facilities along Tumwater Boulevard from overhead to underground.

14. Accordingly, the City requests that the Commission deny PSE's Motion, grant the City 's Cross Motion, and adopt the Staff position in issuing the Commission's Declaratory Order.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of March, 2007.

FOSTER PEPPER PLLC

William H. Patton, WSBA #5771 Attorneys for City of Tumwater

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1

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1	via legal messenger upon the following attorneys:
2 3	James F. Williams Donna L. Barnett
4	Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, 48th Floor
5	Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Attorneys for Puget Sound Energy, Inc.
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7	T 110 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8	I certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington
l	that the foregoing is true and correct.
9	Executed at Seattle, Washington this 30th day of March, 2007.
10	Sati L. Kurkam Kelly
11	Julie Dunham Kelly
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 2

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