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6 BEFORE THE WASHINGTON STATE
7 UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

8 WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
9 TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

Docket No. TG-140560

10 Complainant,

INTERVENOR WASHINGTON
REFUSE AND RECYCLING
ASSOCIATION'S ANSWER TO
PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW OF INITIAL ORDER NO. 12 BY
RESPONDENT WASTE CONTROL, INC.

11 vs.

12 WASTE CONTROL, INC.,

13 Respondents.

14 **COMES NOW** Intervenor Washington Refuse and Recycling Association
15 (WRRRA) and, pursuant to WAC 480-07-825(4), respectfully submits the following
16 Answer to the Petition for Administrative Review filed herein by Respondent
17 Waste Control, Inc. (WCI).

18 **INTRODUCTION:** WRRRA has held Intervenor status in this matter from its
19 inception, has filed responses to Motions and has filed Opening and Reply Briefs
20 in relation to the hearing held on March 11, 2015. WRRRA took an active role in
21 the hearing, particularly in the questioning of Staff's auditor Ms. Cheesman

22 Intervenor's role here has been limited to addressing two of the four issues
23 which remained at hearing. That will continue to be the case here. The primary
24 parties have exhaustively and competently dealt with the technical and
25 accounting issues, and we trust they will continue to do so. Intervenor, while
26 obviously in support of WCI's position in its Petition, also believes it is imperative
in a case like this that any ruling's effect on the regulated solid waste industry as
a whole be considered. This Order has a potentially far-reaching impact on how

1 rates are set and, therefore, involves every regulated company (and every
2 recipient of service) in our state.

3 Those two issues, of course, are found in Findings/Conclusions 14, 15, 17
4 and the proposed Order relative to 17.¹ By this point, it should be clear that
5 Intervenor strongly disagrees with the Initial Order's rulings on rate costs and
6 assessment of a "penalty" pursuant to RCW 81.20.020.

7 There is a third issue which has recently been discussed, and that is the
8 role of the expert advisor to the Administrative Law Judge. Specifically, there
9 appears to be what Intervenor considers to be justified concern that the same
10 person may well be the advisor to the Commission itself in its deliberations over
11 WCI's Petition. This issue is well addressed in WCI's Petition, but Intervenor will
12 discuss it as well, perhaps in a larger view, on behalf of the industry.

13 **RATE COSTS:** This filing has been arduous and expensive for everyone
14 involved, but much more so for WCI. Although it appears that Staff has
15 apparently invested substantially more hours in the matter, WCI has been forced
16 by these circumstances to invest its resources in "outside" professional services
17 whereas Staff, of course, are employees of the Commission and presumably
18 receive the same compensation whether involved in this action or not.² This
19 results in an "apples and oranges" situation when comparing time and
20 expenditures. It does seem clear, however, that if the same 700 hours more in
21 accounting time accrued by Staff through June 2014 were to be billed in the
22 "outside" world (along with attorney's fees at normal rates), WCI's expenditures
23 would pale in comparison. This is not to suggest that the time invested by Staff
24 is inappropriate, only that it has been at least equal to (and probably much
25 greater) than that of WCI. The only difference, of course, is that WCI must pay its
26 attorneys, accountants and experts independently, while Staff does not. Thus, it
is difficult to understand Finding/Conclusion (14)'s conclusion that WCI's rate
case expenses are "excessive," when it is clear that if the same standard of
payment were to be applied to Staff, Staff's expenses would clearly be far greater.

¹ Like WCI, Intervenor will refer to what appear to be a mixture of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as "Findings/Conclusions."

² There is no indication that Staff consulted with outside professionals nor, if they did, these
people were compensated by the Commission.

1 The result of this unequal treatment in the Initial Order is not only unfair but not
2 in keeping with prudent rate making standards. In the future (and in the Final
3 Order here), we strongly suggest that the Administrative Law Judge, as well as
4 the Commission itself, make a "market rate" comparison of rate costs incurred by
5 both "sides" before concluding that one or the other's expenses are excessive or
6 imprudent.

7 There has been something of a "blame game" being played here concerning
8 why this matter has taken so long, thereby dramatically increasing costs. This
9 issue has been addressed extensively already, but it is important that the
10 Commission keep in mind that, due to circumstances, some unforeseen, some
11 foreseeable, Staff must bear responsibility for much of the delay. This is not to
12 place "blame," but to respond to Staff and the Initial Order's treatment of rate
13 costs. The Initial Order seems to, at least partially, base its approval of Staff's
14 unique rate cost proposal on various delays in the proceedings.

15 An example of the fundamental unfairness of this approach concerns the
16 more than two-week delay in the progress of the case in May, 2014. Apparently
17 the assigned Assistant Attorney General abruptly retired and this, we are told,
18 was a surprise to Staff, and we have no reason to disbelieve that. This was a
19 problem for all involved for a variety of reasons, most beyond either party's
20 control. What was within Staff's control, however, was the ability to advise WCI
21 what was happening. Instead of doing so, Staff simply ignored the case for two
22 weeks, despite the fact that, at that point, regular communication between the
23 Staff auditor and WCI's lead accountant, Mr. Davis, was ongoing and crucial to
24 possible resolution of contested issues. Staff auditor, Ms. Cheesman, was asked
25 by the undersigned about this at hearing (Tr., Vol. II at p. 292-293):

26 Q. During that two or so week time, did you make any
communication with Ms. Davis, or anybody at the – I'm sorry, anybody at
the Company, saying "We've got a problem up here. We can't return your
calls. We don't have a lawyer," whatever it was?

A. It's not my – no, I didn't.

1 Thus, WCI's expert went for two plus weeks with no communication from Staff,
2 yet the Initial Order seems to hold WCI fiscally responsible for delay in the
3 process. That is not the way rate making should be done.

4 Another example is Staff's "Motion to Strike" which led to Order 10. This
5 was an ill-advised and completely unnecessary exercise which was rightly and
6 clearly rejected by the Administrative Law Judge. The point, of course, is that
7 WCI had no choice but to expend time, energy and attorney's fees to
8 (successfully) respond to the Motion. To now find that these expenditures, and
9 others like them, are "excessive" is disingenuous at best. Both parties here bear
10 some responsibility for delays.

11 Perhaps Intervenor's biggest concern here is the Initial Order's adoption of
12 the "percentage" allocation of rate costs advocated by Staff and adopted by the
13 Initial Order in Finding/Conclusion (14).³

14 The obvious question is, "Where did this come from?" Staff acknowledges
15 that WCI's attorney and expert have made significant and voluntary reductions in
16 billings, and has no objection to the hourly rates charged. This truly
17 extraordinary proposal which finds its way into the Initial Order has no basis
18 whatever in law, rule or Commission precedent. To the contrary, it seems to have
19 come out of thin air. During cross-examination of the Staff auditor by the
20 undersigned, the following exchange took place:

21 Q. The 50% on the rate case costs, who came up with that 50%?

22 A. I did.

23 Q. Anybody else involved in that decision?

24 A. Well, I talked with several different staff members to think –
25 just discuss, kick around, the re – reasonality (*sic*) of that fifty percent.

26 Q. So it was your idea though?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. How come 50 percent? Why not 40? 60? 70? 30?

³ Although WCI has agreed partially to a percentage reduction, that is a gesture to simplify this stage of the proceeding and, perhaps, offer an "olive branch" to Staff. It should not be construed in any manner to endorse this approach either by WRRRA or, presumably, WCI.

1 A. Again, and that's highlighted in my supplemental testimony,
2 we were just talking about that.

3 Q. What is your answer here today?

4 A. My answer here today is that 50% of one failed litigated rate
5 case and 50 percent of this complicated rate case makes one – the cost of
6 the one – the cost of the fully litigated rate case, and then also in my – my
7 dir – testimony filed July – July 18th, 2014, we are also trying to balance
8 both the ratepayer and the Company's interests.

9 Q. Very well.

10 Is that – was that based upon any rule, any policy, any
11 memorandum here within the Commission, that's something that should
12 happen, the 50%

13 A. No, sir.

14 Q. Was it based upon any portion of the Washington
15 Administrative Code?

16 A. No, sir.⁴

17 In the industry's view, the two most important factors in rate making are
18 consistency and predictability. If one has those, a rate filing can be resolved by
19 discussion, sometimes concessions are made, but the conclusions are always
20 based upon the law, the rules, Commission Policy Statements and precedent. We
21 may not always agree with the results, but at least we can be confident that the
22 "rules of the game" will not be unilaterally modified by the referee. That is why
23 there have been so few rate filings going to hearing over the years, which is as it
24 should be. There are no winners, rate payers included, when a case like this
25 goes as long as it has, simply because an auditor "kicked around" some
26 unsupported and unprecedented theories which were, incredibly, adopted by
Staff and the Administrative Law Judge. This ruling should be as frustrating to
the Commission as it obviously is to the industry.

Of equal concern is the Initial Order's apparent conclusion that the
"bounds of logic" are tested when a company finds itself spending as much on a

⁴ Tr. Vol. III, pp. 294-297.

1 rate case as it may receive in increased revenue.⁵ What this "Conclusion"
2 neglects to address is the simple fact that this, and every other regulated solid
3 waste company, will be back for further rate adjustments as time goes by. What
4 would be imprudent would be to "quit" halfway through the process, leaving
5 unsupported, unfair and statutorily incorrect positions to stand without a
6 complete airing before the Commission itself. WCI's Petition for Administrative
7 Review describes this as a "tipping point" where, to justify its theories, Staff could
8 run up the Company's costs to the point the Company may not even hope to
9 "break even." The solution is not for the Company to "quit." the solution is for
10 the Company and Staff to work together frankly, competently and economically to
11 reach a fair result. The burden of proof may be upon the Company, but the
12 burden of fairness rests with everyone involved. The object of any regulated
13 activity is to achieve fairness and balance, a good example being the allowance of
14 temporary rates, subject to refund.

15 The Commission should approve WCI's voluntary acceptance of reduced
16 costs in TG-131794 as outlined in its Findings/Conclusion (14), and allow the
17 remaining costs as requested. To do otherwise would severely test the bounds of
18 arbitrary and capricious standards.

19 **INVESTIGATION FEES:** The application of RCW 81.20.020 by the Initial
20 Order resulting in what is, in essence, a penalty of \$43,818.82 assessed
21 continues to baffle Intervenor for several reasons.

22 First, this is the first time anyone involved in this matter, Staff included,
23 can recall this law being applied in a general rate case. It simply has never been
24 an issue because no one has ever sought its application. This has been
25 described by WCI as "selective enforcement" which certainly seems an apt
26 description.

Secondly, when the statute is read along with its title, it can only be
described as either permissive (not mandatory), ambiguous, or both.⁶ What is
clear is that when the legislative history, wording of the title and complete lack of

⁵ Initial Order 12, at p. 25, par. 9.

⁶ WCI's Petition for Administrative Review thoroughly covers the case law on this issue and there is no reason for this Answer to recite the same law.

1 enforcement are considered, this law was never intended to be applied in a
2 situation such as we have here. It is (or was), in fact, intended to be punitive and
3 perhaps was appropriate and even necessary for that purpose at the time to
4 "punish" wrongdoers who were guilty of some transgression in a Commission
5 proceeding or were discovered to be in willful noncompliance of Commission laws
and/or rules in an enforcement action, which clearly is not the case here.

6 The Staff has never accused WCI of acting in bad faith or skirting the law;
7 just the opposite is true. During cross-examination of Ms. Cheesman, the
8 following exchange took place:

9 Q. Are you saying here today that the Company acted in any
10 manner in bad faith in either of these dockets?

11 A. No, I – I am not implying any negative connotation of (*sic*) the
12 Company's character.

13 Q. All right. No cheating, no trying to get something by the
14 ratepayers?

15 A. No, sir.

16 Q. Just a disagreement on what is appropriate as far as rate
17 setting and these other peripheral issues?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 The Company has the right and the obligation to file for periodic rate
20 adjustments. Staff has the right and the obligation to review and audit the filing,
21 which almost always results in an agreement on appropriate rates. Here, the
22 process resulted in a partial agreement as evidenced by "Appendix A (partial
23 Settlement Agreement)" attached to the Initial Order. The lack of a complete
24 settlement because of professional disagreements between Staff and the
25 Company should not be the cause of imposition of an "administrative fine" upon
26 the Company.

Third, and of significant interest to WRRRA, is the issue of notice, or lack
thereof. The statute was not quoted in its entirety in the Initial Order.⁷ The
following sentence was left out:

⁷ Initial order 12, p. 27, para. 76.

1 . . . The Commission shall ascertain such expenses, and after giving
2 notice and an opportunity to be heard, shall render a bill therefor by
3 registered mail to the public service company, either at the
4 conclusion of the investigation, valuation, appraisal or services, or
5 from time to time during its progress (Emphasis added).

6 A reading of the entire statute, in particular the emphasized language,
7 makes it clear that two things must happen; first, there has to be "notice" and,
8 secondly, there must be the "opportunity to be heard." Neither has happened
9 here. There is no provision for "constructive notice" via argument in a rate case,
10 nor has WCI been given the "opportunity to be heard" on this particular, and
11 obviously important, issue. Both of these things must take place before the
12 Commission can assess these costs. If the Commission wishes to pursue this,
13 notice must be given and a hearing scheduled and held. Neither has happened
14 yet.

15 If the Initial Order is upheld on this issue, Staff could simply argue for a
16 cost assessment in every contested rate filing, settled or not. That is why the
17 Commission itself must give proper and adequate notice of its intent and hold a
18 hearing. There are some very good reasons why this 1939/1961 statute has
19 apparently never been utilized in a solid waste rate case.⁸

20 **APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS:** This is an issue which may or may not
21 arise, but was addressed in WCI's Petition at page 1, and has caused WRRRA to
22 consider the concerns raised by the Petition. Apparently Mr. Roland Martin, a
23 Commission employee, advised the Administrative Law Judge regarding the
24 technical and accounting issues in this matter. This, of course, is not unusual
25 and is probably an essential component of a case with so many technical issues
26 and use of sometimes obscure accounting and rate making language and
concepts.

The potential problem is that Mr. Martin apparently may be called upon to
advise the Commissioners in considering WCI's Petition for Administrative
Review. While WRRRA certainly does not question Mr. Martin's competence,

⁸ This is not to imply that the Commission should not have authority to assess something like
this penalty in appropriate circumstances; meaning wrongdoing, deliberate inaccuracy of
books and records, obfuscation and the like. WRRRA would certainly be willing to participate
in clarification and modernization of the statute to avoid this situation in the future.

1 professionalism or ethics, this would, as WCI points out, present a clear "conflict
2 of interest, appearance of fairness" situation. We must agree. This matter
3 should be decided on the law and its merits, not on an important, but peripheral
4 issue of conflict or appearance of fairness. While realizing there are budgetary
5 and staffing issues to be considered here, WRRRA strongly urges the Commission
6 to utilize another expert and avoid this issue altogether.

6 **CONCLUSIONS:** Obviously WRRRA supports this Petition and WCI's
7 arguments in support of same. The Initial Order simply ignores the facts and
8 legal/precedential arguments made by WCI and WRRRA. It essentially imposes
9 punishments upon WCI, despite any evidence whatever of wrongdoing, as clearly
10 stated by Staff's own auditor in her testimony. The Initial Order simply penalizes
11 WCI for presenting its case professionally, truthfully and competently, only
12 because that presentation differed on some issues from that of Staff.

11 WRRRA urges the Commission to review this entire record and perhaps hear
12 oral argument on its own Order pursuant to WAC 480-07-825(6). This is not the
13 way a seemingly simple rate case should have gone.

14 Finally, as WCI's Petition concludes, there are important rule makings
15 ongoing which cannot help but be affected, in one way or the other, by the
16 Commission's Final Order in this Docket. Perhaps everyone involved has learned
17 lessons which may well be useful in the rule making process. It is indeed
18 unfortunate that this particular case came along before those rule makings reach
19 completion. But it is equally unfortunate that a seemingly routine rate filing has
20 led us to this point.

19 This action has been unusually contentious and litigious, much more so
20 than the undersigned has experienced in any rate filing in some 30 years of
21 practice before the Commission. This is unfortunate for a variety of reasons, not
22 the least of which is the increase in costs to both parties by reason of endless
23 discovery requests, motions and just plain disagreement over so many issues
24 which, in other filings by this very company, have been resolved fairly and
25 expeditiously. Whatever "went wrong" here needs to be fixed.

25 In Intervenor's view, this situation could well have been avoided had the
26 two rule makings been completed and the new rules, or as WRRRA has many

1 times referenced as a "roadmap", were in effect and followed by all involved. In
2 lieu of that, Staff should not have singled out one filing to set its own new course
3 for rate filings. Until new rules are adopted, if they are, rate filings should be
4 conducted in the same manner, and under the same assumptions, as they have
5 been for these many years. WRRRA was asked to support the rule making process
6 as opposed to, for example, the conduct of a "generic rate case," and continues in
7 that support. This support is in no small way based upon an understanding with
8 the Commission that, pending adoption of the new rules, the "old rules" and
9 Commission precedent would continue to be uniformly applied in individual
10 filings. Obviously we feel that has not happened here. The Commission's ruling
11 in this Docket can, and should, get this process back on track, as well as send a
12 message to everyone involved that rules are made by the Commission, not by
13 Staff or an applicant, and are to be fairly applied in every case.

14 Respectfully submitted this 10th day of July, 2015.

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
16 JAMES K. SELLS
17 WSBA No. 6040
18 Attorney for Washington Refuse and
19 Recycling Association

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served this document upon all parties of record in this proceeding, by the method as indicated below, pursuant to WAC 480-07-150.

Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission 1300 S. Evergreen Park Dr. SW PO Box 47250 Olympia, WA 98504-7250 360.664.1160 records@utc.wa.gov	<input type="checkbox"/> Via Legal Messenger <input type="checkbox"/> Via Facsimile <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Via U.S. Mail <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Via Email
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DATED at Silverdale, Washington, this 28th day of July 2015.


Cheryl L. Sinclair