

**US Department of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Office of Pipeline Safety**

**Gas IMP Field Verification Inspection
49 CFR Subparts 192.911, 192.921, 192.933, & 192.935**

General Notes:

1. This Field Verification Inspection is performed on field activities being performed by an Operator in support of their Integrity Management Program (IMP).
2. This is a two part inspection form:
 - i. A review of applicable Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and IMP processes and procedures applicable to the field activity being inspected to ensure the operator is implementing their O&M and IMP Manuals in a consistent manner.
 - ii. A Field Verification Inspection to determine that activities on the pipeline and facilities are being performed in accordance with written procedures or guidance.
3. Not all parts of this form may be applicable to a specific Field Verification Inspection, and only those applicable portions of this form need to be completed. The applicable portions are identified in the Table below by a check mark. Only those sections of the form marked immediately below need to be documented as either “Satisfactory”; “Unsatisfactory”; or Not Checked (“N/C”). Those sections not marked below may be left blank.

Operator Inspected: *Cascade Natural Gas Corporation*

Op ID: *31522-Wenatchee/MosesLake*

Perform Activity (denoted by mark)	Activity Number	Activity Description
	1A	In-Line Inspection
	1B	Hydrostatic Pressure Testing
x	1C	Direct Assessment Technologies
	1D	Other Assessment Technologies
	2A	Remedial Actions
	2B	Remediation – Implementation
x	3A	Preventive & Mitigative – additional measures evaluated for HCAs
	3B	Preventive & Mitigative – automatic shut-off valves
x	4A	Field Inspection for Verification of HCA Locations
	4B	Field Inspection for Verification of Anomaly Digs
x	4C	Field Inspection to Verify adequacy of the Cathodic Protection System
x	4D	Field inspection for general system characteristics
	attachment	Anomaly Evaluation Report
	attachment	Anomaly Repair Report

Gas IMP Field Verification Inspection Form

Name of Operator: Cascade Natural Gas Corporation

Headquarters Address: 222 Fairview Ave. N., Seattle, WA 98109-5312

Company Official: Eldon Book, COO

Phone Number: 206.624.3900

Fax Number: 206.654.4069

Operator ID: 31522

Persons Interviewed	Title	Phone No.	E-Mail
Tina Beach	Pipeline Safety Spec. Primary Contact	206.445.4121	Tina.beech@cngc.com
Keith Meissner	Mgr. Stds and Compliance	206.381.6734	Keith.meissner@cngc.com
Sam Grant	Gen. Mgr. Wenatchee Dist.	509.750.4269	sgrant@cngc.com

OPS/State Representative(s): Stephanie Zuehlke _____ Date(s) of Inspection: July 8, 2010 _____

Inspector Signature: _____ Date: _____

Pipeline Segment Descriptions: *[note: Description of the Pipeline Segment Inspected as part of this field verification. (If information is available, include the pipe size, wall thickness, grade, seam type, coating type, length, normal operating pressure, MAOP, %SMYS, HCA locations, class locations, and Pipeline Segment boundaries.)]*

Othello. Only 1 section w/2 HCAs. 4" and 6" WSC, wall thickness: .188 both; pipe grade 4=A25, 6-x-42; unknown seam type; Segment 2 total is 1359' length; coating=glass wrap craft paper and semi plasticized enamel (coat tar wrap); normal operating pressure=480psi; MAOP=500psig; %SMYS=23.94; HCA location is called Segment 2 or Othello Town Gate; Class location=2 due to HO structures in the zone; Pipeline Segment boundaries on HCA maps color coded red and begin at 290304-02A and end at 290304-02Z.

Site Location of field activities: *[note: Describe the portion of the pipeline segment reviewed during the field verification, i.e. milepost/stations/valves/pipe-to-soil readings/river crossings/etc. In addition, a brief description and case number of the follow up items in any PHMSA compliance action or consent agreement that required field verification. Note: Complete pages 8 & 9 as appropriate.]*

Station at beginning = 628+16 and end station at 641+45. No operational valves this location. Did check an operational valve outside the HCA to shut HCA line 1 # V-28.

Summary:

Work reviewed identifies commitment to safe operation of system. IM plan appears to be thorough.

Findings:

Initial IM review identified zero HCA in this district. Through reevaluation, CNG has since identified two new HCA's in this district. No IM anomaly digs this location – this inspection did not detail how this district fits in with IM levels company-wide.

Key Documents Reviewed:

Document Title	Document No.	Rev. No	Date
Othello HP shutdown map			05.23.01
IM Program Plan			06.07
Aerial maps of Wenatchee District Transmission			06.06.03
Reevaluation of Company HCAs			12.07.09
Reevaluation of Company HCAs			02.04.08

Part 1 - Performance of Integrity Assessments

1A. In-Line Inspection	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	<p>Notes:</p> <p>No inline inspection on 4 & 6"</p> <p>No procedures for ILI</p> <p>No ILI done within CNG ergo no vendor, tools, or other pertinent info.</p> <p>[Note: Add location specific information, as appropriate.]</p>
Verify that Operator's O&M and IMP procedural requirements (e.g. launching/receiving tools) for performance of ILI were followed.	x			
Verify Operator's ILI procedural requirements were followed (e.g. operation of trap for launching and receiving of pig, operational control of flow), as appropriate.				
Verify ILI tool systems and calibration checks before run were performed to ensure tool was operating correctly prior to assessment being performed, as appropriate.				
Verify ILI complied with Operator's procedural requirements for performance of a successful assessment (e.g. speed of travel within limits, adequate transducer coverage), as appropriate.				
Document ILI Tool Vendor and Tool type (e.g. MFL, Deformation). Document other pertinent information about Vendor and Tool, as appropriate				
Verify that Operator's personnel have access to applicable procedures for preparing, running and monitoring the pipeline for ILI tools include performance requirements (e.g.: tool speeds, pipe cleanliness, operation of tool sensors, and ILI field calibration requirements), as appropriate.				
Other:				
1B. Hydrostatic Pressure Testing	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	<p>Notes: Base line assessment does not include hydro test: utilizing DA due to age of install and operational continuity of service concerns (cutting off service to City of Othello)</p>
Verify that hydrostatic pressure tests complied with Part 192 Subpart J requirements.	x			
Review documentation of Hydrostatic Pressure Test parameters and results. Verify test was performed without leakage and in compliance with Part 192 Subpart J requirements.				
Review test procedures and records and verify test acceptability and validity.				
Review determination of the cause of hydrostatic test failures, as appropriate.				
Document Hydrostatic Pressure Test Vendor and equipment used, as appropriate.				
Verify that the baseline assessment is conducted in a manner that minimizes environmental and safety risks (reference §192.919(e) and ADB-04-01)				
Other:				
1C. Direct Assessment Technologies	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	<p>Notes:</p> <p>Reviewed Threat Eval and Assessment methods which include the operators application of DA.</p> <p>Reviewed IM Plan ECDA and ICDA O&M Plan and appears to meet 192.931.</p>
Verify that application of "Direct Assessment Technology" complied with Part 192.923	x			
Review documentation of Operator's application of "Direct Assessment Technology", if available. Verify compliance with Part 192.923 and Operator's procedural requirements, as applicable.				
Verify that appropriate tests and/or inspections are being performed and appropriate data is being collected, as appropriate.				
Other:				
<p>(a) General. An operator may use direct assessment either as a primary assessment method or as a supplement to the other assessment methods allowed under this subpart. An operator may only use direct assessment as the primary assessment method to address the identified threats of external corrosion (ECDA), internal corrosion (ICDA), and stress corrosion cracking (SCCDA).</p> <p>(b) Primary method. An operator using direct assessment as a primary assessment method must have a plan that complies with the requirements in--</p> <p>(1) ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7), section 6.4; NACE RP0502-2002 (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7); and § 192.925 if addressing external corrosion (ECDA).</p> <p>(2) ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 6.4 and appendix B2, and § 192.927 if addressing internal corrosion (ICDA).</p> <p>(3) ASME/ANSI B31.8S, appendix A3, and § 192.929 if addressing stress corrosion cracking (SCCDA).</p> <p>(c) Supplemental method. An operator using direct assessment as a supplemental assessment method for any applicable threat must have a plan that follows the requirements for confirmatory direct assessment in § 192.931.</p>				

ID. Other Assessment Technologies	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Verify that application of "Other Assessment Technology" complied with Operator's requirements, that appropriate notifications had been submitted to PHMSA, and that appropriate data was collected.	x			None
Review documentation of notification to PHMSA of Operator's application of "Other Assessment Technology", if available. Verify compliance with Operator's procedural requirements. If documentation of notification to PHMSA of Operator's application of "Other Assessment Technology" is available, verify performance of assessment within parameters originally submitted to PHMSA.				
Verify that appropriate tests are being performed and appropriate data is being collected, as appropriate.				
Other.				

Part 2 - Remediation of Anomalies

2A. Remedial Actions – Process	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Verify that remedial actions complied with the Operator's procedural requirements.	x			
Witness anomaly remediation and verify documentation of remediation (e.g. Exposed Pipe Reports, Maintenance Report, any Data Acquisition Forms). Verify compliance with Operator's O&M Manual and Part 192 requirements.				
Verify that Operator's procedures were followed in locating and exposing the anomaly (e.g. any required pressure reductions, line location, identifying approximate location of anomaly for excavation, excavation, coating removal).				
Verify that procedures were followed in measuring the anomaly, determining the severity of the anomaly, and determining remaining strength of the pipe. Review the class location factor and failure pressure ratio used by Operator in determining repair of anomaly.				Cathodic Protection readings of pipe to soil at dig site (if available): On Potential: _____ mV Off Potential: _____ mV
Verify that Operator's personnel have access to and knowledge of applicable procedures.				
Other:				<i>[Note: Add location specific information and note whether CP readings were from the surface or from the pipe following exposure, as appropriate.]</i>
2B. Remediation - Implementation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Verify that the operator has adequately implemented its remediation process and procedures to effectively remediate conditions identified through integrity assessments or information analysis.	x			None
If documentation is available, verify that repairs were completed in accordance with the operator's prioritized schedule and within the time frames allowed in §192.933(d).				
Review any documentation for this inspection site for an immediate repair condition (§192.933(d)(1)) where operating pressure was reduced or the pipeline was shutdown. Verify for an immediate repair condition that temporary operating pressure was determined in accordance with the requirements in §192.933(a) or, if not applicable, the operator should provide an engineering basis justifying the amount of pressure reduction.				
Verify that repairs were performed in accordance with §192.103, §192.111, §192.713, §192.717, §192.719, §192.933 and the Operator's O&M Manual, as appropriate. If welding is performed, verify a qualified welding procedure and qualified welders are used to perform repairs. If composite repair methods are used, verify that a method approved by the Operator is used, procedures are followed, and qualified personnel perform the repair.				Cathodic Protection readings of pipe to soil at dig site (if available): On Potential: _____ mV Off Potential: _____ mV
Review CP readings at anomaly dig site, if possible. (See Part 4 of this form – "Field Inspection to Verify adequacy of the Cathodic Protection System", as appropriate.				
Other:				<i>[Note: Add location specific information and note whether CP readings were from the surface or from the pipe following exposure, as appropriate.]</i>

Part 3 - Preventive and Mitigative Actions

3A. P&M Measures for Third Party Damage	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Identify additional measures evaluated for the HCA section of the pipeline and facilities.	x			
<p>Verify that P & M measures regarding threats due to third party damage are being implemented: [§192.915(c),</p> <p>§192.915 What knowledge and training must personnel have to carry out an integrity management program?</p> <p>(c) Persons responsible for preventive and mitigative measures. The integrity management program must provide criteria for the qualification of any person—Patrols in accordance with CNG O&M manuals, locate request, incidents, monitoring excav. Activities.</p> <p>Conditional: excav. Evidenct will dig or monitor as required. Monitor trends.</p> <p>(1) Who implements preventive and mitigative measures to carry out this subpart, including the marking and locating of buried structures; or Wenatchee GM/Office and Engineering.</p> <p>(2) Who directly supervises excavation work carried out in conjunction with an integrity assessment. Wenatchee district Field employees.</p> <p>192.935(b)(1)(iv)]:</p> <p>§192.935 What additional preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take?</p> <p>(b) Third party damage and outside force damage-</p>				
<p>(1) Third party damage. An operator must enhance its damage prevention program, as required under §192.614 of this part, with respect to a covered segment to prevent and minimize the consequences of a release due to third party damage. Enhanced measures to an existing damage prevention program include, at a minimum- Monitoring digs and surveillance/patrolling.</p> <p>(iv) Monitoring of excavations conducted on covered pipeline segments by pipeline personnel. If an operator finds physical evidence of encroachment involving excavation that the operator did not monitor near a covered segment, an operator must either excavate the area near the encroachment or conduct an above ground survey using methods defined in NACE RP-0502-2002 (incorporated by reference, see §192.7). An operator must excavate, and remediate, in accordance with ANSI/ASME B31.8S and §192.933 any indication of coating holidays or discontinuity warranting direct examination.</p>				<p><i>[Note: Add location specific information, as appropriate.]</i></p>
<p>Confirm the use of qualified personnel for marking, locating, and direct supervision of known excavation work, as appropriate.</p> <p>Reviewed OQ list and conducted marking & locating. Reviewed discipline documentation for missed located (not transmission line) and supervisory monitoring of employees.</p>				
<p>Confirm the use of qualified personnel for monitoring of excavations conducted on covered pipeline segments by pipeline personnel, as appropriate.</p> <p>Reviewed OQ list entitled "Inspecting excavations near lines."</p>				
<p>Other:</p> <p>GM is Director of Local Utility Coordinating Council.</p>				
3B. Installed Automatic Shut-off Valves (Protocol H.07)	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Verify additional preventive and mitigative actions implemented by Operator.	x			
<p>Document that additional measures evaluated by the operator cover alternatives such as, installing Automatic Shut-off Valves or Remote Control Valves, installing computerized monitoring and leak detection systems, replacing pipe segments with pipe of heavier wall thickness, providing additional training to personnel on response procedures, conducting drills with local emergency responders and implementing additional inspection and maintenance programs, as appropriate</p>				

<p><u>Verify that the operator has a process to decide if automatic shut-off valves or remote control valves represent an efficient means of adding protection to potentially affected high consequence areas. [§192.935(c)]</u></p>	<p><i>[Note: Add location specific information, as appropriate.]</i></p>
<p>Process from IM Program Plan 5.2.4 Prevention Responses. Copy in file.</p> <p><u>Verify operation of installed remote control valve by reviewing operator inspection/remote control records for partially opening and closing the valve, as appropriate.</u></p> <p>None in this area since does not meet Evaluation requirements. There is an existing manual valve for operation.</p>	
<p>Other:</p>	

Part 4 - Field Investigations (Additional Activities as appropriate)

4A. Field Inspection for Verification of HCA Locations	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
<p>Review HCAs locations as identified by the Operator. Utilize NPMS and Operator maps, as appropriate.</p>	x			
<p><u>Verify that the operator's integrity management program includes accurate and updated system maps or other suitably detailed means documenting the pipeline segment locations that are located in high consequence areas, as appropriate.</u> [§192.905(a)] Reviewed HCA maps dated 01.04.05.</p>				
<p><u>Review the operator's applicable procedures and forms used to document new information from one-calls, surveys, aerial & ground patrols are being completed by field personnel to communicate new developments that may impact high consequence areas or that may create new high consequence areas to IM personnel, as appropriate.</u> [§192.905(c)] CNG completes an annual review of HCA. GM completes the survey and forwards form to CNG engineering. Reviewed Reevaluation of Company HCA's dated 02.04.08 for lines 3, 9, & 15 and 12.07.09 for lines 3., 9, & 15. (Wenatchee District has 3 lines total)</p>				
<p><u>Review the operator's applicable procedures and forms to confirm that new HCAs and class location changes are being identified through it's continuing surveillance program as required by</u> §192.613(a) Each operator shall have a procedure for continuing surveillance of its facilities to determine and take appropriate action concerning changes in class location, failures, leakage history, corrosion, substantial changes in cathodic protection requirements, and other unusual operating and maintenance conditions. (b) If a segment of pipeline is determined to be in unsatisfactory condition but no immediate hazard exists, the operator shall initiate a program to recondition or phase out the segment involved, or, if the segment cannot be reconditioned or phased out, reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure in accordance with §192.619 (a) and (b). Objective in IM Plan references other CNG procedures: CNG O&M Manual under CP 714.10 discusses the Reconditioning and phase out of pipeline and reducing the MAOP. and §192.905. How does an operator identify a high consequence area? (a) General. To determine which segments of an operator's transmission pipeline system are covered by this subpart, an operator must identify the high consequence areas. An operator must use method (1) or (2) from the definition in § 192.903 to identify a high consequence area. An operator may apply one method to its entire pipeline system, or an operator may apply one method to individual portions of the pipeline system. An operator must describe in its integrity management program which method it is applying to each portion of the operator's pipeline system. The description must include the potential impact radius when utilized to establish a high consequence area. (See appendix E.I. for guidance on identifying high consequence areas.) (b)(1) Identified sites. An operator must identify an identified site, for purposes of this subpart, from information the operator has obtained from routine operation and maintenance activities and from public officials with safety or emergency response or planning responsibilities who indicate to the operator that they know of locations that meet the identified site criteria. These public officials could include officials on a local emergency planning commission or relevant Native American tribal officials. Method 1 is used and reviewed under 4.1.2 HCA Identification Procedure Manual. (2) If a public official with safety or emergency response or planning responsibilities informs an operator that it does not have the information to identify an identified site, the operator must use one of the following sources, as appropriate, to identify these sites. (i) Visible marking (e.g., a sign); or (ii) The site is licensed or registered by a Federal, State, or local government agency; or (iii) The site is on a list (including a list on an internet web site) or map maintained by or available from a Federal, State, or local government agency and available to the general public. (c) Newly identified areas. When an operator has information that the area around a pipeline segment not previously identified as a high consequence area could satisfy any of the definitions in § 192.903, the operator must complete the evaluation using method (1) or (2). If the segment is determined to meet the definition as a high consequence area, it must be incorporated into the operator's baseline assessment plan as a high consequence area within one year from the date the area is identified. The same Form mentioned above "reevaluation of Company HCAs" is completed by GM and sent to engineering to reevaluate.</p>				<p><i>[Note: Add location specific information, as appropriate.]</i> Reviewed O&M IM Manual 4.1.4. Reevaluation of HCAs which contain the procedures. Manual states, "Newly identified HCAs will be added to the existing assessment schedule and will be assessed within 10 years of the date of addition to the plan."</p>

4B. Field Inspection for Verification of Anomaly Digs	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes: [Note: Add location specific information, as appropriate.]
Verify repair areas, ILI verification sites, etc.	x			
<u>Document the anomaly dig sites observed and reviewed as part of this field activity and the actions taken by the operator.</u> NONE				
4C. Field Inspection to Verify adequacy of the Cathodic Protection System	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes: Cathodic Protection readings of pipe to soil at dig site (if available): On Potential: _____ mV Off Potential: _____ mV [Note: Add location specific information and note whether CP readings were from the surface or from the pipe following exposure, as appropriate.]
In case of hydrostatic pressure testing, Cathodic Protection (CP) systems must be evaluated for general adequacy.	x			
The operator should review the CP system performance in conjunction with a hydrostatic pressure test to ensure the integrity assessment addressed applicable threats to the integrity of the pipeline. <u>Has the operator reviewed the CP system performance in conjunction with the hydrostatic pressure test? No pressure test.</u>				
<u>Review records of CP readings from CIS and/or annual survey to ensure minimum code requirements are being met, if available.</u> CP bi-monthly records reviewed.				
<u>Review results of random field CP readings performed during this activity to ensure minimum code requirements are being met, if possible. Perform random rectifier checks during this activity and ensure rectifiers are operating correctly, if possible.</u> No anomaly.				
4D. Field inspection for general system characteristics	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Through field inspection determine overall condition of pipeline and associated facilities for a general estimation of the effectiveness of the operator's IMP implementation.	x			
<u>Evaluate condition of the ROW of inspection site to ensure minimum code requirements are being met, as appropriate.</u>				
<u>Comment on Operator's apparent commitment to the integrity and safe operation of their system, as appropriate.</u> GM work reviewed identifies commitment to safe operation of system. IM plan appears to be thorough.				
<u>Check ROW for pipeline markers in line-of-sight and Emergency call-in number on marker posts.</u> Other:				

Anomaly Evaluation Report *(to be completed as appropriate)*

Pipeline System and Line Pipe Information		
Operator (OpID and System Name):		
Unit ID (Pipeline Name)		
Pipe Manufacturer and Year:	Seam Type and Orientation:	
Pipe Nominal OD (inch):	Depth of Cover:	
Pipe Nominal Wall thickness (inch):	Coating Type and Condition:	
Grade of Pipe:	MAOP:	
ILI Reported Information		
ILI Technology (e.g., Vendor, Tools):		
Anomaly Type (e.g., Mechanical, Metal Loss):		
Is anomaly in a segment that can affect an HCA? (Yes / No)		
Date of Tool Run (MM/DD/YY):	Date of Inspection Report (MM/DD/YY):	
Date of "Discovery of Anomaly" (MM/DD/YY):		
Type of "Condition" (e.g.; Immediate; 60-day; 180-day):		
Anomaly Feature (Int/Ext):	Orientation (O'clock position):	
Anomaly Details: Length (in):	Width (in):	Depth (in):
Anomaly Log Distance (ft):	Distance from Upstream weld (ft):	
Length of joint(s) of pipe in which anomaly is identified (ft):		
Anomaly Dig Site Information Summary		
Date of Anomaly Dig (MM/DD/YY):		
Location Information (describe or attach map):		
Mile Post Number:	Distance from A/G Reference (ft):	
Distance from Upstream weld (ft):		
GPS Readings (if available) Longitude:	Latitude:	
Anomaly Feature (Int/Ext):	Orientation:	
Length of joint of pipe in which anomaly is found (ft):		
For Mechanical Damage Anomaly		
Damage Type (e.g., original construction, plain dent, gouge):		
Length (in):	Width (in):	Depth (in):
Near a weld? (Yes / No):		
Gouge or metal loss associated with dent? (Yes / No):	Are multiple dents present? (Yes / No):	
Did operator perform additional NDE to evaluate presence of cracks in dent? (Yes / No):		
Cracks associated with dent? (Yes / No):		
For Corrosion Metal Loss Anomaly		
Anomaly Type (e.g., pitting, general):		
Length (in):	Width (in):	Max. Depth (in):
Remaining minimum wall thickness (in):	Maximum % Wall Loss measurement(%):	
Safe pressure calculation (psi), as appropriate:		
For "Other Types" of Anomalies		
Describe anomaly (e.g., dent with metal loss, crack, seam defect, SCC):		
Length (in):	Width (in):	Max. Depth (in):
Other Information, as appropriate:		
Did operator perform additional NDE to evaluate presence of cracks? (Yes / No):		
Cracks present? (Yes / No):		

Anomaly Repair Report *(to be completed as appropriate)*

Repair Information		
Was a repair of the anomaly made? (Yes / No):		
Was Operating Pressure Reduced per 192.933(a) requirements?		
Was defect ground out to eliminate need for repair? (Yes / No):		
If grinding used, complete the following for affected area:		
Length (in):	Width (in):	Depth (in):
If NO repair of an anomaly for which RSTRENG/B31.G is applicable, were the Operator's RSTRENG/B31.G calculations reviewed? (Yes / No):		
If Repair made, complete the following:		
Repair Type (e.g., Type B-sleeve, composite wrap)		
Was defect ground out prior to making repair? (Yes / No):		
Operating Pressure at the time of repair:		
Length of Repair:	Pipe re-coating material used:	
Comments on Repair material, as appropriate (e.g., grade of steel, wall thickness):		
Comments on Repair procedure, as appropriate (e.g., welded sleeve, composite wrap):		
General Observations and Comments		
Was a diagram (e.g., corrosion map) of the anomaly made? (Yes / No):		(Include in report if available)
Were pipe-to-soil cathodic protection readings taken? (Yes / No):		
If CP readings taken, Record: On Potential: _____ mV; Off Potential: _____ mV		
<i>[Note: Note whether CP readings were from the surface or from the pipe following exposure, as appropriate.]</i>		
Describe method used by Operator to locate anomaly (as appropriate):		
Comments regarding procedures followed during excavation, repair of anomaly, and backfill (as appropriate):		
CNG utilizes Form 65 to document dig inspection/evaluation form (in folder).		
General Observations and Comments <i>(Note: attach photographs, sketches, etc., as appropriate):</i>		