

BEFORE THE
WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

In the Matter of the Continued Costing and Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements, Transport and Termination))))	Docket No. UT 003013
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**PART B RESPONSIVE TESTIMONY OF
MICHAEL STARKEY**

On behalf of

**FOCAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION OF WASHINGTON
XO WASHINGTON, INC., f/k/a NEXTLINK WASHINGTON, INC.**

October 23, 2000

1 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS FOR THE**
2 **RECORD.**

3 A. My name is Michael Starkey. My business address is QSI Consulting, Inc., 1918
4 Merlin Drive, Jefferson City, Missouri, 65101.

5
6 **Q. WHAT IS QSI CONSULTING, INC. AND WHAT IS YOUR POSITION**
7 **WITH THE FIRM?**

8 A. QSI Consulting, Inc. (“QSI”) is a consulting firm specializing in the areas of
9 telecommunications policy, econometric analysis and computer aided modeling. I
10 currently serve as the firm’s President.

11
12 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF WAS THIS TESTIMONY PREPARED?**

13 A. This testimony was prepared on behalf of Focal Communications Corporation of
14 Washington (“Focal”) and XO Washington, Inc., f/k/a NEXTLINK Washington,
15 Inc. (“XO”).

16
17 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH**
18 **TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY ISSUES AND YOUR RELEVANT**
19 **WORK HISTORY.**

20 A. Prior to founding QSI I was a founding partner and Senior Vice President of
21 Telecommunications Services at Competitive Strategies Group, Ltd. (“CSG”) in
22 Chicago, Illinois. Like QSI, CSG is a consulting firm providing a wide array of

1 telecommunications services to international telecommunications carriers,
2 consumer advocates and policy makers. In my position with both CSG and QSI I
3 have represented multiple clients in regulatory proceedings across the country
4 involving telecommunications issues ranging from Interconnection Agreement
5 disputes to generic proceedings aimed at evaluating and applying the FCC's Total
6 Element Long Run Incremental Cost methodology (TELRIC).

7
8 Prior to founding CSG, I was most recently employed by the Maryland Public
9 Service Commission as Director of the Commission's Telecommunications
10 Division. Prior to my tenure with the Maryland Commission Staff I was
11 employed by the Illinois Commerce Commission as a Senior Policy Analyst
12 within the Commission's Office of Policy and Planning. I began my career with
13 the Staff of the Missouri Public Service Commission as an Economist in the
14 Commission's Utility Services Division.

15
16 A more complete description of my relevant experience can be found in Schedule
17 MTS-1 to this testimony (Exhibit ____).

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21 **Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED TESTIMONY BEFORE THE**
22 **WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION**

1 **(HEREAFTER “THE COMMISSION”)?**

2 A. No, I have not. I have, however, provided testimony before the FCC and state
3 utility commissions in the following states: Alabama, California, Colorado,
4 Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
5 Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New
6 Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
7 South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin and Wyoming.

8

9 **Q. DO YOU HAVE DIRECT EXPERIENCE WITH THE RELEVANT ISSUES**
10 **IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

11 A. Yes, I do. Over the past three years I have represented clients in approximately 25
12 separate interconnection agreement negotiations, complaints, arbitrations and
13 generic proceedings wherein reciprocal compensation and its applicability to
14 telecommunications traffic that is transmitted to an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
15 was at issue. I have addressed both the public policy ramifications of Internet
16 traffic and its impact on proper inter-carrier compensation issues, and. I have
17 addressed issues specific to costs for carrying ISP-bound traffic in comparison to
18 costs resulting from more traditional voice-grade calling. I have provided
19 testimony regarding this particular issue before state utility commissions in 20
20 separate states and, in the past month, I served as an instructor for the Michigan
21 State University, Institute of Public Utilities, Advanced Regulatory Studies
22 Program on the issue of: *Telecommunications Costing and Pricing*,

1 *Interconnection and Intercarrier Compensation.*

2

3 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

4 A. The purpose of my testimony is to respond to issues raised by the Qwest
5 Corporation (“Qwest”) and Verizon Northwest, Inc. (“Verizon”) regarding
6 differences they believe exist in the costs incurred to carry traffic bound for an ISP
7 compared to more traditional voice grade traffic. In addition, my testimony will
8 address issues regarding “symmetrical” compensation and the extent to which
9 competitive local exchange carriers (“CLECs”) should be allowed to assess rates
10 consistent with tandem termination.

11

12 **Q. BOTH QWEST AND VERIZON RAISE A NUMBER OF POLICY ISSUES**
13 **SPECIFIC TO ISP BOUND TRAFFIC AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH**
14 **THE COMMISSION SHOULD ADOPT A WHOLLY SEPARATE**
15 **COMPENSATION MECHANISM (I.E., BILL AND KEEP) FOR THIS**
16 **TYPE OF TRAFFIC. DOES YOUR TESTIMONY ADDRESS THIS**
17 **ISSUE?**

18 A. No, not directly. It is my understanding that the Commission has already decided
19 that reciprocal compensation payments should be made for all local traffic
20 including traffic bound for an ISP. I am also informed that this case is a “cost
21 case” dealing primarily with the costs ILECs incur in providing unbundled
22 network elements and interconnection. Hence, I have not, within this testimony,

1 responded directly to the lengthy policy arguments raised by Messrs. Brotherson
2 and Trimble and Dr. Taylor. For the Commission's information, however, I have
3 attached as Schedule MTS-2, a copy of Rebuttal Testimony I previously submitted
4 before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. That testimony addresses many
5 of the same arguments Qwest and Verizon are making in this case. If the
6 Commission wishes to further explore any of the policy issues raised by the
7 ILECs, my hope is that my previously filed rebuttal testimony will assist them in
8 understanding that alternative viewpoints exist.

9
10 **Q. IS THE ATTACHED TESTIMONY FROM COLORADO MEANT TO BE**
11 **SPECIFIC TO QWEST'S OR VERIZON'S OPERATIONS IN**
12 **WASHINGTON?**

13 A. No, obviously the data and many of the arguments in the attached testimony rely
14 on facts directly relevant to Qwest in Colorado. Hence, that data may not be as
15 directly relevant to Qwest or Verizon in this proceeding (e.g., Qwest in Colorado
16 operates under an alternative form of regulation and some of the testimony
17 focuses on Qwest's obligations in this respect). Regardless, though some facts
18 may differ between Colorado and Washington, these facts do not change my
19 ultimate conclusions regarding the propriety of reciprocal compensation for ISP
20 bound traffic and its inclusion in any inter-carrier compensation mechanism.

21 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THIS**
22 **TESTIMONY.**

1 A. Traffic passing between interconnected carriers uses the transport and switching
2 resources of both carriers. Neither the types of resources or the level of resources
3 required to accommodate this traffic differs depending upon whether the calls at
4 issue are traditional voice or ISP calls. Indeed, the network is largely indifferent
5 to whether a call is a voice call or an ISP-bound call as it must assign capacity to
6 open a circuit for both and maintain that circuit over the length of the call. For
7 these reasons, there are no discernable cost differences between voice and ISP
8 traffic.

9
10 **Q. QWEST AND VERIZON DETAIL A NUMBER OF REASONS WHY**
11 **COSTS FOR CARRYING ISP TRAFFIC MAY BE LOWER THAN COSTS**
12 **FOR CARRYING TRADITIONAL VOICE TRAFFIC. DO YOU AGREE**
13 **WITH THEIR ANALYSIS?**

14 A. No, I do not. After reviewing the testimony of Messrs. Brotherson and Trimble,
15 as well as Dr. Taylor, it appears that the ILECs make the following arguments in
16 this regard:

17 1. Switching costs are largely incurred in two forms; (1) "Setup"
18 costs generated only once per call, and (2) "Duration" costs
19 generated over the entire length of the call. Traditional rate design
20 models have "spread" the per-call Setup costs across the duration
21 of an *average call*, thereby arriving at average per minute of use
22 rates. The average call duration historically used for this
23 "spreading" process was between 3-4 minutes. An average ISP
24 call may last longer than 20 minutes, hence, traditional rate design
25 models based upon voice traffic characteristics are not particularly
26 accurate in estimating average per minute of use costs for ISP

1 bound traffic.¹

- 2
- 3 2. Because ISP traffic is often accommodated with the use of ISDN
4 Primary Rate Interface (ISDN-PRI) lines, the switching resources
5 necessary to accommodate this traffic are largely dedicated and
6 non-usage sensitive in nature. Hence, these switching costs are not
7 appropriately recovered in reciprocal compensation rates.²
- 8
- 9 3. “The proportion of ISP-bound traffic that arrives at the busy hour
10 of the switch may differ from that of ordinary voice traffic. If the
11 load distribution of ISP-bound traffic is flatter than that of voice
12 traffic, then, on average, an incremental minute of ISP-bound
13 traffic would cause a smaller increase in the capacity requirements
14 of the switch than an incremental minute of voice traffic.”³
- 15
- 16 4. “...the switches employed by CLECs to deliver primarily ISP
17 bound traffic are more akin to “tandem switches” in that the
18 termination of traffic to an ISP is facilitated through trunk-to-trunk
19 switching configurations. Thus, it would be rational to expect that
20 the underlying cost to terminate ISP traffic would be more
21 reflective of “tandem switching” costs which are known to be
22 lower than end office switching costs.”
- 23

24 In the following testimony I will detail why each of these arguments can be either
25 misleading, irrelevant or simply inaccurate. Further, I will provide additional
26 evidence supporting my conclusion that costs associated with ISP bound traffic
27 are identical to costs associated with carrying voice traffic when both types of
28 traffic are carried on the same network.

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¹ See *Phase B Direct Testimony of Dennis B. Trimble*, pg. 36, *Direct Testimony of William B. Taylor*, pgs. 34-35.

² Dr. Taylor’s testimony, pgs. 36-39.

³ *Id.*, page 34.

1 **TELRIC METHODOLOGY**

2 **Q. BEFORE YOU ADDRESS EACH OF THE ILEC’S ARGUMENTS**
3 **DIRECTLY, ARE THERE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS WITH THE**
4 **ILECS’ APPROACH?**

5 A. Yes, there are. Unfortunately, many of the arguments made by the ILECs in their
6 direct testimony completely ignore the proper manner by which switched usage
7 costs (a category of which reciprocal compensation is a subset) should be
8 established. The FCC requires that reciprocal compensation rates be determined
9 using its Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost methodology. As indicated
10 by its name, TELRIC requires that cost be determined based upon the “total
11 demand” for the *element* (defined primarily as a facility or a function) in question.
12 With respect to switched usage, the *element* in question is the transport and
13 termination of all traffic that uses the switched network. Costs associated with
14 this traffic are appropriately calculated by dividing the entirety of the investment
15 in transport and switching equipment required to accommodate this “total
16 demand,” by the total amount of traffic that is carried. The result of this
17 calculation is an average, total element long run incremental cost associated with
18 accommodating the total demand for the element (i.e., TELRIC).

19
20
21 **Q. ARE THE ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THE ILECS CONSISTENT WITH**
22 **THE FCC’S TELRIC METHODOLOGY?**

1 A. No, they are not. The ILECs largely ignore the underpinnings of the FCC's
2 TELRIC methodology when attempting to argue that switching costs differ
3 between different types of traffic. The ILECs, with these arguments, invite the
4 Commission to ignore the average incremental costs that represent TELRIC, and
5 instead, focus on a subset of those costs, i.e., cost delivered to a certain type of
6 customer, i.e., ISPs.

7
8 This is problematic for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the FCC's
9 required methodology for establishing reciprocal compensation rates. Imagine the
10 morass that would result if we decided to independently measure costs specific to
11 carrying traffic for every individual customer (or even every customer group, i.e.,
12 pizza parlors, travel agencies, households with teenage children, senior citizens,
13 etc.). Second, and more importantly, however, measuring transport and switching
14 costs consistent with the ILEC's approach produces nonsensical results.

15
16 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR SECOND POINT ABOVE IN MORE DETAIL?**

17 A. Because switching facilities are broadly shared amongst a number of users and
18 services, they are engineered and built to accommodate the entirety of the traffic
19 they will need to support. It is impossible to effectively allocate these resources at
20 a level of detail more precise than an average minute of use. This results from the
21 fact that the cost causation activity (i.e., the primary cost driver), springs from the
22 need to accommodate all traffic carried by the switch (the switch is purchased to

1 accommodate total traffic flow and is engineered pursuant to the demands of the
2 total traffic). Any attempt to allocate switched usage costs more precisely by the
3 type of service or by the type of customer that will use the switch is arbitrary at
4 best. The more rational approach uses the capacity of the switch as a measuring
5 stick (i.e., minutes of use) and allocates the total investment of the switch amongst
6 its various users depending upon how much capacity (i.e., how many minutes of
7 use) they consume. Before the advent of reciprocal compensation and the ILEC's
8 attempts to discern the costs of carrying a certain type of traffic (i.e. ISP traffic), it
9 has been widely understood that service specific switched usage costs are largely
10 meaningless. Discussions about whether one type of minute of use (i.e., voice)
11 versus another type of minute of use (i.e. ISP) uses more or less of the switch's
12 resources (i.e., capacity) are baseless.

13

14 **Q. HOW SHOULD SWITCHED USAGE COSTS BE MEASURED?**

15 A. Switches are generally considered to be capacity constrained, meaning, that any
16 individual switch can only accommodate a certain amount of traffic at any given
17 time of the day. It is this engineered capacity constraint that requires costs to be
18 measured for all traffic that uses the finite capacity resources (i.e., usage). The
19 level of constraint experienced by the switch is not impacted by the extent to
20 which the switch is accommodating the traffic of a pizza parlor, a travel agency, a
21 sporting goods store or an ISP (or any other customer specific group). Instead, the
22 switch is constrained only by the total number of minutes it can accommodate at

1 any given time (generally measured in Centum Call Seconds or “CCS” at the
2 “busy hour”). Indeed, the traffic sensitive switch matrix (where the actual call-
3 mapping takes place) is indifferent to the type of traffic it switches (as I will
4 describe in more detail later) and can just as easily (and with the same level of
5 resources) switch a call to a small business and/or to an ISP subscriber (or any
6 other subscriber). Hence, to suggest that the traffic of one customer is more or
7 less expensive to switch than the traffic of another customer, when they are both
8 consuming the exact same finite capacity resources of the same switch is not
9 credible. This is why the FCC’s “Total Element” long run incremental costing
10 standard is so important. It recognizes that only an incremental cost determined
11 for the average minute of use will provide economically rational results consistent
12 with the manner by which the economic constraints of the switch can be
13 accurately measured.

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21 **CALL LENGTH DIFFERENCES**

22 **Q. ARE INTERNET CALLS LONGER ON AVERAGE THAN VOICE**

1 **CALLS AND DOES THIS IMPACT THE AVERAGE PER MINUTE OF**
2 **USE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CARRYING THIS TYPE OF**
3 **TRAFFIC?**

4 A. While ISP-bound calls may be longer “on average” than traditional voice calls,
5 this phenomenon does impact the *costs* that either type of traffic would generate
6 on a telecommunications network *per se*. Simply put, the costs of carrying either
7 type of traffic will depend upon a number of factors, one of which is the length of
8 the call. The longer the call, the longer a circuit and the resources necessary to
9 support that circuit will need to be assigned to the call (thereby generating costs
10 directly assignable to the call). However, it is the length of the call, not the type
11 of call that will dictate these costs. Said more generally, a 20 minute voice call
12 and a 20 minute ISP call will generate exactly the same level of costs on the
13 network and the network will be indifferent to the fact that one call terminates to a
14 telephone and the other to an ISP’s server. It is for this reason that we must be
15 careful in reviewing the arguments raised by the ILECs in this regard.

16
17 **Q. IS THERE ANY VALIDITY TO THE ILEC’S ARGUMENTS REGARDING**
18 **LONGER CALL LENGTHS?**

19 A. The problem raised by the ILECs with this argument is really an issue more
20 specific to the traditional *pricing* models (not *cost* models) that the ILECs have
21 used to generate average, per minute costs. I would agree that switching costs are
22 generally realized in two fairly distinct components; (1) *Setup* costs incurred once

1 per call, and (2) *Duration* costs incurred over the entire duration of the call.
2 Further, I would agree that traditional *pricing* models have spread per-call *Setup*
3 costs across the *Duration* of an average call so as to arrive at average per minute
4 of use rates. I would also agree that with the growth of machine-to-machine
5 traffic (like ISP-bound traffic), characteristics defining the “average local call”
6 have changed as calls have become longer in duration. Hence, traditional pricing
7 models may no longer provide results with the same levels of accuracy as they did
8 in the past.

9
10 **Q. IS THERE A WAY TO OVERCOME THE INACCURACIES OF THOSE**
11 **TRADITIONAL PRICING MODELS?**

12 A. Yes, there is. If the ILECs no longer believe that the average call length estimates
13 they have traditionally used are accurate, then a useful remedy would be to update
14 those assumptions and recalculate the average length of a local call using more
15 recent data. Unfortunately, this isn’t the approach advocated by most ILECs.
16 Instead, many ILECs have argued that a separate rate design should be devised for
17 ISP bound calls while all other calls would remain under the traditional structure.
18 This isn’t a reasonable approach.

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20
21 **Q. WHAT IS A REASONABLE APPROACH?**

22 A. There are two reasonable alternatives that could be relied upon to remedy the

1 inaccuracies of the ILEC's traditional usage-based pricing models. First, as I
2 described above, the ILECs could use more recent information to arrive at an
3 average local call length more indicative of the traffic on their networks today
4 (including ISP bound calls). However, I should add that I've seen traffic studies
5 that provide current average local call lengths when incorporating ISP traffic. In
6 general, because the volume of voice traffic still dominates the use of the public
7 switched network, changes in the average length of local call are relatively minor.
8 Hence, unless the traffic patterns in Washington differ substantially from those in
9 other parts of the country, altering the rates based upon updated information
10 would have very little impact on the existing rates.

11
12 Second, the Commission could simply reject the traditional pricing models and
13 their attempt to arrive at an average per minute of use rate. Instead, like the Texas
14 and California Commissions have done, the Washington Commission could
15 establish a specific rate that would be applied to the first minute of a call (i.e., to
16 recover the setup costs and one minute's worth of duration costs), and a separate
17 rate that would apply to each subsequent minute of use (i.e., duration), thereby
18 negating the need to spread "setup" costs over some average call length.

19
20 **Q. WHICH OF THE METHODS DESCRIBED ABOVE WOULD YOU**
21 **RECOMMEND?**

22 A. The traditional pricing models were used to arrive at average, per minute of use

1 rates so as to overcome administrative complexities and costs that result from
2 administering a two-tiered rate structure. It is my understanding that these
3 complications still exist and that many carriers (including many ILECs) still
4 struggle with implementing and administering such a system.⁴ For this reason,
5 using updated data within the traditional pricing model provides the most
6 effective method of arriving at reasonable, per minute costs without the additional
7 administrative expense of a two-tiered structure.

8
9 **ISDN-PRI CIRCUITS**

10 **Q. DO CLECS GENERALLY USE ISDN-PRI CIRCUITS TO CARRY ISP-**
11 **BOUND TRAFFIC AND DOES THIS IMPACT THE USAGE SENSITIVE**
12 **COSTS OF CARRYING THIS TRAFFIC?**

13 A. Both CLECs and ILECs generally use ISDN-PRI trunks to carry ISP-bound
14 traffic. However, the use of these types of circuits does not alter the usage
15 sensitive nature of the costs incurred for carrying ISP traffic.

16
17
18 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DEFICIENCY IN DR. TAYLOR'S ARGUMENT.**

1 ⁴ Many of the carriers in both California and Texas where two-tiered rate structures are
2 required, have agreed upon an "average" per minute rate that would reflect the actual
3 rates adopted by the Commission. In other words, to overcome the complexities of a two-
4 tiered rate structure, they have returned to the more traditional approach of spreading
5 setup costs over an agreed upon call length.

1 A. Dr. Taylor’s argument can be fairly characterized as follows: because PRI-ISDN
2 trunks used to provide services to ISP customers are non-concentrated (i.e., are
3 not engineered with a level of concentration greater than 1:1), these trunks are
4 assigned a “dedicated” path through the switch. As such, any switching costs
5 associated with the PRI line are “non-traffic sensitive” costs that should be
6 removed from “traffic sensitive” reciprocal compensation costs/rates and
7 recovered directly from the ISP via “non-traffic sensitive” charges.⁵ Dr. Taylor’s
8 argument rests on a faulty premise.

9
10 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ERROR IN DR. TAYLOR’S ANALYSIS.**

11 A. Simply put, ISDN-PRI lines are not afforded a “dedicated” path through the
12 switch and, contrary to Dr. Taylor’s assertion, they do use the switch’s traffic
13 sensitive elements (i.e., the internal transport links, time slot management
14 equipment, routing/rating functions and the switch’s processor) and do generate
15 traffic sensitive costs.

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18 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT IS MEANT BY A “CONCENTRATION**
19 **RATIO” GENERALLY AND A “1:1” CONCENTRATION RATIO**
20 **SPECIFICALLY.**

1 ⁵ See Dr. Taylor’s Direct Testimony at page 39.

1 A. When network planners determine the level of usage a given switch will be
2 required to accommodate within the busiest hour (the question most specific to
3 how much capacity the switch should be engineered to provide), they assume that
4 not every customer will pick up the phone and try to make a call (or receive a call)
5 at any give time. Instead, based upon past traffic data, they assume that only 1 out
6 of every 6 customers, for example, will require the resources of the switch at any
7 point in time. As a result of this analysis, they then engineer a switch so that it
8 can accommodate the traffic resulting from one out of every six customers at any
9 specific time. By assuming 6 customers, for example, for every available “time
10 slot” in the switch (i.e., a call path that allows a call to be routed to its destination
11 by using the switch’s mapping fabric), engineers are said to have adopted a
12 concentration ratio of 6:1 (6 customers for each individual switching timeslot).
13 This method of concentration allows the engineers to share the switching fabric
14 more efficiently amongst a number of services/customers thereby reducing the
15 overall costs of carrying traffic on a per-subscriber basis.

16
17 A 1:1 concentration ratio requires engineers to assume that a call path will always
18 be available for purposes of accommodating the traffic of the trunk/line in
19 question. Often called a “non-blocking” circuit, 1:1 concentration is provided as a
20 higher grade of service and circuits provided with a 1:1 concentration ratio are
21 generally more expensive to provision than a trunk/line with a higher
22 concentration ratio.

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Q. IS A PRI-ISDN TRUNK ENGINEERED WITH A 1:1 CONCENTRATION RATIO PROVIDED A “DEDICATED” PATH THROUGH THE SWITCH?

A. No, it is not. Indeed, the word “dedicated” is a misnomer that can confuse the issue of how PRI-ISDN circuits are provisioned. First, ISDN is by definition a switched service (not a dedicated service) that relies heavily upon the software inherent in an ISDN capable switch for purposes of managing traffic. Even though ISDN circuits may be provisioned with 1:1 concentration ratios, they nonetheless share the same finite switching resources (i.e., internal transport links, the switch fabric and the processor), as do other circuits. ISDN circuits are allocated switching resources as they are needed (i.e., only when a call is made), regardless of the concentration ratio to which they’ve been engineered. The only difference between an ISDN circuit engineered with a 1:1 concentration ratio versus a more concentrated circuit (e.g., 4:1 or 6:1) is the level of priority the 1:1 circuit is afforded in the process of allocating switching resources in “real-time.” While this may impact which circuits experience “blocking” (i.e., no time slots available) in a congested situation (i.e. 1:1 circuits would not be blocked while more concentrated circuits likely would), it does nothing to impact the fact that all of these switched services are still consuming usage sensitive resources.

Q. ARE LESS HIGHLY CONCENTRATED CIRCUITS MORE EXPENSIVE THAN MORE CONCENTRATED CIRCUITS?

A. Yes, they are. To the extent that CLECs offer circuits with lower levels of

1 concentration, and thereby offer a higher quality of service, their switching
2 recourses required to accommodate the same level of traffic will be higher.
3 Hence, contrary to Dr. Taylor's assertion, CLECs who provide a higher quality of
4 service via lower concentration will have higher switching costs per customer
5 (and per minute) than will an ILEC with lower levels of concentration.
6

7 **Q. DO THE SWITCHING COST MODELS THAT THE MAJORITY OF**
8 **ILECS RELY UPON TO DERIVE USAGE SENSITIVE COSTS**
9 **CONSIDER ISDN-PRI TRUNKS TO USE PREDOMINATELY TRAFFIC**
10 **SENSITIVE COMPONENTS OF THE SWITCH?**

11 A. Yes. Contrary to Dr. Taylor's argument, switching cost models like the Telcordia
12 SCIS model (upon which I understand both Qwest and Verizon rely to support
13 their switch related costs), identify traffic to/from an ISDN circuit as traffic
14 sensitive costs. Generally, SCIS identifies particular components of a switch (i.e.,
15 the line card, a switching module, internal transport links, the switch's processor,
16 etc.) as either traffic sensitive or non-traffic sensitive resources based upon the
17 extent to which these particular switching resources vary with respect to the
18 amount of traffic the switch must accommodate. In essence, the model builders
19 ask: If traffic were to increase beyond a certain level, would the need for this
20 particular resource and/or piece of equipment increase accordingly?
21 Simplistically, if the answer to this question is "Yes," then that piece of
22 equipment is assumed to be a traffic sensitive component of the switch. If the

1 answer is “No,” this piece of equipment is considered to be non-traffic sensitive.
2 After this distinction is made, then services and/or functions accommodated by
3 the switch via the use of traffic sensitive components are considered to consume
4 traffic sensitive resources that could otherwise be used by other
5 services/functions. As such, they are considered to generate usage sensitive costs.
6 ISDN-PRI services (regardless of concentration ratio) require that the switch map
7 originating traffic data to terminating address information. Likewise, the
8 processor and the switch fabric are required to “set-up” ISDN-PRI calls and
9 ultimately to assign appropriate terminating trunk groups for delivery to the called
10 party. All of these functions require the use of traffic sensitive switch resources
11 (i.e., internal transport links, timeslot management resources and switch
12 processing time). Likewise, the use of these traffic sensitive resources generates
13 traffic sensitive costs.

14

15 **Q. IS THIS THE FIRST TIME YOU’VE SEEN DR. TAYLOR MAKE THIS**
16 **ARGUMENT REGARDING THE NON-TRAFFIC SENSITIVE NATURE**
17 **OF ISDN-PRI LINES ENGINEERED AT 1:1 CONCENTRATION?**

18 A. No. Dr. Taylor on behalf of Bell Atlantic (now also “Verizon”) has made this
19 argument over the past six months in a number of arbitrations wherein the issue of
20 reciprocal compensation is being decided. Indeed, Verizon (based upon Dr.
21 Taylor’s advice), has gone so far as to remove from its Telcordia SCIS output, the
22 majority of traffic sensitive costs associated with an ISDN-PRI line for purposes

1 of proposing extremely low per-minute termination rates (rates that would,
2 pursuant to Verizon's proposal, apply only to traffic terminated by CLECs, not
3 Verizon). There are two points worth mentioning with respect to Verizon's
4 championing of this same argument. First, it is noteworthy that Verizon, in an
5 effort to implement this completely unsubstantiated theory, had to make a manual
6 intervention in the SCIS software for purposes of removing a large component of
7 traffic sensitive costs associated with ISDN-PRI usage. The SCIS model, when
8 left to function as designed, allocated the vast majority of ISDN-PRI costs as
9 traffic sensitive costs because ISDN relies, as I stated above, almost exclusively
10 on the traffic sensitive resources of the switch for purposes of processing traffic.
11 In short, a SCIS user must override the model in order to implement the theory
12 that ISDN-PRI circuits somehow enjoy a "dedicated" path through the switch and
13 therefore, use only non-traffic sensitive switch components. Second, Verizon
14 eventually had to admit that ISDN-PRI services actually use more resources of the
15 switch's processor (a usage sensitive cost of the switch) than other types of more
16 traditional lines/trunks. Verizon modified its testimony accordingly.⁶ This results
17 from the fact that ISDN is a software driven service inextricably tied to the switch
18 processors' ability to interpret the ISDN protocol for purposes of accommodating
19 traffic in this format. The switch's processor actually requires more time to

1 ⁶ See the cross-examination transcript of Mr. Gary E. Sanford (Director-Economic
2 Costs/Regulatory Support), Docket No. A-310630F.0002, Before the Pennsylvania Public
3 Utility Commission (May 2000).

1 process a call delivered via ISDN (measured in “milliseconds” and identified
2 within the SCIS model in the “real-time table”) than it does to process other types
3 of more traditional traffic.

4
5 **Q. ARE THERE OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS THAT SHOULD BE MADE**
6 **ABOUT ISDN-PRI TRUNKS AND/OR ANY OTHER TRUNKS**
7 **ENGINEERED AT A CONCENTRATION RATIO OF 1:1?**

8 A. Yes. ILECs also rely upon ISDN-PRI and other digital trunking formats that are
9 engineered in their switches with very low levels of concentration including 1:1.
10 Indeed, it is exactly this type of trunking that is used to connect medium and large
11 sized Private Branch Exchange (PBX) facilities to their networks. Obviously,
12 PBX customers represent some of the ILECs’ largest, most traffic intensive
13 customers and the volume of traffic generated by these large customers constitutes
14 a significant portion of the ILEC’s total usage. This results from the fact that
15 PBX locations can aggregate the traffic generated by hundreds or thousands of
16 individual telephone sets and deliver that traffic to the ILEC switch on a single, or
17 multiple, ISDN-PRI trunk groups (and/or other types of digital or analog trunking
18 facilities). In reality, a carrier’s switch (either ILEC and/or CLEC) cannot and
19 does not distinguish between a customer using a PRI-ISDN line for purposes of
20 accommodating ISP traffic or for use by its PBX. As such, to the extent that
21 traffic generated by large PBX customers is already included in cost studies
22 supporting reciprocal compensation rates, the costs associated with

1 accommodating end-user trunking at low levels of concentration (whether such
2 arrangement actually increases per-unit costs or decreases per-unit costs) should
3 already be incorporated in the studies.
4

5 **LOAD DISTRIBUTION**

6 **Q. DR. TAYLOR, AT PAGE 36 OF HIS DIRECT TESTIMONY, SUGGESTS**
7 **THAT THE “LOAD” CHARACTERISTICS OF ISP TRAFFIC MAY**
8 **CAUSE COST DIFFERENCES WHEN COMPARED TO VOICE**
9 **TRAFFIC. DO YOU AGREE?**

10 A. As a general matter I agree that the load characteristics of a given switch will
11 impact the costs associated with carrying traffic on that switch. I do not agree,
12 however, that the inherent load characteristics of ISP-bound traffic, or any other
13 service-specific traffic for that matter, will result in cost differences when
14 compared to other types of traffic. Load characteristics define costs specific to a
15 switch (i.e., a given facility), not the characteristics of a certain type of traffic.
16

17 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PROBLEM WITH DR. TAYLOR’S ANALYSIS**
18 **IN MORE DETAIL.**

19 A. Dr. Taylor includes the following in his testimony at page 34:

20 “The proportion of ISP-bound traffic that arrives at the busy hour of the
21 switch may differ from that of ordinary voice traffic. If the load
22 distribution of ISP-bound traffic is flatter than that of voice traffic, then,
23 on average, an incremental minute of ISP-bound traffic would cause a
24 smaller increase in the capacity requirements of the switch than an

1 incremental minute of voice traffic.” [emphasis supplied]

2
3 There are a number of points to make about Dr. Taylor’s statement in this respect.

4 First, it is extremely important that the Commission recognize that Dr. Taylor is
5 not making a factual statement about whether ISP-bound traffic does indeed
6 exhibit load distribution characteristics different than traditional voice grade
7 traffic. Dr. Taylor is only positing that *if ISP-bound traffic did exhibit such*
8 *characteristics* (i.e., a less peak oriented load distribution), *then* its patterns of
9 cost causation *may* differ. Though I’ve scoured the testimony of Dr. Taylor and
10 Mr. Brotherson, I didn’t find any contention on the part of Qwest, that as a factual
11 matter, ISP-bound traffic indeed does exhibit any of these less peak oriented
12 traffic characteristics. Hence, even though Dr. Taylor’s statement above is largely
13 true as a theoretical matter, it doesn’t indicate whether ISP bound traffic will be
14 less or perhaps more expensive to carry. For example, it would be equally true to
15 state as follows:

16 The proportion of ISP-bound traffic that arrives at the busy hour of the
17 switch may differ from that of ordinary voice traffic. If the load
18 distribution of ISP-bound traffic is ~~flatter~~ less flat than that of voice traffic,
19 then, on average, an incremental minute of ISP-bound traffic would cause
20 a ~~smaller~~ larger increase in the capacity requirements of the switch than an
21 incremental minute of voice traffic
22
23
24

25
26 **Q. PLEASE BRIEFLY EXPLAIN WHY A FLATTER DISTRIBUTION OR A**
27 **MORE PEAKED DISTRIBUTION OF TRAFFIC IS RELEVANT TO**


1 **SWITCHING INVESTMENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY, TO**
2 **INCREMENTAL COSTS.**

3 A. Switches are engineered to provide a particular “quality of service” at any given
4 period of the day. “Quality of service” in this respect is generally measured by the
5 availability of switch resources that are necessary to complete a call demanded by
6 an end user. For this reason, the number of call attempts that can be successfully
7 accommodated compared to the call attempts that are rejected because of
8 insufficient switch resources is generally used as a measure of “quality of
9 service.” The higher the number of calls that can be accommodated compared to
10 the total number of calls attempted, the higher the quality of service.

11
12 Because traffic isn’t constant throughout a day, engineers must build a switch to
13 provide a target “quality of service” by engineering the switch’s resources to
14 accommodate a particular percentage of call attempts during the switch’s busiest
15 period. This period is generally referred to as the “busy hour.” Said another way,
16 in order to accommodate a level of traffic sufficient to meet the target quality of
17 service at all points of the day, the switch must be built (i.e., investments must be
18 made) to accommodate the completion of a particular percentage of call attempts
19 within the timeframe wherein the switch’s resources will be most taxed. If the
20 target quality of service can be maintained during this time period (i.e., the “busy
21 hour”), then the target quality of service is, by definition, likely to be
22 accommodated at less busy periods.

1 Q. HOW DOES THIS IMPACT THE INVESTMENTS REQUIRED TO
2 ACCOMMODATE PEAKED OR “FLAT-LINE” TRAFFIC?


3 A. Obviously, the more traffic that must be accommodated in a switch’s “busy hour,”
4 the more capacity a switch must have available, and hence, the higher the
5 investment necessary to accommodate that traffic. Hence, if traffic patterns for a
6 given switch are very peaked in the busiest hour, capacity sufficient to
7 accommodate that peak usage is likely to be higher than that required of a switch
8 handling traffic that is relatively balanced over a given day. Where traffic is
9 relatively balanced, the switch can accommodate a larger volume of traffic at a
10 lower level of capacity. The following descriptive diagrams help illustrate this
11 point:



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The switch in Scenario 1 above requires approximately 6.5 CCS to accommodate a total traffic volume of *Y*. However, the switch below (in Scenario 2) requires 8 CCS to accommodate the same total traffic volume (*Y*). This results from the fact that the traffic load accommodated by the switch in Scenario 2 is far more peaked than the traffic load in Scenario 1.



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2 The more CCS capacity required to support a given volume of traffic, the higher the per minute
3 cost associated with that traffic (all else being equal). Hence, the traffic in Scenario 2 above
4 (because of its peaked nature) will exhibit higher per minute of use costs than will Scenario 1.
5

6
7

8 **Q. IS IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT ABOUT THE PEAKED**
9 **NATURE OF ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC?**

10 A. Yes, it is. The extent to which the load distribution of a switch is impacted by either ISP-bound
11 traffic or voice traffic is impacted largely by the customer base (and the calling patterns of those
12 customers) that a particular switch serves. Hence, broad general statements about the peaked
13 nature of ISP-bound traffic, or voice traffic for that matter, are difficult to support. The load
14 distribution of any given switch is likely to be fairly specific to that switch and extrapolating data
15 from any given switch to another is unlikely to yield relevant information. It is for this reason, I
16 would imagine, that Dr. Taylor largely makes this particular argument as a theoretical matter.
17

18

18 **Q. REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKE BROAD**
19 **STATEMENTS ABOUT THE PEAKED NATURE OF ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC, IS IT**
20 **LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT A NETWORK CARRYING PREDOMINANTLY ISP-**
21 **BOUND TRAFFIC WOULD EXHIBIT MORE PEAKED LOAD DISTRIBUTION THAN A**
22 **SWITCH THAT ALSO CARRIED LARGE AMOUNTS OF RESIDENTIAL AND**
23 **BUSINESS VOICE TRAFFIC?**

24 A. Yes, it is. Contrary to Dr. Taylor's hypothetical, it is likely that traffic carried by a network that
25 has an inordinate number of ISP end users who receive primarily dial-up, Internet-bound traffic
26 will exhibit characteristics consistent with Scenario 2 above (i.e., its load distribution is likely to be
27 far more peaked). A network serving a more mature customer base, on the other hand, is likely to

1 have far more distributed calling patterns more consistent with Scenario 1. Because ILECs have
2 mature networks and serve a broad array of end users, the load distribution on their switches is
3 likely to be more evenly distributed than that of a CLEC switch that serves primarily ISP
4 customers. ILEC switches are more likely to accommodate both a business peak, a residential
5 peak and an Internet users' peak, each of which is likely to occur in a different part of the day
6 (between 8-10 a.m. for business customers, 6-9 p.m. for residential customers and 9-11 p.m. for
7 Internet users). Hence, ILEC switches are more likely to accommodate larger volumes of calling
8 with a comparatively smaller peak-load.

9
10 **Q. WOULD CLEC SWITCHES LIKELY HAVE LOAD DISTRIBUTION**
11 **CHARACTERISTICS MORE COMPARABLE TO SCENARIO 2?**

12 A. Yes, I believe they would. Because CLECs are building their customer base from scratch, it is
13 likely that if they are more successful in attracting a certain type of customer (ISP customers for
14 example), that their traffic patterns will exaggerate the peak associated with that particular
15 customer type without the benefit of additional traffic generated by other types of customers (i.e., a
16 predominance of residential and business usage) that can be used to smooth the traffic load over
17 the day. Hence, it is likely that CLECs will have higher peak usage and lower non-peak usage
18 much like the load distribution in scenario 2 (only likely more pronounced in some circumstances).
19 For this reason, CLECs are likely to experience higher CCS investments per peak load (and as a
20 result, higher per minute of use costs). Said another way, while ISP-bound traffic may be helpful
21 in smoothing the distribution of traffic on a switch that also includes a residential and business
22 users peak (i.e. an ILEC switch) thereby reducing per minute of use costs for all traffic, on a switch
23 without both of these peaks, ISP-bound traffic is likely to drive the "busy hour" and thereby
24 increase the investment specific to ISP-bound traffic.⁷

1 ⁷ It is important to note that one of the primary cost drivers identified within the
2 Telcordia SCIS model is the "% of traffic in the busy hour." SCIS uses a company's "%

1

2 **TRUNK-TO-TRUNK SWITCHING**

3 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE VERIZON’S POSITION REGARDING TRUNK-**
4 **TO-TRUNK SWITCHING AND ITS IMPACT ON COSTS SPECIFIC TO**
5 **ISP BOUND TRAFFIC.**

6 A. Mr. Trimble states as follows at page 38 of his Direct Testimony:

7 “...the switches employed by CLECs to deliver primarily ISP bound
8 traffic are more akin to “tandem switches” in that the termination of traffic
9 to an ISP is facilitated through trunk-to-trunk switching configurations.
10 Thus, it would be rational to expect that the underlying cost to terminate
11 ISP traffic would be more reflective of “tandem switching” costs which
12 are known to be lower than end office switching costs.”

13
14 Unfortunately, this is the extent of Mr. Trimble’s argument. Mr. Trimble does not
15 provide any further insight into why he believes ISP bound traffic would exhibit
16 “trunk-to-trunk” characteristics more so than would voice traffic nor does he
17 explain why this would reduce costs associated with carrying ISP bound traffic.
18 In short, Mr. Trimble’s argument is largely unsupported.

19

20 **Q. HAVE YOU ADDRESSED THIS SAME ARGUMENT BY VERIZON IN**
21 **THE PAST?**

1 of traffic in the busy hour” to measure the amount of total traffic accommodated by the
2 switch that will occur in the busiest hour. For CLEC switches where a large amount of
3 ISP traffic may be accommodated in the busiest hour, yet low levels of residential or
4 business calling can be expected to fill the switch in other time periods, average costs per
5 minute are likely much higher than those on ILEC switches with more robust market
6 penetration (all else being equal).

1 A. Yes, I have. In the California generic reciprocal compensation proceeding
2 (Rulemaking 0-02-05) Verizon raised issues similar to that raised by Mr. Trimble
3 above.

4

5 **Q. ARE CLEC SWITCHES THAT ACCOMMODATE SOME LEVEL OF ISP**
6 **BOUND TRAFFIC MORE LIKE TANDEM SWITCHES WITH LOWER**
7 **PER MINUTE OF USE COSTS?**

8 A. No, they are not. Verizon's argument is extremely misleading. Initially, Verizon
9 focuses solely on a comparison of switch *functionality* and completely ignores the
10 other *cost* components of terminating traffic. Even on Verizon's granular level,
11 however, Verizon attempts, via this argument, to suggest that because some
12 amount of ISP traffic is delivered on interconnection trunks, and then switched to
13 ISDN-PRI trunks, this "trunk-to-trunk" architecture is akin to the manner in which
14 tandem switches switch inter-office traffic. Verizon's argument has many holes.
15 First, all traffic for which reciprocal compensation is due (including voice traffic)
16 is delivered to the terminating carrier (either ILEC or CLEC) on interconnection
17 trunks. Likewise, anytime an end user customer is served via either an analog or
18 digital trunk (i.e., T1, PBX, ISDN, Digital Data Circuit, etc.), the end office
19 switch performs a "trunk-to-trunk" function. However, this is the function of an
20 end office, Class 5 switch connecting a dialed telephone number with a called
21 telephone number. This is a very different function than that performed by a
22 tandem switch (Class 4) acting as an intermediary between two independent, fully

1 functional Class 5 switches. The functions performed by the Class 5 and Class 4
2 switch are very different and the costs incurred are significantly different as well.
3 Stated as simply as possible, though some calls switched by Class 5 end office
4 switches are connected between two trunks (i.e., “trunk-to-trunk”), this does not
5 in any way make the costs incurred in performing that switching function similar
6 to the costs incurred to provide tandem switching.

7

8 **Q. TANDEM SWITCHING COSTS ARE GENERALLY LOWER THAN END**
9 **OFFICE SWITCHING COSTS, IS THAT BECAUSE TANDEMS**
10 **PERFORM ONLY TRUNK-TO-TRUNK SWITCHING FUNCTIONS?**

11 A. No. Per minute tandem switching costs are generally lower than end office
12 switching costs primarily because tandem switches are utilized more fully.
13 Tandem switches manage the traffic of multiple end office switches with varying
14 busy hour peaks and load distribution requirements. Hence, a well-managed
15 tandem switch can be largely utilized throughout most of the day (i.e., as
16 discussed earlier, it has a very flat load distribution relative to its busy hour traffic
17 peak). This is the primary reason why tandem switching costs are much lower
18 than end office switching costs.

19

20 **Q. DON'T TANDEM SWITCHES ALSO REQUIRE LESS EQUIPMENT**
21 **BECAUSE THEY MANAGE ONLY TRUNK-TO-TRUNK CALLING?**

22 A. It is true that tandem switches do not require equipment like ring-tone generators

1 and/or analog/digital conversion units that are generally needed to accommodate
2 line-side connectivity (one of the functions of a Class 5, end office switch).
3 Hence the relative initial investment costs of a tandem switch are lower than those
4 of an end office. However, this has no impact on the usage sensitive costs
5 generated by the tandem switch relative to that of an end office switch (nor does it
6 impact the costs of trunk-to-trunk switching relative to trunk-to-line switching).
7 This results from the fact that these devices are largely non-usage sensitive and
8 are recovered on a flat-rated basis within the “line port” monthly charge. Said
9 another way, the investments in the pieces of equipment that generally distinguish
10 between trunk-to-trunk connections and trunk-to-line connections have no impact
11 on the usage sensitive costs that are at issue with respect to proper reciprocal
12 compensation rates. Hence, there is no basis for Verizon’s argument that because
13 ISP traffic is largely trunk-to-trunk in nature, the usage sensitive costs of
14 terminating this traffic are more similar to a tandem switch than they are to an end
15 office switch.

16
17 **Q. ARE YOU AWARE THAT THE WASHINGTON COMMISSION HAS**
18 **APPROVED TANDEM SWITCHING RATES THAT ARE MORE THAN**
19 **END OFFICE SWITCHING RATES ON A PER MINUTE OF USE BASIS?**

20 A. Mr. Trimble in exhibit DBT-2 includes tandem switching rates that are greater
21 than “central office switching” rates on a per minute of use basis. I am also
22 informed by counsel that Qwest’s tandem switching rates exceed its end office

1 switching rates on a per minute of use basis.

2

3 **Q. DOES THIS CONFLICT WITH YOUR DISCUSSION ABOVE?**

4 A. No, it does not. It is important to remember that the traffic characteristics of the
5 network (primarily utilization) will have a large impact on the costs that result
6 from using that network. If the Washington Commission has determined that
7 Qwest's and Verizon's particular traffic patterns warrant higher tandem switching
8 rates than end office rates, this could be a perfectly legitimate finding. I would
9 simply note that such a finding isn't indicative of the majority of switched usage
10 cost analysis I am familiar with. Regardless, this finding does not contradict the
11 discussion above regarding costs specific to "trunk-to-trunk" traffic. Contrary to
12 the inherent assumption in Mr. Trimble's argument, CLECs employ switches that
13 encompass both the functions of a Class 4 (tandem) and Class 5 (end office)
14 switch.⁸ Hence, the costs associated with traffic terminating on these CLEC
15 switches are not comparable to costs generated solely by an ILEC tandem in the
16 ILEC network as suggested by Mr. Trimble (i.e., consistent with his contention
17 that CLEC switches accommodate primarily trunk-to-trunk traffic). Instead, costs
18 experienced by CLECs when terminating traffic are more comparable to costs
19 incurred by the ILEC in providing a combination of central office switching,

1 ⁸ Indeed, CLEC switches are generally included in the Local Exchange Routing Guide
2 ("LERG"), as "Class 4/5" switches, a specific nomenclature allowed by the LERG to
3 identify singular switches that perform both Class 4 and Class 5 functions.

1 transporting traffic to the tandem, and switching that traffic at the tandem level for
2 termination on a CLEC network (i.e., the functions required to ready traffic for
3 termination to a single point of interconnection).

4
5 **Q. MR. TRIMBLE AT PAGE 41 OF HIS TESTIMONY AND IN EXHIBIT**
6 **DBT-2 PROVIDES THE COMMISSION WITH AN ALTERNATIVE**
7 **RATE PROPOSAL FOR ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC. SHOULD THE**
8 **COMMISSION ADOPT MR. TRIMBLE’S PROPOSAL?**

9 A. No, it should not. Mr. Trimble’s rate proposal relies upon many of the same
10 misguided theories I’ve rebutted above. For example, Mr. Trimble’s rate proposal
11 bases the costs of ISP bound traffic on Verizon’s tandem switching costs. There
12 is little if any information in Mr. Trimble’s testimony to support this assumption.
13 Likewise, as I’ve described above, the costs of terminating ISP bound traffic
14 switched by a fully functioning Class 5 switch (the process by which the vast
15 majority of CLECs switch ISP bound traffic), are not comparable to tandem
16 switching costs. Further, Mr. Trimble assumes that ISP bound calls will, on
17 average, last approximately 30 minutes. I didn’t see anywhere in Mr. Trimble’s
18 testimony where he supported this particular assumption with any factual
19 information. Mr. Trimble also fails to identify the manner by which carriers
20 should identify and separate “ISP bound” traffic from other types of traffic for
21 purposes of implementing his proposal, or estimate the amount of administrative
22 expense that would be certainly be generated by doing so (and hence, should also

1 be recoverable). In short, Mr. Trimble hasn't adequately supported his proposal.
2 And, he has based his proposal on unsound theory. Mr. Trimble's proposal
3 should be rejected.
4

5 **"SYMMETRICAL COMPENSATION"**

6 **Q. WHAT RATE OF COMPENSATION SHOULD CLECS BE ALLOWED**
7 **TO CHARGE FOR TRAFFIC DELIVERED TO THEM VIA**
8 **INTERCONNECTION TRUNKS?**

9 A. When a CLEC's interconnecting switch serves a geographic area comparable to
10 the area served by the ILEC's tandem switch, the CLEC should be allowed to
11 assess a rate equal to the end office switching, tandem switching and transport
12 rates assessed by the ILEC when terminating traffic delivered to the tandem
13 switch. This rate of compensation is often referred to as the "tandem rate" and I
14 will refer to it as such throughout the remainder of my testimony.⁹
15

16 **Q. WHY SHOULD CLECS BE ALLOWED TO ASSESS THE TANDEM**

1 ⁹ It is important not to confuse the term "tandem interconnection rate" with "tandem
2 switching costs" as discussed earlier. The tandem interconnection rate is actually a
3 combination of end office switching, transport and tandem switching *functions*. Hence,
4 tandem switching costs resulting from the tandem switching function are but one
5 component of the larger tandem switching interconnection rate. This is important
6 because ILECs have contended in the past, that CLEC switches serve only the end office
7 switching function in the traditional ILEC hierarchy. However, CLEC switches generally
8 provide both an end office and tandem switching function (Class 4/5) within the CLEC
9 network, thereby, making them functionally equivalent to the ILEC two-switch hierarchy.

1 **RATE WHEN THEY MEET THIS SINGULAR CRITERIA?**

2 A. FCC Rule 51.711(a)(3) establishes the proper standard to which CLECS should be
3 held for purposes of assessing a tandem termination rate. Rule 51.711(a) states as
4 follows:

5 §51.711 Symmetrical reciprocal compensation.
6

7 (a) Rates for transport and termination of local telecommunications traffic shall
8 be symmetrical, except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c).
9

10 (1) For purposes of this subpart, symmetrical rates are rates that a
11 carrier other than an incumbent LEC assesses upon an incumbent LEC for transport and
12 termination of local telecommunications traffic equal to those that the incumbent LEC
13 assesses upon the other carrier for the same services.
14

15 (2) In cases where both parties are incumbent LECs, or neither party is
16 an incumbent LEC, a state commission shall establish the symmetrical rates for transport
17 and termination based on the larger carrier's forward-looking costs.
18

19 (3) *Where the switch of a carrier other than an incumbent*
20 *LEC serves a geographic area comparable to the area served by the*
21 *incumbent LEC's tandem switch, the appropriate rate for the carrier other*
22 *than an incumbent LEC is the incumbent LEC's tandem interconnection*
23 *rate. [emphasis added]*
24

25 **Q. EARLIER YOU MENTIONED A SINGLE CRITERIA THAT MUST BE**
26 **MET BEFORE A CLEC CAN CHARGE A TANDEM TERMINATION**
27 **RATE. WHAT IS THAT CRITERIA?**

28 A. The FCC has established single criteria that if met, would allow a CLEC to charge
29 the tandem termination rate. That is, “where the switch of a carrier other than an
30 incumbent LEC serves a geographic area comparable to the area served by the
31 incumbent LEC's tandem switch.” Therefore, pursuant to rule 51.711(a)(3), if a
32 CLEC’s switch covers a geographic area “comparable” to the area served by the

1 incumbent LEC's tandem switch, then the appropriate rate of compensation to be
2 charged by the CLEC is the ILEC's tandem inter-connection rate.

3
4 **Q. HAVE ILEC'S ARGUED THAT ADDITIONAL CRITERIA MUST BE**
5 **MET BEFORE A CLEC CAN ASSESS THE TANDEM**
6 **INTERCONNECTION CHARGE?**

7 A. Yes, many ILEC's have suggested that a CLEC must also prove that its switch
8 serves a similar function to that served by the ILEC's tandem switch before the
9 CLEC can legitimately assess the tandem interconnection rate (i.e., a "functional
10 equivalency" test).

11
12 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE ARGUMENT THAT THE FCC**
13 **REQUIRES A FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCY SHOWING BEFORE**
14 **CLECS CAN RECIPROCALLY ASSESS THE ILEC'S TANDEM**
15 **INTERCONNECTION RATE?**

16 A. The ILECs generally point to paragraph 1090 of the FCC's *First Report and*
17 *Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking* in CC Docket No. 96-98 to
18 support their arguments in this regard. Paragraph 1090 states as follows:

19 1090. We find that the "additional costs" incurred by a LEC when transporting and
20 terminating a call that originated on a competing carrier's network are likely to vary
21 depending upon whether tandem switching is involved. We, therefore, conclude that
22 states may establish transport and termination rates in the arbitration process that vary
23 according to whether the traffic is routed through a tandem switch or directly to an end-
24 office switch. In such event, states shall also consider whether new technologies (e.g.
25 fiber ring or wireless networks) perform functions similar to those performed by an
26 incumbent LEC's tandem switch and thus, whether some or all calls terminating on the

1 new entrant's network should be priced the same as the sum of transport and termination
2 via the incumbent LEC's tandem switch. Where the interconnecting carrier's switch
3 serves a geographic area comparable to that served by the incumbent LEC's tandem
4 switch, the appropriate proxy for the interconnecting carrier's additional costs is the LEC
5 tandem interconnection rate. [emphasis added]
6

7 **Q. IN YOUR OPINION DOES THIS PARAGRAPH REQUIRE CLECS TO**
8 **PROVE THAT THEIR SWITCHES SERVE SIMILAR FUNCTIONS TO**
9 **THOSE PERFORMED BY AN INCUMBENT'S TANDEM SWITCH?**

10 A. No, it does not. The last sentence of this paragraph couldn't be clearer, especially
11 when read in combination with the language the FCC ultimately decided upon for
12 purposes of codifying this section of its order in its rules (the language as shown
13 above in Rule 51.711). That is, it is clear that "where the interconnecting carrier's
14 switch serves a geographic area comparable to that served by the incumbent
15 LEC's tandem switch, the appropriate proxy for the interconnecting carrier's
16 additional costs is the LEC tandem interconnection rate" (i.e. comparable
17 geographic coverage).

18
19 **Q. ASSUME THAT A SECOND TEST IS ALSO REQUIRED BEFORE**
20 **CLECS CAN ASSESS THE TANDEM INTERCONNECTION RATE.**
21 **DOES THE FCC'S LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 1090 PROVIDE ANY**
22 **INSIGHT INTO HOW THIS CRITERIA MIGHT BE MET?**

23 A. Yes it does. First, it is important to note that the FCC uses the term "similar"
24 when describing the functions performed by the CLEC's switch and the ILEC
25 tandem switch. The FCC's did not use the term "identical" or even "the same." It

1 is clear the FCC purposefully contemplated a much lower standard of comparison
2 (i.e. “similar”) in this circumstance. Second, the FCC specifically directs state
3 commissions to consider the extent to which new technologies might be used to
4 meet its test of similar functionality (it specifically mentions fiber ring based
5 architectures). This point is important because it clearly undercuts the ILEC’s
6 traditional arguments regarding the extent to which a CLEC must employ a
7 hierarchical switching structure wherein a traditional Class 4 (tandem) switch is
8 used in combination with a subtending Class 5 (end office) switch. It is clear that
9 the FCC contemplated that the CLECs need not duplicate the ILECs network
10 architecture in this respect in order to charge the tandem interconnection rate. It is
11 for this reason the FCC spoke to similar network “functionality” instead of similar
12 network “architecture.”

13

14 **Q. EXPLAIN FURTHER YOUR POINT THAT THE FCC SPECIFICALLY**
15 **HIGHLIGHTED THE COMPARATIVE VALUE OF THE TWO**
16 **NETWORK “FUNCTIONALITIES” AS OPPOSED TO NETWORK**
17 **“ARCHITECTURES.”**

18 A. Obviously, the FCC could have simply said that if a CLEC employs the same
19 network architecture as that deployed by the ILEC the CLEC may charge a rate
20 equal to the ILEC’s tandem interconnection rate. The FCC, however, specifically
21 did not establish such a strict requirement. If indeed the FCC did establish a
22 “functional” test, (which as I stated earlier I don’t believe it did), it is clear that it

1 established a far more flexible standard than that generally proffered by the ILECs
2 (i.e. identical network architecture). That is, the CLEC must show only that its
3 network performs a similar function to that performed by the ILEC's tandem
4 switch. In this case, the function at issue is the transport and termination of local
5 traffic to a geographic area comparable to that served by the ILEC's tandem.
6

7 **Q. DO THE FCC'S RULES RELY UPON SOUND ECONOMIC AND**
8 **REGULATORY POLICY?**

9 A. Yes, they do. CLEC's often choose to connect to an ILEC's tandem switch
10 because the tandem switch serves as a single point of connection to a large
11 geographic area and a large number of customers. The tandem interconnection
12 reduces the amount of trunking they must provision to accommodate a given level
13 of traffic and reduces the network investment they must make to serve a given
14 number of customers. By providing the ILEC a similar single point of contact at
15 the ILEC's switch, the CLEC similarly provides the ILEC access to the totality of
16 its customer base in a given geographic region and reduces the total network
17 deployment required on the ILEC's part to reach those customers. In short, the
18 ILEC and the CLEC trade similar rights to terminate traffic within a comparable
19 geographic region. Because both carriers are provided symmetrical and reciprocal
20 termination rights within a geographic region, the rates each is allowed to charge
21 are best established at reciprocal and symmetrical levels as well (i.e., the rate the
22 ILEC charges the CLEC to interconnect and terminate traffic at a single point of

1 interconnection).

2

3 **Q. DO CLECS CONNECT DIRECTLY TO ILEC END OFFICES?**

4 A. Yes, in some circumstances they do connect directly to an ILEC end office.

5

6 **Q. DOES THIS ALTER THE RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION**
7 **OBLIGATIONS YOU'VE DISCUSSED ABOVE?**

8 A. No. Connecting directly to an ILEC's end office switch does remove from the
9 CLEC the obligation to incur costs for terminating traffic originated by the ILEC
10 that are represented by the tandem switching and tandem transport rate elements.
11 The fact that the CLEC has chosen to extend its facilities (or lease facilities)
12 directly to the ILEC end office for purposes of *delivering* traffic to the ILEC
13 network, does not change the obligation of the ILEC with respect to traffic
14 *terminating* to the CLEC. The ILEC is still provided a single point of
15 interconnection to reach the entirety of the CLEC's customer base within a
16 geographic area comparable to that served by the ILEC tandem, and is still using
17 the same facilities of the CLEC to accomplish such termination. Hence, the rate
18 the ILEC pays to terminate traffic in such a circumstance (i.e., the tandem
19 interconnection rate) remains unchanged.

20

21 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

22 A. Yes, it does.

