Service Date: November 4, 2025

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON
UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

In the Matter of the Investigation of	DOCKET TV-250448
AIRUS MOVERS LLC	ORDER 02
For Compliance with WAC 480-15-560	FINAL ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

BACKGROUND

1 The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (Commission) initially granted provisional authority for Airus Movers LLC (Airus or Company) to operate as a household goods carrier in September of 2022. Since that time, the Commission staff (Staff), initiated cancellation proceedings against the Company twice.[1]

2 On June 9, 2025, Staff initiated the second cancellation proceeding when it issued a Notice of Intent to Cancel and Notice of Brief Adjudicative Proceeding; Setting Time for Oral Statements in the Matter of the Investigation of Airus Movers LLC, for compliance with Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 480-15-560 (Notice or NOIC). The NOIC in this docket occurred after a Staff safety review that uncovered 50 critical violations and 23 non-critical violations of state and federal safety rules.

3 On July 16, 2025, Airus submitted a Waiver of Hearing, admitting to the violations alleged in the NOIC.

4 On July 17, 2025, Airus filed a Request for Penalty Reduction and Payment Plan, explaining the penalty amount recommended by Staff would be challenging for the Company and described corrective actions the Company had taken since the NOIC was issued to prevent future violations.[2]

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[1] *See generally In re Investigation of Airus Movers LLC*, Docket TV-240620, Order 02 (Nov. 18, 2024) *and In re Investigation of Airus Movers LLC*, Docket TV-250448, Notice of Intent to Cancel Permit as a Household Goods Carrier; Notice of Brief Adjudicatory Proceeding; Setting Time for Oral Statements (June 9, 2025).

[2] Docket TV-250448, Request for Penalty Reduction and Payment Plan (July 17, 2025).

5 On July 23, 2025, Staff filed a copy of Airus' safety management plan (SMP) and Staff's own evaluation of Airus' SMP (Evaluation). In the Evaluation, Staff determined the SMP was acceptable and meets the requirements of 49 CFR § 385.[3]

6 Accordingly, Staff recommended that the Commission not cancel Airus' permit and extend its provisional operating authority until the Company achieved a satisfactory safety rating, or until the Commission otherwise found good cause to cancel, subject to conditions.[4] Further, Staff acknowledged Airus was cooperative throughout the investigation, that the Company had improved since its initial investigation, and recommended that the Commission suspend Airus' $5,200 penalty in Docket TV-250442 subject to conditions.[5]

7 On August 14, 2025, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an Initial Order (Order 01), rejecting the SMP, rejecting extension of temporary authority, and rejecting extension of provisional period.

8 On September 2, 2025, Airus filed a Petition for Administrative Review and Motion to Stay (Airus Petition).

9 On September 4, 2025, Staff filed a Petition for Administrative Review (Staff Petition).

10 The Staff Petition requests that the Commission modify Order 01 and reexamine whether it should extend Airus' provisional period.

11 Staff identifies four issues for review, alleging error in Order 01:

> (1) stating that Airus' provisional period had expired 180 days after the company received it; (2) reasoning that repeat violations were sufficient by themselves to preclude a finding of substantial progress toward a satisfactory safety rating; (3) making an inference about Airus' preparation of driver vehicle inspection reports seemingly explicitly ruled out by the record; and (4) determining that repeat violations were necessarily

[3] Docket TV-250442, Staff Evaluation of Safety Management Plan at 3 (July 23, 2025) (Staff Evaluation).

[4] Staff Evaluation at 3.

[5] Staff Evaluation at 3-4.

> intentional and thus by themselves precluded a finding that Airus was making substantial progress toward a satisfactory safety rating[.][6]

12 Airus' Petition asks the Commission to review Order 01 given Staff's acceptance and recommendations of Airus' SMP.[7]

DISCUSSION

13 We grant Petitions for Administrative Review from Staff and Airus; as discussed below, we modify Order 01.

Standard of Review

14 We review petitions for administrative review *de novo*.[8] In reviewing the decisions reached in an Initial Order, the Commission may exercise all discretion available to the presiding officer, except as limited by law.[9] In this review, the Commissioners personally consider the whole record or such portions as the parties cite in post-hearing pleadings.[10]

15 Because agency heads have the decision-making power to decide and enter a final order, it follows that they are authorized to modify an initial order's conclusions of law[11] and findings of fact.

16 As a result of our review of an Initial Order, we may dispose of the proceeding or remand the matter with instructions to the ALJ for further proceedings, along with temporary relief as is authorized and appropriate.[12]

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[6] Staff's Petition at ¶ 11.

[7] *See generally*, Airus' Petition and Motion to Stay.

[8] RCW 34.05.464(4); *City of Kennewick v. Port of Benton*, Order 04, Den. Pet. for Recons., Pet. for Stay, and Pet. for Reh'g (June 24, 2014).

[9] RCW 34.05.464(4).

[10] RCW 34.05.464(5)("The reviewing officer shall personally consider the whole record or such portions of it as may be cited by the parties.") *See also Bowing v. Board of Trustees*, 85 Wn.2d 300, 534 P.2d 1365 (1975)(finding the statutory term "personally review the record" does not mean to "read" the record.").

[11] *Northwest Steelhead v. State Dep't of Fisheries*, 78 Wn. App. 778, 785 (1995)(finding agency head "authorized under RCW 34.05.464(4) to substitute his own findings of fact for those of the ALJ.").

[12] RCW 34.05.464(7).

Whether Order 01 erred in finding Airus' provisional authority had expired pursuant to Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 81.80.170

17 Staff first asks the Commission to eliminate what it argues is an erroneous "determination that a provisional permit is bounded by the 180-day lifespan found in RCW 81.80.170."[13]

18 Staff explains that all household goods carriers, at least in the last decade or more, file applications for provisional and permanent authority together.[14] Pursuant to RCW 34.05.422(3), Staff argues that in such circumstances of concurrent applications, temporary and provisional permits do not expire until the agency takes action in regard to the application for permanent authority.[15]

Decision

19 We agree with Staff that Order 01 erred in finding and referencing that Airus' authority expired after 180-days. In doing so, we adopt the reasoning as explained in Order 02 of Docket TV-250332, where Staff also petitioned for administrative review, and which shall be issued concurrently with this Order.[16]

20 We further take the opportunity to clarify that RCW 81.80.170 defines but one type of permit that the Commission may issue. Because of the impracticalities of issuing temporary permits and the absence of applications for temporary authority submitted to the Commission, the Commission has moved away from issuing such permits. While the statute remains, in practice temporary permits under RCW 81.80.170 are rarely if ever applied for and issued by the Commission.

Whether the ALJ erred in failing to address the SMP or Staff's Recommendation in conducting their analysis of good cause to extend provisional authority

21 Next, Staff asks the Commission to review Order 01 for its rejection of Staff's recommendation and the Company's request to extend Airus' provisional period based on Staff's Evaluation of Airus' SMP and progress made by the Company.[17] Staff argues that rather than giving meaningful consideration to Staff's Evaluation, the ALJ cancelled

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[13] Staff's Petition at ¶¶ 14-21, *citing* Order 01 at ¶¶ 1, 16 fn.19, 17, 26, 57, 57 fn. 54, 61, and 70.

[14] Petition at ¶ 13.

[15] Petition at ¶ 13.

[16] *In re Investigation of Heritage Moving Solutions, LLC*, Docket TV-250332, Order 02, ¶¶ 23-28.

[17] Staff's Petition at ¶ 22.

Airus' permit based on findings related to Airus' compliance program and the Company's knowledge of regulatory violations it admitted to in its SMP.[18]

22 Staff argues that in general only an unsatisfactory safety rating would result in the cancellation of a carrier's operating authority, but because Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 480-15-305 outlines household goods carriers needing to achieve a satisfactory safety rating within 18 months of obtaining their provisional permits, a conditional safety rating can result in cancellation for Washington intrastate household goods movers.[19]

23 Staff argues that while cancellation under Washington law can occur for those holding provisional permits who receive conditional safety ratings near the end of their 18-month provisional period, the Commission can and has routinely extended the provisional period for good cause.[20] Staff notes that per WAC 480-15-305(3), good cause "may include…substantial progress toward a satisfactory [safety] rating." Staff argues that an acceptable SMP can also be factored into whether good cause exists to extend provisional authority, as can Staff's recommendations, which may include the belief – or lack thereof – that a carrier can adhere to its SMP.[21]

24 In this case, Staff argues that Airus objectively made progress towards a satisfactory safety rating.[22] Staff supports its position by noting that in Airus' first safety investigation, it received an unsatisfactory safety rating and a conditional safety rating during the second investigation.[23] Further, the number of critical violations between investigations one and two went down from 202 to 50.[24] Staff also found the SMP

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[18] *Id*.

[19] Staff's Petition at ¶ 23, *compare* WAC 480-15-305(3) *with* 49 C.F.R. § 385.13(e) ("If a proposed 'unsatisfactory' safety rating or a proposed determination of unfitness becomes final, FMCSA will, following notice, issue an order revoking the operating authority of the owner or operator"). The effect of this difference is well summarized by Staff. "Accordingly, where a provisional carrier receives a conditional safety rating near the end of its 18-month provisional period, the Commission will cancel the provisional permit and dismiss the application for permanent authority, unless the carrier shows good cause to extend the provisional period." Staff's Petition at ¶ 23.

[20] Staff's Petition at ¶¶ 23-24.

[21] Staff's Petition at ¶ 24.

[22] Staff's Petition at ¶ 25.

[23] *Id*.

[24] *Id*.

submitted by Airus met applicable requirements and had no reason to doubt Airus' pledge or ability to comply with its SMP.[25]

25 Staff argues that instead of addressing that evidence, the ALJ instead conducted an analysis *sua sponte*, focused on two pieces of evidence not immediately addressed by Airus or Staff.[26]

26 Staff argues the first error occurred in the ALJ finding that, because the Company had incurred repeat violations and lacked certain paperwork, the ALJ inappropriately inferred Airus was not making satisfactory progress towards obtaining permanent authority.[27] Of particular concern to Staff, is its belief that the ALJ did not ground this analysis in facts other than to note violations were committed, but failed to identify any component of Airus' SMP as unsatisfactory or address Staff's recommendation.[28]

27 Staff further argues that the ALJ inappropriately determined Airus was not demonstrating progress towards obtaining a satisfactory safety rating because it lacked driver vehicle inspection reports (DVIRs).[29] Staff asserts that federal law, incorporated in state law, requires drivers prepare DVIRs listing "any defect or deficiency discovered by or reported to the driver which would affect the safety of operations of the vehicle or result in its mechanical failure."[30] Staff argues that this inherently means that a driver would not need to prepare a DVIR where there is no defect.[31]

28 Staff argues that because one of Airus' vehicles failed inspection and Airus had no DVIRs for that vehicle, the ALJ inferred Airus' compliance program was defective.[32] However, Staff argues the evidence does not support such a finding. Staff argues it did not cite Airus for missing DVIRs because no evidence supported a violation, and accordingly it is unclear how the ALJ could rely on an inference of an uncited violation to support a finding of a lacking compliance program.[33]

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[25] *Id*.

[26] Staff's Petition at ¶ 27.

[27] Staff's Petition at ¶¶ 27-28.

[28] Staff's Petition at ¶ 28 *citing* Order 01 at ¶¶ 27-28.

[29] Staff's Petition at ¶ 31.

[30] Staff's Petition at ¶ 32 *citing* 49 C.F.R. 396.11(a)(2).

[31] Staff's Petition at ¶ 32.

[32] Staff's Petition at ¶ 34.

[33] Staff's Petition at ¶¶ 34-35.

Decision

29 We agree with Staff and find error in Order 01 in finding that repeat violations created a *per se* bar to a finding of substantial progress and in finding Airus' compliance program was deficient because of an alleged violation perceived by the ALJ but not cited by Staff.

30 Order 01 states that because Airus had repeat violations, this "in itself is evidence that the Company's existing compliance program is lacking and has failed to improve despite the Company's work with Staff and having a previously approved SMP to address these exact issues."[34] This analysis is conclusory and omits the facts of the case, specifically that the Company's first investigation resulted in 202 critical violations, and the second resulted in 50 critical violations.[35] This shows substantial improvement.

31 Further, and more importantly, the findings in Order 01 are contradictory to years' worth of Commission precedent and treatment of similarly situated Companies.[36] We agree with Staff that this apparent differential treatment violates the tenet that agencies "should not treat similar situations differently and should strive for equal treatment."[37] Here, we agree with Staff that Order 01 appears to treat Airus differently than other companies that

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[34] Order 01 at ¶ 28.

[35] *See*, Staff's Petition at ¶ 25.

[36] *See*, Staff's Petition at ¶ 29, fn. 51 *citing in re investigation of ASD Ventures d/b/a College Hunks Hauling Junk & Moving,* Dockets TV-210654 & TV-21-655, Order 01, 2 ¶ 5 (Oct. 18, 2021) (ALJ Order) (noting violations of 49 C.F.R. § 395.45(a) but nevertheless extending the company's provisional period) *with in re investigation of ASD Ventures d/b/a College Hunks Hauling Junk & Moving,* Dockets TV-200746 & TV-200745, Order 01, 2 ¶ 3 (Oct. 12, 2020) (ALJ Order) (same), *Miracle Man Movers, LLC, compare Miracle Man Movers, LLC,* Dockets TV-220511 & TV-230503, Order 05/03 (extending the company's provisional period) *with in re Penalty Assessment Against Miracle Man Movers, LLC,* Dockets TV-220511 & TV-230503, Order 04/02, 3 ¶ 5 (Sept. 11, 2023) (noting violations of 49 C.F.R. § 395.8(a)(1)), *and In re Penalty Assessment Against Miracle Man Movers, LLC,* Dockets TV-210128, Order 01, 2-3 ¶ 3 (Apr. 19, 2021) (same), *and David Lu, compare in re Investigation of David Lu d/b/a Grandma's Boy Moving Co.,* Docket TV-230198, Order 01, 2 ¶ 3 (May 8, 2023) (noting violations of 49 C.F.R. § 395.8(a)(1)) *with in re Investigation of David Lu d/b/a Grandma's Boy Moving Co.,* Dockets TV-220149 & TV-220150, Order 01, 2 ¶ 3 (Apr. 11, 2022) (same), *and I Heart Movers, compare I Heart Movers, LLC,* Dockets TV-210308, TV-210309, & TV-210563, Order 02/01, 2 ¶ 3 (noting violations of 49 C.F.R. § 395.8(a)(1) and 49 C.F.R. § 396.17(a)) *with in re Investigation of I Heart Movers, LLC,* Dockets TV-200628 & TV-200627, Order 01, 2 ¶ 3 (Aug. 31, 2020) (same).

[37] *Stericycle of Wash., Inc. v. WUTC*, 190 Wn. App. 74, 93, 359 P.3d. 894 (2015).

have appeared before the Commission, some of whom had more critical violations upon their second investigation, and yet were granted an extension of authority.[38]

32 This differential treatment, while necessary in some cases, appears unwarranted here.[39] Next, Order 01 appears to infer a violation (or at least relies on a negative inference) due to the Company's lack of DVIRs.[40] This discussion is lengthy and while Order 01 admits that a violation for failure to maintain DVIRs is not definitive, the order relies heavily on their absence in its analysis. However, the analysis clearly impacts the decision and is cited as a basis for the finding of fact and conclusion of law that Airus' record management problems are systemic.[41]

33 We agree with Staff that such an analysis is misplaced. In proceedings before the Commission, as before other tribunals, there are individuals who serve as investigators, prosecutors, and decision makers. Here, it appears the lines of this delineation were blurred. Staff did not cite Airus for its lack of DVIRs because Staff felt it lacked evidence to find such a violation. Even if one could argue that the lack of DVIRs is in the record, it cannot be avoided that Staff's investigators determined the Company could not be cited for a violation for the missing records. Finding a violation when one has not been cited raises due process concerns and could go beyond fundamental restrictions in administrative law that agencies only make decisions based on the record before it.[42] Further, Order 01 was issued without a hearing taking place and with Airus and Staff having come to an agreed upon position on the Company's SMP, meaning that Airus had

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[38] *See*, *In re Investigation of PNW Moving and Delivery LLC*, Docket TV-220133, Order 01 at ¶¶ 3-6 (Apr. 22, 2022).

[39] We recognize that in some instances, an administrative law judge may recognize an issue with Commission policy or process. The administrative law judge in such an instance can and should address such an issue. However, as is demonstrated from the rulemaking eliminating temporary permit, the error in Order 01 does not warrant a change in permitting at the Commission. Further, the finding of violations where none were cited shows thorough attention to detail but reaches to find facts in controversy when there are none. Staff was aware of the missing records but could not conclude a violation occurred.

[40] *See*, Order 01 at ¶¶ 29-42.

[41] Order 01 at ¶¶ 69, 74.

[42] While the absence of DVIRs is in the record, as explained by Staff, a violation cannot be inferred. The concern arises in superseding Staff's prosecutorial discretion, and finding that a violation occurred, particularly when the Company had no notice of such a violation and therefore had no reasonable opportunity to defend itself or institute corrective actions to remedy the perceived violation. While the example in Order 01 was used for illustrative purposes, it can fairly be said that Order 01 relied heavily on this illustrative example in finding that the Company lacked adequate controls. Accordingly, even though the discussion was framed as an example, it appears to have been given undue weight in reaching the decision in Order 01.

not only no notice of the violations relied on, but no opportunity to address those findings. Administrative law judges address the issues and evidence presented in the record and do not go beyond the record when deciding a case.

Whether the ALJ erred in determining Airus' authority should not be extended because it knew or should have known it was committing violations

34 Staff next argues that Order 01 erred in finding that Airus "either (1) knew it was violating regulations and did so anyway, or (2) did not know it was violating regulations but should have."[43]

35 Staff argues that this would be true in every case where a household goods carrier has provisional authority extended due to repeat violations and again raises concerns of differential treatment.[44]

Decision

36 We agree with Staff that such a determination creates a situation where Airus was treated differently than many other companies that have appeared before the Commission.

37 Further, in finding that Airus knew or should have known it was violating the law based on statements made in an SMP and the presence of repeat violations, Order 01 is contrary to the Commission's safety and policy goals.[45]

38 The Commission values and looks favorably on companies working with Staff, taking ownership of violations, and working to correct those violations. The Commission can enforce against safety violations through cancellation and imposition of penalties. However, Order 01 serves to chill the overarching goal, which is to work with the Company to correct safety violations. Order 01 serves to stifle such cooperation, an important first step in our safety regulation and, if not modified, would be contrary to those goals. This is not to say Order 01 is completely off base. While Order 01 is correct that the owner of a motor carrier has a duty of knowledge, a duty to train employees, and a duty to follow all laws and regulations, the existence of such a duty does not create a regulatory environment of strict liability where a safety violation automatically results in

[43] Staff's Petition at ¶ 37 *citing* Order 01 at ¶ 54.

[44] Staff's Petition at ¶ 38.

[45] Order 01 at ¶¶ 43-54.

cancellation. Rather, federal and state law allows companies to correct violations despite the concurrent duty to be aware of and follow safety regulations.[46]

39 Further, we note that our rules are already more restrictive than federal regulations in that Washington law requires household goods movers to obtain a satisfactory safety rating within 18-months, effectively treating Washington movers akin to how the FMCSA treats carriers domiciled in Mexico.[47] To create strict adverse inferences or *per se* hurdles to obtaining permanent authority is unnecessary.

40 Having addressed the errors identified by Staff, we now turn to the remedy. Staff asks that the Commission modify Order 01 and take a "fresh look" at Staff's recommendations and whether to extend Airus' provisional authority.[48]

41 The Commission may adopt, modify, or reject an initial order.[49] Here, the issues identified by Staff are pervasive, and we do not see how Order 01 can be modified in a manner consistent with our determinations. Accordingly, we reject Order 01 and reevaluate whether to extend Airus' provisional permit.

42 As mentioned herein, Staff reviewed Airus' SMP, found it acceptable, and determined it met the requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 385.[50] Staff recommended that the Commission accept Airus Movers' SMP, not cancel Airus' provisional permit, and extend Airus' provisional permit subject to conditions.[51] Staff recommended approval of the SMP and extension of Airus' provisional authority subject to the following conditions:

1. Ruslan Dosniyazov and Aida Bekova attend the September 10, 2025, Household Goods Safety training provided by staff;

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[46] *See*, *e.g.*, 49 C.F.R. 385.11(c)-(f); 49 C.F.R. 385.17; 49 C.F.R. 385.323 – .327; WAC 480-15-305.

[47] *Compare* WAC 480-15-305 *with* 49 C.F.R. 385.101 – .103(c).

[48] Staff's Petition at ¶ 40.

[49] *See*, WAC 480-07-825(6) & WAC 480-07-610(8).

[50] Staff's Evaluation and Recommendation, at pg. 3 (July 18, 2025). We interpret a satisfactory SMP to corrective actions or a corrective action plan as contemplated by 49 C.F.R. 385.17 but take such an SMP into consideration not only for determining whether there should be a change in safety rating, but whether there is good cause to extend provisional authority under Washington law. *See*, WAC 480-15-305.

[51] *Id*.

2. Staff conduct a follow-up safety investigation at least six months from the date of an Order;

3. Airus Movers must obtain a satisfactory safety rating following the investigation;

4. Upon reinspection, the Company may not incur any repeat critical violations; and

5. Failing to meet any of these conditions would constitute grounds for cancellation of the Company's provisional permit.[52]

43 Staff further recommended that the Commission suspend the $5,200 penalty recommended in the NOIC for a period of two years, and then waive it, on the conditions that Airus:

1. Satisfy the proposed conditions for extending its provisional period as stated above, and

2. Not incur repeat critical violations during the suspension period.

44 For the reasons previously stated in this Order, we find Airus made substantial improvements between its first and second investigations, something many provisional carriers fail to achieve.

45 We agree with Staff that Airus' SMP is acceptable, and if followed, should result in avoiding repeat violations. Accordingly, we agree with Staff and extend Airus' provisional permit subject to conditions that:

1. Ruslan Dosniyazov and Aida Bekova attend the next available, Household Goods Safety training provided by Staff;

2. Staff conduct a follow-up safety investigation at least six months from the date of this Order;

3. Airus Movers must obtain a satisfactory safety rating following the investigation;

4. Upon reinspection, the Company may not incur any repeat critical violations; and

5. Failing to meet any of these conditions would constitute grounds for cancellation of the Company's provisional permit.

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[52] *Id.*

46 We further agree with Staff that given that Airus is already paying a previously suspended penalty due to repeat violations in this Docket, that the $5,200 penalty recommended by Staff for the violations subject to this docket should be suspended in its entirety, and subsequently waived, after two years subject to the conditions that Airus (1) satisfy the conditions above and (2) not incur any repeat violations on reinspection.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

47 (1) The Commission is an agency of the state of Washington, vested by statute with the authority to regulate the rates, rules, regulations, practices, and accounts of public service companies, including common carriers such as household goods carriers, and has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding.

48 (2) Airus is a household goods carrier subject to Commission regulation.

49 (3) Airus committed two violations of 49 C.F.R. § 391.45(a) for allowing a driver to run a motor vehicle without a valid medical certificate.

50 (4) Airus committed forty-seven violations of 49 C.F.R. § 395.8(a)(1) for failing to require seven drivers to maintain a record of duty status on 47 separate occasions.

51 (5) Airus committed one violation of 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(b) for failing to maintain minimum records of inspection and vehicle maintenance.

52 (6) Airus admitted all violations and submitted an SMP, which Staff found demonstrated corrective actions to remedy the alleged violations, and if followed, prevent reoccurrence.

53 (7) In doing so, Airus has cured the deficiencies that led to the proposed conditional safety rating.

54 (8) Airus has demonstrated good cause to extend the Company's provisional authority.

55 (9) The Commission should assess a penalty of $5,200 for discovered violations, suspending the entirety of the penalty for a period of two years, and then waiving it, subject to the conditions listed in paragraphs 45 and 46 of this Order.

ORDER

THE COMMISSION ORDERS THAT:

56 (1) Commission Staff's Petition for Administrative Review is GRANTED

57 (2) We reject Order 01 and replace the findings therein with those contained in this Order.

58 (3) The Commission approves Airus Movers LLC's safety management plan and finds good cause to extend Airus Movers LLC's provisional authority subject to the conditions that:

1. Ruslan Dosniyazov and Aida Bekova attend the next available Household Goods Safety training provided by Staff;

2. Staff conduct a follow-up safety investigation at least six months from the date of this Order;

3. Airus Movers must obtain a satisfactory safety rating following the investigation;

4. Upon reinspection, the Company may not incur any repeat critical violations; and

5. Failing to meet any of these conditions would constitute grounds for cancellation of the Company's provisional permit.

59 (4) The Commission assesses a penalty of $5,200 for discovered violations, suspending the entirety of the penalty for a period of two years, and then waiving it, subject to the conditions that Airus Movers LLC meets the conditions listed above and does not incur any repeat violations during Staff's follow up investigation.

DATED at Lacey, Washington, and effective November 4, 2025.

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION



BRIAN J. RYBARIK, Chair

ANN E. RENDAHL, Commissioner

MILTON H. DOUMIT, Commissioner

NOTICE TO PARTIES: This is a Commission final order. In addition to judicial review, administrative relief may be available through a petition for reconsideration, filed within 10 days of the service of this order pursuant to RCW 34.05.470 and WAC 480-07-850, or a petition for rehearing pursuant to RCW 81.04.200 and WAC 480-07-870.