

**Exh. ANH-1Tr
Dockets UE-190529/UG-190530 and
UE-190274/UG-190275 (*consolidated*)
Witness: Aimee N. Higby**

**BEFORE THE WASHINGTON
UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION**

**WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,**

Complainant,

v.

PUGET SOUND ENERGY,

Respondent.

**DOCKETS UE-190529
and UG-190530 (*consolidated*)**

In the Matter of the Petition of

PUGET SOUND ENERGY

**For an Order Authorizing Deferral
Accounting and Ratemaking Treatment
for Short-life UT/Technology Investment**

**DOCKETS UE-190274 and
UG-190275 (*consolidated*)**

TESTIMONY OF

Aimee N. Higby

**STAFF OF
WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION**

Pro Forma Policy; Pro Forma Plant Additions; Get to Zero

November 22, 2019

Revised January 31, 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..... 1

II. SCOPE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY..... 2

III. COMMISSION RATEMAKING POLICY AND STANDARDS 6

 A. Background..... 6

 B. Commission Standards for Pro Forma Adjustments 7

 1. Known & Measurable and Offsetting Factors Standards..... 8

 2. Used and Useful Standard 12

 3. Prudence Standard..... 13

 4. Materiality Standard..... 14

IV. MODIFICATION TO THE MATERIALITY STANDARD 16

 A. Identifying the Problem 17

 B. Proposed Modification to the Materiality Threshold..... 21

V. PRO FORMA ADJUSTMENTS 23

VI. ADJUSTMENT 6.24 GET TO ZERO 25

VII. DEFERRED ACCOUNTING..... 27

 A. Background..... 28

 B. Evaluation of PSE’s Petition 29

 1. The Utility Landscape Constitutes Extraordinary Circumstances 30

 2. The Accounting Petition will have a Material Impact 35

 C. Staff Recommendation on the Accounting Petition 37

LIST OF EXHIBITS

- Exh. ANH-2 Digital Innovation: Creating the Utility of the Future
- Exh. ANH-3 The Future of Regulation: Principles for Regulating Emerging
Technologies
- Exh. ANH-4 Customer Centricity: Lynchpin of Utility Strategy
- Exh. ANH-5 PSE Response to UTC Staff Data Request No. 205 (Redacted)

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Q. Please state your name and business address.

A. My name is Aimee N. Higby, and my business address is 621 Woodland Square Loop SE, Lacey, Washington, 98503. My business mailing address is P.O. Box 47250, Olympia, Washington, 98504-7250. My business email address is aimee.higby@utc.wa.gov.

Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?

A. I am employed by the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (Commission) as a Regulatory Analyst in the Energy Regulation Section of the Regulatory Services Division.

Q. How long have you been employed by the Commission?

A. I have been employed by the Commission since October 2018.

Q. Please state your qualifications to provide testimony in this proceeding.

A. I earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Columbia University in 2007. I earned a Master of Public Administration degree from Portland State University in 2013. Prior to my employment with the Commission, I spent six years at Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a federal power marketing agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. While at BPA, I managed multiple projects across the power and transmission business lines, assisted in the development of Power Purchase

1 Agreements as well as new types of contracts for BPA's Power Services, and
2 analyzed the California Independent System Operator's stakeholder and policy
3 initiatives.

4
5 **Q. Have you testified previously before the Commission?**

6 A. Yes. I previously testified in Avista Corporation's 2019 general rate case, Dockets
7 UE-190334, UG-190335, and UE-190222, regarding pro forma policy and capital
8 additions.

9
10 **II. SCOPE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

11
12 **Q. What is the scope and purpose of your testimony?**

13 A. In general, my testimony will provide an overview of the Commission's ratemaking
14 policy and Staff's application of those standards to Puget Sound Energy's (PSE or
15 the Company) proposed pro forma capital additions. Specifically, I address PSE's
16 pro forma adjustments to plant in service:

- 17 • 6.24 Get to Zero (GTZ)
- 18 • 6.27 Public Improvements
- 19 • 6.29 HR Tops
- 20 • 7.09 High Molecular Weight Cable
- 21 • 7.10 Energy Management System (EMS)

22
23 I also address PSE's petition for deferred accounting related to the GTZ
24 initiative through the application of Commission precedent.

1 **Q. Please summarize your recommendations on pro forma capital additions.**

2 A. From a policy perspective, I propose a modification to the materiality threshold for
3 projects placed in service after the test year. When determining whether a project is
4 major, I recommend the Commission consider the depreciable life of the asset in
5 addition to its capital cost. The proposed modification lowers the bar substantially
6 for short-lived assets. Staff witness Chris McGuire discusses the calculation of
7 Staff's proposed materiality threshold.

8 From a ratemaking perspective, I recommend including pro forma
9 adjustments that would have been excluded under the traditional standard. However,
10 some projects for which PSE requests pro forma treatment still do not meet the
11 lowered threshold and are excluded from Staff's pro forma revenue requirement. I
12 include a pro forma adjustment for EMS and for some, but not all, of PSE's GTZ
13 investments. I exclude pro forma adjustments for Public Improvements, HR Tops,
14 and High Molecular Weight Cable. The tables below show the individual adjustment
15 impacts on net operating income, rate base, and revenue requirement.

16 **Table 1: Impact from UTC Staff Electric Pro Forma Adjustments**

Adjustment	Name	Net Operating Income Impact	Rate Base Impact	Revenue Requirement Impact
6.24	Get to Zero	\$1,873,878	(\$8,476,940)	(\$3,369,363)
6.27	Public Improvements	(\$296,261)	(\$12,855,303)	(\$1,697,987)
6.29	HR Tops	(\$538,588)	(\$5,481,050)	(\$1,272,649)
7.09	High Molecular Weight Cable	(\$292,768)	(\$11,899,760)	(\$1,596,433)
7.1	Energy Management System	-	\$263,118	\$8,757
	Total	\$746,261	(\$38,449,935)	(\$7,927,675)

17

Table 2: Impact from UTC Staff Gas Pro Forma Adjustments

Adjustment	Name	Net Operating Income Impact	Rate Base Impact	Revenue Requirement Impact
6.24	Get to Zero	\$957,181	(\$4,330,040)	(\$1,714,879)
6.27	Public Improvements	(\$123,556)	(\$5,946,648)	(\$764,743)
6.29	HR Tops	(\$275,112)	(\$2,799,732)	(\$647,730)
	Total	\$558,513	(\$13,076,420)	(\$3,127,352)

1 **Q. Please summarize your recommendations on PSE’s petition for deferred**
2 **accounting treatment for Get to Zero.**

3 A. I recommend approving in part and denying in part PSE’s petition for deferred
4 accounting treatment for past depreciation expense associated with the GTZ
5 initiative. Consistent with Staff’s revised materiality threshold for pro forma plant
6 additions, I recommend the Commission allow deferred accounting treatment only
7 for those projects that meet the materiality threshold. I also recommend that the
8 Commission deny PSE’s request to include a carrying charge on the GTZ deferral
9 balance, and that it deny PSE’s request for open-ended deferred accounting treatment
10 for unidentified future projects placed in service after this rate case. The tables below
11 summarize the impact of Staff’s adjustments.

12 **Table 3: GTZ Deferral Electric Operations**

Adjustment	Name	Net Operating Income Impact	Rate Base Impact	Revenue Requirement Impact
6.24	Get to Zero	\$ 2,572,306	\$ (6,041,431)	\$ (4,064,184)

13

1

Table 4: GTZ Deferral Gas Operations

Adjustment	Name	Net Operating Income Impact	Rate Base Impact	Revenue Requirement Impact
6.24	Get to Zero	\$ 1,313,939	\$ (3,085,977)	\$ (2,068,517)

2

3

4 **Q. Have you prepared any exhibits in support of your testimony?**

5 A. Yes. I prepared Exhibits ANH-2 through ANH-5.

6

- Exhibit ANH-2 is an article which discusses how the trends in digital innovation are changing the operations of utilities and changing customer expectations.

7

8

9

- Exhibit ANH-3 is an article which discusses how the trends in digital innovation are altering the regulatory environment.

10

11

- Exhibit ANH-4 is an article which discusses the importance of understanding changing customer expectations and the nexus between customer expectations and utility strategy.

12

13

14

- Exhibit ANH-5 is PSE’s response to Staff’s data request regarding spending on information technology (IT) assets.

15

16

1 **III. COMMISSION RATEMAKING POLICY AND STANDARDS**

2

3 **A. Background**

4

5 **Q. What is the Commission’s historical ratemaking practice?**

6 A. The Commission’s regulatory framework consists of two components: a modified
7 historical test year, and limited pro forma adjustments.

8

9 **Q. Please describe the modified historical test year component.**

10 A. The historical test year captures a snapshot of a utility’s operations during a defined
11 period of time. The Commission has said:

12 The Commission’s long-established and well-understood
13 ratemaking practice requires companies filing for revised rates to
14 start with an historical test year. . . . There is a fundamental reason
15 for this starting point in every case: costs, revenues, loads, and all
16 other pertinent factors are known and can be measured with a high
17 degree of certainty because they have, in fact, occurred. The
18 practical value of the historical test year is that the cost, revenue
19 and plant data are available for audit, and the test year captures the
20 complex relationships among the various aspects of utility costs,
21 revenue, load, and other factors over a uniform period of time.¹

22

23 The Commission allows certain restating adjustments to the costs, revenues,
24 and load measured during this test period.² These adjustments to the test year capture
25 changes between actual test year results and results under “normal” circumstances.

26

¹ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n. v. Avista Corp.*, Dockets UE-160228 & UG-160229, Order 06, 47, ¶ 80 (Dec. 15, 2016).

² WAC 480-07-510(3)(c)(i).

1 **Q. Please describe limited pro forma adjustments.**

2 A. Pro forma adjustments allow utilities to reflect post-test year changes to rate base,
3 expenses, or revenues in the revenue requirement calculation. As a general matter,
4 pro forma adjustments are “limited,” i.e., they must conform to the Commission’s
5 rules on pro forma adjustments.³ This means that they must be limited to only known
6 and measurable changes not reflected in the test year, and not offset by other factors.

7 With respect to plant additions, a pro forma adjustment is an adjustment to
8 test year plant balances to account for significant capital projects placed in service
9 after the test year. To the extent that significant post-test year capital additions are
10 not reflected in the revenue requirement calculation, a utility might not have an
11 opportunity to recover its costs and earn a reasonable return on its investments. Pro
12 forma adjustments help to resolve this issue.

13 However, whether a post-test year project warrants pro forma treatment
14 typically depends on whether the project is determined to be “major.” In the next
15 section, I discuss this criterion, as well as other criteria commonly employed by the
16 Commission to determine whether a project warrants pro forma treatment.

17
18 **B. Commission Standards for Pro Forma Adjustments**

19
20 **Q. What standards have historically been applied to determine whether a post-test**
21 **year plant addition is appropriate to include as a pro forma adjustment?**

³ WAC 480-07-510(3)(c)(iii).

1 A. The Commission historically has relied on four basic ratemaking standards in
2 determining whether a post-test year plant addition merits pro forma treatment:

- 3 1. Known & Measurable and Offsetting Factors Standard – Are the costs of the
4 project known and measurable? Has the utility identified and incorporated
5 offsetting factors into the revenue requirement calculation?
- 6 2. Used and Useful Standard – Is it certain that the plant will be in service and
7 providing benefit to ratepayers during the rate-effective period?
- 8 3. Prudence Standard – Did the utility prudently incur costs?
- 9 4. Materiality Standard – Does the project meet a reasonable definition of
10 “major?”

11 I discuss these standards individually below.

12
13 **1. Known & Measurable and Offsetting Factors Standards**

14
15 **Q. What is the Commission’s rule for pro forma adjustments?**

16 A. The Commission’s rule on pro forma adjustments states:

17 Pro forma adjustments give effect for the test period to all known and
18 measurable changes that are not offset by other factors.⁴

19
20 This rule yields the first two standards used by the Commission to determine
21 whether to allow in rates pro forma capital additions: the known and measurable
22 standard and the offsetting factors standard.

23

⁴ WAC 480-07-510(3)(c)(ii).

1 **Q. What is the known and measurable standard?**

2 A. The Commission has stated:

3 The known and measurable concept requires that an event that causes a
4 change in revenue, expense or rate base must be *known* to have occurred
5 during or after the historical 12 months of actual results of operations. It
6 must also be demonstrated (*i.e., known*) that the effect of the event will be in
7 place during the 12-month period when rates will likely be in effect.⁵ The
8 actual amount of the change must be *measurable*. This means the amount
9 cannot be an estimate, a projection, the product of a budget forecast, or some
10 similar exercise of judgment—even informed judgment—concerning future
11 revenue, expense or rate base. Costs that are documented by actual
12 expenditure, invoice, contract, or other specific obligation usually meet this
13 test. Costs that are the product of forecasts, projections, or budgets generally
14 will not qualify.⁶

15

16 **Q. What are the practical implications of the known and measurable standard?**

17 A. To be included in rates through a pro forma adjustment, a capital addition must be
18 known to have been placed in service and the final project cost must be measurable.
19 This means that from a practical standpoint, forecasts of costs do not meet the
20 current interpretation of the “known and measurable” standard.⁷

21

22 **Q. What is the offsetting factors standard?**

23 A. The offsetting factors standard gives effect to the matching principle of ratemaking.⁸
24 It requires consideration of the ripple effects of the investment in question on utility

⁵ This is also known as the “rate year.”

⁶ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. Avista Corp.*, Dockets UE-090134 & UG-090135, Order 10, 21 ¶ 45 (Dec. 22, 2009) (Avista GRC 2009).

⁷ The Commission recently opened an “Inquiry into the Valuation of Public Service Company Property Used and Useful after Rate Effective Date” in Docket U-190531. Staff filed written comments on August 5, 2019, requesting that the Commission provided guidance on how to apply the “known and measurable” standard going forward.

⁸ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc.*, Dockets UE-090704 & UG-090705, Order 11, 11, ¶ 25 (Apr. 2, 2010).

1 operations, such as whether a pro forma investment produces additional revenues or
2 reduces expenses. It requires accounting for the fact that an investment affects more
3 than just rate base and depreciation expense.
4

5 **Q. What is the importance of offsetting factors in pro forma adjustments?**

6 A. A strict interpretation of the Commission's rule on pro forma adjustments requires
7 that, in order to be included as a pro forma adjustment and included in rates, a capital
8 addition must not be offset by other factors. That is, if the capital addition produces
9 incremental revenues, or if it in some way reduces expenses, it should be disqualified
10 from receiving pro forma treatment. The logic is that increased revenue or decreased
11 expenses associated with the capital additions would offset the need for rate relief
12 associated with the investment. The offsetting factors standard ensures that including
13 pro forma adjustments in rates does not result in the understatement or overstatement
14 of the revenue requirement.
15

16 **Q. Does the Commission apply a strict interpretation of the offsetting factors
17 standard?**

18 A. Typically not. The Commission recognizes that the annual benefits of a project
19 cannot perfectly offset the annual cost of the investment. Therefore, the Commission
20 typically allows pro forma plant adjustments as long as the offsetting factors that are
21 reasonably expected to exist have been identified, quantified, and included in the
22 revenue requirement calculation.
23

1 **Q. What are the practical implications of the offsetting factors Standard?**

2 A. With the offsetting factors standard, utilities have the burden of demonstrating *for*
3 *each and every post-test year plant addition* that either (1) there are no offsetting
4 factors, or (2) offsetting factors have been accurately quantified and incorporated
5 into the revenue requirement calculation.

6 The practical implication of the offsetting factors standard is that pro forma
7 adjustments are limited to those for which offsetting benefits can be identified and
8 reasonably evaluated. Indiscriminate adjustments to pro forma plant, including
9 aggregate levels of projected plant-in-service, generally fall short of meeting this
10 standard.

11

12 **Q. How do utilities typically attempt to capture offsetting factors?**

13 A. For pro forma plant, utilities typically include an associated adjustment for
14 operations and maintenance (O&M) offsets. This adjustment accounts for O&M
15 expenses in the test period that will be reduced or eliminated during the rate-effective
16 period as a result of placing specific plant in service after the test year. Each O&M
17 offset is matched to the associated transfer of plant in service; that is, an offset
18 should only be included in the revenue requirement calculation if the associated plant
19 is also included in the calculation.

20

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

2. Used and Useful Standard

Q. What is the Commission’s used and useful standard?

A. RCW 80.04.250 permits the Commission to value for ratemaking purposes only utility property that is “used and useful for service in this state.” The Commission historically has interpreted the used and useful standard to mean that (1) the plant *will be* in service by the rate-effective date,⁹ and (2) the plant provides benefits to ratepayers.¹⁰

Q. What is the importance of the used and useful standard?

A. The standard ensures rates are fair to ratepayers: customers pay through rates for property that is used to provide service.

Q. What is the practical implication of the used and useful standard?

A. If a capital addition is not in service by the time testimony is filed, Staff cannot attest with certainty that the plant will be used and useful by or during the rate effective period. Therefore, in order for Staff to include a project in its revenue requirement calculation, the project should be shown to be in service and providing benefit to ratepayers in advance of the filing date for response testimony.

⁹ Avista GRC 2009 at 22, ¶ 48. In 2019, the legislature made clear that the Commission could value property used and useful during the rate effective period. RCW 80.04.250(2).

¹⁰ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. Pacific Power & Light Co.*, Docket UE-050684, Order 04, 21-22, ¶ 50 (Apr. 17, 2006).

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

3. Prudence Standard

Q. What is the prudence standard?

A. The prudence standard requires utilities to act reasonably in incurring expenses or making investments.¹¹

Q. How does the Commission evaluate the prudence of costs claimed in pro forma adjustments?

A. Utilities bear the burden of showing their decisions are prudent.¹² As noted above, the Commission tests decisions for reasonableness. To do so, it examines three factors: “(1) Was the initiation of the project prudent? (2) Was the continued construction of the project prudent? and (3) Were the construction expenses prudently incurred?”¹³ The Commission examines these factors throughout the life of a given project.¹⁴

Q. What are the practical implications of the prudence standard?

A. To recover costs in rates, a utility bears the burden of demonstrating that the investment was necessary, costs were prudently incurred, and that the investment provides benefits to ratepayers. Providing evidence in line with the Commission’s

¹¹ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc.*, Docket UE-031725, Order 12, 8, ¶ 19 (Apr. 7, 2004).
¹² *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. Pacific Power & Light Co.*, Docket UE-152253, Order 12, 33, ¶ 94 (Sept. 1, 2016).
¹³ *Id.* at 34, ¶ 95 (internal citation omitted).
¹⁴ *Id.* at 34, ¶ 95 (internal citation omitted).

1 parameters is grounded in an *ex post facto* review of what was known at the time of
2 the decision. This is a core component of the regulatory framework and is a cause of
3 regulatory lag, which I discuss later.

4 4. Materiality Standard

7 **Q. What is the Commission’s materiality standard?**

8 A. The Commission has indicated that pro forma adjustments to plant must meet a
9 “reasonable definition of ‘major.’”¹⁵

11 **Q. What is the importance of the materiality standard?**

12 A. Pro forma adjustments to plant are limited to major projects because those are the
13 projects with a material effect on the overall revenue requirement calculation; hence
14 “materiality” standard. This ensures that pro forma adjustments include only projects
15 “relevant to the issue of the financial impact on the Company in the setting of
16 rates.”¹⁶

17 The Commission’s materiality standard also is one of practicality. It is
18 necessary that pro forma plant adjustments be limited in number; otherwise utilities
19 simply cannot meet their burdens of proof for each and every one of their post-test
20 year projects. Further, evaluating pro forma plant additions that are placed into

¹⁵ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. Pacific Power & Light Co.*, Docket UE-140762, Order 08, 73, ¶ 170 (Mar. 25, 2015).

¹⁶ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. Avista Corp.*, Dockets UE-150204 & UG-150205, Order 05, 17, ¶ 40 (Jan. 6, 2016) (Avista GRC 2015).

1 service subsequent to the filing of a rate case, without limit, would require a
2 continuous audit during the pendency of the rate proceeding. This would lead to
3 constantly evolving and fluctuating positions for the parties and the Commission. To
4 this point, the Commission has acknowledged there are “limits imposed by the ‘used
5 and useful’ and ‘known and measurable’ standards” while continuing to allow “the
6 considerable discretion those standards allow in the context of individual cases.”¹⁷
7

8 **Q. How has the Commission applied the materiality standard?**

9 A. In past cases, the Commission has relied on utility budget reporting rules to help
10 define a “major” project. WAC 480-140-040 defines major projects in the following
11 manner:

12 Major construction projects will be determined for water, gas, and electrical
13 companies, as all projects where the Washington-allocated share of the total
14 project is greater than five-tenths of one percent of the company's latest year-
15 end Washington-allocated net utility plant in service, but does not include
16 any project of less than three million dollars on a total project basis. This
17 determination for companies providing combined industry services will be
18 done on an industry-specific basis.
19

20 As the Commission has observed, WAC 480-140-040 is the only directly
21 applicable legal standard for what constitutes a major project.¹⁸ Moreover, the

¹⁷ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co.*, Docket UE-130043, Order 05, 79, ¶ 198 (Dec. 4, 2013).

¹⁸ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co.*, Docket UE-140762, Order 08, 66, ¶ 152 n.222 (Mar. 25, 2015) (“Among the 30 projects included in Pacific Power’s filing in this case, only one, the Merwin Project, is indisputably a ‘major’ plant addition.”).

1 Commission has found the five-tenths of one percent threshold reasonable within the
2 context of a general rate case, observing that:

3 [The five-tenths of one percent threshold] has ... the advantage of being
4 proportional to the size of the Company's rate base and therefore relevant to
5 the issue of the financial impact on the Company in the setting of rates.¹⁹
6
7

8 IV. MODIFICATION TO THE MATERIALITY STANDARD

9

10 **Q. Does Staff recommend modification to the materiality standard?**

11 A. Yes. In an effort to recognize that short-lived assets may have a meaningful financial
12 impact on a utility due to their relatively high depreciation rates, Staff proposes that
13 the materiality standard include consideration of depreciation expense. Doing so will
14 provide a project with a short book life a chance to meet the materiality threshold
15 and qualify for pro forma treatment, even if it does not meet the traditional definition
16 of "major."
17

18 **Q. How do you recommend modifying the materiality threshold?**

19 A. For assessing the materiality of pro forma plant additions, Staff recommends using a
20 gross cost materiality threshold rather than the traditional 0.5 percent of net plant in
21 service. Staff's gross cost threshold includes depreciation expense as well as return
22 on rate base.

23 As McGuire states in his testimony, Staff recommends a gross cost
24 materiality threshold of \$2,710,000 for electric operations and \$1,170,000 for natural

¹⁹ Avista GRC 2015 at 17, ¶ 40.

1 gas plant. For combined gas and electric plant, Staff recommends a gross cost
2 materiality threshold of \$3,890,000. To receive pro forma treatment, a project’s
3 annual depreciation expense plus return on gross plant in service should exceed this
4 threshold.

5
6 **A. Identifying the Problem**

7
8 **Q. Why do you recommend modifying the materiality standard?**

9 A. The Commission has defined major projects as those that are “relevant to the issue of
10 the financial impact on the Company in the setting of rates.”²⁰ However, the
11 traditional materiality threshold limits the definition of “financial impact” to a
12 project’s proportional contribution to rate base.

13 This focus on rate base tends to exclude smaller projects that may have a
14 material financial impact on the company; for example, capital spending on projects
15 with shorter depreciable lives. The financial impact of a project, such as one with a
16 short-depreciable life, is not confined to its proportional contribution to rate base.
17 The financial impact to the Company also includes incremental depreciation
18 expense, which is directly related to the book life of an asset. These investments will
19 likely grow as the industry continues to undergo rapid transformation or as customer
20 expectations evolve.

21 Overlaying these trends is the advance of digital technologies, sometimes at a
22 breath-taking pace. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, Internet of
23 Things, cloud, and block chain can catalyze new business or operating


²⁰ *Id.* at 17, ¶ 40.

1 models, help new entrants disrupt the sector, and enable incumbents to reach
 2 new levels of performance.²¹
 3

4 Innovation, such as IT projects, is a key driver of this trend. Such projects
 5 improve operational efficiency and provide new platforms to expand how a utility
 6 interacts with its customers. The useful life of these projects is often far shorter than
 7 more traditional investments. Figure 1 below demonstrates the high level relationship
 8 between changing forces and the general impacts they have on revenues and costs for
 9 utilities.

10 **Figure 1: Disruptive Forces Potential Impact on Businesses in the Power**

11 **Sector²²**



12

13

²¹ Higby, Exh. ANH-2 at 4.

²² *Id.* at 5.

1 **Q. What are the consequences of not considering the impact of short-lived assets in**
2 **the materiality standard?**

3 A. Excluding assets from pro forma plant in service exposes those assets to regulatory
4 lag. If those assets do not have a material financial impact on the utility, the effect of
5 regulatory lag is relatively modest. However, if those assets are short-lived, a utility
6 may be required to absorb a significant portion of the asset's depreciation. This
7 increases the pressure to file serial rate cases to mitigate the effects of regulatory lag.
8 For the regulator, this burdens the process as fatigue builds from the never ending
9 stream of rate case filings.

10
11 **Q. What is regulatory lag?**

12 A. Regulatory lag is basically a bounded amount of time, generally from 11 to 36
13 months, that starts when a utility incurs an expense for placing an asset in service
14 and when that utility is allowed additional revenues to recover that cost or
15 investment. Overall, regulatory lag has both advantages and disadvantages.

16
17 **Q. What are the advantages of regulatory lag?**

18 A. Regulatory lag incents utilities to operate in an efficient manner by controlling costs.
19 The utility generally controls both when to make an investment and when to seek
20 recovery through a rate case. While there are naturally exceptions to this rule, such
21 as replacement for failed assets, it is overall true that the utility has general control of
22 its capital spending.

23

1 **Q. What are the disadvantages of regulatory lag?**

2 A. Regulatory lag is a direct counter-incentive to investments that produce no revenue
3 or assets with short depreciable lives. Non-revenue generating assets represent
4 immediate expenses that impact the utilities income statement without any
5 corresponding immediate benefit (i.e., revenue).

6 When an asset has a short depreciable life, a utility is exposed to greater risk
7 of not recovering its costs. For example, an asset with a short depreciable life might
8 provide some revenue, but if those revenues are not sufficient to cover the assets
9 depreciation expense, then the utility “loses” money, all else equal.

10

11 **Q. Have these disadvantages always been an issue for the utilities?**

12 A. Yes and no. While they have always been present, there were two other factors that
13 reduced the counter-incentive to invest in non-revenue generating or short-lived
14 plant. First, utilities historically have invested in longer-lived plant such as large
15 generation facilities with relatively small depreciation rates. For longer-lived assets,
16 regulatory lag requires the utility to absorb a much smaller fraction of the asset’s
17 depreciation. Second, utilities historically have had higher load growth, thus
18 providing revenue growth sufficient to cover the cost of new investments.

19

20 **Q. Are these disadvantages an issue in today’s operating environment?**

21 A. Yes. The shorter an asset’s life, the larger proportion of depreciable life exposed to
22 regulatory lag. In contrast, longer lived assets have a relatively minor proportion of

1 their depreciable lives subjected to regulatory lag; therefore the proportional risk
2 related to cost-recovery is lower.

3 Additionally, “flat load growth is the new normal.”²³ As a result, increases in
4 utility costs have outpaced the natural growth in revenues. Absent revenue increases
5 associated with load growth, utilities must seek revenue increases through general
6 rate cases.

7
8 **Q. What can a utility, such as PSE, do to reduce regulatory lag?**

9 A. Within the traditional ratemaking process, serial rate cases are one of the only ways
10 to reduce regulatory lag and mitigate the associated effect on recovery of short-lived
11 assets.

12
13 **B. Proposed Modification to the Materiality Threshold**

14
15 **Q. What is Staff’s proposal to change the materiality threshold for pro forma plant
16 additions?**

17 A. Rather than limit materiality to an asset’s contribution to rate base, Staff proposes to
18 expand materiality to include the effect of an asset’s depreciable life. To do this Staff
19 proposes a gross cost threshold that includes a return on rate base component as well
20 as a depreciation expense component.

21

²³ Higby, Exh. [ANH-4 at 2](#)~~ANH-5 at 4~~ (“flat load growth is the new normal”).

1 **Q. Does Staff’s proposed modification to the materiality threshold address the**
2 **problems with regulatory lag created by short-lived assets?**

3 A. Yes. Modifying the materiality threshold allows a broader range of potential projects
4 to meet the Commission standards while honoring the existing standards for pro
5 forma adjustments.

6

7 **Q. What benefits does Staff’s materiality proposal offer?**

8 A. There are several. First, Staff’s proposal adheres to a reasonable interpretation of
9 materiality while acknowledging the increasing rate of capital spending on projects
10 with relatively short lives and relatively high depreciation rates.

11 Second, the inclusion of short-lived projects merely expands the range of
12 *potential* projects that *may* be considered. Staff’s modified materiality threshold
13 allows the Commission to assess whether the depreciation expense contributes
14 materially to financial results. This will make meaningful and targeted progress in
15 addressing regulatory lag for utilities investing in short-lived assets, because it
16 acknowledges that smaller but shorter-lived investments may contribute materially to
17 financial results.

18 Third, this change will relieve some of the pressure on utilities to file serial
19 rate cases, particularly when investments in short-lived plant drive the filing.

20

21 **Q. Does Staff recommend establishing a specific threshold for determining what**
22 **qualifies as a short lived asset?**

1 A. No. Staff’s proposed threshold includes depreciation expense as well as return on
2 rate base. To the extent that an asset’s life becomes a relevant factor, it will be
3 captured in the depreciation component of the modified materiality threshold.
4

5 **Q. How did Staff calculate the materiality threshold?**

6 A. McGuire provides a detailed explanation of how the materiality threshold was
7 calculated. In summary, Staff relied on both depreciation expense and return on rate
8 base, instead of the existing 0.5 percent of net plant in service. The gross cost
9 threshold allows the Commission to assess whether a capital investment is large
10 enough to be considered “major,” as well as whether the depreciation expense
11 contributes materially to financial results.
12

13 **Q. What gross cost threshold does Staff propose for this case?**

14 A. Staff proposes gross cost thresholds for electric operations, gas operations and
15 electric and gas combined. Staff’s threshold is \$2,710,000 for electric, \$1,170,000
16 for gas and \$3,890,000 for combined.
17

18 **V. PRO FORMA ADJUSTMENTS**
19

20 **Q. Please summarize the steps taken to review pro forma plant additions.**

21 A. Based on the standards described earlier, Staff applied the modified materiality
22 threshold to PSE’s pro forma plant additions to determine what warrants pro forma
23 treatment. Staff does not challenge the prudence of the included pro forma

1 adjustments. Staff used an attestation period through June 30, 2019, to arrive at the
2 recommendation for pro forma plant additions. There were no associated O&M
3 offsets for the pro forma adjustments that meet Staff's threshold.

4
5 **Q. What does PSE propose for pro forma adjustments 6.24, 6.27, 6.29, 7.09 and**
6 **7.10?**

7 A. Table 5 shows PSE's proposed rate base and net operating income impacts for the
8 adjustments.

9 **Table 5: PSE Proposed Rate Base and Net Operating Income Impacts**

Adjustment	Electric Rate Base Impact	Electric Net Operating Income Impact	Gas Rate Base Impact	Gas Net Operating Income Impact
6.24	\$ 12,564,559	\$ (9,627,594)	\$ 6,418,005	\$ (4,917,796)
6.27	\$ 12,855,303	\$ (296,261)	\$ 5,946,648	\$ (123,556)
6.29	\$ 5,481,050	\$ (538,588)	\$ 2,799,732	\$ (275,112)
*7.09	\$ 11,899,760	\$ (292,768)	-	-
*7.10	\$ 4,644,661	\$ 2,441,145	-	-
Total	\$ 47,445,333	\$ (8,314,066)	\$ 15,164,385	\$ (5,316,464)

10 *Electric only adjustment

11
12 **Q. Which of these adjustments meet Staff's proposed materiality threshold?**

13 A. Using the modified materiality threshold the following are included as pro forma
14 adjustments:

- 15 • 6.24 GTZ
- 16 • 7.10 EMS

17 The following adjustments did not meet the materiality threshold and were
18 not included as pro forma adjustments:

- 1 • 6.27 Public Improvements
- 2 • 6.29 HR Tops
- 3 • 7.09 High Molecular Weight Cable
- 4
- 5

6 **VI. ADJUSTMENT 6.24 GET TO ZERO**

7

8 **Q. Why does Staff include GTZ as a pro forma adjustment?**

9 A. Staff recommends the inclusion of one project PSE included under the GTZ umbrella
10 as that project meets Staff’s proposed materiality threshold.

11

12 **Q. What is the GTZ initiative?**

13 A. The GTZ initiative is a series of projects from 2016 to 2021 that are part of PSE’s
14 “digital transformation initiative.”²⁴ The initiative is focused on the digital channels
15 customers use to access information about bills, outages, and service requests. GTZ
16 projects are spread across four functional categories: 1) customer interface; 2) billing
17 payment credit and collections; 3) integrated work management; and 4) data
18 management and analytics.

19

20 **Q. Is the GTZ initiative a single investment or project?**

21 A. No. What PSE calls the GTZ initiative is an amalgamation of numerous discrete
22 projects that are related in the sense that they connect to how customers access
23 information. Some projects were placed in service during the expedited rate filing

²⁴ *In re Petition of Puget Sound Energy for an Accounting Order*, Dockets UE-190274 and UG-190275, Petition of PSE, 2, ¶ 5 (Apr. 10, 2019).

1 test year (July 2017 - June 2018), some GTZ projects were placed in service during
2 the test year for this GRC (the calendar year 2018), and some GTZ projects were
3 placed in service during the pro forma period for this GRC (January 2019 - June
4 2019). Future projects are expected through 2021.

5
6 **Q. How is GTZ reflected in this rate case?**

7 A. GTZ affects multiple elements of this rate case. Some projects are included in the
8 results of operations while PSE presented others as pro forma adjustments. In
9 addition, PSE filed an accounting petition on April 10, 2019, to defer depreciation
10 expense associated for qualifying projects, which I discuss separately in Section VII.

11
12 **Q. What does Staff recommend regarding the pro forma adjustment for the GTZ
13 Initiative?**

14 A. Staff recommends including some GTZ investment as a pro forma adjustment to
15 plant, but only for the one project that meet the Commission's policy standards for
16 pro forma adjustments, including the materiality standard. GTZ is a pro forma
17 adjustment for both electric and gas operations.

18 Specifically, Staff recommends the inclusion of one project in pro forma
19 plant, which decreases PSE's requested revenue requirement \$3,369,363 for electric
20 operations and \$1,714,879 for gas operations.

1 **VII. DEFERRED ACCOUNTING**

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Q. Please describe the Company’s GTZ deferred accounting petition.

A. PSE requests to: 1) defer depreciation expenses for Get to Zero (GTZ) investments with a book life of 10 years or less; 2) allow a monthly carrying charge equal to the current rate of return; and 3) approve continued use of deferred accounting treatment for future qualifying GTZ investments placed in service after rates are established in this GRC.

Q. Why is PSE requesting deferred accounting?

A. PSE provides three conditions that it says justify this accounting petition: 1) IT investments are required to deliver services to ratepayers; 2) IT capital spending has increased significantly relative to total capital spending; and 3) the impact of regulatory lag for short-lived assets.

Q. Please summarize your recommendations.

A. Staff recommends approving, in part, the accounting petition. Staff recommends that the Commission allow deferred depreciation for the projects that meet Staff’s proposed materiality threshold, which would total \$16,687,554. Staff recommends that the Commission deny the request to include a carrying charge on the deferral balance. Staff recommends that the Commission deny the request for open-ended deferred accounting treatment for unidentified future projects.

1 **A. Background**

2

3 **Q. What is deferred accounting?**

4 A. In layperson’s terms, deferred accounting treats an expense from one period as
5 though it was incurred in a future rate period.²⁵ For example, if a utility incurs a large
6 expense to recover from a catastrophic winter storm, the utility may request to
7 “defer” those expenses so that it may recover them later (i.e., recover them in rates).
8 Absent deferral, the utility recognizes the costs in the period in which it incurred
9 them, and it would not recover them.

10 If the Commission authorizes deferred accounting treatment, the utility
11 records the expense as a regulatory asset until a rate case, at which point the utility
12 treats the cost as an expense in the rate year and can therefore include it in rates.

13

14 **Q. When is deferred accounting treatment used?**

15 A. Typically, the Commission authorizes deferred accounting treatment to help mitigate
16 the financial impact to a utility of large, unexpected costs that could not have been
17 considered when setting rates. Thus, deferred accounting typically is reserved for
18 extraordinary circumstances.

19

²⁵ Deferred accounting can also be used for revenues.

1 **Q. What constitutes extraordinary circumstances?**

2 A. The Commission has generally concluded that extraordinary or “exceptional”
3 circumstances are those that 1) are beyond the regulated company’s control²⁶; and 2)
4 generate costs that have a material impact on the utility’s financial results.²⁷

5 Examples of circumstances that have been deemed extraordinary in the past include:
6 costs related to declining hydroelectric generation, power costs from the 2001 energy
7 crisis, and BPA’s residential exchange program. The Commission’s authorization of
8 deferred accounting treatment represents tacit acknowledgment that absent a
9 deferral, authorized rates are insufficient. In general, Staff believes deferred
10 accounting should be used only for extraordinary circumstances, outside of the
11 utility’s ability to control.

12
13 **B. Evaluation of PSE’s Petition**

14
15 **Q. How does Staff evaluate PSE’s accounting petition?**

16 A. First, I evaluate PSE’s operating environment to judge whether there are
17 extraordinary circumstances justifying the use of an accounting petition. Second, I
18 evaluate the amounts included in the accounting petition to see if they are material
19 enough to warrant deferred accounting treatment.

20

²⁶ Pacific Power GRC 2014, Order 8, 107, ¶ 251 (“We emphasize, then, that the treatment we allow is in this instance is exceptional and turns on the unusual nature of the project involved.”).

²⁷ Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n. v. Nw. Nat. Gas Co., Docket UG-080519, Order 01, 3, ¶ 7 (May 2, 2008).

1 **1. The Utility Landscape Constitutes Extraordinary Circumstances**

2
3 **Q. How does the Commission determine extraordinary circumstances?**

4 A. It is unclear. Staff does not know where the Commission would draw the line
5 between ordinary and extraordinary circumstances because of the wide range of
6 circumstances for which the Commission has authorized deferred accounting
7 treatment. Staff recommends the Commission offer further policy guidance on this
8 matter, either through a standalone policy docket or as part of the Commission’s
9 existing Inquiry into the Adequacy of the Current Regulatory Framework (AFOR
10 Inquiry).²⁸

11
12 **Q. Are there extraordinary circumstances supporting the Company’s petition?**

13 A. Yes, Staff believes there are. While PSE’s current situation is not as clearly defined
14 as the 2001 energy crisis or costs related to mandated licensing, Staff agrees there are
15 unique conditions that are outside of the Company’s control.

16 The sector is being reshaped by forces that have been evolving and
17 converging for more than a decade. From rising costs and changing load
18 patterns, to newly viable technologies, regulatory change and the growing
19 call to decarbonize, disruptive forces are transforming the industry, driving it
20 toward a new and different future.²⁹
21

²⁸ See generally *Inquiry into the Adequacy of the Current Regulatory Framework Employed by the Commission in Addressing Developing Industry Trends, New Technologies, and Public Policy Affecting the Utility Sector (AFOR)*, Docket U-180907 (“AFOR”). The AFOR docket is an inquiry examining if the traditional regulatory framework is adequate for the evolving utility landscape. The Commission generally has regulated the provision of utility service through traditional rate-base, rate-of-return regulation; however transformational change brought on by new technologies, rapidly changing costs, and emerging opportunities for customers and utilities may produce conditions in which traditional regulation is not the most efficient and effective means of achieving the Commission’s public interest objectives.

²⁹Higby, Exh. ANH-2 at 4.

1 PSE, and the utility industry as a whole, is faced with enormous change
2 spurred by technological innovation and increasing customer engagement. This
3 disruption exists alongside a regulatory framework that is out of step with 21st
4 century technology. Therefore, investment spending creates an environment in which
5 utilities seek the use of extraordinary tools.

6 The assumption that regulations can be crafted slowly and deliberately, and
7 then remain in place, unchanged for long periods of time, has been upended
8 in today's environment. As new business models and services
9 emerge...government agencies are challenged with creating or modifying
10 regulations, enforcing them, and communicating them to the public at
11 previously undreamed-of pace. And they must do with while working within
12 legacy frameworks *and* attempting to foster innovation.³⁰
13

14 **Q. How does the changing utility landscape present extraordinary circumstances?**

15 A. The broader industry landscape has been swept up in a sea of technological
16 innovation, which has disrupted the traditional business model. Utilities are forced to
17 accommodate and understand these changes, learn how they affect day-to-day
18 operations, identify how to incorporate them into planning, and ascertain what
19 changes this means for how utilities interact with the current regulatory framework.

20 We have a legal, regulatory framework built on the basis of mail, paper,
21 words, versus a new world order which is digital, 24/7, and built on bits and
22 bytes. Somehow we need to square these two worlds.³¹

³⁰ Higby, Exh. ANH-3 at 4.

³¹ *Id.* at 8.

1 Similar to how mobile technology disrupted the telecom industry, the utility
2 industry now faces grid digitization. This is discussed in some detail by Staff
3 Witness Jason Ball.³²
4

5 **Q. How do changing customer expectations affect the utility landscape?**

6 A. Modern, near instantaneous access to data means that customers have the option, and
7 expectation, of real-time, accurate information. This can be related to outages,
8 billing, service requests, or usage. Utilities must update their systems, processes, and
9 software to provide customers the options of how to interact with them. “Customer
10 preferences are growing in diversity and complexity. Energy services technology and
11 alternatives to utility service are dramatically more accessible,”³³ which has forced
12 utilities to rethink the services and options they offer customers as well as how they
13 communicate with one another. This goes beyond how electricity is produced –
14 customers want to choose *how* they communicate with their utility.
15

16 **Q. Do others have concerns about the evolving utility landscape?**

17 A. Yes. The Commission began investigating this very issue when it opened the AFOR
18 Inquiry. When asked “How are developing industry trends, new technologies, and
19 public policy in the utility sectors affecting the effectiveness of traditional rate-base,
20 rate-of-return regulation?” Climate Solutions responded:

³² Ball, Exh. JLB-1T, at 41. Ball discusses how customer expectations changed with the advent of new technology and software. He extrapolates that the utility industry is undergoing a similar transformation.

³³ Higby, Exh. [ANH-4 ANH-3](#) at 2.

1 In the current regulatory structure, utilities are incentivized to make large
2 capital investments in order to keep the utility financially healthy. This does
3 not always align with public interest.³⁴
4

5 Pacific Power and Light Company stated:

6 The current regulatory system has supported the goals of equity,
7 affordability, and universal access, while ensuring safety and reliability. The
8 task that now faces this industry is to continue to support these goals while
9 promoting innovation, increased alignment of customer and utility incentives,
10 and support for state policies.³⁵
11

12 Alliance of Western Energy Consumers noted:

13 In essence, traditional utility regulation imposes the full risk of uncertain
14 future events on customers. Alternative regulation should be designed to
15 address these systematic deficiencies in a manner that inures to the benefit of
16 customers and voids unfair treatment for the utilities.³⁶
17

18 Avista Corporation declared:

19 Each of the pressures identified [changes in business conditions, customer
20 requests, public policies related to energy generation and distribution,
21 customer privacy and cybersecurity] put operating and financial constraints
22 on the utility, which traditional rate-making treatment with its built-in
23 regulatory lag, cannot overcome. The effectiveness of traditional regulation is
24 therefore at question, increasing regulatory risk, increasing the costs of
25 maintaining utility systems, and ultimately increasing costs to serve
26 customers. Given the developing industry trends, current financial incentives
27 of the utility may no longer be aligned with customer needs, nor with the
28 Commission or State policy goals.³⁷
29

30 **Q. How has the Commission begun responding to these industry changes?**

31 A. There is recognition within the industry and by the Commission that current
32 framework has not adapted to accommodate the changing milieu. The Commission
33 implicitly acknowledged the transformation the industry is undertaking through the

³⁴ AFOR, Docket U-180907, Comments of Climate Solutions, 2 (Jan. 17, 2019).

³⁵ AFOR, Docket U-180907, Comments of Pacific Power and Light Company, 3 (Jan. 17, 2019).

³⁶ AFOR, Docket U-180907, Comments of Alliance of Western Energy Consumers, 4-5 (Jan. 17, 2019).

³⁷ AFOR, Docket U-180907, Appendix A of Avista Corporation, 1 (Jan. 17, 2019).

1 AFOR Inquiry. Additionally, the Commission utilizes increasingly complex policy
2 solutions to address the symptoms of the evolving utility landscape, such as large
3 investments in short-lived IT projects.

4

5 **Q. What are the increasingly complex policy solutions that the Commission uses?**

6 A. Over the past few years, there has been a noticeable uptick in the frequency of rate
7 cases, multiple cases featuring attrition, proposals for new decoupling mechanisms,
8 and requests for expedited rate filings. So far then, utilities and the Commission are
9 relying on traditional mechanisms to address new challenges. This may indicate a
10 systemic problem in the current regulatory framework, in so far as traditional
11 mechanisms were designed to deal with specific challenges. Rather than recycling
12 extraordinary tools that are highly complex and require significant analytical
13 oversight to implement, utilities and the Commission should examine new forms of
14 rate making designed for the modern era. For instance, it may be useful to consider
15 the use of performance incentive mechanism's that are attached to specific
16 operational targets for IT infrastructure spending.

17

18 **Q. In summary, what extraordinary circumstances justify the Company's**
19 **accounting petition?**

20 A. There are multiple intertwined components that create extraordinary circumstances
21 for this accounting petition. The individual components begin with the accepting the
22 premise that the utility landscape is undergoing immense evolution. This evolution is
23 occurring in conjunction with vastly changing customer expectations. This creates a

1 gap with a regulatory framework that was purposely developed as a slow,
2 deliberative process, but is now at odds with the break-neck speed at which the
3 industry is evolving. To combat the issue of regulatory lag, the Commission is
4 relying on increasingly complex policy tools to combat the regulatory issues the new
5 environment has created while simultaneously investigating the issues that utilities
6 and stakeholders face in this brave new world.

7
8 **2. The Accounting Petition will have a Material Impact**

9
10 **Q. What constitutes a material effect on a utility's financial results?**

11 **A.** With respect to accounting petitions and materiality, thus far the Commission has
12 offered only generic guidance:

13 In prior decisions concerning accounting petitions, the Commission has
14 determined that deferred amounts must be of a magnitude such that recording
15 costs...has a material impact on company earnings.³⁸
16

17 The Commission has yet to further clarify what constitutes a material impact.
18 Staff encourages the Commission to offer more explicit guidance on how to quantify
19 a material impact. Until such direction is offered, utilities will create their own
20 definition in each accounting petition filed which may result in inconsistent
21 interpretations of materiality.

22

³⁸ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n. v. Nw Nat. Gas Co.*, Docket UG-080519, Order 01, 3, ¶ 7 (May 2, 2008).

1 **Q. Does Staff have a recommendation on how to define material impact?**

2 A. Yes. When evaluating accounting petitions related to utility plant additions, Staff
3 recommends applying the same materiality threshold that was used for pro forma
4 plant. This is primarily because PSE's petition for deferred accounting treatment
5 requests deferral of past depreciation expense for *utility plant*. This is an unusual
6 request as utilities generally have some control over the timing of their investment
7 spending, calling into question whether utility plant should be considered an
8 extraordinary event. Setting aside this issue, it is important to note that Staff's
9 proposed materiality threshold is relevant only for costs associated with pro forma
10 *plant additions*. If the Commission determines utility investments in plant are not
11 extraordinary events outside of the control of the Company, then the materiality
12 threshold becomes irrelevant to accounting petitions.


13 The materiality threshold should be applied when considering whether costs
14 associated with an individual investment contribute materially to the Company's
15 financial results. For instance, Staff is not convinced, nor should the Commission be,
16 that an investment of \$823,000 that has a book life of 10 years and an annual
17 depreciation expense of \$82,000 is a material expense worthy of extraordinary
18 regulatory treatment.

19
20 **Q. Does GTZ represent a material impact worthy of deferral accounting?**

21 A. Yes. As Figure 2 depicts, overall IT spending has substantially increased over the
22 past five years. Staff applied the modified materiality threshold to the projects placed

1 in service across 14 dates. Using the materiality threshold, projects placed in service
2 on three of those 14 dates qualify as material.

3 **Figure 2: PSE IT Budget: 2014-2019**³⁹



4

5

*Unknown if any additional budget was approved for 2019

6

7 **Q. What is the effect of applying a materiality threshold to PSE’s petition?**

8 A. PSE asks for \$30,551,970 to be deferred as depreciation expense in the accounting
9 petition. When Staff’s proposed materiality threshold is applied to the GTZ
10 accounting petition, it drops the deferred depreciation amount to \$16,687,554.

11

12 **C. Staff Recommendation on the Accounting Petition**

13

14 **Q. Please Summarize Staff’s position on the accounting petition**

15 A. Staff recommends approving, in part, the accounting petition. First, the Commission
16 should allow deferred depreciation for the projects that meet Staff’s proposed

³⁹ Higby, Exh. ANH-5 at 2-3.

1 materiality threshold, which total \$16,687,554. Second, the Commission should deny
2 the request to include a carrying charge on the deferral balance. Third, the
3 Commission should also deny the request for deferred accounting treatment for
4 future projects placed in service after this rate case.

5
6 **Q. Why should a carrying charge not be allowed to accrue on the deferral balance?**

7 A. Authorization of the accounting petition itself represents an extraordinary regulatory
8 action, providing the Company with special treatment of depreciation expense, even
9 though those expenses occurred during a period in which the Commission has
10 already determined rates to be sufficient.

11
12 **Q. Why does Staff advise against including future investments automatically in this
13 deferred accounting treatment?**

14 A. PSE is requesting deferred accounting treatment of hypothetical expenses for
15 projects that have not been identified. It is not possible to assess whether
16 circumstances are extraordinary if the circumstances do not yet exist. Further it is not
17 possible to assess materiality because the rates in effect for that period have not yet
18 been authorized.

19 Moreover, if the Commission approves the deferral for unspecified future
20 investments, it is acquiescing to the Company's assertion that rate year revenues will
21 be insufficient the moment they are authorized. The Commission should reject this
22 notion outright.

23

1 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

2 A. Yes.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30