

**Dockets UE-170033 and UG-170034 (consolidated) and Dockets UE-072300 and  
UG-072301 (consolidated)**

**Puget Sound Energy  
2022 Service Quality Program and Electric Service Reliability Filing**

**Attachment C:  
PSE 2022 Critical Infrastructure Security Annual Report**

**Puget Sound Energy**  
**2022**  
**Critical Infrastructure Security Annual Report**

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# PSE 2022 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY ANNUAL REPORT

Puget Sound Energy (PSE) puts a strong focus on cybersecurity and physical security. PSE's goal is to apply the same level of due diligence across the enterprise – which includes critical infrastructure – to ensure that a consistent approach to security is maintained no matter the program. All security program activities and results are treated as highly sensitive and confidential so as not to increase risk to PSE through the exposure of known vulnerabilities or potential threats.

## 1.1 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY – CYBERSECURITY AND PHYSICAL SECURITY

### 1.1.1 Critical Infrastructure Security Policy and Teams

#### 1.1.1.1 Critical Infrastructure Security Policy

*Please provide a copy of the company's Critical Infrastructure (CI) Security policy. In subsequent reports, please provide copies of any sections of the policy that have been added or modified since the last report.*

PSE has three main security related policies – a critical infrastructure cybersecurity policy, an overall physical security policy, and an overall information security and acceptable use policy.

The critical infrastructure cybersecurity policy has not changed in 2022.

The physical security policy has not changed in 2022.

The overall information security and acceptable use policy changed in May 2022. Updates were made to reflect changes made to some of PSE's security technologies and document storage needs.

#### 1.1.1.2 Critical Infrastructure Security Teams

*Please provide an organizational diagram of the company's CI Security team(s). The diagram, or accompanying list, should include the names and titles of staff on the team, including any vacant positions or staff in acting roles.*

The Security, Risk and Compliance team had very limited changes to their staffing in 2022. The structure and resource alignment is as follows:

Security, Risk and Compliance team roles and resources

- Chief Information Security Officer/Director Security, Risk and Compliance
- Senior Manager, Security, Risk and Compliance (1)
- Advisor IT Security Analyst (1)
- Administrative Specialist (1)

Cyber Security team roles and resources

- Manager, IT Cyber Defense Center (1)
- Manager, Cyber Risk Management (1)
- Manger, IT Compliance (1)
- Senior Advisor IT Security Analyst (1)

- Advisor IT Security Analyst (1)
- Senior IT Security Analyst (9)
- IT Security Analyst (3)

Physical Security (physical security) team roles and resources

- Manager, Physical Security (1)
- Supervisor Physical Security Operations (1)
- Physical Security Systems Administrator (1)
- Physical Security Compliance Program Manager (1)
- Security Technician (2)
- Physical Security Specialist (2)
- Investigator (1)

### **1.1.2 Critical Infrastructure Security Policy and Teams Changes**

#### **1.1.2.1 Critical Infrastructure Security Policy Changes**

*Please provide a written description of any changes made in the past year to the company's CI Security policy, and any changes to the team structure or the placement of the team in the company's organizational structure.*

As outlined above, there were no changes made to the critical infrastructure security policy.

As outlined above, there were no changes made to the physical security policy.

#### **1.1.2.2 Critical Infrastructure Security Team Changes**

*Please provide a written description of any changes made in the past year to the company's CI Security policy, and any changes to the team structure or the placement of the team in the company's organizational structure.*

There were some changes made in the Physical Security team which included a Supervisor for the Security Command Center and hiring an investigator to help mature our physical security posture.

### **1.1.3 PSE's External Participation**

*Please describe the company's participation in regional or national tabletop exercises, conferences, committees, or other events related to CI Security.*

In 2022, PSE participated in the following cyber security events:

**U.S. Department of Homeland Security Physical Security Awareness Campaign** – Campaign designed to raise awareness and provide public, private, and law enforcement communities' resources to enhance the physical security and resilience of electric substations.

**GridEx VI** – Exercise held every 2 years that engages all levels of government, utilities (electric, gas, water, waste treatment, etc.), and supporting organizations. The primary focus for GridEx is

cyber-attacks, but other scenarios are pulled in to ensure companies are fully exercising incident response and business continuity plans. Scenarios can include natural disasters, electromagnetic pulses, cyber-attacks, physical/terrorism attacks, and other events that participants want to exercise. 2022 was an initial planning year for the 2023 exercise for GridEx VII.

PSE is also an active participant in many events related to critical infrastructure security. Below is a list of committees PSE participated in during 2022.

- Western Electricity Coordinating Council CIP User Group
- American Gas Association Security Group
- Edison Electric Institute Security & Technologies Group
- Edison Electric Institute Cybersecurity Mutual Assistance Program
- Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center Executive Committee
- Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center Working Group
- Western Electricity Coordinating Council Physical Security Group
- Critical Infrastructure Protection Physical Security Working Group
- King County Critical Infrastructure Protection Work Group
- Washington Emergency Communications Coordination Working Group
- Washington Fusion Center
- PGE Regional Cyber Sharing Group

#### **1.1.4 Unauthorized actions related to cybersecurity and physical security**

*Please include a list of any unauthorized actions related to cybersecurity and physical security that have occurred since the last report which led to one or more of the following:*

- i. loss of service;*
- ii. interruption of a critical business process;*
- iii. breach of sensitive business or customer information; or*
- iv. serious financial harm.*

PSE did not have any cybersecurity unauthorized actions in 2022 that resulted in a loss of service, exposure of sensitive customer data, serious financial harm nor required involvement or reporting to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, military, law enforcement or another regulatory body.

PSE experienced some acts of vandalism at substations which resulted in the loss of power temporarily for PSE customers.

- On February 14, 2022, there was an incident at Mercer Island that caused an outage resulting in 5,490 customers impacted.
- On November 22, 2022, a substation in Thurston County was vandalized. Approximately 5,200 customers were impacted for about 2.5 hours while repairs were made.
- On December 25, 2022, two substations in Pierce County were vandalized. Approximately 23,000 customers combined were impacted for about 19 hours while repairs were made. In

addition, PSE coordinated with law enforcement and arrests were made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with the incident.

Whenever vandalism occurs, it is reported to local law enforcement. The above incidents have also been reported to the U.S. Department of Energy. PSE would be happy to discuss details during a nonpublic review session.

### **1.1.5 Incident Response**

*Does the company have retainers or contracts for outside help in the event of an incident?*

In 2015, PSE placed on retainer or under contract outside counsel, a forensics firm, and public relations firm for support in the event of a cybersecurity incident. The relationships were still in place in 2022. Additionally, we have resources available to us via our cybersecurity insurance.

PSE currently does not have a retainer or contract for physical security support in the event of an incident.

*What kind of support is provided by the company's incident response retainers or contracts that provide similar services?*

Outside counsel provides general guidance and direction and assists in managing other external entities during a cybersecurity event. The forensics firm provides additional layers of expertise in managing cybersecurity attacks and tools as deemed appropriate. The public relations firm assists in communications to the public as advised by PSE and outside council.

PSE currently does not have a retainer or contract for physical security support in the event of an incident.

*Is the company currently participating in any resource sharing agreements such as the Northwest Mutual Assistance Agreement (NMAA), Western Region Mutual Assistance Agreement (WRMAA), or Spare Transformer Equipment Program?*

PSE participates in the Edison Electric Institute's Spare Transformer Equipment Program and has been since 2006. PSE also participates in the Edison Electric Institute's Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council Cybersecurity Mutual Assistance Program and has been since 2016.

*Does the company have an incident response plan? If so, when was it most recently used or tested, and what is the timeframe for the next scheduled test?*

PSE has a cybersecurity incident response plan (CSIRP). The CSIRP is tested at least annually with the last test occurring in November 2022.

PSE has a physical security incident response plan for each location with PSE staff. These site specific physical security incident response plans that include designated employees for incident response roles were distributed to each location in January 2014. Plans were reviewed in 2022 and updates were made as required.

### 1.1.6 Risk Management

*Please identify the risk assessment tools used by the company that relate to CI Security (i.e., ES-C2M2, NIST Framework, etc.).*

There are a variety of national and industry oriented cybersecurity and physical security risk assessment processes and tools. Since each process and/or tool approaches cybersecurity and physical security from a slightly different perspective, PSE pulls from multiple sources to ensure a more well-rounded view into the security activities needed to lower or mitigate risks.

However, the foundational assessment standard utilized is the NIST Cyber Security Framework.

*Has an independent third party reviewed the company's risk management policy? If so, who performed the review, when did it occur, and how many follow-up actions were identified*

PSE has an external review of its overall cybersecurity program approximately every 24 months. Results are prioritized and added to PSE's security roadmap as appropriate. The details of the review are confidential; however, PSE would be happy discuss the details of the review during a nonpublic review session.

PSE did not have an external review of its physical risk management policy in 2022.

*How many of these follow-up actions are scheduled (please provide the calendar quarter of projected start and completion dates), in active implementation (please provide the calendar quarter of the projected completion date), or completed?*

All activities are prioritized and placed in PSE's security roadmap. Again, details can be discussed during a nonpublic review session.

PSE did not have an external review of its physical risk management policy in 2022.

*Please describe any voluntary security standards that the company has adopted.*

There are a variety of national and industry oriented cybersecurity and physical security risk assessment processes and frameworks (e.g. NIST, ES C2M2). Since each process and/or framework approaches cybersecurity and physical security from a slightly different perspective, PSE pulls from multiple sources to ensure a more well-rounded view into the security activities needed to lower or mitigate risks. However, the foundational assessment standard utilized is the NIST Cyber Security Framework.

## 1.2 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY – CYBERSECURITY

### 1.2.1 Cybersecurity budget

*If available, please provide the percentage of the company's entire IT budget spent on cybersecurity. If unavailable, please provide an explanation.*

The cybersecurity budget is in alignment with the security activities identified in the security roadmap.



### **1.2.2 Cybersecurity – Vulnerability assessments**

*Please provide the date of the company's most recent vulnerability assessment, who performed the assessment, and how many follow-up actions were identified.*

The vulnerability management program ensures activities such as vulnerability assessments and secure code reviews are performed in support of cybersecurity activities (e.g. security assessments, system patching, etc.). They occur on a regular basis as opposed to single points in time. All results are documented and tracked on a risk register for follow-up and remediation. The results of all security centric activities are confidential; however, PSE would be happy to discuss any details during a nonpublic review session.

*How many of these follow-up actions are scheduled (please provide the calendar quarter of projected start and completion dates), in active implementation (please provide the calendar quarter of the projected completion date), or completed?*

See above.

### **1.2.3 Cybersecurity – Penetration tests**

*Please provide the date of the company's most recent penetration test, who performed the test, and how many follow-up actions were identified.*

The penetration testing program is designed to discover, validate and analyze security vulnerabilities that may reside on information technology assets. It is a component of holistic security management designed to provide coordination and oversight for various security activities performed internally on behalf of PSE. A penetration test is independently scheduled or in support of other cybersecurity activities (e.g. security assessments) to provide additional insight into valuable information technology assets at PSE. The results of all security centric activities are confidential; however, PSE would be happy to discuss any details during a nonpublic review session.

*How many of these follow-up actions are scheduled (please provide the calendar quarter of projected start and completion dates), in active implementation (please provide the calendar quarter of the projected completion date), or completed?*

See above.

### **1.2.4 Cybersecurity – Vulnerability & Penetration (Future)**

*Please provide the timeframe for the company's next planned vulnerability assessment and penetration test and if the company or a third party will perform each.*

Both programs for cybersecurity have been outlined above. The details behind all security centric activities are confidential; however, PSE would be happy to discuss during a nonpublic review session.

**1.2.5 Information-sharing and collaboration efforts**

*For the following information-sharing and collaboration efforts, please provide a description of the company’s level of involvement with each, and complete the table below.*

	Was the company involved in the effort during the calendar year?	Did the company receive alerts or information from this effort during the calendar year? If so, how often (monthly, quarterly, etc.) was information from this source received and reviewed by the company?	Has the company contributed information to this effort during the calendar year?
Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC)	Yes	Weekly industry report and ad-hoc security alerts (PSE is also a member of the DNG-ISAC, Downstream Natural Gas Information Sharing and Analysis Center )	Yes
Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program (CRISP)	Yes	Yes Reporting via E-ISAC, Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center	Yes
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT)	Yes	Yes Weekly industry report and ad-hoc vulnerability alerts	No
Seattle FBI Cyber Task Force’s FLASH Alerts	Yes	Yes Quarterly cybersecurity status and ad-hoc FLASH alerts	No
Washington State Fusion Center	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)	Yes	Yes Alerts, bulletins, advisories and other information CISA has published	No
U. S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DoE CESER)	Yes	Working on building a Threat Intelligence partnership	No