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BEFORE THE WASHINGTON
UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,

Complainant,

v.

PUGET SOUND ENERGY,

Respondent.

DOCKETS UG-230393

THE PUYALLUP TRIBE OF INDIANS'
POST-HEARING BRIEF

I. INTRODUCTION

The Puyallup Tribe of Indians (Tribe) intervened in this matter to aid the Commission in arriving at a just outcome. Despite Puget Sound Energy’s (PSE or Company) attempts to obfuscate the record, there are a number of undisputed facts central to the Utilities and Transportation Commission’s (Commission) handling of the issues before it.

PSE made the affirmative decision to site a methane liquefaction facility that pollutes the air and poses a risk of catastrophic explosion, the Tacoma LNG facility (Tacoma LNG), on the border of the Tribe’s Reservation. PSE knew the facility would pollute and pose safety risks, and PSE knew that the Tribe and others situated near the facility did not want Tacoma LNG built on their doorstep. PSE proceeded anyway. Washingtonians, including Governor Inslee, voiced their opposition to the facility. PSE proceeded anyway.

1 Tacoma LNG is now built, operating, and emitting toxic pollution to the airshed that it
2 shares with the Tribe. In this proceeding, PSE asks this Commission to add insult to injury by
3 forcing ratepayers to foot an appreciable portion of its sizeable bill for the Tacoma LNG Project
4 (Project). The Commission should refuse PSE's invitation and, instead, disallow its post-
5 September 22, 2016 costs associated with Tacoma LNG for the following reasons.

6 First, PSE overstated the ratepayer need for the Project and has not demonstrated that the
7 Company's investments in the Project are prudent over the life of the facility. Second, PSE failed
8 to show that ignoring the equities associated with its choice of a site for Tacoma LNG and moving
9 forward with construction of the Project in the face of vocal public opposition and changing public
10 policy regarding fossil fuel projects was prudent. Third, significant Project costs were incurred
11 solely for the benefit of PLNG's for-profit operations and provide no benefit to ratepayers. And
12 finally, PSE fails to carry its burden of proof to show that specific Project costs were reasonable
13 and appropriate.

14 **II. BACKGROUND**

15 The purpose of this proceeding is to examine the prudence and reasonableness of costs that
16 were incurred by PSE after its September 22, 2016 decision to build the Project.¹ Because the
17 Commission's threshold determination in Order 24/20 considered only the information that was
18 available to PSE on September 22, 2016, the Commission must now consider whether it continued
19 to be reasonable and prudent for PSE to incur costs on the Project in the face of significant public
20 opposition and as public policy regarding fossil fuel projects shifted.

21 The Puyallup Tribe of Indians is a federally recognized Indian tribe with most of its
22 Reservation located in Tacoma and Fife, Washington. The Tribe's Reservation shares an airshed
23 with Tacoma LNG, and the Tribe has vocally opposed the Tacoma LNG Project (Project) for years.
24 Through that process, the Tribe has developed substantial information about the Project; its
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26 ¹ Order 24/10 at ¶ 393.

1 evolution over the course of design, permitting, and construction; and its impacts on the Tribe and
2 its members.

3 The Tribe is before the Commission to share information and analysis regarding: (1) the
4 Project's disparate impacts on the Tribe and other environmental justice communities; (2) Tacoma
5 LNG's limited public benefit to ratepayers; (3) Project features and processes, and whether the
6 associated costs incurred by PSE were reasonable and necessary to provide peak shaving services
7 to PSE's ratepayers; and (4) why costs claimed by PSE should be denied by the Commission
8 because they are unsupported by the record.

9 The Project disproportionately burdens the Tribe and its members, and PSE has been aware
10 of this fact for many years. Those burdens should be given significant weight in the Commission's
11 prudence determination. The Tribe has consistently called for additional analysis and mitigation
12 of the risks posed by Tacoma LNG. Instead of addressing these concerns, which have been
13 expressed by the Tribe and the public for years, PSE has ignored—and has urged the Commission
14 to ignore—the negative externalities and related inequities that Tacoma LNG poses to those
15 unlucky enough to live near the facility.

16 Now that Tacoma LNG is operating, the negative externalities that were predicted by the
17 Tribe can no longer be dismissed as insignificant or theoretical, nor can PSE or the Commission
18 somehow claim that an air permit prevents them. The numerous Notices of Violation (NOV)
19 issued to PSE for violations of the Tacoma LNG air permit validate the Tribe's longstanding
20 concerns regarding the health and safety risks posed by the Project. While the Commission has
21 noted that it considers itself to primarily be an economic regulator, these facts go to the heart of
22 the equity considerations the Commission has professed to have adopted and ought not be ignored.

23 The Project provides little benefit to ratepayers. PSE provided two reasons for developing
24 the Tacoma LNG Project: (1) to meet its ratepaying customers' peak demand at times when the
25 supply of pipeline gas is insufficient (peak shaving), and (2) to sell LNG to private customers
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1 through Puget LNG (PLNG), PSE’s for-profit subsidiary.² To date, the ratepayer need that PSE
2 projected for the Project has not materialized. The Project has not been necessary to satisfy
3 ratepayer demand for natural gas, and its operations have benefited only PLNG.

4 **A. The Inequities of the Project Were Well Known by September 2016.**

5 As set forth in the Commission’s Order 24/10 in WUTC Dockets UE-220066, UG-220067,
6 and UG-210918 (Consolidated Dockets), this proceeding is a continuation of the Commission’s
7 prudence analysis regarding PSE’s Tacoma LNG Project.³ Under the Consolidated Dockets, the
8 Parties broadly presented evidence and arguments addressing the overall prudence of the Tacoma
9 LNG Project; however, Order 24/10 provided only a threshold prudence determination addressing
10 PSE’s actions up until the PSE Board of Directors’ decision to construct the facility on September
11 22, 2016.⁴ As Staff recently explained at the evidentiary hearing, “all the settlements for the rate
12 case did was defer these issues [the prudence of PSE’s post-September 2016 Project costs] to this
13 proceeding.”⁵

14 PSE admitted during the Consolidated Proceedings that it did not consider the inequities
15 associated with the Project in its decision making.⁶ This is the case even though PSE was aware
16 that the Tribe and citizens of Tacoma had significant concerns about the risks and negative
17 externalities posed by the Project. The Company chose to ignore the inequities associated with the
18 Project because even though such inequities harm the public interest—PSE apparently did not
19 believe they would be factored into the Commission’s prudence determination.

21 ² See Roberts, Exh. RJR-1CT at 17:9-19, *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. Puget Sound Energy*,
22 *Dockets* UE-220066, UG-220067, and UG-210918 (consol.) (filed Jan 31, 2022).

23 ³ *Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v Puget Sound Energy*, *Dockets* UE-220066, UG-220067 and
24 UG-210918 (consol.) Order 24/10 (hereinafter “Order 24/10”) (Dec. 22, 2022).

25 ⁴ As noted by Public Counsel, one reason the Commission deferred its prudence analysis regarding
26 PSE’s post-September 16, 2022 Project costs was that UTC Staff had not yet completed its
prudence review. See Order 24/10 at ¶ 381.

⁵ Evidentiary Hearing Transcript (Nov. 6, 2023) (hereinafter “TR”) at 32:1-3.

⁶ See Order 24/10 at ¶ 386.

1 Public opposition to the Tacoma LNG facility is overwhelming, and PSE’s customers
2 object to having their rates increased to reimburse the Company for an ill-advised, expensive and
3 harmful investment from which ratepayers expect to see little or no benefit. On November 1, 2023,
4 the Commissioners held a hearing to receive public comments from Washingtonians. Many
5 commenters addressed Tacoma LNG, and every single commenter strongly opposed PSE’s
6 attempts to saddle ratepayers with the costs associated with the facility. Further, the Tribe is aware
7 that the Commission received a large volume of written public comments articulating
8 Washingtonians’ overwhelming opposition to Tacoma LNG.^{7, 8} Public opposition to the Project is
9 not new. For years, PSE and the Commission have been aware of public opposition to Tacoma
10 LNG via (inter alia) public opposition expressed in Commission hearings dating back to 2016.

11 The public outcry against the Project is aligned with relevant public policy. The legislature
12 has prioritized equity and environmental justice through passage of the Clean Energy
13 Transformation Act and by promulgation of a revised public interest standard under RCW
14 80.28.425(1) that includes environmental health and greenhouse gas emissions reduction, health
15 and safety, economic development, and equity—to the extent that such factors affect the rates,
16 services, and practices of the regulated utility. Further, Governor Inslee publicly stated that he
17 does not support Tacoma LNG after September 2016 but before PSE built the facility and
18 commenced operations.⁹ Washington’s Attorney General has similarly opposed the facility;
19 indeed, the Attorney General’s Office went so far as appearing as amicus in active litigation
20 challenging Tacoma LNG’s air permit because the AGO is concerned that the facility’s greenhouse
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23 ⁷ See Offer of Public Comment Exh. No. BR-8, UTC Comment Matrix and PCU Tally (filed Nov.
24 29, 2023).

25 ⁸ The Commission heard similar comments at the public hearing conducted under the consolidated
26 dockets. See Exh. BR-3, from the consolidated WUTC Dockets UE-220066, UG-220067, and UG-
210918.

⁹ See Exh. RXS-30.

1 gas impacts are negative and significant.¹⁰ A decision from the Court of Appeals in that matter is
2 imminent.

3 Because the UTC exists to serve Washingtonians and “regulate in the public interest,”¹¹
4 the Commissioners should give significant weight to statewide policies regarding equity and the
5 public’s overwhelming opposition to: (1) being subjected to the negative externalities associated
6 with the Project; (2) being saddled with the costs of constructing and operating a facility that
7 primarily benefits PSE shareholders; and (3) being financially responsible for costs that PSE has
8 not shown to be incurred prudently and in the public interest.

9 **B. The Tribe has Provided Incontrovertible Evidence of the Project’s**
10 **Disparate Impacts and Unnecessary Costs.**

11 To assist the Commission, the Tribe presented written and oral testimony from Dr. Ranajit
12 Sahu.¹² Dr. Sahu has worked and taught in the fields of environmental, mechanical, and chemical
13 engineering for more than thirty years.¹³ Dr. Sahu has extensive experience with the quantification
14 of facility emissions; modeling the impacts of such emissions on surrounding areas; determining
15 the health risks associated with exposing surrounding populations and the environment to air
16 pollutants; and monitoring of air pollutants in ambient air. And with regard to safety concerns,
17 Dr. Sahu has, over the course of his career, assessed the accidental and non-routine risks posed by
18 fossil fuel facilities.¹⁴ In addition to his consulting work, Dr. Sahu has taught university-level
19 courses regarding air pollution and air pollution controls, risk assessments, and hazardous waste
20 management for over twenty years.¹⁵

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22 ¹⁰ Exh. RXS-31.

23 ¹¹ RCW 80.01.040(3).

24 ¹² Exh. RXS-1T; Exh. RXS-35T.

25 ¹³ See Exh. RXS-2.

26 ¹⁴ See Exh. RXS-1T at 6-8; see also Exh. RXS-2.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 7

1 Dr. Sahu is the only witness before the Commission with such experience. Dr. Sahu's
2 expertise in assessing the generation of various air pollutants from industrial processes applies to
3 his review of the significant sources of air emission at Tacoma LNG, which include the facility's
4 flare, its vaporizer, and fugitive emissions (leaks of gaseous volatile compounds) from the
5 thousands of components comprising the facility.

6 Dr. Sahu first began reviewing materials related to the Project in 2018, including thousands
7 of documents produced to the Puyallup Tribe by PSE, by PSE's vendors and consultants, and by
8 government agencies that have been involved in the permitting and commissioning of the Project.¹⁶
9 In other words, Dr. Sahu's testimony is well-informed.

- 10 1. Emissions from the Project cause and contribute to human health
11 impacts that disproportionately fall on the Tribe and surrounding
highly-impacted communities.

12 Dr. Sahu's testimony presents a concept that should be self-evident: permitted pollution is
13 still pollution.¹⁷ This is important to the Commission's prudence analysis because tools developed
14 by the Washington Department of Health show that the airshed into which Tacoma LNG emits its
15 carcinogens (and other pollutants) is already degraded and over-burdened by pollution—even
16 before the Tacoma LNG facility began operating.¹⁸ And the Tacoma LNG air permit application
17 acknowledges that a host of Toxic Air Pollutants (TAPs) and Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs)
18 will be emitted from the facility.¹⁹ Tacoma LNG's emissions are making an already degraded
19 airshed worse from a health standpoint, and PSE cannot credibly contend that the Tacoma LNG
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22 ¹⁶ *Id.* at 8-9.

23 ¹⁷ *See* Exh. RXS-1T at 28.

24 ¹⁸ *See* Exh. RXS-1T at 28.

25 ¹⁹ *See* Exh. RXS-1T at 22 (for example, the following pollutants will be emitted above specified
26 regulatory threshold levels: 7,12-dimethylbenz(a)anthracene; benzene; formaldehyde; hydrogen
sulfide; arsenic; beryllium; cadmium; manganese; and vanadium); *see also* Exh. RXS-13 (PSE
Notice of Construction Application for Tacoma LNG (5/22/2017)) at 3-6 to 3-7 and Table 7.

1 facility does not diminish the health of people in its vicinity through emissions of pollutants to the
2 air.²⁰

- 3 a. Any dispute over Tacoma LNG’s negative externalities and
4 disparate impacts is resolved by the PSCAA NOV’s before
5 the Commission in this proceeding.

6 On May 12, 2023, the Puget Sound Clean Air Agency (PSCAA) issued numerous Notices
7 of Violation (NOVs) to the Tacoma LNG facility for violations of its air permit.²¹ These NOVs
8 document significant violations of permit conditions.²² These permit violations include multiple
9 instances of bypass events, in which waste gases that should have been flared were instead released
10 directly to the atmosphere without flaring; such bypass events significantly increase the facility’s
11 total actual emissions.²³

12 As Dr. Sahu explains in his Cross-Answering Testimony, the air permit anticipates
13 (because the air permit requires) that the flare at Tacoma LNG will destroy over 99% of the toxic
14 air pollutants in the waste gases.²⁴ This high level of destruction efficiency is necessary for the
15 Tacoma LNG facility to remain in compliance with its permitted emission thresholds. When the
16 flare is bypassed and Tacoma LNG waste gases are released directly to the atmosphere, the
17 facility’s emissions are approximately 100 times higher than when the flare is properly operated.
18 Thus, each minute of a bypass event at the Tacoma LNG facility emits the equivalent of 100
19 minutes of emissions during flaring.²⁵

20 Because we do not know the details of the waste gas composition released during Tacoma
21 LNG’s permit-violating flare bypass events, it is impossible to know the exact quantity of HAPs

22 ²⁰ See Exh. RXS-1T at 30.

23 ²¹ Exh. RXS-35T at 11; Exh. RXS-37 (containing PSCAA-issued NOVs and PSE response to
24 PSCAA); see also Exh. RXS-38 (table summarizing NOVs issued by PSCAA to Tacoma LNG on
25 May 12, 2023).

26 ²² Exh. RXS-35T at 11

²³ Exh. RXS-35T at 12.

²⁴ This 99% destruction efficiency is one of the reasons that PSCAA permitted the facility as a “minor
source” under the Clean Air Act.

²⁵ Exh. RXS-35T at 12.

1 and TAPs those events released to the Tribe's airshed. However, the releases can be estimated by
2 considering the total time of the flare bypass events along with the flare's hourly potential to emit.
3 PSE provided information about potential emissions from the enclosed ground flare burners in its
4 NOC application, which provides hourly emission rates of various pollutants for five gas
5 compositions.²⁶ The PSCAA NOV's issued for flare bypass events document 394 minutes (over
6 six- and one-half hours) that waste gases were released without flaring.²⁷ Using the emission rates
7 PSE presented as Cases 1 and 5 in the NOC Application to calculate the potential emissions during
8 394 minutes of flare bypass events, these violations would result in a release of between 1,970 and
9 6,764 pounds of VOCs, between 1.12 and 4.1 pounds of benzene, and between 11.8 and 43.3
10 pounds of hexane.²⁸

11 It concerns the Tribe, and should concern the Commission (as a tribunal to which PSE is
12 making representations about the facility), that during the permitting process PSE repeatedly stated
13 to the Pollution Control Hearings Board that use of the flare bypass would rarely or never occur.²⁹
14 For example, Matthew Stobart, an employee of Chicago Bridge & Iron testifying on behalf of PSE
15 before the Pollution Control Hearings Board, minimized concerns about the impacts of the bypass,
16 stating that "...we hope that it never gets used. It might get used over a couple times over the
17 lifetime of the facility."³⁰ In other words, Tacoma LNG has not been the clean-operating facility
18 that PSE claimed it would be, and the Commission should be skeptical of any representations PSE
19 has made about the facility's impacts to the surrounding community.

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21 ²⁶ See Exh. RXS-13 at 7-11 (Tables B-4 through B-8).

22 ²⁷ See Exh. RXS-37.

23 ²⁸ See Exh. RXS-13 at 7 (Table B-4 lists potential emissions of 3 lbs/hour of VOCs, 1.7E-03
24 lbs/hour of benzene, and 1.8E-02 lbs/hr of hexane for PSE's "Case 1"); see also Exh. RXS-13 at
25 11 (Table B-8 lists potential emissions of 10.3 lbs/hour of VOCs, 6.3E-03 lbs/hour of benzene,
26 and 6.6E-02 lbs/hr of hexane for PSE's "Case 5").

²⁹ See e.g., Exhs. RJR-18X and RJR-19X.

³⁰ Exh. RJR-18X; see also RJR-19X (PSE counsel relying on Mr. Stobart's testimony in response
to the Tribe's concerns that the Tacoma LNG facility would violate enforcement permit
conditions.)

1 In addition to the flare bypass events, NOV's were issued to the Tacoma LNG facility for
2 its failure to maintain the required minimum temperatures for various flaring conditions—which
3 are pre-requisites for ensuring that the flare is properly destroying toxic air pollutants at the
4 required efficiency.³¹ There have been at least eleven violations of the PSCAA air permit
5 requirement that the flare maintain minimum temperatures.³² In each such instance, the flare was
6 operated in a manner that would not have destroyed contaminants to the degree required—resulting
7 in the Tacoma LNG facility emitting more of these contaminants than PSE had asserted would
8 occur.³³

9 In addition to permit violations associated with operation of the flare, PSE also received
10 NOV's for failure to collect the required quantity of valid monitoring data—which is essential to
11 verify compliance with permit requirements; and at least one instance of clearly violating the
12 quantity of VOC emissions (including harmful air toxics) allowed by the permit.

13 Each of the air permit conditions are intended to be protective, so these violations all have
14 negative impacts which are felt most significantly by those living or working nearby.³⁴ Violating
15 the permit limit for VOCs directly results in more emissions and more impacts to the Tribe and
16 surrounding communities.³⁵ Violation of the permit requirements regarding the collection of
17 sufficient quantities of valid monitoring data means that there are greater periods of time in which
18 no one knows the amount of pollutants being emitted into the local airshed.³⁶ Tacoma LNG could
19 have been violating its permit during these times and nobody would know.³⁷

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22 ³¹ Exh. RXS-35T at 12.

23 ³² Exh. RXS-38.

24 ³³ Exh. RXS-35T at 12-13.

25 ³⁴ Exh. RXS-35T at 13.

26 ³⁵ Exh. RXS-35T at 13.

³⁶ Exh. RXS-35T at 13.

³⁷ Exh. RXS-35T at 13-14.

1 Viewed together, the NOV's issued to Tacoma LNG demonstrate two facts relevant to the
2 Commission's prudency analysis. First, that PSE misrepresented the facility's impacts to tribunals
3 in the past, including when it said the flare bypass would likely never be used. Second, as should
4 now be clear to the Commission, this facility pollutes the air. The fact that it has a permit is not
5 preventing pollution or protecting the Tribe from it.³⁸

6 2. The Project presents inequitable risks associated with the potential
7 for a catastrophic accident adjacent to the Tribe's land and
8 resources.

9 The negative externalities created by the Project extend beyond the ongoing addition of
10 pollutants to the Tribe's airshed; it also presents significant safety risks that include the potential
11 for explosions or other catastrophic events. All methane liquefaction facilities present an inherent
12 risk of catastrophic explosion; and for Tacoma LNG, that risk was even disclosed in the facility's
13 Environmental Impact Statement.³⁹

14 As the Commission knows, there have been numerous accidents and catastrophic events at
15 liquefaction facilities in the United States and across the world, including the 2014 explosion at
16 the Plymouth LNG facility, which the Commission is familiar with because it is located here in
17 Washington State.⁴⁰ Like Tacoma LNG, the facilities where such incidents have occurred were
18 subject to safety evaluations; thus even permitted, code-compliant facilities pose the risk of a
19 catastrophic event.⁴¹

20 Regarding the unquantified safety risks associated with Tacoma LNG, Dr. Sahu explains
21 that a number of potential accidents were not considered in the design and permitting process. The
22 regulatory analysis looked only at higher probability/low-consequence scenarios and ignored the
23 more concerning high-consequence scenarios.⁴² For example, Dr. Sahu notes that the Tacoma

23 ³⁸ Exh. RXS-35T at 13.

24 ³⁹ See Exh. RXS-18.

25 ⁴⁰ Exh. RXS-1T at 33.

26 ⁴¹ Exh. RXS-1T at 33-34.

⁴² Exh. RXS-1T at 35.

1 LNG facility “presents a large target to any number of bad actors in the US and abroad,”⁴³ meaning
2 it is a soft target for terrorism that is located in a highly-populated area. Despite such risks, the
3 Tribe is not aware of any worst-case scenario risk analysis performed for the Tacoma LNG facility.

4 Additionally, though UTC Pipeline Safety Staff performed the analysis necessary to
5 determine Tacoma LNG complied with PHMSA requirements—that analysis was not intended to
6 establish that the facility does not pose a risk of catastrophic accident. And in that context, UTC
7 staff acknowledged that even the “design spill” scenario that PSE modeled for the facility does not
8 represent all reasonably anticipatable risks posed by the facility.⁴⁴ The “design spill” is a
9 standardized scenario in which a small-quantity spill and its low consequences are analyzed, but
10 does not account for all potential risks presented by methane liquefaction facilities, including those
11 that are more significant in volume and duration – and which would have far greater
12 consequences.⁴⁵ Without information about the true scope of Project impacts, regulators cannot
13 consider whether mitigation of those impacts is necessary and possible. The Tribe has presented
14 uncontroverted evidence that the Project poses such risks, and PSE has not established that high-
15 consequence scenarios cannot occur.

16 PSE’s responses to the PSCAA NOV’s indicate that venting occurred at the bypass to
17 alleviate unsafe operations at the flare.⁴⁶ Further, PSE’s witness Mr. Roberts acknowledged that
18 the facility’s operations pose safety risks on cross examination. During a discussion of the releases
19 of unburned waste gases to the atmosphere via the flare bypass, Mr. Roberts explained that PSE
20 could not commit to removing or disabling the flare bypass because it is a safety feature of the
21 plant that is there for a reason, and that doing so would cause a safety issue.⁴⁷

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⁴³ Exh. RXS-1T at 34.

24 ⁴⁴ See Exh. RXS-25 at 2.

25 ⁴⁵ Exh. RXS-1T at 35.

26 ⁴⁶ See Exh. RXS-37.

⁴⁷ TR at 60:19-61:12.

1 In short, based on the record before it and common sense, the Commission cannot credibly
2 conclude that Tacoma LNG does not pose safety risks to the neighboring community. The
3 externalities exist and should not be ignored in this proceeding.

4 **C. Substantial portions of the Tacoma LNG facility are unnecessary to**
5 **provide peak shaving service to PSE customers.**

6 The Project's design was driven by the need to accommodate the needs and specifications
7 of PLNG's marine fueling customers. PSE cannot be allowed to recoup costs from ratepayers
8 unless those costs are for facilities that are needed and necessary to provide service to ratepayers.
9 Section III(C)(2) of Dr. Sahu's testimony discusses the aspects of the Project that are unnecessary
10 to satisfy ratepayer needs.⁴⁸

11 For example, PSE's decision to site the Tacoma LNG facility was based on the ability to
12 conveniently and seamlessly deliver LNG to PLNG's maritime fuel customer at the adjacent TOTE
13 facility. This decision required the construction of an expensive four-mile pipeline to deliver feed
14 gas to the LNG facility, and then to transport any vaporized LNG back through that four-mile
15 pipeline to be introduced into PSE's distribution system for ratepayers during periods of peak
16 shaving.⁴⁹

17 Additionally, PSE incurred significant costs in the design and construction of equipment
18 and processes to ensure the fuel produced for PLNG meets a certain quality, despite the fact that
19 no additional treatment is necessary for pipeline gas to be delivered to PSE's ratepayers.⁵⁰ It is
20 generally necessary to remove moisture and CO₂ from feed gas prior to its liquefaction to prevent
21 those constituents from fouling the liquefaction system.⁵¹ However, it is not necessary to remove
22 heavy hydrocarbons (e.g., ethane, propane, butane, and pentane) from feed gas to produce LNG.⁵²

23 ⁴⁸ Exh. RXS-1T at 43-47.

24 ⁴⁹ Exh. RXS-1T at 47.

25 ⁵⁰ Exh. RXS-1T at 48.

26 ⁵¹ Exh. RXS-1T at 44.

⁵² Exh. RXS-1T at 44.

1 During its redesign of the facility, once PSE decided to remove heavy hydrocarbons during
2 pretreatment to ensure it could meet the necessary marine fuel specifications, it had multiple
3 options as to how to dispose of those heavy hydrocarbons. Rather than dispose of TLNG’s process
4 waste in a manner releasing virtually no emissions, PSE chose to flare TLNG’s process waste,
5 releasing pollutants into an already-burdened airshed.

6 The decisions PSE made during the redesign of the facility, which was only necessary to
7 satisfy the needs of PLNG’s business, resulted in an investment in additional pretreatment
8 equipment that provides no benefit to PSE ratepayers. PSE’s attempt to frame the removal of heavy
9 hydrocarbons as a benefit to ratepayers⁵³ should be rejected. PSE does not perform pretreatment
10 to address the Wobbe index of pipeline gas before it is distributed to customers. The Commission
11 should dismiss PSE’s claim that the removal of heavy hydrocarbons from the relatively small
12 volume of gas the Project may provide during peak shaving provides a legitimate benefit to
13 ratepayers.

14 III. ARGUMENT

15 The Commission should disallow all Project costs that were incurred by PSE after
16 September 22, 2016.

17 Section A below explains why those costs were not incurred prudently. Specifically, those
18 costs were incurred solely for the benefit of PSE’s marine fueling business—and since it was
19 commissioned, Tacoma LNG has benefitted only PSE’s for-profit subsidiary. The customer
20 demand projected by PSE has not materialized, and the Project has not been used for peak shaving,
21 the resource need articulated by PSE as its public interest rationale for constructing the Project.
22 Further, the Project is inequitable because it imposes heavy burdens—including air pollution and
23 the risk of catastrophic harm—on its neighbors. Thus, the Project is actively causing disparate
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26 ⁵³ See RXS-28, PSE Response to Public Counsel Data Request No. 28; see also RXS-29, PSE
Response to Public Counsel Data Request No. 28.

1 impacts to the Tribe and surrounding community despite not having performed any peak shaving
2 operations to benefit ratepayers.

3 Section B explains, in the alternative, that PSE has not carried its burden of justifying
4 certain cost items. For example, most of the construction at issue was necessary only for the
5 development of PSE's for-profit marine-fueling business and had no relation to building capacity
6 to benefit ratepayers. Further, PSE has failed to satisfy its burden of showing that legal fees and
7 costs it incurred in relation to the Project are reasonable or appropriately borne by ratepayers.
8 Thus, even if the Commission allows PSE to recoup some of its claimed costs from ratepayers,
9 these categories must be excluded.

10 **A. The Commission Should Protect Ratepayers from Bearing Costs that**
11 **are Not Prudent and in the Public Interest by Disallowing All Project**
12 **Costs.**

13 PSE's investment in Tacoma LNG should be found not prudent and all Project costs
14 incurred by PSE after September 22, 2016 should be disallowed. At least two overriding factors
15 preclude a prudence finding here. The first is the fact that PSE failed to demonstrate credible
16 ratepayer need for this project. PSE oversells Tacoma LNG's benefits to ratepayers and is now
17 attempting to overburden ratepayers with unnecessary costs associated with the facility's
18 construction and operations. The second is that this project was not in the public interest. The
19 Commission must consider the public interest with respect to its regulation of rates, services, and
20 practices.⁵⁴

21 To protect the public interest, the Commission may consider factors such as environmental
22 health and GHG emissions reductions, health and safety concerns, economic development, and
23 equity.⁵⁵ In derogation of the public interest, the Project disproportionately impacts the health and
24 safety of the Tribe and other highly-impacted communities, is contrary to environmental justice,
25 and reinforces structural inequities while providing little or no benefit to ratepayers. Because the

26 ⁵⁴ RCW 80.01.040(3).

⁵⁵ RCW 80.28.425(1).

1 Project’s negative externalities significantly outweigh its benefits to the public, PSE’s investment
2 in Tacoma LNG should be found not prudent and all Project costs incurred by PSE after September
3 22, 2016 should be disallowed.

- 4 1. PSE overstated the ratepayer need for the Project and has not
5 demonstrated that the investment is prudent over the life of the
6 facility.

7 Although there is no single set of factors applied in the Commission’s prudence analysis,⁵⁶
8 one important factor is the need for the resource.⁵⁷ PSE failed to establish that such a need existed
9 here.

10 The Commission should disregard PSE’s claims that the Project has provided a benefit to
11 ratepayers because, as discussed by Public Counsel, the purported ratepayer use of the Project has
12 been performative and unnecessary.⁵⁸

13 In its threshold decision, the Commission noted that *capacity* is, by itself, a used and useful
14 resource “when it is supported by credible forecasts for customer demand.”⁵⁹ However, it also
15 signaled that PSE would need to make a showing that its projected need for the Project’s peak
16 shaving capacity was in fact credible, noting that the Commission will consider the “extent to
17 which the Facility was used as a peak shaving resource” in its deferred prudency analysis.⁶⁰

18 PSE’s use of the Project to deliver gas to customers on days when adequate pipeline gas
19 resources were available does not establish that the Project capacity is used and useful as a peak
20 shaving resource. The Tribe and Dr. Sahu agree with Public Counsel’s witness Dr. Earle that
21

22 ⁵⁶ See e.g., *WUTC v. The Wash. Water Power Co.*, Cause U-83-26, Fifth Supplemental Order at
23 15-16 (January 19, 1984).

24 ⁵⁷ See *WUTC v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co.*, Docket UE-921262, et al., Nineteenth
25 Supplemental Order at 11 (September 27, 1994).

26 ⁵⁸ See Post-Hearing Brief of Public Counsel, Docket UG-230393 (12/8/2023) at ¶¶ 22-26.

⁵⁹ Order 24/10 at ¶ 405.

⁶⁰ Order 24/10 at ¶ 405.

1 PSE’s use of the vaporizer was a manufactured situation performed to give the Commission reason
2 to believe the Project was responding to customer demand.⁶¹

3 PSE similarly overstates and misrepresents the need for ratepayer use of the four-mile
4 transmission pipeline in the context of non-peak shaving deliveries of boil-off gas into its customer
5 distribution system during times Tacoma LNG is not conducting liquefaction.⁶² In response to
6 testimony from Staff and Public Counsel arguing against PSE’s proposed pipeline allocation, PSE
7 witness Donohue testified that it is appropriate for ratepayers to cover the costs of the outbound
8 share of the pipeline based on the use of the outbound pipeline for both peak shaving and to deliver
9 boil-off gas to ratepayers.⁶³ Mr. Donohue’s argument, and PSE’s proposed allocation of pipeline
10 costs is inappropriate because the public purpose of the Project is to provide a peak shaving
11 resource. The delivery of boil-off gas does not meet the definition of peak shaving. Further,
12 outbound use of the pipeline is unnecessary for the disposal of boil-off gas because that waste
13 stream can be directed to the flare, or reliquefied and returned to the storage tank. Instead of
14 utilizing its existing investments to address the boil-off gas, PSE has manufactured a “use” for the
15 boil-off gas stream to justify its proposed allocation of an inappropriate share of pipeline costs to
16 ratepayers.

17 2. PSE Failed to Show that Building Tacoma LNG was in the Public
18 Interest.

19 Another important factor is the public interest.⁶⁴ As the Commission has acknowledged,
20 because PSE’s GRC filing occurred after December 31, 2022, it was the legislature’s intent that
21 the Commission would review PSE’s decision to construct the Project and its recovery of Project-
22 related costs under the standards set forth in RCW 80.28.425.⁶⁵ These standards include “the public

23 ⁶¹ See Exh. RLE-1CT at 17:18–20; see also Exh. RXS-35T at 7.

24 ⁶² See Exh. WFD-5T at 5:5-10 (referencing “PSE’s firm right to call on outbound capacity for
25 peak-shaving or boil-off gas delivery to the outbound function.”).

26 ⁶³ See e.g., Exh. WFD-5T at 4:14-5:15.

⁶⁴ RCW 80.28.425(1).

⁶⁵ See *WUTC v. Cascade Natural Gas Corp.*, Dkt. UG-210755, Order 09, ¶ 53 at FN 31.

1 interest” and whether the rates are fair, just, reasonable, and equitable.⁶⁶ This factor weighs
2 heavily against a prudence finding.

3 a. By Statute, and the Commission’s Own Commitments, the
4 Commission Must Consider Equity in its Analysis.

5 The Commission considers many factors in its public interest analysis, including equity,⁶⁷
6 and it has embraced the Clean Energy Transformation Act’s (CETA) statement of legislative
7 intent.⁶⁸ CETA provides that the public interest includes the “reduction of burdens to vulnerable
8 populations and highly impacted communities” and that in achieving this policy, “there should not
9 be an increase in environmental health impacts to highly impacted communities.”⁶⁹

10 The Commission has also adopted the principles that the legislature announced when it
11 established the Washington Office of Equity.⁷⁰ On those principles, the legislature instructed that
12 equity requires: “developing, strengthening, and supporting policies and procedures that distribute
13 and prioritize resources to those who have been historically and currently marginalized, including
14 tribes”; eliminating the systemic barriers that are “entrenched in systems of inequality and
15 oppression”; and “promoting dignity, honor, and respect for all people.”⁷¹ To this end, the
16 Commission has committed to considering energy justice and equity throughout its decision-
17 making so that its “decisions do not continue to contribute to ongoing systemic harms.”⁷² And to
18 reduce inequities and to promote the public interest, the Commission has incorporated into its
19 decision-making the “core tenets of energy justice”, a four-tiered framework for the evaluation of
20 energy projects, which considers:⁷³

21 ⁶⁶ RCW 80.28.425(1).

22 ⁶⁷ *Id.*

23 ⁶⁸ See *WUTC v. Cascade Natural Gas Corp.*, Dkt. UG-210755, Order 09, ¶ 52 (Aug. 23, 2022)
(citing RCW 19.405.010).

24 ⁶⁹ RCW 19.405.010(6).

25 ⁷⁰ *Cascade Natural*, *supra* Order 09 at ¶ 55.

26 ⁷¹ RCW 43.06D.020(3)(a).

⁷² *Cascade Natural*, *supra* Order 09 at ¶ 58.

⁷³ *Cascade Natural*, *supra* Order 09 at ¶ 56.

- 1 • Distributional justice, which includes ensuring that marginalized and vulnerable
2 populations do not receive an inordinate share of the burdens;
- 3 • Procedural justice, which includes ensuring that decision-making is more inclusive,
4 recognizing that marginalized and vulnerable populations have been excluded from
5 decision-making processes historically;
- 6 • Recognition justice, which includes making efforts to reconcile historic and ongoing
7 inequalities; and
- 8 • Restorative justice, which seeks to disrupt and address distributional, recognitional, or
9 procedural injustices, and to correct them through laws, rules, policies, orders, and
10 practices.⁷⁴

11 While the Commission may view itself "primarily as an *economic* regulator,"⁷⁵ it has the
12 authority, and an obligation, to apply these principles of equity and energy justice to its
13 determination of the prudence of the costs incurred by PSE.

14 b. PSE must demonstrate that its investments are prudent and
15 in the public interest throughout the life of the Project.

16 The Commission recognizes that an equity lens is foundational to its review of "all
17 requests, proposals, and recommendations" and has repeatedly stated that it is committed to
18 applying an equity lens in all public interest considerations going forward.⁷⁶ The Commission has
19 held that "regulated companies should inquire whether each proposed modification to their rates,
20 practices, or operations corrects or perpetuates inequities."⁷⁷ To meaningfully apply that equity
21 lens to the Project—which will impact the Tribe and surrounding communities for decades—the

22
23 ⁷⁴ *See id.*

24 ⁷⁵ Final Order 24/10 at ¶ 427.

25 ⁷⁶ *See e.g.*, Order 24/10 at ¶ 421 (quoting *WUTC v. Cascade Natural Gas Corporation*, Docket
26 UG-210755 Order 09 ¶ 58 (August 23, 2022)).

⁷⁷ Order 24/10 at ¶ 57 (quoting *WUTC v. Cascade Natural Gas Corporation*, Docket UG-210755
Order 10 ¶ 58 (August 23, 2022)).

1 Commission must consider the prudence of PSE’s expenditures both in light of what it knew at
2 the time those costs were incurred as well as over the life of the investment.⁷⁸

3 In the Consolidated Dockets, the Commission appeared concerned about fully applying the
4 current public interest standard to its analysis of the Project. It acknowledged that the facts
5 surrounding the Project presented difficult questions about how to apply an equity lens while also
6 applying the Commission’s long-standing principles of ratemaking.⁷⁹ In approving a profoundly
7 limited settlement in Order 24/10, the Commission justified disregarding the inequities associated
8 with the Company’s decisions for the Project by holding that PSE’s decision to construct the
9 facility, made in September 2016, should not “retroactively” be held to the current public interest
10 standard because that standard evolved during the pendency of the Tacoma LNG Project.⁸⁰

11 The Commission did not hold, however, that the Project is not subject to the current public
12 interest standard. Instead, the Commission limited its approval and adoption of the Amended
13 Settlement Stipulation and Agreement on Tacoma LNG (Tacoma LNG Settlement) to the
14 “prudence of the Company’s actions up through the initial decision to build the Tacoma LNG
15 Facility on September 22, 2016.”⁸¹ This limited decision deferred the Commission’s review of
16 “the prudence and reasonableness of costs incurred” after September 22, 2016, to the current
17 proceeding.⁸²

18 In its examination of whether, in the context of the full life of the Project, PSE prudently
19 incurred costs for the construction and operation of the Project, the Commission must not ignore
20 its legislative mandate or disregard its commitment to considering equities and addressing ongoing
21 systemic harms.

22
23 ⁷⁸ Order 24/10 at ¶ 425 (citing Used and Useful Policy Statement at ¶ 20).

24 ⁷⁹ Order 24/10 at ¶ 421.

25 ⁸⁰ Order 24/10 at ¶ 427.

26 ⁸¹ Order 24/10 at ¶ 393.

⁸² Order 24/10 at ¶ 393.

1 c. The Inequities Associated with Tacoma LNG Militate
2 Against a Finding that the Costs Incurred by PSE are
3 Prudent or in the Public Interest Over the Life of the
4 Project.

5 In Order 24/10, the Commission made a threshold determination that PSE’s initial decision
6 to construct the Tacoma LNG facility on September 22, 2016 was prudent, but it deferred any
7 determination as to the prudence of PSE’s recovery of costs and the appropriate rate of return on
8 its investment.

9 PSE has argued that this equity analysis should not apply to its attempt to pass the cost of
10 building Tacoma LNG onto ratepayers because RCW 80.28.425(1) was enacted after PSE decided
11 to build Tacoma LNG. That argument—to the extent PSE is offering it—should be rejected, for
12 two reasons.

13 First, long before PSE decided to build Tacoma LNG, the Commission required regulated
14 companies to establish that their capital expenditures were “prudent” before allowing them to pass
15 the costs onto ratepayers. *WUTC v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc.*, Dkt. UE-031725, Order 12 at ¶ 19
16 (Apr. 7, 2004); *WUTC v. The Wash. Water Power Co.*, Cause U-83-26, 5th Supp. Order at 15–16
17 (Jan. 19, 1984). And the Commission’s legislative mandate has always been to regulate in the
18 public interest. RCW 80.01.040(3). The Commission’s decisions have identified many different
19 factors that should be considered in this analysis and have repeatedly stressed that the factors
20 identified are nonexclusive and that the specific factors to be considered will vary depending on
21 the facts of each case. *See, e.g., The Wash. Water Power Co., supra*, 5th Supp. Order at 15–16
22 (applying thirteen factors and stating that “[a]dditional factors may be considered in subsequent
23 cases as dictated by the facts”). The unique facts of this case include PSE building a facility that
24 (1) has the potential to cause a catastrophic accident in a highly-populated area and (2) will emit
25 carcinogens and other harmful contaminants into an Indian reservation. With or without a
26 legislative mandate, it was incumbent on PSE to consider the prudence and public interest
implications of building this facility in this location.

1 Second, regardless of what PSE believes was required in 2016, the legislature now requires
2 the Commission to conduct a public interest analysis, and this Commission has determined that
3 such analysis must include these equitable considerations. *Cascade Natural, supra* Order 09 at ¶
4 58. PSE had no vested right to assume, in 2016, that the law would remain unchanged. There “is
5 neither a vested right in an existing law which precludes its amendment or repeal nor a vested right
6 in the omission to legislate on a particular subject.” *Kellogg v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.*, 199
7 Wn.2d 205, 230–31, 504 P.3d 796 (2022) (quoting *Godfrey v. State*, 84 Wn.2d 959, 962–63, 530
8 P.2d 630 (1975)). No “one can have a vested right in any general rule of law or policy of legislation
9 which entitles [them] to insist that it remain unchanged for [their] benefit.” *Id.* at 231 (alterations
10 in original) (quoting *Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason*, 80 Wn.2d 445, 452, 495
11 P.2d 657 (1972)). In other words, “there can be no vested right in legislation remaining
12 unchanged.” *Id.*; see also *United States v. Carlton*, 512 U.S. 26, 33–34, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 129 L.
13 Ed. 2d 22 (1994) (legislation is not a promise, and the fact that individuals may have relied on
14 existing legislation to their detriment does not preclude even retroactive changes to the law).

15 Thus, when PSE chose to build Tacoma LNG, it ran the risk that the legal prerequisites for
16 passing the costs onto ratepayers would change. Moreover, since at least 2004, Washington’s
17 Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC) has required an analysis of the equities when
18 deciding whether to certify an energy facility site. See WAC 463-60-535. An application for
19 certification must include, for example, a “description of whether or not any minority or low-
20 income populations would be ... disproportionately impacted.” WAC 463-60-535(1)(e). PSE
21 demonstrated its awareness of EFSEC’s standards when it formally sought a determination that
22 EFSEC lacked jurisdiction over Tacoma LNG and, thus, could play no role in determining whether
23 PSE could build this facility on the border of the Tribe’s Reservation. Thus, when it chose Tacoma
24 LNG’s location, PSE was on notice that Washington law favors consideration of equitable
25 principles when evaluating energy companies’ decisions about where to site their facilities.
26

1 PSE might have assumed that avoiding EFSEC jurisdiction gave it a license to ignore the
2 burdens it was foisting on an already over-burdened community. But that callous assumption did
3 not preclude either the legislature or this Commission from further developing the public interest
4 analysis. *Kellogg*, 199 Wn.2d at 230–31.

5 Moreover, the need to consider equity became increasingly apparent following PSE’s 2016
6 decision to build Tacoma LNG, as opposition from the Tribe and the general public grew. The
7 notion that a company can act prudently by ignoring a project’s impacts on the surrounding
8 community, despite vociferous public outcry, simply because its decision to build the project was
9 made a few years before the legislature explicitly mandated a consideration of such impacts,
10 contravenes basic principles of justice and the very definition of the word “prudent.” The
11 Commission was therefore correct in ruling that equity must be considered in this case. *Cascade*
12 *Natural*, *supra* Order 09 at ¶ 53.

13 And it is beyond reasonable dispute that Tacoma LNG’s impacts are inequitable. During
14 its relatively short period of operation, the Tacoma LNG facility has caused exactly the type of
15 harm the Tribe has long warned against. As highlighted by PSCAA’s Notices of Violation, Tacoma
16 LNG’s air emissions are negatively impacting the airshed that it shares with the Tribe and other
17 highly-impacted communities. Dr. Sahu’s uncontroverted testimony establishes that these
18 disparate impacts are inequitable, and PSE’s costs incurred creating that inequity were not prudent
19 and should be disallowed in their entirety.

20 **B. PSE fails to carry its burden of proof regarding specific costs.**

21 The Commission cannot allow PSE to recover any costs from ratepayers unless and until
22 PSE has carried its burden of showing they were incurred prudently. PSE has failed to show that
23 certain specific costs meet that standard. As discussed in Section III(B)(1) below, the Commission
24 must deny all costs incurred by PSE to design, construct, and operate Project features that provide
25 no benefit to ratepayers. For example, PSE cannot recoup the costs of any construction required
26 only for PSE’s for-profit marine-fueling business.

1 Section III(B)2 discusses why PSE has failed to satisfy its burden of showing that legal
2 fees and costs it incurred in relation to the Project are reasonable or appropriately borne by
3 ratepayers. Even if the Commission allows the Company to recoup some Project costs from
4 ratepayers, these categories must be excluded.

5 1. Costs incurred solely to meet the requirements of PLNG or its
6 customers cannot be borne by ratepayers.

7 The dual use aspect of the Project and its funding require that the Commission closely
8 scrutinize all costs PSE seeks, to ensure ratepayers are not improperly subsidizing the for-profit
9 operations of PLNG. As discussed below and *supra* in Section II.C, many Project costs incurred
10 by PSE were for the benefit of PLNG and not ratepayers.

11 a. Facility modifications to meet marine fuel quality
12 requirements increased costs and negative externalities
13 while providing no benefit to ratepayers.

14 In its response to a Staff data request, PSE admitted that if the facility were used only for
15 liquefaction and LNG storage later to be vaporized to meet peak shaving, a redesign of the facility
16 would not have been necessary.⁸³ PSE found this redesign was necessary to produce the quality of
17 gas necessary for its marine fueling business due to changes in the composition of pipeline gas.⁸⁴
18 This admission led Staff to conclude that the redesign was not intended to serve the interests of
19 PSE's ratepayers. The Tribe agrees with Staff's conclusion that the Commission should deny
20 PSE's recovery of the costs of the facility redesign.

21 However, as set forth in Dr. Sahu's testimony, the scope of increased costs associated with
22 the redesign exceeds the \$500,000 acknowledged by Staff.⁸⁵ This is because the redesign was
23 followed by construction and operation of extra pretreatment processes.⁸⁶ During the redesign,
24 PSE decided to remove heavy hydrocarbons through additional pretreatment processes that occur

25 ⁸³ See Exh. BAE-5.

26 ⁸⁴ See Exh. RJR-8C at 15.

⁸⁵ See Exh. RXS-35T at 9-10.

⁸⁶ See Exh. RXS-1T at Section III(C)(2).

1 following the removal of moisture and CO₂ from the feed gas.^{87,88} Because this decision was
2 driven by the needs of PLNG and the additional process and operations provide no benefit to
3 ratepayers, the Commission should also deny the recovery of any costs incurred by PSE in the
4 construction and operation of the additional pretreatment processes.

5 In addition to the costs associated with the construction and equipment and operation of
6 the extra pretreatment process, PSE's redesign created another issue—how to dispose of the heavy
7 hydrocarbons removed during processing. The extra pretreatment step creates an extra waste gas
8 stream that contains numerous heavy hydrocarbons and sulfur compounds (which are harmful to
9 human health and the environment).⁸⁹ PSE decided to dispose of this waste gas through the
10 construction of a complex and unique flare.⁹⁰ The complexity of the flare has resulted in increased
11 Project costs, as Mr. Roberts acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing, it was necessary for PSE
12 to bring in outside experts to address flare operations, and the Company has “thrown a lot of
13 resources at it both internal and external” including bringing in “many consultants, experts in the
14 field to work on the flare itself.”⁹¹ Not only did PSE's decisions made during the redesign increase
15 Project costs, but those decisions also increased Tacoma LNG's emissions of harmful pollutants
16 to surrounding communities. Tacoma LNG's permit application acknowledges that a host of Toxic
17 Air Pollutants and Hazardous Air Pollutants are emitted by the facility.⁹²

18 Furthermore, PSE's response to the NOV's demonstrate that the facility redesign—and
19 PSE's decision to construct a complex and unique flare—have contributed to numerous instances

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21 ⁸⁷ *See id.* at 44.

22 ⁸⁸ The Commission should not be misled by PSE's attempt to conflate pretreatment removal of
23 moisture and CO₂ from the feed gas stream, which is necessary for liquefaction, and the heavy
24 hydrocarbon removal process, which is conducted only to achieve a desired quality of LNG for
25 marine fueling uses. *See* Exh. RXS-1T at 44.

26 ⁸⁹ *See* Exh. RXS-1T at 45.

⁹⁰ *See* Exh. RXS-1T at 45; *see also* Exh. RXS-35T at 10.

⁹¹ TR 62:2-10.

⁹² *See* Exh. RXS-1T at 22.

1 where gases were directed to a diversion vent and released directly to the airshed rather than being
2 directed to the flare for destruction.⁹³

3 In sum, PSE's decision to remove and flare heavy hydrocarbons created an excessive waste
4 stream, which required PSE to design, construct, and operate extraordinary facility design features
5 necessary dispose of that waste. As such, the resulting increase in Project costs and facility air
6 emissions associated with the ground flare are a result of the needs of PLNG customers, not
7 ratepayers.⁹⁴ The costs associated with pretreatment, including Tacoma LNG's flare, are driven
8 by PLNG's for-profit marine fueling operations. Accordingly, it is inappropriate for ratepayers to
9 be forced to bear any costs associated with pretreating the already pipeline-quality gas that comes
10 into the facility or flaring the waste created by that pretreatment. The Commission should deny all
11 costs associated with the facility redesign and also all costs associated with the construction and
12 operation of the extra pretreatment equipment and the complex ground flare made necessary by
13 that extra equipment.

14 2. On this Record, the Commission Cannot Legitimately Require
15 Ratepayers to Reimburse PSE's Legal Fees and Costs.

16 Whether a party is seeking legal costs from a court or from this Commission, costs incurred
17 in litigation must be reasonable.⁹⁵ In Washington, there are well-accepted ways of determining
18 the reasonableness of legal fees and costs. Here, PSE has failed to demonstrate that its legal fees
19 and costs are reasonable. Indeed, cross examination of Susan Free demonstrated that the
20 Commission does not even have a record *by which it can assess* the reasonableness of the legal
21 costs that PSE seeks to hang on ratepayers.

22 The burden of demonstrating that legal fees are reasonable is on the fee applicant. *Scott*
23 *Fetzer Co. v. Weeks*, 122 Wn.2d 141, 151, 859 P.2d 1210 (1993). In assessing reasonableness,

24 ⁹³ See Exh. RXS-37T at 60-61 (describing "Flare Controls Resolution").

25 ⁹⁴ See Exh. RXS-1T at 46.

26 ⁹⁵ Notably, in this context, the same Rules of Professional Conduct requirements apply as in any
other, including the rules governing legal fees. If anything, ratepayers are innocent third parties
who deserve more protections than do litigants held responsible for an opposing party's legal fees
and costs.

1 “[c]ourts must take an *active* role in assessing the reasonableness of fee awards, rather than treating
2 cost decisions as a litigation afterthought” and “should not simply accept unquestioningly fee
3 affidavits from counsel.” *Mahler v. Szucs*, 135 Wn.2d 398, 434–35, 957 P.2d 632, 966 P.2d 305
4 (1998), overruled on other grounds by *Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 173 Wn.2d 643,
5 272 P.3d 802 (2012)

6 In Washington, a determination of reasonable attorney fees typically begins with a
7 calculation of the “lodestar,” which is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
8 multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. *Mahler*, 135 Wn.2d at 433–34. Such must comply with the
9 ethical rules for attorneys, including the general rule that a lawyer shall not charge an unreasonable
10 fee. RPC 1.5; *Fetzer*, 122 Wn.2d at 149–50.

11 Whether or not the Commission uses the lodestar method to determine the reasonableness
12 of the fees and costs PSE incurred, there still needs to be a sufficient record demonstrating their
13 reasonableness (and a reviewing court will almost certainly require one). As an example, in *Fetzer*,
14 the Washington Supreme Court reversed an award of fees where “a total of 481.49 hours—the
15 equivalent of almost 3 months of uninterrupted legal work by one attorney—was awarded, with
16 no examination of the actual reasonableness of these hours.” *Fetzer*, 122 Wn.2d at 152, 859 P.2d
17 1210. In protecting ratepayers from unsupported fee requests, the Commission has recognized
18 these principles. See *Washington Utilities & Transp. Comm’n*, 239 P.U.R.4th 95 (Feb. 18, 2005)
19 (“Here the evidence is sparse and will support no more than what we allow.”).

20 A decision allowing a recoupment of fees unsupported by an adequate record will be
21 remanded. See *Mahler*, 135 Wn.2d at 435; *Eagle Point Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Coy*, 102 Wn.
22 App. 697, 715–16, 9 P.3d 898 (2000). Further, a tribunal allowing a party to recoup legal fees and
23 costs “must do more than give lip service to the word ‘reasonable.’” *Berryman v. Metcalf*, 177
24 Wn. App. 644, 658, 312 P.3d 745 (2013). Indeed, failure to ascertain whether fees and costs are
25 "duplicative or unnecessary" constitutes "reversible error." *Id.* at 658–59.

1 a. PSE has failed to demonstrate that its legal fees and costs
2 related to the Tacoma LNG Project are reasonable and
3 appropriate.

4 In the present matter, PSE has woefully failed to demonstrate that the legal fees and costs
5 for which it seeks reimbursement were reasonable and appropriate.⁹⁶ In fact, following the cross-
6 examination of PSE's primary witness on legal costs and fees, Ms. Free, it is not clear what exactly
7 comprise the fees and costs underlying PSE's reimbursement request. For example, Ms. Free was
8 unable to articulate whether PSE seeks reimbursement of legal fees only, or if it also asks
9 ratepayers to pay for the expert witnesses that PSE hired.⁹⁷ The Commission cannot legitimately
10 assess the reasonableness of a reimbursement request without knowing what is being reimbursed.

11 Indeed, cross-examination showed Ms. Free's testimony that "PSE's legal fees related to
12 the Tacoma LNG Project are reasonable and appropriate" to be completely hollow. Ms. Free could
13 not articulate the difference between reasonable and unreasonable fees.⁹⁸ Ms. Free could not even
14 identify the pieces of litigation from which the fees emanate, much less what those cases involved,
15 the number of attorneys representing PSE in those matters and/or what rates those unknown
16 attorneys charged for their work.⁹⁹ When asked the market rate for environmental attorneys in
17 western Washington during the relevant years, Ms. Free was unable to provide the Commission
18 with that information.¹⁰⁰

19 Ms. Free's "reasonable and appropriate" testimony is further belied by the fact that she was
20 not the one who reviewed or approved legal bills from outside counsel, nor could she identify who
21 performed that review or what it consisted of.¹⁰¹ However, the Commission should note that Ms.
22 Free did state that she was not aware of PSE ever disputing a bill that it received from outside

23 ⁹⁶ As such, the Commission need not search for reasons to give "little weight" to Dr. Sahu's or Mr.
24 Earle's testimony on this issue.

25 ⁹⁷ See TR at 99:21-100:7.

26 ⁹⁸ See TR 100:15-101:24; see also TR 102:7-102:21.

⁹⁹ See TR 104:9-104:13; see also 114:11-115:15.

¹⁰⁰ See TR 113:9-19.

¹⁰¹ See TR 111:20-112:4.

1 counsel.¹⁰² That testimony is significant because the monthly legal spend that PSE claims in this
2 matter was enormous—indeed, PSE contends that it was billed in excess of \$1 million in certain
3 months.^{103, 104}

4 The record is similarly deficient regarding the Company’s “internal” fees, and PSE fails to
5 make the necessary showing that claimed “internal” fees for in-house counsel are reasonable and
6 appropriate. Ms. Free confirmed that its internal legal costs were those incurred by PSE’s in-house
7 counsel.¹⁰⁵ However, she was unable to identify the scope of those claimed costs or testify as to
8 whether such “internal costs” were restricted to attorneys.¹⁰⁶

9 In short, the record does not establish the reasonableness of PSE’s legal fees and costs.
10 Accordingly, the Commission cannot legitimately foist them onto ratepayers.

11 b. Even if PSE had demonstrated that its legal fees and costs
12 were reasonable, they are still PSE’s responsibility.

13 Even if the Commission determines that PSE’s legal costs were reasonable—which
14 determination would be reversible pursuant to RCW 34.05.370(e) and (i)—ratepayers are not
15 responsible for them because litigation fees and costs are non-recurring expenses. *See Washington*
16 *Utilities & Transp. Comm’n*, 204 P.U.R.4th 1 (Sept. 29, 2000) (disallowing litigation fees and
17 costs: “We will follow the general rule against including out-of-period, non-recurring expenses in
18 rates.”); *see also Amended Petition of Puget Sound Energy, Inc. for an Ord. Authorizing the Use*
19 *of the Proceeds from the Sale of Renewable Energy Credits & Carbon Fin. Instruments*, 282
20 P.U.R.4th 303 (May 20, 2010) (reducing REC sales premium “by the \$4.6 million in litigation
21 costs for which PSE’s shareholders should be held accountable”); *Washington Utilities & Transp.*

22 ¹⁰² See TR 112:5-8.

23 ¹⁰³ Failing to protect ratepayers from responsibility for such excessive costs creates a perverse
24 incentive for utilities to do controversial things and take a scorched earth approach to defending
25 them in litigation.

26 ¹⁰⁴ See Exh. RLE-12, Attachment A (PSE Response to Public Counsel Data Request No. 26).

¹⁰⁵ See TR 99:9-14.

¹⁰⁶ See TR 99:21-100:7.

1 *Comm'n*, 239 P.U.R.4th 95 (Feb. 18, 2005) (“Based on the evidence, including discussion at
2 hearing, it appears to us that the amount of the Deloitte fee is not representative of the level of
3 ongoing expense PSE might reasonably be expected to incur. The consulting assignment in this
4 instance concerned a matter more complicated and contentious than what the Company might
5 expect to encounter on a year in and year out basis.”).

6 c. Because PSE’s legal costs and fees are properly rejected,
7 the Tribe agrees with PSE that an audit is unnecessary.

8 Because PSE has failed to make the requisite showing that its legal fees and costs are
9 reasonable and appropriate, the inquiry is over—this Commission cannot legitimately make
10 ratepayers responsible for PSE’s exorbitant legal costs. Accordingly, there is no need to perform
11 the audit that Public Counsel urges.

12 **IV. CONCLUSION**

13 Because PSE cannot satisfy the Commission-established standards to meet its burden of
14 showing that the costs incurred by PSE for the Tacoma LNG project were reasonable, appropriate,
15 and in the public interest, the Commission should find that PSE’s post-September 22, 2016
16 decisions regarding the Project were not prudent and disallow PSE from recovering its investments
17 in the Tacoma LNG Project.

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19 DATED this 8th day of December, 2023, at Seattle, Washington.

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21 OGDEN MURPHY WALLACE, P.L.L.C.
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