EXHIBIT NO. __(DEM-3C) DOCKET NO. UE-12___ PCA 10 COMPLIANCE WITNESS: DAVID E. MILLS

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

In the Matter of the Petition of

PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.

Docket No. UE-12____

For Approval of its March 2012 Power Cost Adjustment Mechanism Report

SECOND EXHIBIT (CONFIDENTIAL) TO THE PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DAVID E. MILLS ON BEHALF OF PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.

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MARCH 30, 2012



1	PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.
2 3 4	ILLUSTRATION OF PSE'S PORTFOLIO AND RISK MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES FOR PCA PERIOD 10 POWER SUPPLY FOR THE SINGLE MONTH AUGUST 2011
5	I. PUGET SOUND ENERGY'S HEDGING PLAN
6	The purpose of this exhibit is to illustrate the manner in which Puget Sound Energy,
7	Inc. ("PSE") manages its electric portfolio, including risk management activities, by
8	describing how PSE managed power supply and costs for a single month during PCA
9	Period 10: August 2011.
10	The Energy Management Committee ("EMC") is responsible for providing
11	oversight and direction on all portfolio risk issues in addition to approving long-term
12	resource contracts and acquisitions. Power and Gas Supply Operations Staff ("Staff")
13	follow the EMC approved Programmatic Hedge strategy to guide them in the specific time
14	periods and quantities of energy to hedge. PSE manages its short-term energy supply
15	hedging and portfolio risk activities in accordance with the EMC-approved Energy Supply
16	Hedging & Optimization Procedures Manual ("Procedures Manual"). In addition, the
17	Audit Committee of PSE's Board of Directors also provides oversight of these activities in
18	accordance with PSE's Energy Risk Policy.
19	On July 22, 2004, the EMC approved the original programmatic hedging strategy,
20	with a Staff transactional purview of the state of the . The programmatic hedge strategy
21	authorizes Staff to use a dollar cost averaging informed by Margin at Risk ("MaR")
22	analysis, with defined minimum and maximum monthly exposure limits. See Exhibit
	Second Exhibit (Confidential) to the Exhibit No. (DEM-3C)

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1	No. (DEM-5C) for a PowerPoint presentation on MaR. This hedging plan increases
2	Staff's ability to react to position changes due to stream or hydro flow variation, forced
3	thermal plant outages and changing market conditions.
4	The term of the EMC approved strategy, known as the "Programmatically Managed
5	Hedge" period, consisted of the last
6	known as the "Rolling Hedge". The first
7	following control) of the control purview were actively managed ("Actively
8	Managed Hedge") in accordance with the Procedures Manual.
9	On January 7, 2006, the "Rolling Control of Control Hedge" was amended to be a "Rolling
10	Hedge" and the Actively Managed Hedge was extended to include the current
11	month plus the next extension . In October 2007, consistent with PSE's benchmarking of
12	hedging best practices and market research efforts tailored to measure the value of energy
13	commodity hedging to customers, PSE extended its hedging tenor from to to the second second .
14	At that time, the first sector of this period became the Actively Managed Hedge period
15	and the remaining and the second second through (b) became the Programmatically
16	Managed Hedge period in accordance with the EMC approved strategy. The
17	Programmatically Managed Hedge period is currently referred to as the "Rolling
18	"hedge. The Programmatically Managed Hedge is designed to reduce PSE's net
19	power portfolio exposure starting and a starting in advance of delivery, subject to minimum and
20	maximum exposure reduction, based upon a fundamental view and is intended to remove
21	commodity price volatility.
22	All of the transactions for the "sample PCA month" (August 2011) were executed
23	after the extension of the hedging strategy and many were transacted more than
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prior to delivery, leaving primarily shorter-term balancing transactions to respond to changes in market heat rates, load conditions, unit assumptions and other variables.

3 The Programmatically Managed Hedge is designed to reduce the power portfolio's 4 total net exposure for each month, so that the total net exposure will fall below the EMC 5 exposure limits set forth in the Procedures Manual when each month falls into Staff's 6 Actively Managed Hedge. The "maximum" monthly hedge is calculated by dividing the 7 total net exposure by the remaining months prior to the time when the position falls into the 8 Actively Managed Hedge term. The "minimum" monthly hedge is calculated by dividing 9 the total net exposure (plus or minus the Director's limit authority) by the remaining 10 months prior to the time when the position falls into the Actively Managed Hedge. The 11 "mid-point" monthly hedge is the average of the "maximum" and the "minimum" monthly 12 hedge amounts. If such a month's position already falls within the Director's exposure 13 limit authority, there is no monthly hedge requirement. As defined in Schedule F of the 14 Procedures Manual, "Spot Market Exposure for Gas and Power Portfolios", the Director 15 has exposure authority up to the CFO/CRO level (\$ monthly or \$ for the 16 period). Spot market exposure above the CFO/CRO level requires rolling notification to the EMC. See Exhibit No. (DEM-10C) for the Schedule F excerpt from 17 18 the Procedures Manual.

During the Actively Managed Hedge period, Staff manages the monthly net
exposure in accordance with the Procedures Manual. The exposure is calculated
individually for peak, off-peak, and gas for power positions. The authority limit is
calculated on the net spot exposure of all three positions. Spot market exposure is

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1	measured by multiplying the open position by the hourly spot price. See Exhibit
2	No. (DEM-10C) for the spot market exposure limits from the Procedures Manual.
3	Margin at Risk measures risk reduction as a result of incremental hedging. As
4	PSE's hedging strategy evolved, the MaR concept was added to the evaluation process in
5	May 2004 for the Programmatically Managed Hedge strategy to measure risk reduction for
6	various alternatives. MaR analysis shows how much risk reduction is gained by month and
7	by strategy – providing an additional tool to determine which commodity is the best choice
8	and for which month given a credit-constrained environment. The MaR calculation shows
9	the amount of portfolio risk removed for each hedging dollar spent when 25 MW of on-
10	peak or off-peak power or 5,000-MMBtu/day of gas is transacted.
11	The remainder of this report will illustrate the systems and tools used by Staff and
12	their application for PCA Period 10 by describing actual hedging strategy decisions and the
13	execution thereof by PSE. Detailed explanation is provided in section II.A for
14	with respect to power supply for delivery in August 2011. For
15	all subsequent months, please reference sections II.B through V which provide a summary
16	of the second second second , and reviews the analysis and fundamental views relied upon
17	by Staff to make hedging decisions for August 2011. Section IV provides a description of
18	the exhibits, Exhibit No. (DEM-4C) through Exhibit No. (DEM-13C), which
19	provide additional detail supporting this narrative.
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1	During During , as part of the Programmatically Managed Hedge, Staff
2	reviewed market fundamentals and came up with a hedging strategy for the
3	through August 2011 time frame. Although a strengthening U.S. dollar and weakening oil
4	prices put downward pressure on natural gas prices, prompt month natural gas prices
5	remained fairly strong and volatile given the summer hurricane activity and current
6	weather forecasts. Long term natural gas prices were still high compared to historic levels.
7	However, the potential existed for prices to move even higher - rather than lower - if
8	storage injections were to fall below forecasts, weather in the East were to get warmer,
9	hurricane activity were to pick up and winter weather forecasts were to start calling for
10	below normal temperatures. Staff elected to continue hedging to the state of the
11	Programmatically Managed Hedge. See Exhibit No. (DEM-11C) for the fundamentals
12	and market prices that affected August 2011.
13	Near the end of Contraction , the Mint Farm Energy Center ("Mint Farm") gas-
14	fired combined cycle combustion turbine with 296 MW of additional capacity was added to
15	the power portfolio. As a result, the August 2011 position became
16	due to the fact that market heat rates were the dispatch heat rate of Mint
17	Farm which, therefore, was set to be the set of the set
18	No(DEM-12C).
19	By late and the second second second , signs of a global economic slow down began to emerge
20	and energy prices appeared to have peaked. In the energy , the U.S. economy was
21	falling into what would become the worst economic recession since the Great Depression.
22	Other economies around the world soon followed the U.S. into recession, pulling energy
23	prices down with them. See Exhibit No. (DEM-13C).
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1	Both near and long-term energy demand and production forecasts were being
2	revised almost weekly as global economies spiraled deeper into recession. At the same
3	time, great strides were being made in the unconventional natural gas drilling technologies
4	used to extract gas from developments - such as shale - in the U.S. As the drilling
5	technology improved, these once high cost unconventional sites now became more cost
6	competitive. In addition, production estimates from these developments greatly exceeded
7	original estimates.
8	Lower energy demand and the potential for greater cost competitive domestic
9	production continued to keep downward pressure on energy prices. While this was most
10	evident in the near-term price curve, it was less evident in the Rolling evident period as
11	forecasts and expectations for economic recovery were being discussed. Nonetheless,
12	prices in the Rolling Continued were softening and Staff continued to hedge at Continued to
13	. It was unclear
14	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might
14 15	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices.
14 15 16	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices. During concerns through concerns , in accordance with the maximum
14 15 16 17	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices. During additional through additional , in accordance with the maximum hedging strategy, Staff reduced PSE's August 2011 exposure by
14 15 16 17 18	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices. During and through additional upward pressure on natural gas prices , in accordance with the maximum hedging strategy, Staff reduced PSE's August 2011 exposure by additional upward for August 2011 delivery. By the end of
14 15 16 17 18 19	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices. During and through and the secondance with the maximum hedging strategy, Staff reduced PSE's August 2011 exposure by additional and the secondance for August 2011 delivery. By the end of additional and the second second and the second second second second second second second second second second during additional and the second se
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices. During through for accordance with the maximum hedging strategy, Staff reduced PSE's August 2011 exposure by Staff reduced for August 2011 delivery. By the end of Staff reduced , due to PSE's hedging program, as well as lower market prices as shown in Exhibit No. (DEM-13C), PSE's August 2011 power exposure was Staff reduced , a
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices. During through for a condance with the maximum hedging strategy, Staff reduced PSE's August 2011 exposure by Condense for August 2011 delivery. By the end of Condense , due to PSE's hedging program, as well as lower market prices as shown in Exhibit No. (DEM-13C), PSE's August 2011 power exposure was Condense , a reduction of from the Condense exposure when August 2011 rolled into
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices. During through through for a condance with the maximum hedging strategy, Staff reduced PSE's August 2011 exposure by for a conditional delivery. By the end of for August 2011 delivery. By the end of for August 2011 power exposure was for a shown in Exhibit No. (DEM-13C), PSE's August 2011 power exposure was for a shown in from the formation of the from the formation of exposure when August 2011 rolled into Staff's Programmatically Managed Hedge purview.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices. During through from the production, in accordance with the maximum hedging strategy, Staff reduced PSE's August 2011 exposure by for a strategy. By the end of for August 2011 delivery. By the end of for August 2011 delivery. By the end of for August 2011 delivery. By the end of for August 2011 power exposure was for a shown in Exhibit No (DEM-13C), PSE's August 2011 power exposure was for a shown in Staff's Programmatically Managed Hedge purview.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	as to how the natural gas markets would respond given concerns that producers might curtail some production, thereby putting additional upward pressure on natural gas prices. During through through in accordance with the maximum hedging strategy, Staff reduced PSE's August 2011 exposure by Exercise for August 2011 delivery. By the end of defined, due to PSE's hedging program, as well as lower market prices as shown in Exhibit No. (DEM-13C), PSE's August 2011 power exposure was Exercise , a reduction of from the Exercise exposure when August 2011 rolled into Staff's Programmatically Managed Hedge purview. REDACTED VERSION Exhibit No. (DEM-3C)

1	An overview of PSE's hedging activities for August 2011 can be found in Exhibit
2	Nos. (DEM-7C) and (DEM-8C). Exhibit No. (DEM-7C) provides details of
3	each hedge transacted for August 2011. The hedges are charted by transaction date and
4	transaction price for on-peak (also referred to as "heavy load hours", which represents the
5	sixteen hours ending 0700 through 2200 Monday through Saturday, except NERC
6	holidays), off-peak (also referred to as "light load hours", which represents the eight hours
7	ending 0100 through 0600 and 2300 through 2400 Monday through Saturday, except
8	NERC holidays, as well as all 24 hours of NERC defined holidays and Sundays), flat
9	(which represents hours 0100 through 2400) and gas for power. The charts in Exhibit
10	No. (DEM-8C) show the mid-mark (as provided by a third-party, independent source)
11	and the price at which the hedge was executed relative to the market price movement for
12	August 2011.
10	
13	B. <u>Inrougn</u>
14	During the months Example 1 through Example 2 , Staff managed the August
15	2011 spot market exposure similar to the and a quarter of and a –to reduce the monthly
16	exposures at a level pursuant to the Programmatically Managed Hedge strategy
17	- with an eye towards the power and natural gas market fundamentals which include water
18	supply and weather conditions.
19	Looking at delivery month August 2011 in the quarter of quarter of PSE's MaR
20	analysis indicated that the greatest exposure reduction would be to exposure . See
21	Exhibit No. (DEM-6C) for the August 2011 MaR over the hedging term. For example,
22	in Example 1 , if 5,000 MMBtu/day gas was purchased for August 2011, it would reduce
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1	
2	Example 1 In Example , PSE again updated its customer load forecast to better reflect
3	the on-going economic impact to its service territory. As a result, the August 2011 demand
4	forecast
5	III. ACTIVELY MANAGED HEDGING PERIOD
6	In Example , August 2011 rolled into Staff's Actively Managed Hedge. This
7	allowed Staff to more actively manage the August 2011 position for a full
8	prior to delivery. At the beginning of contraction , the position report indicated the
9	August 2011 net exposure was and the set of the set of
10	on-peak power where position, a where or where MW off-peak power where position and
11	an Market State MMBtu/day natural gas set and position. See Exhibit
12	No. (DEM-4C) for the August 2011 exposures over the hedging period. At this time,
13	forecast flat heat rates for August 2011 were averaging around and the second se
14	where many of PSE's gas-fired generators are forecast to be economically dispatched,
15	causing a gas demand and a gas power position. See Exhibit No (DEM-
16	12C). The total net exposure was a second seco
17	In other words, the position was and the second second second . However, staff was not
18	compelled to
19	
20	Moving into the contraction , the U.S. economy had slightly improved and
21	unemployment rates were still high. The unemployment rate in PSE's service territory was
22	hovering around nine percent. As discussed in more detail in the following section, gas
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1	and power prices continued to fall. As discussed in more detail in Exhibit No(DEM-
2	11C), in Example , the 2011 water year was forecast to be around the normal range.
3	Through the month of January 2011, the run-off forecast decreased to the mid-90 percent
4	of normal range, due to unseasonable warm temperatures in the region. However, as the
5	water year progressed, the January through July 2011 run-off forecast increased and by
6	April 2011, the 2011 water year forecast was 108 percent so that by the end of the January
7	through July 2011 hydro period, the actual average was 125 percent of normal. See Exhibit
8	No. (DEM-9). In large part due to the above average hydro outlook for the 2011 runoff
9	period, forecast such that
10	near the end of and the set of t
11	
12	During During Staff
13	
14	. At this heat rate level, only a few of PSE's gas
15	fired generators were forecast to be economically dispatched, resulting in a
16	. In other words, PSE's position
17	
18	
19	During the Example 1 , PSE also Example 1 for the third
20	quarter 2011 to an
21	Forecast flat market heat rates for August 2011 continued to and by the beginning of
22	, flat heat rates were at a second s
23	for the month of August has averaged 9,578, 10,839 and 7,801 for flat, on-peak and off-
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1	peak, respectively. Given the then above normal snow pack and forecasts for cooler
2	summer temperatures in the Pacific Northwest, it was believed that the above normal hydro
3	run-off would continue into August and the second se
4	not
5	
6	
7	. <i>See</i> Exhibit No (DEM-12C).
8	In East , as PSE switched to a more deterministic set up for August 2011, PSE
9	
10	in the beginning of the month and expected sector in the back half of the
11	month. Staff also and the second second second and the second seco
12	from the second s
13	Generating Station outage was extended to last through August 2011. Staff also
14	because, given the
15	BPA planned line outage, PSE would not be able to wheel its entire contract share of
16	Colstrip generation output to PSE's load. Staff was able to
17	
18	. In addition, Staff also
19	
20	At the end of July 2011, the net exposure for August 2011 was
21	and within the Actively Managed hedging limits defined by the Procedures
22	Manual. REDACTED VERSION
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2	The monthly exposure for August 2011 is included in Exhibit No(DEM-4C).
3	PSE's PowerPoint presentation on MaR is included in Exhibit No. (DEM-5C). The
4	monthly MaR analysis for August 2011 can be found in Exhibit No(DEM-6C). As
5	stated previously, the MaR analysis shows how much risk reduction is gained by month
6	and by strategy – providing Staff with an additional tool to evaluate which commodity to
7	hedge given a credit-constrained environment.
8	August 2011 hedges are shown for both power and gas for power in Exhibit
9	Nos. (DEM-7C) and (DEM-8C).
10	The Northwest River Forecast Center ("NWRFC") issued its first official water
11	supply forecast of the 2011 water year on December 16, 2010. The January-July period
12	run-off at Grand Coulee was projected to be 64,100 thousands of acre feet ("KAF"). The
13	30-year average (1971-2000), also referred to as "normal," for the January-July period at
14	Grand Coulee is 62,900 KAF. Thus, the NWRFC predicted the January-July 2011 runoff
15	to be 102 percent of normal at Grand Coulee (64,100 KAF/62,900 KAF). The actual
16	January-July 2011 runoff was 125 percent of normal at Grand Coulee, or 78,714 KAF. All
17	subsequent forecasts for the 2011 water year can be found in Exhibit No(DEM-9).
18	The monthly runoff volumes at Grand Coulee for water years 2007 through 2011 are also
19	shown in Exhibit No(DEM-9).
20	A copy of Schedule F from the Procedures Manual, "Spot Market Exposure for Gas
21	and Power Portfolios", which provides the monthly exposure limits, is provided in Exhibit
22	No. (DEM-10C). Exhibit No. (DEM-11C) provides a summarized retrospective of
23	the market prices and fundamentals over the hedging term
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1	2011 – all of which played a key role in Staff's management of, and hedging decisions for,
2	August 2011. The above referenced tools, forecasts, and fundamental views were used to
3	manage the monthly spot market exposure for delivery month August 2011. August 2011
4	hedges were executed in accordance with both the Programmatically Managed Hedge and
5	Actively Managed Hedge strategies and the hedge details are shown for both power and
6	gas for power in Exhibit No(DEM-7C).
7	Daily heat rate trends for August 2011 can be found in Exhibit No. (DEM-12C),
8	as well as the dispatch heat rate of PSE's gas fired turbines. Implied market heat rates
9	fluctuate daily depending on the power and gas prices, and are part of the dispatch logic
10	used in the risk model to determine which gas fired turbines are "in the money" and may
11	dispatch economically.
12	Daily commodity prices for August 2011 are in Exhibit No. (DEM-13C). This
13	chart illustrates on-peak power, off-peak power, and gas for power prices as they evolved
14	over the hedging period.
15	V. AUGUST 2011 – WITHIN MONTH OVERVIEW
16	At the end of July 2011, the net exposure for August 2011 was which
17	represented a
18	
19) respectively. As PSE entered August 2011 market observers were
20	taking into consideration the weather forecasts for the remainder of the summer months as
21	above normal temperatures nationally and regionally could lead to increased demand and
22	potential price spikes. Nationally, July 2011 surpassed the record for the hottest July.
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1	based on Population Weighted Cooling Degree Days. Although temperatures were below
2	normal in the Pacific Northwest for July 2011, the natural gas Consuming Region East
3	recorded record temperatures for July 2011. Additionally, the 2011 hurricane season was
4	underway and forecasters were calling for an above normal hurricane season. The higher
5	the number and severity of hurricanes, the more likely that gas supplies could be
6	interrupted, which lends support to higher forecast gas prices. In the early days of August,
7	above normal temperatures continued to develop in the East, while below normal
8	temperatures were seen in the Northwest. Above normal runoff continued on the Mid-
9	Columbia as a result of the above normal snow pack and water year. Because stream flows
10	were expected to subside and August temperatures were expected to be normal, Staff went
11	into the month with a variable position. Knowing that continued stream flows would
12	facilitate lower power prices and thus, lower heat rates, PSE was in a second second in that
13	environment. As flows receded, however, PSE expected heat rates to strengthen enough to
14	economically dispatch both Goldendale and Mint farm, increasing PSE's
15	position. The NWRFC forecast for Chief Joe was at 147 kilo cubic feet per second (kcfs) -
16	which would translate to around 20,000 MWhs of inflows - more than normal for the
17	month of August.
18	Looking back on August 2011 and viewing it as two halves, PSE's forecast
19	assumptions played out as heat rates were example and the set of August . August 1 st
20	through the 15 th PSE traded an average of \$31.48 on-peak power and \$16.85 off-peak. The
21	average daily heat rate was at 6,938 Btu/kWh. During the back half of August, on-peak
22	prices were slightly higher at \$33.89 and off-peak rose to \$23.14, the flat heat rate for the
23	last sixteen days of August was at 7,993 Btu/kWh on average. Flows from Chief Joe help
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