1 BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION 2 COMMISSION 3 In re Application No. B-079273) of AQUA EXPRESS, LLC)DOCKET NO. TS-040650 For a Certificate of Public)Volume I 4 Convenience and Necessity to)Pages 1 - 41 Provide Commercial Ferry Service.) 5 _____ 6 7 A prehearing conference in the above matter 8 was held on May 21, 2004, at 1:32 p.m., at 1300 South 9 Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, Olympia, Washington, 10 before Administrative Law Judge ANN E. RENDAHL. 11 12 The parties were present as follows: 13 AQUA EXPRESS, LLC, by DAVID W. WILEY, Attorney at Law, Williams, Kastner & Gibbs, 601 Union 14 Street, Suite 4100, Seattle, Washington 98101; telephone, (206) 233-2895. 15 WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, by DONALD T. TROTTER, Assistant Attorney 16 General, 1400 South Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, Post Office Box 40128, Olympia, Washington 98504; 17 telephone, (360) 664-1189. 18 INLANDBOATMEN'S UNION OF THE PACIFIC, by DMITRI IGLITZIN (via bridge line), Attorney at Law, 19 Schwerin, Campbell, Barnard, 18 West Mercer Street, 20 Suite 400, Seattle, Washington 98119; telephone, (800) 238-4231. 21 KITSAP TRANSIT, by RONALD C. TEMPLETON (via 22 bridge line), Attorney at Law, 3212 Northwest Byron Street, Silverdale, Washington 98383; telephone, (360) 23 692-4215. 24 Kathryn T. Wilson, CCR

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Court Reporter

PROCEEDINGS 1 2 JUDGE RENDAHL: Let's be on the record. Good 3 afternoon. I'm Ann Rendahl, an administrative law 4 judge presiding over this proceeding. We are here 5 before the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission this afternoon, Friday, May the 21st, 2004, б 7 for a prehearing conference in Docket No. TS-040650, also Application No. B-79273, which is captioned, In 8 9 the matter of the application of Aqua Express, LLC, for 10 a certificate of public convenience and necessity to 11 operate commercial ferry service. 12 To recap the history of this application 13 proceeding, on April 8th, 2004, Aqua Express filed a 14 commercial ferry application with the Commission. That 15 application was docketed as Application No. B-079273 16 and docketed as TS-040650. Notice of that application 17 was published in the Commission's April 12th, 2004 docket. On May 6th, 2004, the Inlandboatmen's Union of 18 the Pacific filed a protest to the application, and the 19 20 30-day docket period ended on May 12th, 2004. 21 On May 13th, the Commission issued the notice 22 of prehearing conference in this matter which scheduled 23 today's prehearing conference. While the notice 24 indicates the commissioners would be presiding in this 25 matter, they are not presiding this afternoon, but if

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1 there is a hearing in this matter, they will be

2 presiding.

Then on May 18th, Aqua Express filed a motion to strike the Inlandboatmen's Union protest, and yesterday on May 20th, both the Inlandboatmen's Union and the staff filed responses to the Applicant's motion. So that's the procedural status of this application.

As I noted off the record, the purpose of our 9 10 prehearing conference this afternoon is to take 11 appearances, to consider any petitions to intervene in 12 the matter, to hear arguments on Aqua Express's motion 13 to strike the Inlandboatmen's Union protest, establish 14 issues for the proceeding, establish a process, 15 including a procedural schedule for considering the 16 application as well as the type of hearing or process 17 involved, and identify any other matters for discussion. 18

19 So before we go any further, let's take 20 appearances. To assist the Commission in organizing 21 its master service list and to be able to communicate 22 with all of you effectively, please state your full 23 name, the party you represent, your full address, 24 telephone number, fax number, and e-mail address. 25 Let's begin with the Applicant.

1	MR. WILEY: Thank you, Your Honor. David W.
2	Wiley with the law firm of Williams, Kastner and Gibbs,
3	Two Union Square, Suite 4100, 601 Union Street,
4	Seattle, Washington, 98101-2380. Our fax number is
5	(206) 628-6611. My direct line number is
6	(206) 233-2895, and my e-mail address is
7	dwiley@wkg.com. I'm appearing today on behalf of
8	Applicant Aqua Express, LLC.
9	JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you, Mr. Wiley. For
10	the protestant?
11	MR. IGLITZIN: My name is Dmitri Iglitzin
12	with the law firm of Schwerin, Campbell and Barnard,
13	LLP, 18 West Mercer Street, Suite 400, Seattle,
14	Washington, 98119.
15	JUDGE RENDAHL: Your telephone number?
16	MR. IGLITZIN: (800) 238-4231.
17	JUDGE RENDAHL: And a fax number?
18	MR. IGLITZIN: (206) 378-4132.
19	JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. Is this 800
20	number your direct line, or is that the firm's line?
21	MR. IGLITZIN: It's the firm's line. I don't
22	have a direct line.
23	JUDGE RENDAHL: Your e-mail address?
24	MR. IGLITZIN: Iglitzin@workerlaw.com.
25	JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. For staff,

1 Mr. Trotter?

2 MR. TROTTER: My name is Donald T. Trotter, 3 and I'm an assistant attorney general. My address is 4 1400 South Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, PO Box 5 40128, Olympia, Washington, 98504-0128. My telephone number is (360) 664-1189; fax, (360) 586-5522, and my б 7 e-mail is dtrotter@wutc.wa.gov. JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. Also on the 8 9 bridge line we have Kitsap Transit. Mr. Templeton, are 10 you making an appearance? 11 MR. TEMPLETON: Yes, Your Honor. My full 12 name is Ronald C. Templeton. My address is 3212 13 Northwest Byron Street, Silverdale, Washington, 98383. My phone number is (360) 692-6415. My fax is 14 15 (360) 692-1257. My e-mail is rctempleton@telebyte.com. 16 JUDGE RENDAHL: You are entering an 17 appearance for Kitsap Transit. Is that the full name of the intervenor? 18 19 MR. TEMPLETON: Yes. It is Kitsap Transit, a 20 Washington Municipal Corporation. 21 JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. I will be 22 including as an attachment to the prehearing conference 23 order a list of representatives with all of this 24 information. If I have not captured any of it correctly, if you could please let me know. All of you 25

1 can use it to communicate with one another, and the 2 Commission will use it to communicate with you via 3 e-mail and mail and fax, if necessary. 4 Okay. Mr. Templeton, there was no filed 5 intervention, I noted, by Kitsap Transit. Could you б please make an oral motion to intervene? 7 MR. TEMPLETON: We would like to make a conditional motion to intervene. We would like to 8 9 participate only if this proceeding turns into a protested proceeding, and I think that's going to be 10 11 dependent upon the ruling on the Applicant's motion 12 today. Kitsap Transit is really an integral part of 13 this application and it supports this application. If 14 this is not a protested proceeding, we don't see any 15 need to participate. JUDGE RENDAHL: Beginning with the Applicant, 16 17 is there any objection to Kitsap Transit's conditional motion to intervene? 18 19 MR. WILEY: None, Your Honor. 20 JUDGE RENDAHL: For Staff? 21 MR. TROTTER: Just a question, Your Honor. 22 Do I take it correctly that Kitsap Transit is not a 23 protestant and that is why he did not file a protest? 24 MR. TEMPLETON: That's correct. 25 MR. TROTTER: Mr. Templeton said Kitsap

1	Transit was an integral part of this matter, but there
2	was no further information, so if we could have more
3	information on that for the record, that would be
4	helpful, if I may ask that, Your Honor.
5	JUDGE RENDAHL: Please go ahead.
6	MR. TEMPLETON: Under the ESHB 1853, your
7	Honor, several statutes were amended and clearly made
8	statute governing public transportation benefit areas,
9	of which Kitsap Transit is one. They've also amended
10	some of the provisions dealing with ferry service and
11	ten-mile radii, and then specifically, the DPT's
12	jurisdiction over passenger-only ferry service, it gave
13	public agencies, PTBA in particular, until March of
14	next year the exclusive right to institute
15	passenger-only ferry service.
16	Kitsap Transit waived its right to institute
17	passenger-only ferry service and specifically agreed by
18	resolution that operators such as Aqua Express could
19	submit certificate applications to the UTC prior to
20	March of 2005, and we've provided that consent and have
21	actively supported the Applicant's application.
22	JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Trotter, does that
23	satisfy your concerns about the nature of Kitsap
24	Transit as an integral part of this application?
25	MR. TROTTER: Your Honor, I'm aware that the

1 statutes require the PTBA to authorize the application in this case to be filed, and there is a resolution 2 3 attached to the Application in which Kitsap Transit did 4 agree that this application could be filed pursuant to 5 statutes 81.84.020, specifically, and I'm also aware б that after application is granted, if it is in this 7 case, a contract with Kitsap Transit will have to be approved by Kitsap Transit, or an agreement is what 8 9 it's called. That is RCW 36.57(a).100.

10 So it appears that the transit authority has 11 a role before and after this case. It's not as 12 apparent that it has an independent role during the 13 case; although, I do understand that the transit 14 authority is very supportive of this transportation 15 application. Having said all that, if it turns out 16 that the Protestant IBU is permitted in, then we might 17 as well have everybody in, but I think they are hanging on a thin reed, so on that basis, we will conditionally 18 19 object to the intervention.

20JUDGE RENDAHL: From Mr. Iglitzin, please.21MR. IGLITZIN: The IBU has no objection to22Kitsap Transit's conditional motion to intervene.23JUDGE RENDAHL: This may be taking the cart

24 before the horse, but at this point, I would grant the 25 conditional intervention to intervene pending our

discussion of the motion to strike the IBU's protest. 1 2 Is there any other person appearing in the 3 room or on the line that wishes to make an appearance 4 in this matter or intervene? Hearing nothing, we will 5 go on to the issue of the motion to strike. I've read through all of the written materials, but I would like 6 7 to hear from the parties any oral argument or statement you would like to make, and then we will take it form 8 9 there. Go ahead, Mr. Wiley. MR. WILEY: Thank you, Your Honor. I did 10

11 wish to offer a few comments to the filings from 12 yesterday afternoon that I had an opportunity to review 13 this morning before I headed down here. I wanted to 14 respond particularly to the IBU's reply on a number of 15 points.

16 The first one is that the motion to strike versus the motion to dismiss, we are all laboring under 17 18 some very new procedural rules that were implemented in 19 January of 2004. I still believe that the appropriate 20 nomenclature for what this motion is is a motion to 21 strike, having read the revised procedural rules, but I 22 don't think that whether it's a motion to dismiss or to 23 strike that the Protestant was prejudiced because we 24 are operating under an expedited prehearing conference procedure that the prehearing conference noted at 25

1 480-07-440, and all parties have now had an opportunity 2 to provide written response in addition to the oral 3 comments today. So no one is being prejudiced, whether 4 it's a motion to dismiss or to strike, and there are 5 different time periods applicable.

6 As far as another comment that the IBU made, 7 clearly your decision about granting or denying our 8 motion, particularly if it's granted, is subject to 9 interlocutory review under WAC 480-07-810, so there is 10 no prejudice there. The Commission can consider a 11 denial of participation under the current rule.

12 Now, I also wanted to note that there was 13 some dispute in both the Staff's and the IBU's 14 responsive pleadings about our reliance upon the 15 standards for review of agency order and whether they 16 are coextensive with the considerations of standing to 17 participate in an administrative proceeding. I think 18 whether or not you feel they are synonymous, the point that the Applicant was trying to allude to is that the 19 20 standards that have been used in appellate procedure 21 under either federal or state APA have been referred to 22 by the Commission in making threshold standing 23 determinations in administrative proceedings, and those 24 are the injury and fact and the zone of interest test. 25 Whether or not it's ultimately proper to

equate them as being synonymous, they certainly have been used by this commission to evaluate the interest that is raised in a possible protest or intervention motion, and we've cited to the Rosario Utilities case as a footnote of Page 3 of our brief.

б I also was able to identify another case this 7 morning where the Commission has referred to the standards that are applicable for appeal in 8 9 administrative agency decision and threshold standing 10 arguments in administrative proceedings, and low and 11 behold, there was a young attorney about 21 years ago 12 who was on the wrong end of that decision in a case 13 called Brown's Limousine Crew Car, Inc., Order MVCH No. 14 950. There the Commission found -- and the assistant 15 attorney general was apparently a Mr. Trotter in that 16 case. There, the Commission found that the 17 protestant's counsel won Mr. Wiley's argument that because a taxicab had a license from the Commission to 18 19 transport packages, it could, in fact, protest a 20 passenger charter party application. The Commission 21 found that the protestant lacked standing. While it 22 could prove injury and fact, it could not prove that it 23 had a zone of interest sought to be protected by the 24 statute citing data processing service which we cite in 25 our brief.

1 Commission there also said, and I quote, 2 "Public interest cannot be served if the elements of 3 public convenience and necessity require consideration 4 of activities over which the Commission has no power to 5 control, to supervise or to regulate in any fashion. б The Commission has no power to protect the interest of 7 businesses which it does not regulate." JUDGE RENDAHL: Would you please repeat the 8 9 MVH number and the other identifying information? MR. WILEY: Yes. It's Order MVCH No. 950 in 10 11 1983, July, 1983, and that quotation in that case 12 really brings to the fore the argument of the Applicant 13 vis-a-vis the punitive protest here. There is not an 14 interest that the Commission has jurisdiction to effect 15 that's being raised by the IBU, and, in fact, we have a 16 problem with who the real party and interest is as we 17 review and evaluate the IBU's punitive protest. The Staff's response sets forth all of the 18 six issues that the IBU seeks to raise, and both the 19 20 Applicant and the Staff have demonstrated why under 21 statute rule and case law, none of those issues does 22 the IBU have standing to raise. Ultimately, IBU's 23 argument and articulation of issues it seeks to raise 24 reveal the classic emperor-has-no-clothes position that 25 they are in, and clearly, the Washington Supreme Court

in Cole, cited in our motion to strike, and the Brown's
 Limousine Crew Case as well as the Rosario Utilities
 case show that ultimately, if the Commission has no
 jurisdiction to effect the actions complained of, the
 protestant has no standing to participate in the
 hearing.

7 Additionally, IBU appears to attempt to ride the coattails of a very unwilling principle here. In 8 9 other words, the IBU's arguments are voiced through 10 impacts which it claims to be deleterious on the 11 Washington State Ferry system. But there has been no 12 showing by the IBU that it has standing to represent 13 any interest of the Washington State Ferry service in 14 this proceeding, and that is the real problem with 15 IBU's position here. In other words, it's seeking 16 participation status based on arguments that are 17 predicated on alleged negative impacts of this application on a principle that it does not represent. 18 19 The points raised in the Staff's and the 20 Applicant's motion about the substantive issues that 21 IBU seeks to proffer here, we don't need to reiterate 22 in terms of why they individually and collectively lack 23 any legal impact to establish standing, but I also 24 wanted to mention this reference to the public

25 importance doctrine that the IBU mentions in its

response. That appears to be a sort of last gasp legal
 alternative argument that the IBU offers at the end of
 its reply if every other premise of its punitive
 standing is shot down.

5 Now, one of the problems again in it raising б that argument, that fallback doctrine, is the real 7 party in interest or the privy with the WSF, but even if that were put aside, the doctrine that they rely 8 9 upon from a 1969 Washington Supreme Court case 10 involving Washington Natural Gas and the PUD is 11 distinguishable. First of all, it was two years before 12 the Cole case was decided, so obviously, the Supreme 13 Court must have been assumed to have that in mind when 14 it ruled in the Cole case.

15 But second of all, that case was very 16 different, because there, we had Washington Natural Gas 17 seeking to intervene in a proceeding involving the sale of electrical utility service that was in direct 18 19 competition with Washington Natural Gas's service. The 20 court seemed to in that case reluctantly allow 21 participation by Washington Natural Gas because what 22 they found to be an impact of the decision on, quote, a 23 substantial percentage of the population with immediate 24 statewide impact on the operation of public utility districts and municipal corporations. Clearly that is 25

1 distinguishable from the situation here.

2 While we would suggest we have an innovative 3 service proposal which involves local transit agencies 4 and recent legislative change coloring the proposal, we 5 are not claiming that an application between Kingston б and Seattle has a sweeping statewide impact that 7 affects all public utility infrastructure such as was 8 the case in the Washington Natural Gas case. We think 9 this application will have a beneficial and incremental 10 impact on public transit alternatives, but it is the 11 first step, and it is clearly not one that affects most 12 of or a large percentage of the citizens in the state. 13 So for all of the above reasons in terms of 14 the issues raised by the IBU and for the arguments that 15 we allude to in our written response, we ask that their 16 participation in this proceeding be denied and that you 17 find that in the public interest, their involvement would be contrary to the public interest and would 18 protract and expand the record unnecessarily. 19 20 JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you, Mr. Wiley, 21 Mr. Iglitzin? 22 MR. IGLITZIN: Thank you. As an initial 23 matter, I think it's important to address the 24 procedural context of what has been entitled a motion to strike. As the IBU set forth in its brief, a motion 25

which will completely end the participation of a party 1 or be a complete determination of one or more issues is 2 3 a dispositive motion or a motion for summary 4 determination entitling the nonmoving party to 20 days 5 to respond, and at a minimum, if one is looking at the б WAC subsection entitled dismissal of intervenor, the 7 intervenor has to be given notice any reasonable opportunity to be heard if the Commission determines at 8 9 any time the intervenor has no substantial interest in 10 the proceeding or that the public interest will not be 11 served by the intervenor's continued participation. 12 It is IBU's position that that provision does 13 not apply here because we have sought to intervene, but 14 the dismissal of intervenor rule applies at a 15 subsequent time if the Commission were to decide to 16 dismiss the intervenor. What we are dealing with now 17 is an effort to prevent the IBU from intervening at all. The significance of those procedural issues is 18 twofold. First of all, the IBU has had no opportunity 19 20 to respond to any of the arguments made by Commission 21 staff, and the Commission staff in their brief raised 22 completely different issues than are raised by the 23 Applicant, and factual and evidentiary issues which we 24 have had no opportunity at all to respond to either

25 through written argument or through evidence.

I guess I would direct your attention to the 1 2 first argument made by Commission staff suggesting that 3 there is no evidence in the record that the IBU is 4 authorized to represent its members in a Commission 5 proceeding of this nature. In terms of argument, I б would suggest that the Commission staff's memorandum 7 betrays a lack of understanding of labor relations in the nature of a relationship between a union and its 8 9 members. The members of the IBU voluntarily joined the 10 IBU, and that relationship is governed by the 11 constitution and bylaws of the IBU which the members 12 have voluntarily signed on to, and those documents give 13 the IBU the authority to speak on behalf of their members not merely in an employee, employer 14 15 relationship. 16 Prior to a ruling adverse to the IBU 17 predicated on that Commission staff argument, we would make an offer of proof and be prepared to present 18 19 evidence both documentary and testimonial that the 20 members of the IBU, in fact, have specifically 21 authorized the IBU to take precisely these types of 22 actions in the interest of its members. In the 23 judgment of the IBU, actions like this are appropriate. 24 The lack of 20-days notice is additionally significant with regard to the arguments made by the 25

Applicant. So for example, the Applicant cites the 1 2 Washington Natural Gas decision as being predicated in 3 some way on the specific finding in that case that the 4 decision at issue affected a substantial percentage of 5 the population. Therefore, the case is one of statewide importance. The IBU had not had an б 7 opportunity to respond to that argument by showing evidence indicating the actual negative impact of this 8 9 application if granted.

In other words, the actual number of workers 10 11 who will lose their jobs, families who may lose their 12 homes, and the kind of economic analysis that is used 13 by economists looking at job loss that for every one 14 job, certain other jobs are lost as a result of the 15 lack of wages going into the retail stream and that 16 type of thing. The IBU had no opportunity to respond 17 if we are going to be talking about the public importance doctrine. 18

We have had no opportunity to present any evidence to explain why the effect of this application might actually meet the criteria that the Supreme Court would follow in applying the public importance doctrine. Obviously in our protest, we set forth what we believed to be the basis of our interest, but that was not an opportunity to present documentation and

evidence without being put on notice that such was
 necessary to actually show if it is disputed why this
 is so important.

4 I'm not going to reargue what I've already 5 put in writing, but I will address a couple of things Mr. Wiley just noted. One is the suggestion that what б 7 the IBU is doing is riding on the coattails of an unwilling principle, because I think that that really 8 9 zeros in on the reason why intervention should be 10 granted on the part of the IBU and the so-called motion 11 to strike should be denied. Because the Washington 12 State Ferry is a political entity, and it may and does 13 have a whole range of political motivations for making 14 the decisions it makes, and among those decisions is 15 the decision to write the letter that is attached, I 16 believe, to the Application saying, We don't have a 17 problem. We are not taking a position on this 18 application.

19 If, in fact, the IBU is correct that the 20 effect of this application will be to have a 21 substantial adverse effect on the Washington State 22 Ferry that that has to be of significant, if not 23 paramount significance, to the Commission, because I 24 don't believe that it is disputed, and, in fact, it's 25 in the statute that the Commission is supposed to

consider and give substantial weight to the effect of
 its decisions on public agencies operating or eligible
 to operate passenger-only ferry service.

4 The statute RCW 81.84.020(4), does not say 5 the Commission shall only consider and give substantial б weight to this factor if the public agency asks the 7 Commission to consider and give substantial weight to that decision or to that effect, and there is nothing 8 9 in the statute, the regulation, or the case law which 10 has been cited that takes away from the Commission 11 either the right or the responsibility of asking the 12 following question: What will be the effect of this 13 application on Washington State ferries? Will that 14 effect, in fact, be serious, negative, and detrimental? 15 Will it have widespread social implications that affect 16 the substantial majority of the population, or at least 17 that population that has any interest or use of commercial ferries. 18

19 That is what the distinguishes this case from 20 the other authority cited by Mr. Wiley and the 21 Applicant because it is precisely the IBU is to a large 22 extent asserting a right that is derivative of the 23 impact on the state ferry. The IBU is not contending 24 that the impact on its members wholly separate from the 25 impact on the Washington State Ferry would be

sufficient, necessarily, to establish a right to
 intervene in this matter, but the IBU is the only
 entity that is, in fact, raising the issue which the
 Commission is supposed to place substantial weight on,
 the effect of this decision on the Washington State
 Ferry.

7 Which brings us back to what the IBU is the 8 ultimate message of the Washington Natural Gas Company 9 case, which is where a controversy of is serious public 10 importance, it is appropriate and within the discretion 11 of the Commission to permit a party to intervene. The 12 interests of the IBU are clearly protected by 13 Washington State law as part of the statutory framework 14 that governs Washington State Ferry. They are not 15 merely an incidental beneficiary of Washington State 16 Ferry. We cite in the brief an entire RCW statutory 17 chapter dealing with the relationship between the ferry and labor organizations representing Washington State 18 19 Ferry workers.

The Commission also has the authority and has the discretion to permit the IBU to intervene and to deny the protest if the Commission believes that it will further the interest of the Commission. The bottom line of the part of the IBU is a ruling that permits the IBU to intervene and raise the issues that

it has indicated it wishes to raise, the result and 1 administrative law judge decision and the Commission 2 3 decision adjudicating those issues, and let us suppose 4 hypothetically that the adjudication is in favor of 5 Applicant. At least we will all know and the public б will know that the Commission addressed these issues, 7 evaluated the weight and significance and validity of the issues raised by the IBU, made a ruling in favor to 8 9 the Applicant, and then the Application moves forward 10 and its legitimacy is essentially unchallengeable at 11 that point, but if the Commission exercises its 12 discretion to grant the so-called motion to strike, 13 then it will be in a situation of potentially moving 14 forward and granting an application when very 15 fundamental and very serious issues of concern to large 16 portions of the public will never be adjudicated, and 17 there will never be review of those issues.

That latter approach is inconsistent with the 18 approach that the Commission and the courts have 19 20 preferred in the past, and in the case law, all the 21 parties have referred you to the various other times 22 when labor organizations have, in fact, been allowed to 23 intervene in Commission proceedings where what you see 24 is where it furthers the interest of the Commission and it assists the Commission. It further the goals of the 25

statute to assist the Commission in making its
 decisions with regards to those entities which it does
 regulate that the better course of action in this case
 is to deny the motion to strike. Thank you.

5 JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you, Mr. Iglitzin.6 Mr. Trotter?

7 MR. TROTTER: Just a few comments, Your Honor. Thank you. First of all, on behalf of 8 9 Commission staff, we did make the argument, as 10 Mr. Iglitzin notes, that the protest did not reflect 11 that the IBU is authorized to represent its member in 12 this context. It stated solely that it was their 13 exclusive bargaining representative. Our raising of 14 that issue did not reflect a lack of understanding how 15 a union works but rather a full appreciation of what 16 the protest said.

17 Now, if Mr. Iglitzin is correct that the IBU 18 is, in fact, authorized to raise the issues on behalf 19 of its members that it seeks to raise here, so be it, 20 and if you wish to allow it to amend its protest to 21 include or whether you wish to allow they have to rise 22 or fall by the protest they filed, either way, is that 23 satisfactory to us.

Also, we are sensitive to the fact that Mr. Iglitzin did not get our pleading until mid

afternoon yesterday, and if you wish to allow him reasonable opportunity to respond in writing, we will not object to that. I'm not sure we really added too many issues that they are incapable of responding to, which in fact they did respond to, so I think they've been given a fair hearing on it, but my prior comment stands.

We have to read the protest for what it says, 8 9 and several of the issues on their list talk about the impact on the union members, and we cited you the Puget 10 11 Sound Power and Light case, which said, quote, "The 12 Commission will not consider issues of wages, benefits, 13 or job protection for union members," unquote, so those 14 issues are out. The air and water quality issues they 15 raise, there is no statutory authority for the 16 Commission to hear those issues. There is no 17 allegation there is a violation of any law or rule related to air quality, even if the Commission could 18 consider those issues, so we think those issues are 19 20 out. That leaves impact on the state ferry system. 21 Now, one statute we think is particularly 22 pertinent here is RCW 47.60.120. That statute, which 23 is therefore the protection of the ferry system, 24 states, essentially, that if a private ferry crossing

is within ten miles of an existing state crossing, it

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cannot be allowed to proceed unless there is a waiver of that ten-mile rule, and in granting a waiver, the Commission has authority, or maybe it says "shall consider," impact on the ferry system as a whole and air quality improvement.

Now, there, to us, the legislature is saying б 7 the ten-mile rule is our law protecting the state ferry system, and that is where the legislature has directed 8 9 the Commission to deal with that issue. The ten-mile 10 rule doesn't apply here for the reasons addressed in 11 our memo, and secondly, the statute very clearly states 12 that passenger-only ferry services are exempt. To us, 13 that's a very significant statement by the legislature 14 that it does not wish the Commission to delve into 15 those issues in cases where the ten-mile rule does not 16 apply.

17 Mr. Iglitzin has focused on another statute, 81.84.020(4), and I believe you quoted or paraphrased 18 it correctly. That refers broadly to public agencies. 19 20 We think the specific statute here controls, and that's 21 47.60.120. Therefore, in this particular context, we 22 think the legislature in reconciling these two 23 sections, the only logical conclusion is that for 24 passenger-only ferries that do not meet the ten-mile rule, that is not an issue for the Commission to 25

resolve. But even if it was, we have attached to our memo the letter from the Department of Transportation, who is the Washington State Ferry -- that is simply the name used by the Department of Transportation doing that activity -- and they have said that they are not opposing this application on any basis and they reviewed it and don't oppose it.

Now, the public-interest doctrine does permit 8 9 liberal standing in certain circumstances, and we cited 10 in our second to last footnote the general rule for 11 third-party standing, and we do not believe the IBU 12 qualifies, but the one point regarding the 13 public-interest doctrine is that the court applies that 14 liberal standing policy when there is really no one 15 else to bring the issue to the court, so the court can 16 resolve issues of public importance where there might not be someone withstanding to assert the harm. 17

Well, here we have a party who is fully 18 capable of protecting its own interests, and that is 19 20 the Washington State Ferry system itself, and they have 21 elected not to contest that issue, so we do have 22 someone here in the state to raise these issues, and 23 they have affirmatively elected not to, so we don't 24 believe the public-interest doctrine applies in that 25 context.

So that is why we are supporting the motion. 1 There is an issue as to whether it's a motion to strike 2 or a motion involving intervention. I did not read the 3 4 reply of IBU to demand 20 days to respond, and it does 5 seem to me it's more in the disposition of a motion to б intervene than it is a dispositive motion, because 7 right now, there is no participation, so it really is the allowing parties into the case aspect of the case, 8 9 and that is more analogous to the intervention of 10 rules, so we think that applies, but as I said at the 11 outset, if they desire a period of time to effectively 12 respond to our memo, we are not going to object to 13 that.

But overall, we simply don't think their own protest as filed and as defended survives legal scrutiny, and the Commission should exercise whatever discretion it has to deny it or as a matter of law to deny it. Thank you.

JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you, Mr. Trotter.Anything further, Mr. Wiley?

21 MR. WILEY: Just briefly, Your Honor. In 22 hearing Mr. Iglitzin's rationale for standing to raise 23 the issues that he grappled with articulating in his 24 comments and his response, I was struck again by the 25 appropriateness of the quotation from the Washington

Supreme Court in the St. Joseph's case, which is cited 1 at Page 3 of our brief and is quoted, and I think, Your 2 3 Honor, if you revisit that language on Page 3 that is 4 quoted, it's clear that the kind of interest that 5 Mr. Iglitzin is trying to articulate is the type of б amorphoused interest that the courts in reviewing 7 standing issues have said are not within the purview of an injury-in-fact jurisdiction by this Commission, and 8 9 I think the Commission certainly is given broad 10 discretion to rule on standing, but those rulings and 11 those actions have always been consistent with a 12 statutory mandate in terms of regulating public service 13 companies, and here, we clearly have that type of 14 disconnect between the type of interest, the 15 amorphoused broad interest that anyone can claim an 16 entry application might hold for their interest group 17 and what the statute specifically directs. The statute in this case, RCW 81.84, is very 18 specific in setting forth the road map as to what 19

20 issues must be considered by this commission after 21 hearing before it grants or denies an application. All 22 of those statutory issues, which have also been 23 implemented by rule by this Commission, are before us 24 and must be addressed by the Applicant in this 25 proceeding. The role of the IBU in addressing those is

not going to extinguish the fact that we must make 1 2 affirmative showings on fitness, willingness, ability, 3 ridership, all sorts of financial showings. So again, 4 Your Honor, I think that the reason there is disconnect 5 is because the group that Mr. Iglitzin is seeking to б represent in this proceeding simply lacks any role in a 7 proceeding of this type. JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you, all of you, for 8 9 your presentations and arguments. MR. IGLITZIN: I did just want to clarify 10 11 that I am requesting the 20-day period to respond in 12 writing to the motion to strike and to the Commission 13 staff's memorandum on that issue. JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. I'll take that 14 15 under consideration. 16 MR. IGLITZIN: Thank you. 17 JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Wiley, just to further clarify the Brown's Limousine case that you cited, Was 18 19 that an administrative law judge decision or a 20 Commission decision? 21 MR. WILEY: It's a final Commission decision 22 at 1983 Washington UTC Lexus 41. JUDGE RENDAHL: And Mr. Trotter, the letter 23 24 from the state ferry system, I attempted to locate that 25 on our docket system. It doesn't appear to be posted

1 yet.

2 MR. TROTTER: We had an e-mail copy of that 3 letter, but we have not received it through the mail, 4 so I asked yesterday for the Department to fax it 5 because the e-mail version was not on letterhead or signed, so they faxed it, so what is attached there, I б 7 can't explain why it wasn't delivered in the mail yet, but I will follow through on that and make sure it is, 8 9 but they did fax me the signed copy, and I was sure 10 that that was the official letter of the Department, 11 but I can't tell you why it has yet to come in the 12 mail. I will pursue that and find out.

JUDGE RENDAHL: That's okay. I had also not received the Inlandboatmen's Union response through our docket system and it was not yet posted, so it may be a backup in our record's center, which may simply be the issue, and I have not had time to inquire, so I simply wanted to know if it has been filed with the Commission, and if you don't know, that's fine.

20 MR. TROTTER: I don't know. I did note that 21 the IBU's response, I think, did get logged on a couple 22 of hours ago.

JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. Because of the short notice of this prehearing conference and then the necessity for the Applicant to quickly file its motion,

and I do appreciate the very rapid responses by the 1 other parties in this proceeding, but I do believe that 2 3 in order to provide due process to, in particular, the 4 Protestant in this matter that I'm going to allow an 5 opportunity to respond in writing, and in reviewing the б rules that you have referenced, Mr. Iglitzin, in 7 particular, WAC 480-07-375, which addresses motions, and is WAC 480-07-380, which addresses dispositive 8 9 motions, while I agree that those rules establish a 10 20-day period or a five-day period, they also do allow 11 the Commission to set a separate date if it's 12 appropriate, and given the need to resolve this issue 13 in rather short notice, I don't believe a 20-day period 14 is appropriate. Given that an initial response to the 15 Applicant has already been provided, I'm going to try 16 to establish a different date and to accommodate the 17 need to respond to both the arguments made today and those in the written responses by Staff and Aqua 18 19 Express.

This also ties into the need to establish the procedural schedule. I'm not going to rule on the motion today because I would like to hear in writing from the Inlandboatmen's Union and give them an opportunity to respond. I would like to resolve this rather guickly. We are now Friday the 21st of May.

Mr. Iglitzin, is it possible for you to file by noon 1 2 next Friday on the 28th? MR. IGLITZIN: Yes. 3 4 JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Wiley and Mr. Trotter, do 5 you have any reason to file a response to what б Mr. Iglitzin provides? 7 MR. WILEY: As I understand, the IBU has had an opportunity to respond to our motion to strike. 8 9 It's the Staff's reply to our motion to strike that 10 they seek to respond to; is that correct? 11 JUDGE RENDAHL: Yes. The timing has been 12 very, very short, and I would allow the IBU to provide 13 supplemental response to your motion given the short response period that they had to submit something to 14 15 the Commission. 16 MR. WILEY: I would like to reserve since we 17 have the burden on a motion to strike to show the lack of standing, as I understand the rules, to be able to 18 19 reply briefly if we need to by the following Wednesday. 20 JUDGE RENDAHL: So what I would do is allow 21 the Inlandboatmen's Union to provide a supplemental 22 response to the Applicant and a response to Staff's 23 arguments by noon on Friday the 28th of May. To 24 expedite, the parties can file or can submit the

response electronically to the Commission and then

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1 follow it up on Monday with a paper copy so that we will receive it electronically by noon on Friday, and 2 then Mr. Wiley, if you can provide any reply you might 3 4 have by noon on Wednesday, June 2nd, that would be 5 helpful to allow the Commission to try to resolve this б by Monday the 7th of June at the very latest. 7 MR. TROTTER: Your Honor, I would note that that Monday is a state and federal holiday. I don't 8 9 know if that affects the timing or not. JUDGE RENDAHL: I leave that up to Mr. Wiley. 10 11 MR. WILEY: I'm going out of town that 12 Wednesday, Your Honor, so I have to have it finished by 13 then. I appreciate Mr. Trotter noting that, but it 14 doesn't help me. 15 JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Iglitzin? 16 MR. IGLITZIN: Thank you. I don't know 17 whether it would be possible to get a transcript of today's argument in a timely fashion, because 18 19 obviously, a number of arguments have been raised today 20 that are not in the Applicant's -- especially in the 21 Applicant's motion to strike. 22 JUDGE RENDAHL: You can order an expedited 23 transcript of the proceeding from the court reporter. 24 Let's go off the record.

25 (Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE RENDAHL: While we were off the record, 1 we discussed the availability of the transcript. The 2 3 court reporter indicated that the standard turnaround 4 time for the transcript would be June 7th but that any 5 party could choose to expedite the transcript if they so choose, but it's an extra cost, and Mr. Iglitzin, I б 7 understand you to say that you would choose to have the 8 transcript on the 7th and have a response on the 9th, 9 and Mr. Wiley and Mr. Trotter were about to weigh in, 10 so I'll turn first to Mr. Wiley.

11 MR. WILEY: Thank you. I would object to an 12 extension and protraction of this issue and the ruling 13 thereon to the 9th. As you know, the Commission has 14 invoked an expedited proceeding to have the prehearing 15 conference. We certainly want the hearing to be 16 scheduled in a timely fashion, and extending it past 17 that date simply to accommodate the lack of requesting an overnight or expedited transcript is not certainly 18 19 consistent with our interest in this proceeding, so we 20 would object.

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JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Trotter?

22 MR. TROTTER: I did not hear Mr. Iglitzin say 23 he was not going to seek an expedited transcript, so 24 until he does, I guess I can't comment further. I 25 think we can still do it on the schedule we have if the

IBU is going to get an expedited transcript. It 1 2 shouldn't be a very lengthy one. JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Iglitzin, your need for 3 4 the expedited transcript you said was based on the 5 citations made by Mr. Wiley, I believe? MR. IGLITZIN: In part based on the б 7 citations. I believe that Mr. Wiley only cited one decision that is not in his brief. That's the Brown'S 8 9 Limousine Crew Car decision. If I could confirm that, that would be one bit of useful information. 10 11 MR. WILEY: That's correct, and I will 12 provide it to you by mail by Monday. 13 MR. IGLITZIN: That would be great, but 14 because the oral argument made at this prehearing 15 conference is going to be part of the record and is 16 going to be available to be reviewed by both the 17 administrative law judge and the Commission if this goes up to interlocutory review, it basically is the 18 19 same as written pleading, and the IBU very much wants 20 the opportunity to be able to review those arguments.

21 I took notes while Mr. Wiley was talking, but I did not 22 take a verbatim transcript of his comments.

I am not in a position to know whether the IBU can afford or is willing to pay for an expedited transcript. Perhaps if we go off the record and the

court reporter can give us an idea of what we are 1 talking about, that might put me in a position to make 2 3 that decision. 4 JUDGE RENDAHL: Let's be off the record for a 5 moment. 6 (Discussion off the record.) 7 JUDGE RENDAHL: We do need to talk scheduling, and the reason we do is that in reading 8 9 this statute or my reading of the statute is that in order to resolve this application, the statute requires 10 11 a hearing. Now, the nature of the hearing is the 12 question. If we have a protested application, then I 13 think we need more of a full evidentiary hearing. 14 Although, how we structure that, there is variations, 15 and if there is no protested application, then the 16 nature of the hearing is different. 17 So I will also inform you all that given the Commission's schedule in the month of June and during 18 19 the summer, I understand that the Applicant has a 20 temporary permit that expires in September; is that 21 correct? 22 MR. WILEY: You are confusing us with a another recent applicant. We have no temporary. 23 24 JUDGE RENDAHL: But the Applicant does wish

25 to initiate service in September?

2 JUDGE RENDAHL: In order to give the Commission time to hold a hearing and evaluate and 3 4 issue an order and allow for any time for appeals that 5 might occur to allow service to begin in September, б it's important to try to schedule this hearing before 7 the end of June, and looking at the Commission schedule, the two available days the Commission has are 8 9 Monday and Tuesday, June the 21st and 22nd, because the 10 4th of July holiday week is a not a good option, and 11 the commissioners are also gone the week of the 12th 12 and the 14th, and for other reasons, the week of the 13 28th is not a good one, so we are kind of between a 14 rock and a hard place here. 15 MR. WILEY: Does the Commission have the week 16 of July 5th open? 17 JUDGE RENDAHL: They do, but I will not be 18 here. 19 MR. IGLITZIN: I will not be available that 20 week either. 21 JUDGE RENDAHL: Is the 21st and 22nd a 22 possibility for the parties? 23 MR. WILEY: Can we go off the record? 24 JUDGE RENDAHL: Let's go off the record for a

25 moment.

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MR. WILEY: Correct.

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(Discussion off the record.)

(Recess.)

JUDGE RENDAHL: While we were off the record, we tried to do some planning of scheduling a hearing and the type of hearing we might have and the timing that we would need, so this is what we came up with, and please chime in if I have not gotten it correct.

8 The Applicant is requesting a day of hearing 9 here in Olympia with a day of hearing in Kingston. We 10 are reserving the date of June 21st for a hearing here 11 in Olympia that would address financial witnesses and 12 operation witnesses, and then July 1st in Kingston, and 13 the Applicant and Intervenor Kitsap Transit will be 14 looking into whether there is a public room we can use 15 for that hearing. The Commission would need a PA 16 system, but I'm assuming any sort of a public 17 auditorium would have that, and probably no need of a conference bridge. All parties will be participating. 18

19 The time estimates for witnesses and 20 testimony varied greatly depending on whether the IBU's 21 protest is dismissed or not, so I'm not going to go 22 into great detail there at this point. The timing for 23 the protest motion response is on Friday the 28th of 24 May. The IBU will file its supplemental response to 25 the Applicant's motion as well as a response to the Staff's response to the motion, and then on Wednesday,
 the 2nd of June, the Applicant will file a reply to the
 IBU's response.

The Commission will endeavor to have an order out by June 7th resolving the issue of the protest, and then a prehearing conference will be scheduled at 1:30 on the following day, June 8th, at which parties can participate via the phone as opposed to attending in person so we can finalize details depending on whether the motion is granted or not.

11 The parties have agreed to exchange summary 12 statements of witness testimony and evidence by the 13 16th at noon in advance of the hearing on the 21st, and the order that will address the motion will also 14 15 address the issue of the commissioners' request for a 16 prehearing briefing and whether, in fact, that is 17 needed, and if so, the nature of that briefing and the timing. Have I missed something? 18

MR. TROTTER: The summary of evidence to be
filed would also include proposed exhibits.
JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. Mr. Wiley?

22 MR. WILEY: The only thing I see that you 23 missed is the contingency that if the application is 24 unprotested, we are reserving a half day in the 25 afternoon on the 22nd. Is that correct?

JUDGE RENDAHL: That is correct, and I didn't 1 state it. If not, we will reserve the afternoon on the 2 3 22nd to address any financial and operational testimony 4 that didn't get addressed on the 21st to allow us to 5 proceed solely on the 1st with shipper need and a public hearing, and I'm not sure if I stated, but the б 7 Commission would like to have a public hearing on the 1st, and we will determine whether it's appropriate to 8 9 do that during the day or in the evening, and we can 10 also address that further on the 8th at the next 11 prehearing? 12 Is there anything else we need to discuss

13 this afternoon? If you haven't already, if you could 14 please let the court reporter know if you need a copy 15 of the transcript. I know Mr. Iglitzin will be 16 communicating with Ms. Wilson in terms of obtaining an 17 expedited transcript.

18 MR. IGLITZIN: I take it the court reporter 19 is there right now. If I could communicate at this 20 point that we would like an expedited transcript, and 21 if it's possible to only request the substantive 22 argument portion.

JUDGE RENDAHL: I'll let you two communicate with one another on that. Is there any other party that wishes to obtain a copy of the transcript?

Hearing nothing, is there anything else we need to address? Hearing nothing on that, this conference stands adjourned, and I will be entering a prehearing conference order on the definitive issues that we have discussed today within the week. Thank you very much. We will be off the record. (Prehearing conference concluded at 3:30 p.m.)