EXHIBIT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ (DEG-1TC)
DOCKET NO. \_\_\_\_
2001 PSE RATE CASE
WITNESS: DONALD E. GAINES

## BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

## WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,

Complainant,

٧.

**PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.** 

Respondent.

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DONALD E. GAINES ON BEHALF OF PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.

**NOVEMBER 26, 2001** 

1		
2		PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC. DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DONALD E. GAINES
3		DIRECT TESTINION OF BOWNED E. GIM (ES
4		I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
5		
6	Q.	Please state your name, business address, and position with Puget Sound Energy, Inc.
7	A.	My name is Donald E. Gaines. My business address is P.O. Box 97034 OBC-15,
8		Bellevue, WA 98009-9734. I am Vice President & Treasurer at Puget Sound Energy,
9		Inc. ("PSE" or "the Company" hereinafter).
10	Q.	Have you prepared an exhibit describing your education and professional
11		qualifications?
12	A.	Yes, I have. It is Exhibit DEG-2.
13	Q.	What are your duties as Vice President & Treasurer?
14	A.	I have overall responsibility for investing and raising capital in the financial markets.
15		I am also responsible for maintaining relations with credit rating agencies, financial
16		analysts and commercial and investment banks. In addition, I oversee the Company's
17		forecasting, analytical, performance analysis and budgeting activities.
18	Q.	What is the purpose of and the primary conclusions of your testimony?
19	A.	The purpose and primary conclusions of my testimony are summarized as follows:
20		• The Company needs and accesses the capital markets on a daily basis. In order to
21		meet these financial needs, PSE must have ongoing access to capital markets on
22		reasonable terms. However, the Company's ongoing access to capital has been
23		jeopardized and the cost of available capital is excessive. This is due to the
24		under-recovery of power costs (i.e., an under-recovery of approximately \$625,000
25		per day) and the lack of a mechanism to timely recover these costs.
26		

- The Company is seeking to reestablish the financial profile that supports an "A" bond rating. An "A" rating provides an optimal balance of cost (economy) and risk (safety), and provides customers with a critical margin of safety during periods of industry change and uncertain conditions. However, due to the lack of a timely power cost recovery mechanism and the Company's current eroding financial position, S&P has twice downgraded the Company's credit ratings and Moody's has placed the Company's ratings under review for possible downgrade. The Company now faces the real risk of falling off the precipice of investment grade ratings, and the corresponding risk with respect to access to capital markets.
  - The Company is requesting a capital structure that builds equity, thereby
    maintaining the appropriate balance of safety and economy. The Company's
    proposed capital structure includes an adjustment of \$XXXXX million (in lieu of
    an attrition adjustment to revenue requirements) to increase earnings capacity.
     The Company will be able to achieve its proposed capital structure (less the
    amount of the proposed adjustment) by the end of the rate year by issuing equity.
  - The total cost of debt is 7.40%. The cost of trust preferred is 8.58%. The cost of preferred stock is 7.78%.
  - The total cost of equity is 14%, based upon Dr. Hadaway's recommended 13.5% cost of equity and a 50 basis point incentive adjustment for efficient and innovative operations.
  - The requested overall rate of return for the Company is 10.47%.

#### II. THE COMPANY'S FINANCING NEEDS

#### Q. Please describe PSE's financial needs?

A. PSE incurs construction and operating costs necessary to provide safe and reliable service to its customers. These costs are presented for the test year in the testimony

of Karl R. Karzmar. As discussed in the testimony of William A. Gaines, extraordinary circumstances attributable to volatility in the wholesale energy supply markets have caused the Company's power costs to significantly increase. These costs fall outside of the test year, and therefore are not captured in the revenue requirements presented in this case.

Further, under its current rate structure, the Company is not fully recovering these power costs, and has projected a shortfall of \$XXX million between September 1, 2001 and the beginning of the rate year. This under-recovery is a short fall of approximately \$625,000 per day. As a result, PSE's access to needed capital is in jeopardy, and the cost of available capital is excessive. This under-recovery will produce financial results that fall significantly below PSE's authorized rate of return.

#### Q. How does PSE typically meet these financing needs?

In general, PSE obtains the money it needs through charges collected from customers through Commission-approved rates. To the extent cash flow from customer bills is insufficient to meet the Company's financial needs, PSE acquires funds from capital markets. Historically, PSE has been, and is likely to remain, a "net borrower." This means that the charges collected from customers are typically insufficient to meet all of the Company's cash needs. When cash flows fall short of needs, the Company must borrow. As a result, "financing" is not a periodic need. In fact, the Company needs and accesses the capital markets on a daily basis. In order to meet the financial needs discussed above, PSE must have ongoing access to capital markets on reasonable terms.

### Q. What do you mean by "reasonable terms"?

A. The Company is seeking to reestablish and maintain a financial structure that supports an "A" bond rating. This, among other factors, will allow the Company to raise debt capital at investment grade costs under most circumstances. "Reasonable terms"

A.

1		means a cost of debt that is consistent with an investment grade credit rating, without
2		a penalty premium attributable to an unacceptable risk profile. Additionally,
3		"reasonable terms" means that the Company must be able to raise equity capital at a
4		stock price that is not artificially depressed by the current inability to fully recover
5		costs, uncertainty as to future cost recovery, and to maintain an appropriate level of
6		earnings.
7	Q.	What costs are currently associated with accessing capital markets?
8	A.	Currently, the Company's cost of debt as reflected in current spreads over Treasury
9		securities for 10-year debt is 250 basis points, which is 60 basis points higher than the
10		current 190 basis point spread for similarly rated utility debt. The cost level indicated
11		by these spreads is excessive. These are the very type of penalty premiums that, as
12		noted in the testimony of Howard Hiller, constitute unreasonable debt costs. It is also
13		unreasonably high when compared to the current average spread of 150 basis points
14		for "A" rated utility debt.
15		Similarly, the Company's cost of equity as reflected in current yields and growth rates
16		is 13.5% as described by Dr. Hadaway. This reflects the Company's current
17		diminished stock price and resulting high dividend yield.
18	Q.	What factors impact PSE's ability to access capital and the cost of capital?
19	A.	Investors in the debt and equity capital markets demand returns commensurate with
20		the risk of their investment. These elements of risk are not unique to the Company.
21		In general, as in other businesses, there are two types of risk facing the Company; (1)
22		business risk, or the riskiness of PSE's operations and its operating environment, and

(2) financial risk, the additional risk placed on common stockholders resulting from

the use of debt. These two types of risk can be balanced to present an acceptable risk

profile to investors, resulting in a reasonable overall cost of capital to customers.

**23** 

**24** 

**25** 

1		PSE currently has a significant business risk attributable to the volatility in the
2		Company's power supply costs, which is a factor that it cannot control. This power
3		cost risk, and the lack of timely recovery of these costs, is a key factor frustrating
4		PSE's current ability to access capital on reasonable terms. This is why PSE needs a
5		mechanism to recover these costs.
6		III. THE IMPORTANCE TO CUSTOMERS OF CREDIT RATINGS
7	Q.	What are rating agencies and credit ratings?
8	A.	There are independent agencies, called credit rating agencies, that assess the above-
9		described risks for investors. The two most widely recognized rating agencies are
10		Standard & Poor's (S&P) and Moody's Investors Service (Moody's). These rating
11		agencies assign a credit rating to companies and their securities so investors can more
12		easily understand the risks involved by investing in their debt and preferred stock.
13	Q.	Why are credit ratings important to customers?
14	A.	Credit ratings are important to customers because they are an independent assessment
15		of risk. As a result, they are a major factor in determining the cost of capital to the
16		Company and its customers. A declining credit rating, as experienced by the
17		Company, increases the cost of capital and thereby increases the cost of service to
18		customers.
19		Customers benefit when the appropriate risk profile, found by managing business risk
20		with the appropriate degree of debt leverage, supports a credit rating that allows the
21		Company to access capital at a reasonable cost. Because credit ratings take into
22		consideration these risk elements and have such a dramatic impact on the cost of
23		capital, they are of importance to customers.
24		
25		
26		

1	Q.	Please summarize the factors credit rating agencies examine when determining credit ratings.		
2	A.	Included as pages 1 through 19 in Exhibit DEG-3 is a copy of S&P's "Rating		
3		Methodology." Also included, as pages 20 through 27 is a description of Moody's		
4		ratings process. To summarize, S&P examines:		
5		Corporate Credit Analysis Factors		
6		_		
7		Business Risk Industry Characteristics Competitive Position	Financial Risk Financial Characteristics Financial Policy	
8		Competitive Position (e.g.) Marketing	Financial Policy Profitability	
9		(e.g.) Technology	Capital Structure	
10		(e.g.) Efficiency (e.g.) Regulation	Cash Flow Protection Financial Flexibility	
11				
12		Specifically for companies like PSE, S&P	also examines regulation, markets,	
13		operations and competitiveness. In the are	a of "regulation", S&P assesses the	
14		following:		
15		Electric T&D Company Rating F	actors Related to "Regulation"	
16	,	• The nature of the rate-making structure, e.	g., performance-based vs. cost-of-service	
17		Authorized return on equity		
18		Timely and consistent rate treatment		
19		• Status of restructuring, e.g., residual oblig	ation to provide power, which entails the	
20		purchase of electricity for resale		
21		<ul> <li>FERC's evolving rules for regional transm</li> </ul>	nission organizations, independent system	
22		operators, and for-profit transmission com	panies	
23		<ul> <li>Incentives to maintain existing delivery as</li> </ul>	ssets and invest in new assets	
24		<ul> <li>Nature of distributor support that retains t</li> </ul>	he status of provider of last resort	
<b>25</b>		In examining the items listed above, there	s no formula for combining assessments of	
<b>26</b>		these factors to arrive at a specific credit ra	ting. The agency's collective experience	

1		and expertise applied to a review of these factors results in a credit rating. As S&P
2		states, "ratings represent an art as much as a science."
3	Q.	Please summarize credit ratings.
4	A.	The four highest credit rating categories, "AAA", "AA", "A" and "BBB", using S&P's
5		nomenclature, are generally recognized as being investment grade. Ratings of "BB"
6		and below are generally referred to as speculative grade (the term "junk bond" is
7		merely a more irreverent expression for debt issued by firms of this speculative rating
8		category). A more thorough description of these ratings categories can be found in
9		Exhibit DEG-3.
10	Q.	What credit rating does PSE need in order to attract capital on reasonable
11		terms?
12	A.	The Company is seeking to reestablish and maintain a financial structure that supports
13		an "A" bond rating. PSE competes with other firms in the financial markets for
14		investors' money. The Company must present a risk and return profile that will cause
15		investors to invest in PSE rather than the other firms competing for investors' money.
16	Q.	What is the credit rating of the State of Washington and publicly owned utilities in Washington?
17	A.	The State of Washington and the majority of publicly owned utilities in the region
18		maintain "A" or better credit ratings. The State of Washington taxes residents at
19		levels that enables it to maintain a credit rating substantially higher than what the
20		Company is requesting in this proceeding. The general obligation bonds issued by
21		Washington State are rated as follows:
22		S&P rating AA+
23		Moody's rating AA+  Mal
24		
25		The major PUDs and municipal utilities located in Washington State with publicly
26		traded bonds are allowed rates and capitalization that support credit ratings at or

1		above what the Com	pany is requesting. Below is a list of	of S&P's credit ratings for
2		these entities.		
3			Seattle City Light	A+
4			Tacoma City Light	A+/stable
5			Snohomish County PUD Douglas County PUD	A+/stable AA-/stable
6			Franklin County PUD Pacific County PUD	A-/stable A-/stable
7			Tuelle County 1 CD	11/500010
8		On October 22, 2003	1, S&P lowered the credit ratings of	Seattle Municipal Light &
9		Power from "AA-" t	o "A+". A Seattle Post Intelligence	r newspaper article dated
10		October 27, 2001 sta	ated that City Light's ratings were cu	nt after higher-than-expected
11		power costs drained	cash reserves. The article further n	nentions that City Light
12		sidestepped more ca	sh deficits by raising customer rates	almost 58 percent this year
13		and noted that additi	onal rate increases in 2002 are likel	y if below-average rainfall
14		reduces hydroelectri	c generation.	
15	Q.	Have public utility investor-owned util	commissions recognized the value	e of a solid credit rating for
16	A.	Yes. The objective	of maintaining a solid credit rating f	for investor owned utilities
17		has long been accept	ted and approved by public utility co	ommissions. In fact, this
18		Commission has exp	olicitly recognized the value of the C	Company maintaining an "A'
19		bond rating in a deci	sion involving amortization method	ls for accumulated deferred
20			ts. In that order, the Commission st	
21				
22		_	trated that it will require additional or risk losing the "A-" bond rating the	_
23		enjoys, which coul	Id jeopardize its ability to attract caping costs for ratepayers.	1 4
24				
<b>25</b>		The Commission further	er stated:	

	However, we wish to make it abundantly clear that the ITC treatment
1	allowed by this order is justified only in view of Puget's financial condition
2	and the threat of a lowered bond rating if relief is not forthcoming.

In the Matter of the Application of Puget Sound Power & Light Company, for Approval to Modify Amortization Methods for Accumulated Deferred Investment Tax Credits, Second Supplemental Order Granting Petition For Reconsideration, Cause No. U-86-115 (February, 1987), p.4 and p.5.

#### Q. Why is it important for PSE to maintain an "A" rating?


A. An "A" credit rating reflects a financial structure that provides an optimal balance of cost (economy) and risk (safety) while providing the Company with the financial flexibility needed to access the capital markets on reasonable terms in difficult times. An "A" rating is also important because it saves customers money and provides them with a margin of safety during periods of industry change and uncertain conditions. When negative developments occur, the reaction of rating agencies in downgrading a company can be dramatic and swift. The Company experienced this when it's debt was downgraded two notches by S&P, from "A-" to "BBB" in a matter of weeks in October 2001 due to the lack of timely power cost recovery mechanisms and the resulting erosion of the Company's financial position. Had the Company started with a corporate credit rating of just one notch lower, these actions would have resulted in the Company's credit being in the below investment grade or "junk" category. As it stands today, PSE is one notch away, and the preferred securities are now rated "junk."

## Q. Does a "BBB" rating also provide an appropriate balance of economy and safety?

A. No. A "BBB" rating reflects increased risk levels that are only one step away from junk. It is dangerous to be teetering on the brink of non-investment grade rating. The increase in the cost of debt from an "A" rating to "junk" status ("BB") is always huge and can vary substantially over time. This can be seen in the following chart, which

contains historical credit spreads over Treasury securities from January 1993 to August 2001.

### **Credit Spreads Over Treasury Securities**



The volatility in "BB" spreads is also dramatic. From the chart above, one can see the spread between "A" and "BBB" rated securities remains fairly constant and narrow. However, the spreads between these ratings and "BB" rated securities is wide and has varied substantially. When these spreads will contract or expand is unpredictable. Such wide spreads have a huge impact on borrowing costs.

A.

### Q. Is the stability of the Company's credit rating also important?

Yes. A strong credit rating should be maintained over time as the Company requires continuous access to capital markets. When a company faces financial difficulties that threaten its credit rating, typically the capital markets will react negatively before the credit rating agencies downgrade the credit rating. However, if a company subsequently takes steps to improve its financial position and its credit rating is

- upgraded, the market will lag the upgrade taking longer for the company to benefit
  from the reduced capital costs associated with a better credit rating. It is by
  maintaining a solid credit rating over time that a company maintains access to capital
  on reasonable terms.
- O. Please provide some quantitative examples of why it is important to maintain an "A" credit rating.
- 7 A. The following table shows average spread differential for certain bond ratings from January 1993 through August 2001:

#### **Average Credit Spreads Over Treasury Securities**

Rating	Average Spread	<b>Change from A Rating</b>
A	0.87%	
BBB	1.14%	0.27%
BB	3.37%	2.50%

Using the average spreads above, the additional cost of dropping below investment grade on a \$200 million debt offering would be \$5 million per year. The cost of maintaining an "A" vs. a "BBB" rating is one tenth of that amount.

Equally as important, but far more extreme, is the impact on the value of all the debt outstanding. The Company's approximately \$2 billion of long-term debt outstanding has a cost rate of 7.40% and an average remaining maturity of 13.6 years. The cost to bondholders of a 250 basis point increase in yield drops the value of this debt by approximately \$365 million. Dramatic changes in the value of bondholders' investment will cause them to demand compensation for being exposed to such volatility. This is why it is important to maintain an "A" bond rating at all times, not just when the Company is planning to issue securities. Maintaining the rating is also an indication of management's commitment to credit quality – a commitment the rating agencies look for when assessing a company's management.

short-term borrowings. Credit sensitive commercial paper buyers likely will n longer be interested in lending to PSE. Like commercial paper, uncommitted borrowings are likely to become limited to an over-night basis or may become unavailable altogether. This happened earlier in 2001 when it became clear the California utilities would not be paying for their power purchases on time and as a result of the recent S&P downgrades.  The Company's \$375 million revolving line of credit contains pricing that is be credit ratings. As the credit rating declines, the cost of borrowing increases. The credit rating in the Company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Offer Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis points to 30 basis points to 30 basis points to 30 basis points agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used. At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its possible control bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security. In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE were also as a result of the current of the currently do business with PSE were also as a result of the current of the currently do business with PSE were also as a result of the current of the currently do business with PSE were also as a result of the currently do business with PSE were also as a result of the currently do business with PSE were also as a result of the currently	In	n addition to spreads widening on long-term debt issues, upon a downgrade to below
longer be interested in lending to PSE. Like commercial paper, uncommitted borrowings are likely to become limited to an over-night basis or may become unavailable altogether. This happened earlier in 2001 when it became clear the California utilities would not be paying for their power purchases on time and as a result of the recent S&P downgrades.  The Company's \$375 million revolving line of credit contains pricing that is becredit ratings. As the credit rating declines, the cost of borrowing increases. The cent drop in the Company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Off Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis points to 30 basis points the commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annut of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used.  At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its potential bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE we	in	nvestment-grade status, spreads would also widen on commercial paper and other
borrowings are likely to become limited to an over-night basis or may become unavailable altogether. This happened earlier in 2001 when it became clear the California utilities would not be paying for their power purchases on time and as a result of the recent S&P downgrades.  The Company's \$375 million revolving line of credit contains pricing that is be credit ratings. As the credit rating declines, the cost of borrowing increases. The company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Of Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis points the commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annual of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used. At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its positional bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured—there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE were as a result of the paying that it is became clear the clear that is became and the paying that is a result, the PSE were are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE were applied to the paying that the paying that the paying that is a paying that the paying that is a paying that the paying that is a paying that the paying that is a paying that the paying that is a paying that	sh	nort-term borrowings. Credit sensitive commercial paper buyers likely will no
unavailable altogether. This happened earlier in 2001 when it became clear the California utilities would not be paying for their power purchases on time and as a result of the recent S&P downgrades.  The Company's \$375 million revolving line of credit contains pricing that is became drop in the Company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Of Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis points commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annu of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used.  At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its pocontrol bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE were also as a result of the power of the power process.	lo	onger be interested in lending to PSE. Like commercial paper, uncommitted
California utilities would not be paying for their power purchases on time and as a result of the recent S&P downgrades.  The Company's \$375 million revolving line of credit contains pricing that is be credit ratings. As the credit rating declines, the cost of borrowing increases. The company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Of Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis points the commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annual of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used. At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its positive control bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE were credit ratings with PSE with PSE were controlled to the paying that it is because of the paying that is the property of the paying that is because of the paying that paying the paying that paying the paying the paying that paying	bo	orrowings are likely to become limited to an over-night basis or may become
as a result of the recent S&P downgrades.  The Company's \$375 million revolving line of credit contains pricing that is be credit ratings. As the credit rating declines, the cost of borrowing increases. The recent drop in the Company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Of Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis points the commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annual of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used.  At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its post control bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security. In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE were as a result of the properties of the pr	un	navailable altogether. This happened earlier in 2001 when it became clear the
The Company's \$375 million revolving line of credit contains pricing that is be credit ratings. As the credit rating declines, the cost of borrowing increases. The recent drop in the Company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Of Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis point the commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annual of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used. At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its post control bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security. In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE were also as a result of the property o	Ca	California utilities would not be paying for their power purchases on time and again
credit ratings. As the credit rating declines, the cost of borrowing increases. The recent drop in the Company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Of Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis points the commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annual of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used. At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its positionary control bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bonds cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those securities and the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE with the cost of debt, there are other costs with PSE with the cost of debt is a currently do business with PSE with the cost of debt.	as	s a result of the recent S&P downgrades.
recent drop in the Company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Of Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis point the commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annu of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used. At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its porcontrol bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE we	Tł	The Company's \$375 million revolving line of credit contains pricing that is based on
Rate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis points the commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annu of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used.  At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its potential bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bonds cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security. In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE were also as a result, the PSE were also as a result and the PSE were also as a result a	cre	redit ratings. As the credit rating declines, the cost of borrowing increases. The
the commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annual of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used. At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its possible control bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security. In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE we	ree	ecent drop in the Company's credit ratings increased the London Interbank Offering
of that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used.  At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its possible control bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security. In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE we	Ra	ate ("LIBOR") margin in that agreement from 25 basis points to 30 basis points and
At lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may be unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its porcontrol bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those security. In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE we	the	ne commitment fee from 8 basis points to 9 basis points. As a result, the annual cost
unavailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its pole control bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indical would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those securit In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE we	of	f that agreement has risen by \$187,500 assuming the line is fully used.
control bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indica would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those securit In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE w	At	at lower bond ratings, bond insurance costs increase or such insurance may become
AMBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bonds cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is not for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those securit In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE were also as a security of the s	un	navailable altogether. The Company had been considering refinancing its pollution
would not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is no for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those securit In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE w	co	ontrol bonds with similar securities of lower interest rates. The bond insurer
regulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bond cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is no for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those securit In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE w	Al	MBAC insures the existing bonds. Recent discussions with AMBAC indicated they
cannot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is no for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those securit In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE w	W	ould not be willing to insure PSE's bonds given its current credit ratings and
for them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those securit In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE w	re	egulatory climate. Investment bankers have told the Company that such bonds
In addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE w	ca	annot be refinanced without the new bonds being insured – there simply is no market
maintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE w	fo	or them. As a result, the Company is no longer able to refinance those securities.
	In	addition to these impacts on the cost of debt, there are other costs of not
do business with firms rated below investment grade (e.g. Citibank Bankers L.	m	naintaining an "A" rating. Many firms who currently do business with PSE will not
2. State of the st	do	o business with firms rated below investment grade (e.g. Citibank Bankers Leasing,

1

	the company with whom PSE ma	aintains a master oper	rating lease agreement,	
	do business with firms rated below investment grade).			
Q.	What are PSE's current credit	ratings.		
A.	The Company's current credit rat	tings are as follows:		
	PSE's	s Credit Ratings		
		S&P	Moody's	
	Senior Secured Debt	BBB	Baa1	
	Issuer (Company) Rating	BBB-	Baa2	
	Senior Unsecured Debt	BB+	Baa2	
	<b>Trust Preferred Rating</b>	BB	Baa3	
	<b>Preferred Stock Rating</b>	BB	Ba1	
	<b>Commercial Paper</b>	A-3	Prime -2	
	These ratings reflect the fact that ratings due to the lack of a timely current eroding financial position	y power cost recovery	mechanism and the C d the Company's rating	
	review for possible downgrade.		•	
	Although PSE's financial perfocurrent mismatch between its eincurring, we believe that taking	existing electric rates	and the net supply cost	
	response to the recent orders w	ould be premature. V	We choose instead to av	
	further developments in the upcoming general rate filing. Moody's will continue to assess PSE's ability to achieve some initial financial relief in the form of an interim rate hike relatively early in the general rate case, or from other actions			
	internit rate line relatively carr	iy iii iiie general rate t		
	the state might take within the	· ·		
	•	same near-term horiz	on.	

ratings were "BBB+" and "Baa2" and its commercial paper was rated "A-2" and

"Prime-2" by S&P and Moody's respectively.

**24** 

**25** 

1	Q.	Assuming the Commission grants the rate relief requested in this proceeding, will the projected financial results support an "A" rating?
2	A.	As noted above, credit rating agencies examine a number of qualitative and
3		quantitative factors in determining a credit rating, and there is no formula for
4		combining assessments of these factors to arrive at a specific credit rating. However,
5		I believe that the combination of granting timely and appropriate interim relief, and in
6		the general case, putting in place a stronger capital structure, the appropriate return on
7		equity and regulatory mechanisms that reduce the Company's power cost risk will
8		likely lead credit rating agencies to look more favorably on the Company's financial
9		condition, and will support a solid investment-grade credit rating. Taken together,
10		these factors will significantly improve the Company's risk profile and demonstrate a
11		supportive regulatory climate that should move PSE well toward the goal of
12		reclaiming an "A" rating.
13		IV. CAPITAL STRUCTURE
14	Q.	What factors are typically considered in selecting the appropriate capital
15		structure?
16	A	Selecting the appropriate capital structure involves a balancing of risk and cost. In
17		Puget Sound Power & Light Company's 1992 rate case, the Commission referred to
18		this balance of economy and safety. The Commission said:
19		The Commission determines an appropriate balance of debt and equity
20		within the capital structure on the bases of economy and safety.  Because the composite cost of debt is generally less than that of
21		equity, overall capital costs can be expected to decrease as a greater portion of the capital structure is composed of debt. The economy of
22		lower capital cost must be balanced against the safety of the capital structure.
23		
24		The concept of "safety" refers to the fact that the company has no legal obligation to pay a return to the holders of common stock. In dire
25		financial circumstances, a company can reduce or suspend the payment of dividends to the owners of common stock without the legal
26		consequences that would flow from a failure to pay interest on debt.

In return, holders of common equity generally demand a greater return than do lenders who have a claim on the company's earnings.

Puget Sound Power & Light Company, Cause No. UE-921262 (1993).

As the Commission observed, a capital structure with a high equity component does not take advantage of lower cost tax-deductible debt, resulting in relatively high capital costs to customers. Incorporating too much debt leverage into the capital structure adds risk, and as the Commission observes, this can result in dire financial consequences. In such cases, the appropriate regulatory action (in the context of a general rate case) is to provide interim regulatory relief before a utility faces dire financial circumstances. This properly avoids the negative financial consequence of forcing a utility to reduce or suspend the payment of dividends, further deflating investor interest in equity, and thereby making it incredibly expensive (if not impossible) for the utility to issue additional equity and restore the appropriate balance of risk and cost.

### Q. How has the Commission struck this balance in the past?

In its last general rate case, Puget Sound Power & Light Co. was authorized a capital structure of 45% equity. This was done in the context of the Company operating under a power cost tracker mechanism ("PRAM"). Similarly, in its last general rate case, Washington Natural Gas was authorized a capital structure of 44% equity and operated with a Purchased Gas Adjustment ("PGA") mechanism. These equity ratios are in line with the capital structures of the comparable companies used in Dr. Hadaway's analysis. As Dr. Hadaway testifies, the comparable companies have tracking mechanisms (or are presented with other circumstances) that effectively shield them from significant power cost risk. Their equity ratios on average are also consistent with the Company's current request.

A.

#### Q. What is the Company's actual capital structure?

A. As of September 30, 2001, the Company's capital structure is as follows:

3		
4		
5		
6		
7		

1

Capital Component	Percentage
Short-term Debt	7.1%
Long-term Debt	51.5%
Trust Preferred	7.1%
Preferred Stock	2.6%
Common Equity	31.7%
Total Capitalization	100.0%

9

10

11

8

# Q. Does the Company's current capital structure appropriately balance the risks and costs of shareholder and debt funding?

12 A. No. Since the merger, the equity component of the Company's capital structure has
13 eroded. The Company's ability to rebuild equity is hampered by its artificially
14 depressed stock price and uncertainties surrounding the Company's ongoing financial
15 condition, such as PSE's exposure to power cost risk of a magnitude equivalent to its
16 annual earnings. It is important to resolve these uncertainties so that the value of the
17 Company's equity can be restored, and the Company can issue equity at its restored
18 value to reestablish its historic equity ratio.

### Q. What is PSE's capital structure expected to be during the rate year?

Page 1 of Exhibit DEG-4C shows what PSE's capital structure that is expected to be towards the end of the rate year. PSE will achieve this capital structure as a result of debt maturities and retirements, retained earnings, additional equity issued to meet the

**23** 

19

20

21

22

A.

24

25

1		requirements of the dividend reinvestment plan, through sales of common stock and
2		an adjustment to the capital structure as discussed below.
3	Q.	What is the Company's plan to achieve the requested capital structure?
4	A.	The Company's proposed capital structure includes an adjustment of \$XXXX million
5		(in lieu of an attrition adjustment to revenue requirements) to increase earnings
6		capacity. The Company will be able to achieve its proposed capital structure (less the
7		amount of the proposed adjustment) by the end of the rate year by issuing equity.
8		The Company's plan to issue equity includes public sales of common stock in
9		November 2002 of \$XXX million and another \$XXX million in April 2003. The
10		issues are timed to follow the completion of the general rate proceeding, to avoid
11		selling stock at an artificially depressed price before the results of the case are known
12		to the financial markets.
13		The adjustment to the proposed capital structure of \$XXXXX million is made in lieu
14		of an attrition allowance to revenue requirements. This accounts for the financial
15		impact of extraordinary circumstances attributable to volatility in the wholesale
16		energy supply markets, which circumstances have caused the Company's net power
17		costs to significantly increase. These events, and the resulting costs, are described in
18		the testimony of William A. Gaines. These costs are not included in test year costs,
19		and are of such a magnitude that they are not offset to any significant degree by cost
20		savings in other areas, or by revenues.
21		Under these circumstances, PSE could seek an attrition adjustment to revenue
22		requirements. However, rather than seeking an attrition allowance to revenue
<b>23</b>		requirements, PSE has made a comparable adjustment to its proposed capital
24		structure. This also helps to reestablish the appropriate balance of debt and equity.
25		The resulting earnings capacity will allow the Company to prospectively reduce debt

and offset, over time, the adjustment to retained earnings with actual earnings.

- Should, however, the Company be granted interim relief during the pendency of this proceeding for some portion of these extraordinary costs, the adjustment to the capital structure would be reduced similarly.
- 4 Q. How does the capital structure the Company is requesting compare to the companies included in Dr. Hadaway's comparable company analysis?
- A. Dr. Hadaway includes 23 companies in his comparable company analysis. As can be seen in the table below, on average, these companies' capital structures compare favorably to the capital structure the Company is requesting:

	Capital	PSE	Comparable
<u>C</u>	<u>omponent</u>	Request	<b>Companies</b>
$\overline{\mathrm{D}}$	ebt	52.7%*	51.5%
Pi	referred Stock	2.3%	3.1%
C	ommon Equity	<u>45.0%</u>	<u>45.4%</u>
Te	otal	100.0%	100.0%

<sup>\*</sup> For comparison purposes, the Company's trust preferred has been included with debt.

While very similar, it should be noted that the comparable companies have slightly more equity than PSE is requesting in this proceeding.

## 16 Q. Are you proposing the same capital structure for gas and electric operations?

A. Yes. Puget Sound Energy is an integrated gas and electric utility. The Company is not run with separate electric and gas divisions. The capital acquired to finance the Company is not split between gas and electric operations. The use of proceeds from such financing is not tied to any one type of energy. As a result, a single capital structure is appropriate.

#### V. THE COST OF DEBT

- Q. What has the Company done to reduce its debt cost since the last general rate proceeding?
- 25 A. The Company has taken several steps to reduce its cost of debt. First, when the Company issues long-term debt, it almost exclusively issues debt secured by

9

10

11

12

13

17

18

19

20

21


1	mortgages on its electric and gas properties. As a gas and electric distribution
2	business, the Company has plenty of property to use to as collateral to secure its debt.
3	Because of the collateral backing, secured debt is less expensive than unsecured debt.
4	In the debt capital markets, for a company like PSE that was split rated before the
5	recent downgrades, secured debt can typically be issued with a coupon rate that is 30
6	to 40 basis points less than unsecured debt of similar terms. That savings reduces the
7	cost of debt to PSE's customers.
8	The Company also looks to refinance its investments with less expensive debt when it
9	is able to do so. Although very little of the Company's debt is callable, there have
10	been instances where the Company was able to refinance debt at a savings.
11	In 1995 and again in 1997, the Company was able to refinance its investment in
12	customer owned conservation by securitizing the revenue streams customers would
13	pay for such investments. Once the Commission approved these revenue streams for
14	recovery under state law, the Company sold those streams to investors. With the
15	backing of state law and other features of the issues (such as a small amount of over-
16	collateralization and a provision for true-ups to the revenue streams), the revenue
17	streams were used to repay debt issued to investors at the highest of credit ratings.
18	This resulted in these investments being financed at much lower rates and creating a
19	savings to customers. The Company was credited as the first utility to securitize its
20	conservation investment and this structure was successfully used for other purposes in
21	other states and in foreign countries.
22	Another example of this was related to the Company's acquisition of the Encogen
23	generating facility. In acquiring that project, the Company assumed approximately
24	\$109 million of Encogen project debt. The assumed debt contained interest rates
25	ranging from 8.64% to 13.03%. These rates were higher than what the Company
26	would pay for debt capital at the time and the project nature of the assumed debt

placed certain administrative requirements on the facility. These included insurance requirements and an annual project audit. Through negotiations with the lenders, the Company was able to pay off this expensive project debt with a portion of the proceeds of a \$225 medium term note with a 7.96% coupon rate. The savings from this refinancing was approximately \$1.9 million on a present value basis. The retirement of the project debt also removed the administrative requirements.

As a result of this and other activities, the Company's cost of debt has declined since the last time debt costs were recovered in a general rate proceeding. The cost of long-term debt has declined from 7.91% to 7.40%, a total reduction of 51 basis points. That reduction, when applied to the approximately \$2 billion of long-term debt that will be outstanding on average during the rate year, represents a reduction in interest expense of approximately \$10 million per year.

The following chart reflects the cost of debt and how it has changed since the Company's last general rate proceeding.

## **Cost of Long-term Debt**



Q.	Would you	summarize your	calculation of	f the cost	of long-term	debt?
Ų.	would you	Summarize your	Calculation of	i me cost	or rong-term	uei

The cost of long-term debt was calculated in similar manner to its calculation in prior A. rate proceedings. Consideration was given as to whether or not the embedded rate at 3 June 30, 2001, was a reasonable measure of the cost of debt in light of the long-term debt transactions expected to occur through September 30, 2003, the end of the rate year. I believe, consistent with the past practices of this Commission, that prospective debt costs should be considered.

> To calculate the cost of long-term debt, the yield-to-maturity or cost rate of each debt issue is calculated, using the issue date, maturity date, net proceeds to the Company and coupon rate of that security. The proportional share that each issue's principal amount represents of the total amount of long-term debt outstanding is then used to weigh these cost rates.

These calculations can be found on pages 3 through 5 of Exhibit DEG-4C.

#### How did you treat the 1995 and 1997 conservation securitization debt? Q.

The conservation securitization debt has been included as part of the cost of longterm debt. Likewise, the corresponding unamortized balances of these investments have been included as part of rate base.

The Company acts as the servicer on these transactions. As a result, it includes the unamortized balance of its investment in rate base and the related debt in its capital structure. That results in the costs of those transactions being included in customer's bills. The Company forwards to two separate trusts the revenue streams related to these transactions as required and defined in the related rate schedules. The 1997 conservation securitization will mature and will no longer be outstanding before the beginning of the rate year. As a result, only the 1995 transaction has been included in the cost of debt and rate base.

1

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

A.

1		Unlike a typical medium-term note which matures on a specific date, the conservation
2		securities are similar to home mortgage debt in that a portion of the principal is paid
3		with each monthly (or in the case of this transaction, quarterly) payment. As a result,
4		I have calculated the internal rate of return for this security using the original balance
5		and the actual and expected quarterly repayments. These calculations can be seen on
6		page 6 of Exhibit DEG-4C.
7	Q.	How did you treat new issues of long-term debt?
8	A.	The Company is not planning to issue any additional long-term debt between the test
9		year and the end of the rate year. As a result, there are no new issues to include.
10	Q.	Are there any issues of long-term debt that will mature or retire between the test
11		year and the end of the rate year?
12	A.	Yes. The long-term debt maturities and retirements since the end of the test year are
13		shown on page 5 of Exhibit DEG-4C.
14		Because these issues will not be in place during the rate year, they have been
15		excluded from the calculation of the cost of long-term debt.
16	Q.	What is the resulting cost of long-term debt?
17	A.	The embedded cost of long-term debt is 7.40% as shown on line 41, page 5 of Exhibit
18		DEG-4C.
19	Q.	Would you summarize your calculation of the cost of short-term debt?
20	A.	In the Company's last several general rate cases, the capital structure that the
21		Commission approved included short-term debt as part of the debt component of
22		capital structure. The level of short-term debt expected to be outstanding at the end
23		of the rate year is \$15 million. However, as a result of my capital structure attrition
24		adjustment, the capital structure I am proposing for rate setting purposes includes no
25		short-term debt. This is depicted on page 2 of Exhibit DEG-4C.

1		To calculate the cost of short-term debt during the rate year, the Company calculates
2		the current spread between its short-term borrowing costs and LIBOR, then applies
3		that spread to an estimate of LIBOR during the rate year. The expected cost of the
4		Company's revolving credit agreement is also included in the cost of short-term debt.
5		This calculation can be seen on page 11 of Exhibit DEG-4C.
6		The resulting cost of short-term debt is 6.25%.
7 8	Q.	How did you determine the overall cost of debt as part of your rate of return calculation?
9		A. The total cost of debt is 7.40%, as shown on line 41, page 5 of Exhibit DEG-4C.
10		VI. THE COST OF TRUST PREFERRED
11	Q.	Please describe trust preferred securities.
12	A.	Trust preferred is a security that contains equity-like characteristics yet the cost is
13		deductible for federal income tax purposes. On PSE's financial statements, these
14		securities are called "corporation obligated, mandatorily redeemable preferred
15		securities of subsidiary trust holding solely junior subordinated debentures of the
16		corporation." Because that is a rather unwieldy name, the generic title "trust
17		preferred" is often used to describe these securities.
18		In issuing trust preferred, the Company creates a trust that then issues preferred stock
19		to investors. The trust then lends the proceeds from the sale of the preferred stock to
20		the Company on terms (i.e. maturity, interest rate, etc.) that are identical to the terms
21		of the preferred stock. Typically, these terms include a provision for interest on the
22		loan, and dividends to investors, to be deferred under certain circumstances. Because
23		the Company has borrowed the proceeds from the trust, the Internal Revenue Service
24		allows the interest on the loan to be deductible for federal income tax purposes.
25		Because the interest and dividends are deferrable, and because of the relatively long
26		maturity (i.e. 30 or 40 years), the credit rating agencies consider the securities as

1		having certain equity-like characteristics. S&P, for example, considers the trust
2		preferred of the Company as being 40% equity and 60% debt.
3	Q.	How many trust preferred issues does the Company have outstanding?
4	A.	The Company has two trust preferred issues outstanding. These include a \$100
5		million 8.231% series issued June 6, 1997 and maturing on June 1, 2027 and a
6		\$200 million 8.40% series issued on May 24, 2001 and maturing on June 30, 2041.
7	Q.	How did you determine the costs of these two issues?
8	A.	The cost rates for these two issues were calculated in the same manner as the cost
9		rates for debt issues. The specific calculations of these costs can be seen on page 12
10		of Exhibit DEG-4C.
11	Q.	What is the resulting cost of trust preferred?
12	A.	The resulting cost of trust preferred is 8.58%.
13	Q.	How have you included the trust preferred in the capital structure?
14	A.	Being a separate type of security, I have included the trust preferred as a separate line
15		in the capital structure. Although trust preferred contains equity-like characteristics
16		(e.g. deferrable interest and dividends), the cost of these securities is deductible for
17		federal income tax purposes. Showing trust preferred as a separate line item
18		facilitates their proper treatment in the calculation of the revenue requirement.
19		VII THE COST OF PREFERRED STOCK
20		VII. THE COST OF PREFERRED STOCK
21	Q.	Please review the Company's refinancing program with respect to preferred stock.
22	A.	Since the last general rate proceeding, the Company has redeemed several of its
23		higher cost preferred stock issues. Specifically, the Company has redeemed the 8.5%
24		series, the 8.0% series, the 7.875% series and its adjustable rate preferred stock. As a
25		

1		result, there are four remaining series of preferred stock as shown on page 12 of
2		Exhibit DEG-4C.
3	Q.	Will you then proceed with your comments on the cost of preferred stock?
4	A.	The cost of preferred stock is calculated in the same manner as has been done in prior
5		rate proceedings. That is, the cost is calculated by weighting the cost rate of each
6		issue by the balance outstanding during the rate year. The cost of reacquired
7		preferred stock is also included. Page 12 of Exhibit DEG-4C shows the calculation of
8		the embedded cost of preferred stock. The resulting cost of preferred stock is 7.78%.
9		VIII. THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY
10	Q.	Have you prepared a study of the cost of common equity for PSE?
11	A.	No. I have relied on the study prepared by Dr. Hadaway.
12	Q.	Do you agree with his findings?
13	A.	Yes. Dr. Hadaway has used several different methods to determine the appropriate
14		cost of equity capital for PSE. His conclusion is that the fair cost is 13.5% if interim
15		rate relief is not granted or 11.5% if appropriate interim rate relief, which relief is
16		critical, is granted.
17	Q.	What equity cost rate are you using in determining the rate of return?
18	A.	In addition to Dr. Hadaway's recommended 13.5% cost of equity, I include a 50 basis
19		point incentive adjustment for efficient and innovative operations consistent with the
20		standard established for such adjustments in WUTC vs. Avista Corp., Docket No.
21		UE-991606, UE-991607 (September 29, 2000). Such an incentive adjustment is
22		appropriate upon a showing of truly extraordinary circumstances. The basis of this
23		adjustment is PSE's success in developing and implementing innovative management
24		tools and technologies, and in achieving significant efficiencies and cost savings as
<b>25</b>		

described, in detail, in the testimony of John M. Shearman, Susan McLain and Penny Gullekson. This adjustment is calculated on page 15 in Exhibit DEG-4C.

As described in Mr. Shearman's testimony, the Company is among the lowest-cost utilities in the industry and has achieved savings since the merger far in excess of those projected at the time of the merger or of those obtained as a result of other mergers in the industry over the last decade. As shown in Mr. Shearman's exhibit JMS-47, the savings achieved by the Company will produce significant value beyond those projected. My 50 basis point adjustment to the cost of equity, reflects a sharing of those extraordinary savings between the Company and its customers and is within the range of equity returns described by Dr. Hadaway. This adjustment is analogous to the recovery of the fair and equitable cost of research and development.

Such an adjustment provides a going-forward incentive for continued efficiency and innovation, benefiting customers. Conversely, lack of such incentives encourages mediocrity.

#### IX. RATE OF RETURN

- Q. Would you now discuss your recommended overall rate of return given the proposed capital structure?
- 17 A. Yes. On page 1 of Exhibit DEG-4C the cost rate for each capital component is
  18 applied to the recommended capital structure. Absent interim rate relief, the
  19 Company requires a 14% cost of equity, as described above. Using that rate, the
  20 overall rate of return for the Company is 10.47%.
- The calculation of these amounts is shown below:

22			Cost	Weighted
0.0	<b>Component</b>	<b>Ratio</b>	<b>Rate</b>	<b>Average</b>
23	Debt	45.66%	7.40%	3.38%
24	Trust Preferred	7.08%	8.58%	0.61%
~ 1	Preferred Stock	2.26%	7.78%	0.18%
25	Common Equity	<u>45.00%</u>	14.00%	<u>6.30%</u>
	Total	100.0%		10.47%
26				

1		However, were the Company granted appropriate interim relief, which relief is
2		critical, then PSE's cost of equity would be 12% and the resulting overall rate of
3		return would be 9.57%.
4	Q.	Would you propose the same rate of return for gas and electric operations?
5	A.	Yes. PSE is an integrated gas and electric company. As such, the capital structure
6		and cost of capital are appropriate for the integrated company. In addition, the 13.5%
7		cost of equity recommended by Dr. Hadaway was based on the Company's stock
8		price without any distinction between gas and electric operations.
9	Q.	Does that conclude your testimony?
10	A.	Yes, it does.
11	ΓR Δ013	3300.018]
12	[DA013	
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
<b>26</b>		