US Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Office of Pipeline Safety

Hazardous Liquid IMP Field Verification Inspection 49 CFR Parts 195.450 and 195.452

General Notes:

- 1. This Field Verification Inspection is performed on field activities being performed by an Operator in support of their Integrity Management Program (IMP).
- 2. This is a two part inspection form:
 - i. A review of applicable Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and IMP processes and procedures applicable to the field activity being inspected to ensure the operator is implementing their O&M and IMP Manuals in a consistent manner.
 - ii. A Field Verification Inspection to determine that activities on the pipeline and facilities are being performed in accordance with written procedures or guidance.
- 3. Not all parts of this form may be applicable to a specific Field Verification Inspection, and only those applicable portions of this form need to be completed. The applicable portions are identified in the Table below by a check mark. Only those sections of the form marked immediately below need to be documented as either "Satisfactory"; "Unsatisfactory"; or Not Checked ("N/C"). Those sections not marked below may be left blank.

Operator Inspected: <u>ExxonMobil Corporation</u>
Op ID: <u>32009</u>

Perform Activity	Activity	Activity Description
(denoted by mark)	Number	마르크리
N/A	1A	In-Line Inspection
X	1B	Hydrostatic Pressure Testing
	1C	Other Assessment Technologies
X	2A	Remedial Actions
	2B	Remediation – Implementation
	3A	Installed Leak Detection System Information
	3B	Installed Emergency Flow Restrictive Device
N/A	4A	Field Inspection for Verification of HCA Locations
N/A	4B	Field Inspection for Verification of Anomaly Digs
X	4C	Field Inspection to Verify adequacy of the Cathodic Protection
		System
X	4D	Field inspection for general system characteristics

Hazardous Liquid IMP Field Verification Inspection Form

Name of Operator:	Ex	xonMobil Pipeline Company		
Headquarters Addres 12851 166 th S Cerritos, CA 9	treet			
Company Official:	Jim Rose, Area Ma	nager	•	
Phone Number:	310-212-2935			
Fax Number:	310-212-1788			
Operator ID:	32009			
		<u> </u>		·
Persons	Interviewed	Title	Phone No.	E-Mail
Laura K. Sleeve		Spokane & Helena Terminal Supt. Primary Contact	509-534-8132	laura.k.sleevi@ exxonmobil.com
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
OPS/State Representa	itive(s): <u>Al Jones /</u> : <u>Al Jones</u>	WUTC Dates of Ins	pection: <u>October 5</u> -	8, 2009
		ption of the Pipeline Segment Inspecto e, commodities, HCA locations, and P		
The ExxonMobil Terr breakout tanks and Y		ground valves and header piping fo	r diesel and gasoline	connection for the
milepost/stations/valves	s/pipe-to-soil readings/r	be the portion of the pipeline segment iver crossings/etc. In addition, a brief sent agreement that required field ver	description and case	number of the follow up

The field activities consisted of the ExxonMobil Terminal facility located in Spokane, Washington for breakout tanks, header piping, and valves.

Summary:

The field inspection included six breakout tanks and piping at the ExxonMobil Spokane Terminal. The maintenance records and the Out-of-Service tank evaluations prepared by Tank Consultants, Inc of Tulsa, Oklahoma for tanks #502 and #504 were reviewed. The cathodic protection history for the past two years was reviewed and field CP readings at breakout tanks and pipe locations were taken. (See field data report).

Findings:

No probable violations of CFR 195 were identified.

Key Documents Reviewed:

Document Title	Document No.	Rev. No	Date
Tank Consultants, Inc report for out-of-service evaluation for tank #502 and 504.	Factor (4/29/2008 and 10/8/2007
Pipeline Safety Damage Prevention Information for public and emergency responder/public officials.			2008
Training history for employees			1/1/2004 to 10/7/2009
Internal Floating Roofs for Atmospheric Storage Tanks	GP 09-77-10		October 2006
	·		

Part 1 - Performance of Integrity Assessments

1A. In-Line Inspection (Protocol 3.04 & 3.05)	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Verify that Operator's O&M and IMP procedural		ł		
requirements (e.g. launching/receiving tools) for			X	
performance of ILI were followed.		<u> </u>		
Verify Operator's ILI procedural requirements were fo			rap	
for launching and receiving of pig, operational control	of flow), as	appropriate.		
Verify ILI tool systems and calibration checks before r	un were per	formed to ensi	ıre	
tool was operating correctly prior to assessment being	performed, a	s appropriate.		
Verify ILI complied with Operator's procedural requir	ements for p	erformance of	`a	
successful assessment (e.g. speed of travel within limit				
coverage), as appropriate.	, ,			
Document ILI Tool Vendor and Tool type (e.g. MFL, I	Deformation). Document		
other pertinent information about Vendor and Tool, as				
Verify that Operator's personnel have access to applica		res		
	teres ariality			[Note: Add location specific information,
O MIOI .				as appropriate.]
1B. Hydrostatic Pressure Testing (Protocol 3.06)	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Verify that hydrostatic pressure tests complied with	v			
Part 195 Subpart E requirements.	X			Reviewed reports for breakout tank
Review documentation of Hydrostatic Pressure Test pa	rameters and	d results. Ver	ify	#502 & #504 including hydrostatic
test was performed without leakage and in compliance			•	tested of new double bottom
requirements.				installation.
•				
Review test procedures and records and verify test accords	eptability and	d validity.		
Review determination of the cause of hydrostatic test f	ailures, as ap	propriate.		
Document Hydrostatic Pressure Test Vendor and equip	ment used a	as appropriate		
Other:	mont abou, t	з арргориасо		
Culoi.				
1C. Other Assessment Technologies (Protocol 3.07)	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Verify that application of "Other Assessment				
Technology" complied with Operator's requirements,				
that appropriate notifications had been submitted to			X	
OPS, and that appropriate data was collected.				·
Review documentation of notification to OPS of Opera	tor's applies	tion of "Other	•	
Assessment Technology", if available. Verify complia			١	
procedural requirements. If documentation of notifical				·
application of "Other Assessment Technology" is avail			_{\f}	
		periormance c	"	
assessment within parameters originally submitted to C	JF 3.			
Vouis that annuaries tasts are being neutroned and a	ioto d	ata ia haina		,
Verify that appropriate tests are being performed and a collected, as appropriate.	рргоргіаце ц	ata is being		
Other.				
		<u> </u>		

Part 2 - Remediation of Anomalies

2A. Remedial Actions – Process (Protocol 4.1) Satisfa	actory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Verify that remedial actions complied with the			X	
Operator's procedural requirements.				
Witness anomaly remediation and verify documentation of ren	mediati	ion (e.g.		
Exposed Pipe Reports, Maintenance Report, any Data Acquisi	ition F	orms). Verif	y	
compliance with Operator's O&M Manual and Part 195 require	rement	ts.		
X 10 d + 0				
Verify that Operator's procedures were followed in locating an				
anomaly (e.g. any required pressure reductions, line location, i				
approximate location of anomaly for excavation, excavation, c	coating	g removal).		
Verify that procedures were followed in measuring the anoma	lv det	ermining the		
severity of the anomaly, and determining remaining strength o				
Verify that Operator's personnel have access to applicable pro	ncedure	96		
verify that Operator's personner have access to applicable pro	occuuic			
Other:				•
	gty ti	3 Tab		
2B. Remediation - Implementation (Protocol 4.02) Satisfa	actory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Verify that the operator has adequately implemented			ra galeni.	•
its remediation process and procedures to effectively	z			
remediate conditions identified through integrity	`			Reviewed data and documentation for
assessments or information analysis.				the remediation of the thermowell that
If documentation is available, verify that repairs were complet	ted in a	accordance w	ith	was inadvertently removed on
the operator's prioritized schedule and within the time frames	allowe	ed in		November 3, 2008.
§195.452(h).				
Review any documentation for this inspection site for an imme			ion	
(§195.452(h)(4)(i) where operating pressure was reduced or the				
shutdown. Verify for an immediate repair condition that temp				
pressure was determined in accordance with the formula in Se				
ASME/ANSI B31.4 or, if not applicable, the operator should p	provid	e an engineer	ing	
basis justifying the amount of pressure reduction.				
Verify that repairs were performed in accordance with §195.42	22 and	the Operator	r'c	
O&M Manual, as appropriate.	ZZ unu	i ine Operator		
Com Manager as appropriate.				
Review CP readings at anomaly dig site, if possible. (See Part				•
"Field Inspection to Verify adequacy of the Cathodic Protection	on Sys	tem", as		
appropriate.	7" 1.	. 1		
		for any		
		•		Cathodic Protection readings of pipe to
O41				soil at dig site (if available):
Other:				On Potential:mV
				Off Potential:mV
				far
				[Note: Add location specific information,
				as appropriate.]

Part 3 - Preventive and Mitigative Actions

Identify installed leak detection systems on pipelines and facilities that can affect an HCA. Document leak detection system components installed on system to enhance capabilities, as appropriate. Document the frequency of monitoring of installed leak detection systems and verify connection of installed components to leak detection minitoring system, as appropriate, Other: Note: Add location specific information, as appropriate.	3A. Installed Leak Detection System Information (Protocol 6.05)	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
Document leak detection system components installed on system to enhance capabilities, as appropriate. Document the frequency of monitoring of installed leak detection systems and verify connection of installed components to leak detection monitoring system, as appropriate, Other: Satisfactory Unsatisfactory NC Verify additional preventive and mitigative actions implemented by Operator. Document Emergency Flow Restrictive Device (EFRD) component(s) installed on system. Note that EFRD per \$195.450 means a check valve or remote control valve as follows: (1) Check valve means a valve that permits fluid to flow freely in one direction and contains a mechanism to automatically prevent flow in the other direction. (2) Remote control valve or RCV means any valve that is operated from a location remote from where the valve is installed. The RCV is usually operated by the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The linkage between the pipeline control center and the RCV may be by fiber optics, microwave, telephone lines, or satellite. Document the frequency of monitoring of installed EFRDs and verify connection of installed components to monitoring/operating system, as appropriate. Position of remote control valve by having operator send remote command to partially open or close the valve, as appropriate. Into a Add location specific information, as appropriate.	Identify installed leak detection systems on pipelines			X	
connection of installed components to leak detection monitoring system, as appropriate, Other: Installed Emergency Flow Restrictive Device	Document leak detection system components installed of	on system to	enhance		
3B. Installed Emergency Flow Restrictive Device (Protocol 6.06) Verify additional preventive and mitigative actions implemented by Operator. Document Emergency Flow Restrictive Device (EFRD) component(s) installed on system. Note that EFRD per §195.450 means a check valve or remote control valve as follows: (1) Check valve means a valve that permits fluid to flow freely in one direction and contains a mechanism to automatically prevent flow in the other direction. (2) Remote control valve or RCV means any valve that is operated from a location remote from where the valve is installed. The RCV is usually operated by the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The linkage between the pipeline control center and the RCV may be by fiber optics, microwave, telephone lines, or satellite. Document the frequency of monitoring of installed EFRDs and verify connection of installed components to monitoring/operating system, as appropriate. Verify operation of remote control valve by having operator send remote command to partially open or close the valve, as appropriate. Comment on the perceived effectiveness of the EFRD in mitigating the consequences of a release on the HCA that it is designed to protect. [Note: Add location specific information, as appropriate.]	connection of installed components to leak detection me			rify	
Protocol 6.06 Satisfactory Onsatisfactory N/C	Other:				
Implemented by Operator. Document Emergency Flow Restrictive Device (EFRD) component(s) installed on system. Note that EFRD per §195.450 means a check valve or remote control valve as follows: (1) Check valve means a valve that permits fluid to flow freely in one direction and contains a mechanism to automatically prevent flow in the other direction. (2) Remote control valve or RCV means any valve that is operated from a location remote from where the valve is installed. The RCV is usually operated by the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The linkage between the pipeline control center and the RCV may be by fiber optics, microwave, telephone lines, or satellite. Document the frequency of monitoring of installed EFRDs and verify connection of installed components to monitoring/operating system, as appropriate. Verify operation of remote control valve by having operator send remote command to partially open or close the valve, as appropriate. [Note: Add location specific information, as appropriate.]		Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:
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consequences of a release on the HCA that it is designed to protect. as appropriate.]		rator send re	emote comma	nd	
Other:					
	Other:				

Part 4 - Field Investigations (Additional Activities as appropriate)

4A. Field Inspection for Verification of HCA Locations	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:	
Review HCAs locations as identified by the Operator.			Х		
Utilize NPMS, as appropriate. Verify population derived HCAs in the field are as they	ınc				
and NPMS, as appropriate. Document newly constructed			ıps		
population and/or commercial areas that could be affect			as		
appropriate.		,			
Note that population derived HCAs are defined in §195					
Verify drinking water and ecological HCAs in the field					
Operator's maps and NPMS, as appropriate. Document water sources and/or ecological resources areas (within					
affected by a pipeline release, as appropriate.	iasi 2-3 yea	irs) that could	be	·	
Note that unusually sensitive areas (USAs) are defined	in 8195.6				
Verify commercially navigable waterway HCAs in the		they appear or	n		
Operator's maps and NPMS, as appropriate. Document					
nature) that could affect the waterways status as a comn	nercially na	vigable			
waterway, as appropriate.				[Note: Add location specific information,	
Note that commercially navigable waterway HCAs are	defined in §	195.450		as appropriate.]	
4B. Field Inspection for Verification of Anomaly Digs	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:	
Verify repair areas, ILI verification sites, etc.			X		
Document the anomaly dig sites reviewed as part of this	field activi	ity and actions	S	[Note: Add location specific information,	
taken by the operator.		w.j.g.ng.ng.ng.		as appropriate.]	
4C. Field Inspection to Verify adequacy of the				Notes:	
Cathodic Protection System	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C		
In case of hydrostatic pressure testing, Cathodic				Field verified adequate CP readings at	
Protection (CP) systems must be evaluated for general	X	PakKBan aka Maka na		breakout tanks and piping.	
The operator should review the CP system performance	l				
hydrostatic pressure test to ensure the integrity assessment					
threats to the integrity of the pipeline. Has the operator					
performance in conjunction with the hydrostatic pressur		,			
Review records of CP readings from CIS and/or annual	survey to e	nsure minimu	m		
code requirements are being met, if available.					
				Cathodic Protection readings of pipe to	
Review results of random field CP readings performed of	dumina thia a	ativita ta ana		soil at dig site (if available): On Potential: mV	
minimum code requirements are being met, if possible.	Perform ra	ictivity to ells ndom rectifie	ure r	Off Potential: mV	
checks during this activity and ensure rectifiers are oper	ating correc	tly, if possibl	e.		
•		,, , p		[Note: Add location specific information,	
				as appropriate.]	
4D. Field inspection for general system characteristics	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	N/C	Notes:	
Through field inspection determine overall condition of					
pipeline and associated facilities for a general	x			Field inspected terminal security,	
estimation of the effectiveness of the operator's IMP	^			emergency signs, exit gates, and	
implementation.				containment area for breakout tanks.	
Evaluate condition of the ROW of inspection site to ens requirements are being met, as appropriate.	ure minimu	m code			
	Comment on Operator's apparent commitment to the integrity and safe operation of				
their system, as appropriate.					
Other					
					

Anomaly Evaluation Report (to be completed as appropriate)

Dinalina Swa	tem and Line Pipe Information
	tem and the ripe information
Operator (OpID and System Name):	
Unit ID (Pipeline Name)	10' 4'
Pipe Manufacturer and Year:	Seam Type and Orientation:
Pipe Nominal OD (inch):	Seam Orientation:
Pipe Nominal Wall thickness (inch):	Coating Type:
Grade of Pipe:	MOP:
	Reported Information
ILI Technology (e.g., Vendor, Tools):	
Anomaly Type (e.g., Mechanical, Metal Lo	ss):
Is anomaly in a segment that can affect an I	HCA? (Yes / No)
Date of Tool Run (MM/DD/YY):	Date of Inspection Report (MM/DD/YY):
Date of "Discovery of Anomaly" (MM/DD	/YY):
Type of "Condition" (e.g.; Immediate; 60-d	lay; 180-day):
Anomaly Feature (Int/Ext):	Orientation:
Anomaly Details: Length (in):	Width (in): Depth (in):
Anomaly Log Distance (ft):	Distance from Upstream weld (ft):
Length of joint of pipe in which anomaly is	
	Dig Site Information Summary
Date of Anomaly Dig (MM/DD/YY):	
Location Information:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Mile Post Number:	Distance from A/G Reference (ft):
Distance from Upstream weld (ft):	Distance from And Reference (11).
GPS Readings (if available) Longitude:	Latitude:
Anomaly Feature (Int/Ext):	Orientation:
Length of joint of pipe in which anomaly is	<u> </u>
Damage Type (e.g., original construction, p	chanical Damage Anomaly
	Width (in): Depth (in):
Length (in):	widii (iii). Depiii (iii).
Near a weld? (Yes / No):	(Vag / Na).
Gouge or metal loss associated with dent? (\ \tag{\tag{\tag{\tag{\tag{\tag{\tag{
	aluate presence of cracks in dent? (Yes / No):
Cracks associated with dent? (Yes / No):	
	rosion Metal Loss Anomaly
Anomaly Type (e.g., pitting, general):	
Length (in):	Width (in): Max. Depth (in):
Remaining minimum wall thickness (in):	Maximum % Wall Loss measurement(%):
Safe pressure calculation (psi), as appropria	
	Other Types" of Anomalies
Describe anomaly (e.g., dent with metal los	ss, crack, seam defect, SCC):
Length (in):	Width (in): Max. Depth (in):
Other Information, as appropriate:	
Did operator perform additional NDE to ev	aluate presence of cracks? (Yes / No):
Cracks present? (Yes / No):	
Length (in): Other Information, as appropriate: Did operator perform additional NDE to ev	Width (in): Max. Depth (in):

Anomaly Repair Report (to be completed as appropriate)

Was a repair of the anomaly made? (Yes / No):
Was defect ground out to eliminate need for repair? (Yes / No):
If grinding used, complete the following for affected area:
Length (in): Depth (in):
If NO repair of an anomaly for which RSTRENG is applicable, were the Operator's RSTRENG calculations
reviewed? (Yes / No):
If Repair made, complete the following:
Repair Type (e.g., Type B-sleeve, composite wrap)
Length of Repair:
Comments on Repair material, as appropriate (e.g., grade of steel):
Pipe re-coating material used following excavation:
General Observations and Comments
Was a diagram (e.g., corrosion map) of the anomaly made? (Yes / No): (Include in report if available
Were pipe-to-soil cathodic protection readings taken? (Yes / No):
If readings taken, Record: On Potential: mV; Off Potential: mV
Describe method used to Operator to locate anomaly (as appropriate):
Comments regarding procedures followed during excavation, repair of anomaly, and backfill (as appropriate)
General Observations and Comments (Note: attach photographs, sketches, etc., as appropriate):