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February 16, 2006

## VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL

Carole J. Washburn, Executive Secretary
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission
1300 S. Evergreen Park Drive S.W.
P.O. Box 47250
Olympia, Washington 98504-7250

Re: William Stuth and Aqua Test, Inc.
Petition for Declaratory Order, Docket No. A-050528
STUTH AND AQUA TEST'S REPLY TO COMMISSION STAFF'S CLOSING
BRIEF

Dear Ms. Washburn:

Pursuant to the directive of Chief ALJ C. Robert Wallis given at the January 27, 2006 hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary determination in this case, submitted herewith and filed by mail with the WUTC is Stuth and Aqua Test's Reply To Commission Staff's Closing Brief. In addition to the original and five hard copies, I am also e-mailing a \*.pdf copy and a MS Word version of this brief to the WUTC records center and to all participating parties.

Please contact me if you have any questions regarding this matter. Thank you for your consideration and continued cooperation.

Very truly yours,

RHYS A STERLING, P.E., J.D.

Rhys A. Sterling Attorney at Law

Enclosures

cc: Sally G. Johnston, Senior AAG, Chief, UTC Division Bill Stuth/Aqua Test, Inc.

## BEFORE THE WASHINGTON STATE UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

In The Matter of the Petition of

WILLIAM L. STUTH, and AQUA TEST,
INC.,

TO COMMISSION STAFF'S CLOSING BRIEF

For Declaratory Order Designating
a Public Service Company

DOCKET NO. A-050528

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STUTH AND AQUA TEST'S REPLY
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TO COMMISSION STAFF'S CLOSING BRIEF

Lawrence (Yogi) Berra's gift with words could find no better application than in the Commission Staff's Closing Brief, as such is truly "déjà vu all over again."

Notable by its total absence from Staff's Brief is any case law or legislative guidance supporting its steadfast and erroneous position that "if you're not identified by name in Title 80 RCW as a public service company, then you're out and cannot be a public service company as a matter of law." Support for this proposition is missing very simply because such support does not exist.

Instead, Staff once again hammers on legal issues that were raised, presented, argued, considered and rejected by Judge Richard Hicks of the Thurston County Superior Court.

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All one need is to spend a few minutes and review Judge Hicks' oral decision to ascertain that, upon his most thorough review of the issues, briefs, case law, and statutes, Judge Hicks found and concluded that Stuth and Aqua Test had presented a prima facie case supporting their Petition for Declaratory Order; ordered the WUTC hold the statutory fact finding hearing; and as a question of fact, determine whether a wastewater company proposed by Stuth and Aqua Test is a public service company subject to regulation by the WUTC.

Judge Hicks was presented with the issues still clamored by Staff regarding the WUTC's jurisdiction, purported lack of a justiciable controversy to issue other than a mere advisory opinion, balance of adverse effects as to the company and the public, the Cole case, overextending regulation into businesses not named in Title 80 RCW, etc etc etc. Had Judge Hicks agreed with Staff as to any one of these issues raised, briefed and vigorously argued before him, he would have found for the WUTC and dismissed the Stuth and Aqua Test appeal. However and most obviously, he did not, the WUTC did not appeal, the remand became effective, and we are now in the midst of the statutorily mandated fact finding hearing — so end of discussion.

As for the Staff's assertion that the WUTC never, ever entertains a petition for declaratory order as to whether a person or company not currently organized and not yet in the business of providing an existing service to the public will be subject to WUTC's

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jurisdiction under its proposed service plan, such contention baldly ignores the historical usage of the declaratory order proceeding for just such purposes. The following discussion is presented simply to illustrate the use of the Declaratory Order procedure as it applies to future proposed business enterprises and/or undertakings for the express purpose of obtaining a present determination, as a question of fact, whether such future service and/or provider would or would not be subject to WUTC's jurisdiction as a public service company, and for no other purpose.

For example, in WUTC Order No. 1 filed in Docket No. UE-051439 the WUTC Commissioners noted the procedural background of that matter as follows:

On September 26, 2005, Sea Breeze Pacific Juan de Fuca Cable, LP, Olympic Converter Corporation, and Victoria Converter, NSULC ("Petitioners"), filed with the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission ("Commission") a petition for declaratory order, seeking a determination that the Petitioners, who plan to construct electrical transmission facilities between Port Angeles, Washington, and Victoria, British Columbia, would not be subject to Commission regulation, and asking the Commission to disclaim jurisdiction.

In

In re Sea Breeze Pacific Juan de Fuca Cable, Docket No. UE-051439, Order No. 01 p. 1 ¶ 2. Under Part II, "The Facts Presented", WUTC notes as fact that "Petitioners plan to construct" a cable project consisting of a "22-mile long 540-MW, direct-current submarine cable" and that "Petitioners assert that the Project may help solve existing transmission constraints BPA faces on the Olympic Peninsu-

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la". <u>Id</u>. at p. 2 ¶¶ 5-6 (emphasis added).¹ In Part III, "Discussion", the Commissioners note that the first issue presented to the WUTC in this particular matter was a determination as to whether it "should enter a declaratory order disclaiming jurisdiction over the Petitioners and the JdF Project facilities, operations and services under Title 80 RCW where, under Washington law, none of the Petitioners is, or will become, a 'public service company.'" <u>Id</u>. at p. 4 ¶ 14 (emphasis added).² Accordingly, the WUTC concluded that:

[T]he Commission is authorized by RCW 80.04.015 to make the determinations of fact, and to enter the appropriate orders, necessary to answer the question of whether the Petitioners would be conducting business subject to regulation under Title 80 RCW.

In re Sea Breeze Pacific Juan de Fuca Cable, Docket No. UE-051439, Order No. 01 p. 6 ¶ 20. Not surprisingly and as cited by Stuth and Aqua Test as an integral part of the body of "public services laws" of Washington, in making its determination based on the facts provided by the Petitioners, WUTC based its decision on the Inland Empire and the West Valley Land Co. cases. Id. at pp. 6-7 ¶¶ 21-22.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> It is further stated as fact that "Petitioners intend to own the JdF Project, but do not intend to operate or maintain the JdF Project after it is completed." <u>Id</u>. at p. 3, para. 8.

Thus, there is no artificial limitation imposed by the WUTC that the petitioner for a declaratory order must be a person or company currently providing an existing service to the public. As long as the proposed services may be expressed in concrete terms, it is the duty of WUTC to make a determination based on such facts as to its jurisdiction over the provider of such future service to the public. Judge Hicks found and concluded there is a justiciable controversy present, and ordered WUTC to conduct this hearing.

In re Sea Breeze Pacific Juan de Fuca Cable, Docket No. UE-051439, Order No. 01 p. 10 ¶ 33 (emphasis added).

Another case illustrating the same use of the declaratory order procedure for presently determining the status of a future business or service is that in Docket No. UE-991993, In re TECWA Power, Inc. For A Declaratory Order. As a finding, the Commissioners noted that "Petitioner (TECWA) . . . is the contract purchaser of the Centralia Generating Plant pursuant to . . . [a] Purchase and Sale Agreement . . . [and that] under the terms of the purchase contract, Petitioner will acquire the [plant and associated transmission lines] by acquiring TransAlta Centralia Generation LLC . . . which, at time of closing, will own the Electric Facilities." Docket No. UE-991993, Declaratory Order at p. 2 ¶¶ 7-8. TECWA petitioned the WUTC for a declaratory order "that the LLC, under the circumstances pleaded, will not be subject to regulation as a public service company by the Commission." Id. at p. 3 ¶ 12 (emphasis added). WUTC further concluded that "based on the facts stated in the Petition for Declaratory Order, . . . it does not have jurisdiction over the operations of TransAlta Centralia should the sale of the Electric Facilities close." Id. at p. 4 ¶ 15 (emphasis added). At that time it was not even certain the sale would close.

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Based on the foregoing it is very clear that falling within 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

the WUTC's authority is the entry of declaratory orders for the express purpose of presently determining, as a question of fact, whether or not a future provider of proposed services is subject to regulation as a public service company. And it must be noted that just because the petitions for declaratory order in the above cases address types of services that would ostensibly be provided by a public service company identified by "name" under Title 80 RCW that such facial nexus is not at all determinative or dispositive as to whether or not an "unnamed" person or corporation providing utility service to the public will in fact be subject to regulation by WUTC as a public service company. Hence the fundamental reason for the Legislature to use words such as "includes" or "including, but not limited to" so as to enlarge, rather than limit, the universe of public service companies. Once more recall the sage words of Judge Richard Hicks, echoing other utility commissions' observations:

And I think that's exactly why the legislature has this all-inclusive language, because they were wise enough to see they couldn't foresee every possible service that may come to be a public service.

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It is interesting that the Staff would be heard to assert that the declaratory orders entered by the Commissioners in the foregoing cases are an "unlawful academic exercise." Staff Closing Brief at p. 9. Obviously, it must be that the entry of declaratory orders for the purpose of disclaiming jurisdiction as to a provider of a future service is materially different from, and is therefore lawful vis-à-vis, the entry of declaratory orders for the purpose of claiming jurisdiction over such providers (note the tongue in cheek).

Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at p. 13.4 The body of Washington public service law is clear and unequivocal that the WUTC's jurisdiction extends and applies to AWY person or corporation that will qualify as a public service company as a matter of fact — and this is precisely why Judge Hicks ordered WUTC to conduct a fact-finding hearing for making such determination, subject also to the additional underlying ruling by Judge Hicks that Stuth and Aqua Test have in fact legally made out a prima facie case.

Finally, it must be observed that the Supreme Court decision in <u>State ex rel. Spokane United Railways v. Department of Public Service</u>, 191 Wash. 595, 71 P. 2d 661 (1937) may be old, but it is still good and reliable law, and that it is clear thereunder that:

"A thing which is within the object, spirit and the meaning of the statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter." [citation omitted] . . . When the extent and scope of the statute are considered, . . . it was the intention of the legislature . . . to include within its reach all public service corporations, except where there was a special exemption . . . .

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<sup>4</sup> It is held that "the expressio unius [est exclusio alterius] maxim has no force in the face of directly contradictory language in the contract [or statute], such as the clause 'including but not limited to'." Society for the Advancement of Education, Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc., 1999 WL 33023, \*7 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (construing contract); State v. Engler, 259 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Wis. 1977) (statutory construction). In the absence of substantial factual evidence that the Legislature intended the expressio unius rule to apply, its usage of the terms "includes" and "including, but not limited to" in Title 80 RCW evinces the clear and unambiguous intent to negate any effect of the maxim and to ensure that the universe of public service companies subject to WUTC regulation is not limited to only those subsequently identified by name. Cf. Engler, 259 N.W.2d at 100.

Spokane United Railways, 191 Wash. at 598-99 (emphasis added).5

There is no special exemption under Title 80 RCW regarding the regulation of persons or corporations owning, operating and managing large on-site sewage systems for hire for the public as public service companies -- and thus if the facts fit, they're in.

And neither is there any special exemption created under HB 3056 (1998 Laws of Washington, Ch. 34). It is interesting to note that the codification of this session law resulted only in its § 3 being incorporated into statutory law as RCW 70.05.077.6 Section 2 of HB 30567 has in essence been supplanted by Chapter 18.210 RCW which placed the licensure of designers of on-site sewage systems

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> And it should be noted that the statutory definition given public service company is just as broad and inclusive as the statutory definition given common carrier.

<sup>16</sup> 

And this has only to do with "the department of health, in consultation and cooperation with local environmental health officers, shall develop a one-day course to train local environmental health officers, health officers, and environmental health specialists and technicians to address the application of the waiver authority granted under RCW 70.05.072 as well as other existing statutory or regulatory flexibility for siting on-site sewage systems." RCW 70.05.077(1). The directive set forth in Section 1 of HB 3056 resulted only in the production of a Work Group Report to the DOL Director dated December 1, 1999, that focused only on financial requirements for on-site system designers and inspectors.

This section is not codified and only called for "the department of licensing and the department of health shall jointly convene an advisory committee for the purpose of developing legislation that will establish licensing requirements for the designers of on-site septic systems, and a proposed certification program for inspectors of on-site septic systems . . . " Ch. 34 § 2, Laws of 1998.

under the regulatory authority of the Department of Licensing and the Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors. Respectfully, Stuth and Aqua Test have absolutely no idea as to the purported relevancy of Ch. 34, Laws of 1998 in addressing the question posed by the Chief ALJ. If anything, perhaps it does demonstrate that the Department of Health is not the one-stop shopping mart for all purposes regarding and relating to the on-site sewage program as Staff would like the Chief ALJ to believe. Again, the Department of Health's expertise and jurisdiction lie in the design and operational criteria for on-site sewage systems to ensure system performance for the protection of public health; but the expertise and jurisdiction over those persons or corporations owning, operating and managing large on-site sewage systems for hire for the public on demand wherever located in the State lie in

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And this was all preceded by a lawsuit brought in Thurston County Superior Court against the State and local Boards of Health and the Board of Registration in which judgment was entered declaring that the design of on-site sewage systems constituted the practice of engineering and, accordingly, those persons designing such systems were subject to licensure and regulation by the Board of Registration -- not the Board of Health. Sterling, et al. v. Board of Registration, et al., Thurston County Superior Court No. 89-2-01838-9. It was made clear in that lawsuit that whereas the DOH had jurisdiction over the design criteria for on-site systems, the persons who designed such systems were under the jurisdiction of the Board of Registration.

<sup>9</sup> As, for example, while the DOH has within its jurisdiction setting the design criteria for on-site systems that designers must follow, it is the DOL through the Board of Registration that has jurisdiction over those persons who actually design such on-site systems. DOH's authority is neither all-inclusive nor exclusive.

the WUTC for regulation of such person or corporation as a public service company in the public interest as to business practices, reasonable rates, and stability of essential services. As so appropriately and cogently discussed by WUTC Staff:

[The NRRI Briefing Paper] points out the rationale for developing a team approach by environmental and regulatory agencies . . . and the utility regulators bring the "economic regulation" expertise into the picture to help put the companies on a more sound management and financial footing.

Chris Rose to David Danner Memo dated October 26, 2005.10

## CONCLUSIONS

Albeit in a shroud of secrecy behind closed doors, WUTC Staff recognize the rationale for WUTC to step up to the plate and assert its jurisdiction over persons and corporations owning, operating and managing large on-site sewage systems for hire for the public on demand wherever located in the State as a public service company under Title 80 RCW. The existing body of public service laws that apply in this State is broad and inclusive enough to charge WUTC with the responsibility and duty to regulate wastewater companies in the public interest. There is no special exemption given under

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The October 2005 NRRI Briefing Paper clearly recognizes and promotes this symbiotic relationship among the respective state agencies as to actively involving and applying their areas of expertise, and Staff admits that it just may be the time for WUTC to assert itself and bring its regulatory powers to bear. The Puget Sound Action Team has expressed its concurrence and support as well. See PSAT Position Paper titled "WUTC Regulation of Large Onsite Sewage Systems," Terry Hull (October 25, 2005).

this body of law to exclude the regulation of wastewater companies by the WUTC as a public service company, and therefore, they're in as Staff has presented absolutely no facts to rebut or refute the more than prima facie case established by Stuth and Aqua Test in support of WUTC regulation. 11

Based on the existing body of public service laws, the public interest, and the undisputed facts in the record, the WUTC has not only the responsibility but the duty to make the determination as a question of fact that a person or corporation owning, operating and managing large on-site sewage systems for hire for the public on demand and wherever located in the State of Washington, under the business model set forth by Stuth and Aqua Test, is a public service company subject to WUTC regulation under Title 80 RCW.

Accordingly, the Chief ALJ should grant Stuth and Aqua Test's Petition for Declaratory Order and order the WUTC to regulate such persons and corporations dedicated to providing this essential public service with facilities devoted to public use as public service companies.

any facts or law in support of a regulatory basis for intervention

was made, Stuth and Aqua Test have here more than merely suggested the legal and factual grounds supporting regulation, they have fac-

tually and legally made out a prima facie case for such regulation as a public service company that has been made even stronger and

conclusive in this fact-finding hearing, as WUTC Staff has offered absolutely no facts or evidence to rebut or refute their case for

regulation in the public interest under the public service laws.

Thus, unlike and distinguishable from Cole wherein not even

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1	DATED this /6 day of February, 2006.
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3	Respectfully submitted,
4	RHYS A. STERLING, P.E., J.D.
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7	Rhys A. Sterling, WSBA #13846 Attorney for Petitioners Stuth and
8	Aqua Test, Inc.
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14	CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE  Legity under penalty of periup
15	I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the Kong day of February
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