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February 3, 2006

## VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL

Carole J. Washburn, Executive Secretary
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission
1300 S. Evergreen Park Drive S.W.
P.O. Box 47250
Olympia, Washington 98504-7250

Re: William Stuth and Aqua Test, Inc.
Petition for Declaratory Order, Docket No. A-050528
STUTH AND AQUA TEST'S STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION AND
CLOSING STATEMENT ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION

Dear Ms. Washburn:

Pursuant to the directive of Chief ALJ C. Robert Wallis given at the January 27, 2006 hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary determination in this case, submitted herewith and filed by mail with the WUTC is Stuth and Aqua Test's Statement Regarding Jurisdiction And Closing Statement On Motion For Summary Determination. In addition to the original and five hard copies, I am also e-mailing a \*.pdf copy and a MS Word version of this brief to the WUTC records center and to all participating parties.

Please contact me if you have any questions regarding this matter. Thank you for your consideration and continued cooperation.

Very truly yours,

RHYS A. STERLING, P.E., J.D.

Rhys A. Sterling

Attorney at Law

Enclosures

cc: Sally G. Johnston, Senior AAG, Chief, UTC Division (via mail) Bill Stuth/Aqua Test, Inc.

2 3 4 5 6 7 BEFORE THE WASHINGTON STATE UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION 8 9 In The Matter of the Petition of 10 WILLIAM L. STUTH, and AQUA TEST, INC., 11 For Declaratory Order Designating 12 a Public Service Company MINATION 13 14 15 16 deration and response: 17 18 19 fied in Title 80 RCW? 20 21 22 23

DOCKET NO. A-050528 STUTH AND AQUA TEST STATE-

MENT REGARDING JURISDICTION AND CLOSING STATEMENT ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETER-

At the January 27, 2006 hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary determination, Chief Administrative Law Judge C. Robert Wallis posed the following question to the parties for their consi-

Whether there is any judicial or legislative intent or guidance expressed anywhere as to the WUTC's jurisdiction to regulate enterprises/services not specifically identi-

And as an additional matter, each party was given the opportunity to submit written closing arguments. In response to Chief Wallis' instructions, set forth hereinbelow are Stuth and Aqua Test's (1) Statement Regarding Jurisdiction, and (2) Closing Statement.

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Wherever one looks for guidance regarding the jurisdiction of public service/utilities commissions, it appears that at one time or another each Commission has in some manner addressed the question of whether its regulatory reach encompasses a certain enterprise or service that is not expressly identified or listed in the governing statutes as a public service or utility. In our case, the question boils down simply as follows:

Whether because Title 80 RCW does not specifically identify as a public service company those persons or corporations which own, operate, and manage large on-site sewage systems serving the public for hire and on demand, is WUTC thereby precluded as a matter of law from asserting jurisdiction and making a determination as a question of fact pursuant to RCW 80.04.015 whether such person or corporation is nevertheless a public service company subject to its regulation?

WUTC staff contends that the Supreme Court in <u>Cole v. Wash-ington Utilities and Transportation Commission</u>, 79 Wn.2d 302, 485 P.2d 71 (1971), has answered this query concretely in the affirmative -- i.e., WUTC has no jurisdiction. On the other hand, Stuth and Aqua Test assert that <u>Cole</u> is inapposite and the body of public service law is clearly to the contrary, and thus the query must be answered in the negative -- i.e., WUTC indeed has jurisdiction.

And past practice is no indicator of jurisdiction, as "whether or not an activity has ever been sanctioned by the commission is not relevant to the determination that such activity is or is not a public service subject to commission jurisdiction and regulation." In re Southern Public Service Company, 38 PUR 4th 559, 563 (West Virginia Public Service Commission, 1980).

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The test to be applied under the public service laws of Washington, and uniformly in other jurisdictions as well, is that "it's not the label that's ascribed the provided service, it's the service that's in fact provided" which makes a person or corporation a public service company subject to WUTC regulation. Although it may be expedient and wishful thinking to claim a one-size-fits-all litmus test that says simply "if it's not in, it's out", the public interest is not well served by a regulatory commission ignoring the facts and taking such a short cut.

A public service company, in its broadest sense, is a partnership consisting of the state as an institution, the public as a group of customers, and the company. The state determines the extent to which the company may go and regulates its rates, services, and practices. company furnishes the facilities with which these rights are exercised and the services rendered. Those members of the public, who constitute the customers, furnish the revenue with which the company is enabled to perform No public service company can exist these services. without customers, and these customers must be treated with fairness, both by the company and by the state or any particular division thereof. . . . [I]mportant functions of a Public Service Commission [are] to see that the company and its patrons are treating each other fairly [and] that the company and its customers are each accorded full justice by every outside agency.

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<sup>19</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> And "service is used in [Title 80 RCW] in its broadest and most inclusive sense." RCW 80.04.010.

And the explicit charge of the WUTC is to "regulate in the public interest, as provided by the public service laws, the rates, services, facilities, and practices of all persons engaging within this state in the business of supplying any utility service or commodity to the public for compensation, and related activities; including, but not limited to, electrical companies, gas companies, . . . and water companies." RCW 80.01.040(3) (emphasis added).

In re Cumberland County Power & Light Company, P.U.R.1920C, 26, 35-36 (Maine Public Utilities Commission, 1920).4

Simply and very well established as the common thread underlying the determination as to the jurisdictional reach of public service/utilities commissions is the true litmus test that "you're in
if you provide a service of consequence as to which the public is
entitled to demand and have continued for a reasonable charge, unless you're specifically exempted out". The reason for this is
born not only from necessity, but of pure common sense:

It is impossible to define the term "public utilities" in terms that will apply generally to all cases and it is therefore necessary that each case be decided upon its own merits, and the one controlling factor is the character of the service being rendered, or rather the manner in which they hold themselves out to the public.

<u>Pesevanto v. Byrd</u>, 3 P.U.R. Digest 2640 (Illinois, 1922). In fact, Judge Hicks used strikingly similar language underwriting the mandate of the Court remanding to WUTC the Stuth and Aqua Test Petition for Declaratory Order for the required fact-finding hearing.

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<sup>&</sup>quot;Outside agencies" are individuals, communities, and the State itself from which a regulated company is entitled to "be reasonably protected from unwarranted or unlawful treatment". <u>Id</u>. at p. 36. <u>See also State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court for King County</u>, 67 Wash. 37, 57-60, 120 Pac. 861 (1912).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> "The point at issue in this case resolves itself into the one question of whether or not the service being rendered by the respondent is of such a character as to constitute them public utilities and bring them under the jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce Commission." <u>Pesevanto v. Byrd</u>, Commission Order in No. 11949, at pp. 2-3 (July 12, 1922).

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And I think that's exactly why the legislature has this all-inclusive language, because they were wise enough to see they couldn't foresee every possible service that may come to be a public service. And the Supreme Court was wise enough to give the test in the <u>Inland Empire</u> case that says it isn't what you call yourself, it's what, in fact, you do that must be determined as to whether or not you qualify and should be regulated by the government.

Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at pp. 13-14.6

As for the application of the foregoing fundamental principles of public service law to actual cases and circumstances in Washington, one only need consider the advent of motorized transportation and the hauling of what one would generally consider as worthless throwaways.

In what is without question the seminal case regarding the reach of the WUTC's jurisdiction to persons or companies in fact providing a public service but not specifically identified in the governing statutes, the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Spokane United Railways v. Department of Public Service, 191 Wash. 595, 71 P. 2d 661 (1937), held that the Department was required to assume jurisdiction as to the reasonableness and adequacy of the tariffs for motor busses notwithstanding the fact that such vehicles were not specifically identified in the statutory definition of "common car-

<sup>6 &</sup>quot;The question of the character of a corporation is one of fact to be determined by the evidence disclosed by the record. . . What it does is the important thing, not what it, or the state, says that it is." <u>Inland Empire Rural Electrification Inc. v. Department of Public Service</u>, 199 Wash. 527, 538, 92 P.2d 258 (1939).

The Department of Public Service is a WUTC predecessor.

rier" in the governing statutes.8

It thus appears that the question presented is one of jurisdiction of the department of public service, and the answer to this question must be found in chapter 117 of the Laws of 1911, p. 538 . . . . That chapter contains an act of the legislature relating to public service properties and utilities within the state and providing for the regulation of the same. It is a comprehensive act, and in § 8, p. 541, thereof . . . there are a large number of persons and things defined [including] the term "common carrier" . . . It will be observed that there is no mention within this definition of motor busses for the carriage of persons or property.

The question then is reduced to whether, motor busses not having been specially mentioned and other things being mentioned, the motor busses are excluded from the operation of the statute. . . . The act, as suggested, is a long and comprehensive one, and it was the evident purpose of the legislature to confer upon the then public service commission, now the department of public service, authority which would include "within its reach all public service corporations." State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861 [1912] . . .

From the fact that, in defining common carriers, the statute mentioned street railroads and street railway companies, but did not mention motor busses, it does not necessarily follow that it was the legislative intent that motor busses should not come under the operation of the law. The rule that the expression of one thing will, under certain circumstances, exclude others, should be applied as a means of discovering the legislative intent, and its application should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. . . .

In determining the legislative intent, the purpose for which a law was enacted is a matter of prime importance in arriving at a correct interpretation of its parts, and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Eerily similar to our case, "the department, acting on the opinion of the attorney general, dismissed the application [submitted by United Railways to approve tariffs] on the ground that the department did not have jurisdiction over the operation of the motor busses." Spokane United Railways, 191 Wash. at 596.

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"'A thing which is within the object, spirit and the meaning of the statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter.'" 2 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d ed.), §§ 369 and 379.

When the extent and scope of the statute are considered, it becomes perfectly plain that it was the intention of the legislature, as above pointed out, to include within its reach all public service corporations, except where there was a special exemption . . . .

Spokane United Railways, 191 Wash. at 597-99. It should be noted that the same Chapter 117, Laws of 1911, is the comprehensive statutory scheme for the then Public Service Commission<sup>9</sup> to take jurisdiction over and regulate public service companies. 10

Thus it is that the courts have weighed in strongly in favor of the WUTC's right and duty in serving and protecting the public interest to assert jurisdiction over companies that, although not specifically identified in the governing statutes, are nevertheless public service companies in fact and thus subject to regulation.

The other relevant case of equal importance to the issue at hand is that of <u>State v. Diamond Tank Transport, Inc.</u>, 2 Wn.2d 13, 97 P.2d 145 (1939). The issue in that case presented the affirmation of the Department of Public Service's claim of jurisdiction over garbage and refuse haulers in the 1930's as contract carriers in the absence of specific legislative authority identifying such companies in the governing statutes.

<sup>9</sup> Again, a predecessor agency of the WUTC.

<sup>10</sup> Laws of 1911, ch. 117 § 8, at pp. 544-46.

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Prior to the effective date (July 1, 1961) of Laws of 1961, chapter 295, carriers of garbage and refuse were governed and regulated by the commission upon the basis of its general regulatory powers over common and contract carriers.

City Sanitary Service, Inc. v. Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, 64 Wn.2d 739, 742, 393 P.2d 952 (1964).

Under the governing statutes passed in 1937, a "contract carrier" was generally described to "include any person who under special and individual contracts or agreements transports property by motor vehicle for compensation." The question then arose whether garbage "had a property value" thus requiring a permit to transport such from the department of public service as it had previously asserted under its general regulatory powers. In Diamond Tank Transport, the Supreme Court affirmed that garbage indeed had a property value, at least as to some of it being hauled, and the contract carriers of which were subject to regulation by the department.

So it was that with the affirmation from the Supreme Court the WUTC's predecessors continued to regulate garbage and refuse haulers under its general regulatory powers over contract carriers not-withstanding the absence of a governing statute specifically ident-

<sup>11</sup> Laws of 1937, ch. 166 § 2, at p. 624.

Further history of the WUTC's assertion of jurisdiction over garbage and refuse haulers is presented in 1961-62 Wash. AGO No. 67, at pp. 7-9.

<sup>13 2</sup> Wn.2d at 16.

ifying such public service by name. It was not until 1961 that the Legislature specially identified and set apart "garbage and refuse collection companies" from other contract carriers and established a certificate of convenience and necessity manner of authorization in lieu of formerly issued operating permits -- but nonetheless all under the WUTC's jurisdiction as originally asserted in 1937. 14

What may be gleaned from the foregoing discussion underscores the judicial and legislative intent and guidance where the WUTC's jurisdiction is asserted as to persons or corporations involved in providing a public service but otherwise not specially identified in the governing statutes; to wit, the assertion of jurisdiction by the WUTC in order to make a determination of fact as to the character of the company and the public service provided will not be challenged. The WUTC does not fulfill its duty to regulate in the public interest under the public service laws by narrowly construing this charge to limit its jurisdictional reach only to those companies specifically identified by name in Title 80 RCW. It is very clear that the body of public service laws in Washington does not submit to such artificial limitation.

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As for the Legislature, its affirmation was by silence for over 20 years until the 1961 legislation which retained in WUTC jurisdiction over garbage and refuse haulers but reorganized certain regulatory aspects. Thus it is that both the judicial and the legislative branches weighed in with affirmation of the WUTC's claim of jurisdiction over garbage and refuse haulers under its general regulatory powers notwithstanding such public service not being specially identified in the governing statutes.

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[I]t was the evident purpose of the legislature to confer upon the [WUTC] authority which would include "within its reach all public service corporations." . . [And] a thing which is within the object, spirit and the meaning of the statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter.

Spokane United Railways, 191 Wash. at 598. And therefore the rule of jurisdictional reach is crystal clear; namely, included within the WUTC's jurisdiction are ALL persons or corporations in the business of supplying ANY utility service or commodity to the public for compensation, except where they are granted a special exemption by the Legislature. This is the reason underlying RCW 80.04.015, in order to make the foregoing determination as a question of fact and not on name only. And so as not to have too sweeping an effect from this very broad and all-inclusive legislative mandate, the judiciary has imposed a set of reasonable constraints that must be taken into consideration by the WUTC in its fact-finding mission. The special reasonable constraints are supplied to the supplied to the reasonable constraints that must be taken into consideration by the WUTC in its fact-finding mission.

<sup>15</sup> RCW 80.01.040(3); <u>Spokane United Railways</u>, 191 Wash. at 599.

Inland Empire Rural Electrification, 199 Wash. at 538.

Wash. 462, 464-65, 291 Pac. 346 (1930) (service available to all who can be served and not limited only to members or stockholders); Clark v. Olson, 177 Wash. 237, 246, 31 P.2d 534 (1934) (company dedicated to serve the public with facilities devoted to a public use to meet certain public expectations); West Valley Land Company, Inc. v. Nob Hill Water Association, 107 Wn.2d 359, 366, 729 P.2d 42 (1986) (distinguishing factors include whether the company is an independent corporation engaged in business for profit to itself at the expense of a consuming public which has no voice in the management of its affairs and no interest in the financial returns).

In conclusion, the answer to the Chief ALJ's query lies very clearly within and is very well settled under the body of Washington public service laws, with guidance set forth both in the governing statutes and in the interpretive caselaw. The jurisdictional reach of the WUTC extends to any and all public service companies regardless of whether or not such may be specially identified in the governing statutes, and the essence of the WUTC's jurisdiction is its fundamental power and authority to make the determination as to whether any person or corporation is a public service company subject to its regulatory control as a question of fact — i.e., what it in fact does, not what it's called.

## CLOSING STATEMENT

A person or corporation dedicated to serve a public need with facilities devoted to a public use. In distilled form, that is the essence of a public service company subject to regulation by the WUTC. Why? Because it's in the public interest to ensure the provision of essential utility services by competent entities and it's in the best interest of the public to ensure those services are available to those who require it to receive service upon demand, continuously for a reasonable charge. This is why Stuth and Aqua Test are here today and why they petitioned WUTC for a Declaratory Order determining as a matter of fact under the body of Washington public service laws that a person or corporation owning, operating and managing large on-site sewage systems for hire on demand for

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the public served thereby and dependent thereon for an essential part of their everyday life, is a public service company subject to regulation by the WUTC.

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The public record for this proceeding is replete with statements explaining in detail the public need and interests served by a private company impressed with this public service to be regulated by the WUTC. In order to provide stable and reasonable delivery of services of great consequence to the public connected to decentralized wastewater systems, and in order to meet the needs for facilities replacement, upgrades, and growth, the US EPA, the NRRI, and the Puget Sound Action Team indorse and recommend the attributes proposed by the business model as outlined by Stuth and Aqua Test. The key to success under the business model is facility ownership; and the key to successful ownership is a tariff and business system fair to the service provider and to the consuming public. The Washington Department of Health requires backup or guarantees by public entities for large on-site sewage systems serving residential developments as part of its legitimate mandate to protect public health and the environment. Performing such service in the past have been municipalities and special public districts. As the record here demonstrates, however, municipalities and special public districts are failing to provide the necessary and essential service to the public because they have neither the time, staff, resources, nor expertise to in fact effectively and efficiently op-

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erate and manage large on-site sewage systems. These systems are, in reality, complex mini-public sewerage systems requiring specialized knowledge, skills and expertise to properly manage. Another form of public entity must step up, step in, and accept the responsibilities currently and reluctantly undertaken by governmental agencies. The Department of Health recognizes this problem and has determined to resolve it as a top priority. A WUTC-regulated public service company that owns, operates, and manages large on-site sewage systems will not only meet the Department's need; but more importantly, a regulated public service company will meet the public's expectations, needs, and interests in performing and providing to them a utility service of great consequence continuously, cost-effectively, and with accountability to a known and respected regulatory authority -- the WUTC.

The public record here is also replete with competent proof that Stuth and Aqua Test have the specialized knowledge, skill and expertise to efficiently and effectively operate and manage large on-site sewage systems. They also have the expertise, background and fundamental capabilities to develop and implement a sound business plan to ensure financial stability and success as to not only the operation and management of large on-site sewage systems, but the ownership of such facilities as well. They are certain they can do the job expected and demanded of them. But what of the public's interests and expectations -- those served by such systems

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are entitled to demand continuous service at a fair and reasonable 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10

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price. They expect and deserve a fair and impartial forum designed and staffed with experts to ensure efficient delivery of promised services at a fair price to those paying and for those performing such services. As NRRI recognizes and as WUTC's own staff admits, there is a need for a team approach by environmental and regulatory agencies in the business of wastewater, with the utility regulators bringing the economic regulation expertise into the picture to help put the wastewater companies on a more sound management and financial footing. The service provided by the proposed wastewater companies is

of great consequence to the public and to the environment - just ask the Puget Sound Action Team regarding its statutory charge to address and clean up the waters of Puget Sound and its identification of on-site sewage systems as a critical contributor and costs for cleanup that will greatly impact the public pocketbook. better system for management of existing facilities by those with the expertise and the stability of operations, subject to regulatory oversight with ownership of such facilities to provide immediate response to taking corrective actions, will give the PSAT, in a team approach, a powerful ally with which to succeed where previous efforts have stumbled and failed. Again, the public record here is replete with competent proof that it is very much in the public interest to grant the Stuth and Aqua Test Petition.

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Judge Richard Hicks ruled that Stuth and Agua Test have met their initial burden of production and have set out a prima facie case for regulation. Judge Hicks mandated that the WUTC hold a fact finding hearing as required by law, the purpose of which is to put such prima facie case to the test by allowing staff and the public to counter the overwhelming evidentiary case with competent evidence of their own. The public, as represented by the Attorney General's Office, has offered nothing to rebut or refute the evidence supporting the public need, necessity and interest in regulating wastewater companies as public service companies. WUTC staff has likewise offered nothing factually to rebut or refute the evidence produced by Stuth and Aqua Test in support of regulation. As a factual determination, there are, as WUTC staff candidly admits, no genuine issues of any material fact. Based on what it is that a wastewater company will in fact perform and provide as being dedicated to serve a public need with facilities devoted to a public use, there is no dispute, there is no contravening evidence, and there is no doubt whatsoever. In a summary determination proceeding, considered under the law applicable to CR 56 summary judgment proceedings, now is the time and the only time to make an evidentiary offer of proof to pose any genuine issues as to the material facts. WUTC staff cannot sit back and take a wait-and-see posture, they must play their evidentiary cards now if they have any. Based on the complete absence of any offer of proof, there simply are no

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evidentiary cards in their deck to play.

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So what's left to put into play where the facts are undisputed and are against you? You play the law card. But WUTC staff has already argued in a most vigorous and competent fashion to a court of law that the WUTC has no jurisdiction in this case as a matter of law. Someone should remind staff that they lost that battle and do not have a right to resurrect those same arguments in this administrative proceeding. Under whichever name or doctrine one wishes to choose and apply, be it res judicata, collateral estoppel, law of the case, or just plain simply -- you've already had your one fair bite of the apple and you don't get another --, the attempt to relitigate the jurisdictional issue of law is barred in this forum as a matter of law. When Judge Hicks remanded this matter to the WUTC for a fact finding hearing testing Stuth and Aqua Test's prima facie case, he intended only for WUTC to apply the body of Washington public service law to such facts -- he certainly did not sanction the WUTC reopening the basic jurisdictional issue that was fully, fairly and vigorously argued to him and decided by him against the WUTC staff's position. The door is not open even one iota -- it is closed and locked.

What the WUTC is to do in this proceeding is to apply the body of Washington public service laws to the uncontested facts and make the determination that a person or corporation owning, operating and managing large on-site sewage systems under the model proposed

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by Stuth and Aqua Test qualifies as and is a public service company 1 2 3 5 6 7

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subject to regulation by the WUTC. The body of Washington public service laws is well-defined and is well-described by both Judge Hicks in his decision as well as in Petitioners' briefs in this proceeding. The question of fact to be determined is what the company does as a public service, and not what it is or is not called and not whether it is expressly listed by name in Title 80 RCW.

Stuth and Aqua Test have done much more than merely "suggest" that a wastewater company is a public service company under the public service laws of Washington -- they have set forth an unrebutted prima facie case, they have carried the burden of production and persuasion by presenting substantial and convincing competent evidence as to the public need served and the public interest in WUTC regulation, and they have squarely faced and rebutted all WUTC staff legal arguments trying to deny the public this essential service and regulatory oversight. Where the business of a person or corporation is indeed factually dedicated to serving a public need with facilities devoted for a public use, the legal standards to be applied for making the determination that, as a matter of law, such business is a public utility impressed with a public duty to provide nondiscriminatory service to all those in the public demanding to be served subject to government oversight to ensure fair rates and financially sound operations are equally clear and very wellestablished.

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Under the public service laws, to be a public service company the business must hold itself out to supply its service on demand and as a matter of right to that segment of the public for which such service is of consequence and needed. This is precisely the service that Stuth and Aqua Test will provide to the public dependent upon large on-site sewage systems for wastewater collection and treatment and disposal on a permanent basis, wherever located in the State of Washington. The consuming public will not be members or subscribers, or shareholder or stockholders in the private business affairs of the provider service company, the public's only assurance as to being subjected to fair and reasonable rates, and in return sound fundamental financial management and stability of the provider company, will be the approved tariffs and regulatory control by the WUTC. The service is for hire and for profit, with facilities owned by the private business but impressed with a public use. These are all attributes of a public service company, not the attributes of a private business serving only select members of the public of its own choosing and on its own terms and who can deny anyone within its sphere of operations from receiving its service because they're not wearing shoes, a shirt, or a suit coat and tie. Moreover, it is unquestioned that it is in the public interest to, and the best interest of the public is served by, the WUTC regulating wastewater companies as public service companies. We cannot say it any better than as so clearly stated in the letters of supp-

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ort for our Petition submitted by developers, design professionals, system operators, educators, health agencies and even those likely to become regulated public service companies. As these individuals state so clearly and as uncontroverted in the public record, the need for such service is great and the public interest served by WUTC regulation is equally great. Under the body of public service laws in the State of Washington, as defined in both statute and in caselaw, a person or corporation owning, operating and managing on a continuous basis large on-site sewage systems for hire, on demand and for profit wherever located in this State qualifies both factually and legally as a public service company that is subject to regulation by the WUTC.

Wastewater collection, treatment and disposal is a public service of immense consequence. Just ask the PSAT or the public served by underperforming or failed on-site systems. One thing is for certain, we the people can and must demand from our government agencies that they work together under the laws to correct past problems and ensure that history does not repeat. The Health Department will do its part and regulate facility design and performance to protect public health, safety and environment. Stuth and Aqua Test are ready, willing and able to do their part and own, operate and manage large on-site sewage systems to serve the public need. WUTC is respectfully implored to step up and do its part and regulate wastewater companies as public service companies in the public interest.

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Under the governing statutes and caselaw, WUTC has in its jurisdiction the power, the authority, and the duty to make a determination as to whether a person or corporation which owns, operates and manages large on-site sewage systems for hire for the public served thereby on demand wherever located in the State of Washington is a public service company subject to its regulatory control as a question of fact based on the public service provided, notwithstanding the absence of wastewater companies being specially identified under Title 80 RCW. The WUTC would have to rewrite the history of public service laws in this State to bypass its fact-finding obligation in favor of a simple recusal as a matter of law, and in so doing commit a grave injustice and disservice upon the public and patently disregard the important interests to be served by the assertion in this case of regulatory control by WUTC.

The authority of the public service commission [now WUTC] was, by the legislature in 1911, extended so as to include within its reach all public service corporations. Laws 1911, p. 538, § 1.

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State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court for King County, 67 Wash.

37, 41, 120 Pac. 861 (1912) (emphasis added). And that legislative mandate remains the same today. 18

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STUTH AND AQUA TEST'S STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION AND CLOSING STATEMENT -- PAGE 20 OF 21

Furthermore, as previously discussed in the Petitioners' initial and reply briefs, the NRRI, the PSAT, and the US EPA have all underscored the public interest that will be served by the effective regulation of those persons and companies owning, operating (continued...)

Based on the foregoing and (1) in light of the factual record as to which WUTC staff admits there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and (2) Judge Hicks' ruling that a prima facie case for regulation has been made that necessitates a fact-finding hearing for the proffer of any rebuttal evidence and as to which absolutely none has been offered by the WUTC staff, the public, or any other interest group; Petitioners Stuth and Agua Test respectfully ask the Chief ALJ to grant their Motion For Summary Determination and Petition for Declaratory Order, and to enter an Order setting forth the determination that a person or corporation which owns, operates, and manages large on-site sewage systems for hire for the public served thereby on demand and wherever located in this State, is a public service company subject to regulation by the WUTC. DATED this 3'd day of February, 2006. Respectfully submitted, RHYS A. STERLING, P.E., J.D.

WSBA #13846

Rhys A. Sterling, Attorney for Petitioners Stuth and

Aqua Test, Inc.

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<sup>18 (...</sup>continued) and managing large on-site sewage systems. The financial and business side of the equation is not addressed by the Washington Department of Health or by local health agencies, whereas such aspects very much lie within the expertise and jurisdiction of the WUTC.

## CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

under the laws of the State of Washington that on the 3'd day of February 19206 I mailed a copy of this document to all parties.

DATED at