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January 10, 2006

VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL

Carole J. Washburn, Executive Secretary Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission 1300 S. Evergreen Park Drive S.W. P.O. Box 47250 Olympia, Washington 98504-7250

Re: William Stuth and Aqua Test, Inc.
Petition for Declaratory Order, Docket No. A-050528
STUTH AND AQUA TEST'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY
DETERMINATION FOR DECLARATORY ORDER DESIGNATING A PUBLIC
SERVICE COMPANY

Dear Ms. Washburn:

Pursuant to WAC 480-07-380(2) and in accordance with the Prehearing Conference Order (amended by the Order On Clarification), submitted herewith and filed by mail with the WUTC is Stuth and Aqua Test's Reply Brief in Support of Summary Determination for Declaratory Order Designating a Public Service Company. In addition to the original and five hard copies, I am also e-mailing a *.pdf copy and a MS Word version of the reply brief to the WUTC records center and to all participating parties. (Note that Simon ffitch confirmed to me by phone conversation that his office is no longer actively participating in this matter.)

Please contact me if you have any questions regarding this matter. Thank you for your consideration and continued cooperation.

Very truly yours,

RHYS A. STERLING, P.E., J.D.

Rhys A. Sterling Attorney at Law

Enclosures

cc: Christopher G. Swanson, AAG (via mail and e-mail) Bill Stuth/Aqua Test, Inc.

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON STATE UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

In The Matter of the Petition of

WILLIAM L. STUTH, and AQUA TEST,
INC.,

Por Declaratory Order Designating a Public Service Company

DOCKET NO. __A-050528

STUTH AND AQUA TEST REPLY

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY

DETERMINATION FOR DECLARA
TORY ORDER DESIGNATING A

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY

Petitioners Stuth and Aqua Test hereinbelow reply to the WUTC Staff's Motion for Summary Determination.

The WUTC Staff continues to travel down their chosen path of attempting to focus the ALJ on summarily disposing this matter by determining as a matter of law that WUTC simply does not have "jurisdiction over large on-site sewage system (LOSS) operators, as that term is described in Order No. 02". WUTC Staff then points to a selected excerpt from Judge Richard D. Hicks' decision as purported support for the ALJ to wander from the mandate issued by the Thurston County Superior Court. However, omitted by the WUTC Staff

STUTH AND AQUA TEST'S REPLY BRIEF FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION -- PAGE 1 OF 11

Accordingly, WUTC asserts that "no issues of material fact exist as to" their motion for summary determination. WUTC Motion for Summary Determination, at p. 1.

WUTC Motion, at p., 2.

from this very same portion of text from Judge Hicks' decision to remand is the remainder of this all-important paragraph, which continues immediately after the end of the WUTC excerpt with the following "rul[ing]":

But I do <u>rule</u> that the petitioners in this case <u>have</u> set out a <u>prima facie case</u> that requires the Commission to <u>hold a fact finding hearing</u> and <u>make a determination</u> as to whether or not this kind of company can be a <u>public</u> utility.

Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at pp. 12-13 (emphasis added). Contrary to the WUTC Staff's contention that the door is still open for the ALJ to revisit the threshold issue as to the WUTC's jurisdiction as a matter of law, by directly and fully considering such jurisdictional issue as a question of law in the administrative review trial held between these same parties, Judge Hicks by ruling as he did that Stuth and Aqua Test have "set out a prima facie case" firmly but forcefully closed that door. In fact, as a preface to giving his decision, Judge Hicks made the following statement on the record for all of us to pay careful attention:

I'll often make some kind of notes if I have the time, and I did have time to make notes in this case because everybody filed their briefs on time. Sometimes I abandon the notes and just rule from memory, and it's tempting to do that on a Friday afternoon like we have here. But because I think this case is of some importance, I want to demonstrate to any later reviewer that I have considered all of the arguments that were presented by both sides.

³ <u>See</u> Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at pp. 4 (lines 15-24); and 8-10.

Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at p. 3 (emphasis added).

And the arguments presented by the WUTC to Judge Hicks, and that which he fully and carefully considered, were the legal bases it contended supported its "hold[ing] that they have no jurisdiction over such companies without a specific legislative declaration citing Cole v. WUTC, 79 Wn.2d 302, 306 (1971) and they distinguish the Inland Empire case . . . "4 Judge Hicks continued with his most thorough analysis of the statutes and caselaw, 5 and concluded that "the legislature has this all-inclusive language, because they were wise enough to see they couldn't foresee every possible service that may come to be a public service. And the Supreme Court was wise enough to give the test in the Inland Empire case that says it isn't what you call yourself, it's what, in fact, you do that must be determined as to whether or not you qualify and should be regulated by the government."6 And as a factual determination based on what service is in fact being given to the public rather than merely looking at the name of such service, Judge Hicks observed that:

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STUTH AND AQUA TEST'S REPLY BRIEF FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION -- PAGE 3 OF 11

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⁴ Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at p. 4.

⁵ Carefully considering, **inter alia**, the Legislature's specific choice of words in Title 80; namely, "including, but not limited to" in RCW 80.01.040(3), and the definition of "service" in RCW 80.04.010 to be "in its broadest and most inclusive sense." Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at pp. 6-7.

Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at pp. 13-14.

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[N]ot only because of what's taking place in Tennessee but that [the Petitioners are] being urged by the Department of Health to provide a service that is ordinarily provided to the public by a municipality or special government district; that this is the kind of company that may qualify as a public service company such that it should not be summarily dismissed as a matter of law that no such qualification could ever be possible.

Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at p. 12.

A factual determination as to the qualification of the Stuth and Aqua Test Proposed Business Model is what is required by law, and is what Judge Hicks mandated WUTC to conduct on remand. And even though Judge Hicks stated that the ultimate resolution of such fact finding hearing "would have to be determined by the Commission based on the facts it finds and the law it applies, "B Judge Hicks did make one essential "ruling" to guide the WUTC and ALJ in the hearing process; to wit, "that the petitioners in this case have set out a *prima facie case* that requires the Commission to hold a fact finding hearing and make a determination as to whether or not this kind of company can be a public utility." This is the part of Judge Hicks' decision and mandate on remand that WUTC Staff so carefully excised -- and with very good reason as such a ruling is

⁷ Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at p. 12 (lines 19-21).

⁸ Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at p. 12 (lines 22-25).

⁹ Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at pp. 12-13 (emphasis added).

not at all favorable to the WUTC Staff's position to narrowly focus the ALJ's attention in a bold attempt to garner yet another bite of the apple. However, a bite from the jurisdictional apple must be resisted under the well-established jurisprudence considering the legal effect stemming from the establishment of a prima facie case.

A prima facie case . . . means not only that plaintiff's evidence would reasonably allow conclusion plaintiff seeks, but also that plaintiff's evidence compels such a conclusion if the defendant produces no evidence to rebut it.

Black's Law Dictionary, at p. 1071 (5th ed. 1979). 10 And where stated in terms of a party's duty to carry the "burden of production" to support the relief sought in an action, Washington courts hold that the burden of production is to "produce evidence sufficient to support" the needed findings, 11 that the "burden of production [requires evidence] sufficient to meet the prima facie case, "12 and

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A "prima facie case means the production by the plaintiff of such evidence which, although not compelling a verdict on the issue for the party whose contention it supports, is sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof to support a verdict in favor of the party by whom it is introduced when the trier of fact finds the prima facie case is not rebutted by other evidence." State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. District Court, 703 P.2d 148, 156-57 (Mont. 1985) (citing State ex rel. Department of Public Health v. Hogg, 466 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Mo.App. 1971), and State ex rel. Department of Public Health v. Ruble, 461 S.W.2d 909, 912-13 (Mo.App. 1970)).

State v. Pineda, 99 Wn. App. 65, 77, 992 P.2d 525 (2000).

Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 364, 753 P.2d 517 (1988).

the "burden of production is met by proving a prima facie case". 13

Stuth and Aqua Test have thus produced sufficient evidence to support a finding that a person or corporation dedicating its service to ownership, operation and maintenance of LOSS for hire and devoted to the public served thereby on demand wherever located in the State (a "Wastewater Company") is a public service company subject to regulation by the WUTC. Under the jurisprudence to be applied by the ALJ in making such determination, 14 Stuth and Aqua Test have made a sufficient evidentiary showing for the ALJ to find and conclude that Wastewater Companies are subject to regulation by the WUTC as public service companies, UNLESS WUTC Staff presents sufficient competent evidence to rebut Petitioners' prima facie case. 15 And WUTC Staff has pointedly failed to do so as it very candidly admits that in this cross motion proceeding for summary determination, "no issues of material fact exist." WUTC Motion, at p. 2.

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¹⁷ Martini v. State, 121 Wn. App. 150, 162 n.29, 89 P.3d 250 (2004), rev. denied, 153 Wn.2d 1023 (2005) (citing Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 3.2, at pp. 130-31 (2d ed. 1995)).

See West Valley Land Company, Inc. v. Nob Hill Water Association, 107 Wn.2d 359, 366, 729 P.2d 42 (1986); Inland Empire Rural Electrification Inc. v. Department of Public Service, 199 Wash. 527, 537-38, 92 P. 2d 258 (1939); Clark v. Olson, 177 Wash. 237, 246, 31 P.2d 534 (1934); State ex rel. Addy v. Department of Public Works, 158 Wash. 462, 465, 291 Pac. 346 (1930). See also Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibit "C" at pp. 13-14.

[&]quot;[A prima facie case is] such as will prevail until contradicted and overcome by other evidence." Black's Law Dictionary, at p. 1071.

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In a summary determination proceeding, judged under the same standards as a CR 56 summary judgment proceeding in court, 16 an absence of competent evidence to rebut that quantum of sworn evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case is a fatal deficiency.

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

CR 56(e).17

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WAC 480-07-380(2)(a).

Summary judgment as sought "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends, in whole or in part. Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wn.2d 491, 494, 519 P.2d 7 (1974). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that, as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 774, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that demonstrates that material facts are in dispute. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc., 112 Wn.2d 127, 132, 769 P.2d 298 (1989). The nonmoving party may not rely on speculation, argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain, or its affidavits being considered at face value. Seven Gables Corporation v. MGM/UA Entertainment Company, 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986). "A party moving for summary judgment is entitled to the benefit of any relevant presumptions that support the motion." Coca-Cola Company v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982). mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment because the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Factual (continued...)

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An essential part of the mandate under which Judge Hicks rem-1 anded this matter to the WUTC was his ruling that Stuth and Aqua 2 Test "have set out a prima facie case" sufficient on its face to support a determination that a Wastewater Company be designated a public service company subject to regulation by the WUTC; however, 5 that such prima facie case would be subjected to "a fact finding 6 hearing" as required by RCW 80.04.015, thus affording WUTC Staff, 7 the public, and other interested persons and companies an opportun-8 ity to present competent evidence to rebut such prima facie status. 9 But according to the public record in this case, no member of the 10 public or any other interested company has come forward with any 11 evidence or testimony other than solid support for Stuth and Aqua 12 Test's Petition for Declaratory Order. Public health officials, 13 developers, university professors and, yes, even other persons and 14 companies likely to become Wastewater Companies themselves unanim-15 ously voice their support for WUTC regulation of Wastewater Compan-16

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ies as a public utility. 18 Not only is there no competent factual

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^{17(...}continued) disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is therefore now or never for WUTC Staff to play all its cards in this summary determination proceeding; it cannot hold any facts in its vest pocket at this stage, hope to defeat the motion, and then present them later. Summary judgments don't operate in such manner, and neither should summary determinations.

See Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, Exhibits "D" and "T". See also filed statement from Northwest Cascade, Inc.

evidence in the record to controvert that presented in support of the Stuth and Aqua Test Petition for Declaratory Order, we dare say that no facts will be found to exist as the proposed regulation of Wastewater Companies meets an essential public need, necessity and interest, and protects the environment and public health.

The only apparent reason why WUTC Staff continues its opposition to Stuth and Aqua Test's Petition for Declaratory Order is the viewpoint that simply because Title 80 RCW does not name Wastewater Companies by name, that such automatically precludes regulation of such persons or corporations as public service companies, notwithstanding WUTC Staff's admission that "no issues of material fact exist" in this summary determination proceeding. But the body of law that applies to the WUTC's determination of whether a person or corporation is in fact a public service company subject to its regulation avoids the name game and focuses on what public service is in fact provided by such person or corporation.

The question of the character of a corporation is one of fact to be determined by the evidence disclosed by the record. . . . What it does is the important thing, not what it, or the state, says that it is.

<u>Inland Empire</u>, 199 Wash. at 538. 19 Separating the wheat from the chaff as the ALJ must in this proceeding, Stuth and Aqua Test have

STUTH AND AQUA TEST'S REPLY
BRIEF FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION
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¹⁹ And as a Wastewater Company is not within the realm of "competitive" utilities, the public has no other effective choice as to the services and facilities provided thereby and therefore need and deserve the protection and oversight offered by the WUTC.

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sustained their burden of producing substantial competent evidence to support their Petition for Declaratory Order and WUTC has done nothing to rebut such proof. Moreover, the body of law the ALJ is to apply is clear and unambiguous. Stuth and Aqua Test are entitled to prevail on their motion for summary determination.

CONCLUSION

As a matter and question of fact under the body of laws that apply to public service companies in the State of Washington, Stuth and Aqua Test have more than met their burden of proving their case for a determination that a Wastewater Company is a public service company subject to regulation by the WUTC. On the other hand, WUTC Staff has offered absolutely no factual evidence to rebut such substantial and convincing proof, admits that "no issues of material fact exist" in this proceeding, and its sole mission is to reargue a point of law that was clearly decided against the WUTC and put to rest by a court of law.

As a matter of fact and law, the ALJ should find and conclude that Stuth and Aqua Test's motion for summary determination must be granted; that their Petition for Declaratory Order must be granted; and that WUTC declare that a Wastewater Company as proposed by Petitioners²⁰ is a public service company subject to regulation by the WUTC.

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See Stuth and Aqua Test Initial Brief, at p. 21 (Wastewater Company Proposed Business Model).

,	DATED this 10th day of January, 2006.
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3	Respectfully submitted,
4	RHYS A. STERLING, P.E., J.D.
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7	Rhys A. Sterling, WSBA #13846 Attorney for Petitioners
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13	CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
14	i certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington
15	that on the day of January
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