

Exh. AMM-3

WUTC DOCKET: 190334

EXHIBIT: AMM-3

ADMIT W/D REJECT

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. UE-19 _____

DOCKET NO. UG-19 _____

EXH. AMM-3

ADRIEN M. MCKENZIE

REPRESENTING AVISTA CORPORATION

I. DESCRIPTION OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES

1 **Q. What is the purpose of this exhibit?**

2 A. Exh. AMM-3 presents capital market estimates of the cost of equity for the
3 jurisdictional electric and natural gas utility operations of Avista Corp. (“Avista” or “the
4 Company”). First, I will briefly summarize the concept of the cost of equity, along with the
5 risk-return tradeoff principle fundamental to capital markets. Next, I describe my
6 applications of the Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”), the Capital Asset Pricing Model
7 (“CAPM”), the empirical form of the CAPM (“ECAPM”), a risk premium analyses based on
8 allowed ROEs for electric utilities, and reference to expected rates of return for electric
9 utilities. This exhibit also presents a market-based test to my utility quantitative analyses by
10 applying the DCF model to a group of low risk non-utility firms.

A. Overview

11 **Q. What fundamental economic principle underlies any evaluation of**
12 **investors’ required return on equity (“ROE”)?**

13 A. The fundamental economic principle underlying the cost of equity concept is
14 the notion that investors are risk averse. In capital markets where relatively risk-free assets
15 are available (*e.g.*, U.S. Treasury securities), investors can be induced to hold riskier assets
16 only if they are offered a premium, or additional return, above the rate of return on a
17 risk-free asset. Because all assets compete with each other for investor funds, riskier assets
18 must yield a higher expected rate of return than safer assets to induce investors to hold them.

19 Given this risk-return tradeoff, the required rate of return (k) from an asset (i) can be
20 generally expressed as:

1 $k_i = R_f + RP_i$

2 where: R_f = Risk-free rate of return, and
3 RP_i = Risk premium required to hold riskier asset i.

4 Thus, the required rate of return for a particular asset at any point in time is a function of: 1)
5 the yield on risk-free assets, and 2) its relative risk, with investors demanding
6 correspondingly larger risk premiums for assets bearing greater risk.

7 **Q. Is there evidence that the risk-return tradeoff principle actually operates**
8 **in the capital markets?**

9 A. Yes. The risk-return tradeoff can be readily documented in segments of the
10 capital markets where required rates of return can be directly inferred from market data and
11 where generally accepted measures of risk exist. Bond yields, for example, reflect investors'
12 expected rates of return, and bond ratings measure the risk of individual bond issues.
13 Comparing the observed yields on government securities, which are considered free of
14 default risk, to the yields on bonds of various rating categories demonstrates that the risk-
15 return tradeoff does, in fact, exist.

16 **Q. Does the risk-return tradeoff observed with fixed income securities**
17 **extend to common stocks and other assets?**

18 A. It is widely accepted that the risk-return tradeoff evidenced with long-term
19 debt extends to all assets. Documenting the risk-return tradeoff for assets other than fixed
20 income securities, however, is complicated by two factors. First, there is no standard
21 measure of risk applicable to all assets. Second, for most assets – including common stock –
22 required rates of return cannot be directly observed. Yet there is every reason to believe that
23 investors exhibit risk aversion in deciding whether or not to hold common stocks and other
24 assets, just as when choosing among fixed-income securities.

1 **Q. Is this risk-return tradeoff limited to differences between firms?**

2 A. No. The risk-return tradeoff principle applies not only to investments in
3 different firms, but also to different securities issued by the same firm. The securities issued
4 by a utility vary considerably in risk because they have different characteristics and
5 priorities. As noted earlier, long-term debt is senior among all capital in its claim on a
6 utility's net revenues and is, therefore, the least risky. The last investors in line are common
7 shareholders. They receive only the net revenues, if any, remaining after all other claimants
8 have been paid. As a result, the rate of return that investors require from a utility's common
9 stock, the most junior and riskiest of its securities, must be considerably higher than the
10 yield offered by the utility's senior, long-term debt.

11 **Q. What are the challenges in determining a just and reasonable ROE for a
12 regulated enterprise?**

13 A. The actual return investors require is unobservable. Different methodologies
14 have been developed to estimate investors' expected and required return on capital, but all
15 such methodologies are merely theoretical tools and generally produce a range of estimates,
16 based on different assumptions and inputs. The DCF method, which is frequently
17 referenced and relied on by regulators, is only one theoretical approach to gain insight into
18 the return investors require; there are numerous other methodologies for estimating the cost
19 of capital and the ranges produced by the different approaches can vary widely.

20 **Q. Is it customary to consider the results of multiple approaches when
21 evaluating a just and reasonable ROE?**

22 A. Yes. In my experience, financial analysts and regulators routinely consider
23 the results of alternative approaches in determining allowed ROEs. It is widely recognized
24 that no single method can be regarded as failsafe; with all approaches having advantages and

1 shortcomings. As FERC has noted, “The determination of rate of return on equity starts
2 from the premise that there is no single approach or methodology for determining the correct
3 rate of return.”¹ Similarly, a publication of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial
4 Analysts concluded that:

5 Each model requires the exercise of judgment as to the reasonableness of the
6 underlying assumptions of the methodology and on the reasonableness of the
7 proxies used to validate the theory. Each model has its own way of
8 examining investor behavior, its own premises, and its own set of
9 simplifications of reality. Each method proceeds from different fundamental
10 premises, most of which cannot be validated empirically. Investors clearly do
11 not subscribe to any singular method, nor does the stock price reflect the
12 application of any one single method by investors.²

13 As this treatise succinctly observed, “no single model is so inherently precise that it can be
14 relied on solely to the exclusion of other theoretically sound models.”³ Similarly, *New*
15 *Regulatory Finance* concluded that:

16 There is no single model that conclusively determines or estimates the
17 expected return for an individual firm. Each methodology possesses its own
18 way of examining investor behavior, its own premises, and its own set of
19 simplifications of reality. Each method proceeds from different fundamental
20 premises that cannot be validated empirically. Investors do not necessarily
21 subscribe to any one method, nor does the stock price reflect the application
22 of any one single method by the price-setting investor. There is no monopoly
23 as to which method is used by investors. In the absence of any hard evidence
24 as to which method outdoes the other, all relevant evidence should be used
25 and weighted equally, in order to minimize judgmental error, measurement
26 error, and conceptual infirmities.⁴

27 Thus, while the DCF model is a recognized approach to estimating the ROE, it is not
28 without shortcomings and does not otherwise eliminate the need to ensure that the “end
29 result” is fair. The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission has recognized this principle:

¹ *Northwest Pipeline Co.*, Opinion No. 396-C, 81 FERC ¶ 61,036 at 4 (1997).

² David C. Parcell, *The Cost of Capital – A Practitioner’s Guide*, Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts (2010) at 84.

³ *Id.*

⁴ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Util. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 429.

1 There are three principal reasons for our unwillingness to place a great deal
2 of weight on the results of any DCF analysis. One is . . . the failure of the
3 DCF model to conform to reality. The second is the undeniable fact that
4 rarely if ever do two expert witnesses agree on the terms of a DCF equation
5 for the same utility – for example, as we shall see in more detail below,
6 projections of future dividend cash flow and anticipated price appreciation of
7 the stock can vary widely. And, the third reason is that the unadjusted DCF
8 result is almost always well below what any informed financial analysis
9 would regard as defensible, and therefore require an upward adjustment
10 based largely on the expert witness’s judgment. In these circumstances, we
11 find it difficult to regard the results of a DCF computation as any more than
12 suggestive.⁵

13 **Q. Has the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) recently**
14 **proposed to modify its practices to recognize these realities?**

15 A. Yes. In Opinion No. 531, FERC recognized the potential for any application
16 of the DCF model to produce unreliable results.⁶ Considering the potential for DCF results
17 to be distorted and in light of prevailing conditions in capital markets, FERC stated that it
18 had “less confidence that the [DCF model] . . . accurately reflects the equity returns
19 necessary” to attract capital.⁷ FERC recently announced its intention to end its practice of
20 relying exclusively on the DCF model,⁸ concluding that:

21 In short, we intend to give equal weight to the results of the four financial
22 models in the record, instead of primarily relying on the DCF model. In
23 relying on a broader range of record evidence to estimate [a utility’s] cost of
24 equity, we ensure that our chosen ROE is based on substantial evidence and
25 bring our methodology into closer alignment with how investors inform their
26 investment decisions.⁹

⁵ *Ind. Michigan Power Co.*, Cause No. 38728, 116 PUR4th, 1, 17-18 (IURC 8/24/1990).

⁶ *Coakley v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co.*, Opinion No. 531, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 41 (2014).

⁷ *Id.* at P 145. FERC confirmed these findings in Opinion No. 531-B (*Coakley v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co.*, Opinion No. 531-B, 150 FERC ¶ 61,165 at P 84 (2015), and more recently in Opinion No. 551 (*Ass’n of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, Opinion No. 551, 156 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 122 (2016)).

⁸ *Coakley v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co.*, Order Directing Briefs, 165 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2018) (“Coakley Briefing Order”); *Ass’n of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, Order Directing Briefs, 165 FERC ¶ 61,118 (2018) (“MISO Briefing Order”) (together, “Briefing Orders”).

⁹ Coakley Briefing Order at P 15.

1 The four models referenced by FERC to be used in estimating the cost of equity are
2 the DCF, CAPM, expected earnings, and risk premium approaches. As FERC concluded in
3 its Briefing Orders, the primary reason for averaging the results of the DCF, CAPM,
4 Expected Earnings, and Risk Premium methods to evaluate a just and reasonable ROE “is
5 that investors use those models, in addition to the DCF methodology, to inform their
6 investment decisions.”¹⁰ I submitted testimony in Docket Nos. EL16-64-002 and
7 EL15-45-000, which were both proceedings subject to the Briefing Orders, recommending
8 that FERC abandon sole reliance on the DCF model and give explicit consideration to the
9 results of the CAPM, expected earnings, and risk premium methodologies in evaluating a
10 just and reasonable ROE. I agree with FERC’s conclusion that “providing four different
11 approaches to estimating the cost of equity . . . reduces the risk associated with relying on
12 only one model; that is, the risk of misidentifying the just and reasonable ROE by relying on
13 a flawed cost of equity estimate.”¹¹

14 **Q. What does the above discussion imply with respect to estimating the**
15 **ROE for a utility?**

16 A. Although the ROE cannot be observed directly, it is a function of the returns
17 available from other investment alternatives and the risks to which the equity capital is
18 exposed. Because it is not readily observable, the ROE for a particular utility must be
19 estimated by analyzing information about capital market conditions generally, assessing the
20 relative risks of the company specifically, and employing various quantitative methods that
21 focus on investors’ required rates of return. These various quantitative methods typically

¹⁰ Coakley Briefing Order at P 44 (emphasis original); MISO Briefing Order at 46 (emphasis supplied).

¹¹ Coakley Briefing Order at P 38; MISO Briefing Order at P 40.

1 attempt to infer investors' required rates of return from stock prices, interest rates, or other
2 capital market data.

B. Comparable Risk Proxy Group

3 **Q. How did you implement quantitative methods to estimate the cost of**
4 **common equity for Avista?**

5 A. Application of quantitative methods to estimate the cost of equity requires
6 observable capital market data, such as stock prices. Moreover, even for a firm with
7 publicly traded stock, the cost of equity can only be estimated. As a result, applying
8 quantitative models using observable market data produces an estimate that inherently
9 includes some degree of observation error. Thus, the accepted approach to increase
10 confidence in the results is to apply multiple quantitative methods such as the DCF and
11 ECAPM to a proxy group of publicly traded utility companies that investors regard as risk-
12 comparable.

13 **Q. What specific proxy group of utilities did you rely on for your analyses?**

14 A. In order to reflect the risks and prospects associated with Avista's
15 jurisdictional utility operations, my DCF analyses focused on a reference group of other
16 utilities composed of those companies included by The Value Line Investment Survey
17 ("Value Line") in its Electric Utilities Industry groups with:

- 18 1. Corporate credit ratings from S&P and Moody's corresponding to one notch
19 above and below the Company's current ratings. For S&P, this resulted in a
20 ratings range of BBB-, BBB, and BBB+; for Moody's the range was Baa3,
21 Baa2, or Baa1.
- 22 2. Value Line Safety Rank of "2" or "3".
- 23 3. No ongoing involvement in a major merger or acquisition that would distort
24 quantitative results.
- 25 4. No cuts in dividend payments during the past six months and no
26 announcement of a dividend cut since that time.

1 These criteria resulted in a proxy group composed of 22 companies, which I refer to as the
2 “Utility Group.”

3 **Q. How did you evaluate the risks of the Utility Group relative to Avista?**

4 A. My evaluation of relative risk considered four objective, published
5 benchmarks that are widely relied on in the investment community. Credit ratings are
6 assigned by independent rating agencies for the purpose of providing investors with a broad
7 assessment of the creditworthiness of a firm. Ratings generally extend from triple-A (the
8 highest) to D (in default). Other symbols (*e.g.*, "BBB+") are used to show relative standing
9 within a category. Because the rating agencies' evaluation includes virtually all of the
10 factors normally considered important in assessing a firm's relative credit standing,
11 corporate credit ratings provide a broad, objective measure of overall investment risk that is
12 readily available to investors. Although the credit rating agencies are not immune to
13 criticism, their rankings and analyses are widely cited in the investment community and
14 referenced by investors. Investment restrictions tied to credit ratings continue to influence
15 capital flows, and credit ratings are also frequently used as a primary risk indicator in
16 establishing proxy groups to estimate the cost of common equity.

17 While credit ratings provide the most widely referenced benchmark for investment
18 risks, other quality rankings published by investment advisory services also provide relative
19 assessments of risks that are considered by investors in forming their expectations for
20 common stocks. Value Line's primary risk indicator is its Safety Rank, which ranges from
21 “1” (Safest) to “5” (Riskiest). This overall risk measure is intended to capture the total risk
22 of a stock, and incorporates elements of stock price stability and financial strength. Given
23 that Value Line is perhaps the most widely available source of investment advisory

1 information, its Safety Rank provides useful guidance regarding the risk perceptions of
2 investors.

3 The Financial Strength Rating is designed as a guide to overall financial strength and
4 creditworthiness, with the key inputs including financial leverage, business volatility
5 measures, and company size. Value Line's Financial Strength Ratings range from "A++"
6 (strongest) down to "C" (weakest) in nine steps. Finally, Value Line's beta measures a
7 utility's stock price volatility relative to the market as a whole. A stock that tends to respond
8 less to market movements has a beta less than 1.00, while stocks that tend to move more
9 than the market have betas greater than 1.00. Beta is the only relevant measure of
10 investment risk under modern capital market theory, and is widely cited in academics and in
11 the investment industry as a guide to investors' risk perceptions. Moreover, in my
12 experience Value Line is the most widely referenced source for beta in regulatory
13 proceedings. As noted in *New Regulatory Finance*:

14 Value Line is the largest and most widely circulated independent investment
15 advisory service, and influences the expectations of a large number of
16 institutional and individual investors. ... Value Line betas are computed on a
17 theoretically sound basis using a broadly based market index, and they are
18 adjusted for the regression tendency of betas to converge to 1.00.¹²

19 **Q. How do the overall risks of your proxy group compare with Avista?**

20 A. Table 1 compares the Utility Group with Avista across five key indicators of
21 investment risk:

¹² Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Util. Reports (2006) at 71.

1
2
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF RISK INDICATORS

	Credit Rating		Value Line		
	S&P	Moody's	Safety Rank	Financial Strength	Beta
	Utility Group	BBB+	Baa2	2	B++
Avista	BBB	Baa2	2	A	0.65

3 **Q. What does this comparison indicate regarding investors' assessment of**
4 **the relative risk associated with your Utility Group?**

5 A. As shown above, the S&P credit rating of BBB for Avista indicates slightly
6 more risk for Avista than for the average of credit ratings for the Utility Group. The Baa2
7 Moody's credit rating corresponding to Avista is identical to the average of credit ratings for
8 the Utility Group. The average Value Line Safety Rank for the Utility Group is the same as
9 that assigned to the Company. With respect to Value Line's Financial Strength, the average
10 values for the Utility Group indicate slightly more risk than for Avista. The average of Value
11 Line's betas for the Utility Group is nearly identical to Avista's beta. Considered together,
12 this comparison of objective measures, which consider a broad spectrum of risks, including
13 financial and business position, and exposure to firm-specific factors, indicates that investors
14 would likely conclude that the overall investment risks for Avista are generally comparable
15 to those of the firms in the Utility Group.

C. Discounted Cash Flow Analyses

16 **Q. How are DCF models used to estimate the cost of equity?**

17 A. DCF models attempt to replicate the market valuation process that sets the
18 price investors are willing to pay for a share of a company's stock. The model rests on the
19 assumption that investors evaluate the risks and expected rates of return from all securities
20 in the capital markets. Given these expectations, the price of each stock is adjusted by the

1 market until investors are adequately compensated for the risks they bear. Therefore, we can
 2 look to the market to determine what investors believe a share of common stock is worth.
 3 By estimating the cash flows investors expect to receive from the stock in the way of future
 4 dividends and capital gains, we can calculate their required rate of return. That is, the cost
 5 of equity is the discount rate that equates the current price of a share of stock with the
 6 present value of all expected cash flows from the stock. The formula for the general form of
 7 the DCF model is as follows:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+k_e)^1} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k_e)^2} + \dots + \frac{D_t}{(1+k_e)^t} + \frac{P_t}{(1+k_e)^t}$$

8

9 where: P_0 = Current price per share;
 10 P_t = Expected future price per share in period t;
 11 D_t = Expected dividend per share in period t;
 12 k_e = Cost of common equity.

13 **Q. What form of the DCF model is customarily used to estimate the cost of**
 14 **equity in rate cases?**

15 A. Rather than developing annual estimates of cash flows into perpetuity, the
 16 DCF model can be simplified to a “constant growth” form:¹³

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{k_e - g}$$

17

18 where: P_0 = Current price per share;
 19 D_1 = Expected dividend per share in the coming year;
 20 k_e = Cost of equity;
 21 g = Investors’ long-term growth expectations.

22 The cost of equity (k_e) can be isolated by rearranging terms:

¹³ The constant growth DCF model is dependent on a number of assumptions, which in practice are never strictly met. These include a constant growth rate for both dividends and earnings; a stable dividend payout ratio; the discount rate exceeds the growth rate; a constant growth rate for book value and price; a constant earned rate of return on book value; no sales of stock at a price above or below book value; a constant price-earnings ratio; a constant discount rate (*i.e.*, no changes in risk or interest rate levels and a flat yield curve); and all of the above extend to infinity.

$$k_e = \frac{D_1}{P_0} + g$$

1

2

This constant growth form of the DCF model recognizes that the rate of return to

3

stockholders consists of two parts: 1) dividend yield (D_1/P_0), and 2) growth (g). In other

4

words, investors expect to receive a portion of their total return in the form of current

5

dividends and the remainder through price appreciation.

6

Q. What steps are required to apply the DCF model?

7

A. The first step in implementing the constant growth DCF model is to

8

determine the expected dividend yield (D_1/P_0) for the firm in question. This is usually

9

calculated based on an estimate of dividends to be paid in the coming year divided by the

10

current price of the stock. The second step is to estimate investors' long-term growth

11

expectations (g) for the firm. The final step is to sum the firm's dividend yield and estimated

12

growth rate to arrive at an estimate of its cost of equity.

13

Q. How was the dividend yield for the Utility Group determined?

14

A. Estimates of dividends to be paid by each of these utilities over the next

15

twelve months, obtained from Value Line, served as D_1 . This annual dividend was then

16

divided by a 30-day average stock price for each utility to arrive at the expected dividend

17

yield. The stock prices, expected dividends, and resulting dividend yields for the firms in

18

the Utility Group are presented on page 1 of Exh. AMM-6.

19

Q. What is the next step in applying the constant growth DCF model?

20

A. The next step is to evaluate long-term growth expectations, or “ g ”, for the

21

firm in question. In constant growth DCF theory, earnings, dividends, book value, and

22

market price are all assumed to grow in lockstep, and the growth horizon of the DCF model

23

is infinite. But implementation of the DCF model is more than just a theoretical exercise; it

1 is an attempt to replicate the mechanism investors used to arrive at observable stock prices.
2 A wide variety of techniques can be used to derive growth rates, but the only “g” that
3 matters in applying the DCF model is the value that investors expect.

4 **Q. What are investors most likely to consider in developing their long-term**
5 **growth expectations?**

6 A. Implementation of the DCF model is solely concerned with replicating the
7 forward-looking evaluation of real-world investors. In the case of utilities, dividend growth
8 rates are not likely to provide a meaningful guide to investors’ current growth expectations.
9 This is because utilities have significantly altered their dividend policies in response to more
10 accentuated business risks in the industry, with the payout ratios falling significantly from
11 historical levels. As a result, dividend growth in the utility industry has lagged growth in
12 earnings as utilities conserve financial resources to provide a hedge against heightened
13 uncertainties.

14 A measure that plays a pivotal role in determining investors’ long-term growth
15 expectations are future trends in earnings per share (“EPS”), which provide the source for
16 future dividends and ultimately support share prices. The importance of earnings in
17 evaluating investors’ expectations and requirements is well accepted in the investment
18 community, and surveys of analytical techniques relied on by professional analysts indicate
19 that growth in earnings is far more influential than trends in dividends per share (“DPS”).

20 The availability of projected EPS growth rates also is key to investors relying on this
21 measure as compared to future trends in DPS. Apart from Value Line, investment advisory
22 services do not generally publish comprehensive DPS growth projections, and this scarcity
23 of dividend growth rates relative to the abundance of earnings forecasts attests to their
24 relative influence. The fact that securities analysts focus on EPS growth, and that DPS

1 growth rates are not routinely published, indicates that projected EPS growth rates are likely
2 to provide a superior indicator of the future long-term growth expected by investors.

3 **Q. Do the growth rate projections of security analysts consider historical**
4 **trends?**

5 A. Yes. Professional security analysts study historical trends extensively in
6 developing their projections of future earnings. Hence, to the extent there is any useful
7 information in historical patterns, that information is incorporated into analysts' growth
8 forecasts.

9 **Q. Did Professor Myron J. Gordon, who pioneered the DCF approach,**
10 **recognize the pivotal role that earnings play in forming investors' expectations?**

11 A. Yes. Dr. Gordon specifically recognized that "it is the growth that investors
12 expect that should be used" in applying the DCF model and he concluded:

13 A number of considerations suggest that investors may, in fact, use earnings
14 growth as a measure of expected future growth."¹⁴

15 **Q. Are analysts' assessments of growth rates appropriate for estimating**
16 **investors' required return using the DCF model?**

17 A. Yes. In applying the DCF model to estimate the cost of common equity, the
18 only relevant growth rate is the forward-looking expectations of investors that are captured
19 in current stock prices. Investors, just like securities analysts and others in the investment
20 community, do not know how the future will actually turn out. They can only make
21 investment decisions based on their best estimate of what the future holds in the way of
22 long-term growth for a particular stock, and securities prices are constantly adjusting to
23 reflect their assessment of available information.

¹⁴ Myron J. Gordon, *The Cost of Capital to a Public Utility*, MSU Public Utilities Studies (1974) at 89.

1 Any claims that analysts' estimates are not relied upon by investors are illogical
2 given the reality of a competitive market for investment advice. If financial analysts'
3 forecasts do not add value to investors' decision making, then it is irrational for investors to
4 pay for these estimates. Similarly, those financial analysts who fail to provide reliable
5 forecasts will lose out in competitive markets relative to those analysts whose forecasts
6 investors find more credible. The reality that analyst estimates are routinely referenced in
7 the financial media and in investment advisory publications (*e.g.*, Value Line) implies that
8 investors use them as a basis for their expectations.

9 While the projections of securities analysts may be proven optimistic or pessimistic
10 in hindsight, this is irrelevant in assessing the expected growth that investors have
11 incorporated into current stock prices, and any bias in analysts' forecasts—whether
12 pessimistic or optimistic—is irrelevant if investors share analysts' views. Earnings growth
13 projections of security analysts provide the most frequently referenced guide to investors'
14 views and are widely accepted in applying the DCF model. As explained in *New Regulatory*
15 *Finance*:

16 Because of the dominance of institutional investors and their influence on
17 individual investors, analysts' forecasts of long-run growth rates provide a
18 sound basis for estimating required returns. Financial analysts exert a strong
19 influence on the expectations of many investors who do not possess the
20 resources to make their own forecasts, that is, they are a cause of *g* [growth].
21 The accuracy of these forecasts in the sense of whether they turn out to be
22 correct is not an issue here, as long as they reflect widely held expectations.¹⁵

23 **Q. Have regulators also recognized that analysts' growth rate estimates are**
24 **an important and meaningful guide to investors' expectations?**

25 A. Yes. The Kentucky Public Service Commission has indicated its preference
26 for relying on analysts' projections in establishing investors' expectations:

¹⁵ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Util. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 298 (emphasis added).

1 KU's argument concerning the appropriateness of using investors'
2 expectations in performing a DCF analysis is more persuasive than the AG's
3 argument that analysts' projections should be rejected in favor of historical
4 results. The Commission agrees that analysts' projections of growth will be
5 relatively more compelling in forming investors' forward-looking
6 expectations than relying on historical performance, especially given the
7 current state of the economy.¹⁶

8 Similarly, FERC has expressed a clear preference for projected EPS growth rates in applying
9 the DCF model to estimate the cost of equity for both electric and natural gas pipeline
10 utilities:

11 Opinion No. 414-A held that the IBES five-year growth forecasts for each
12 company in the proxy group are the best available evidence of the short-term
13 growth rates expected by the investment community. It cited evidence that (1)
14 those forecasts are provided to IBES by professional security analysts, (2)
15 IBES reports the forecast for each firm as a service to investors, and (3) the
16 IBES reports are well known in the investment community and used by
17 investors. The Commission has also rejected the suggestion that the IBES
18 analysts are biased and stated that "in fact the analysts have a significant
19 incentive to make their analyses as accurate as possible to meet the needs of
20 their clients since those investors will not utilize brokerage firms whose
21 analysts repeatedly overstate the growth potential of companies."¹⁷

22 The Public Utility Regulatory Authority of Connecticut has also noted that "there is
23 not growth in DPS without growth in EPS," and concluded that securities analysts' growth
24 projections have a greater influence over investors' expectations and stock prices.¹⁸ In
25 addition, the Regulatory Commission of Alaska ("RCA") has previously determined that
26 analysts' EPS growth rates provide a superior basis on which to estimate investors'
27 expectations:

28 We also find persuasive the testimony . . . that projected EPS returns are more
29 indicative of investor expectations of dividend growth than historical growth

¹⁶ *Kentucky Utilities Co.*, Case No. 2009-00548 (Ky PSC Jul. 30, 2010) at 30-31.

¹⁷ *Kern River Gas Transmission Co.*, 126 FERC ¶ 61,034 at P 121 (2009) (footnote omitted).

¹⁸ *Decision*, Docket No. 13-02-20 (Sept. 24, 2013).

1 data because persons making the forecasts already consider the historical
2 numbers in their analyses.¹⁹

3 The RCA has concluded that arguments against exclusive reliance on analysts' EPS growth
4 rates to apply the DCF model "are not convincing."²⁰

5 **Q. What are security analysts currently projecting in the way of growth for**
6 **the firms in the Utility Proxy Group?**

7 A. The projected EPS growth rates for each of the firms in the Utility Group
8 reported by Value Line, IBES,²¹ and Zacks Investment Research ("Zacks") are displayed on
9 page 2 of Exh. AMM-6.

10 **Q. How else are investors' expectations of future long-term growth**
11 **prospects often estimated for use in the constant growth DCF model?**

12 A. In constant growth theory, growth in book equity will be equal to the product
13 of the earnings retention ratio (one minus the dividend payout ratio) and the earned rate of
14 return on book equity. Furthermore, if the earned rate of return and the payout ratio are
15 constant over time, growth in earnings and dividends will be equal to growth in book value.
16 Despite the fact that these conditions are seldom, if ever, met in practice, this "sustainable
17 growth" approach may provide a rough guide for evaluating a firm's growth prospects and is
18 frequently proposed in regulatory proceedings.

19 The sustainable growth rate is calculated by the formula, $g = br + sv$, where "b" is the
20 expected retention ratio, "r" is the expected earned return on equity, "s" is the percent of
21 common equity expected to be issued annually as new common stock, and "v" is the equity
22 accretion rate. Under DCF theory, the "sv" factor is a component of the growth rate

¹⁹ Regulatory Commission of Alaska, U-07-76(8) at 65, n. 258.

²⁰ Regulatory Commission of Alaska, U-08-157(10) at 36.

²¹ Formerly I/B/E/S International, Inc., IBES growth rates are now compiled and published by Thomson Reuters.

1 designed to capture the impact of issuing new common stock at a price above, or below,
2 book value. The sustainable, “br+sv” growth rates for each firm in the Utility Group are
3 summarized on page 2 of Exh. AMM-6, with the underlying details being presented on Exh.
4 AMM-7.²²

5 **Q. Are there significant shortcomings associated with the “br+sv” growth**
6 **rate?**

7 A. Yes. First, in order to calculate the sustainable growth rate, it is necessary to
8 develop estimates of investors’ expectations for four separate variables; namely, “b”, “r”,
9 “s”, and “v.” Given the inherent difficulty in forecasting each parameter and the difficulty of
10 estimating the expectations of investors, the potential for measurement error is significantly
11 increased when using four variables, as opposed to referencing a direct projection for EPS
12 growth. Second, empirical research in the finance literature indicates that sustainable
13 growth rates are not as significantly correlated to measures of value, such as share prices, as
14 are analysts’ EPS growth forecasts.²³ The “sustainable growth” approach was included for
15 completeness, but evidence indicates that analysts’ forecasts provide a superior and more
16 direct guide to investors’ growth expectations.

17 **Q. What cost of equity estimates were implied for the Utility Group using**
18 **the DCF model?**

19 A. After combining the dividend yields and respective growth projections for
20 each utility, the resulting cost of equity estimates are shown on page 3 of Exh. AMM-6.

²² Because Value Line reports end-of-year book values, an adjustment factor was incorporated to compute an average rate of return over the year, which is consistent with the theory underlying this approach.

²³ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Util. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 307.

1 **Q. In evaluating the results of the constant growth DCF model, is it**
2 **appropriate to eliminate illogical low or high-end values?**

3 A. Yes. In applying quantitative methods to estimate the cost of equity, it is
4 essential that the resulting values pass fundamental tests of reasonableness and economic
5 logic. Accordingly, DCF estimates that are implausibly low or high should be eliminated
6 when evaluating the results of this method.

7 **Q. How did you evaluate DCF estimates at the low end of the range?**

8 A. I based my evaluation of DCF estimates at the low end of the range on the
9 fundamental risk-return tradeoff, which holds that investors will only take on more risk if
10 they expect to earn a return to compensate them for the greater uncertainty. Because
11 common stocks lack the protections associated with an investment in long-term bonds, a
12 utility's common stock imposes far greater risks on investors. As a result, the rate of return
13 that investors require from a utility's common stock is considerably higher than the yield
14 offered by senior, long-term debt. Consistent with this principle, DCF results that are not
15 sufficiently higher than the yields available on less risky utility bonds must be eliminated.

16 **Q. Have similar tests been applied by regulators?**

17 A. Yes. FERC has noted that adjustments are justified where applications of the
18 DCF approach produce illogical results. FERC evaluates DCF results against observable
19 yields on long-term public utility debt and has recognized that it is appropriate to eliminate
20 estimates that do not sufficiently exceed this threshold.²⁴ FERC affirmed that:

21 The purpose of the low-end outlier test is to exclude from the proxy group
22 those companies whose ROE estimates are below the average bond yield or
23 are above the average bond yield but are sufficiently low that an investor
24 would consider the stock to yield essentially the same return as debt. In
25 public utility ROE cases, the Commission has used 100 basis points above
26 the cost of debt as an approximation of this threshold, but has also considered

²⁴ See, e.g., *Southern California Edison Co.*, 131 FERC ¶ 61,020 at P 55 (2010) (“*SoCal Edison*”).

1 the distribution of proxy group companies to inform its decision on which
2 companies are outliers. As the Presiding Judge explained, this is a flexible
3 test.²⁵

4 **Q. What interest rate benchmark did you consider in evaluating the DCF**
5 **results for Avista?**

6 A. As noted earlier, the S&P and Moody's ratings for Avista are BBB and Baa2,
7 respectively, which fall in the triple-B rating category. Accordingly, I referenced average
8 yields on triple-B utility bonds as my benchmark in evaluating low-end results. Monthly
9 yields on Baa bonds reported by Moody's averaged 4.87 percent over the six months ending
10 March 2019.²⁶

11 **Q. What else should be considered in evaluating DCF estimates at the low**
12 **end of the range?**

13 A. As indicated earlier, it is generally expected that long-term interest rates will
14 rise as the Federal Reserve normalizes monetary policies. As shown in Table 2 below,
15 forecasts of IHS Global Insight and the EIA imply an average triple-B bond yield of
16 approximately 5.85 percent over the period 2019-2020:

²⁵ *Martha Coakley et al., v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Company, et al.*, Opinion No. 531, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 122 (2014).

²⁶ Moody's Investors Service, *CreditTrends*.

1
2
TABLE 2
IMPLIED BBB BOND YIELD

	Baa Yield <u>2019-20</u>
Projected Aa Utility Yield	
IHS Global Insight (a)	5.02%
EIA (b)	<u>5.32%</u>
Average	5.17%
Current Baa - Aa Yield Spread (c)	<u>0.68%</u>
Implied Baa Utility Yield	5.85%

-
- (a) IHS Global Insight, Long-Term Macro Forecast - Baseline (Jan.
(b) Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2019
(Jan. 24, 2019)..
(c) Based on monthly average bond yields from Moody's Investors
Service for the six-month period Oct. 2018 - Mar. 2019.

3 The increase in debt yields anticipated by IHS Global Insight and EIA is also supported by
4 the widely-referenced Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, which projects that yields on corporate
5 bonds will climb on the order of 100 basis points through 2023.²⁷

6 **Q. What does this test of logic imply with respect to the DCF estimates for**
7 **the Utility Group?**

8 A. Adding a 100 basis-point premium to the historical and projected average
9 utility bond yields implies a low-end threshold on the order of 5.9 percent to 6.9 percent. As
10 highlighted on page 3 of Exh. AMM-6, after considering these tests and the distribution of
11 individual estimates, I eliminated low-end DCF estimates ranging from -2.8 percent to 6.5
12 percent. Based on my professional experience and the risk-return tradeoff principle that is
13 fundamental to finance, it is inconceivable that investors are not requiring a substantially
14 higher rate of return for holding common stock. As a result, consistent with the threshold

²⁷ Wolters Kluwer, *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, (Dec. 1, 2018).

1 established by historical and projected utility bond yields, these values provide little
2 guidance as to the returns investors require from utility common stocks and should be
3 excluded.

4 **Q. What else should be considered in evaluating DCF estimates at the low**
5 **end of the range?**

6 A. While FERC has historically relied on a 100 basis point spread over public
7 utility bond yields as a starting place in evaluating low-end values, reference to a static test
8 ignores the implications of current low bond yields. Specifically, the premium that investors
9 demand to bear the higher risks of common stock is not constant. As I demonstrate later in
10 my testimony, equity risk premiums expand when interest rates fall, and vice versa. Given
11 that bond yields have remained uncharacteristically low, this inverse relationship implies a
12 significant increase in the equity risk premium that investors require to accept the higher
13 uncertainties associated with an investment in utility common stocks versus bonds. As a
14 result, using a fixed premium of 100 basis points over public utility bond yields will vastly
15 understate the threshold for investors' minimum required return on utility stocks.

16 **Q. Do you also recommend excluding estimates at the high end of the range**
17 **of DCF results?**

18 A. I typically recommend the exclusion of high end estimates that are clearly
19 implausible. In this case, one such value existed. The upper end of the cost of common
20 equity range produced by the DCF analysis presented on page 3 of Exh. AMM-6 was set by
21 a cost of equity estimate of 16.3 percent. When compared with the balance of the remaining
22 estimates, this value is unreasonable and should be excluded in evaluating the results of the
23 DCF model for the Utility Group.

1 move more than the market have betas greater than 1.00. The CAPM is mathematically
2 expressed as:

3
$$R_j = R_f + \beta_j(R_m - R_f)$$

4 where: R_j = required rate of return for stock j;
5 R_f = risk-free rate;
6 R_m = expected return on the market portfolio; and,
7 β_j = beta, or systematic risk, for stock j.

8 Under the CAPM formula above, a stock's required return is a function of the risk-
9 free rate (R_f), plus a risk premium that is scaled to reflect the relative volatility of a firm's
10 stock price, as measured by beta (β). Like the DCF model, the CAPM is an *ex-ante*, or
11 forward-looking model based on expectations of the future. As a result, in order to produce
12 a meaningful estimate of investors' required rate of return, the CAPM must be applied using
13 estimates that reflect the expectations of actual investors in the market, not with backward-
14 looking, historical data.

15 **Q. Why is the CAPM approach an appropriate component of evaluating the**
16 **cost of equity for Avista?**

17 A. The CAPM approach (which also forms the foundation of the ECAPM)
18 generally is considered to be the most widely referenced method for estimating the cost of
19 equity among academicians and professional practitioners, with the pioneering researchers
20 of this method receiving the Nobel Prize in 1990. Because this is the dominant model for
21 estimating the cost of equity outside the regulatory sphere, the CAPM (and ECAPM)
22 provides important insight into investors' required rate of return for utility stocks, including
23 Avista.

1 **Q. How did you apply the CAPM to estimate the cost of common equity?**

2 A. Application of the CAPM to the Utility Group based on a forward-looking
3 estimate for investors' required rate of return from common stocks is presented on Exh.
4 AMM-8. In order to capture the expectations of today's investors in current capital markets,
5 the expected market rate of return was estimated by conducting a DCF analysis on the
6 dividend paying firms in the S&P 500.

7 The dividend yield for each firm was obtained from Zacks, and the growth rate was
8 equal to the average of the earnings growth projections for each firm published by Value
9 Line, IBES, and Zacks with each firm's dividend yield and growth rate being weighted by
10 its proportionate share of total market value. Based on the weighted average of the
11 projections for the individual firms, current estimates imply an average growth rate over the
12 next five years of 10.7 percent. Combining this average growth rate with a year-ahead
13 dividend yield of 2.5 percent results in a current cost of common equity estimate for the
14 market as a whole (R_m) of 13.2 percent. Subtracting a 3.1 percent risk-free rate based on the
15 average yield on 30-year Treasury bonds for the six months ending March 2019 produced a
16 market equity risk premium of 10.1 percent.

17 **Q. What was the source of the beta values you used to apply the CAPM?**

18 A. As I did in the development of my proxy group discussed above, I relied on
19 the beta values reported by Value Line, which in my experience is the most widely
20 referenced source for beta in regulatory proceedings.

21 **Q. What else should be considered in applying the CAPM?**

22 A. Financial research indicates that the CAPM does not fully account for
23 observed differences in rates of return attributable to firm size. Accordingly, a modification
24 is required to account for this size effect. As explained by Morningstar:

1 One of the most remarkable discoveries of modern finance is the finding of a
2 relationship between firm size and return. On average, small companies have
3 higher returns than larger ones. . . . The relationship between firm size and
4 return cuts across the entire size spectrum; it is not restricted to the smallest
5 stocks.²⁸

6 According to the CAPM, the expected return on a security should consist of the
7 riskless rate, plus a premium to compensate for the systematic risk of the particular security.
8 The degree of systematic risk is represented by the beta coefficient. The need for the size
9 adjustment arises because differences in investors' required rates of return that are related to
10 firm size are not fully captured by beta. To account for this, researchers have developed size
11 premiums that need to be added to CAPM cost of equity estimates to account for the level of
12 a firm's market capitalization in determining the CAPM cost of equity.²⁹ Accordingly, my
13 CAPM analyses incorporated an adjustment to recognize the impact of size distinctions, as
14 measured by the average market capitalization for the firms in the Utility Group.

15 **Q. Is this size adjustment related to the relative size of Avista as compared**
16 **with the proxy group?**

17 A. No. I am not proposing to apply a general size risk premium in evaluating a
18 fair and reasonable ROE for the Company and my recommendation does not include any
19 adjustment related to the relative size of Avista. Rather, this size adjustment is specific to
20 the CAPM and merely corrects for an observed inability of the beta measure to fully reflect
21 the risks perceived by investors for the firms in the proxy groups. As FERC has recognized,
22 "This type of size adjustment is a generally accepted approach to CAPM analyses."³⁰

²⁸ Morningstar, *2015 Ibbotson SBBI Classic Yearbook*, at p. 99 (footnote omitted).

²⁹ Originally compiled by Ibbotson Associates and published in their annual yearbook entitled, "Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation," these size premia are now developed by Duff & Phelps and presented in its *Valuation Handbook – Guide to Cost of Capital*.

³⁰ Opinion No. 531-B, 150 FERC ¶ 61,165 at P 117 (2015).

1 **Q. What cost of equity is indicated for the Utility Group using the CAPM**
2 **approach?**


3 A. As shown on Exh. AMM-8, after adjusting for the impact of firm size the
4 CAPM approach implied an average and midpoint cost of equity estimates of 10.2% for the
5 Utility Group.

E. Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model

6 **Q. How does the ECAPM approach differ from traditional applications of**
7 **the CAPM?**

8 A. Empirical tests of the CAPM have shown that low-beta securities earn returns
9 somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than
10 predicted. In other words, the CAPM tends to overstate the actual sensitivity of the cost
11 of capital to beta, with low-beta stocks tending to have higher returns and high-beta
12 stocks tending to have lower risk returns than predicted by the CAPM. This is illustrated
13 graphically in the figure below:

14 **FIGURE 1**
15 **CAPM – PREDICTED VS. OBSERVED RETURNS**



16 Because the betas of utility stocks, including those in the Utility Group, are generally
17 less than 1.0, this implies that cost of equity estimates based on the traditional CAPM would

1 understate the cost of equity. This empirical finding is widely reported in the finance
2 literature, as summarized in *New Regulatory Finance*:

3 As discussed in the previous section, several finance scholars have developed
4 refined and expanded versions of the standard CAPM by relaxing the
5 constraints imposed on the CAPM, such as dividend yield, size, and
6 skewness effects. These enhanced CAPMs typically produce a risk-return
7 relationship that is flatter than the CAPM prediction in keeping with the
8 actual observed risk-return relationship. The ECAPM makes use of these
9 empirical relationships.³¹

10 As discussed in *New Regulatory Finance*, based on a review of the empirical
11 evidence, the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the ECAPM, which is
12 represented by the following formula:

13
$$R_j = R_f + 0.25(R_m - R_f) + 0.75[\beta_j(R_m - R_f)]$$

14 Like the CAPM formula presented earlier, the ECAPM represents a stock's required return
15 as a function of the risk-free rate (R_f), plus a risk premium. In the formula above, this risk
16 premium is composed of two parts: (1) the market risk premium ($R_m - R_f$) weighted by a
17 factor of 25 percent, and (2) a company-specific risk premium based on the stocks relative
18 volatility [$(\beta)(R_m - R_f)$] weighted by 75 percent. This ECAPM equation, and its associated
19 weighting factors, recognizes the observed relationship between standard CAPM estimates
20 and the cost of capital documented in the financial research, and corrects for the understated
21 returns that would otherwise be produced for low beta stocks.

22 **Q. Is the use of the ECAPM consistent with the use of Value Line betas?**

23 A. Yes. Value Line beta values are adjusted for the observed tendency of beta to
24 converge toward the mean value of 1.00 over time.³² The purpose of this adjustment is to

³¹ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Util. Reports (2006) at 189.

³² See, e.g., Marshall E. Blume, *Betas and Their Regression Tendencies*, *Journal of Finance* (Jun. 1975), pp. 785-795.

1 refine beta values determined using historical data to better match forward-looking estimates
2 of beta, which are the relevant parameter in applying the CAPM or ECAPM models.
3 Meanwhile, the ECAPM does not involve any adjustment to beta whatsoever. Rather, it
4 represents a formal recognition of findings in the financial literature that the observed risk-
5 return tradeoff illustrated in Figure 1 is flatter than predicted by the CAPM. In other words,
6 even if a firm's beta value were estimated with perfect precision, the CAPM would still
7 understate the return for low-beta stocks and overstate the return for high-beta stocks. The
8 ECAPM and the use of adjusted betas represent two separate and distinct issues in
9 estimating returns.

10 **Q. Have other regulators relied on the ECAPM?**

11 A. Yes. The ECAPM approach has been relied on by the Staff of the MDPSC.
12 For example, Staff Witness Julie McKenna noted that “the ECAPM model adjusts for the
13 tendency of the CAPM model to underestimate returns for low Beta stocks,” and concluded
14 that, “I believe under current economic conditions that the ECAPM gives a more realistic
15 measure of the ROE than the CAPM model does.”³³ The staff of the Colorado commission
16 has recognized that, “The ECAPM is an empirical method that attempts to enhance the
17 CAPM analysis by flattening the risk-return relationship,”³⁴ and relied on the exact same
18 standard ECAPM equation presented above.³⁵ The Regulatory Commission of Alaska has
19 also relied on the ECAPM approach, noting that:

20 Tesoro averaged the results it obtained from CAPM and ECAPM while at the
21 same time providing empirical testimony that the ECAPM results are more
22 accurate than [sic] traditional CAPM results. The reasonable investor would

³³ *Direct Testimony and Exhibits of Julie McKenna*, Maryland PSC Case No. 9299 (Oct. 12, 2012) at 9.

³⁴ Proceeding No. 13AL-0067G, *Answer Testimony and Schedules of Scott England* (July 31, 2013) at 47.

³⁵ *Id.* at 48.

1 be aware of these empirical results. Therefore, we adjust Tesoro's
2 recommendation to reflect only the ECAPM result.³⁶

3 The Wyoming Office of Consumer Advocate, an independent division of the
4 Wyoming Public Service Commission, has also relied on this same ECAPM formula in
5 estimating the cost of equity for a natural gas utility, as have witnesses for the Office of
6 Arkansas Attorney General.³⁷ More recently, the Montana Public Service Commission
7 determined that "[t]he evidence in this proceeding has convinced the Commission that the
8 Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model ("ECAPM") should be the primary method for
9 estimating . . . the cost of equity" for a gas distribution utility under its jurisdiction.³⁸

10 **Q. What cost of equity is indicated by the ECAPM?**

11 A. My applications of the traditional ECAPM were based on the same forward-
12 looking market rate of return, risk-free rates, and beta values discussed earlier in connections
13 with the CAPM. As shown on Exh. AMM-9, applying the forward-looking ECAPM
14 approach to the firms in the Utility Group results in an average of 11.1 percent after
15 incorporating the size adjustment corresponding to the market capitalization of the
16 individual utilities.

F. Risk Premium Approach

17 **Q. Please briefly describe the risk premium method.**

18 A. The risk premium method of estimating investors' required rate of return
19 extends to common stocks the risk-return tradeoff observed with bonds. The cost of equity
20 is estimated by first determining the additional return investors require to forgo the relative
21 safety of bonds and to bear the greater risks associated with common stock, and by then

³⁶ Regulatory Commission of Alaska, Order No. P-97-004(151) (Nov. 27, 2002) at 145.

³⁷ Docket No. 30011-97-GR-17, *Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of Anthony J. Ornelas* (May 1, 2018) at 52-53; Docket No. 17-071-U, *Direct Testimony of Marlon F. Griffing, PH.D.* (May 29, 2018) at 33-35.

³⁸ Montana Public Service Commission, Docket No. D2017.9.80, Order No. 7575c (Sep. 26, 2018) at P 114.

1 adding this equity risk premium to the current yield on bonds. Like the DCF model, the risk
2 premium method is capital market oriented. However, unlike DCF models, which indirectly
3 impute the cost of equity, risk premium methods directly estimate investors' required rate of
4 return by adding an equity risk premium to observable bond yields.

5 **Q. Is the risk premium approach a widely accepted method for estimating**
6 **the cost of equity?**

7 A. Yes. The risk premium approach is based on the fundamental risk-return
8 principle that is central to finance, which holds that investors will require a premium in the
9 form of a higher return in order to assume additional risk. This method is routinely
10 referenced by the investment community and in academia and regulatory proceedings, and
11 provides an important tool in estimating a fair ROE for Avista.

12 **Q. How did you implement the risk premium method?**

13 A. I based my estimates of equity risk premiums for electric utilities on surveys
14 of previously authorized ROEs. Authorized ROEs presumably reflect regulatory
15 commissions' best estimates of the cost of equity, however determined, at the time they
16 issued their final order. Moreover, allowed ROEs are an important consideration for
17 investors and have the potential to influence other observable investment parameters,
18 including credit ratings and borrowing costs. Thus, when considered in the context of a
19 complete and rigorous analysis, this data provides a logical and frequently referenced basis
20 for estimating equity risk premiums for regulated utilities.

21 **Q. Is it circular to consider risk premiums based on authorized returns in**
22 **assessing a fair ROE for Avista?**

23 A. No. In establishing authorized ROEs, regulators typically consider the results
24 of alternative market-based approaches, including the DCF model. Because allowed risk

1 premiums consider objective market data (*e.g.*, stock prices, dividends, beta, and interest
2 rates), and are not based strictly on past actions of other regulators, this mitigates concerns
3 over any potential for circularity.

4 **Q. How did you calculate the equity risk premiums based on allowed**
5 **returns?**

6 A. The ROEs authorized for electric utilities by regulatory commissions across
7 the U.S. are compiled by S&P Global Market Intelligence and published in its *RRA*
8 *Regulatory Focus* report. On page 3 of Exh. AMM-10, the average yield on long-term
9 public utility bonds is subtracted from the average allowed rate of return on common equity
10 for electric utilities to calculate equity risk premiums for each year between 1974 and
11 2018.³⁹ Over this 45-year period, these equity risk premiums for electric utilities averaged
12 3.75 percent, and the yield on public utility bonds averaged 8.19 percent.

13 **Q. Is there any capital market relationship that must be considered when**
14 **implementing the risk premium method?**

15 A. Yes. There is considerable evidence that the magnitude of equity risk
16 premiums is not constant and that equity risk premiums tend to move inversely with interest
17 rates. In other words, when interest rate levels are relatively high, equity risk premiums
18 narrow, and when interest rates are relatively low, equity risk premiums widen. The
19 implication of this inverse relationship is that the cost of equity does not move as much as,
20 or in lockstep with, interest rates. Accordingly, for a 1 percent increase or decrease in
21 interest rates, the cost of equity may only rise or fall some fraction of 1 percent. Therefore,
22 when implementing the risk premium method, adjustments may be required to incorporate

³⁹ Yield averages reported by Moody's are for seasoned bonds with a remaining maturity of 20 years or more.

1 this inverse relationship if current interest rate levels diverge from the average interest rate
2 level represented in the data set.

3 Current bond yields are lower than those prevailing over the risk premium study
4 periods. Given that equity risk premiums move inversely with interest rates, these lower
5 bond yields also imply an increase in the equity risk premium that investors require to accept
6 the higher uncertainties associated with an investment in utility common stocks versus
7 bonds. In other words, higher required equity risk premiums offset the impact of declining
8 interest rates on the ROE.

9 **Q. Has this inverse relationship been documented in the financial research?**

10 A. Yes. There is considerable empirical evidence that when interest rates are
11 relatively high, equity risk premiums narrow, and when interest rates are relatively low,
12 equity risk premiums are greater. This inverse relationship between equity risk premiums
13 and interest rates has been widely reported in the financial literature. As summarized by
14 New Regulatory Finance:

15 Published studies by Brigham, Shome, and Vinson (1985), Harris (1986),
16 Harris and Marston (1992, 1993), Carelton, Chambers, and Lakonishok
17 (1983), Morin (2005), and McShane (2005), and others demonstrate that,
18 beginning in 1980, risk premiums varied inversely with the level of interest
19 rates – rising when rates fell and declining when rates rose.⁴⁰

20 Other regulators have also recognized that, while the cost of equity trends in the same
21 direction as interest rates, these variables do not move in lock-step.⁴¹ This relationship is
22 illustrated in the figure on page 4 of Exh. AMM-10.

⁴⁰ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Util. Reports (2006) at 128.


⁴¹ See, e.g., California Public Utilities Commission, Decision 08-05-035 (May 29, 2008); Entergy Mississippi Formula Rate Plan FRP-6, https://www.entergy-mississippi.com/userfiles/content/price/tariffs/eml_frp.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2019); *Martha Coakley et al.*, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 147 (2014).

1 **Q. What are the implications of this relationship under current capital**
 2 **market conditions?**

3 A. Current bond yields are lower than those prevailing over the risk premium
 4 study periods. Given that equity risk premiums move inversely with interest rates, these
 5 lower bond yields also imply an increase in the equity risk premium that investors require to
 6 accept the higher uncertainties associated with an investment in utility common stocks
 7 versus bonds. In other words, higher required equity risk premiums offset the impact of
 8 declining interest rates on the ROE. This relationship is illustrated in the figure below,
 9 which is based on three-year rolling averages for the utility bond yields and risk premiums
 10 shown on page 3 of Exh. AMM-10.

11
 12

**FIGURE 2
 INVERSE RELATIONSHIP**



1 **Q. What cost of equity is implied by the risk premium method using surveys**
2 **of allowed ROEs?**

3 A. Because risk premiums move inversely with interest rates and current bond
4 yields are significantly lower than the average over the study period, it is necessary to adjust
5 the average equity risk premium over the study period to reflect the impact of changes in
6 bond yields. Based on the regression output between the interest rates and equity risk
7 premiums displayed on page 4 of Exh. AMM-10, the equity risk premium for electric
8 utilities increased approximately 43 basis points for each percentage point drop in the yield
9 on average public utility bonds. As illustrated on page 1 of Exh. AMM-10, with the yield on
10 average public utility bonds for the six months ending March 2019 being 4.47 percent, this
11 implied a current equity risk premium of 5.35 percent for electric utilities. Adding this
12 equity risk premium to the yield on Baa utility bonds of 4.87 percent produces a current cost
13 of equity of 10.22 percent.

14 **Q. Do you also apply the risk premium method using forecasted bond**
15 **yields?**

16 A. Yes. As discussed earlier, widely-referenced forecasting services continue to
17 document expectations for higher interest rates over the near-term. Accordingly, in addition
18 to the use of current bond yields, I apply the risk premium based on the forecasted utility
19 bond yields developed based on projections published by Value Line, IHS Global Insight,
20 and Blue Chip.

21 **Q. What cost of equity was produced by the risk premium approach after**
22 **incorporating forecasted bond yields?**

23 A. As shown on page 2 of Exh. AMM-10, incorporating a forecasted yield for
24 2019-2020 and adjusting for changes in interest rates since the study period implied an

1 equity risk premium of 4.93 percent for electric utilities. Adding this equity risk premium to
2 the average implied yield on long-term Baa public utility bonds for 2019-2020 of 5.85
3 percent resulted in an implied cost of equity of approximately 10.78 percent.

G. Expected Earnings Approach

4 **Q. What other analyses did you conduct to estimate the cost of common**
5 **equity?**

6 A. I also evaluated the cost of common equity using the expected earnings
7 method. Reference to rates of return available from alternative investments of comparable
8 risk can provide an important benchmark in assessing the return necessary to assure
9 confidence in the financial integrity of a firm and its ability to attract capital. This expected
10 earnings approach is consistent with the economic underpinnings for a fair rate of return
11 established by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Bluefield* and *Hope*. Moreover, it avoids the
12 complexities and limitations of capital market methods and instead focuses on the returns
13 earned on book equity, which are readily available to investors.

14 **Q. What economic premise underlies the expected earnings approach?**

15 A. The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach
16 is that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity. If the
17 utility is unable to offer a return similar to that available from other opportunities of
18 comparable risk, investors will become unwilling to supply the capital on reasonable terms.
19 For existing investors, denying the utility an opportunity to earn what is available from other
20 similar risk alternatives prevents them from earning their opportunity cost of capital. Such
21 an outcome would violate the *Hope* and *Bluefield* standards and undermine the utility's
22 access to capital on reasonable terms.

1 **Q. How is the expected earnings approach typically implemented?**

2 A. The traditional comparable earnings test identifies a group of companies that
3 are believed to be comparable in risk to the utility. The actual earnings of those companies
4 on the book value of their investment are then compared to the allowed return of the utility.
5 While the traditional comparable earnings test is implemented using historical data taken
6 from the accounting records, it is also common to use projections of returns on book
7 investment, such as those published by recognized investment advisory publications (*e.g.*,
8 Value Line). Because these returns on book value equity are analogous to the allowed return
9 on a utility's rate base, this measure of opportunity costs results in a direct, "apples to
10 apples" comparison.

11 Moreover, regulators do not set the returns that investors earn in the capital markets,
12 which are a function of dividend payments and fluctuations in common stock prices, both of
13 which are outside their control. Regulators can only establish the allowed ROE, which is
14 applied to the book value of a utility's investment in rate base, as determined from its
15 accounting records. This is directly analogous to the expected earnings approach, which
16 measures the return that investors expect the utility to earn on book value. As a result, the
17 expected earnings approach provides a meaningful guide to ensure that the allowed ROE is
18 similar to what other utilities of comparable risk will earn on invested capital. This expected
19 earnings test does not require theoretical models to indirectly infer investors' perceptions
20 from stock prices or other market data. As long as the proxy companies are similar in risk,
21 their expected earned returns on invested capital provide a direct benchmark for investors'
22 opportunity costs that is independent of fluctuating stock prices, market-to-book ratios,
23 debates over DCF growth rates, or the limitations inherent in any theoretical model of
24 investor behavior.

1 **Q. What rates of return on equity are indicated for utilities based on the**
2 **expected earnings approach?**

3 A. For the firms in the Utility Group, the year-end returns on common equity
4 projected by Value Line over its forecast horizon are shown on Exh. AMM-11. As I
5 explained earlier in my discussion of the br+sv growth rates used in applying the DCF
6 model, Value Line’s returns on common equity are calculated using year-end equity
7 balances, which understates the average return earned over the year.⁴² Accordingly, these
8 year-end values were converted to average returns using the same adjustment factor
9 discussed earlier and developed on Exh. AMM-7. As shown on Exh. AMM-11, Value
10 Line’s projections for the Utility Group suggest an average ROE of approximately 10.7
11 percent, with a midpoint value of 10.6 percent.

II. NON-UTILITY BENCHMARK

12 **Q. What other proxy group did you consider in evaluating a fair ROE for**
13 **Avista?**

14 A. Consistent with underlying economic and regulatory standards, I also applied
15 the DCF model to a reference group of low-risk companies in the non-utility sectors of the
16 economy. I refer to this group as the “Non-Utility Group”.

17 **Q. Do utilities have to compete with non-regulated firms for capital?**

18 A. Yes. The cost of capital is an opportunity cost based on the returns that
19 investors could realize by putting their money in other alternatives. Clearly, the total capital
20 invested in utility stocks is only the tip of the iceberg of total common stock investment, and
21 there are a plethora of other enterprises available to investors beyond those in the utility

⁴² For example, to compute the annual return on a passbook savings account with a beginning balance of \$1,000 and an ending balance of \$5,000, the interest income would be divided by the average balance of \$3,000. Using the \$5,000 balance at the end of the year would understate the actual return.

1 industry. Utilities must compete for capital, not just against firms in their own industry, but
2 with other investment opportunities of comparable risk. Indeed, modern portfolio theory is
3 built on the assumption that rational investors will hold a diverse portfolio of stocks, not just
4 companies in a single industry.

5 **Q. Is it consistent with the *Bluefield* and *Hope* cases to consider investors’**
6 **required ROE for non-utility companies?**

7 A. Yes. The cost of equity capital in the competitive sector of the economy forms
8 the very underpinning for utility ROEs because regulation purports to serve as a substitute
9 for the actions of competitive markets. The Supreme Court has recognized that it is the
10 degree of risk, not the nature of the business, which is relevant in evaluating an allowed
11 ROE for a utility. The *Bluefield* case refers to “business undertakings attended with
12 comparable risks and uncertainties.” It does not restrict consideration to other utilities.
13 Similarly, the *Hope* case states:

14 By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with
15 returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.⁴³

16 As in the *Bluefield* decision, there is nothing to restrict “other enterprises” solely to the
17 utility industry.

18 **Q. Does consideration of the results for the Non-Utility Group make the**
19 **estimation of the cost of equity using the DCF model more reliable for Avista?**

20 A. Yes. The estimates of growth from the DCF model depend on analysts’
21 forecasts. It is possible for utility growth rates to be distorted by short-term trends in the
22 industry, or by the industry falling into favor or disfavor by analysts. Such distortions could
23 result in biased DCF estimates for utilities. Because the Non-Utility Group includes low

⁴³ *Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 391 (1944) (“*Hope*”).

1 risk companies from many industries, it helps to insulate against any possible distortion that
2 may be present in the results for a particular sector.

3 **Q. What criteria did you apply to develop the Non-Utility Group?**

4 A. The comparable risk proxy group was composed of those U.S. companies
5 followed by Value Line that:

- 6 1) pay common dividends;
- 7 2) have a Safety Rank of “1”;
- 8 3) have a Financial Strength Rating of “A” or greater;
- 9 4) have a beta of 0.75 or less; and
- 10 5) have investment grade credit ratings from S&P and Moody’s.

11 **Q. How do the overall risks of this Non-Utility Group compare with the**
12 **Utility Group and Avista?**

13 A. As illustrated in Table 4 below, the average credit ratings, Safety Rank, and
14 Financial Strength Rating for the Non-Utility Group suggest less risk than for Avista and the
15 proxy group of utilities.

16 **TABLE 4**
17 **COMPARISON OF RISK INDICATORS**

	<u>Credit Rating</u>		<u>Value Line</u>		
			<u>Safety</u>	<u>Financial</u>	
	<u>S&P</u>	<u>Moody's</u>		<u>Rank</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Non-Utility Group	A-	A3	1	A+	0.73
Utility Group	BBB+	Baa2	2	B++	0.63
Avista	BBB	Baa2	2	A	0.65

18 The companies that make up the Non-Utility Group are representative of the
19 pinnacle of corporate America. These firms, which include household names such as Coca-
20 Cola, Procter & Gamble, and Wal-Mart, have long corporate histories, well-established track
21 records, and exceedingly conservative risk profiles. Many of these companies pay dividends

1 on a par with utilities, with the average dividend yield for the group of 3 percent. Moreover,
2 because of their significance and name recognition, these companies receive intense scrutiny
3 by the investment community, which increases confidence that published growth estimates
4 are representative of the consensus expectations reflected in common stock prices.

5 **Q. What were the results of your DCF analysis for the Non-Utility Group?**

6 A. I applied the DCF model to the Non-Utility Group using analysts EPS growth
7 projections, as described earlier for the Utility Group, with the results being presented in
8 Exh. AMM-12. As summarized in Table 5, below, application of the constant growth DCF
9 model resulted in the following cost of equity estimates:

10 **TABLE 5**
11 **DCF RESULTS – NON-UTILITY GROUP**

<u>Growth Rate</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>Midpoint</u>
Value Line	10.3%	11.3%
IBES	9.9%	10.2%
Zacks	9.5%	9.7%

12 As discussed earlier, reference to the Non-Utility Group is consistent with
13 established regulatory principles. Required returns for utilities should be in line with those
14 of non-utility firms of comparable risk operating under the constraints of free competition.
15 Because the actual cost of equity is unobservable, and DCF results inherently incorporate a
16 degree of error, cost of equity estimates for the Non-Utility Group provide an important
17 benchmark in evaluating a fair and reasonable ROE. The DCF results for the Non-Utility
18 Group suggest that the 9.9 percent requested ROE for Avista's utility operations is a
19 conservative estimate of a fair return.