SEADOCS:177674. 1

1	<u>DISCUSSION</u>
2	Although the FCC held that AT&T's "specific service is a telecommunications
3	service as defined by the Act" and subject to access charges under its rules, the FCC left all the
4	doors open to a completely different approach in near future. For example, the FCC noted that
5	its order, "in no way precludes the Commission from adopting a fundamentally different
6	approach when it resolves the IP services rulemaking, or when it resolves the Intercarrier
7	Compensation proceeding." $Id_{\underline{.}}$, ¶ 10 (emphasis added). Thus, not only was the <u>AT&T Order</u>
8	narrowly limited to the "specific" AT&T service under review, the FCC stated that its ruling
9	even on that specific service was open to revision in two other pending dockets.
10	The FCC repeatedly emphasized the interim, temporary, nature of its holding in
11	the <u>AT&T Order</u> . For example:
12	[The FCC] has commenced a comprehensive rulemaking proceeding to address IP
13	services generally. [footnote omitted] That proceeding will entail an analysis of
14	the regulatory characterization of a variety of IP services, including VoIP, and the applicability of access charges to those services. The decision we make in this
15	order with regard to AT&T's specific service is meant to provide clarity to the industry with respect to the application of interstate access charges pending the
16	outcome of the rulemaking proceeding.
17	Id., ¶ 10 (emphasis added). While the FCC may have claimed it was bringing "regulatory
18	certainty" to the field, such certainty as there is is transitory, at best.
19	The obvious overhang to this case is the threat of FCC preemption. The broader
20	this Commission's decision, the greater is the exposure to federal preemption. The FCC recently
21	reaffirmed its intent to preempt state regulation of the Internet.
22	While many states have not acted to produce an outright conflict between federal
23	and state law that justifies Commission preemption, today's Order confirms that the Commission possess significant authority to act in this area if a conflict of law
24	should occur.
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26	³ <u>AT&T Order</u> , ¶ 12 (emphasis added).
	ANSWER OF BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION OF WASHINGTON - 2

1	In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither
2	Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, WC Docket No. 03-45 (Feb. 19, 2004)
3	("Pulver Order"), Statement of Michael Powell; see also, id., ¶ 18. Indeed, the Pulver Order is
4	somewhat remarkable for its extensive discussion of the FCC's preemption powers and its long
5	history of broad preemption of state regulation of the Internet. <i>Id.</i> ¶¶ 15-25
6	Nothing in the AT&T Order detracts from the FCC's preemption of state
7	regulation of the Internet. Indeed, the FCC effectively reaffirmed its decision in the <u>Pulver</u>
8	Order and its intention to continue to develop the law regarding voice communications over the
9	Internet. See AT&T Order, ¶ 10. Based on not only long-standing precedent, but also the
10	caveats in very recent <u>Pulver Order</u> and <u>AT&T Order</u> , this Commission should expect the FCC
11	to be very expansive in its preemption of any and all state regulation of Internet-based services.
12	Thus, simply because the FCC declared a specific service to be subject to interstate access
13	charges (albeit temporarily), that does not mean the FCC would permit states to assess access
14	charges on an allegedly similar service that a state might view as "intrastate."
15	The problem a state faces in attempting to assert jurisdiction over Internet-based
16	services that are perceived to be "intrastate" is that it begs the question of what is "intrastate" or,
17	more importantly, what is not "interstate." It is the FCC, not this Commission, that will
18	ultimately determine the scope of the interstate jurisdiction. The FCC has unmistakably signaled
19	its intention to preempt state regulation of the Internet, perhaps to the full extent constitutionally
20	permitted by the Commerce Clause. See Pulver Order, ¶¶ 23-25. Accordingly, the best way for
21	this Commission to avoid preemptionor at least minimize the potential for arguments that its
22	orders are preemptedis to avoid any appearance that it is regulating the Internet. See, e.g.,
23	Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. PUC, 290 F. Supp. 2 nd 993 (2003). In particular, the
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	Commission should rejected WECA's invitation for the Commission to extend its ruling in this
	case to the very recent, and relatively minor, aspect of LocalDial's service that uses the Internet. ⁴
	WECA argues that it would be more efficient to deal with LocalDial's new,
	Internet-based service, even though it did not exist at the time of the Federal court's referral. In
	reality, the opposite is likely to be true. Because of the continuing uncertainty regarding
	Federal/state jurisdiction, the more expansive order WECA seeks is likel to lead to litigation over
	the jurisdictional questions. Even at best, following WECA's recommendation to broaden the
	issues referred by the court could lead to an order that is irrelevant or preempted later this year or
)	early next year.
)	<u>CONCLUSION</u>
	The Commission certainly could, but need not, enter an order regarding voice
	over Internet. However, the more prudent and efficient approach is to follow the FCC's lead in
	the AT&T Order. As did the FCC, the Commission should limit its order to the "specific
	service" that was before the U.S. District Court when it referred the LocalDial case to this
	Commission. That service did not use the Internet.
	DATED this 3 rd day of May, 2004.
	MILLER NASH LLP
)	Brooks E. Harlow
)	WSB No. 11843 Fax: (206) 622-7485
	brooks.harlow@millernash.com
	Attorneys for Intervenor Broadband Communications Association
	of Washington

SEADOCS:177674. 1