

**BEFORE THE WASHINGTON STATE
UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION**

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,)	
)	DOCKET NO.: UE-100467
)	DOCKET NO. UG-100468
Complainant,)	(consolidated)
)	
v.)	ANSWER OF AVISTA CORPORATION
)	TO PUBLIC COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR
AVISTA CORPORATION, d/b/a AVISTA UTILITIES,)	PAYMENT OF EXPERT WITNESS
)	COSTS
)	
Respondent.)	
)	

1. COMES NOW, Avista Corporation (hereinafter “Avista” or “the Company”), by and through its undersigned attorneys, and respectfully submits this Answer to Public Counsel’s “Motion for Payment of Expert Witness Costs,” filed with this Commission on May 6, 2010.

I. INTRODUCTION

2. In its Motion, Public Counsel requests an Order directing Avista to pay up to \$150,000 for Public Counsel’s expert witness costs in this case. (Motion at ¶1) There is no statutory support for such a request (Public Counsel’s reliance on RCW 80.20.020 is entirely misplaced) and Public Counsel has asked this Commission to supplant the judgment of the Washington State Legislature and the Fiscal Office of the Attorney General’s Office with respect to the appropriation of funds to run the Office of Public Counsel. Moreover, Public Counsel utterly fails to explain why it has already “exhausted” its entire budget for expert witnesses for the two year biennium, as established by the Office of the Attorney General and the Legislature. The Motion, if granted, would represent a special assessment outside the purview of the Legislature where budgeting policy decisions are appropriately initiated. Nor is it incumbent upon any regulated public service company, or its customers, to make up for either any shortfall in budget

appropriations or the “exhaustion” of such funding by the Office of Public Counsel, prior to the end of its budgeting cycle.

II. PUBLIC COUNSEL’S REFERENCES TO RCW 80.20.020 ARE UNAVAILING, AS SUPPORT FOR ITS MOTION

3. Public Counsel primarily relies on RCW 80.20.020 for the proposition that the Commission may order a utility to pay expenses not covered by the existing regulatory fee. (Motion at ¶5) RCW 80.20.020 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

Cost of Investigation May Be Assessed Against Company.

4. Whenever the commission in any proceeding upon its own motion or upon complaint shall deem it necessary in order to carry out the duties imposed upon it by law to investigate the books, accounts, practices and activities of, or make any valuation or appraisal of the property of any public service company, or to investigate or appraise any phase of its operations, or to render any engineering or accounting service to or in connection with any public service company, and the cost thereof to the commission exceeds in amount the ordinary regulatory fees paid by such public service company during the preceding calendar year or estimated to be paid during the current year, whichever is more, such public service company shall pay the expenses reasonably attributable and allocable to such investigation, valuation, appraisal or services. The commission shall ascertain such expenses, and, after giving notice and an opportunity to be heard, shall render a bill therefor by registered mail to the public service company, either at the conclusion of the investigation, valuation, appraisal or services, or from time to time during its progress. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

5. What is noteworthy about this statute, is that it only references the “cost thereof to the Commission” in order for it “to carry out the duties imposed upon it by law to investigate the books, accounts, practices and activities” of the public service company. (Emphasis added) (Id.) Simply put, if the regular assessments otherwise provided for under RCW Chapter 80.24 do not otherwise cover the costs of the Commission’s own investigation, RCW 80.20.020 only allows the Commission to charge any such additional costs of the Commission’s activities, in that regard, to the particular regulated utility being investigated. Moreover, Public Counsel

completely fails to demonstrate that the “ordinary regulatory fees” referenced in RCW 80.20.020 that were actually collected under RCW Chapter 80.24 from Avista are otherwise insufficient so as to even allow the Commission to invoke RCW 80.20.020 in the first place.

6. Nowhere within the confines of RCW 80.20.020 is there a reference to costs incurred by other parties, including Public Counsel.¹ If Public Counsel could invoke this statute, arguably so could any other intervenor. This would clearly run afoul of the provisions of RCW 80.20.020 that make clear reference only to the “costs thereof to the Commission.” (Emphasis added) No reasonable construction or interpretation of this statute would support the claims of Public Counsel. Indeed, if it were otherwise, the legislation, on its face, would have so provided.

7. Further guidance as to the appropriate interpretation of the predecessor statute to RCW 80.20.020 [See, 1939 c203 §2(a); RRS §10458 - 6a(a)] was provided by the court in State v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 27 Wn.2d 893, 181 P.2d 637 (1947), which determined that the statute was meant only to cover the expenses “of the department of public service” in its investigation, and not to cover the legal fees and other expenses of the attorney general’s office:

It is quite apparent that the legislature meant to require the public utility to pay the expenses of the *department of public service* in its investigation, valuation, appraisal or services. The department has complete jurisdiction of its investigations. It hires its investigators, conducts hearings, and, finally, makes its determination concerning the inquiry. The attorney general of the state has no authority or supervision over the department’s proceedings whatsoever. (italics in original)

27 Wa. 2d at 897. The court went on to conclude:

The statute is clear and specific. It states which expenses the department can require the public utility to pay. The judicial proceedings in the courts of this state are entirely distinct and separate from the investigations, valuations, appraisals or services of the department of public service. In the event the legislature had intended that legal fees and other expenses of the attorney general’s office should be paid by a utility under investigation by the department, then the legislature would

¹ Indeed, RCW 80.20.020 was enacted in 1961, before the establishment of the Office of Public Counsel in 1983.

have so stated. Not having done so, such expenses cannot be recovered from the utility.

(Id. at 898.) Moreover, the court concluded that the statute was a “taxing” statute, and was to be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the corporation; where reasonable doubt existed as to the meaning of the statute, doubt was to be resolved in favor of the corporation.

(Id. at 896-97)

8. Nor will it suffice to argue, as does Public Counsel, that RCW 80.01.100 and 80.04.510 provide the necessary statutory authority for funding. (See Motion at ¶6) While it may be the “duty” of the Attorney General to represent and appear for the people of the State of Washington, this says nothing about whether the affected utility and its customers have a duty to step in and provide funding when Public Counsel overspends the budget for witness fees established by the Fiscal Office of the Attorney General.

9. Furthermore, Public Counsel’s reference to the case of POWER v. Washington Water Power Co., 99 Wn.2d 289, 662 P.2d 374 (1983) (hereinafter “POWER”), is misplaced. Indeed, Public Counsel acknowledges that “the case was decided before the formal establishment of Public Counsel as a unit within the Attorney General’s Office.” (See Motion at p.4, fn.8). The Office of Public Counsel was established in 1983 by the then-Attorney General Ken Eikenberry, who pursued legislation to establish and fund an Office of Public Counsel within the Attorney General’s Office. The Office of Public Counsel has operated since that time based on a budget established by the Fiscal Office of the Attorney General’s Office that specifically “includes a separate identification of the funds to be available for expert witness costs.” (Declaration of

ffitch at ¶4) As further noted in the Declaration of Simon J. ffitch at ¶4, this budget is “established on a biennial basis by the Fiscal Office at the Attorney General’s Office.”²

10. Public Counsel’s Motion (at ¶14) provides an excerpt from POWER, supra, which discusses the authority of the Special Assistant Attorney General to hire experts. (See POWER, 99 Wn.2d at 294-95.) The majority of the Court, in POWER, however, reaffirmed the adequacy of public representation in the case before it by the then-Special Assistant Attorney General (forerunner to Public Counsel), even though he did not actually hire any expert witnesses. (Id. at 291, 295) Only the dissent in POWER would have found that the Special Assistant Attorney General did not adequately represent the public, because of the absence of funding to hire experts. (Id. at 299-301) Even the concerns of the dissent in POWER, supra, over the funding of expert witnesses have been sufficiently addressed by the very funding structure that was subsequently created after the court’s ruling – i.e., the structure that exists today whereby the Public Service Revolving Fund (PSRF) serves as the source of funding for the Office of Public Counsel based on a biennial budget established by the Fiscal Office of the Attorney General’s Office that specifically earmarks funds to hire expert witnesses. (See Declaration at ¶¶ 3-4) The fact that Public Counsel overspent its allotment by the Attorney General does not mean that, ipso facto, insufficient funds were available to hire expert witnesses, even under the dissent’s reasoning in POWER. (Note: The majority’s opinion in POWER, supra, was subsequently reaffirmed on reconsideration. (See 102 Wn.2d 260, 684 P.2d 716 (1984))

11. Public Counsel was fully aware of its expert witness budget; after all it was established by his own employing agency (the Attorney General’s Office), as affirmed by Mr. ffitch. (Declaration paragraph 4) . Essentially, Public Counsel is asking this Commission to circumvent the budgeting process established within Public Counsel’s own agency (Office of Attorney

² He further explained that Public Counsel’s “divisional budget for the current biennium is \$1,919,733.” (Id.)

General) when the Attorney General, itself, did not even seek supplemental appropriations for expert fees to remedy the situation, as discussed infra.

12. What is interesting to note is that Public Counsel's expert witness budget established by the Attorney General's Office for the current 2009-2011 biennium was \$400,000, as acknowledged by Mr. ffitch. (Declaration at ¶5) Public Counsel observes that this budgeted amount for the biennium was approximately 22% less than that which was appropriated for the 2007-2009 biennium. (Id.) This, in itself, is revealing. First of all, it is clear, as acknowledged by Public Counsel (Declaration at ¶3), that its budget is based on "a legislative appropriation that is part of the overall budget of the Attorney General's Office." (Emphasis added) This appropriation incorporated a budget of \$400,000 for the 2009-2011 biennium for expert witnesses. It is initially the Legislature and then the Office of the Attorney General, not this Commission, that must make tough policy decisions with respect to the allocation of funds for expert witnesses through the budget process. It is not the province of this Commission to upset the balancing of interests established by the Legislature, through the budgeting and appropriations process for the Attorney General.

13. It is remarkable that Public Counsel has already "exhausted" its entire budget for expert witnesses only midway through the 2009-2011 biennium. (See Declaration at ¶7) (See also, Motion at p.9) Nowhere does Public Counsel attempt to explain whether it even sought a supplemental appropriation for the 2009-2011 Biennium from the Legislature for purposes of hiring expert witnesses, if it had "exhausted" its funds. Attached to this Answer is a copy of the Attorney General's "2009-11 Revised Omnibus Operating Budget (2010 Supp)" submitted to the Ways and Means Committee in April 2010. While this supplemental appropriations request references many discrete items, nowhere does it request an increase in appropriations for Public

Counsel expert fees. Simply put, the Attorney General's Office could have, but did not, request a supplemental appropriation for witness costs.³

14. Interestingly enough, Public Counsel, in its Motion at ¶5, freely acknowledges that this budget “was intended to cover all electricity, gas and telecommunications matters before the Commission in which Public Counsel might participate” for the biennium. (Motion at ¶11) Public Counsel then asserts that “approximately \$40,000 of the Public Counsel’s biennial expert witness budget “can be attributed to Avista’s regulatory fee payments,” based on Avista’s proportionate share (10.39%) of regulatory fees paid. (Id.) Why then did Public Counsel spend \$173,303 in a single consolidated proceeding for Avista in Dkt. No(s). UE-090134/UG-090135/UE-060518 (decoupling)? (See Declaration at ¶6)

15. Notwithstanding a biennial budget of \$400,000 for expert witness in all proceedings, Public Counsel’s expert witness fees for Avista’s prior rate case alone were \$173,300, of which \$106,117 was paid in the current biennium. (Motion at ¶12) This represents a substantial portion of Public Counsel’s entire budget for the two year biennium for all companies. While perhaps regrettable that Public Counsel has exhausted its budget for expert witnesses, the question of how it budgets its allocated resources over a two year biennium is a matter of proper administration of funding within the Office of the Attorney General – it is not a matter for this Commission to rectify, nor for Avista and its ratepayers to remedy.

16. Nowhere does Public Counsel explain what efforts it made to allocate its budgeted resources for expert witnesses throughout the 2009-2011 biennium, even though it was well aware that funding in that regard had been cut by nearly 22%. Instead, it would appear that Public Counsel has simply overspent its allotment established by the Office of the Attorney

³ Also note that the Office of the Attorney General’s original “2009-2011 Budget Proposal” at page 99 (posted on its website at www.atg.wa.gov/) requested an additional \$360,000 for the biennium to add an additional Assistant Attorney General to its staff, but made no request for additional funding of expert costs at the time.

General from funds originating from a Legislative appropriation from the Public Service Revolving Fund. Were the Commission to grant Public Counsel's Motion, it would mean that Public Counsel could seek additional funding for expert witness fees from every other public service company (gas/electric/telecommunications/water) for any adjudicated matter for the remainder of the 2009-2011 biennium. By granting Public Counsel's Motion, the Commission would establish a precedent that places the Commission in a position of having to exercise broad discretion in individual circumstances without statutory authority or necessary legislative guidance. In addition, by granting Public Counsel's Motion, the Commission would supplant the budgeting authority and process of the Office of the Attorney General, an independent Constitutionally-chartered office under Article III, Section 21, with respect to the administration of its own Office of Public Counsel. Simply stated, Public Counsel's Motion asks the Commission to substitute its judgment for Public Counsel's employing agency.

17. Public Counsel advances a proposition under which Avista would make a payment to the Commission for "deposit in the PSRF for the use of Public Counsel as costs are incurred." (Motion at ¶20.) Public Counsel's Motion fails, however, to explain how funds could be deposited into the PSRF and subsequently withdrawn by the Commission without Legislative appropriation. Public Counsel may confuse the function of the PSRF with the Legal Services Revolving Fund (LSRF), which provides for ". . . a centralized funding, accounting, and distribution of the actual costs of the legal services provided to agencies of the state government by the attorney general." (See RCW 43.10.150) The LSRF is a funding mechanism for the Office of the Attorney General, appropriations from which are governed in the first instance by the Legislature. Agency clients of the Attorney General pay into the LSRF such amounts as necessary to reimburse the Attorney General for legal services billed to the agency. The Attorney

General is then permitted under RCW 42.10.170 to receive disbursements from the LSRF through a voucher mechanism involving the Office of Financial Management. RCW 43.10.190 provides an exception to the customary process for transferring funds through the LSRF to the Office of the Attorney General. It authorizes the Attorney General to request direct payment from agency clients “. . . where there are unanticipated demands for legal services or where there are insufficient funds on hand or available for payment through the legal services revolving fund or in other cases of necessity . . .” The referenced legal services are those provided by the Assistant Attorneys General to the Commission as the client. The Commission is not the client of Public Counsel.

18. In contrast, the Commission is authorized only to deposit into the Public Service Revolving Fund regulatory fees paid by public service companies pursuant to Chapter 80.24 RCW. The Commission has no extra-ordinary authority comparable to the Attorney General to seek disbursement from the PSRF once the Legislature has appropriated a specific amount of funds from that account for Commission operations. Public Counsel is proposing an inappropriate assessment and reimbursement mechanism that circumvents the Legislative process.

III. PUBLIC COUNSEL CAN EFFECTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THIS PROCEEDING, WITHOUT AN ADDITIONAL SURCHARGE TO FUND ITS EXPERTS

19. Beginning at paragraph 13 of its Motion, Public Counsel asserts that it “cannot meaningfully participate in this case without expert witness funding.” It asserts that it does not have the staff necessary to thoroughly review and analyze the Company’s general rate case filing. Public Counsel states that its full staffing level consists of 4.3 legal and analyst personnel (two full-time attorneys, one full-time analyst, one 0.7 analyst, and one 0.6 analyst). (Declaration at ¶9.) Again, how Public Counsel chooses to organize itself and deploy resources, is not a

question for this Commission. It has been allotted resources by the Office of the Attorney General to hire expert witnesses, in addition to funding its permanent staffing, but it has simply overspent its allotment.

20. Public Counsel, nevertheless, goes on to argue that, given the issues in Avista's pending rate case, it is in need of additional expert testimony. (Motion at ¶17) In particular, Public Counsel cites five discreet areas in which it would intend to devote its efforts: First of all, with reference to Avista's Lancaster Purchase Power Agreement (PPA), it is noteworthy that Public Counsel sponsored expert witness testimony (Mr. Woodruff) in Avista's last rate case and undertook extensive discovery in that regard, offering substantial materials into the record. Avista, at the pre-hearing conference in the pending case, stated that it would accommodate Public Counsel's funding concerns in this case, by stipulating into the record the entirety of Public Counsel's case on the Lancaster issue in the last proceeding, thereby avoiding the need for Public Counsel to engage an expert to recreate discovery or reargue positions.

21. Secondly, with reference to the Company's Demand Side Management (DSM) programs, Mary Kimball, an analyst with Public Counsel, is already well-versed in this area and has participated extensively in reviewing Avista's DSM efforts and programs and has previously sponsored testimony in that regard. (There has been no demonstration that additional outside expert testimony is needed.) Thirdly, the same holds true with reference to "decoupling," and its impact on non-residential customers. Here again, there has been no demonstration that Public Counsel's own resources cannot address these matters, especially given the Office's extensive involvement with the recently-litigated decoupling proposal of Avista. Fourthly, with reference to Avista's incentive compensation program, there are opportunities for Public Counsel to coordinate with Staff and other parties in the development of positions in that regard. (In fact,

Public Counsel has not described in its Motion any efforts it has made to coordinate with other parties on the issues.) Finally, the remaining issue identified by Public Counsel, i.e., the impact of decoupling on Avista's return on equity is a discreet issue that can be addressed, if at all, through Public Counsel's existing resources and through discovery and argument.

22. Simply put, Public Counsel's concerns can either be addressed through the incorporation of the prior record into this case (i.e., with respect to Lancaster) or through the use of its existing resources already on its staff, or through the coordination with other parties and the joint presentation of witnesses, where interests align. Moreover, the issues of interest identified by Public Counsel will also be examined by the Commission's own Staff, which is also charged with representing the interests of all customers, including residential and limited-income customers. Even if the law allowed the Commission to surcharge Avista's ratepayers for Public Counsel's experts – which it does not – Public Counsel has made no effort in its Motion to identify, with particularity, the costs it would incur in pursuing issues of interest. It simply asks for up to \$150,000 of funding.⁴

23. It should be recognized, at the outset, that Avista has recently completed a general rate case in which nearly all of the recurring issues have been subject to extensive discovery. Moreover, much discovery has already taken place in this case. Indeed, Public Counsel, for its part, has already tendered over 100 data requests to the Company, and is the recipient of copies of the Company's response to a like number of other data requests served by Staff and intervenors. As such, Public Counsel is already actively engaged in discovery. It would promote administrative efficiency and the efficient use of resources to explore early settlement of some or all issues in this proceeding. For its part, Avista is committed to engage in "good faith"

⁴ By way of context, Avista, itself, has retained one outside expert thusfar in this proceeding to present testimony: Dr. Avera has charged Avista \$12,292 (WA share) for the preparation of his entire cost of capital testimony.

substantive settlement discussions in order to seek early resolution of the issues, and avoid the additional expense of expert testimony by the parties.

IV. CONCLUSION

24. In summary: (1) Public Counsel knew what its biennial budget was, as it was established, presumably with its own involvement, by his own employing agency; (2) Public Counsel had the discretion to spend the budget as he thought appropriate; (3) Public Counsel exhausted his own budget, presumably with full knowledge that he was doing so; (4) Public Counsel is now asking the Commission to intervene between him and his employing agency (Office of the Attorney General) to get more funding (without presenting any evidence that he has asked for and failed to obtain more funding from the Office of the Attorney General); and (5) the Office of the Attorney General has previously demonstrated its ability and willingness to seek supplemental funding outside of the current process where appropriate, when it went to the Legislature asking for additional general fund monies to pay for certain out-of-budget items - a precedent that could have also been followed this year to fund additional experts, but wasn't. Public Counsel has simply overspent its funds for the Biennium.

25. Public Counsel has not demonstrated that the law would permit the Commission to direct Avista and its ratepayers to additionally contribute to the cost of expert witness funding. Moreover, as Public Counsel acknowledges, its budget is ultimately based on a "legislative appropriation." (Declaration at ¶3) As with all budget appropriations, the Legislature deals with matters of policy as it allocates scarce funds. That determination should not be disturbed by this Commission. The fact remains that Public Counsel has already "exhausted" or overspent the entirety of the budget for the 2009-2011 biennium for expert witnesses. That is a matter for the Office of the Attorney General to address, not this Commission.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of May, 2010.



David J. Meyer, Vice President and Chief Counsel
for Regulatory and Governmental Affairs

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2009-11 Revised Omnibus Operating Budget (2010 Supp)

Office of the Attorney General

(Dollars in Thousands)

	Senate Floor Passed		House Floor Passed		Passed Legislature	
	Near GF-S	Total	Near GF-S	Total	Near GF-S	Total
2009-11 Original Appropriations	10,899	241,878	10,899	241,878	10,899	241,878
2009-11 Maintenance Level	11,693	246,113	11,693	246,113	11,693	246,113
2010 Policy Non-Comp Changes:						
1. Legal Services to State Agencies	0	-1,476	0	-5,583	0	-2,503
2. Sunshine Committee - Eliminate	0	0	-24	-24	0	0
3. Admin Legal Services Reductions	0	0	-174	-174	-174	-174
4. Sunshine Committee	0	0	0	0	-11	-11
5. Water Right Permits	0	0	0	382	0	0
6. Farm Internship Pilot Project #	0	0	0	0	0	21
7. School Civil Rights Compliance #	0	0	0	0	0	53
8. Small Business Compliance #	0	0	0	0	0	96
9. Greenhouse Gas Emissions #	0	0	0	0	0	21
10. Teck Cominco Litigation Costs	0	0	0	0	0	66
11. Reduced Legal Services to DSHS	0	0	0	0	0	-2,500
12. Language Access Providers #	0	0	0	0	0	131
13. Temporary Layoffs	-254	-254	0	0	0	0
Policy -- Non-Comp Total	-254	-1,730	-198	-5,399	-185	-4,800
2010 Policy Comp Changes:						
14. Health Insurance Increase	0	0	0	0	92	1,347
15. Temporary Layoffs	0	0	0	0	-20	-714
Policy -- Comp Total	0	0	0	0	72	633
Total Policy Changes	-254	-1,730	-198	-5,399	-113	-4,167
2009-11 Revised Appropriations	11,439	244,383	11,495	240,714	11,580	241,946
Difference from Original Appropriations	540	2,505	596	-1,164	681	68
% Change from Original Appropriations	5.0%	1.0%	5.5%	-0.5%	6.3%	0.0%

Comments:

1. **Legal Services to State Agencies** - For the remainder of the 2009-11 Biennium, the Attorney General's Office will work closely with client agencies to reduce the overall cost and usage of legal services. (Legal Services Revolving Account-State)

3. **Admin Legal Services Reductions** - Administrative costs are reduced for Criminal Division litigation functions, Consumer Protection Division functions, and Homicide Investigation Tracking Unit functions.

4. **Sunshine Committee** - Funding for the Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee (Sunshine Committee) is eliminated for Fiscal Year 2011. The Committee reviews all exemptions to the Public Disclosure Act on an annual basis and makes recommendations to repeal or amend exemptions to the Public Records Act.

6. **Farm Internship Pilot Project #** - One-time funding is provided for the legal costs associated with the farm internship pilot project under Substitute Senate Bill 6349. (Legal Services Revolving Fund)

7. **School Civil Rights Compliance #** - Funding is provided for the legal costs associated with the implementation of Second Substitute House Bill 3026 (school district compliance with civil rights statutes). (Legal Services Revolving Fund)

* Near General Fund-State = GF-S + ELT

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8. Small Business Compliance # - Funding is provided for the legal costs associated with implementing Second Substitute House Bill 2603 (small business regulatory compliance). (Legal Services Revolving Fund)

9. Greenhouse Gas Emissions # - Funding is provided for the legal costs associated with implementation of Substitute Senate Bill 6373 (greenhouse gas emissions). (Legal Services Revolving Fund)

10. Teck Cominco Litigation Costs - One-time funding is provided for legal services associated with the Pakootas et al. v. Teck Cominco, Ltd., case concerning a toxic cleanup site on the Upper Columbia River. The Department of Ecology and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation are co-plaintiffs in this litigation, which addresses the liability, under federal cleanup law, of a smelter complex located in British Columbia, Canada. (Legal Services Revolving Fund)

11. Reduced Legal Services to DSHS - Funding from the Legal Services Revolving Fund for legal services to the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) is reduced to reflect reduced General Fund--State appropriations to DSHS.

12. Language Access Providers # - Funding is provided for legal services related to Chapter 296, Laws of 2010 (ESSB 6726, collective bargaining for language access providers). (Legal Services Revolving Fund)

14. Health Insurance Increase - Funding is provided for an increase in the monthly employer contribution for state employee health benefits funding rate for FY 2011 from \$768 to \$850. (General Fund-State, various other funds)

15. Temporary Layoffs - Agency appropriations are reduced consistent with Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6503, as amended (closing state agencies on specified dates) due to the closure of state agencies and higher education institutions, or approved alternative compensation reduction plans. (General Fund-State, various other funds)

* Near General Fund-State = GF-S + ELT