

# The Shrinking Equity Premium

*Historical facts and future forecasts.*

Jeremy J. Siegel

Few conundrums have caught the imagination of economists and practitioners as much as the “Equity Premium Puzzle,” the title chosen by Rajneesh Mehra and Edward Prescott for their seminal 1985 article in the *Journal of Monetary Economics*. Mehra and Prescott show that the historical return on stocks has been too high in relation to the return on risk-free assets to be explained by the standard economic models of risk and return without invoking unreasonably high levels of risk aversion.<sup>1</sup> They calculate the margin by which stocks outperformed safe assets — the *equity premium* — to be in excess of 6 percentage points per year, and claim that the profession is at a loss to explain its magnitude.

There have been many attempts since to explain the size of the equity premium by variations of the standard finance model. I shall not enumerate them here, but refer readers to reviews by Abel [1991], Kocherlakota [1996], Cochrane [1997], and Siegel and Thaler [1997].

I review here the estimates of the equity premium derived from historical data, and offer some reasons why I believe that most of the historical data underestimate the real return on fixed-income assets and overestimate the expected return on equities. I shall also offer some reasons why, given the current high level of the stock market relative to corporate earnings, the forward-looking equity premium may be considerably lower than the historical average.

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## REAL RETURNS ON “RISK-FREE” ASSETS

From 1889 through 1978, Mehra and Prescott estimate the real return on short-dated fixed-income

assets (commercial paper until 1920 and Treasury bills thereafter) to have been 0.8%. In 1976 and again in 1982, Roger Ibbotson and Rex Sinquefeld formally estimated the real risk-free rate to be even lower — at zero, based on historical data analyzed from 1926. This extremely low level of the short-term real rate is by itself puzzling, and has been termed the “real rate puzzle” by Weil [1989]. The essence of this puzzle is that, given the historical growth of per capita income, it is surprising that the demand to borrow against tomorrow’s higher consumption has not resulted in higher borrowing rates.

The low measured level of the risk-free rate may in fact be in part an artifact of the time period examined. There is abundant evidence that the real rate both during the nineteenth century and after 1982 has been substantially higher. Exhibit 1, based on Siegel [1998], indicates that over the entire period from 1802 through 1998, the real compound annual return on Treasury bills (or equivalent safe assets) has been 2.9%, while the realized return on long-term government bonds has been 3.5%. Exhibit 2 presents the historical equity premium

**EXHIBIT 1**  
**COMPOUND ANNUAL REAL RETURNS (%)**  
**U.S. DATA, 1802-1998**

	Stocks	Bonds	Bills	Gold	Inflation
1802-1998	7.0	3.5	2.9	-0.1	1.3
1802-1870	7.0	4.8	5.1	0.2	0.1
1871-1925	6.6	3.7	3.2	-0.8	0.6
1926-1998	7.4	2.2	0.7	0.2	3.1
1946-1998	7.8	1.3	0.6	-0.7	4.2

Source: Siegel [1998] updated.

for selected time periods for both bonds and bills based on the same data.<sup>2</sup>

The danger of using historical averages — even over long periods — to make forecasts is readily illustrated by noting Ibbotson and Sinquefeld’s long-term predictions made in 1976 and again in 1982 on the basis of their own analysis of the historical data. In 1976, they made predictions for the twenty-five-year period from

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**EXHIBIT 2**  
**EQUITY PREMIUMS (%) — U.S. DATA, 1802-1998**

	Equity Premium with Bonds		Equity Premium with Bills	
	Geometric	Arithmetic	Geometric	Arithmetic
1802-1998	3.5	4.7	5.1	5.5
1802-1870	2.2	3.2	1.9	2.9
1871-1925	2.9	4.0	3.4	4.6
1926-1998	5.2	6.7	6.7	8.6
1946-1998	6.5	7.3	7.2	8.6

Source: Siegel [1998] updated.

1976 through 2000, and in 1982 they made predictions for the twenty-year period from 1982 through 2001. Their forecasts are shown in Exhibit 3. Since we now have data for most of these forecast periods, it is of interest to assess their estimates.

The last two decades have been extremely good for financial assets, so it is not surprising that Ibbotson and Sinquefeld underestimate all their real returns. But their most serious underestimation is for fixed-income assets, where they forecast the real bill rate to average essentially zero and the real return on bonds to be less than 2%. Given the standard deviation of estimates, realized annual real bond and bill returns have been 9.9% and 2.9%, respectively, significantly above their estimates. Since negative real returns on fixed-income assets persisted between the two surveys, Ibbotson and Sinquefeld more seriously underestimate long-term real bill rates in their 1982 forecasts than they did in 1976.<sup>3</sup>

My purpose here is not to highlight errors in Ibbotson's and Sinquefeld's past forecasts. Their analysis was state-of-the-art, and their data have rightly

**EXHIBIT 3**  
**LONG-TERM FORECASTS OF REAL RETURNS —**  
**COMPOUND ANNUAL RATES OF RETURN**

Forecast Period		Stocks	Bonds	Bills	Inflation
1976-2000	Forecast	6.3 (23.5)	1.5 (8.0)	0.4 (4.6)	6.4 (4.8)
	Actual*	11.0	5.3	2.1	4.8
1982-2001	Forecast	7.6 (21.9)	1.8 (8.3)	0.0 (4.4)	12.8 (5.1)
	Actual*	14.6	9.9	2.9	3.3

\*Data through 1998.  
 Standard deviations of annual returns in parentheses.  
 Source: Ibbotson and Sinquefeld [1976, 1982].

formed the benchmark for the risk and return estimates used by both professional and academic economists. I bring these forecasts to light to show that even the fifty-year history of financial returns available to economists at that time was insufficient to estimate future real fixed-income returns.

It is not well understood why the real rate of returns on fixed-income assets was so low during the 1926-1980 period. The bursts of unanticipated inflation following the end of World War II and during the 1970s certainly had a negative effect on the realized real returns from long-term bonds. Perhaps the shift from a gold standard to a paper monetary standard had a negative effect on these real returns until investors fully adjusted to the inflationary bias inherent in the new monetary standard.<sup>4</sup>

Whatever the reasons, the current yields on the Treasury inflation-protected securities, or TIPS, first issued in 1997 support the assertion that the future real returns on risk-free assets will be substantially above the level estimated over the Ibbotson-Sinquefeld period. This is so even when the estimating period includes the higher real rates of the past two decades. In August 1999, the ten- and thirty-year TIPS bond yielded 4.0%, nearly twice the realized rate of return on long-dated government bonds over the past seventy-five years.<sup>5</sup>

The market projects real returns on risk-free assets to be substantially higher in the future than they have been over most of this century. It is also likely that the expected returns in the past are substantially greater than they have turned out ex post, especially for longer-dated securities. If one uses a 3.5% real return on fixed-income assets, the geometric equity premium for a 7.0% real stock return falls to 3.5%.

**HISTORICAL EQUITY RETURNS**  
**AND SURVIVORSHIP BIAS**

The real return on stocks, as I have emphasized [1998], has displayed a remarkable long-term stability. Over the entire 196-year period that I examine, the long-term after-inflation geometric annual rate of return on equity averages 7.0%. In the 1926-1998 period, the real return has been 7.4%, and since 1946 (when virtually all the thirteenfold increase in the consumer price index over the past two hundred years has taken place) the real return on equity has been 7.8%. The relative stability of long-term real equity returns is in marked contrast to the unstable real returns on fixed-income assets.

Some economists believe the 7% historical real

return on equities very likely overstates the true expected return on stocks. They claim that using the ex post equity returns in the United States to represent returns expected by shareholders is misleading. This is because no investor in the nineteenth or early twentieth century could know for certain that the United States would be the most successful capitalist country in history and experience the highest equity returns.

This "survivorship bias" hypothesis, as it has been called, is examined by Jorion and Goetzmann [1999] in "Global Stock Markets in the Twentieth Century." They conclude that of thirty-nine equity markets that existed in 1921, none of them show as high a real capital appreciation as the United States, and most of them have had substantial disruptions in their operations or have disappeared altogether. They report that the median real capital appreciation of non-U.S. markets has been only 0.8% per year as opposed to 4.3% in the U.S.<sup>6</sup>

But this evidence may be misleading. Total returns of a portfolio, especially over long periods of time, are a very non-linear function of the returns of the individual components. Mathematically it can be shown that if individual stock returns are lognormal, the performance of the *median* stock is almost always worse than the market portfolio performance.<sup>7</sup>

So, it is not surprising that the median performance of individual countries will not match the "world portfolio" or the returns in the dominant market. Jorion and Goetzmann recognize this near the end of their study when they show that compound annual real return on a GDP-weighted portfolio of equities in all countries falls only 28 basis points short of the U.S. return. In fact, because of the real depreciation of the dollar over this time, the compound annual *dollar* return on a GDP-weighted world is actually 30 basis points *higher* than the return on U.S. equities.<sup>8</sup>

But examining international stock returns alone does not give us a better measure of the equity premium. The equity premium measures the *difference* between the returns on stocks and safe bonds. Although stock returns may be lower in foreign countries than the U.S., the real returns on foreign bonds are substantially lower. Almost all disrupted markets experienced severe inflation, in some instances wiping out the value of fixed-income assets. (One could say that the equity premium in Germany covering any period including the 1922-1923 hyperinflation is over 100%, since the real value of fixed-income assets fell to zero while equities did not.)

Even investors who purchased bonds that

promised precious metals or foreign currency experienced significant defaults. It is my belief that if one uses a world portfolio of stocks and bonds, the equity *premium* will turn out higher, not lower, than found in the U.S.<sup>9</sup>

## TRANSACTION COSTS AND DIVERSIFICATION

I believe that 7.0% per year does approximate the long-term real return on equity indexes. But the return on equity *indexes* does not necessarily represent the *realized* return to the equityholder. There are two reasons for this: transaction costs and the lack of diversification.<sup>10</sup>

Mutual funds and, more recently, low-cost "index funds" were not available to investors of the nineteenth or early twentieth century. Prior to 1975, brokerage commissions on buying and selling individual stocks were fixed by the New York Stock Exchange, and were substantially higher than today. This made the accumulation and maintenance of a fully diversified portfolio of stocks quite costly.

The advent of mutual funds has substantially lowered the cost of maintaining a diversified portfolio. And the cost of investing in mutual funds has declined over the last several decades. Rea and Reid [1998] report a decline of 76 basis points (from 225 to 149) in the average annual fee for equity mutual funds from 1980 to 1997 (see also Bogle [1999, p. 69]). Index funds with a cost of less than 20 basis points per year are now available to small investors.

Furthermore, the risk experienced by investors unable to fully diversify their portfolios made the risk-return trade-off less desirable than that calculated from stock indexes. On a risk-adjusted basis, a less-than-fully diversified portfolio has a lower expected return than the total market.

Given transaction costs and inadequate diversification, I assume that equity investors experienced real returns more in the neighborhood of 5% to 6% over most of the nineteenth and twentieth century rather than the 7% calculated from indexes. Assuming a 3.5% real return on bonds, the historical equity premium may be more like 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points, rather than the 6.0 percentage points recorded by Mehra and Prescott.

## PROJECTING FUTURE EQUITY RETURNS

Future stock returns should not be viewed independently of current fundamentals, since the price of

stocks is the present discounted value of all expected future cash flows. Earnings are the source of these cash flows, and the average price-to-earnings (P-E) ratio in the U.S. from 1871 through 1998 is 14 (see Shiller [1989] for an excellent source for this series).

Using data from August 13, 1999, the S&P 500 stock index is 1327, and the mean 1999 estimate for operating earnings of the S&P 500 stock index of fifteen analysts polled by Bloomberg News is \$48.47.<sup>11</sup> This yields a current P-E ratio on the market of 27.4. But due to the increased number of write-offs and other special charges taken by management over the last several years, operating earnings have exceeded total earnings by 10% to 15%.<sup>12</sup> On the basis of reported earnings, which is what most historical series report (including Shiller's), the P-E ratio of the market is currently about 32.<sup>13</sup>

There are two long-term consequences of the high level of stock prices relative to fundamentals. Either 1) future stock returns are going to be lower than historical averages, or 2) earnings (and hence other fundamentals such as dividends or book value) are going to rise at a more rapid rate in the future. A third possibility, that P-E ratios will rise continually without bound, is ruled out since this would cause an unstable bubble in stock prices that must burst.

If future dividends grow no faster than they have in the past, forward-looking real stock returns will be lower than the 7% historical average. As is well known from the dividend discount model, the rate of return on stocks can be calculated by adding the current dividend yield to the expected rate of growth of future dividends. The current dividend yield on the S&P 500 index is 1.2%. Since 1871, the growth of real per share dividends on the index has been 1.3%, but since 1946, due in part to a higher reinvestment rate, growth has risen to 2.1%. If we assume future growth of real per share dividends to be close to the most recent average of 2.1%, we obtain a 3.3% real return on equities, less than one-half the historical average.

A second method of calculating future real returns yields a similar figure. If the rate of return on capital equals the return investors require on stocks, the *earnings yield*, or the reciprocal of the price-earnings ratio, equals the forward-looking real long-term return on equity (see Phillips [1999] for a more formal development of this proposition). Long-term data support this contention; a 14 price-to-earnings ratio corresponds to a 7.1% earnings yield, which approximates the long-term real return on equities. The current P-E ratio on the S&P 500 stock

index is between 27 to 32, depending on whether total or operating earnings are considered. This indicates a current earnings yield, and hence a future long-term and real return, of between 3.1% to 3.7% on equities.

One way to explain these projected lower future equity returns is that investors are bidding up the price of stocks to higher levels as the favorable historical data about the risks and returns in the equity market become incorporated into investor decisions.<sup>14</sup> Lower transaction costs further enable investors to assemble diversified portfolios of stocks to take advantage of these returns. The desirability of stocks may be further reinforced by the perception that the business cycle has become less severe over time and has reduced the inherent risk in equities.<sup>15</sup>

If these factors are the cause of the current bull market, then the revaluation of equity prices is a one-time adjustment. This means that future expected equity returns should be lower, not higher, than in the past. During this period of upward price adjustment, however, equity returns will be higher than average, increasing the historical measured returns in the equity market.

This divergence between increased historical returns and lower future returns could set the stage for some significant investor disappointment, as survey evidence suggests that many investors expect future returns to be higher, not lower, than in the past (see "PaineWebber Index of Investor Optimism" [1999]).

## SOURCES OF FASTER EARNINGS GROWTH

Although the increased recognition of the risks and returns to equity may be part of the explanation for the bull market in stocks, there must be other reasons. This is because the forward-looking rates of return we derive for equities fall below the current 4.0% yield on inflation-protected government bonds. Although one could debate whether in the long run stocks or *nominal* bonds are riskier in real terms, there should be no doubt that the inflation-protected bonds are safer than equities and should have a lower expected return.

Hence, some part of the current bull market in stocks must be due to the expectations that future earnings (and dividend) growth will be significantly above the historical average. Optimists frequently cite higher growth of real output and enhanced productivity, enabled by the technological and communications revolution, as the source of this higher growth. Yet the long-run relation between the growth of real output and *per share* earn-

ings growth is quite weak on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Per share earnings growth has been primarily determined by the reinvestment rate of the firm, or the earnings yield minus the dividend yield, not the rate of output growth.<sup>16</sup>

The reason why output growth does not factor into per share earnings growth is that new shares must be issued (or debt floated) to cover the expansion of productive technology needed to increase output. Over the long run, the returns to technological progress have gone to workers in the form of higher real wages, while the return per unit of capital has remained essentially unchanged. Real output growth could spur growth in per share earnings only if it were "capital-enhancing," in the growth terminology, which is contrary to the labor-augmenting and wage-enhancing technological change that has marked the historical data (see Diamond [1999] for a discussion of growth and real return).

But there are factors that may contribute to higher future earnings growth of U.S. corporations, at least temporarily. The United States has emerged as the leader in the fastest-growing segments of the world economy: technology, communications, pharmaceuticals, and, most recently, the Internet and Internet technology. Furthermore, the penetration of U.S. brand names such as Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, Disney, Nike, and others into the global economy can lead to temporarily higher profit growth for U.S. firms.

Nonetheless, the level of corporate earnings would have to double to bring the P-E ratio down to the long-term average, or to increase by 50% to bring the P-E ratio down to 20. A 20 price-to-earnings yield corresponds to a 5% earnings yield or a 5% real return, a return that I believe approximates realized historical equity returns after transaction costs are subtracted. For per share earnings to temporarily grow to a level 50% above the long-term trend is clearly possible in a world economy where the U.S. plays a dominant role, but it is by no means certain.

## CONCLUSION

The degree of the equity premium calculated from data estimated from 1926 is unlikely to persist in the future. The real return on fixed-income assets is likely to be significantly higher than that estimated on earlier data. This is confirmed by the yields available on Treasury inflation-linked securities, which currently exceed 4%. Furthermore, despite the acceleration in earnings

growth, the return on equities is likely to fall from its historical level due to the very high level of equity prices relative to fundamentals.<sup>17</sup>

All of this makes it very surprising that Ivo Welch [1999] in a survey of over 200 academic economists finds that most estimate the equity premium at 5 to 6 percentage points over the next thirty years. Such a premium would require a 9% to 10% real return on stocks, given the current real yield on Treasury inflation-indexed securities. This means that real per share dividends would have to grow by nearly 8.0% to 9.0% per year, given the current 1.2% dividend yield, to prevent the P-E ratio from rising farther from its current record levels. This growth rate is more than six times the growth rate of real dividends since 1871 and more than triple their growth rate since the end of World War II.

Unless there is a substantial increase in the productivity of capital, dividend growth of this magnitude would mean an ever-increasing share of national income going to profits. This by itself might cause political ramifications that could be negative for shareholders.

## ENDNOTES

This article is adapted from a paper delivered at the UCLA Conference, "The Equity Premium and Stock Market Valuations," and a Princeton Center for Economic Policy Studies Conference, "What's Up with the Stock Market?" both held in May 1999. The author thanks participants in these seminars and particularly Jay Ritter, Robert Shiller, and Peter L. Bernstein for their comments.

<sup>1</sup>A few economists believe these high levels of risk aversion are not unreasonable; see, e.g., Kandel and Stambaugh [1991].

<sup>2</sup>In the capital asset pricing model, equity risk premiums are derived from the *arithmetic* and not geometric returns. Compound annual geometric returns are almost universally used in characterizing long-term returns.

<sup>3</sup>Their wildly high 12.8% long-term inflation estimate in 1982 is derived by subtracting their low historical real yield from the high nominal bond rate. This overprediction has no effect on their estimated *real* returns.

<sup>4</sup>But real rates on *short-dated* bonds, for which unanticipated inflation should have been less important, were also extremely low between 1926 and 1980.

<sup>5</sup>I am very persuaded by the research of Campbell and Viceira [1998], who argue that in a multiperiod world the proper risk-free asset is an inflation-indexed annuity rather than the short-dated Treasury bill. This conclusion comes from intertemporal models where agents desire to hedge against unanticipated changes in the real rate of interest. The duration of such an indexed annuity is closely approximated by the ten-year inflation-indexed bonds.

<sup>6</sup>They are unable to construct dividend series for most foreign countries, but they make a not-unreasonable assumption that dividend yields in the U.S. were at least as high as abroad.

<sup>7</sup>Intuitively, the return of the winners more than compensates for the lower returns of the more numerous losers.

<sup>8</sup>Furthermore, the dollar return on the foreign portfolio is much better measured than the real return. These data are taken from Jorion and Goetzmann [1991], Tables VI and VII.

<sup>9</sup>To avoid the problems with default, gold is considered the "risk-free" alternative in many countries. But gold's long-term real returns are negative in the U.S. even before one considers storage and insurance costs. And precious metals are far from risk-free in real terms. The real return on gold since 1982 has been a negative 7% per year.

<sup>10</sup>I abstract from taxes, which reduce the return on both bonds and stocks.

<sup>11</sup>These data were taken from the Bloomberg terminal on August 16, 1999.

<sup>12</sup>From 1970 through 1989, operating earnings exceeded reported earnings by an average of 2.29%. Since 1990, the average has been 12.93%.

<sup>13</sup>There are other factors that distort reported earnings, some upward (underreporting option costs: see Murray, Smithers, and Emerson [1998]) and some downward (overexpensing R&D; see Nakamura [1999]). No clear bias is evident.

<sup>14</sup>This is particularly true on a long-term, after-inflation basis. See Siegel [1998, Chapter 2].

<sup>15</sup>Bernstein [1998] has emphasized the role of economic stability in stock valuation. Also see Zarnowitz [1999] and Romer [1999]. Other reasons given for the high price of equities rely on demographic factors, specifically the accumulations of "baby boomers." This should, however, reduce both stock and bond returns, yet we see real bond returns as high if not higher than historically.

<sup>16</sup>From 1871 to 1998, the growth of real per share earnings is only 1.7% per year, slightly less than obtained by subtracting the median dividend yield of 4.8% from the median earnings yield of 7.2%.

<sup>17</sup>This should not be construed as predicting that equity prices need fall significantly, or that the expected returns on equities are not higher, even at current levels, than those on fixed-income investments.

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