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00849
     BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION
 2.
                          COMMISSION
   WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
   TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,
 4
                  Complainant,
 5
             vs.
                                 )
                                      DOCKET NO. UE-991832
 6
                                 )
                                      VOLUME 9
   PACIFICORP, d/b/a
                                     Pages 849 - 936
                                 )
   PACIFIC LIGHT AND POWER,
 8
             Respondent. )
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             A hearing in the above matter was held on
11
   July 17, 2000, at 1:35 p.m., at 1300 South
12
   Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, Olympia, Washington,
13
   before Administrative Law Judge DENNIS J. MOSS,
14
   CHAIRWOMAN MARILYN SHOWALTER, COMMISSIONER RICHARD
15
   HEMSTAD, COMMISSIONER WILLIAM R. GILLIS,
16
17
             The parties were present as follows:
18
             PACIFICORP by JAMES M. VAN NOSTRAND, Attorney
19
   at Law, Stoel Rives, 600 University Street, Suite 3600,
20 Seattle, Washington 98101-3197.
21
             INDUSTRIAL CUSTOMERS OF NORTHWEST UTILITIES,
   by MELINDA J. DAVISON, Attorney at Law, Duncan,
   Weinberg, Genzer and Pembroke, 1300 Southwest Fifth
   Avenue, Suite 2915, Portland, Oregon 97201.
23
             PUBLIC COUNSEL, by ROBERT W. CROMWELL, JR.,
24
   Assistant Attorney General, 900 Fourth Avenue, Suite
    2000, Seattle, Washington 98164-1012.
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00850
              WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION
    COMMISSION, by ROBERT D. CEDARBAUM, Assistant Attorney
    General, 1400 South Evergreen Park Drive Southwest,
    Post Office Box 40128, Olympia, Washington 98504-0128.
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   Kathryn T. Wilson, CCR
25 Court Reporter
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00851		
2		INDEX OF EXHIBITS
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 JUDGE MOSS: Let's go on the record. Good afternoon, everyone. We are convened in the settlement hearing proceeding in the matter styled Washington 5 Utilities and Transportation Commission V PacifiCorp, d/b/a Pacific Power and Light, Docket Number UE-991832. The parties have filed what I refer to in my thinking, at least, is a comprehensive stipulation or settlement agreement, and the purpose of our convening today is to 9 10 have a panel of witnesses and inquiries from the Bench, 11 probably statements by counsel as well. 12 The Commissioners are not all available until 13 2:30, about 50 minutes from now, so what we will do is 14 spend some time on the record here now taking care of 15 preliminary matters, including making sure our exhibit 16 list includes everything it needs to be included in the 17 records and take appearances, and then we will take a 18 brief recess until all the Commissioners are available 19 at 2:30, so let us begin then with appearances of 20 counsel, and why don't we just start with you, 21 Mr. Cromwell. 22 MR. CROMWELL: Robert Cromwell for Public 23 Counsel. 24 MR. VAN NOSTRAND: James M. Van Nostrand for 25 PacifiCorp.

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              MS. DAVISON: Melinda Davison for ICNU.
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              MR. CEDARBAUM: Robert Cedarbaum for
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   Commission staff.
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              JUDGE MOSS: Do we have any other
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   appearances? I had indicated through the notice that
   the teleconference bridge would be available for
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   monitoring purposes only, and it seems to be on.
                                                      Is
   there anybody on the teleconference bridge line?
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   Apparently not. Why don't we go ahead and have our
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   panel -- this is our panel, I take it, these five, so
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   why don't we go ahead and get the names on the record,
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    starting with you, Mr. Elgin.
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              MR. ELGIN: Kenneth L. Elgin, E-l-g-i-n, for
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    Commission staff.
15
              MS. KELLY: Andrea Kelly, K-e-l-l-y, for
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   PacifiCorp.
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              MR. EBERDT: Charles Eberdt for the Energy
   Project and Yakima OIC and Yakima Valley Farm Workers.
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19
              MS. DIXON: Danielle Dixon for the Northwest
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   Energy Coalition.
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              MR. LAZAR:
                          Jim Lazar for Public Counsel.
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              JUDGE MOSS: Welcome to all of you. What I
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   propose to do then is take care of the swearing, and
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   we'll just swear you all in collectively, so if you
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   will please rise.
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              (Witnesses sworn.)
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             JUDGE MOSS: As far as the record is
   concerned, I think you all have the latest version of
   the exhibit list, or you have had that available to
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   you. We do have the Bench requests, which I propose to
   make exhibits, and I can give those numbers, but let me
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   ask for purposes of the record whether the parties have
   any supplemental material. Let's go off the record for
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   a moment.
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              (Discussion off the record.)
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             JUDGE MOSS: I was asking if the parties have
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   any other material they wish to have made part of the
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   record. I had mentioned the Bench request will be made
   exhibits, subject to any objection. Anything?
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             MR. CEDARBAUM: I think we probably assume
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   that the Stipulation itself would be made an exhibit,
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   which is sort of the customary practice.
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             JUDGE MOSS: That's right, and I was mentally
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   ahead of you but procedurally behind you. I have
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   already given it an exhibit number in my mind, so we
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   will take care of that formally. I seem to have even
   added it to the exhibit list already. The
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   Comprehensive Stipulation, which was filed by the
   parties June 20th, 2000, is Bench Exhibit No. 269, and
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let's see, how many of those Bench exhibits were there?

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There are eight of those. We will begin those and just go sequentially. The first one, which was Bench Request No. 3, will be Exhibit 270, and that will carry through 277. Any objection? Hearing none, those will 5 be made exhibits bearing the numbers as indicated. 6 MR. ELGIN: Your Honor, it would go through 7 Exhibit 278. There are actually nine of them. JUDGE MOSS: So 278 will correspond with 9 Bench Request 11. 270 will correspond to Bench Request 10 3, and rest of us, even the mathematically challenged 11 will be able to figure that out, referring to myself. 12 Are there any preliminary matters that we can 13 take care of while we await the arrival of the 14 Commissioners? 15 MR. CEDARBAUM: Just to fill you in, the 16 parties met last Thursday to at least talk about how we 17 saw this going that would be most helpful to the 18 Commissioners, and I guess I drew the long or short 19 straw of being designated as our representative to 20 provide an opening statement rather than each counsel 21 doing that. 22 JUDGE MOSS: That's very efficient. I 23 appreciate that prior planning, so we will allow for 24 that when the Commissioners come on the Bench.

Anything else? All right. I apologize for the

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inconvenience, but we will stand in recess until 2:30. (Recess.) 3 JUDGE MOSS: Let's go back on the record. 4 After our recess, we are ready to proceed. We've got 5 our witness panel sitting here ready across the front, Mr. Elgin, Ms. Kelly, Mr. Eberdt, Ms. Dixon, and 7 Mr. Lazar, and these witnesses have been sworn, and we have dispensed with our housekeeping matters. Our 9 exhibit list has now been supplemented by the admission 10 of the Bench request responses and what I've been 11 calling the Comprehensive Stipulation, which was the 12 one filed June 20th, and that's Exhibit 269, as I 13 recall. 14 The way I'd like to proceed this afternoon, I 15 have a few clarifying questions with respect to the 16 Bench requests, and we will take answers from whomever 17 is the appropriate person to give those. I will say 18 this, that although the Bench requests were directed to the Company, as is common, others may wish to comment 19 20 in response, and they certainly may do so if they have 21 something supplemental to say. 22 Once we have completed the clarification on 23 those points, then I think what we will do, as we have done in recent proceedings, is look at the Stipulation

itself, go through it page by page, have the

Commissioners' questions to the panel and the responses, of course, and then counsel may help us out from time to time as well, and I left out one step. Earlier, Mr. Cedarbaum indicated that he had drawn 5 either the long or the short straw, as we may yet see, in terms of giving an opening statement on behalf of all counsel since this is a joint stipulation. I think it would probably be best to have your opening first 9 and then we will go into the clarifying questions. 10 MR. CEDARBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor. I 11 quess I will assume the safe assumption that the 12 Commissioners and you have read the Stipulation so I 13 don't inside to explain the details. We do have a 14 panel of witnesses, as you have indicated, and counsel 15 to answer questions on the details when we get to that. 16 What I would like to focus on by way of an 17 opening statement is the comprehensive nature that the 18 Stipulation has been presented to you, and by 19 comprehensive, I speak of that in two general terms. 20 The first is that it's comprehensive in the sense that 21 all parties have signed the Stipulation - Staff, Public Counsel, the Company, ICNU, the Energy Project, and 22 23 Northwest Energy Coalition are all parties in this 24 case, and all parties have signed the Stipulation, so you do have a broad base, a divergent set of viewpoints

brought to bear in negotiating and drafting and presenting the Stipulation. There are no outliers.

There are no separate agreements amongst less than all the parties that have been presented to you today, so this really is a comprehensive stipulation in terms of the interests that have been brought to bear in presenting it to you.

The second general meaning that I would like 9 to give to the word comprehensive is it's comprehensive 10 in the sense of the issues that have been included in 11 the Stipulation. This is a Stipulation of all the 12 issues that all of the parties have identified in the 13 case, and the comprehensive elements of it, the general elements of it are that there is a five-year rate plan 14 15 with a post rate plan earnings review. There is an 16 agreement on how the Centralia gain should be treated 17 for rate-making purposes. There are agreements as to 18 rate design issues in the case. An agreement that the 19 service quality standards from the merger of last year 20 will continue through the rate plan period rather than 21 end according to the terms in the merger before the 22 rate plan period would expire. There is an agreement 23 as to how the Company will write down its investment in 24 the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant, and then importantly, there is an agreement with respect to processes that

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will be used by the parties if the Commission accepts the Stipulation to resolve issues that we couldn't resolve in detail with respect to the specifics, but we have set up a process on how we would get there, and 5 that would be issues with respect to the prudence review, issues with respect to the system's benefit charge, and issues with respect to low-income program discounts, and there is also a provision and stipulation that will deal with the BPA subscription 9 10 process. 11

So in those two respects, we feel we've presented a comprehensive stipulation to you both with respect to the interests that have been brought to bear and the subject matters that are contained in the Stipulation. I think all parties have come today to present the Stipulation to you and believe that the acceptance of the Stipulation is in the public interest and will establish rates that are just, fair, reasonable, and sufficient through the five-year rate plan, and we are here to ask that you adopt it, and we are here to answer any of your questions on the details 22 of the Stipulation as well, so with that, that 23 concludes my opening statement on the matter. If there 24 are any questions you have of me of what I said or any details with respect to the Stipulation, panelists are

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here and so are counsel. JUDGE MOSS: Any questions to counsel at this juncture? We may reserve also, but there may be some 4 at this point. 5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I have a general question, and I will just start it with you. question of what it means to approve a rate plan without incorporating into it the prudence review of 9 prior acquisitions. I don't really understand how it 10 is that we get to a finding that this rate is fair, 11 just, and reasonable without having made those 12 determinations, and I wish you would elaborate a little 13 bit on why you think it's entirely proper for us to do 14 it and how it would work in the future. MR. CEDARBAUM: It could be that each party 15 16 has their own position on that. I think from the 17 Staff's perspective, and Mr. Elgin may want to expound 18 on this, but from the Staff's perspective, Staff is comfortable with the level of rate relief that has been 19 20 included in the rate plan of three percent, three 21 percent, one percent, and then zero percent and zero percent for the five years, and that is really a 22 23 separate matter from the prudence review, and that 24 consistent with the Commission's precedent and practice

of analyzing prudence, the prudence of acquisitions in

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a general rate case, is that the rate case will come after the five-year rate plan. That's the point in time when the Commission would have that issue before, and in the meantime, the parties will develope a report 5 that the Commission will have access to with respect to the prudence.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Why is it appropriate to carry the prudence issue beyond this rate case into the next rate case when these acquisitions were made some time ago? Why aren't we bringing things up to date as of today in a rate?

MR. CEDARBAUM: I don't know if Mr. Elgin has anything to add to what I said.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: We can wait until the panel if you want. I thought I would begin with the legal counsel.

MR. CEDARBAUM: I quess Staff's perspective is that the rates in the rate plan established rates that are just, fair, reasonable, and sufficient and that you don't need at this point to get to the prudence review in order to adopt the rate plan. JUDGE MOSS: Perhaps we will restate that

23 question?

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: As things go on, I'll 25 be raising it again.

JUDGE MOSS: Why don't we turn then to the clarifying questions. Looking at the response to Bench Request No. 3, what the Bench called for in this request was a schedule identical to one that had been presented through Mr. Griffith's testimony, which showed in a very useful way the impact of the proposed increases by the Company at the time of the as-file case, and so this was to permit a comparison between the settlement or the stipulation and what was as filed.

Now, looking at the column on the left there on the top table -- I think there are three tables, and in the left most column where it shows the base rate, I notice that for year one -- although, there is a three percent increase, we are looking at increases here in the range of 3.1 percent to 4.1 percent, and I'm wondering, is that a result of the four-month deferral? In other words, the proposal is that the rates actually be implemented on September 1 but then not be charged to customers until January 1, or is there some other explanation why these percentages are all higher than three percent.

MS. KELLY: That's the explanation. That includes the impact of the deferral.

JUDGE MOSS: I also understand in response to

another of the Bench requests that the \$4.25 base rate that is stated to be effective, that will be effective January 1, and that includes the four-month also.

MS. KELLY: That's correct.

JUDGE MOSS: The credit for Centralia and the merger credit, which are indicated in that portion of the table, I'm a little curious, those are not reflected in the second table or the third table, and maybe somebody can explain to me what's going on in terms of that aspect of it. As I understand it, these are to be separate credits as opposed to something rolled in.

MS. KELLY: What we were trying to do here for each of the years was to show the annual impact, so once those credits go in place, they stay in place for four years and five years, and so there wouldn't be an incremental impact in the second year or the third year. The next time there would be an impact from the merger credit or the Centralia credit would be when they went away.

JUDGE MOSS: With that answer in mind, looking at the second table there, which is for the year 2002, I notice again in the left-hand column that although we are talking about a three percent across the board increase for that year, the range here is 1.5

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1 percent to 2.1 percent. What accounts for that. MS. KELLY: That is to reflect the fact that the one percent deferral goes away, but a three-percent increase to base rate occurs, but the net impact to 5 customers bill would be the two percent. JUDGE MOSS: I understand. You have 7 confirmed that the merger credit -- as I recall, the merger credit initiates January 1, 2001 and carries for 9 four years? 10 MS. KELLY: Yes. 11 JUDGE MOSS: And the Centralia credit 12 initiates -- will it also initiate on January 1, 2001. 13 MS. KELLY: Yes, that's the intention. 14 JUDGE MOSS: It would go through the rate 15 plan period of five years? 16 MS. KELLY: It would be designed to go 17 through the rate plan period but would terminate once the full amount was returned to customers. 18 19 JUDGE MOSS: I notice that under the subtotal 20 and total columns in the second and third tables, there 21 is a single asterisk indicating a footnote, but I don't 22 see a corresponding footnote. Is there some other 23 reading I should be giving that? 24 MS. KELLY: No. I think that was

inadvertently left in from a different.

JUDGE MOSS: I didn't have anything on four, which was the question about the interplay between the comprehensive settlement. That was a nine percent increase, and the increase cumulatively is less than nine percent, so that would not be triggered in any event.

On Bench Request No. 5, I was asking for an explanation of the 1.7-percent figure in terms of explaining the merger credit, and the response does explain that, and I think it's also picked up in the response to No. 3 that we just discussed, but in the response, you indicate how the estimate is derived, and we look at the figure 171 million.

Now, if that figure is Washington retail revenue excluding special contracts, it appears to have come from the filing as opposed to a figure that was generated from the settlement rates. Could you help me out a little bit there?

MS. KELLY: That's correct. The 1.7 percent is an estimate that was based on the present revenues. Actually, if you divide that out, it ends up being about 1.75 percent on present revenues, and it depends on when you calculate the merger credit. If you calculate it after an increase in rates occurred, it is going to be a little bit lower, but it's the

three-million-dollar amount that is the driver here and that is the commitment, and that's the amount that will be passed back to customers each year, so it's the three million dollars that's the important piece. 5 JUDGE MOSS: When we say "a little bit," how much of a little bit are we talking about? Are we 7 talking about changing 1.7 to 1.2 or talking about changing it to 1.64? It's more the latter than the 9 MS. KELLY: 10 former. It's more magnitude to small. 11 MR. LAZAR: The only thing that we saw that 12 would change that by more than a rounding error or sort 13 of normal two-percent load growth is if Boise-Cascade 14 returns to regular tariff service. The 15 171-million-dollar Washington retail revenue does not 16 include Boise-Cascade special contract revenue. If 17 they came back onto regular tariff service, the 171 18 would go up significantly, and the three million 19 dollars would again get divided by a larger 20 denominator, and that might have an effect that's more 21 than just rounding. 22 JUDGE MOSS: When you say back to regular 23 service, you mean under a tariff as opposed to special 24 contract.

MR. LAZAR: Correct. They went on special

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contract and are not a part of the 171.

JUDGE MOSS: Thank you, Mr. Lazar. Looking at the response to Bench Request No. 6, which has to do with Section 11 of the Comprehensive Stipulation, which I believe is referred to in the Stipulation as a reopener, this is the provision that allows the Company to make a general rate filing; although, this would be in the nature of a filing for interim rates and would be subject to that high standard, or as I read it, it looks like a high standard.

Let me see if I can bring this down to common speak and say this provision is in there basically to provide for the circumstance of electric markets or credit markets going haywire, creating a situation where the Company can no longer function economically or in a financial sound way would be a better way to say it, I suppose.

17 18 MR. ELGIN: Yes. I would just clarify that. 19 It's not just the energy market. It's primarily that 20 the Company needs access to capital. It has a certain 21 public service obligation, and that it's earnings and tests in order to access credit is such that without 22 23 interim rate relief, it can't access credit and that it 24 would have a material impact on the public future 25 service, so interim rates are traditionally filed in

the contract of a general rate application, so we analyze what is the emergent need for rate relief so the company can maintain adequate and reliable service to the public, and then we process the remainder of the case. So it's a very strict standard in the context of the company's ability to access capital and provide reasonable service to the public.

JUDGE MOSS: So we would expect to see experts from the capital market sector come to testify

JUDGE MOSS: So we would expect to see experts from the capital market sector come to testify that this company is not going to get any access to credit under the current circumstances?

MR. ELGIN: You would see primarily the company's chief financial officer presenting testimony and exhibits showing that the company's coverages were such that it would not be able to access and sell any debt is the testimony and analysis you would see.

JUDGE MOSS: Let me round that question out in this fashion, and I appreciate the answer. Let's hypothesize a situation such as we experienced recently in the Pacific Northwest where we have had some rather significant spikes in the wholesale price of electricity. Is that the kind of thing that would trigger this, or is that conceivable?

MR. ELGIN: Probably not. If it would be that that spike were to occur and it would be such that

it was an extended period of time that we were perceiving those kind of energy prices, and the company had to access those markets on a regular basis for a significant portion of its power supply, it might, but 5 I suspect for this particular company, it would not. 6 MR. LAZAR: This company is a net seller. 7 They kind of tends to win in that situation. JUDGE MOSS: So its customers could then 9 expect electricity too cheap to meter. 10 MR. LAZAR: Not during the five years of the 11 rate stipulation. There is not a counterpart to this reopener in the event of high earnings. 12 13 JUDGE MOSS: No. 7, I didn't have any 14 questions. That was the Bench request concerning the 15 transition period. The Bench was asking for some 16 further explanation of what the parties referred to 17 when they meant a significant transition for the 18 Company, one of the bases, one of the primary goals of 19 this settlement, and that was clarified in the 20 response. 21 In No. 8, the Bench asked for clarification 22 with respect to Section 6 of the Stipulation where only 23 PacifiCorp is allowed to take action in response to a 24 joint report that is contemplated with respect to prudence, and the response is that yes, only PacifiCorp

1 can take actions in response to such joint report, and the answer goes on to explain that the Company may choose to take action to address or mitigate the identified issues in the event of an adverse finding on 5 the question of prudence, and the question that pops to mind is such as what sort of actions might the Company 7 take in mitigation of an adverse prudence finding? MS. KELLY: I think it's difficult to guess on what might be the outcome of the finding, but there 9 10 may be ways -- if, for example, it were to renegotiate 11 funds for a contract, or if there were questions on the 12 prudence of a specific resource, maybe decide whether 13 or not to include that in rate base. 14 I think there are several ways to work 15 through this, and I think from the Company's perspective, that's the appeal of having a prudence 16 17 review done and a process that's not, I quess, tied 18 specifically to a rate case. It provides the parties 19 an opportunity to share information in a collaborative 20 approach and then work together to develop 21 recommendations on which the Company can take action 22 before the next rate case, so it gives to us the 23 opportunity to do that. 24 JUDGE MOSS: This may be more a question for

the lawyers, but is there any interrelationship, any

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interplay between the Commission's prudence determinations in connection with resource acquisitions and the rules that govern transfers of property under 4 RCW 80.12? 5 MR. CEDARBAUM: I would think that if one of 6 the mitigation measures that the Company took would be to sell investment, then that would have to come before 7 the Commission as a transfer of property application, 9 and I think that's not precluded by the Stipulation. 10 That would be utility property. 11 JUDGE MOSS: So it would be true regardless 12 of whether there had been a prudence determination? 13 MR. CEDARBAUM: I think so. 14 MR. ELGIN: Yes. If I could follow up with that and answer it in the hypothetical. If you look 15 16 only Page 4 of the Comprehensive Stipulation in 17 Footnote 5, and let's say hypothetically there was an 18 issue related to the acquisition of Cholla, and the 19 Company decided that based on the report that was filed 20 that it's in the best interest of shareholders and

ratepayers to dispose of Cholla. Then under 80.12, the

Commission would have jurisdiction to evaluate the sale

and that's a separate application within the context of

of that property and the disposition of those assets,

that particular statute. It has no bearing on what

rates might eventually come out of that and how that might impact the rate plan under your consideration this afternoon from the Stipulation. JUDGE MOSS: There is a public interest 5 determination both in the context of transfer of property and also in prudence review, isn't there? MR. ELGIN: Yes. The public interest standard, I think, is the primary factor in the 9 transfer of property application, but in the prudence 10 standard, it's my understanding of past Commission 11 decisions, both public interest and whether or not, as we've tried to articulate on Page 5 is the Commission 12 13 standard that came out of the U-8354 in the 14 determination of the Skagit Hanford investment for 15 Puget Sound Power and Light, so it's a little broader 16 and more comprehensive. It's not really in the public 17 interest, but what specific standards and what specific actions and information did the Company rely on to 18 19 acquire that particular resource. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: As long as we are on 20 21 that footnote, it cites different facilities that have been purchased or built over time, and then it says, 22 23 "They shall not be considered as part of the rate base 24 for Washington rate-making purposes until the prudence has been evaluated in the next general rate case."

Let's say 100 percent of their costs were deemed to be prudent in the next general rate case. Does that mean that all of those costs would then be later loaded on into the rate base, meaning none of those costs are recognized in this rate that we are approving?

MR. ELGIN: No. I'm going to dissect your question. First off is that what this language is saying that the Commission, by accepting this stipulation, has not made a determination under the statute that provides for the Commission to make a rate base finding and evaluation under 80.04.250 about what is the proper rate base. In other words, we are saying the Commission has not made a determination for these specific facilities. That's not to say that imbedded in these rates and in the Company's results of operations that are in evidence in this record, the Company has made specific proposals that these be, in fact, included.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: That's the nub of my issue. How do we include these costs in a rate that we approve without having found them to be prudent, because if they are not prudent and to the extent they are not prudent, it seems to me we can't say the rate is fair, just, and reasonable.

How do we know this rate is fair, just, and reasonable until we've made that determination, if we are including that in the rate base?

MR. ELGIN: I guess I would answer that in two specific parts. First off is that you have some evidence about the Company's acquisitions. The Company's policy witness has testified in this proceeding that he believes the Company has carried the burden of proof with respect to those specific resources and believes the Company has made a showing that those facilities are in rate base and have made a specific prudence finding.

What we are saying is that the Staff has

What we are saying is that the Staff has analyzed that information and analyzed that request, and we are saying that to the extent that these rates were approved, we thing that there is reasonable basis for going forward with these rates and having another process within this next five-year period to gather all the information that we need regarding the specific finding, and then at year five, in 2005, we will bring our investigation, our report back to the Commission for final determination, so we are saying this is a bridge, a five-year bridge on these specific resources that the three, three, one, zero, zero rate plan will provide reasonable rates based on how the Company is

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booking those costs. They are in the utilities plan accounts. We are saying for this five-year period, three, three, one, zero, zero, this five-year rate plan provides adequate rates for the Company and provides 5 all the parties a sufficient window with which to evaluate the prudence decision. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Does that mean this is 8 essentially an interim rate pending prudence 9 determinations later? 10 MR. ELGIN: I would say interim in the sense 11 that it's not subject to refund. When we have 12 traditionally used that word "interim rate," it means 13 that should the company not carry its burden that 14 somehow we can go back and refund the customers. It's 15 interim in the sense that through this five-year 16 period, this three, one, one rate plan will provide a 17 bridge until we make that specific finding, and the 18 Staff and all the parties believe that these are just,

has traditionally viewed interim rates.

MR. LAZAR: This was an area that was of
particular concern to us. Public Counsel was sort of
the lead party in creating the prudence review
precedent with Puget back in the early '90's, and we

fair, and reasonable and sufficient rates. So interim

in that sense, but not in the sense how this Commission

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Without going into specifics on them, one part of your question seemed to ask, if we are not putting them in rate base now, does that mean we are going to load them all in later, and the answer to that is in Section 5 of the Stipulation, which is that the depreciation rates for those plans are adopted as a part of the Stipulation, and when we get five years down the road and you make a determination on prudency, a significant part of the cost of those plants will be behind us.

Our feeling was that while we have some questions about whether all those plants were cost effective today, we think it's more likely that they will be cost-effective from a 2005 looking forward perspective because of the depreciation that's occurred.

18 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I find that answer 19 puzzling. Isn't our responsibility to not make an 20 after-the-fact determination, was the decision to 21 acquire the resource prudent, but was the decision of the Company, its boards of directors, reasonable, 22 giving the Company some considerable latitude at the 23 24 time the decision was made. Why would we be better 25 able to make that decision five years hence than at the

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present time, unless we are looking after the fact? MR. ELGIN: Can I make a shot at that? think why you are going to have a better decision is because of the process the parties have agreed to find 5 out what was behind the decisions. One of the struggles we have is just the nature of the rate case process and the discovery and the whole litigation surrounding the investigation, and so what we are 9 attempting to do by this section of the Comprehensive 10 Stipulation is to some extent recognize what the 11 Commission did in the Puget Sound Power and Light case 12 in 1992, and that is create a separate proceeding for 13 which prudence is evaluated. 14

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: We did that only because the Company had not put on a case in the rate case. I distinctly recall we said, We will give you one last chance to put on the case, hence the separate proceeding.

MR. ELGIN: Yes, sir. We are trying to give the Company a process that's similar to what the Commission gave in the 1992 case, and that is a process outside of litigation where the parties have discovery. The parties have an opportunity to sit down in a nonadversarial manner and discuss the standard about the board's decisions with respect to these resources

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and as well, to have some dialogue about that whole issue of how much latitude, and then to have the parties file a report with the Commission that would provide the basis for, to get to your question, about 5 will we get a better decision in five years, and I think we will because we will have a better process to develop the information, and I think we will have a better understanding of what the Company did and a 9 better understanding of how to apply that standard 10 given our history with this whole issue surrounding 11 prudence. 12

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I realize this is a settlement party to make whatever accommodations seem appropriate, and so you may not want to answer this question, but is it a practical problem that there wasn't sufficient time within the rate case period to do that evaluation?

MR. ELGIN: No. I think the question became more in the context of two parties having different perspective as to what the standard meant. It's not a question of time. I think it's more of a question the Company having one idea what this means, Staff having one idea, Public Counsel having some idea, the Industrial Customers of Northwest Utilities having some idea, and then all of us bringing this disparate notion

to the Commission and saying, This resource in and this resource out, but what we felt was having this process to evaluate the information would be a better process and develop better information for the Commission and have everybody more comfortable with the Company's resource acquisitions and then making a recommendation at some point in time which then really defines the bounds about what available information was there and then enabling the Company to take whatever action that it deemed necessary based on those findings in the report.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Just one last comment.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Just one last comment. I find myself a bit uncomfortable with the reality of that the Company hasn't been here for 14 years, and now we are adding another five onto that. I don't know when these particular resources were acquired, but that means we are looking at a potential time frame of almost two decades before, if any of these resources were acquired early, before a determination has been made of this prudency. At least where I come from, that's a long time.

MR. ELGIN: It's a long time in any event.
It's already 15 years, and I think that's what this
stipulation recognizes. It's been 15 years. We could
have brought our positions in advocacy proceedings to

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the Commission and every party take their best shot about these specific resources and what the standard means, but we are thinking if we have a year for the Staff, Company, Public Counsel, the Industrial 5 Customers to investigate, to have some opportunity to further research the materials, to go back into the records and develop a report that we are going to have better information, and then yes, the decision is still 9 five years hence, but the information is better, and I 10 think the parties are better able to evaluate the 11 specific resource decisions in the context of this prudency standard. 12

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Then just one further comment question. If we are to have that report and therefore the position of the parties in another year, the current rate case then is contemporaneous with that report. Why wouldn't we take it up and deal with the issue then rather than deferring it for another four years before incorporating the results, whatever they are, into the rates?

MR. ELGIN: It's a balance. What we are looking at are these modest levels of rate increases in light of the expected outcomes of what may or may not come about as a result of a prudency determination and a specific finding by the Commission in terms of

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whether or not this company was prudent or imprudent with respect to any of these resources, and then what is the effective remedy.

That is another question in and of itself. 5 Let's just say hypothetically that the Company was found imprudent with respect to the Hermiston 7 acquisition. The process is not to disallow all the costs. The process is to go back and reconstruct what should have the Company done and what is fair to the 9 10 Company in light of the best resource alternative 11 that's available, and so what we've attempted to do is 12 try to balance those two decisions and come up with a 13 rate plan that we feel is reasonable that balances the 14 public's interest to pay fair rates and a process for 15 to us investigate what are those resource decisions, 16 and where and what Staff would do in the context of 17 that second question is that holds ratepayers harmless. 18

That's a very difficult proposition is to go back and determine in 1992 what could have the Company done absent the acquisition of Hermiston or Cholla or Craig or Hayden or any of these. That's the real difficult exercise in this whole -- it's not necessarily just the prudence case, but it's also once

23 necessarily just the prudence case, but it's also one 24 you make a finding of imprudence, what do you do and

25 what are the consequences to the utility and the

1 ratepayers as a result of that. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Implicitly, aren't you really saying it's pretty prudent? Why would you be agreeing to this rate that does include these costs if 5 you didn't think it was roughly okay? Why isn't this part of the settlement? MR. ELGIN: What I think I'm saying is that the three, three, one rate proposal may, in fact, take 9 into account that some of these acquisitions were 10 imprudent, and it does calculate to some extent what 11 may be the outcome of Staff saying, This is the 12 alternative and this is how you hold ratepayers 13 harmless. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So you are betting we 14 15 will find something to be imprudent or some portion 16 imprudent? 17 MR. ELGIN: No. I'm just saying that's what 18 the rate plan does is it balances those factors. Not to say that the Staff at this point has made a finding 19 20 that one of these is imprudent. It balances those 21 diverse two factors about a finding of imprudence and 22 then holding ratepayers harmless. 23 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I have three 24 questions. First, can you give me the dates of these

facilities when they were brought on line?

MS. KELLY: For Cholla, that was 1990; for Craig, that was 1992; for Hayden, that was also 1992; for Hermiston, 1996; James River, 1996, and Foote 4 Creek, 1999. 5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: James River isn't 6 listed in this footnote. Does that mean anything? 7 MS. KELLY: Well, it's one of the smallest of them, which may be part of the oversight. 9 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: The second question is 10 this generation one of today's ratepayers versus the 11 next year's or five years from now ratepayers, aren't 12 we saying that we are going to balance this sort of, 13 quote, on the backs of future ratepayers or the other 14 way? Either today's ratepayers may be paying too much 15 or too little, and we will figure it out and tell you 16 in five years, in which case it's some other ratepayers 17 who will make up the difference. 18 MS. KELLY: We wouldn't be doing anything to 19 catch up in the later years. The amortization that has 20 occurred over time would be reflected in the rate base 21 balances at the time that rates are set after the rate 22 plan period, so as Mr. Lazar was alluding to, there 23 would be a lower balance on each of those plants 24 because they would have amortized out. So we wouldn't

be going back and trying time to collect past costs

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from future generations. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I quess I'm saying if we had as of today made a determination of prudency, or at least made a settlement that included that issue in it, compared to rolling that in five years from now, 5 couldn't there be a difference in terms of what today's 7 ratepayers would pay, unless the outcome turns out to be exactly what rate we're approving today? 9 MS. KELLY: I guess I would respond to that 10 by looking at the three, three, one, zero, zero 11 reflects each party's opinion on what is included in 12 rates at this point, and so if you asked each party the 13 same question, while we didn't go down and break out 14 what is in rate base and what is not, each party got 15 there, and this essentially cuts the increase that the 16 Company requested in half. 17 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: The third question is, 18 your faith that the process you are setting up is better than what's gone on in the past, and I'm not 19 20 sure what's been happening since '92, '96, or '99, but 21

I don't understand why the parties haven't been looking at these issues to date. I know the Company has put in a case, but part of a rate case is that it forces issues and forces people to confront them. You are saying you think we'll do better at prudency if we have

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another year to think about it, but the pressure seems to be somewhat off, and in the meantime, life goes on. The Company has issues. The Staff has other issues to deal with. You will have lost the pressure, really, 5 that a rate case forces to resolve issues. MS. KELLY: I think the way the process is 7 set up, giving us a year to do it doesn't mean it will take a full year, but I think outside of a litigated process, I believe there will be a freer flow of 9 10 information in that parties won't be reading the exact words of a data request and responding to those exact 11 12 words. It will more of an interactive process so that Public Counsel, Staff, ICNU, and the other parties get 13 14 the information they really need without litigation

15 getting in the way of that flow of information, and 16

that is what I see as the benefit.

We take this very seriously. It doesn't take any pressure off the Company to demonstrate this, because the report itself will be put together over the next year, provided to the Commission, will form a basis for our next rate case, and all of the discovery and data and the information that is provided to the parties through this informal process, we've agreed we won't challenge the authenticity. We will allow it, essentially, to go directly into the next rate case.

I think in response to Commissioner Hemstad's question of why can't we use it right away, from the Company's perspective, that is essentially a one-item rate case during the rate plan period, and we do have 5 some carve-outs, but from the Company's perspective, looking at a three, three, one, zero, zero stream to 7 then have the results of a prudence process laid on top of that, it's unlikely that there will be upside for the Company in that, and yet, it could significantly 9 10 impact the economics of the earning plan for it. that's why from our perspective it's important that 11 this be done as an informal process, but that folks 12 13 recognize that we take this very seriously. 14 JUDGE MOSS: I think I just have one more 15 clarifying question and then we will get back to the 16 Stipulation, some parts of which we've covered already. 17 With respect to Beverage Request 11, that 18 Bench request concerns the question of which benchmarks 19 will be used to evaluate PacifiCorp's earnings during 20 the post rate plan earnings review in Section 3 of the 21 Comprehensive Settlement, and some specific examples 22 are given in the question, capital structure, cost of 23 capital elements, overall return. The answer does at 24 least pick up on the suggestion of a reasonable range 25 of return to the extent it responds that the Company's

expectation as to earnings may be at the lower end of some range of reasonableness during the early years and perhaps at a higher end of that range during the later years, so that explains the statement of why the 5 average earns over the rate year are expected to It will give reflect equity return and overall return. 7 the Company the opportunity to earn reasonable return. I wanted to ask, and frankly, the question is 9 contemplating, perhaps wishfully, something harder than 10 was given in the response, and I wonder if parties can at least identify the anchors or end points of range of 11 12 reasonableness that we are talking about here. 13 MR. LAZAR: I don't think so. Part of this 14 settlement is there is no rate base. There is no rate 15 of return. There is no capital structure. If we had 16 gone one more step in the proceeding with all the 17 parties filing their testimony and Public Counsel had 18 come in with a 10 percent return on equity and a 19 40-percent equity capitalization ratio, and the Company 20 was at 11-and-a-quarter and 40 something, there would 21 be some anchor points, but I think that's one of the 22 things that we recognized we were giving up in this. There is only one bit of evidence in the 23 24 record on rate of return and capital structure, which 25 those are when the semi-annual reports are filed, they

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are compared to the allowed rate of return, and I hope that no one would think that the rate of return approved in U-8602 is an appropriate anchor point today or going forward, but that's the last approved rate of 5 return for this company.

JUDGE MOSS: That is one source of the concern over this aspect of the proposed stipulation is that, as you point out, Mr. Lazar, it is typically the case that as Staff reviews the rates of the company and 10 examines them in terms of the question, are there excessive earnings, it has to be excessive earnings relative to what? Relative to something, and that is typically the allowed rate of return or at least the range of reasonableness to upper points and lower points, and as you also point out, the last one we have, the last Commission approved return components and cost of money elements and capital structure and so forth is now 14 going on 15 years old, so that's the source of the concern, and if there is something anybody else wants to offer, we would be happy to here it.

MS. KELLY: I would just add that's always something of a moving target because it generally reflects the capital market of the time, so even if we 25 were to set a reasonable rate of return today, that may

not be the reasonable rate of return five years from now, and I think the Company has been operating under the understanding that our last authorized rate of return is not reflective of current market conditions, 5 and we would, in the context of this rate plan, be looking at what are the capital markets at that time and requesting cost of capital consistent with those and comparing ourselves again cost of capital figures 9 that are more representative of what the capital 10 markets are at the time. 11 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What time is this? 12 MS. KELLY: At the time of the post rate plan 13 earnings review. 14 JUDGE MOSS: Did you want to comment on that, 15 Mr. Elgin? 16 MR. ELGIN: I just want to emphasize the 17 point that Mr. Lazar mentions that the evidence that

18 you have in front of you is the Company's request for a 19 9.1 percent overall rate of return and an 20 11-and-a-quarter percent equity, which produced a 21 revenue deficiency with these kind of rate increases that were part of its initial tariff filing, and what 22 23 we have attempted to do in this stipulation is to put 24 in a range of increases that the parties feel 25 comfortable with going forward. They are modest

increases. They are designed to emulate kind of a phase-in over some period of time. It's trying to recognize that the impacts on the Company of its merger with ScottishPower and what salutary effects may result at year five when we would actually measure the increases.

One of the things that this thing does is that the Company has to make an affirmative showing in 9 year five that the three, three, one increases as a 10 result of this rate plan will prospectively result in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable from that 11 12 point going forward. That's one of the benefits this 13 settlement provides is that at that point, we will then 14 make a measurement and make a finding about what is 15 fair rate of return at that point. What is a proper 16 test period, and what are all those things that go into the traditional measuring process. So we've mitigated 17 18 the increases. We've provided a fairly stable, known five-year rate level for the customers, and at the end 19 20 of that, we will measure and make sure that what the 21 parties have agreed to, it does, in fact, hold up to that traditional standard of measuring the Company in 22 23 the context of rate of return and return on equity. 24 JUDGE MOSS: Just one more piece of this 25 question, I think, and that is this scenario: At the

end of five years, instead of making a general rate filing, the Company makes a filing to demonstrate that its currently effective rates -- that is, rates that would be approved under the Stipulation if it is approved -- are reasonable. How will the Staff then be in a position to carry its burden of proof if it decides there is an overearning situation and wishes to proceed with a complaint?

9 MR. ELGIN: We would do it precisely as we 10 have done it in the past. When the notice of hearing initially goes out, one of the things that we would put 11 12 the Company on notice is that their existing rate 13 levels are an issue, so consistent with how we've done 14 past cases is when a company has made a general rate 15 filing and the Staff has some reason to believe that 16 rates should go down, we put the company on notice that 17 its existing rates are at issue, and the Staff may, in 18 fact, recommend reductions in the rates and general 19 overall revenues from the company, so at that point, 20 the company would be on notice and we would carry our 21 burden.

But this process contemplates the Company coming in and making an affirmative showing. Once we had that filing, then if we felt that the existing rates were, in fact, excessive, we would put them on

notice and carry our burden and put on our case to recommend that rates should be lowered. JUDGE MOSS: That takes care of the clarifying questions with respect to the Bench request, 5 so I think the thing to do at this juncture would be to turn to the Stipulation itself, and as we have done in some prior proceedings, we will go through it a page at a time, and as the various members of the Bench have 9 questions, they can raise those. Looking at Page 1, then, and I guess we actually get into the Agreement 10 11 itself and its various terms beginning with Section 1 12 on Page 2, which describes the rate plan periods. 13 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: This comes up later, 14 but it's referenced in the third paragraph under 15 "Purpose", so I'll raise it now, where it says, "... 16 the Company will submit either a filing demonstrating 17 the reasonableness of the Company's then-existing rates 18 or a general rate filing." What does that mean? 19 MR. ELGIN: What it means is -- I don't know 20 if you've heard the phrase "a show-cause proceeding" 21 that some jurisdictions have, or a Commission can ask a 22 utility to show cause and come in and justify your 23 That is what that language is existing rates. 24 attempting. It's saying that for the purposes of this 25 settlement, the Company will come in and demonstrate

the reasonableness of the rates at the end of the rate plan period, and this gets to the question from Judge Moss earlier about what would Staff do if we felt that they were overearning, and that's what we tried to anticipate here.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: One way or the other, the intention here is for a full-blown rate case after the five years.

MR. ELGIN: That's correct.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: We don't have show cause in this state so that the Company's promise to come in here and show us something -- what kind of legal animal do we have in front of us? It seems there is not much we can do about what they show us unless the Commission files a complaint, in which case it has the burden of proof.

MR. ELGIN: In that hypothetical, then you also have the remedy of the Company violating the Commission order.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What do you mean?
MR. ELGIN: There are specific sanctions in
the statute for the Commission to take with respect to
a company violating one of the Commission's orders.
CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Suppose they come and

say, We think our current rate is reasonable. We're

complying with the order. We think it's reasonable because of ABC. But if we don't think it's reasonable, then it seems to me the burden is actually on the 5 Commission, not the Company. MR. ELGIN: No, ma'am. I don't believe 7 I believe that the Company has, in the that's correct. basis of this, a responsibility to justify its existing rates, to file the results of operations and evidence 9 10 supporting existing rates. The Staff and the parties 11 will do that traditional investigation, develop its own 12 case, and if it in fact determines that rates should go 13 down, we well make that recommendation in the context 14 of the Staff and Intervenors' direct cases, and the 15 Company then has the opportunity for rebuttal to prove 16 that what it has failed is, in fact, the right thing. 17 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Are you saying that 18 these words right here, "... filing demonstrating the 19 reasonableness of the Company's then-existing rates..." 20 that this itself creates the obligation and the burden? 21 MR. ELGIN: Yes. 22 COMMISSIONER GILLIS: What I'd like to know 23 is why do you want to go there? Why not a general rate

MR. ELGIN: I think that that's what this, in

24 case filing? 25

00895 effect, does. COMMISSIONER GILLIS: So why not just say it? MR. VAN NOSTRAND: I think the feeling was 4 the Company might not be able to justify a rate 5 increase. They make just come in and show their existing rates are reasonable, but the intent is that the Company has the burden of proof. The advantage is that the Commission doesn't have to call the Company in 9 and then the Commission bears the burden. The Company 10 will make a filing, and it bears the burden of either 11 showing that its existing rates are reasonable, or if 12 it asks for increases, to carry the burden, but the 13 Company is here and has the burden. 14 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: It seems to me if you 15 filed for a rate, not a rate increase, but just filed 16 for a rate, which happened to be the same, then maybe 17 the burden would be on you, but to me, what these words 18 say is, you will file something that demonstrates the 19 reasonableness. These words themselves, I don't think, 20 says anything about the burden of proof. 21 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I think I disagree 22 with that. I think I now understand the difference and 23 the reason. Able to file demonstrating the

reasonableness of rates. It certainly carries the point that the burden is on the Company to demonstrate

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that its rates in effect at the time are reasonable. MR. ELGIN: That's correct. 3 MR. VAN NOSTRAND: We were probably picking up on this notion of show cause from other 5 jurisdictions, even though we don't have it here, but it's the same notion. The Company has the burden of demonstrating its rates, but the understanding of everyone in the negotiations, we are clarifying it here is that the Company has the burden. 9 10 MR. LAZAR: The only way you could make this 11 stronger in that regard that occurs to me is that you 12 could make the rates that are in here, the three, 13 three, and one, interim with an expiration date in five 14 years, and then if the Company doesn't make a rate 15 filing that demonstrates something, the rates would 16 revert to the now current tariff rates. That wasn't 17 the intent of the group; that there would be a filing that would either -- and I view one as demonstrating 18 19 the reasonableness of rates as a little thinner than 20 the rate case that seeks to defend a rate increase, but 21 the burden would be the same. 22 MS. KELLY: I think with all due to respect 23

MS. KELLY: I think with all due to respect to Mr. Lazar, that was discussed in settlement and was not part of the agreement that was reached. I think it's clear that the Company -- and we are willing to

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clarify on record the Company bears the burden of proof on either of these filings, and that's certainly our intent, and I suspect that the beast that we file at that time will look very much the same, whether it's a 5 general rate case or a demonstration of the reasonableness of the earnings.

JUDGE MOSS: At that point in time, this filing would include the prior determinations or report, at least, with respect to prudence, so this is, in a sense, a reality check.

MS. KELLY: Correct.
JUDGE MOSS: It's like, we are taking our best shot looking forward and thinking that we've taken into account the likelihood that some costs may be found imprudent but most will be found prudent, and now, we are going to look back and see how good our quess was.

MS. KELLY: It's also a time when the transition plan will have been fully implemented, and so the result of that will be reflected in test year operations and that will help to make sure that costs and benefits match and we are not arguing over known and measurable changes; in fact, the transition plan will be implemented at that time.

JUDGE MOSS: It will more known than

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speculative. Anything else with respect to the material on Page 2 of the Stipulation? CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: It might be better to raise it later, but just a footnote to what is or isn't 5 included in rate, and you give the example of system benefit charge, and I think it was Bench Request No. 4, but does it mean that if later we determine a system benefit charge of one-half percent or six percent --9 anything within a range of zero to six percent --10 doesn't the fact the rate that is paid? Is that what 11 that means? 12 MS. KELLY: The implementation of the system 13 benefit charge would be incremental to the three, 14 three, one, zero, zero, so it would have an impact on 15 customer's bills. I think the question we are getting 16 at in Bench Request No. 4 is would there be some 17 trigger where it would be carried over into later 18 years. 19 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So it is separate and 20 it's a separate surcharge. 21 MS. KELLY: Yes. 22 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: And it's only if it 23 exceeds six percent, what's above the six percent would 24 go potentially in the rate base?

MS. KELLY: That somehow that would be

deferred until another year; although, I have to say the parties don't expect that that first year will see a six percent system benefit charge. 4 JUDGE MOSS: Some things being less 5 speculative than others. Anything else with respect to Page 2 material? Let's look at Page 3. COMMISSIONER GILLIS: I have a question on Page 3. I'm somewhat concerned about line item, at 9 least our experience of the telecommunications 10 consumers is that they aren't always happy with a lot 11 of line items, and maybe it's a question for Mr. Lazar, 12 but what is the usefulness of putting on a monthly bill 13 a separate credit labeled "merger benefits and merger 14 savings, " and likewise for Centralia? 15 MR. LAZAR: We didn't seek these to be 16 separate. The merger credit was established separate 17 from the merger proceeding. The Centralia credit was 18 established as separate because it's a specific amount of money to be refunded, and if we get to December 19 20 13th, 2005, and it's done, then it would expire on 21 December 13th. That was a way to make sure that a 22 specific amount of money was flowed through and that 23 wasn't a component. Neither of these is a component of 24 permanent rates because there is a specific amount of

25 money to be flowed through it.

COMMISSIONER GILLIS: What is the purpose of putting it on the bill? MR. LAZAR: I think I'd have to ask Ken and Andrea to speak to that. It wasn't an issue for us. 5 MS. KELLY: I think from the company's perspective, I think we found that it provides 7 information to customers. It's traditionally what we've done in the other states. The merger credit has started up in some of the other states. The Centralia 9 10 credit is going to be reflected in some of the other states, so it's a way to explain to customers the sort 11 of a one-off in that this isn't part of the revenue 12 13 requirement calculation. It's similar to a system 14 benefit charge in that it's there for a finite period 15 of time, as Mr. Lazar said. This is a means to reflect 16 it to customers and to give them information. Frankly, 17 we didn't have our heart set on a line item; although, 18 I think it's important not to wrap it, necessarily, 19 into base rates to let customers know that there is a 20 time when that credit would go away. 21 COMMISSIONER GILLIS: That's a potentially 22 different issue of whether it should be on the bill on 23 a monthly basis or simply inform customers of the 24 intent and what it is. I'm just reflecting on what we've learned in telecom is that consumers are very

confused by various line items, and within this agreement alone, there is a potential of four new line items. There is two potential credits and a potential system benefit charge and a potential of a low-income charge that could end up as a line item on the bill, and just what I've experienced in a different industry, that concerns me.

MR. ELGIN: One of the things to consider is some of the prior experiences we had with respect to other utilities that had these deferrals and things that go back to customers is particularly when they are credits, it helps to make sure the customers understand the rates when those credits expire. If you build it into rates, you've built in rate increases once the credit has expired, so it's better that consumers appear to respond better to that.

In the Puget case when the program was unwound and some of these credits went away and deferrals went away, the rates were going all over the place, and I think particularly with credits -- and Centralia and merger credit are one specifically where we've had special treatment of those items -- I think it's fair to put those on the bills. I share your concern about the telephone industry, but I'm thinking that we'll be mindful of that, particularly when it

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comes to SBC and some of the other things that we will be bringing in for consideration. JUDGE MOSS: Any more questions with respect to the material on Page 3? And that carries over onto 5 Page 4, and we have had some discussion of the prudence issue already. Page 5 then. Page 6? COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I'm looking at Paragraph 9. It's talking about changes that can be made. As it says, "... tariff or rate changes for the 9 following purposes: " and then under F, it says, "New 10 11 service offerings; pursuing special contracts tailored 12 to meet individual customer needs..." How is that 13 applicable to the question of a tariff or rate changes? MR. ELGIN: Hypothetically, let's say 14 something is going on in the commercial sector with 15 16 respect to the Company's rates, and there is a 17 potential for some kind of bypass or some kind of new 18 service offering that the Company needs to respond and 19 it needs to change its rates or have a special contract 20 to deal with that circumstance. What we are saying is 21 that doesn't constitute a rate change, but it's a 22 tariff change in that the rate plan would allow the 23 Company to file. 24 Another example is the Boise Cascade

circumstance. This special contract does expire, and

it may best well be that the Company needs to file a new tariff or new special contract to keep that customer. So what we are trying to say is those kinds of filings are appropriate for the utility to make in 5 the pendency of this five-year rate plan. JUDGE MOSS: That almost seems to contemplate 7 as a foregone conclusion that were the Company to be faced with market conditions that required it to 9 renegotiate its special contracts to lower prices to 10 the industrial customer group that there would be no 11 impact on the residential customers, for example. 12 MR. ELGIN: Yes, that's correct. 13 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Why wouldn't it be the 14 other way around, make tariff changes to raise tariffs 15 for residential customers because of special contract 16 following the industrial customers? 17 MR. ELGIN: I think what Section E is it's 18 revenue neutral; that there may be a circumstance that 19 a tariff fixed within the class or a rate design fixed 20 within the class, as long as it were revenue neutral, 21 may accommodate the need, and that's well and done, but to the extent that a tariff or a special contract would 22 lower the rate for an industrial customer but then the 23 24 offsetting losses in revenue and contribution margins

would be captured by other classes that the rate plan

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fixes the level of rates for all other classes of customers. MR. LAZAR: This was an issue of great concern to us. The language that is in E dealing with intraclass rate design, very specifically, is not 5 allowing interclass rate rebalancing, and the special contract language or individual customer needs in Section F, I guess the comparison I would make would be 9 to Puget's Schedule 48 where the Commission approved a 10 special tariff or which a small number of customers 11 were eligible at the time it was approved, we believe 12 that it would lead to substantial attrition and revenue 13 to Puget. It hasn't guite worked out the way we'd all 14 expected in the last few months, but that was our 15 expectation at the time, and the Commission order very 16 explicitly said, We are going to approve this tariff, 17 but there is not going to be any cost shifting to other 18 classes as a result of it. 19 The E and F, we think, were constructed to 20 give some flexibility for the Company to address 21

individual customer or group customer situations as they come up, but not to have those slop over across classes.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: So as I understand it, 25 E and F read together mean that there can be cost

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shifts within classes but not between classes. MR. LAZAR: Correct. I quess I'd like to here Andrea interpret it as well. MS. KELLY: The only thing I'm concerned 5 about in making that blanket statement is the we don't want to prejudge what happens in the low-income 7 assistance program filing, so I think the way that -- I guess I would say with the exception of that, that is 9 the intention is that in the special contracts and all 10 of those to the extent that there are filings, revenue 11 neutral filings, there will be are intraclass, and we 12 won't be shifting between classes. 13 MR. LAZAR: Section B anticipates the 14 possibility that there will be a system benefit charge 15 filing that would increase the rates for some or all 16 classes, depending on how its structured. 17 C anticipates that the possibility of a low-income 18 assistance program filing that would cause rates for 19 non low-income customers to increase to cover some or 20 all of the assistance that's provided through that 21 rate, and that would cause changes to the three, three, 22 one results. 23 I expect that the system benefit charge is 24 going to be pretty uniform across classes, and the

low-income impact is going to be modest when it gets

spread out across a large group of customers. It's not going to be a very significant number. I expect it to be a number. I don't expect it to be a big one. JUDGE MOSS: Your last comment that it might 5 affect the three, three, one, or some have referred to it the three, three, one, zero, zero rate plan, puzzles 7 me a little bit. Is the contemplation then that with the advent of a low-income program -- and this is just a scenario, a hypothetical, if you will. Let's say 9 10 such a plan allows certain customers to pay a \$4 base 11 rate instead of a 4.5 base rates. A revenue neutral 12 filing of that nature would take that 25 cents, 13 multiply it by the low-income customers that are 14 receiving that benefit and then spread those dollars to 15 others, intraclass or interclass. That would be 16 revenue neutral, wouldn't it? It wouldn't change the 17 three, three, one, would it? It would just change the figures that we see reflected in response to Bench 18 19 Request 3. 20 MR. LAZAR: I think it would change the 21 three, three, one. To pick an easy numerical example. 22 A 1.7-million-dollar low-income discount would be one 23 percent of Company revenues, and that might be spread 24 as a one-percent increase to all other customers, 25 okay? --

00907 MS. KELLY: So it impacts the rate spread of the three percent, not the overall amount. JUDGE MOSS: That was my point. It affects 4 the allocation but not the amount. 5 MS. KELLY: Yes. 6 MR. LAZAR: Correct. It would mean that 7 low-income customers would see one percent more, and low-income customers would see whatever 1.7 million 9 dollars works out to less. 10 Come from the Company's gross revenue 11 perspective, if all of the concession to low-income 12 customers was recovered from other customers, it would make no difference. If, however, some of the 13 14 low-income assistance, and one of the programs that one 15 of the utilities in the states does this, is designed 16 to reduce the level of uncollectibles. Some of this 17 money can come out of a reduction on collectibles; that 18 we don't have to raise rates to everybody else to 19 recover the money that's no longer uncollectible. It 20 might be the 1.7 million, maybe 1.5 million, gets 21 spread across the classes, and 200,000 is reduction in 22 expected levels of uncollectibles.

perspective three, three, one because there is built

into the Company's filing and built into history a

So it's actually still from the Company's

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level of uncollectibles, but if that's going to go down, the net revenues collected by the Company changes, but the rates don't reflect as high a percentage increase. It would be slightly lower rates to which a slightly lower level of uncollectibles would be expected to occur.

MS. KELLY: I think probably what we are seeing is that people have different approaches to the low-income assistance programs and different ideas in their minds, which we will be working out over time. think it's important to make clear from the Company's perspective that we agree to this plan expecting a three, three, one, zero, zero, and that the low-income assistance program would not impact that, so that's where we are coming from in the design of this, and again, that's part of the process and part of what the Commission will be deliberating when the low-income filing is made.

MR. ELGIN: If I could add, you are correct. If you turn to Exhibit 270, it's response to Bench request No. 3, unfortunately, the year 2001 spreadsheet that's at the top of the page makes it look like low income is in addition to system revenues, which it is not. It's a separate distinct filing that will be evaluated in the context of the overall revenues that

the Company is realizing in implementing the rate plan. So you are correct in that it does affect the spread, but it doesn't affect the total revenue the Company would collect from this settlement proposal. 5 JUDGE MOSS: So in terms of implementing such a program, what we might expect to see is something 7 that would essentially amend the rate spread aspect of this overall package, including the two stipulations. 9 MR. ELGIN: Right. So hypothetically, these 10 base rates in the first column might change to reflect 11 whatever the level of low-income assistance that the 12 Commission would deem reasonable perspectively. 13 JUDGE MOSS: Or it might be necessary to 14 segment the residential class and the low income and 15 non low income where some would be experiencing 4.3 and 16 some would be experiencing 3.7. 17 MR. ELGIN: That would be one way to do it as 18 well, yes. 19 JUDGE MOSS: I think we were on Page 6, and 20 carrying over to Page 7 then. Any more questions on 21 these areas? I do have another question on 11, the way it's phrased, I guess. A general rate case filing would be made under the interim rate standard. Now, as 22 23 Mr. Elgin discussed earlier, typically, interim rates 24 25 are part of a general rate case filing where the

company asks for immediate implementation on an interim basis pending review and determination of a final rate. It is not unknown for a regulatory Commission to approve interim rates subject to refund, and there is a 5 significant body of law that validates that process. 6 Is that the process that's contemplated here, 7 or is this contemplating another circumstance? Let me rephrase the question. If the circumstances that 9 trigger Section 11 were to eventuate, is it the 10 contemplation of the parties that that would result in 11 a filing that would include both a request for interim, 12 that is to say, essentially, temporary rate relief, and 13 a permanent rate increase on a prospective basis? 14 MR. ELGIN: Yes. That's what Staff 15 contemplates. 16 JUDGE MOSS: Anything else on Page 7 from the 17 Bench? Page 8? 18 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I have a question as 19 to what, on No. 13, what are Schedule 300 charges? 20 What is their magnitude? 21 MS. KELLY: Miscellaneous charges that 22 include reconnection charges and tampering charges. 23 What we would be doing -- I can give you the list --24 meter test charges, service call charges, contract 25 administration credits and things like that. So they

are miscellaneous charges that are charged to a customer when they ask for a specific service that incurs additional costs, and what the Company would be doing is filing those with the Commission to change 5 those over time. The rate plan allows for that, but, of course, they would subject to the same reviews of any tariff filing, and this is not intended to prejudge it or bind any of the parties on the positions that 9 they would be taking. 10 JUDGE MOSS: Just a follow-up on that point, 11 as I recall the original filing in this proceeding, 12 there was some testimony to the effect that the 13 Schedule 300 charges, even as proposed by the Company, 14 would still not recover the full cost of those various 15 miscellaneous charges, such as reconnection, and I 16 would presume from that then that the additional costs 17 are somehow rolled into general rates so that the 18 Company is not in an under-recovery situation. 19 doing this as an independent filing, is it the 20 intention that the Company will take fully into account 21 the, I'll call it subsidy for lack of a better word, 22 that is implicit in what I just described? 23 MS. KELLY: I'm not the expert on these 24 Schedule 300 charges, but my understanding is that 25 while there may be some cost of those included in the

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revenue requirements on a baseline level, for the most part, the costs are driven by how often the service is required, so it's very difficult to estimate what the costs would be and then include them in the revenue requirement, so my understanding is that not very much of these costs have been included in our revenue requirement because it's difficult to estimate what they might be, and that's why we are trying to get them closer.

What I can say is that we would be able to

What I can say is that we would be able to address that concern at the time of the filing and make sure that you are talking to the experts about it, and they can address those questions as they come up.

JUDGE MOSS: I would just be concerned there is probably a fair amount of general administrative

expenses not recovered in this fashion, and that would be a concern. Anything else on Page 8? Page 9?

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I don't have a question on Page 9, but I have a question back on the prudency issues and what it means for the management of the business and the agency. If it seems inherently

the business and the agency. If it seems inherently difficult to address prudency in a rate proceeding and

23 we approve this settlement, with the approval of 24 addressing prudency after a rate case instead of before

25 or during, what do you think it will mean for how

prudency is addressed in other settings? It would seem to me it would be better to address prudency before the rate case even comes up, but at least at the rate case if it hasn't come up, but if it's too difficult to do in a rate case, then it 5 seems like the result is we push that issue ahead or beyond the rate case, in which case the rate case really isn't the closure or tying up of issues that I would have thought it would be. Maybe it just doesn't 9 10 have to be. It becomes more like an interim rate, 11 which I use that word advisedly since I think interim rate has other requirements, but maybe that's a good 12 13 idea that an interim rate has other requirements. 14 MR. ELGIN: I think that's what this 15 settlement embodies is a five-year transition period of 16 some interim level of rates that all the parties are 17 comfortable with. Ostensibly, you have before you in 18 direct testimony and exhibits a request for 25 million dollars in general revenues over a two-year period, and 19 20 what we've tried to do is evaluate that and then 21 provide some level of rate relief that the Staff feels 22 comfortable with. 23 Regarding the idea of -- I don't mean to say 24 that the prudence process is too difficult, that we 25 can't do it. We can do it, but it just seems that once

we head down that road, positions get very intractable. Information doesn't flow. It's difficult in the sense that it's just an awful process. I've been through one, and I know, telling you from personal experience, it's not fun, and it's not a rewarding use of professional expertise, because people think and bring different perspectives, and the idea is to try something new.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: This is not just this company and these parties. As is obvious from looking

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: This is not just this company and these parties. As is obvious from looking at the Agreement, what we say today is used by others later, and I guess the question I'm posing --

MR. ELGIN: I don't believe it is.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I think we would be saying, fine, it's okay not to address the prudency of six facilities that have been purchased beginning in 1992. That's okay, we'll set a rate, and we'll get to this other stuff later.

If that's what we are doing, and I think it is what we would be doing, what message does that send to people, and is there anything wrong with a practice like that? Companies buy things. They put them on line. We don't have to worry about this until after the next rate case because it's too tough. We know we can kind of agree on an interim rate or agree on a

rate, and we'll get to this other stuff later. Is that a problem? It seems like a problem, but maybe it's not a problem. MR. VAN NOSTRAND: I guess I don't see this 5 as being a statement that we can't do prudency reviews in a general rate case. I think it's a recognition 7 that we were going to examine the prudence of these resource in this case. It was a big issue, but we are 9 not able to resolve it. I think it still stands for 10 the proposition that prudence reviews are done in 11 general rate cases and can still be done in general 12 rate cases, but as part of this settlement, we did not 13 reach an agreement on that issue, and we held it 14 forward and developed a process so that we can do the 15 process that we can do the process that would preserve 16 it until the general rate case. I think it's a 17 recognition that it probably belongs in this case, and we didn't resolve it in this case, but not for the 18 general proposition we can't do prudence reviews in 19 20 general rate cases. 21 MR. LAZAR: This is one of many awkward 22 issues that has finessed in this settlement, and that's 23 the nature of settlements is you finesse awkward 24 issues, and we were --

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But usually you

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finesse them and reach closure on them. It's not really a global settlement as you suggested, because the issues here aren't really resolved. You've resolved some of the issues and you've punted on 5 others, in fact, some fairly significant ones. When something is finessed, it's settled 7 without a clear articulation of where the parties stand, that's one thing. Finesse meaning we didn't 9 really resolve it is a different kind of finessing. 10 MR. LAZAR: I agree. We were prepared to 11 address prudence in this case; however, we were 12 handicapped by the fact that the Company didn't file an 13 initial case with all the data in it demonstrating 14 their burden of proof on prudence, so we were kind of 15 starting from nowhere. You were going to get a very 16 crude record from Public Counsel on the prudence issue. 17 With this process, we will have instead of a 18 crude record in this proceeding, we will have an 19 elegant piece of shelf art that will sit quietly for 20 four years and perhaps be used at the end of that 21 periods by your successors or you, if you are 22 unfortunate enough to sit there forever. But we will 23 have a much more complete record because -- we had a 24 lot of issues to look at in this case, and it was a finite amount of time that we could devote to any of

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them, and this was one that we had very little time to
dedicate to, and we didn't have much in the record to
start with, so we are really starting from scratch.

I think we will have a much better analysis
through this process than we would have had we filed on
the schedule we were directed to file on, but we won't
have closure, as you indicate, until there is a
decision.

MR. CROMWELL: Chairwoman Showalter, I wasn't sure if I heard if you were concerned about the precedential value of an order of the Commission for other companies or other cases separate from the process you contemplate?

14 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: By precedent, I mean 15 parties look at what we do and what we approve. I 16 don't mean to say an approval of a settlement has 17 necessarily legal precedence, but I think it does have a practice type of precedence, as you have just cited 18 the earlier case of Puget where something was kicked 19 20 beyond the rate case, so that probably is the signal 21 that you took to say, Well, this is an idea we can do, 22 and this would be yet another instance, I guess, of 23 that.

I'm not certain there is a problem with such a practice. It seems odd to me to buy something in

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1992 and have it incorporated into rates in a general way and not really resolve until 2006, 16 or 17 at the earlier.

MR. CEDARBAUM: I just wanted to echo the 5 comments that Mr. Elgin and others have made that I don't think that we've punted, necessarily, on these issues by just setting up a process. I think what we've done is established processes that will be 9 meaningful; that the result will be a collaboration of 10 all these parties and all the interests that are around 11 the table with respect to -- prudence drawing the most 12 attention, but also the system benefit charge and low 13 income, and those will be valuable processes. 14 won't be useless. I think we will have a result that's 15 very beneficial to the parties, Commission, and 16 ratepayers. I don't think just setting up a process is 17 necessarily a bad thing if the process is one that the 18 end product is something that is valuable to the 19 players and results in a product that is useful and 20 beneficial. 21

MS. KELLY: I think from the Company's perspective is we look at this process as a way to evaluate future acquisitions to the extent there are future acquisitions, and that in a way of essentially making it so that in future rate cases, the Company's

direct case includes the information that parties need, so I guess on some level a learning process of what is the exact information that will be helpful in Staff and Public Counsel and others making their recommendations on this, and then we would be able to use that going forward in our next rate cases to insure that that standard is met in those cases. So I think it also has some future value in the way the Company would come before the Commission in future cases.

MS. DIXON: I know the focus has been more on

MS. DIXON: I know the focus has been more on the prudency process, but certainly Mr. Cedarbaum also mentioned the SBC and the low-income assistance.

Our preference would have been to address those in detail in the Stipulation, but absent that, our expectation is to move forward with processes on both of those that will be meaningful, where parties will be discussing and negotiating in good faith and where we can bring forward something that the Commission will be comfortable approving and that implementation will occur.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I'd just make a general comment on prudence. We are in this problem, at least in part, because it's been 14 years since the Company has been here, and that's a continuing problem. I think it needs to be better addressed. It's a real

problem with prudence because again, our responsibility to put ourselves into the environment at the time that the Company made the decision, the longer the period of time that goes by, people retire, die. Nobody remembers anymore. If records aren't meticulously kept, even when this comes back, there is a good chance you will have an entirely new Commission who will be addressing this issue. Time in this environment is not a friend.

MR. CROMWELL: If I may, Commissioner, that was very well contemplated by all the parties during this process, and part of the idea of putting the prudence process together was that we could develop a better record than we might otherwise be able to do in a more workshop -- if I can use the term loosely, a workshop style process as opposed to a litigated case which we were proceeding under at the time this settlement was reached, and I think it's directly the concern that you have just expressed; that we are trying to respond to a process that was created in the Stipulation.

MR. LAZAR: I'm not sure that you or your successor Commissioners will want to impose the standard that you just identified; that is, putting yourself in the place of the Company at the time the

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decision was made when these come forward for review. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Isn't that what's required by the Stipulation? Among other things, we 4 are binding ourselves to some old orders on this. Page 5 6 MR. LAZAR: It binds to a process of 7 examining prudence. It doesn't bind to the standard that this Commission has imposed, for example, in the 9 Puget case, imposed in 1983 in the Kettle Falls case, 10 so what should management have done when they did it? 11 I just want to give an example here. 12 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I want to be sure, 13 because it seems to me that the parties have agreed on 14 a standard that the Commission previously approved this 15 standard or articulated this standard, but we are 16 saying -- It says, "The standard applied by the 17 Commission to measure prudence are generally as 18 follows: What would a reasonable board of directors and company management have decided given what they 19 20 know or reasonably should have known to be true at the 21 time they made a decision." I heard you to be saying 22 maybe we weren't buying this standard. 23 MR. LAZAR: I was trying to get to a simple 24 numerical example, maybe I'm wrong. Let's take the

Cholla plant, for example, in 1990, and let's say we

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finds as a result of this prudence review it was a bad deal. Too much was paid for it. In the first 10 years of its life it was way above market, and then for the next 10 years of its life, it was about at market, and 5 for the last 10 years of its life, it was below market, and from 1990 to 2000, the Company absorbed that into the system without a rate case, and we never paid a rate increase to pay for this thing during its 9 expensive years, and then for the next five years when 10 it's about at market, we are paying a pretty modest 11 rate increase, and when we look at it in 2005, that 12 standard may well say, This thing wasn't a very good 13 deal from a 1990 perspective, but it's a darn good deal 14 from a 2005 perspective. 15 It's hard for me to imagine that a future

Commission won't consider that possibility should it be before them. I just can't imagine somebody looking at something that's a great deal going forward, and saying, it's a great deal going forward, but because in 1990, it was a bad deal, somehow we need to --CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What about the reverse situation? Supposing something appears to be a pretty good deal when it's undertaken, and suddenly, the whole

market changes or whatever, but this thing is a dog, 24 25 and the Company is saying, But, but, we didn't know

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this when we went into it. Maybe you did, maybe you didn't, but this thing, we don't want to stick the ratepayers with it.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I agree with that 5 comment. I don't see how the Commission can do other than to look at the situation at the time to do other than that. It is precisely the after-the-fact Monday morning quarterbacking, which I recall we were accused 9 of doing even at the time of the Puget environment, 10 incorrectly, but in any event, I think there would be a 11 due process issue if we were to start making evaluative 12 choices long after the fact based upon the evidence at 13 the time. That wouldn't be fair to the Company. would be unfair to somebody. 14

MR. ELGIN: I guess I wanted to do reiterate too. The prudence test and standard itself really is a two-process kind of application. One, the question is, in fact, was the Company prudent with respect to the acquisition of a resource, and then if it wasn't, then the second part of the exercise becomes, and this is very difficult, is how do you hold ratepayers harmless?

The last time this issue was before the

The last time this issue was before the Commission, the range of dollar estimates was 100 million to 500 million dollars net present value.

25 That's a huge range, and what this process is going to

attempt to accomplish is first off, get better
information than we have now in the context of what did
the Company do with respect to these resources at these
various points in time, and then if it turns out that
the Staff or Public counsel or any other party have an
issue with a specific resource to begin to answer that
more difficult question is to what is the right action
with respect to holding the ratepayers harmless for
those decisions.

10 What we think we've crafted here is a 11 balanced rate plan over a five-year period that enables 12 the Company to understand Staff and Public Counsel's 13 and other parties' perspective as to what's the 14 standard, and then to the extent that we had issues, 15 then let's give the Company some opportunity to 16 mitigate those issues, and hopefully, we can get to 17 resolution of what might be some appropriate mitigation 18 and let the Company take those actions, and what we 19 think we have crafted here before you is a balanced 20 process, because quite frankly, Mr. Lazar has already 21 alluded to you that the Staff and Public Counsel had 22 issues with respect to the direct case, so the alternative that we saw was Staff coming in and saying, 23 24 These costs need to be rejected or we need some other kind of process, and the Commission's precedent was to

give us another year and another year's time to evaluate the information, so let's try something different with respect to how we get the information and how we evaluate those resource decisions, and then 5 how do we evaluate what might be proper mitigation. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Why do you think the 7 process that you are anticipating will be less adversarial than a rate case? What's different about It seems to be the most difficult issues and 9 10 contested issues that will result in potentially a 11 large difference. 12 MR. ELGIN: Because anything has to be better 13 than the process we went through in the Puget case. 14 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You may laugh, but I'm What is the process? Things can be worse. 15 serious. MR. ELGIN: I'm just telling you from my 16 17 perspective that in terms of discovery and sitting down 18 with the Company and trying to get a dialogue going, 19 when you are in a position where the Company has been 20 told that there is questions regarding the prudence of 21 acquisition adjustment, the fences go up. 22 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: That may be. Why is 23 this going to be different? 24 MR. ELGIN: Well, I quess we've taken the 25 Company's good faith representations that it will, in

fact, be different, and they will work with Staff and the parties to provide the information we need, and we accepted that. We think there is a better process, and we are going to take a shot at it. My gut reaction is that it's got to be better than what we went through with Puget, went through twice.

MR. LAZAR: From my perspective, even if it's not better than what we went through with Puget, and it 9 conceivably might not be, it's better than what we 10 would have brought you as a record in this proceeding, 11 for the same reason that the Puget proceeding was 12 created, which is there was nothing on the table up 13 front, and we kind of came in with a chain saw and a 14 meat ax trying to get at some information, and in the 15 short time frame of this proceeding with all the other 16 issues on rate base and rate of return and operating 17 expenses and cost allocation and rate design, no, it's 18 not a lot of time to get at some pretty thorny issues. 19 From our perspective, we can be more tenacious but also 20 be a bit more civil to the Company about how we go 21 after information in this kind of a process. 22

JUDGE MOSS: I wanted to follow up on this because I have written down the same question. What is the basis for all the optimism I'm hearing expressed about how this is going to be a process that's going to

produce more open, warm, and fuzzy exchange of information than what is typically experienced? In the rate case context, there is at least the leverage of the other elements of the rate case. 5 Here, you are going to have a prudence review undertaken in isolation, and if the Company decides it 7 wants to be intransigent, what level of assurance and what enforceable assurances do the parties have that they will be able to extract the necessary information 9 10 to develop this record that you anticipate, Mr. Lazar? 11 MR. ELGIN: I'll answer that question. Let's 12 say the company is intractable. Then the report from 13 Staff will say, The Company has failed to demonstrate 14 its burden, and what we will be doing is making an 15 effort to hold ratepayers harmless. So the state of 16 record will be, in fact, that, at the end of the 17 five-year rate plan; that the Company was intractable. 18 There has not been a showing of prudence, and our 19 effort will now be focused to hold ratepayers harmless, 20 and the result of that case will not be a second chance 21 for the Company but, in fact, a finding of imprudence 22 and what is the proper remedy. 23 So we are not going to be messing around and 24 beating around the bush. I don't mean to think this is 25 going to be warm and fuzzy, but I hope it's better than

the process we had with the prudence case. The fact we do get the information so we can come forward with a recommendation saying that, Yes, the Company has made an affirmative showing, and these resources do belong in the rate base, and there are no adjustments for rate-making purposes.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What if they are not intractable but are cooperative and provide information and the parties simply disagree on the information, which seems to be a fairly logical possibility.

MR. ELGIN: Then we are at the same position. We are still disagreeing with the Company, and our efforts will now be focused on developing what information at this point to hold ratepayers harmless for some future rate case. But we've at least made another shot in a process outside of litigation to get to the information, and I think that's a better process. Give it a shot. It's a risk; I agree, but I think it's worthwhile, based on my prior experience with these kinds of thorny issues.

MR. CEDARBAUM: If I could just add to that, part of the stipulation on the joint report does allow for any party to include their own separate statement on one or more resources, so by "joint report," we are not necessarily meaning a consensus report. We mean a

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1 report that shows you all the contested issues with 2 respect to one or more resources.

JUDGE MOSS: In the meantime, to reiterate a point that was perhaps made earlier on, Staff for its part of it believes that the three, three, one, zero, zero plan for rate increases adequately takes into account the risk that some of these costs ultimately will be found to be imprudent.

MR. ELGIN: That might be found imprudent, that is correct, not it could be.

11 JUDGE MOSS: Right. That's why I used the 12 word risk. I had another question that occurred to me 13 earlier. Under the statutes that govern the 14 Commission's determination of general rate cases, it's 15 really necessary to make two findings. One is that the 16 existing rates that are proposed to be changed are no 17 longer just, reasonable, or compensatory, and the other 18 finding is that the rates proposed to be implemented 19 are just, reasonable, and compensatory.

Is Staff satisfied on the basis of its review of the rate filing, which included cross-examination of the Company's witnesses during an earlier phase of this case, that the existing rates, indeed, are not just, reasonable, and compensatory?

MR. ELGIN: That's correct.

JUDGE MOSS: Are there other questions from the Bench? I think we've actually gone through the Stipulation page by page, and we've also then returned to some general questions and concerns in the area of prudence. I think I have exhausted my questions and wondered if the Bench has any others. I suppose I feel momentarily awkward when Commissioner Gillis is absent and I'm about to close this thing up. Go ahead, Ms. Davison.

MS. DAVISON: I have been sorts of

MS. DAVISON: I have been sorts of uncharacteristically quiet through this process, and I wanted to add a couple comment about why ICNU supports this stipulation. First, I would like to thank the Bench and the Commissioners for some very good, tough questions. These records are exceedingly important for the reasons that have been talked about this afternoon, and as someone who has relied on records in previous proceedings of this nature, I can tell you they become very important in years, two, three, four, and five, so I very much appreciate the good dialogue this afternoon.

I think that some of the more difficult questions perhaps have been hard to answer by virtue of the fact that this is a settlement, and I think that if you were able to be the mouse in the room or listen to

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the conversation that took place in the context of
    settlement, you would hear that there were,
   particularly on the prudence issues, there were
   positions that said, This number should be zero, and
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   other positions that said, We have made our case and
   the number should be what it is, and in the context of
   that give and take, that was an issue that we simply
   could not come up with a number that we thought was
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    acceptable in the time frame that was imposed here on
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   the settlement process, or at least the time frame we
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   felt the pressure with the schedule that was in place.
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              One point I would like to say is I'm not
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   comfortable with any kind of representation -- not
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   necessarily that there is, but I certainly would want
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   the record to be clear from ICNU's perspective that we
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    do believe that prudence review should happen generally
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    in a rate case, or it should happen separately with a
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    separate filing by the Company. We do not want this,
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    if this is approved, to be any kind of representation
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   that prudence review should be dealt with in some
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   special manner, and I think that there are very
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    important questions, particularly in these current
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   times with power costs what they are. They are
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    important to evaluate these issues.
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              So we are comfortable with the process that
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has been laid out. Whether it is one that is amicable or not, we think that it is critical to get this information and to evaluate it, and we were comfortable signing onto this issue because there is nothing in 5 this settlement that predetermines the outcome with regard to the prudence of these resources that have not been reviewed by this Commission. That was an important element for us. I understand it does raise some procedural issues and some other discomfort, but 9 10 that was sort of the other side to that. 11 Some other issues I want to quickly bring to 12 your attention -- I know it's getting late -- that were 13 important to us in terms of evaluating this that we 14 haven't talked about is that the Company cannot come in 15 during this five-year period and make a filing to 16 recover additional moneys, let's say, for the 17 increasing power costs that is quite the talk right 18 now, so that gives the customers in the State of 19 Washington a five-year period of rate certainty and I 20 think security in a very volatile market at the moment. 21 Then the last thing that we also talked about 22 this afternoon that was very important to us, and it's 23 certainly a point that we don't necessarily see 24 eye-to-eye with the Company on is the transition plan. 25 We think that is a very important document. We think,

if implemented as described, it will fundamentally change this company, and the provision that we talked about earlier at the beginning of the Stipulation that mandates that the Company come in and make a filing, whatever that filing is, and it's our interpretation 5 that it will be a general rate case filing, I cannot as a practical matter imagine the Company going through the effort of filing a general rate case without the 9 number changing. It's hard to imagine it will be 10 status quo. In fact, I don't believe it can be status 11 quo if this transition plan is implemented, and it's 12 very important to us that there be that definitive 13 requirement because we think that if these savings are 14 achieved, we want there to be a certain mechanism to 15 pass that through to customers. Thank you. JUDGE MOSS: I gather from your comments that 16 17 your client, at least, might prefer a statement in any 18 Commission order approving this stipulation; that the 19 deferral of the prudence matter is not something 20 generally favored. 21 MS. DAVISON: I think that's probably right, 22 yes. 23 MR. CROMWELL: I would concur with the 24 comments that Ms. Davison made. I also just wanted to 25 emphasize to the Commission that this settlement was a

package that was put together during an occasionally painful process, and as with all things, there is give and take, and I also in that context want to emphasize that the prudence process is one of three, including 5 the low income and the systems benefit process, and those three processes were integral to our willingness 7 to accept this settlement. We expect those to be fruitful processes. As we've described here discussing 9 prudence, I think the same commitment is there in terms 10 of low income as well as the systems benefit charge. 11 I think that it's important in looking at 12 this settlement or this stipulation that was entered, 13 in looking at it as a whole and as was alluded to 14 earlier, there is rate certainty to be gained. residential customers who are this Thursday going to be 15 16 asking us, What does this do for me? What is going to 17 happen to my rates? That is what I'm anticipating we 18 will be facing very shortly from the public, and 19 unfortunately because we have those processes ongoing, 20 we won't have the certainty that folks are going to 21 want on Thursday, but we have a system, I think, in place that would provide that, and again, maybe 22 stepping back or going up and looking at this in the 23 24 larger arena, as Commissioner Hemstad alluded to 25 earlier, it's been a long time since this company has

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been before the Commission. If this stipulation is accepted by the Commission, it will be awhile before they are all before you again, but the flip side of that coin is that there will have been a seven-percent 5 rate increase, give or take, over about a 19-year period, and that's not bad.

JUDGE MOSS: Anything else from the Bench? If there is not, then I'm not going to bring the proceedings to a close, but I'm going to suggest that the Commissioners may wish to retire at this time and allow us to close this up in an orderly fashion without the need of them being here, and then we will get our record complete and move on.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

I really don't think we have much in the way of other business to conduct, having had the opportunity at the outset to take up that question, but I will offer the opportunity at this point in the proceeding to ask counsel if there are any other matters we need to take up in proceeding before the Commissioners retire to deliberate and make a determination with regard to the proposal that they approve this second stipulation taken together with the first as a comprehensive resolution of the issues in the case.

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              Apparently there is not any further business
   that we need to take up in that regard, and I would
    like to express the Bench's appreciation for the
   participation by the witnesses today. Thank you all
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    very much for your very good answers to the sometimes
    tough questions, and also to counsel. With that, we
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    will bring our proceedings for today to a close.
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               (Hearing concluded at 4:30 p.m.)
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