

**Effect of analysts' optimism on estimates of the
expected rate of return implied by earnings forecasts**

Peter D. Easton
University of Notre Dame

and

Gregory A. Sommers
Southern Methodist University

August 2006

The comments of Ashiq Ali, Robert Battalio, Sung Chung, Somnath Das, Gus DeFranco, John Lyon, Hai Lu, Paul Healy, Rick Mendenhall, Krishna Palepu, Gord Richardson, Scott Richardson, Steven Rock, Cathy Schrand, Lisa Sedor, Margaret Shackell-Dowel, Pervin Shroff, Philip Stocken, Phil Shane, Tom Stober, Rex Thompson, Jenny Tucker, Kent Womack, Tzachi Zach, Paul Zarowin, and workshop participants at the 2006 American Accounting Association annual meeting in Washington, DC, Dartmouth College, Drexel University, the 2006 London Business School Accounting Symposium, the 2006 Lone Star Accounting Research Conference, Harvard University, New York University, Pennsylvania State University, Southern Methodist University, Tilburg University, the University of Colorado, the University of Illinois, the University of Melbourne, the University of Minnesota, the University of Notre Dame, and the University of Toronto are greatly appreciated. The paper reflects many long conversations with Mark Zmijewski. We thank Lorie Marsh for her assistance with the preparation of this paper.

Abstract

Recent literature has used analysts' earnings forecasts, which are known to be optimistic, to estimate expected rates of return; yielding upwardly biased estimates. We find a bias of 2.84 percent computed as the difference between the estimates of the expected rate of return based on analysts' earnings forecasts and estimates based on current earnings realizations. The importance of this bias is illustrated by the fact that studies using the biased estimates of the expected rate of return suggest an equity premium in the vicinity of 3 percent. Further analyses show that use of value-weighted, rather than equally-weighted, estimates reduces the bias and yields more reasonable estimates of the equity premium. We also show that analysts recommend "buy" ("sell") when they expect the future return to be high (low) regardless of market expectations and that bias is present for all recommendation types.

1. Introduction

A large and expanding body of literature uses analysts' forecasts of earnings to determine the expected rate of return implied by these forecasts, current book values, and current prices. These implied expected rates of return are often used as estimates of the market's expected rate of return and/or as estimates of the cost of capital.¹ Yet the earnings forecasts are optimistic; and they are made by sell-side analysts who are in the business of making buy/hold/sell recommendations which are, presumably, based on the difference between their expectation of the future rate of return and the market expectation of this rate of return. If these earnings forecasts are optimistically biased, the expected rates of return implied by these forecasts will be upward biased. We estimate the extent of this bias.²

We show that, consistent with the extant evidence that forecasts (particularly longer-run forecasts) are optimistic, the difference between the expected rate of return implied by analysts' earnings forecasts and the expected rate of return implied by current earnings is statistically and economically significantly positive. In other words, *ceteris paribus*, studies that use the expected rate of return implied by current prices and these forecasts of earnings have estimates of the cost of capital that may be too high.³

The extant literature on analysts' optimism/pessimism generally compares forecasts of earnings with realizations of the earnings that are forecasted. This is an ex post measure of optimism and one that pervades the extant literature. Most of our analysis is a comparison of the expected rate of return implied by analysts' earnings forecasts and the expected rate of return

¹ Cost of capital is an equilibrium concept that relies on the no arbitrage assumption. In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the market's expected rate of return is equal to the cost of capital.

² Claus and Thomas (2001) observe that the optimistic bias in analysts' forecasts will bias their estimate of the equity premium upward.

³ Examples include Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002).

implied by current earnings. This is an ex ante measure of optimism/pessimism. We are primarily interested in this ex ante comparison for two reasons. First, our goal is to determine the bias in estimates of expected rates of return implied by analysts' forecasts at the time that these forecasts are made. Second, this comparison provides an indication of optimism/pessimism that is not affected by events that occur between the forecast date and the time of the earnings realization.⁴

All of our analyses are based on two methods for simultaneously estimating the expected rate of return and the expected growth rate for a portfolio/group of stocks. The estimate of the expected growth rate is not important in and of itself in our study; but estimating it simultaneously with the estimation of the expected rate of return avoids the introduction of error which will almost inevitably arise when the expected growth rate is assumed. Any assumed growth rate will almost invariably differ from the growth rate implied by the data.⁵

The method we use for estimating the expected rate of return that is implied by prices and current accounting data is an adaptation of the method that O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) use to estimate the expected market equity premium for the U.K. The method we use for estimating the expected rate of return that is implied by prices, current book values, and forecasts of earnings is an adaptation of the method that Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) use to estimate the equity premium in the U.S.

Literature that reverse-engineers valuation models to obtain estimates of the expected rate of return on equity investment is very new. These models include the dividend capitalization model in Botosan (1997); the residual income valuation model in O'Hanlon and Steele (2000),

⁴ An obvious recent example of such an event is the tragedy of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. This event, which was not foreseen by analysts, would almost certainly have made their forecasts overly optimistic with the benefit of hindsight. We will return to this example.

⁵ See Easton (2005) for a detailed discussion of this source of error.

Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002), and Baginski and Wahlen (2003); and the abnormal growth in earnings model in Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Easton (2004). Literature using these estimates to test hypotheses regarding factors that may affect the expected rate of return developed almost simultaneously; for example, see Daske (2006); Dhaliwal, Krull, Li, and Moser (2005); Francis, Khurana, and Periera (2005); Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004); Hail and Leuz (2006); Hribar and Jenkins (2004); and Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999). This development took place despite the fact that (1) some of these methods were not designed to provide firm-specific estimates; see, in particular, Claus and Thomas (2001), Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002), and Easton (2004); and (2) there is very little evidence regarding the empirical validity of these methods.

The conclusion from the very recent studies that examine the validity of firm-specific estimates of expected rate of return derived from these reverse-engineering exercises (see, Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Guay, Kothari and Shu, 2005; and Easton and Monahan, 2005), is that these estimates are poor, indeed. None of these studies addressed the issue of the difference between the market expectation of the rate of return, which these studies purport to measure, and rates implied by analysts' forecasts. Nevertheless, it is possible that the difference is a correlated omitted variable, which could affect the results in studies comparing estimates of the implied expected rate of return on equity capital. For example, it is possible that analysts' forecasts for firms under one accounting regime (say, accounting based on international accounting standards) may be more optimistic than analysts' forecasts for firms under a different accounting regime (say, accounting based on domestic standards). These optimistic forecasts will bias the estimate

of the expected rate of return upward, potentially leading to the (possibly erroneous) conclusion that the cost of capital is higher for these firms.

In light of analysts' tendency to be optimistic, estimates of the expected rate of return based on analysts' forecasts are likely to be higher than the cost of capital. Williams (2004) makes this point in his discussion of Botosan, Plumlee, and Xie (2004). This effect of analysts' optimism is exacerbated by the fact that all studies using analysts' forecasts to calculate an implied expected rate of return are based on forecasts made well in advance (usually at least a year ahead) of the earnings announcement. These forecasts tend to be much more optimistic than those made closer to the earnings announcement; see Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004).

All of our analyses are based on I/B/E/S forecasts of earnings and recommendations for the years 1993 to 2004 and actual prices and accounting data for 1992 to 2004. Consistent with the extant literature, the forecasts tend to be optimistic. We show that, on average, the estimate of the expected rate of return based on analysts' forecasts is 2.84 percent higher than the estimate that is based on current accounting data. An implication of the observation that analysts tend to make optimistic forecasts is that caution should be taken when interpreting the meaning of the expected rate of return implied by analysts' earnings forecasts; it may not be, as the literature generally claims, an estimate of the cost of capital.

The observation that the optimism bias in analysts' forecasts may imply a 2.84 percent upward bias in the estimate of the implied expected rate of return is troublesome. Comparing this bias with the estimates of the expected equity premium based on these data (3 percent or less in Claus and Thomas (2001); between 2 and 3 percent in Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (1999); and 4.8 percent in Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002)) suggests that there

may be no premium at all! It is important to note, however, that each of these papers attributes equal weight to all stocks that are used in the calculation of the mean or median estimate of the market expected rate of return in Claus and Thomas (2001) and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (1999), and in the regression in Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002).

This equal-weighting has two potential effects. First, small stocks have an undue effect on the estimate of the market return. Second, stocks with low or negative earnings, which are somewhat meaningless as summary valuation metrics, potentially have an influence that is similar to the influence of large stable firms where earnings are a much more meaningful valuation metric. In order to avoid these undue influences, we repeat all of the analyses weighting each of the observations by market capitalization.

Our estimate of the implied expected rate of return on the market from the value-weighted regression, after removing the effect of bias in analysts' forecasts, is 9.67 percent with an implied equity premium of 4.43 percent. Of course, this estimate of the equity premium is more reasonable than that obtained when all observations have equal weight. We also find that the extent of analysts' optimism decreases as firm size increases. The effect of analysts' bias on the estimate of the implied expected rate of return on the market that is based on the value-weighted regression is lower than the estimate from the equally-weighted regression; 1.60 percent compared with 2.84 percent.

Studies such as Michaely and Womack (1999); Boni and Womack (2002); Eames, Glover, and Kennedy (2002); and Bradshaw (2004) show that analysts generally make "strong buy" and "buy" recommendations. They sometimes recommend "hold", and rarely recommend "sell". It seems reasonable to expect that buy recommendations will be associated with ex ante

optimistic forecasts. In other words, the pervasiveness of buy recommendations may explain the optimistic bias in forecasts and in expected rates of return based on analysts' forecasts.

To examine this issue further, we repeat the analyses for sub-samples formed on the basis of number of analysts comprising the consensus who recommend "buy". Contrary to our expectations, we show that the consensus analyst forecast is optimistic even when less than 30 percent of analysts' comprising the consensus recommend "buy".⁶ Estimates of the implied expected rate of return are biased upward even for these sub-samples. Interestingly, we show that the implied expected rate of return declines monotonically as the percentage of analysts recommending "buy" declines. In other words, analysts' recommendations appear to be based on expected rates of return rather than the difference between the analysts' expectations and the market expectation. This evidence is consistent with the observation in Groysberg, Healy, Chapman, and Gui (2006) that analysts' salary increases and bonuses are based on stock returns subsequent to their recommendations adjusted for the return on the S&P 500 index.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we outline the methods used in estimating the expected rate of return implied by market prices, current book value of equity, and current and forecasted accounting earnings. Section 3 describes the data used in our analyses. In section 4, we document the ex post and the ex ante bias in consensus analysts' forecasts and discuss the implications for cost of capital estimates in extant accounting research, which are generally based on equal weighting of observations from the entire sample of firms followed by analysts. In section 5, we repeat the analyses using value-weighting of firms to show that the estimate of the bias is lower and the estimate of the expected equity risk premium is more reasonable than that obtained in extant studies. Sub-samples based on percentage of

⁶ While it is reasonable to expect that the level of the analyst's recommendation should be associated with *expected* abnormal returns, it should be noted that Bradshaw (2004) finds analysts' recommendations uncorrelated with future *realized* abnormal returns.

analysts recommending buy are analyzed in section 6. Section 7 concludes with a summary of implications for future research.

2. Methods of estimating the implied expected rate of return

We develop three methods for estimating the implied expected rate of return. These estimates, which are based on (1) I/B/E/S earnings forecasts, (2) realized earnings, and (3) perfect foresight forecasts of earnings, lead to two determinations of the bias when estimates of the market expected rate of return are based on analysts' forecasts of earnings. Each of these methods determines bias as the difference between estimates based on forecasts of earnings and estimates based on earnings realizations.

We refer to the primary measure as the *ex ante* measure of bias because it relies on information available at the time of the earnings forecast. This measure compares the estimates of the implied expected rate of return based on analysts' forecasts with estimates based on current earnings realizations. The other measure compares estimates formed using analysts' forecasts with estimates based on perfect foresight of next-period earnings realizations. We refer to this as the *ex post* measure. We note there may be factors other than analysts' optimism affecting each of these measures of bias; but, since other factors affecting the *ex ante* measure would not affect the *ex post* measure (and vice-versa), obtaining similar results based on both measures suggests that the effect of other factors is minimal. We elaborate on this point in section 2.3.

2.1. Ex ante determination of the effect of bias

Each of the methods for estimating the implied expected rate of return are derived from the residual income valuation model which may be written as follows:

$$v_{jt} \equiv bps_{jt} + \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \frac{eps_{jt+\tau} - r_j \times bps_{jt+\tau-1}}{(1+r_j)^\tau} \quad (1)$$

where v_{jt} is the intrinsic value per share of firm j at time t , bps_{jt} is the book value per share of common equity of firm j at time t , eps_{jt} is the earnings per share of firm j at time t and r_j is the cost of capital for firm j .⁷ Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) rely on the following finite horizon version of this model:

$$p_{jt} \equiv bps_{jt} + \frac{eps_{jt+1}^{IBES} - r_j \times bps_{jt}}{(r_j - g_j)} \quad (2)$$

where p_{jt} is price per share for firm j at time t , eps_{jt+1}^{IBES} is an I/B/E/S forecast of earnings for period $t+1$, and g_j is the expected rate of growth in residual income beyond period $t+1$ required to equate $(p_{jt} - bps_{jt})$ and the present value of an infinite residual income stream.^{8,9}

Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002), like many other studies, implicitly use analysts' forecasts of earnings as a proxy for market expectations of next period earnings. Optimistic bias in analysts' forecasts implies a bias in this proxy. In this paper we use a modification of the method in O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) to determine, ex ante, the effect of the forecast error on the estimate of the expected rate of return. This method provides an estimate of the expected rate of return implied by current realized accounting earnings; we compare this with

⁷ Derivation of this model requires the no arbitrage assumption, which is necessary to derive the dividend capitalization formula, and that earnings are comprehensive – in other words, the articulation of earnings and book value is clean surplus.

⁸ Price in this relation replaces intrinsic value. This form of the residual income model does not rely on the no-arbitrage assumption – rather it is simply based on the definition of the expected rate of return (the difference between current price and expected cum-dividend end-of-year price divided by current price).

⁹ In Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) the period t to $t+1$ is 4 years so that eps_{jt+1} is aggregate expected cum-dividend earnings for the four years after date t . We use a one-year forecast horizon instead of four years in order to facilitate more effective use of the data on analysts' recommendations. Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) note that estimates of the expected rate of return based on just one year of forecasts are very similar to those based on four years of forecasts.

the estimate implied by analysts' earnings forecasts from Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002).

The method adapted from O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) is based on the following form of the residual income valuation model:

$$p_{jt} \equiv bps_{jt} + \frac{(eps_{jt} - r_j \times bps_{jt-1})(1 + g'_j)}{(r_j - g'_j)} \quad (3)$$

The difference between this form of the model and the form used by Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) is that g'_j is the perpetual growth rate starting from *current residual income* (that is, at time t) that implies a residual income stream such that the present value of this stream is equal to the difference between price and book value; in Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002), g_j is the perpetual growth rate starting from *next-period residual income* (that is, time $t+1$). Since eps_{jt} (that is, realized earnings) is the only pay-off used in estimating the implied expected rate of return based on equation (3), this estimate is not affected by analysts' optimism unless that optimism is shared by the market and captured in p_{jt} .¹⁰ Therefore, the estimate based on current accounting data can serve as an estimate of market expectations. It follows that the difference between the estimate of the expected rate of return based on analysts' forecasts in equation (2) and the estimate based on current earnings in equation (3) is an ex ante estimate of bias introduced when analysts' forecasts are used to estimate the markets' expected rate of return.

2.2. Ex post determination of the effect of bias

Optimistic bias in analysts' earnings forecasts is well-established in the literature; see, for example, O'Brien (1988); Mendenhall (1991); Brown (1993); Dugar and Nathan (1995); and

¹⁰ Our empirical evidence is consistent with the maintained hypothesis that the analysts' optimism is not shared by the market.

Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998). Each of these studies estimates the ex post bias by comparing earnings forecasts with realizations of these forecasted earnings. We obtain an ex post measure of the bias in the estimate of the expected rate of return by comparing the estimate of the expected rate of return based on I/B/E/S analysts' forecasts using the method in Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) with the expected rate of return based on (perfect foresight forecasts of) earnings realizations; that is, we replace eps_{jt+1}^{IBES} in equation (2) with earnings realizations for period $t+1$, denoted eps_{jt+1}^{PF} . Of course, this ex post comparison, like the studies of bias in analysts' forecasts, will be affected by events having an effect on earnings, which happen between the time of the forecast and the date of the earnings announcement.

2.3. Ex ante and ex post comparisons

In the ex post comparison of expected rates of return, unforeseen events are *omitted* from the market price, which is used as the basis for estimating the expected rate of return. On the other hand, in the ex ante comparison, expectations of future events impounded in market expectations of earnings are not included in the current accounting earnings but are implicitly *included* in the market price, which is used as the basis for estimating the expected rate of return. Since there is no obvious reason to expect a correlation between the information omitted from price in the analyses based on equation (2) and the information included in price but excluded from earnings in the analyses based on equation (3), we use the results from both methods to gain alternative, independent estimates of the bias. As expected our results are similar using either method.

Our maintained hypothesis in the ex ante comparison of implied expected rates of return is that the market at time t sees through (un-does) the optimistic bias in the analysts' forecasts.

The observation that the implied expected rates of return based on current earnings and on realized future earnings are the same, suggests that this maintained hypothesis is reasonable.

2.4. Estimation based on prices, book value, and earnings forecasts

Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) transform equation (2) to form the following regression relation:

$$\frac{eps_{jt+1}}{bps_{jt}} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \frac{p_{jt}}{bps_{jt}} + \mu_{jt} \quad (4)$$

where $\gamma_0 = g$, $\gamma_1 = r - g$.¹¹ This regression may be estimated for any group/portfolio of stocks to obtain an estimate of the implied expected rate of return, r , and the implied expected growth rate, g , for the portfolio. Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) run this regression for a sample of U.S. stocks to obtain an estimate of the expected rate of return on the U.S. equity market and hence an estimate of the equity premium for that market. In the empirical implementation of this model, eps_{jt+1} is the I/B/E/S forecast of earnings. Since this is the only pay-off which is used in the estimation of implied expected rate of return, any bias in the forecast will lead to a bias in the estimate of the expected rate of return.

¹¹ At the firm-specific level, the following relation between the regression variables: $\frac{eps_{jt+1}}{bps_{jt}} = \gamma_{0j} + \gamma_{1j} \frac{p_{jt}}{bps_{jt}}$, is readily obtained by rearranging the identity shown in equation (2). In the re-expression of this relation for a group of observations (as in equation (4)) as a regression relation, the coefficients γ_0 and γ_1 represent an average of the firm-specific γ_{0j} and γ_{1j} coefficients and the cross-sectional variation in these coefficients creates the regression residual. Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) describe this regression in more detail pointing out that it involves the implicit assumption that it has the properties of a random coefficient regression. It is, of course, possible that the γ_{0j} and γ_{1j} are correlated in cross-section with either (or both) the dependent or the independent variable and this correlation may introduce bias into the estimates of the regression coefficients (and, hence, into the estimates of the implied expected rates of return). It seems reasonable to assume, however, that this bias will be very similar for the regressions based on analysts' earnings forecasts (eps_{jt+1}^{IBES}) and for those based on perfect foresight forecast of earnings (eps_{jt+1}^{PF}). Also, we can think of no reason why the effect of the bias in the analyses based regression (4) will be the same as the effect for the analyses based on current accounting earnings (regression (5)). In other words, similar results from the analysis based on perfect foresight forecasts and from the analyses based on current accounting data support the conclusion that this bias does not unduly affect our estimates.

2.5. Estimation based on current accounting data

The analyses in O’Hanlon and Steele (2000) are based on realized earnings rather than earnings forecasts. Following the essence of the idea in O’Hanlon and Steele (2000), which is summarized in equation (3), we transform this equation to form the following regression relation:¹²

$$\frac{eps_{jt}}{bps_{jt-1}} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \frac{p_{jt} - bps_{jt}}{bps_{jt-1}} + \zeta_{jt} \quad (5)$$

where $\delta_0 = r$, $\delta_1 = (r - g')/(1 + g')$. This regression may be estimated for any group/portfolio of stocks to obtain an estimate of the expected rate of return, r , and the expected growth rate, g' , for the portfolio. O’Hanlon and Steele (2000) run a regression similar to (5) for a sample of U.K. stocks to obtain an estimate of the expected rate of return on the U.K. equity market; and hence an estimate of the equity premium for that market. In the empirical implementation of regression (5), eps_{jt} is realized earnings. Since this is the only pay-off used in estimating the implied expected rate of return, this estimate is not affected by analysts’ optimism unless that optimism is shared by the market and captured in p_{jt} . It follows that the difference between the estimate of the expected rate of return obtained via regression (4) and the estimate based on regression (5) is an ex ante estimate of the bias when analysts’ forecasts are used to estimate expected rates of return.

¹² We attribute this model to O’Hanlon and Steele (2000) because they capture its essential elements. The similarity to their model may not, however, be immediately apparent. Since the derivation in O’Hanlon and Steele (2000) is based on Ohlson (1989), the observation that the regression intercept is an estimate of the implied expected rate of return is not evident and O’Hanlon and Steele (2000) do not use it in this way. Rather, they estimate the implied expected rate of return at the firm-specific level by applying their model to time-series data and then measuring the risk premium as the slope of the Securities Market Line estimated from a regression of these firm-specific rates of return on corresponding beta estimates. Notice that, in addition to requiring earnings to be clean surplus in all future periods, this form of the residual income model also requires that the relation between earnings for period t and book value for periods t and $t-1$ follows the clean surplus relation.

2.6. The relation between prices, actual earnings, and forecasts of earnings

In order to ensure that we obtain an estimate of the expected rate of return implied by analysts' forecasts we must use prices in regression (4) that reflect analysts' forecasts. Similarly, in regression (5) we must use prices that reflect earnings realizations to obtain an estimate of the markets' expected rate of return. The alignment of price-dates, earnings announcement dates, and analysts' forecast-dates is described in this sub-section and summarized in figure 1.

We choose the first consensus forecast announced at least 14 days after the date of the earnings announcement.¹³ In the analyses based on these forecasts, we use the price at the close of trade one day after the earnings announcement. Consistent with numerous studies of the information content of earnings, it seems reasonable to assume that this price incorporates the information in realized earnings. Further, we implicitly assume that this price was known to analysts at the time they formed their earnings forecasts. In view of the fact that the forecasts comprising the consensus are formed at various points in time, this assumption may be invalid; some of the forecasts comprising the consensus may precede the earnings announcement date or they may have been issued a considerable time after this date. We examine the sensitivity of the results to this assumption by varying the price-date from the day after the earnings announcement to one day after the consensus forecast is measured. This latter measurement date for price allows for the incorporation of the information in the analysts' forecasts in price. The results are not sensitive to this choice. We will return to this point.

The residual income valuation model underlying regressions (4) and (5) describes the value of a stock at the fiscal period end-date. Our analyses are based on prices after this date. To accommodate this difference, we replace price (p_{jt}) in equations (4) and (5) with price at the

¹³ Use of the first forecast made after the earnings announcement from the I/B/E/S Detail History database does not alter any results.

dates described above discounted by the expected rate of return (\hat{r}) back to the fiscal year end; that is, $p_{jt+\tau} / (1 + \hat{r})^{\tau/365}$, where τ is the number of days between the fiscal year end and the price-date. Since the discounting of price requires the expected rate of return we are attempting to estimate in equations (4) and (5), we use an iterative method as used in Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002). We begin these iterations by assuming a discount rate for prices of 12 percent. We run each regression and obtain estimates of the expected rate of return which we then use as the new rate for discounting prices. We then re-run the regressions to re-estimate equation (4) and/or equation (5) and provide another estimate of expected return. This procedure is repeated until the estimate of the expected return and the rate used in discounting price converge.¹⁴

3. Description of the data

All earnings forecast and recommendation data are obtained from the I/B/E/S unadjusted research databases. We use the first median consensus forecast of earnings for year $t+1$ released 14 days or more after the announcement of earnings for year t . This forecast is released on the third Thursday of each month. These data are obtained from the I/B/E/S Summary database. “Actual” earnings are also obtained from this database. The first year of our analyses uses forecasts and recommendations for 1993 in order to ensure the dates of the individual analysts’ forecasts are reliable.¹⁵ Book value of common equity and common shares outstanding are

¹⁴ This iterative process is repeated until none of the annual estimates changes by more than 0.00001%. In our samples, the annual estimates usually converged in 5-6 iterations. This iterative procedure is not sensitive to choices of beginning discount rates between five and 20 percent.

¹⁵ Zitzewitz [2002, p. 16] describes the importance of not relying on forecast dates in the I/B/E/S database prior to 1993 as follows:

“I/B/E/S dates forecasts using the date it was entered into the I/B/E/S system. It has been well documented (e.g., by O’Brien, 1988) that the lags between a forecast becoming public and its entry into the I/B/E/S system were substantial in the 1980s (i.e., up to a month). In the 1980s, analysts mailed their forecasts,

obtained from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT annual merged database.¹⁶ Prices are obtained from the CRSP daily price file.

We delete firms with non-December fiscal-year end so that the market implied discount rate and growth rate are estimated at the same point in time for each firm-year observation. For each set of tests, firms with any of the dependent or independent variables for that year in the top or bottom two percent of observations are removed to reduce the effects of outliers. Dropping between one and five percent of observations does not affect the conclusions of the study. For December 1999, in particular, removal of only one percent of observations has a large effect on that year's results in the value-weighted analyses; this is due to the extremely high price-to-book ratios of some internet firms prior to the market crash in 2000.

4. Ex post and ex ante bias in analysts' consensus forecasts

We begin by documenting the accuracy (that is, the mean/median *absolute* earnings forecast error) and the ex post bias (that is, the mean/median earnings forecast error) in the earnings forecasts for the entire sample of stocks. We then compare the estimate of the expected rate of return implied by prices, book values, and analysts' forecasts of earnings with the

often in monthly batches, to I/B/E/S where they were hand entered into the system. Since 1991-92, however, almost all analysts have entered their forecasts directly into the I/B/E/S system on the day they wish to make their forecast widely available (Kutsoati and Bernhardt, 1999). Current practice for analysts is now usually to publicly release forecasts within 24 hours of providing them to clients. I/B/E/S analysts have real-time access to each other's forecasts through this system, so an analyst entering a forecast into the system on Wednesday knows about forecasts entered on Tuesday and could potentially revise her forecast to incorporate their information. An additional advantage of the post-92 data is the shift from retrospective data entry by a specialist to real-time data entry by either the analyst or her employee should have considerably reduced data-entry related measurement error."

¹⁶ In order to ensure that the clean-surplus assumption required for the derivation of the residual income valuation model holds in the data for fiscal year t , contemporaneous book value in regression (5) – that is, b_{jt} – is calculated as Compustat book value of common equity minus Compustat net income plus I/B/E/S actual income. That is, we use the book value number that would have been reported if the (corresponding) income statement had been based on I/B/E/S actual earnings. We also remove year t dirty surplus items from Compustat book value. These adjustments are unnecessary for the book value variable in regression (4) because the clean-surplus assumption only refers to future income statements and balance sheets.

estimate obtained from prices, book values, and actual current earnings. This is an estimate of ex ante bias in the estimates of the expected rate of return reported in the extant literature.

4.1. Accuracy and bias in the analysts' forecasts of earnings

Table 1 summarizes the accuracy and the ex post measure of bias in the I/B/E/S consensus forecast of earnings at the end of each of the years 1992 to 2003. We use the mean and the median absolute forecast error as the measure of accuracy. The mean absolute forecast error ranges from \$0.427 in 1994 to \$1.394 in 2000; the median absolute forecast error ranges from \$0.160 in 2002 to \$0.310 in 2000. We also present the mean and the median absolute forecast error deflated by end-of-year price in order to give an indication of the scale of these errors. The mean absolute price-deflated forecast error ranges from 0.019 in 2003 to 0.052 in 2000; the median absolute price-deflated forecast error ranges from 0.008 in 2003 to 0.018 in 2000.

We use the mean (median) forecast error as the measure of the ex post bias in the analysts' forecasts. The mean forecast error ranges from -\$1.257 in 2000 to \$0.119 in 2002. The median forecast error ranges from -\$0.240 in 2000 to -\$0.010 in 2003. The mean price-deflated forecast error ranges from -0.041 in 2000 to -0.003 in 2003. The median price-deflated forecast error ranges from -0.012 in 2000 to 0.000 in 2003.

These predominantly negative forecast errors are consistent with the prior literature, which concludes that analysts' forecasts, particularly long-run forecasts, tend to be optimistic; see, for example, O'Brien (1993); Lin (1994); and Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004). As noted earlier, these forecast errors compare forecasts with ex post realizations.

4.2 Description of regression variables

The number of observations we use to estimate the annual regressions ranges from 1,418 at December 1992 to 2,137 at December 1997. As shown in table 2, the mean price-to-book ratio, which is the independent variable in regression (4), ranges from 1.945 at December 2002 to 3.398 at December 1999; the median price-to-book ratio ranges from 1.625 at December 2002 to 2.409 at December 1997. Regression (4) is run with the forecasted return-on-equity based on the I/B/E/S consensus forecast as the dependent variable. The mean forecasted return-on-equity ranges from 0.079 at December 2001 to 0.146 at December 1994; the median forecasted return-on-equity ranges from 0.111 at December 2001 to 0.145 at December 1994.

The annual mean and median current return-on-equity, which is the dependent variable in regression (5), is generally a little less than the corresponding mean and median forecasted return-on-equity. The mean current return-on-equity ranges from 0.077 at December 2001 to 0.122 at December 1995; the median current return-on-equity ranges from 0.010 at December 2001 to 0.132 at December 1995. The mean of the independent variable in this regression, the difference between price and current book value deflated by lagged book value, ranges from 1.007 at December 2002 to 2.699 at December 1999; the median ranges from 0.662 at December 2002 to 1.491 at December 1997.

4.3. Comparison of implied expected rates of return based on I/B/E/S forecasts of earnings with implied expected rate of return based on current accounting data

In this section, we compare the estimates of the implied expected rates of return based on the method in Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002), which uses one-year ahead I/B/E/S consensus forecasts of earnings in regression (4), with the estimates obtained from the method adapted from O'Hanlon and Steele (2000), which uses current earnings and current and lagged

book value in regression (5). We also compare the estimates based on analysts' forecasts to those implied by future earnings realizations; that is, by perfect foresight forecasts.

4.3.1. The expected rate of return implied by analysts' earnings forecasts

The summary statistics from regression (4), where the dependent variable is I/B/E/S forecasted return-on-equity, are included in panel A of table 3. We provide year-by-year estimates of the regression coefficients and t-statistics for tests of their difference from zero. These t-statistics may be over-stated due to the possibility of correlated residuals; so we present the mean coefficient estimates and the related Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics. The regression adjusted r-square ranges from 0.73 percent at December 1999, to 36.60 percent at December 1992.¹⁷ The mean estimate of the intercept coefficient γ_0 , an estimate of the implied growth in residual income beyond the one-year forecast horizon, is 0.074 with a t-statistic of 8.50. The mean estimate of the slope coefficient γ_1 , an estimate of the difference between the implied expected rate of return and the implied growth in residual income beyond the one-year forecast horizon, is 0.020 with a t-statistic of 5.86.

The estimates of the implied expected rate of return obtained from the estimates of the regression (4) coefficients, where the dependent variable is analysts' forecasts of return-on-equity, are in panel A of table 3. These estimates range from 4.93 percent at December 2001, to 13.29 percent at December 1999; with a mean (t-statistic) of 9.43 percent (14.16).

¹⁷ We note the very low r-square in some of these regressions. As a result we performed several analyses of the effects of outliers including more severe outlier removal – for example, removing up to the top and bottom 20 percent of observations or by eliminating all observations with an R-student statistic greater than 2 -- the regression r-square increases but none of our inferences based on the resulting estimates of the implied expected rate of return change. We also perform all analyses on the sub-set of observations for which analysts forecast positive earnings. Again we obtain much higher r-squares but inferences remain unchanged. These further analyses of outliers are also performed on all subsequent regressions and, in all cases, our inferences are unchanged.

4.3.2. The expected rate of return implied by current accounting data

The summary statistics from regression (5) are included in panel A of table 3. The regression adjusted r-square ranges from 0.34 percent at December 1999 to 27.09 percent at December 1992. The mean estimate of the intercept coefficient δ_0 , which is an estimate of the implied expected rate of return, is 0.066 (t-statistic of 10.50); and the mean estimate of the slope coefficient δ_1 , which is a function of the expected rate of return and the expected growth in residual income, is 0.022 (t-statistic of 5.51). The estimates of the implied expected rate of return are also included in panel A of table 3. These estimates range from 2.82 percent at December 2001 to 9.97 percent at December 1999; with a mean (t-statistic) of 6.59 percent (10.50).

4.3.3. The ex ante difference between the estimate of the expected rate of return based on analysts' earnings forecasts and the estimate of the expected rate of return based on current accounting data

Differences between the estimates of expected rate of return based on regressions (4) and (5) are included in the last column of panel A of table 3. On average, the difference between the estimate of the expected rate of return based on analysts' earnings forecasts and the estimate of the expected rate of return based on earnings realizations is 2.84 percent (t-statistic of 12.33). There are some years when the difference is quite large; for example, for the sample of stocks at December 1994, the difference is 3.83 percent. These results are not surprising in view of the fact that analysts' forecasts are known to be optimistic.

An implication of the observation that expected rates of return based on analysts' forecasts tend to be higher is that caution should be taken when interpreting the meaning of the rate of return that is implied by analysts' earnings forecasts; if, as is often the case in the extant literature, it is used as an estimate of the cost of capital, it is likely upward biased.

4.3.4. Estimates of the expected rate of return based on perfect foresight forecasts

The results in section 4.3.3 are roughly consistent with the results in Table 1. For example, we saw, in Table 1 that the mean deflated forecast error is -0.020. A crude PE valuation model, which relies on full payout and earnings following a random walk, suggests that the price-to-forward-earnings ratio is equal to the inverse of the expected rate of return. Thus a deflated forecast error of -0.020 implies an error in the expected rate of return of 2 percent. Allowing for the conservative nature of accounting, as in the models used in the ex ante indicators of optimism in panel A of table 3, leads to the conclusion that these estimates are at least “in the same ball-park”.

Alternatively, the ex post forecast error can be re-parameterized as an error in the implied expected rate of return. This error may be estimated as the difference between the implied expected rate of return based on regression (4) where expected earnings are I/B/E/S forecasts (as in panel A of table 3) and the implied expected rate of return when these expected earnings are replaced in this regression with realized earnings for year $t+1$. The results of estimating the implied expected rate of return using realized earnings as “perfect foresight” forecasts are reported in panel B of table 3. Using perfect foresight earnings, the estimates of expected rate of return range from 3.13 percent at December 2001 to 9.79 percent at December 1999; with a mean (t-statistic) of 6.68 percent (10.79). Comparing the perfect foresight forecast to the consensus forecasts, the mean bias is 2.75 percent (t-statistic of 7.13).

4.3.5. Comparison of the estimates of the expected rate of return

The two estimates of expected rate of return that are not expected to contain bias, that is, those based on perfect foresight earnings and those based on current accounting data are very similar. The difference of -0.09 percent between these estimates is not significantly different

from zero with a t-statistic of -0.19. It follows that our estimates of the bias are similar using either method. That is, both methods yield alternative, independent estimates of the bias that do not differ significantly; this observation supports the maintained hypothesis that the market sees through the optimistic bias in the analysts' forecasts.

Further evidence consistent with the notion that the market sees through the optimistic bias is the fact that, consistent with Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004), the forecast error declines almost monotonically as the forecast horizon decreases from approximately 12 months as in the analyses in panel C of table 3 to shortly before the earnings announcement date for year $t+1$. The un-tabulated associated implied expected rate of return based on these forecast and prices immediately following these forecasts also decreases almost monotonically to 6.47 percent for the consensus forecasts (of $t+1$ earnings) made in January of year $t+1$. That is, the expected rate of return implied by analysts' forecasts declines to the expected rate of return implied by the ex ante estimate of the expected rate of return implied by accounting earnings at date t . Again these results suggest that the market at date t sees through the optimistic bias in the analysts' forecasts of earnings for period $t+1$.

4.3.6. Effects of altering the timing of price measurement

As mentioned in section 2.3, we use price measured after the release of the prior year earnings but before analysts' forecast revisions in our primary analyses. Panel C of table 3 summarizes the results of the analysis summarized in panels A and B of table 3, but using prices measured at close of trade on the day after the consensus forecast is measured. This price is at least 14 days and could be a month and a half after the price used in panels A and B. We assume that this price reflects the information in the analysts' forecasts. Comparison of panels A and C reveals that the measurement of price at differing points; and, therefore, differing periods for

discounting of price back to fiscal year-end; has no statistically or economically significant effect. The primary result from panel A of table 3 of an average 2.84 percent difference between the analysts' and market's expected rate of return is virtually unchanged at 2.93, with an untabulated t-statistic of 14.69, when price is measured at the day after the consensus forecast is measured.¹⁸

5. Value-weighted estimates of the implied expected rate of return

The analyses in section 4 examine the average effect of bias in analysts' forecasts of earnings on estimates of the implied expected rate of return. All observations are given equal weight in the analyses. Such weighting will be appropriate in some studies. Easton, Sommers, and Zmijewski (2006), for example, compare the difference between the expected rate of return implied by analysts' forecasts and the expected rate of return implied by current earnings for firms subject to litigation under section 10b-5.¹⁹ Since the focus of their study is on average differences, they give each observation equal weight; value-weighting would lead to results that were dominated by cases associated with WorldCom and Enron.

Value-weighting will be more appropriate in many studies. Perhaps the best example is the estimation of the equity risk premium, which is a central part of three well-known studies based on analysts' earnings forecasts by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001); Claus and Thomas (2001); and Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002). These studies give equal weighting to all stocks. Yet, estimating the risk premium from investing in the equity market is more meaningful if stocks are weighted by their market capitalization. In the equally-weighted

¹⁸ The results are virtually identical if we use prices taken from any date ranging from one day after the earnings announcement date to one day after the forecast announcement date (the set of s price-dates shown in Figure 1).

¹⁹ Under Rule 10b-5, a firm and its officials can be held liable for damages to investors who bought and sold the firm's securities if the damages are attributable to investors' reliance on misleading statements or omission of material facts.

analyses in the papers referred to above, small stocks will have an undue effect on the estimate of the market return. Further, stocks with low or negative earnings, which are somewhat meaningless as summary valuation metrics, potentially have an influence that is similar to the influence of large stable firms where earnings are a much more meaningful valuation metric. In order to avoid these undue influences, and to provide an estimate of the equity risk premium that is (1) not affected by analysts' optimism; and (2) more representative of the risk premium for the market portfolio; we repeat all of the analyses weighting each of the observations by market capitalization.

In order to provide a sense of the likely effect of value weighting, we begin by describing the way that analysts' optimism differs with firm size. We also document the relation between firm size and the variables used in regressions (4) and (5). Central to our analyses is the observation, documented in panel A of table 4, that the mean scaled absolute forecast error declines in a monotonic manner from 0.102 for the decile of smallest firms to 0.012 for the decile of largest firms. Similarly, the median absolute scaled forecast error declines in a monotonic manner from 0.042 to 0.006.

Analysts' optimism, measured by the mean (median) forecast error, declines almost monotonically from -0.116 (-0.023) for the decile of smallest firms to -0.086 (-0.002) for the decile of largest firms. The differences in optimistic bias across these size deciles illustrate the point that difference in bias across samples of observations may explain a significant portion of the difference in the implied expected rates of return across these samples; in other words, differences in bias across samples may lead to spurious inferences.

Consistent with prior literature, see, for example, Fama and French (1992), the price-to-book ratio increases with firm size from a mean of 1.707 for the decile of smallest firms to a

mean of 3.593 for the decile of largest firms. The forecasted and the realized return-on-equity also increase with firm size, suggesting that the smaller firms tend to be firms with higher expected earnings growth.²⁰

The results from the estimation of value-weighted regressions (4) and (5) are summarized in panel B of table 4. A notable difference between these value-weighted regression results and the results for equally-weighted regressions (see panels A and B of table 3) is the higher adjusted r-square for the value-weighted regressions. For example, the average adjusted r-square for regression (4) based on analysts' consensus forecasts is 47.16 percent for the value-weighted regression; whereas it is 9.58 percent for the equally-weighted regression. As expected, t-statistics on the coefficient estimates in these value-weighted regressions are also higher.

The mean estimates (t-statistic) of the expected rate of return, also reported in panel B of table 4, are 11.27 percent (21.20) using analysts' forecasts and 9.67 percent (13.90) using current accounting data.²¹ The un-tabulated minimum expected rate of return estimated using current accounting data is 6.22 percent at December 1992. The average of 9.67 percent yields a more reasonable estimate of the risk premium than the equal-weighted sample; 4.43 percent using 5-year treasuries as a proxy for the risk free rate. Differences between the estimates are also reported in panel B of table 4. The difference, though smaller in the value-weighted analyses than in the equally-weighted analyses, 1.60 percent compared with 2.84 percent, is still significantly positive (t-statistic of 4.90).

²⁰ The firms in the deciles of smaller firms also tend to have a much greater proportion of losses (the proportion of losses decreases monotonically from 17.64 percent for the decile of smallest firms to 1.65 percent for the decile of largest firms).

²¹ The mean estimate (t-statistic) of the expected rate of return based on perfect foresight forecasts is 10.63 percent (14.35).

6. Variation in the implied expected rate of return with changes in the percentage of analysts making “buy” recommendations

Having documented a bias in the estimates of the expected rate of return based on analysts’ forecasts of earnings, we now examine how the bias varies across analysts’ recommendations. It is well-known that analysts seldom issue “sell” recommendations. To the extent that our samples examined thus far contain a majority of firms with “buy” recommendations, the observed positive bias in the expected rate of return using analysts’ forecasts may be capturing the analysts’ expectation of the abnormal returns, which can be earned from these stocks. To examine this notion, we compare estimates of the expected rates of return for stocks where the consensus forecast is comprised of analysts with varying recommendation types.

6.1 Sample description

I/B/E/S provides data on the percentage of analysts whose forecasts comprise the consensus who also make either a “strong buy” or a “buy” recommendation. We repeat the analyses in section 4.3 for sub-samples with various percentages of these types of recommendations. Descriptive statistics are provided in table 5, panel A. The choice of the five partitions of the data is based on a desire to maintain a sufficient number of observations to provide reasonable confidence in the regression output in each year. We restrict the sample to those consensus forecasts which are comprised of at least 5 analysts so that it is possible for a firm to appear in any of the partitions.²²

The mean and median forecast error is always negative; that is, analysts are optimistic, regardless of the percentage of “buy” recommendations in the consensus. For example, the median deflated forecast error is -0.004 when the percentage of buy recommendations is greater

²² Our findings and conclusions are unchanged when firms with consensus forecasts comprised of less than 5 analysts are included.

than 90 percent, between 30 and 50 percent, and when the percentage of “buy” recommendations is less than 30 percent.

Both the return-on-equity and the price-to-book ratio tend to be higher for the observations where there are more “buy” recommendations comprising the consensus. For example, the median forecasted return-on-equity for the sub-samples where greater than 90 percent of the analysts recommend “buy” and where between 70 and 90 percent recommend “buy” is 0.157 and 0.162 while median forecasted return-on-equity for the sub-sample where less than 30 percent of the analysts recommend “buy” is 0.112. The median price-to-book ratio for the sub-samples where greater than 90 percent of the analysts recommend “buy” and where between 70 and 90 percent recommend “buy” is 3.011 and 2.686 while median price-to-book ratio for the sub-samples where less than 30 percent of the analysts recommend “buy” is 1.649.

6.2. Estimates of implied expected rates of return

The results from the estimation of regression (4) based on price, I/B/E/S forecasts of earnings, and current book value and from the estimation of regression (5) based on price and current accounting data and are summarized in table 5, panel B. We focus our discussion on the estimates of the implied expected rates of return obtained from these regression parameters. These estimates are also included in panel B.

The estimates of the expected rates of return implied by I/B/E/S analysts’ forecasts decline almost monotonically with the percentage of “buy” recommendations associated with the forecasts of earnings comprising the consensus; the means of these estimates are 11.20 percent, 11.84 percent, 10.82 percent, 9.18 percent, and 6.86 percent, suggesting that analysts’ recommendations are, indeed, consistent with the implied expectations of rates of return. The estimates of the expected rates of return based on prices and current accounting data show a

pattern that is very similar to that of those based on analysts' forecasts. The mean estimates of the expected rate of return for each of the groups of data decline monotonically with the percentage of "buy" recommendations associated with the forecasts of earnings comprising the consensus; the means of these estimates are 10.94 percent, 10.22 percent, 8.90 percent, 7.23 percent, and 4.60 percent.

Differences between the estimates of expected rate of return based on percentage of "buy" recommendations are included in table 5, panel C. Comparing the expected rates of return based on prices and current accounting data with the estimates based on analysts' forecasts reveals that even when the analysts are not recommending "buy" their forecasts imply a rate of return that is higher than expectations based on current accounting data; these mean differences between the estimates based on analysts' forecasts and estimates based on current accounting data are 0.26 percent, 1.61 percent, 1.92 percent, 1.95 percent, and 2.27 percent. Four of these differences are significant. This pervasive optimism in the expected return measured by comparing analysts' return expectations with return expectations based on current accounting data is, interestingly, quite similar to the pervasive optimism observed when comparing expectations of future earnings with actual realizations of earnings; see table 5, panel A.

6.3. Summary

To summarize the analyses in this section, we observe that analysts' recommendations are consistent with their expectations of returns; that is, there is a monotonic decrease in expected rate of return as the percentage of "buy" recommendations declines.²³ Analysts' expected rates of return are higher than expectations based on current accounting data regardless of their recommendation. An interpretation of this result is that analysts are always optimistic;

²³ Our findings and conclusions are unchanged when the analysis is repeated using a value-weighted analysis similar to section 5.

even when they are not issuing “buy” recommendations.²⁴ The bias in expected rates of return based on analysts’ forecasts is not the result of analysts’ expectations of positive abnormal returns isolated in firms with “buy” or “strong buy” recommendations.

7. Summary and conclusions

We show that, on average, the difference between the estimate of the expected rate of return based on analysts’ earnings forecasts and the estimate of based on current earnings realizations is 2.84 percent. An implication of the observation that rates of return based on analysts’ forecasts are higher than market expectations is that caution should be taken when interpreting the meaning of the rate of return that is implied by analysts’ earnings forecasts; it may not be, as the literature generally claims, an estimate of the cost of capital.

When estimates of the expected rate of return in the extant literature are adjusted to remove the effect of optimism bias in analysts’ forecasts, the estimate of the equity risk premium appears to be approximately zero. We show, however, when estimates are based on value-weighted analyses, the bias in the estimate of the expected rate of return is lower and the estimate of the expected equity premium is more reasonable; 4.43 percent.

Results from sub-samples formed on the basis of percentage of analysts comprising the consensus recommending “buy” show that the estimate of the expected rate of return, based on both analysts’ forecasts of earnings and on current earnings, declines in a monotonic manner as the percentage of analysts recommending “buy” declines. A comparison of the estimates of the expected rate of return based on the analysts’ forecasts, with estimates based on earnings realizations, suggests that analysts tend to be more optimistic than the market even when they are

²⁴ This result is consistent with Barber, Lehavy, McNicholls, and Trueman (2001) who show that analysts’ recommendations (in their case, those summarized in the Zach’s database) can not be used to form profitable trading strategies.

not making “buy” recommendations. That is, analysts recommend “buy” when they expect the future return to be high and “sell” when they expect the return to be low regardless of market expectations.

Our paper has two key implications for future research which uses market price, book value of equity, and accounting earnings to obtain estimates of the implied expected rate of return for a portfolio of stocks. First, since analysts’ forecasts are pervasively optimistic, estimates of the implied expected rate of return formed using forecasts will be pervasively and significantly upward biased. This bias may be avoided by estimating the rate of return implied by price, book values, and *realized* earnings rather than biased earnings *forecasts*. Second, value-weighted analyses may be more appropriate in addressing certain issues such as estimating the equity premium, than equal-weighted analyses. The value-weighted analyses may provide more realistic estimates of the expected rate of return than are implied by equally-weighted analyses; which may be unnecessarily affected by less representative observations, such as penny stocks, and stocks making losses.

When coupled with results from the papers that demonstrate the troublesome effects of measurement error in firm-specific estimates of the expected rate of return, the results in this study suggest that the extant measures of implied expected rate of return should be used with considerable caution. The challenge is to find means of reducing the measurement error and to mitigate the effects of bias. Easton and Monahan (2005) suggest focusing on sub-samples where the measurement error is likely to be small. Our paper suggests that methods based on realized earnings rather than earnings forecasts may be a possible means of avoiding the effects of bias in analysts’ forecasts. Another possible avenue might be to attempt to un-do the bias; following, for example, the ideas in Frankel and Lee (1998).

Figure 1: Alignment of Price-Dates, Earnings Announcement Dates, and Analysts' Forecast-Dates




Table 1: Descriptive statistics on forecast errors for the consensus sample

<i>t</i>	N	Accuracy of forecasts				Bias in forecasts			
		$ FE_{jt+1} $		$ FE_{jt+1} /p_{jt}$		FE_{jt+1}		FE_{jt+1}/p_{jt}	
		Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
12/92	1,418	0.594	0.280	0.030	0.014	-0.241	-0.150	-0.017	-0.007
12/93	1,544	0.461	0.190	0.028	0.009	-0.228	-0.070	-0.019	-0.003
12/94	1,781	0.427	0.220	0.030	0.012	-0.206	-0.080	-0.019	-0.004
12/95	1,939	0.451	0.210	0.028	0.011	-0.261	-0.070	-0.019	-0.004
12/96	2,006	0.518	0.210	0.027	0.010	-0.187	-0.100	-0.018	-0.005
12/97	2,137	0.606	0.270	0.031	0.013	-0.376	-0.200	-0.024	-0.009
12/98	2,044	0.718	0.215	0.040	0.012	-0.515	-0.080	-0.025	-0.004
12/99	1,854	0.668	0.230	0.046	0.012	-0.399	-0.090	-0.028	-0.004
12/00	1,729	1.394	0.310	0.052	0.018	-1.257	-0.240	-0.041	-0.012
12/01	1,809	0.705	0.200	0.033	0.011	0.063	-0.060	-0.018	-0.003
12/02	1,825	0.570	0.160	0.031	0.011	0.119	-0.030	-0.012	-0.002
12/03	2,000	0.650	0.170	0.019	0.008	-0.251	-0.010	-0.003	0.000
Means	1,841	0.647	0.222	0.033	0.012	-0.312	-0.098	-0.020	-0.005

Notes to Table 1:

FE_{jt+1} is actual earnings per share for year $t+1$ as reported by I/B/E/S less the first median consensus forecast of earnings per share for year $t+1$ released at least 14 days after the announcement of year t earnings

p_{jt} is price per share as of the end of fiscal year t

Table 2: Summary statistics for regression variables

<i>t</i>	N	$\frac{eps_{jt+1}^{Cons}}{bps_{jt}}$		$\frac{eps_{jt}}{bps_{jt-1}}$		$\frac{p'_{jt}}{bps_{jt}}$		$\frac{p'_{jt} - bps_{jt}^*}{bps_{jt-1}}$	
		Equation (4) dependent variable		Equation (5) dependent variable		Equation (4) independent variable		Equation (5) independent variable	
		Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
12/92	1,418	0.138	0.132	0.104	0.110	2.193	1.792	1.265	0.854
12/93	1,544	0.138	0.138	0.113	0.122	2.374	1.929	1.505	0.994
12/94	1,781	0.146	0.145	0.121	0.126	2.114	1.706	1.334	0.834
12/95	1,939	0.145	0.142	0.122	0.132	2.454	1.906	1.679	1.060
12/96	2,006	0.135	0.139	0.108	0.126	2.654	2.114	1.851	1.228
12/97	2,137	0.125	0.140	0.102	0.125	2.998	2.409	2.132	1.491
12/98	2,044	0.118	0.134	0.093	0.116	2.728	1.974	1.810	0.959
12/99	1,854	0.126	0.141	0.094	0.124	3.398	1.883	2.699	0.996
12/00	1,729	0.116	0.136	0.100	0.130	2.749	1.964	2.022	1.109
12/01	1,809	0.079	0.111	0.068	0.100	2.457	1.928	1.548	0.989
12/02	1,825	0.093	0.117	0.077	0.102	1.945	1.625	1.007	0.662
12/03	2,000	0.106	0.121	0.090	0.111	2.883	2.314	2.198	1.450
Means	1,841	0.122	0.133	0.099	0.119	2.579	1.962	1.754	1.052

Notes to Table 2:

- eps_{jt+1}^{Cons} is the first median consensus forecast of earnings per share for firm *j* for year *t*+1 released at least 14 days after the announcement of year *t* earnings
- eps_{jt} is the I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for firm *j* for year *t*
- bps_{jt} is common book value of equity per share for firm *j* at time *t*
- $p'_{jt} = \frac{P_{jt+\tau}}{(1 + \hat{r})^{365}}$ is the price per share for firm *j* at time *t*+ τ (one day after the earnings announcement date), $P_{jt+\tau}$, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends since the end of the fiscal year, discounted to year end using the estimated discount rate
- bps_{jt}^* is the common book value of equity per share for firm *j* at time *t* less net income for firm *j* for year *t* plus I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for firm *j* for year *t*

Table 3: Comparison of implied expected rates of return based on I/B/E/S forecasts of earnings with implied expected rate of return based on current accounting data

Panel A: Estimates of expected rate of return based on analysts' forecasts and current accounting data

		$\frac{eps_{jt+1}^{Cons}}{bps_{jt}} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \frac{p'_{jt}}{bps_{jt}} + \mu_{jt} \quad (4)$ Analysts' consensus earnings forecasts				$\frac{eps_{jt}}{bps_{jt-1}} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \frac{p'_{jt} - bps_{jt}^*}{bps_{jt-1}} + \zeta_{jt} \quad (5)$ Current accounting data				Difference in expected rate of return
<i>T</i>	N	γ_0	γ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1$	δ_0	δ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \delta_0$	
12/92	1,418	0.057 (17.71)	0.037 (28.62)	36.60%	9.39%	0.057 (18.96)	0.037 (22.97)	27.09%	5.67%	3.72%
12/93	1,544	0.073 (16.53)	0.027 (16.91)	15.59%	10.08%	0.068 (18.37)	0.030 (16.74)	15.32%	6.83%	3.25%
12/94	1,781	0.073 (16.25)	0.035 (18.99)	16.81%	10.73%	0.069 (21.01)	0.039 (23.73)	24.00%	6.90%	3.83%
12/95	1,939	0.095 (23.47)	0.021 (15.38)	10.83%	11.53%	0.092 (23.40)	0.018 (11.70)	6.55%	9.22%	2.31%
12/96	2,006	0.089 (18.91)	0.018 (12.00)	6.66%	10.61%	0.073 (16.79)	0.019 (12.11)	6.77%	7.26%	3.35%
12/97	2,137	0.082 (14.64)	0.014 (9.13)	3.71%	9.64%	0.066 (14.61)	0.017 (11.30)	5.60%	6.62%	3.02%
12/98	2,044	0.082 (15.23)	0.013 (8.67)	3.50%	9.50%	0.065 (15.86)	0.016 (11.89)	6.43%	6.49%	3.01%
12/99	1,854	0.136 (32.67)	-0.003 (-3.83)	0.73%	13.29%	0.100 (22.54)	-0.002 (-2.71)	0.34%	9.97%	3.32%
12/00	1,729	0.084 (15.42)	0.012 (7.84)	3.38%	9.57%	0.086 (16.02)	0.007 (4.30)	1.00%	8.61%	0.96%
12/01	1,809	0.029 (4.64)	0.020 (9.42)	4.63%	4.93%	0.028 (6.30)	0.026 (14.20)	9.99%	2.82%	2.11%
12/02	1,825	0.019 (3.12)	0.038 (14.14)	9.83%	5.70%	0.030 (7.98)	0.047 (22.13)	21.13%	2.96%	2.74%
12/03	2,000	0.069 (11.65)	0.013 (7.55)	2.72%	8.18%	0.057 (11.55)	0.015 (9.59)	4.35%	5.74%	2.44%
Means	1,841	0.074	0.020	9.58%	9.43%	0.066	0.022	10.71%	6.59%	2.84%
t-Statistics		(8.50)	(5.86)		(14.16)	(10.50)	(5.51)		(10.50)	(12.33)

Table 3: Continued

Panel B: Estimates of expected rate of return based on future realized earnings

$$\frac{eps_{jt+1}}{bps_{jt}} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \frac{p'_{jt}}{bps_{jt}} + \mu_{jt} \quad (4)$$

<i>t</i>	Perfect foresight earnings forecasts				Analysts' Forecasts Less Perfect Foresight	Current Accounting Data Less Perfect Foresight
	γ_0	γ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1$		
12/92	0.037 (7.09)	0.031 (15.31)	14.10%	6.77%	2.62%	-1.10%
12/93	0.049 (8.10)	0.026 (11.61)	7.97%	7.45%	2.63%	-0.62%
12/94	0.046 (7.56)	0.031 (12.77)	8.33%	7.71%	3.02%	-0.81%
12/95	0.076 (13.29)	0.013 (6.69)	2.22%	8.87%	2.66%	0.35%
12/96	0.082 (12.01)	0.004 (1.83)	0.12%	8.56%	2.05%	-1.30%
12/97	0.040 (5.14)	0.009 (4.18)	0.77%	4.89%	4.75%	1.73%
12/98	0.057 (8.28)	0.006 (3.15)	0.44%	6.27%	3.23%	0.22%
12/99	0.105 (17.73)	-0.007 (-6.01)	1.87%	9.79%	3.50%	0.18%
12/00	0.043 (6.16)	0.004 (2.05)	0.18%	4.70%	4.87%	3.91%
12/01	0.018 (2.47)	0.013 (5.16)	1.40%	3.13%	1.80%	-0.31%
12/02	-0.003 (-0.48)	0.041 (13.60)	9.16%	3.77%	1.93%	-0.81%
12/03	0.075 (11.02)	0.007 (3.71)	0.64%	8.28%	-0.10%	-2.54%
Means	0.052	0.015	3.93%	6.68%	2.75%	-0.09%
t-Statistics	(6.12)	(3.63)		(10.79)	(7.13)	(-0.19)

Table 3: Continued

Panel C: Comparison of implied expected rates of return based on I/B/E/S forecasts of earnings with implied expected rate of return based on current accounting data and on future realized earnings using prices measured the day after the consensus forecast

$$\frac{eps_{jt+1}^{Cons}}{bps_{jt}} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \frac{p'_{jt}}{bps_{jt}} + \mu_{jt} \quad (4)$$

Analysts' consensus earnings forecasts

	N	γ_0	γ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1$
Means	1,841	0.072	0.021	10.07%	9.34%
t-Statistics		(8.04)	(5.93)		(13.68)

$$\frac{eps_{jt}}{bps_{jt-1}} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \frac{p'_{jt} - bps_{jt}^*}{bps_{jt-1}} + \zeta_{jt} \quad (5)$$

Current accounting data

	N	δ_0	δ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \delta_0$
Means	1,841	0.064	0.023	11.36%	6.41%
t-Statistics		(10.13)	(5.86)		(10.13)

$$\frac{eps_{jt+1}^{PF}}{bps_{jt}} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \frac{p'_{jt}}{bps_{jt}} + \mu_{jt} \quad (4)$$

Perfect foresight earnings forecasts

	N	γ_0	γ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1$
Means	1,841	0.049	0.016	4.42%	6.50%
t-Statistics		(5.36)	(3.84)		(9.72)

Notes to Table 3:

Panel A of the table reports the results of estimating regression (4) using I/B/E/S consensus forecasts and regression (5) using current accounting data cross-sectionally using all available observations. Panel B reports the results of estimating regression (4) using subsequent earnings realizations as perfect foresight forecasts. Observations with any of the dependent or independent variables in the top and bottom two percent observations are removed to reduce the effects of outliers. The variables are as defined in the notes to Tables 1 and 2. Summary means across the annual regressions and the related Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics are provided. The last column of Panel A contains the difference between estimates of expected return from the estimation of regression (4) using I/B/E/S consensus forecasts and regression (5) using current accounting data. The last two columns of Panel B contain the differences between perfect foresight estimates and the estimates of expected return from the estimation of regression (4) using I/B/E/S consensus forecasts and regression (5) using current accounting data. Panel C repeats the analysis performed in Panels A and B using an alternative definition of price. Instead of measuring price at trade close the day after the earnings announcement, price is measured at trade close the day following the consensus forecast. This results in a price variable measured 14 days to a month and a half later. All other variables remain unchanged.

Table 4: Value-weighting observations, results of comparison of implied expected rates of return based on I/B/E/S forecasts of earnings, based on current accounting data and based on future realizations of earnings

Panel A: Descriptive statistics

Mean of annual means	Decile of market capitalization at time t									
	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	6 th	7 th	8 th	9 th	10 th
$ FE_{jt+1} $	0.419	0.397	0.398	0.443	0.428	0.455	0.466	0.488	0.579	2.369
$ FE_{jt+1} /p_{jt}$	0.102	0.053	0.040	0.034	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.017	0.015	0.012
FE_{jt+1}	-0.284	-0.235	-0.242	-0.266	-0.233	-0.237	-0.214	-0.246	-0.273	-0.890
FE_{jt+1}/p_{jt}	-0.075	-0.033	-0.025	-0.021	-0.015	-0.013	-0.009	-0.009	-0.007	-0.005
$eps_{jt+1}^{Cons}/bps_{jt}$	0.065	0.081	0.093	0.095	0.113	0.128	0.140	0.149	0.160	0.186
eps_{jt}/bps_{jt-1}	0.002	0.050	0.066	0.075	0.095	0.113	0.126	0.134	0.145	0.168
p'_{jt}/bps_{jt}	1.707	1.954	2.188	2.362	2.482	2.676	2.794	2.895	2.941	3.593
$(p'_{jt} - bps_{jt}^*)/bps_{jt-1}$	0.641	1.000	1.275	1.533	1.752	1.958	2.083	2.142	2.146	2.732

Mean of annual medians	Decile of market capitalization at time t									
	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	6 th	7 th	8 th	9 th	10 th
$ FE_{jt+1} $	0.218	0.200	0.211	0.225	0.225	0.221	0.238	0.223	0.242	0.246
$ FE_{jt+1} /p_{jt}$	0.042	0.024	0.018	0.016	0.012	0.010	0.009	0.008	0.007	0.006
FE_{jt+1}	-0.116	-0.106	-0.108	-0.116	-0.098	-0.092	-0.092	-0.090	-0.075	-0.086
FE_{jt+1}/p_{jt}	-0.023	-0.012	-0.009	-0.007	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
$eps_{jt+1}^{Cons}/bps_{jt}$	0.095	0.110	0.115	0.118	0.126	0.134	0.143	0.148	0.155	0.176
eps_{jt}/bps_{jt-1}	0.052	0.086	0.097	0.104	0.114	0.125	0.131	0.136	0.142	0.160
p'_{jt}/bps_{jt}	1.316	1.577	1.748	1.836	1.926	2.060	2.183	2.221	2.304	2.829
$(p'_{jt} - bps_{jt}^*)/bps_{jt-1}$	0.259	0.605	0.818	0.944	1.017	1.220	1.327	1.313	1.439	1.934

Table 4: Continued

Panel B: Value-weighted estimates of expected rate of return based on analysts' forecasts and current accounting data

$$\frac{eps_{jt+1}^{Cons}}{bps_{jt}} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \frac{p'_{jt}}{bps_{jt}} + \mu_{jt} \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{eps_{jt}}{bps_{jt-1}} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \frac{p'_{jt} - bps_{jt}^*}{bps_{jt-1}} + \zeta_{jt} \quad (5)$$

<i>T</i>	N	Analysts' consensus earnings forecasts				Current accounting data				Difference in expected rate of return
		γ_0	γ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1$	δ_0	δ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \delta_0$	
12/92	1,418	0.047 (14.73)	0.047 (44.03)	57.76%	9.35%	0.062 (23.49)	0.044 (35.38)	46.89%	6.22%	3.13%
12/93	1,544	0.052 (14.70)	0.047 (40.70)	51.76%	9.82%	0.079 (29.00)	0.042 (36.43)	46.23%	7.87%	1.95%
12/94	1,781	0.072 (22.46)	0.049 (43.95)	52.03%	12.15%	0.084 (34.82)	0.050 (48.64)	57.05%	8.39%	3.76%
12/95	1,938	0.092 (26.96)	0.036 (41.36)	46.89%	12.76%	0.127 (41.25)	0.028 (30.46)	32.37%	12.65%	0.11%
12/96	2,006	0.081 (25.50)	0.034 (45.77)	51.09%	11.53%	0.106 (38.36)	0.029 (40.29)	44.72%	10.64%	0.89%
12/97	2,137	0.094 (28.17)	0.026 (41.48)	44.60%	12.01%	0.106 (41.10)	0.023 (37.67)	39.89%	10.58%	1.43%
12/98	2,044	0.093 (28.30)	0.022 (42.72)	47.17%	11.49%	0.090 (33.70)	0.022 (45.20)	49.99%	8.97%	2.52%
12/99	1,855	0.147 (35.74)	0.010 (23.92)	23.55%	15.69%	0.147 (36.07)	0.004 (8.85)	4.00%	14.66%	1.03%
12/00	1,729	0.091 (22.09)	0.022 (36.13)	43.02%	11.26%	0.110 (28.77)	0.021 (29.60)	33.61%	11.04%	0.22%
12/01	1,808	0.059 (15.74)	0.031 (38.34)	44.84%	8.98%	0.070 (22.45)	0.030 (40.29)	47.31%	6.98%	2.00%
12/02	1,825	0.055 (18.77)	0.043 (52.26)	59.95%	9.76%	0.083 (34.75)	0.041 (54.05)	61.56%	8.26%	1.50%
12/03	2,000	0.072 (21.58)	0.032 (39.02)	43.22%	10.41%	0.098 (27.36)	0.031 (36.65)	40.17%	9.76%	0.65%
Means	1,841	0.079	0.033	47.16%	11.27%	0.097	0.030	41.98%	9.67%	1.60%
t-Statistics		(10.09)	(9.62)		(21.20)	(13.90)	(8.38)		(13.90)	(4.91)

Notes to Table 4:

Panel A of the table reports the summary statistics from repeating the analysis performed in Tables 1 and 2 by annual decile of market capitalization at time t . Panel B repeats the analysis in Table 3 using weighted least squares regression with regression weights equal to market capitalization at time t .

Table 5: Variation in the implied expected rate of return with changes in the percentage of analysts' making "buy" recommendation – minimum of five analysts following firm

Panel A: Descriptive statistics by percent of buy recommendations

	$90 \leq \% \text{ Buy} \leq 100$		$70 \leq \% \text{ Buy} \leq 90$		$50 \leq \% \text{ Buy} < 70$		$30 \leq \% \text{ Buy} < 50$		$0 \leq \% \text{ Buy} < 30$	
	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
$ FE_{jt+1} $	0.437	0.218	0.932	0.232	0.497	0.220	0.540	0.235	0.536	0.229
$ FE_{jt+1} /p_{jt}$	0.017	0.008	0.017	0.008	0.019	0.008	0.026	0.010	0.041	0.011
FE_{jt+1}	-0.268	-0.101	-0.725	-0.103	-0.251	-0.083	-0.271	-0.089	-0.287	-0.082
FE_{jt+1}/p_{jt}	-0.010	-0.004	-0.009	-0.003	-0.010	-0.003	-0.016	-0.004	-0.027	-0.004
$eps_{jt+1}^{Cons}/bps_{jt}$	0.140	0.157	0.164	0.162	0.159	0.153	0.134	0.131	0.108	0.112
eps_{jt}/bps_{jt-1}	0.125	0.150	0.152	0.151	0.143	0.140	0.120	0.120	0.091	0.101
p'_{jt}/bps_{jt}	3.860	3.011	3.435	2.686	2.848	2.305	2.371	1.921	2.029	1.649
$(p'_{jt} - bps_{jt}^*)/bps_{jt-1}$	3.649	2.313	2.844	1.948	2.005	1.438	1.485	1.016	1.032	0.704
# of observations	135		227		263		176		154	

Table 5: Continued

Panel B: Summary of results of estimation by percent of buy recommendations

$$\frac{eps_{jt+1}^{Cons}}{bps_{jt}} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \frac{p'_{jt}}{bps_{jt}} + \mu_{jt} \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{eps_{jt}}{bps_{jt-1}} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \frac{p'_{jt} - bps_{jt}^*}{bps_{jt-1}} + \zeta_{jt} \quad (5)$$

Recommendation	N	Analysts' consensus earnings forecasts				Current accounting data			
		γ_0	γ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1$	δ_0	δ_1	Adj R ²	$\hat{r} = \delta_0$
90 ≤ % Buy ≤ 100	135	0.100 (7.93)	0.012 (3.32)	7.90%	11.20% (9.93)	0.109 (5.12)	0.012 (1.46)	18.18%	10.94% (5.12)
70 ≤ % Buy ≤ 90	227	0.098 (9.87)	0.021 (7.73)	16.82%	11.84% (14.29)	0.102 (10.23)	0.020 (5.88)	17.42%	10.22% (10.23)
50 ≤ % Buy < 70	263	0.080 (13.67)	0.029 (12.69)	34.28%	10.82% (20.84)	0.089 (18.09)	0.028 (10.96)	30.29%	8.90% (18.09)
30 ≤ % Buy < 50	176	0.060 (7.04)	0.031 (6.80)	28.31%	9.18% (16.25)	0.072 (13.25)	0.033 (8.38)	26.85%	7.23% (13.25)
0 ≤ % Buy < 30	154	0.032 (3.13)	0.037 (9.60)	32.00%	6.86% (8.85)	0.046 (5.60)	0.044 (9.67)	30.09%	4.60% (5.60)

Table 5: Continued

Panel C: Mean differences in (t-statistics for) estimates of expected rate of return

		Analysts' expected rate of return					Expected rate of return based on current accounting data			
		90 ≤ % ≤ 100	70 ≤ % ≤ 90	50 ≤ % < 70	30 ≤ % < 50	0 ≤ % < 30	90 ≤ % ≤ 100	70 ≤ % ≤ 90	50 ≤ % < 70	30 ≤ % < 50
Analysts' expected rate of return	70 ≤ % ≤ 90	-0.64% (-0.79)								
	50 ≤ % < 70	0.38% (0.50)	1.02% (2.11)							
	30 ≤ % < 50	2.02% (2.50)	2.66% (4.76)	1.64% (3.96)						
	0 ≤ % < 30	4.34% (5.46)	4.97% (9.01)	3.96% (8.90)	2.31% (5.04)					
Expected rate of return based on current accounting data	90 ≤ % ≤ 100	0.26% (0.15)								
	70 ≤ % ≤ 90		1.61% (3.14)				0.72% (0.30)			
	50 ≤ % < 70			1.92% (5.04)			2.04% (1.03)	1.32% (1.81)		
	30 ≤ % < 50				1.95% (6.38)		3.72% (1.82)	3.00% (4.77)	1.68% (3.96)	
	0 ≤ % < 30					2.27% (7.15)	6.35% (3.15)	5.63% (8.25)	4.31% (7.40)	2.63% (5.29)

Table 5: Continued

Notes to Table 5:

Using the median consensus analysts' forecast and the percent of buy recommendations from the summary I/B/E/S database, we estimate expected rate of return by percentage of buy recommendations for all firms with at least five analysts included in the consensus. Panel A reports descriptive statistics by percentage of buy recommendations. The variables are as defined in the notes to Tables 1 and 2. Panel B reports the results of estimating regression (4) using I/B/E/S consensus forecasts and regression (5) using current accounting data cross-sectionally using all available observations of that percentage of buy recommendations. Within the percentage of buy recommendations, observations with any of the dependent or independent variables in the top and bottom two percent observations are removed to reduce the effects of outliers. The reported numbers are the summary means across the annual regressions and the related Fama and Macbeth (1973) t-statistics. The last column for each regression in Panel B reports the annual estimates of expected rate of return by percentage of buy recommendations. Panel C reports summary means of the differences in estimates across the annual regressions and the related Fama and Macbeth (1973) t-statistics.

REFERENCES

- Baginski, S. and J. Wahlen. 2003. Residual income, risk, intrinsic values, and share prices. *The Accounting Review* 78: 327-351.
- Barber, B, R. Lehavy, M. McNicholls, and B. Trueman. 2001. Can investors profit from the prophets? Security analyst recommendations and stock returns. *Journal of Finance* 56: 531-563.
- Boni, L. and K. Womack. 2002. Wall Street's credibility problem: misaligned incentive and dubious fixes. *Wharton Financial Institutions Center*.
- Botosan, C. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. *The Accounting Review* 72: 323-349.
- Botosan, C. and M. Plumlee. 2005. Assessing alternative proxies for the expected risk premium. *The Accounting Review* 80: 21-54.
- Botosan, C., M. Plumlee, Y. Xie. 2004. The role of information precision in determining the cost of equity capital. *Review of Accounting Studies* 9: 233-259.
- Bradshaw, M. 2004. How do analysts use their earnings forecasts in generating stock recommendations? *The Accounting Review* 79: 25-50.
- Brown, L. 1993. Earnings forecasting research: Its implications for capital markets research. *International Journal of Forecasting* 9: 295-320.
- Claus, J. and J. Thomas. 2001. Equity risk premium as low as three percent? Evidence from analysts' earnings forecasts for domestic and international stocks. *Journal of Finance* 56: 1629-1666.
- Das, S., B. Levine, and K. Sivaramankrishnan. 1998. Earnings predictability and bias in analysts' earnings forecasts. *The Accounting Review* 73: 277-294.
- Daske, H. 2006. Economic benefits of adopting IFRS or US-GAAP – Have the expected costs of equity capital really decreased? *Journal of Business, Finance, and Accounting*. Forthcoming.
- Dhaliwal, D., L. Krull, O. Li, and W. Moser. 2005. Dividend taxes and implied cost of capital. *Journal of Accounting Research*. 43: 675-715.
- Dugar, A., and S. Nathan. 1995. The effect of banking relationships on financial analysts' earnings investment recommendations. *Contemporary Accounting Research* 12: 131-160.

- Eames, M., S. Glover, and J. Kennedy. 2002. The association between broker recommendations and broker-analysts' earnings forecasts. *Journal of Accounting Research* 40: 85-104.
- Easton, P. 2004. PE ratios, PEG ratios, and estimating the implied expected rate of return on equity capital. *The Accounting Review* 79: 73-96.
- Easton, P. 2006. Use of forecasts of earnings to estimate and compare cost of capital across regimes. *Journal of Business, Finance, and Accounting* 33: 374-394.
- Easton, P., and S. Monahan. 2005. An evaluation of accounting-based measures of expected returns. *The Accounting Review* 80: 501-538.
- Easton, P., G. Sommers, and M. Zmijewski. 2006. Effects of fraud on expectations of returns on equity investment and growth. University of Notre Dame. Working paper.
- Easton, P., G. Taylor, P. Shroff, and T. Sougiannis. 2002. Using forecasts of earnings to simultaneously estimate growth and the rate of return on equity investment. *Journal of Accounting Research* 40: 657-676.
- Fama, E. and K. French. 1992. The cross-section of expected returns. *Journal of Finance* 47: 427-465.
- Fama, E. and J. MacBeth. 1973. Risk, return and equilibrium – Empirical tests. *The Journal of Political Economy* 81: 607-636.
- Francis, J., I. Khurana, and R. Periera. 2005. Disclosure incentives and effects on cost of capital around the world. *Accounting Review* 80: 1125-1163.
- Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson and K. Schipper. 2004. Costs of equity and earnings attributes. *Accounting Review* 79: 967-1011.
- Frankel, R. and C. Lee. 1998. Accounting valuation, market expectation, and cross-sectional stock returns. *Journal of Accounting and Economics* 25: 283-319.
- Gebhardt, W., C. Lee, and B. Swaminathan. 2001. Towards an ex-ante cost of capital. *Journal of Accounting Research* 39: 135-176.
- Gode, D. and P. Mohanram. 2003. Inferring the cost of capital using the Ohlson-Juettner model. *Review of Accounting Studies* 8: 399-431.
- Groysberg, B., P. Healy, C. Chapman, and Y. Gui. 2006. Do buy-side analysts outperform the sell-side. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*. Forthcoming.

- Guay, W., S. Kothari, S. Shu. 2005. Properties of implied cost of capital using analysts' forecasts. University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School. Working paper.
- Hail, L. and C. Leuz. 2006. International differences in the cost of equity capital: Do legal institutions and securities regulation matter? *Journal of Accounting Research*. Forthcoming.
- Hribar, P. and N. Jenkins. 2004. The effect of accounting restatements on earnings revisions and the estimated cost of capital. *Review of Accounting Studies* 9: 337-356.
- Kutsoati, E. and D. Bernhardt. 1999. Can relative performance evaluation explain analysts' forecasts of earnings. Tufts University. Working paper.
- Lee, C., J. Myers, and B. Swaminathan. 1999. What is the intrinsic value of the Dow? *Journal of Finance* Volume 54 Issue 5: 1693-1741.
- Lin, H. 1994. Security analysts' investment recommendations. Stanford University. Ph.D. dissertation.
- Mendenhall, R. 1991. Evidence on the possible underweighting of earnings information. *Journal of Accounting Research* 29: 170-179.
- Michaely, R and K. Womack. 1999. Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations. *Review of Financial Studies* 12: 653-686.
- O'Brien, P. 1988. Analysts' forecasts as earnings recommendations. *Journal of Accounting and Economics* 10: 53-83.
- O'Brien, P. 1993. Earnings forecasts and the macroeconomy. University of Michigan. Working Paper.
- O'Hanlon, J. and A. Steele. 2000. Estimating the equity risk premium using accounting fundamentals. *Journal of Business Finance and Accounting* 27: 1051-1084.
- Ohlson, J. 1989. Accounting earnings, book value and dividends: the theory of the clean surplus equation (part I). Reproduced in R. Brief and K. Peasnell (eds.) *Clean Surplus: A Link Between Accounting and Finance* (Garland), 167-227.
- Richardson, S., S. Teoh, and P. Wysocki. 2004. The walk-down to beatable analyst forecasts: the role of equity issuances and insider trading incentives. *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 21, 885-924.
- Williams, M. 2004. Discussion of "The role of information precision in determining the cost of equity capital." *Review of Accounting Studies* 9: 261-264.

Zitzewitz, E. 2002. Regulation fair disclosure and the private information of analysts.
Stanford University. Working paper.