Puget Sound Energy 2015 Critical Infrastructure Security Annual Report

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 2015 ANNUAL REPORT

Puget Sound Energy ("PSE") puts a strong focus on cybersecurity and physical security. PSE's goal is to apply the same level of due diligence across the enterprise – which includes critical infrastructure – to ensure a consistent approach to security is maintained no matter the program. All security program activities and results are treated as highly sensitive and confidential so as not to increase risk to the company through the exposure of known vulnerabilities or potential threats.

1.1 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY – CYBERSECURITY AND PHYSICAL SECURITY

1.1.1 Critical Infrastructure Security Policy and Teams

1.1.1.1 Critical Infrastructure Security Policy

Please provide a copy of the company's Critical Infrastructure ("Cl") Security policy. In subsequent reports, please provide copies of any sections of the policy that have been added or modified since the last report.

PSE has three main security related policies – a critical infrastructure cybersecurity policy, an overall physical security policy, and an overall Information Security and Acceptable Use policy.

The PSE cybersecurity policy has not changed in 2015.

The overall PSE physical security policy has not changed in 2015.

In January 2015, a new corporate policy – Information Security and Acceptable Use – was published. It is a consolidation of multiple, pre-existing corporate policies as well as some new content. The areas covered are:

Business Use

- Etiquette and Content
- Electronic Messaging and Communications

Access Control

- User Accountability
- Information Protection
- Encryption of Sensitive Data
- Laptop Encryption

Networking

- Internet
- Inappropriate Sites
- Downloading
- Publishing Material on the Internet
- Tools to Compromise Systems Security

Physical Security

- Responsibility for Equipment
- Use of Personal Equipment

Licensing

- Software Licensing
- Copyright Protection

General Responsibilities

- Reporting Problems
- Reporting Theft of a Laptop (or Other Device)

1.1.1.2 Critical Infrastructure Security Team

Please provide an organizational diagram of the company's CI Security team(s). The diagram, or accompanying list, should include the names and titles of staff on the team, including any vacant positions or staff in acting roles.

The cybersecurity team did change in 2015.

The roles and resources are as follow:

- Director/Information Security Officer (1)
- Manager, IT Security (1)
- Manager, IT Compliance (1)
- Security Architect (1)
- Advisor IT Security Analyst (4)
- Senior IT Security Analyst (5)
- Associate IT Security Analyst (1)
- Senior Records Management Analyst (2)
- Administrative Specialist (1)

The physical security team did not change in 2015.

The roles and resources are as follow:

- Manager (1)
- Senior Investigator (2)
- Physical Security Program Administrator (1)
- Senior Regulatory Compliance Analyst (1)
- Security Technician (1)
- Administrative Specialist (1)

1.1.2 Critical Infrastructure Security Policy and Teams Changes

1.1.2.1 Critical Infrastructure Security Policy Changes

Please provide a written description of any changes made in the past year to the company's CI Security policy, and any changes to the team structure or the placement of the team in the company's organizational structure.

There have been no changes to PSE's physical security and cybersecurity policies in 2015.

1.1.2.2 Critical Infrastructure Security Team Changes

Please provide a written description of any changes made in the past year to the company's CI Security policy, and any changes to the team structure or the placement of the team in the company's organizational structure.

As outlined above, there were changes made to the cybersecurity team. Mainly, two new managers were added to the team. There have been no changes to the PSE physical security team in 2015.

1.1.3 PSE's External Participation

Please describe the company's participation in regional or national tabletop exercises, conferences, committees, or other events related to CI Security.

FERC Assessment – In late January 2015, FERC's Office of Energy Infrastructure Security ("OEIS") team conducted a security assessment at PSE. The assessment was discussion based over a two-day period. At the end of day 2, the OEIS team conducted a *verbal* debrief to the PSE's senior team, highlighting areas of concern and comparing PSE to other entities who have performed this OEIS review (12 to date).

Northwest Cybersecurity Symposium – Cybersecurity conference that brought together prominent individuals in the region to discuss cyber threats and what it would mean to construct and implement a more "coordinated response" to cyber attacks.

FEMA Cyber VTTX – This virtual tabletop exercise was focused on a cyber-based event, specifically looking at response and recovery efforts. The VTTX involved key personnel discussing simulated scenarios in an informal setting. Lead facilitation for the exercise was coordinated by the Emergency Management Institute.

Cyber Guard Prelude 2015 Functional Exercise – This event was part of the national level exercise Cyber Guard Prelude 2015 which was being controlled by DHS from the NCCIC in Washington DC. It was a very focused 3-hour functional exercise to work through some specific injects involving a cyber-incident impacting critical infrastructure in multiple jurisdictions across the state.

DHS Physical Security Awareness Campaign – Campaign designed to raise awareness and provide public, private, and law enforcement communities resources to enhance the physical security and resilience of electric substations.

PSE is also an active participant in many events related to critical infrastructure security. Below is a list of committee's PSE participated in during 2015.

- WECC CIPUG
- American Gas Association Security Group
- Edison Electric Institute Security Group
- Western Electricity Coordinating Council Physical Security Group
- Critical Infrastructure Protection Physical Security Working Group
- King County Critical Infrastructure Protection Work Group
- Washington Fusion Center

1.1.4 Unauthorized actions related to cybersecurity and physical security

Please include a list of any unauthorized actions related to cybersecurity and physical security that have occurred since the last report which led to one or more of the following:

- i. loss of service;
- ii. interruption of a critical business process;
- iii. breach of sensitive business or customer information; or
- iv. serious financial harm.

PSE did not have any cybersecurity or physical security events in 2015 that resulted in a loss of service, exposure of sensitive customer data, serious financial harm nor required involvement or reporting to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, military, law enforcement or another regulatory body.

However, some PSE employees may have been affected by the Premera and Anthem breaches that occurred in 2015. The breaches may have included personally identifiable information as well as the possibility of medical claims information. All vendors handled their respective responses and notifications.

1.1.5 Incident Response

Does the company have retainers or contracts for outside help in the event of an incident?

In 2015, PSE placed on retainer or under contract outside counsel, a forensics firm, and public relations firm for support in the event of a cybersecurity incident.

PSE currently does not have a retainer or contract for physical security support in the event of an incident.

What kind of support is provided by the company's incident response retainers or contracts that provide similar services?

Outside counsel provides general guidance and direction and assists in managing other external entities during a cybersecurity event. The forensics firm provides additional layers of expertise in managing cybersecurity attacks and tools as deemed appropriate. The public relations firm assists in communications to the public as advised by PSE and outside council.

PSE currently does not have a retainer or contract for physical security support in the event of an incident.

Is the company currently participating in any resource sharing agreements such as the Northwest Mutual Assistance Agreement (NMAA), Western Region Mutual Assistance Agreement (WRMAA), or Spare Transformer Equipment Program?

Puget Sound Energy participates in the Edison Electric Institute's Spare Transformer Equipment Program and has been since 2006.

Does the company have an incident response plan? If so, when was it most recently used or tested, and what is the timeframe for the next scheduled test?

Puget Sound Energy has a cybersecurity incident response plan – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan (CSIRP). The CSIRP was last updated on October 14, 2015 and is tested at least annually.

PSE has a physical security incident response plan for each location with PSE staff. These site specific physical security incident response plans that include designated employees for incident response roles were distributed to each location in January 2014. Review of the plans will occur in 2016.

1.1.6 Risk Management

Please identify the risk assessment tools used by the company that relate to CI Security (i.e., ES-C2M2, NIST Framework, etc.).

There are a variety of national and industry oriented cybersecurity and physical security risk assessment processes and tools. Since each process and/or tool approaches cybersecurity and physical security from a slightly different perspective, PSE pulls from multiple sources to ensure a more well-rounded view into the security activities needed to lower or mitigate risks.

Has an independent third party reviewed the company's risk management policy? If so, who performed the review, when did it occur, and how many follow-up actions were identified

PSE has an external review of its overall cybersecurity program approximately every 12 months. Results are prioritized and added to PSE's security roadmap as appropriate. The details of the review are confidential; however, PSE would be happy discuss the details of the review during a nonpublic review session.

PSE did not have an external review of its physical risk management policy in 2015.

How many of these follow-up actions are scheduled (please provide the calendar quarter of projected start and completion dates), in active implementation (please provide the calendar quarter of the projected completion date), or completed?

All activities are currently being prioritized and placed in PSE's security roadmap. Again, details can be discussed during a nonpublic review session.

PSE did not have an external review of its physical risk management policy in 2015.

Please describe any voluntary security standards that the company has adopted.

There are a variety of national and industry oriented cybersecurity and physical security risk assessment processes and frameworks (e.g. NIST, ES C2M2). Since each process and/or framework approaches cybersecurity and physical security from a slightly different perspective, PSE pulls from multiple sources to ensure a more well-rounded view into the security activities needed to lower or mitigate risks.

1.2 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY – CYBERSECURITY

1.2.1 Cybersecurity budget

If available, please provide the percentage of the company's entire IT budget spent on cybersecurity. If unavailable, please provide an explanation.

The cybersecurity budget is in alignment with the security activities identified in the security roadmap.

1.2.2 Cybersecurity – Vulnerability assessments

Please provide the date of the company's most recent vulnerability assessment, who performed the assessment, and how many follow-up actions were identified.

The vulnerability management program ensures activities such as vulnerability assessments and secure code reviews are performed in support of cybersecurity activities (e.g. security assessments, system patching, etc.). They occur on a regular basis as opposed to single points in time. All results are documented and tracked on a risk register for follow-up and remediation. The results of all security centric activities are confidential; however, PSE would be happy discuss any details during a nonpublic review session.

How many of these follow-up actions are scheduled (please provide the calendar quarter of projected start and completion dates), in active implementation (please provide the calendar quarter of the projected completion date), or completed?

See above.

1.2.3 Cybersecurity – Penetration tests

Please provide the date of the company's most recent penetration test, who performed the test, and how many follow-up actions were identified.

The penetration testing program is designed to discover, validate and analyze security vulnerabilities that may reside on information technology assets. It is a component of holistic security management designed to provide coordination and oversight for various security activities performed internally on behalf of PSE. A penetration test is independently scheduled or in support of other cybersecurity activities (e.g. security assessments) to provide additional insight into valuable IT assets at PSE. The results of all security centric activities are confidential; however, PSE would be happy discuss any details during a nonpublic review session.

How many of these follow-up actions are scheduled (please provide the calendar quarter of projected start and completion dates), in active implementation (please provide the calendar quarter of the projected completion date), or completed?

See above.

1.2.4 Cybersecurity – Vulnerability & Penetration (Future)

Please provide the timeframe for the company's next planned vulnerability assessment and penetration test and if the company or a third party will perform each.

Both programs for cybersecurity have been outlined above. The details behind all security centric activities are confidential; however, PSE would be happy discuss during a nonpublic review session.

1.2.5 Information-sharing and collaboration efforts

For the following information-sharing and collaboration efforts, please provide a description of the company's level of involvement with each, and complete the table below.

	Was the company involved in the effort during the calendar year?	Did the company receive alerts or information from this effort during the calendar year? If so, how often (monthly, quarterly, etc.) was information from this source received and reviewed by the company?	Has the company contributed information to this effort during the calendar year?
Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC)	Yes	Weekly industry report Ad-hoc security alerts	No
Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program (CRISP)	No	No	No
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS- CERT)	Yes	Weekly industry report Ad-hoc vulnerability alerts	No
Seattle FBI Cyber Task Force's FLASH Alerts	Yes	Quarterly cybersecurity status Ad-hoc FLASH alerts	No
Public, Regional Information Security Event Management (PRISEM)	No	No	No
Cyber Incident Response Coalition for Analysis Services, (CIRCAS)	Yes	Yes Ad hoc	Yes