2 COMMISSION 3 In the Matter of the Petition ) for Arbitration of an ) Interconnection Agreement ) DOCKET NO. UT-043045 4 Between Volume IV ) Pages 382 - 463 5 ) DIECA COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ) d/b/a COVAD COMMUNICATIONS б ) COMPANY ) 7 with ) QWEST CORPORATION ) 8 ) Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section ) 9 252(b), and the Triennial ) Review Order. ) 10 -----11 Oral argument in the above matter was held on 12 January 13, 2005, at 1:40 p.m., at 1300 South Evergreen 13 Park Drive Southwest, Olympia, Washington, before 14 Chairwoman MARILYN SHOWALTER, Commissioners PATRICK J. 15 OSHIE and RICHARD HEMSTAD. 16 The parties were present as follows: 17 COVAD COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, by ANDREW NEWELL, Attorney at Law, Krys Boyle, 600 17th Street, 18 Suite 2700, Denver, Colorado 80202; telephone, (303) 19 893-2300. 20 QWEST CORPORATION, by WINSLOW B. WAXTER, Senior Attorney, 1005 17th Street, Room 200, Denver, 21 Colorado 80202; telephone, (303) 896-1518. QWEST CORPORATION, by JOHN M. DEVANEY, 22 Attorney at Law, Perkins Coie, 607 14th Street Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20005; telephone, (202) 23 434-1624. 24 Kathryn T. Wilson, CCR

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION

25 Court Reporter

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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Let's be on the 3 record. We are here on January 13th, 2005, in Docket 4 No. UT-043045. I'm Marilyn Showalter, chair of the Commission, and with me are my two colleagues, Richard 5 Hemstad and Patrick Oshie. б 7 This is oral argument on a Covad, Qwest 8 arbitration, and we have set for argument five issues that have been raised to us, and they are identified by 9 10 numbers that refer to an earlier list, and they are in 11 the order that we will take them in: Issue No. 2, 12 which is UNE issues; Issue No. 3, commingling and 13 combinations; Issue No. 1, retirement copper 14 facilities; Issue No. 5, channel regeneration; Issue 15 No. 8, payment issues. 16 Let's begin by taking appearances, and when you give your appearance, if there is a division of 17 18 labor involved on these issues, please identify that. Thank you. Go ahead. 19 20 MS. WAXTER: Good afternoon, Chairwoman, 21 Commissioners, Winslow Waxter on behalf of Qwest. I 22 will be handling Issue No. 5 and Issue No. 8. 23 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Would you spell your 24 last name, please? MS. WAXTER: W-a-x-t-e-r. 25

1	CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You are going to be
2	Issue No. 5 and Issue No. 8, and that's the fourth and
3	fifth issue we will take up.
4	MS. WAXTER: That's correct. Thank you.
5	CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Mr. Devaney?
б	MR. DEVANEY: John Devaney also appearing for
7	Qwest, and I will be handling Issues 1, 2, and 3, and
8	the orders of those are 2, 3, and 1.
9	MR. NEWELL: Good afternoon, Chairwoman,
10	Commissioners. My name is Andrew Newell. I'm with the
11	law firm Krys Boyle in Denver, Colorado, and I
12	represent Covad Communications, and I will be handling
13	all issues.
14	CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Are you going to go
15	first on each of the issues with a response from Qwest?
16	MR. NEWELL: Yes.
17	CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I will try to keep
18	good time. I'm not a master at it, however. All
19	right. Let's turn to the first issue, which is issue
20	No. 2, on UNE issues. Go ahead, Mr. Newell.
21	MR. NEWELL: Thank you, Chairwoman. I think
22	to start, I would like to explain from an operational
23	perspective, Covad is essentially proposing to maintain
24	the status quo. Access to the same elements that were
25	available to it prior to the Triennial Review Order

1 from an operational perspective.

2 From a legal perspective, the theory for 3 access to those elements has changed. Covad recognizes that Section 251 has been reinterpreted by the FCC to 4 interpret out access to those elements, at least 5 pursuant to Section 251, but we believe that Washington б 7 law, as well as Section 271 of the Telecommunications 8 Act, still mandate access to those elements, and they 9 should be made available, and the interconnection 10 agreement in the arbitration process is the most 11 obvious and expedient and legal, permissible way to 12 process those requests.

13 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: On that, don't you 14 need to address, and I think you have addressed, 15 whether first this commission has been preempted by the 16 federal scheme, and if we have not, is this arbitration proceeding the correct proceeding to be addressing 17 18 other things we may have jurisdiction on? MR. NEWELL: Well, I'll take the first part 19 20 of your question first, the preemption question. I

21 don't believe there is any doubt that this commission 22 has not been preempted. Even in the Triennial Review 23 Order, the FCC recognized that states under the savings 24 clause in the Section 251(d)(3) maintain their 25 authority to add elements to the national list of

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1 UNE's.

2 Federal courts have interpreted that language 3 as well and have confirmed that state commissions have 4 the right to enforce state law and have the right to add additional UNE's and additional unbundling 5 requirements. This commission enacted specific, 6 7 detailed and very detailed collocation rules under 8 essentially the same sort of theory that the FCC is not 9 the first and last word on local competition. That's 10 clear under the Act. 11 Now, with respect to your second question --12 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Before you leave the 13 first one, there is sort of a new wrinkle that your 14 answer poses, which are you saying that we have added 15 new UNE elements to the list under 251(d)(3), and 16 therefore, it does fall on this proceeding, or 17 somewhere else, say, under our state authority or 271, 18 we've done some other things, because I think those are two different situations, aren't they? 19 20 MR. NEWELL: Yes. If this commission were to 21 adopt Covad's proposals, it would not do so under 22 Section 251(c)(3). It could do so under its state law 23 authority, which is clearly authorized by Section 24 251(d)(3).

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Section 251(d)(3) doesn't grant any organic

authority to this commission. It would be Washington
 law that would do that, and it would be the same theory
 by which this commission has enacted additional
 collocation rules, the same theories that led to the
 first interconnection were in 1995 prior to the passage
 of the Act.

7 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So now you were going8 to the second issue.

9 MR. NEWELL: Which is whether this is the 10 proper forum to resolve the issues. I don't think 11 Covad has any problem with a generic proceeding to 12 determine the scope of Washington law with respect to 13 unbundling, but there is certainly nothing wrong with 14 resolving that issue in this proceeding.

15 The Act is clear. Section 252 is clear that 16 state commissions are to resolve all issues that are presented in a petition and response for arbitration, 17 18 and the only qualification to that is what's contained in the Coserve case that issues have to be open issues 19 20 that when negotiated by the parties, and in addition to 21 that, there is another savings clause in Section 22 252(e)(3), I believe, that establishes that state 23 commissions may also enforce state law obligations as 24 part of the 252 arbitration process.

So I'm not really taking a position on what

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is the most expedient, efficient way, but in terms of
 legal authority, the Commission clearly has authority
 to impose obligations beyond those in Section 251 in a
 252 arbitration.

5 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: Mr. Newell, are you б basing solely on our authority under state law to 7 include any elements in an interconnection agreement? 8 I thought the argument too was tied up in 9 what was an element under 271 versus an element under 10 Section 251, but the way you addressed it, it seems 11 that you are resting really on our authority under 12 Washington law to include in an ICA under which we have 13 jurisdiction to arbitrate or to hear on arbitration the 14 inclusion of elements.

MR. NEWELL: We rely on both. We believe that in addition to the clear policy directives under Washington law, Section 271 is absolutely crystal clear as to what needs to be unbundled; loops, switching, transport to name three, and this commission also has the authority to enforce Section 271.

The FCC has confirmed that in its 271 orders that it expects state commissions along with the FCC to prevent backsliding, and if the state commission weren't to take an active role in implementing the language of 271 and enforcing it in an interconnection

context, I'm not sure what else enforcement of those
 271 obligations could mean.

3 Now, that's a separate issue from determining interLATA entry. That authority is clearly solely with 4 the FCC. Only the FCC can revoke interLATA authority, 5 б and only the FCC can grant intraLATA entry to Bell 7 operating companies. But that's a separate issue from 8 enforcing federal law, which this commission can clearly do under existing theories of parallel state 9 10 and federal enforcement of federal law.

11 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: So you see our authority 12 to arbitrate an interconnection agreement or to deal 13 with the issues within stemming both from 251 and also 14 from the enforcement provisions arising out of 271? In 15 other words, that we can use an arbitration proceeding 16 to enforce an obligation to unbundle under 271?

MR. NEWELL: Yes, I believe you can. I don't 17 believe there is anything in the law that prohibits it. 18 19 It's the most administratively expedient way to do it. 20 Certainly this commission has, I think, some 21 discretion as to how actively it would like to enforce 22 Section 271 of the Act. Ultimately, the FCC has that 23 residual authority and certainly is the only entity 24 that has the authority to revoke 271 authority, but most commissions that have reviewed the issue have 25

decided that their state orders and the commitments 1 2 made to those state commissions in the process of 3 obtaining 271 approval are enforceable by state 4 commissions as separate state law orders. 5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So how do you б distinguish the Indiana Bell case, other than it's not 7 our circuit? 8 MR. NEWELL: In Indiana Bell, the Indiana 9 Utility Regulatory, IURC, they attempted in the 271 10 review process, attempted to impose additional 11 conditions beyond the requirements of Section 271 on Indiana Bell and essentially withheld their 12 13 recommendations of 271 approval until Indiana Bell 14 would agree to those conditions. 15 The court ruled that that was improper, that 16 only the FCC could grant 271 authority, and there is nothing in Federal law that allowed state commissions 17 18 to add conditions to entry, and it really didn't matter because the Commission didn't have the ultimate 19 20 authority to grant 271 rule. 21 But the court also said that those same 22 conditions could be imposed in a Section 252 23 arbitration proceeding, so it's really -- I don't think 24 that case tells us much about this case because all Covad is asking for is implementation of the 25

requirements of 271. We are not asking for any 1 2 additions and we are not asking for this commission to 3 withhold or approval after the fact or to recommend 4 revocation of Qwest 271 authority to the FCC if they don't agree to additional requirements. 5 б CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: We should probably 7 continue with your own argument. We've been 8 interrupting here. 9 MR. NEWELL: No, please. 10 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Particularly if there 11 are areas we haven't asked about that you want to 12 emphasize. 13 MR. NEWELL: I think I've already been 14 overemphasizing Washington law, but at the expense of 15 doing that again, I'll go back to it. Revised Code of 16 Washington 80.36.300, Subsection 5, has typically been 17 a key section the Commission has relied on to promote 18 local competition. The statute directs the Commission to promote 19 20 diversity in the supply of telecommunications services. 21 That has been interpreted by this commission to mean 22 local competition, and that interpretation led to the 23 Commission deciding to unbundle loops prior to passage 24 of the Act.

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CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I think there is

really no question if there were no Federal Telecom Act 1 2 and we were just operating under our own statutes, we 3 would know that we had or would have fairly broad 4 authority. Isn't really the question of how is it that the federal act reaches in and removes, if it does, 5 б some of our authority to do what we used to do? 7 MR. NEWELL: Well, now we are back to the 8 preemption question, and I think the most constructive case, the case that is most on point, is the Michigan 9 10 Bell case that we cited in our brief where the federal 11 court, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the purpose, the 12 core purpose of Section 251 is to open the market to 13 competition, so the only state rules that really 14 preempt Section 251 are rules that would frustrate that 15 goal. In other words, would deny local competitors 16 access to UNE's that are required under Section 251. 17 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Maybe it's because I've just recently read the Indiana case and I'm 18 19 looking at its rationale, but it's not enough that you 20 have a common goal. That is, it's a problem if the 21 state has a goal of competition and the federal act has 22 a goal of competition, but the federal act has 23 different procedures for getting there. 24 You can't do an end-run around those procedures, so it's like you have to get down one more 25

level and find that the procedures or the process that
 the federal act has set up can be fully honored, even
 if there is an independent state process and standards
 for achieving the same goal.

5 MR. NEWELL: I think that's true. I think 6 the question is -- I believe what you are getting at is 7 two people can have the same goal, but because they 8 choose different means to get there, you can end up 9 with confusion and frustrate each other's progress.

10 I don't think there is anything about our 11 proposal that does that. All it does is add elements 12 that would not otherwise be available under federal 13 law. I think of it as the equivalent of the state of 14 California having more strict regulations with respect 15 to certain consumer products or air quality. Those 16 things are clearly authorized under federal law under the same theory that our proposal would be authorized. 17

18 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You actually have just 19 a minute left, so why don't you summarize anything we 20 haven't touched on.

21 MR. NEWELL: We haven't talked about the 22 pricing issue so I will do that briefly. We covered it 23 in our brief. The state of Washington, independent of 24 the Telecom Act, has adopted a cost methodology that is 25 either the equivalent of or actually is TELRIC, and

that pricing standard ought to apply to elements that
 the Commission adds to the national list under state
 law.

4 With respect to 271 elements, if the theory of access is Section 271, the FCC has made clear that 5 б the pricing standards of Section 201 and 202 of the 7 Act, there is nothing that prevents this commission 8 from applying that pricing standard just as it applies 9 Section 251(d)(2) pricing standards, and it clearly has 10 the authority to set those rates under its plenary 11 authority under Washington law to establish rates for 12 public utilities.

13 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: If I can just ask one 14 question, Mr. Newell, and I know you have probably run 15 out of time here, but I will go over this briefly.

16 If we were to follow Qwest's guidance in this matter, would the result be that Covad would be 17 18 required to sign two agreements, one essentially covering the 271 elements in whatever form it may be, 19 20 and then one covering the 251 elements, and only those 21 elements under 251 would be subject to arbitration 22 under 252? Is that where we would be? Or essentially, 23 you are asking to interlace those -- I'll use that 24 term -- and for us to decide if they should be, to use another term, commonly bundled together in one 25

1 arbitration proceeding.

2 MR. NEWELL: I think the scenario you raised, 3 the separate agreement scenario, is the best-case 4 scenario. That assumes that Qwest is willing to negotiate an agreement to cover 271 elements and they 5 agree with us what those elements are. I can tell you 6 7 there are serious disagreements as to what elements are 8 covered under 271 between Owest and Covad. They are not subject to this arbitration. 9 10 But the other position that Qwest has taken, 11 as I understand it, is to the extent that they have a 12 tariff that includes a fairly equivalent service, they 13 won't sign a commercial agreement. They will just 14 expect people to buy it out of their retail tariff or 15 perhaps utilize their resale option under the Act to 16 avoid the cost discount.

17 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Your time is up.18 Mr. Devaney?

19 MR. DEVANEY: Thank you, Chairwoman. Before 20 I jump into the heart of this issue, I thought I would 21 mention that in Qwest's view, the way this negotiation 22 and arbitration process has proceeded is an example 23 really of how the Act ought to work, because both 24 sides, Qwest and Covad, our negotiators got together 25 more than a year ago and really worked in good faith to

resolve hundreds of contract issues leaving us with
 only six disputed issues before the Commission. Just
 for the record, I would like to applaud both
 negotiators on both sides.

5 In our view though, a common theme with 6 respect to all six disputed issues is that Covad is 7 taking positions that aren't supported by the Triennial 8 Review Order, by the DC circuit's decision in USTA-2, 9 or in some cases by the evidentiary record in this 10 case. This whole UNE unbundling issue is a good 11 example of that, in our view.

12 In that regard, I want to just talk about the 13 context of how this dispute arose. In the Triennial 14 Review Order, as the Commission is no doubt aware of, 15 the FCC found that CLEC's are not impaired without 16 access to certain unbundled network elements. In some 17 cases, the FCC said there is impairment for other 18 elements.

And I found Mr. Newell's opening statement, I think his first sentence was, We are trying to maintain the status quo. We are trying to have the elements that existed to us before the Triennial Review Order, and that's precisely what they are trying to do through their unbundling language, and during the negotiations, we saw this, and I had in my notes the term "end-run."

We saw this as an end-run on the Triennial Review Order where they were trying to get access to elements for which the FCC had expressly found CLEC's are not impaired without them, and as you all know under Section 251 of the Act, unbundling has to be premised on a finding of impairment. If there is no impairment, there can be no Section 251 unbundling requirement.

8 So that's why we objected to the holes in 9 this case, that we would have to provide under this 251 10 interconnection agreement elements for which there is 11 no impairment, and that really goes to the heart of the 12 dispute. In response to certain issues that you raised 13 in your discussion with Mr. Newell, rather than going 14 through our brief, I will just try to address certain 15 issues that you discussed.

16 First state law. The statutory scheme of the Telecom Act of '96 is fairly dramatic in that I think 17 18 what congress did is it took largely away from states 19 the regulation of the local exchange market but gave 20 back to the states certain authority in specifically 21 defined areas to continue to regulate, and that 22 authority is given in the context of these savings 23 clauses that Mr. Newell has talked about.

A very important factor is that in exercising authority under these savings clauses, a state

commission must act consistently with federal law; that is, with findings by the FCC and the Act itself. Our view is that Covad's proposal here is essentially asking the Commission to act inconsistently with federal law.

6 An example of this is in the Triennial Review 7 Order, the FCC found that CLEC's are not impaired 8 without access to so-called feeder subloops, and under 9 Covad's proposal in this case, we would have to provide 10 feeder subloops. There is a direct clash between that 11 request and the FCC's federal policy that ILEC's 12 shouldn't be required to provide unbundled access to 13 feeder subloops, so by asking for access to that 14 element from this commission, Covad is asking for a 15 ruling that would conflict directly with what the FCC 16 has done, and whether you call it preemption or whether you call it consistency with federal law, it's unlawful 17 18 and impermissible.

19 Related to that, as I mentioned before, it's 20 essential that any unbundling requirement be based on 21 evidence of impairment. I remember nine months ago you 22 all convened in the Triennial Review proceeding, which 23 I think lasted for less than a day because of USTA-2, 24 but the whole purpose of that proceeding was to take 25 evidence of impairment, and that's what you have to do

to decide whether something needs to be unbundled. 1 2 In this case, as the administrative law judge 3 correctly found and there is no dispute, there is no 4 evidence in this record of impairment. Covad didn't present any evidence that's impaired without access to 5 б feeder subloops or some of the other elements it's 7 seeking in this agreement, and without that evidence, 8 there is no basis for a ruling that Qwest is required 9 to unbundle elements as Covad would have us do under 10 its proposal. 11 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Is it your view that 12 were there such evidence of impairment that we would 13 have the authority to act? 14 MR. DEVANEY: No. So my impairment point is 15 a secondary point. My first point is that you are 16 being asked to act inconsistently with federal law. 17 But setting that aside, even if there weren't that 18 problem, you still couldn't, in our view, order the 19 unbundling that Covad has requested because there is no 20 evidence of impairment with respect to specific

21 elements.

22 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You are saying
23 evidence of impairment is necessary but not sufficient.
24 You are saying that even if we found evidence of
25 impairment, that if the FCC had found there is no

1 impairment, that would be a conflict. Is that what you
2 are saying?

3 MR. DEVANEY: That is what I'm saying, yes. 4 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: In other words, you 5 are saying that we don't have the independent ability 6 to find impairment if the FCC has already ruled on that 7 precise thing, which is perhaps different than adding 8 an element to the list if the FCC has somehow been 9 silent on that UNE.

10 MR. DEVANEY: There is a distinction. 11 Clearly in the former case, there is a problem with 12 inconsistency in the federal law and preemption. In 13 the latter case, there still may be preemption issues. 14 There still may be consistency issues, for instance, a 15 clash with a federal policy if you are unbundling a 16 certain element, but it's a different situation. What the FCC has said, for example, feeder subloops, No, you 17 18 don't have to provide them, and the state commission 19 said, Yes, you do.

20 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: What is your view of 21 how the Colorado and Minnesota commissions dealt with 22 this issue?

23 MR. DEVANEY: In Colorado, interestingly,
24 Covad agreed to Qwest on unbundling language, so we
25 didn't even arbitrate these issues in Colorado. It was

just agreed out of the box that they would use our
 language.

In Minnesota, the ruling there was that these unbundling proposals from Covad also were improper in a 251 agreement. This is from the administrative law judge in Minnesota. It hasn't gone to the full commission yet. So we fully agree with the Minnesota administrative law judge.

9 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: How about Utah and 10 Maine?

11 MR. DEVANEY: Utah, there has been no ruling 12 yet on these unbundling issues. Maine is somewhat 13 unique. I think the ruling in Maine had to do 14 specifically with Commission jurisdiction over certain 15 271 elements with respect to pricing, as I recall, and 16 what's unique about Maine -- in fact, in the Minnesota decision, the Covad/Qwest arbitration, the ALJ, I 17 18 think, aptly described why Maine is different from this 19 situation.

In Maine, there was a commitment by, I guess it was Verizon, to have certain 271 elements tariffed in their pricing, and that was part of the entry into the long-distance market. So there, the Maine Commission was really engaging in enforcing a deal it had reached with Verizon in connection with 271 in

pricing, which, of course, is a very different 1 2 situation from this 251 interconnection agreement. 3 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: So may I conclude from your remarks that at least in your view, none of those 4 courts ruled in such a way that's inconsistent with 5 б your position? 7 MR. DEVANEY: That's correct, yes. The other couple of points I would like to make before I conclude 8 9 is whether, and this goes to Commissioner Oshie's 10 question, the whole issue of whether 271 elements 11 should be included in the 251 agreement, and in the 12 Triennial Review Order and in USTA-2 both, the FCC and 13 DC Circuit made it very clear that there is a different 14 legal framework for elements provided under 251 and for 15 elements provided under 271. 16 For example, under Section 251, TELRIC-based rates apply to elements that the carrier provides. 17 18 Under 271, so-called market-based rates apply. Consistent with that, it makes sense to have separate 19 20 agreements for those elements so that you have 251 21 elements covered with TELRIC rates and the 251

agreement and 271 elements covered either in commercial agreements or tariffs, and that's very consistent with the legal framework that the FCC and DC Circuit has established.

Then my final point on this issue goes to 1 2 another issue the arbitrator, we believe, correctly 3 addressed, and that is the state commission authority 4 in arbitrations, in interconnection arbitrations, the authority, with all due respect to my opponent, is not 5 simply to decide any open issue that one party presents 6 7 to the Commission. Rather the authority requires 8 looking at Section 252(c) of the Act, and in turn, 9 251(b)and(c).

10 I know I've given a lot of subsections there, 11 but fundamentally, the Commission's authority is to 12 resolve terms and conditions relating to an ILEC's 13 obligations under 251(b)and(c), and if you look at 14 251(b)and(c), there is nothing mentioned there about 15 unbundling under 271. There is unbundling under 251, 16 and this commission certainly has jurisdiction in an interconnection arbitration to decide terms and 17 18 conditions related to unbundling under 251 but not under 271. 19

Then finally, consistent with that, the Indiana Bell case, Indiana Bell says quite clearly that state commission authority in the area of 271 is in a consulting investigatory role, and that is, the FCC has the ultimate decision-making authority under 271, and therefore, that's another reason, in our view, why

Covad's request for you to declare that we, Qwest, had 1 2 the unbundling in 271 is asking you to exercise 3 authority that pursuant to the Indiana Bell, and we 4 think the Act and the state commissions don't have. That's all I have on the issue of additional questions. 5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I think that we are б 7 ready to go on to Issue No. 3, commingling and combination, which is somewhat related to the issue we 8 9 were just discussing, so my guess is you can work 10 whatever argument you look as if you want to make into 11 that.

12 MR. NEWELL: Yes. I was going to ask that if 13 there would be time at some point to go back over 14 John's arguments, I will do that quickly. There is a 15 lot of discussion about impairment and making 16 impairment determinations. I think we need to be 17 clear.

18 The only statute we are talking about here 19 that involves impairment analysis is Section 251, and 20 the only entity that makes that impairment analysis 21 under Section 251 is the FCC. We are not asking this 22 commission to analyze impairment under Section 251. We 23 are asking this commission to look at Washington law 24 and determine whether it's statutory directives require it to unbundle these elements under state law. There 25

is no impairment analysis contained in Washington law. 1 2 That doesn't mean that that can't be part of 3 the policy analysis that goes on, but it's certainly 4 not a parallel impairment analysis under 251 that would be conducted that would be in direct conflict with the 5 б impairment analysis the FCC had performed. 7 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I think to 8 characterize it, you would say that if we exercise 9 independent state authority about unbundling, that does 10 not conflict with the federal scheme; whereas 11 Mr. Devaney would say it would conflict, so it's an 12 issue of when do we or don't we conflict, and at what 13 level of detail and process do we conflict, and at what 14 level is it some kind of parallel goals.

MR. NEWELL: Yes. I believe it is a logical impossibility for any unbundling that is required under 271, any of those elements when they are required by a state commission pursuant to state law, how that can conflict with the Act.

The FCC has made clear that 271 elements are not subject to 251 impairment analysis. They have to be made available notwithstanding impairment analysis. All we are asking for in this arbitration is those elements that are on that check list. So I fail to understand how asking for those elements that are set

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forth in federal law can conflict with federal law. 1 2 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Wouldn't Mr. Devaney's 3 answer be it's not that they do. It's who has 4 authority, us or the FCC, to enforce those? 5 MR. NEWELL: I think the savings clause and even the FCC has made clear that state commissions can б 7 add elements to the national list that is almost 8 verbatim what they said. 9 The other point John made is that if a 10 decision of this commission on unbundling is 11 inconsistent with an FCC determination under 251, then 12 it's de facto preempted, and under the Iowa Utilities 13 Board decision, that is not the case. 14 In fact, the FCC in the TRO discussed the 15 Iowa Utilities Board case and said based upon the plain 16 language of the statute, We conclude the distinct authority to preserve by Section 251(d)(3) is limited 17 18 to state unbundling actions that are consistent with requirements of Section 251 and do not substantially 19 20 prevent the implementation of the federal regulatory 21 regime. We find the most reasonable interpretation of 22 Congress's intent in enacting Sections 251 and 252 to 23 be that state action, whether taken in the course of a 24 rule-making or during the review of an interconnection agreement, must be consistent with Section 251 and must 25

1 not substantially prevent its implementation.

2 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I hope you are making 3 comments that are somewhat relevant to commingling 4 because that's the time slot you are in, which is only 5 ten minutes.

6 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I was going to ask the 7 same question of you. What about the other state 8 commission actions to date? Do you see those as 9 supporting your position or not?

10 MR. NEWELL: In Colorado, we didn't put the 11 issue on the table for operational reasons. Covad 12 makes decisions about whether they will fight issues 13 based on market entry and all sorts of issues.

14 We don't agree with the Minnesota decision. 15 We don't believe it supports our position, but the 16 position, as I recall, is essentially, Yes, the 17 Commission has the authority to order additional 18 unbundling, but it can't do so in a 252 arbitration, and we don't agree with that decision and expect that 19 20 it will be reversed by the full commission. So no 21 utilities commission has yet issued a distinction on 22 these issues, a final decision.

23 So commingling, I'm sorry. I think this is
24 essentially a language interpretation issue of the
25 Triennial Review Order, and there is essentially three

categories that the FCC could have intended for 271 1 2 elements with respect to commingling. They could have 3 either made clear that 271 elements are the equivalent 4 of a 251(c)(3) element, and they are available to combine with other 251(c)(3) elements in UNE 5 6 combinations, like UNE-P, or they could decide it's just another wholesale service like any wholesale 7 8 service that's not a 251(c)(3), like resale or access 9 elements, something like that, or they could decide 10 it's in a category all by itself and cannot be 11 connected or combined with any other element.

Qwest's position is it's all by itself. It can't be combined with any other element. It's in this special new category that is inferior even to an access service or any other wholesale service, and that's the position that was taken in the arbitrator's report as well.

18 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I just want to be 19 precise about our language because I think it would 20 help. You are not saying that anybody says it can't be 21 combined. The issue is whether this commission can 22 force the ILEC to combine it; right? In other words, 23 no one is prohibiting it from being combined. Isn't 24 the issue whether Qwest and we direct it for us to 25 combine something?

1	MR. NEWELL: I think both of those are
2	issues. The way the FCC's decision reads on
3	commingling, they made clear that if something is
4	eligible for commingling that a competitor can
5	commingle them or they can ask the ILEC to commingle
6	for them. So I don't think it is entirely clear that
7	even if 271 elements were ineligible for commingling
8	that a CLEC could commingle them. I think it would be
9	open to dispute.
10	I think the most natural reading would be if
11	a CLEC connects them itself that it should be able to
12	do that, but I don't think it's entirely clear, and I
13	think what the FCC was trying to do and trying to
14	clarify in the errata was 271 elements don't have the
15	status of 251(c)(3) UNE's. They are not a UNE. They
16	are not eligible for combinations, which is a legal
17	category that's established in Section 251(c)(3) that
18	those elements may be combined together.
19	The FCC relies on different authority to
20	establish its commingling rules. While the two
21	operationally are very similar, the legal theories
22	supporting each is very different, and that's the
23	purpose of making the distinction. Qwest argues there
24	is really no distinction between commingling and
25	combination, and that's clearly not supported by the

TRO where they discuss each separately and talk about
 the eligibility rules for commingling.

3 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Can you make clear, 4 are you here arguing that point as an abstract 5 principle, or are you asking for particular б combinations or commingling that we need to order? In 7 other words, is this sort of a legal issue or is this 8 an operational issue in the context of this proceeding? 9 MR. NEWELL: We see it as potentially huge 10 operational issue, and the reason is we expect under 11 the FCC's rules, at least, if this commission does not 12 add the elements under state law, we could see 13 unbundled transport go away as a 251(c)(3) UNE, at 14 least on certain routes in certain central offices, and 15 maybe --

16 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Is it something you've been denied? It seems like normally, this would come 17 18 up where you would have asked for something and Qwest 19 would say, No, you are not entitled to that, and you 20 would be asking us to say, Yes, you are entitled to 21 this particular element or thing that you want in the 22 real world, and that's what I'm having a hard time 23 with.

24 MR. NEWELL: Under the existing agreement, 25 there is no question about the availability of the

elements. There has never been a denial, but really, 1 this is focused on future business plans. It's 2 3 specifically providing voice-over IP service and 4 perhaps using commingling EELs, which under the arbitrator's reading of the TRO wouldn't really exist 5 б because you couldn't connect an unbundled loop under 7 251(c)(3) with a transport element that you had to 8 purchase under Section 271. 9 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Your time is up unless 10 you have one more minute. 11 MR. NEWELL: No, that's fine. 12 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Mr. Devaney? 13 MR. DEVANEY: I guess I would like to begin 14 with a response to Mr. Newell's last statement that was 15 in response to the Chairwoman's question about is this 16 abstract or is it concrete, and Mr. Newell said that, 17 for example, in the future, Covad may want to have 18 commingled EELs, which is a combining of a loop with 19 transport. 20 In the last couple of months, language has 21 specifically said in this agreement there will be no 22 access to commingling EELs. Covad has agreed for

24 commingled EELs, so it's just not an issue. We haven't 25 denied it to them, but they've said, We don't want it

purposes of this agreement it is not seeking access to

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in this agreement, and we agreed to language to that
 effect.

3 So I have to take exception to the suggestion 4 that that is a concrete issue. It's not. It's one the parties have agreed upon, so this really is more at an 5 б abstract level. We haven't been presented with any 7 suggestion by Covad that, We want to put this together 8 with that and you are not permitting us to do that. It's really at a very high level without any examples, 9 10 that I'm aware of, that we've been presented with.

With respect to the legal issue of commingling itself --

13 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: I want to make sure I'm 14 clear on the issue, and that is, we are talking 15 about -- I know that commingling and combinations have 16 their own meaning within the telecommunications world, but as I hear the argument, what I'm hearing is that 17 18 the elements cannot be combined, and so there are legal reasons why they may not be combined or could not be. 19 20 There are technical reasons, for example, why they 21 couldn't be combined, perhaps, but I don't know whether 22 you are saying that the FCC has prohibited those 23 elements from being combined or that Qwest isn't 24 required to combine them anymore and therefore will only combine them if they could be negotiated to 25

Owest's satisfaction or that they won't be combined in 1 2 an ICA and that you would have a market agreement on 3 one side, an ICA on the other that combines the 4 elements in a technical way to provision the service. So maybe you can explain to me, at least --5 б maybe the other commissioners know precisely what you 7 are talking about, but maybe you could explain it to 8 me. 9 MR. DEVANEY: Sure. I'll see if I can. 10 First of all, what is commingling? It's the combining, 11 connecting, or attaching of one element to another 12 element or one element to a combination of a group of 13 elements. It's the physical act of, I guess, running 14 jumpers to connect these pieces together. I'm not sure 15 if this is part of your question --16 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: I think I'm beyond that, but understanding that to be true, when you say they 17 18 cannot be combined or -- what do you mean by that? MR. DEVANEY: It's a legal use of the word 19 20 "cannot." Physically, most of these elements that we 21 are talking about, I believe, can be combined. But 22 what we are really getting at is an interpretation not 23 just of the Triennial Review Order but of the Act, and 24 whether there is a legal requirement for Qwest in a 251 agreement to combine these elements together. Should I 25

1 continue?

COMMISSIONER OSHIE: That's fine. So really 2 3 it's whether Qwest is obligated to combine them. Let's 4 go under an ICA or within the context of an ICA? MR. DEVANEY: Of course, that's the context 5 б we are discussing, so yes, within the context of an 7 ICA, but I think I can address that legal question even 8 outside the context of an ICA, and here, in our view, 9 is what the critical distinction is. 10 In Section 251, and I'm sorry, but I'm 11 forgetting the subsection right now, there is clearly 12 an obligation to combine unbundled network elements. 13 There is language in that section of the Act that says, 14 Yes, you need to combine, and we don't dispute that. 15 In Section 271 by contrast, and the FCC and the DC 16 Circuit are very careful to point out this distinction, there is no combination language in the checklist items 17 18 that require us to produce network elements. 19 So I think the FCC said in 251, congress 20 said, Yes, you have to combine elements, and 271, 21 congress didn't say that, and if they had wanted to 22 require the combining or commingling of 271 elements, 23 they would have said so because they did in 251, but 24 they didn't in 271, and that's the heart of our position on this, and again, it's not just 25

interpretation of the Triennial Review Order. That
 supports us as does USTA-2, but it begins with an
 interpretation of the express language of the Act, 271
 versus 251.

5 Our view is if we are required to commingle 6 271 elements with 251 UNE's that that directly 7 contradicts what the Act says about our combination 8 requirements and also directly contradicts the ruling 9 of the FCC and the DC Circuit that BAC's don't have an 10 obligation to combine 271 elements.

11 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Is this Footnote 1990 12 from the FCC?

13 MR. DEVANEY: Yes, that's correct. 14 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So if the FCC said, 15 and I'm quoting from their Footnote 1990, Paragraph 655, but I can't tell you what order, the Triennial 16 17 Review, I believe, "We decline to require BAC's 18 pursuant to Section 271 to combine network elements that are no longer required to be unbundled under 19 Section 251." 20

I can read that sentence and I can see what the FCC is saying they decline to do, and the question is, if they have declined to do that, does that mean we also must decline, and doesn't this get back to the issue of what does or doesn't conflict, and you would

say yes, it conflicts because the FCC has just said 1 2 this is a required --3 MR. DEVANEY: Actually, I would say it 4 slightly differently. I would say that yes, you cannot do it because the Act doesn't permit it because Section 5 б 271, as I mentioned earlier, doesn't contain a 7 combination requirement. Section 251 does. 8 And since any authority this commission has 9 has to be exercised consistent with the Act, there is 10 no authority to require us to combine Section 271 11 elements. I'm not disagreeing with you, but I begin 12 with the Act and then I go to the FCC. 13 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: It really gets in a 14 way to the same question, just substitute "Act" for 15 "FCC," and you would say it conflicts with the Act 16 because it's not required by it, but then there is this little zone under the Act of permissible state 17 18 activity, so don't you just get back to a more functional analysis of what kinds of things the state 19 20 can order without running afoul of the Act in an 21 operational sense? 22 Isn't there a degree of judgment there that's 23 not probably going to be black or white? You have to

25 arguably, when is the scheme enhanced or complementary

say when is the scheme frustrated by a state versus,

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1 or basically not frustrated?

2 MR. DEVANEY: I certainly agree that, as we 3 discussed earlier, there is some areas where there have 4 been clear, definitive statements from the FCC about 5 what is and is not permitted. Other areas are grayer, 6 and it's very difficult to get into that gray area to 7 determine where state authority begins and ends, so I 8 agree with that concept.

9 In this case though, again, we are dealing 10 with 271 elements, and so I also go back to Indiana 11 Bell and raise the question, since we are talking about 12 the combining of 271 elements, even if this commission 13 had the authority or even if the Act permitted you to 14 do that, although it's not required under the Act, 15 could this commission exercise that kind of authority 16 over a 271 element, and as we discussed earlier, under Indiana Bell, and we think the express language of 271, 17 18 there is no authority to do that.

19 Could I spend 20 seconds on a point that goes
20 back to the first issue?

21 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Yes, because I think22 we had a little extra time on that one.

23 MR. DEVANEY: It goes to the whole question 24 and even to this issue of whether state actions under 25 the Act must be consistent with federal law. It came

1 to my attention just yesterday as I was preparing for 2 this argument that a decision came down last week from 3 a federal court in Michigan that the Commission might 4 already be aware of.

5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Is this district 6 court?

7 MR. DEVANEY: Yes, Federal District Court in
8 Michigan, Michigan Bell versus the Michigan Commission
9 and AT&T.

10 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Is there a district? 11 MR. DEVANEY: Eastern District of Michigan, 12 Southern Division, and this was reported in one of the 13 communications reports, and it had to do with the 14 Michigan Commission's directive for Michigan Bell, or 15 SBC, to engage in a batch hot-cut process and 16 collaborative workshop, and SBC filed for a preliminary injunction to stop that from going forward arguing that 17 18 the proceeding was inconsistent with federal law, and 19 this decision that just came down last week talks about 20 how state actions have to be consistent with federal 21 law. So it goes to the point we've been talking about 22 with respect to both of these issues.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What did the court do?
MR. DEVANEY: They granted the injunction and
said this proceeding was not consistent with federal

law, and I apologize for not telling you, but I was
 going to pull this out. I'll gave this to you at the
 break, but I wanted that to be brought to the
 Commission's attention.

5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Let's go to the third 6 issue, and this one is 15 minutes apiece on retirement 7 of copper facilities, and that's Issue No. 1. Go 8 ahead.

9 MR. NEWELL: John's point dovetails nicely 10 into the point I wanted to make to start out with, 11 copper retirement, which was -- first of all, I read 12 you the wrong quotation before talking about the 13 consistency issue, which is a critical issue for copper 14 retirement as well.

15 To the extent this new case says that 16 absolute consistency is necessary, it seems to conflict with the 8th Circuit decision, which says, Merely an 17 18 inconsistency, and I'm not quoting now, between state 19 regulation and a commission regulation was not 20 sufficient for commission preemption under 251(d)(3), 21 and that's in the Triennial Review Order citing the 22 Iowa Utilities Board case, Paragraph 192, 611.

23 There is a recognition there that absolute 24 uniformity is not necessary, and as a logical matter, 25 it wouldn't make any sense to have the vacancy clause

1 if absolute uniformity was necessary.

2 The other point I wanted to make just to tell 3 the other side of the story with respect to the 4 commingling, EEL issue, on the eve of filing these arbitration proceedings, Covad acquired a company 5 called Go Beam who provides voice-over IP services, and 6 7 that is driving new business plans that are not really 8 reflected in this arbitration, because we discussed those issues and decided it would be unfair to try to 9 10 arbitrate those issues on the eve of filing.

11 So on to copper retirement. I apologize. 12 Covad's position is really crafted to not disturb what 13 the FCC has said with respect to retiring copper 14 facilities. For instance, Covad is not through its 15 language attempting to prevent Qwest from retiring 16 copper, and they are not attempting to apply their alternative service proposal to fiber-to-the-home or 17 18 fiber-to-the-curb deployments, which the FCC clearly weighed Section 706 of the Act in its directive to 19 20 remove broadband deployment against the unbundling 21 requirements of Section 251, so we thought it best to 22 avoid that issue all together and craft a proposal that 23 doesn't apply to those loops where the Commission, the 24 FCC had conducted that 706 analysis.

25

Instead, it applies to feeder deployments

that don't result in a fiber-to-the-home or 1 2 fiber-to-the-curb loop, and these are typically related 3 to maintenance issues or, let's say, a road 4 construction-issue request has to abandon a copper facility. In today's world, no one replaces copper 5 with copper. That's very rare. Everyone replaces with 6 7 fiber. It doesn't necessarily mean you are going to 8 provide anything new or you even have the capability to 9 provide anything new over that facility. 10 But if Covad is denied access to that 11 facility and they have customers that are served by 12 that facility, then those customers don't have DSL service anymore. They don't have a choice about 13 14 service. So essentially, a road construction project

15 can determine whether there is local competition or 16 not, and we believe that's an incorrect result. It's 17 inconsistent with Washington law.

And the FCC certainly hasn't taken any definitive action to decide otherwise. In fact, they pointed out that any state copper retirement policies would continue to apply, notwithstanding their copper retirement rules that apply to fiber-for-the-home loops and their generic network notification rules.

24 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I'm wondering on this25 one what kind of remedy or modification, I guess, of

the arbitrator's report you think would be sufficient, 1 2 and if we did require that the notice will include 3 information identified in the FCC rule, including the 4 locations at which changes will occur and a description of the types of changes planned and a description of 5 б the reasonably foreseeable effect of the plan changes, 7 would that satisfy you? I'm trying to get a sense of 8 where the dispute is.

9 MR. NEWELL: The dispute is really 10 surrounding what determining the reasonably foreseeable 11 impact means. We think it means Qwest needs to tell us 12 whether we have customers on those facilities that are 13 being retired so we can look at our records and 14 determine whether it's a service that can be continued 15 over fiber, i.e., a narrowband service, or if they are 16 being provided DSL and their service would have to be 17 discontinued.

Quest thinks it means they broadcast these general announcements of copper retirement and tell you the DA where the copper is being retired, and it's then your job as a CLEC to go research in databases to figure out if you have any customers that are served out of that distribution area.

24 So for each and every Qwest project, you 25 would have to look, and it takes substantial time to do

that, and we believe the rule is clear that determining 1 2 the reasonably foreseeable impact at a minimum should 3 be tell us if we have any customers that are on those 4 facilities, and Qwest refuses to do that going forward. 5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So I think the answer б to my question is no, that would not satisfy you for 7 this commission simply to repeat, more or less, what is 8 required in the federal rule. You want direction or 9 guidance from us on what constitutes or compliance with 10 the requirement to state impact; is that correct? 11 MR. NEWELL: Yes, because Qwest believes its 12 current notices comply with that requirement, and we 13 completely disagree. So it will be necessary to 14 implement clearer language with respect to the notice 15 requirement. 16 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Do you have such language that you proposed or that you offer to us? 17 18 MR. NEWELL: Yes. We proposed language that laid out the specifics of the notice, and it's 19 20 consistent with notices Covad receives from other bell 21 operating companies, other ILEC's, when they retire 22 copper. 23 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: And that's in your 24 brief? 25 MR. NEWELL: It is, and it should be in the

issues matrix for this issue as well. 1 2 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You will forgive us, 3 but there are a lot of materials. If you are able 4 quickly to point to any page in your brief, that would just help us. 5 б MR. NEWELL: I'm not finding it. Our 7 proposed language should be in the issues matrix, and to your point, there are a lot of materials, and we've 8 9 got seven of these open now, so it's all sort of a 10 blur. 11 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: We will find it. 12 Anything more on this? 13 MR. NEWELL: Yes. One of Qwest's points, and 14 I thought was interesting supporting its position that 15 it shouldn't have to unbundle these fiber facilities 16 that result from copper retirement, is that not having 17 to unbundle those facilities essentially that are a result of maintenance decisions and network-driven 18 decisions that it will encourage them to continue to 19 20 deploy fiber. 21 They are already deploying fiber for 22 efficiency reasons, and essentially what they are 23 saying is, Give us back our monopoly and we will deploy 24 more fiber. In the maintenance context, it doesn't 25 make a lot of sense, and this reminds me of a story

that Professor Phil Wiser loves to tell at the 1 2 University of Colorado. He loves to tell it because 3 he's told the story about five times about decades ago, 4 Dow-Corning went to AT&T and said, We have this great new technology, fiber optics, and we want to build 5 fiber-optic cabling for you, and you can run long-haul б 7 fiber all over the country, and AT&T said to them --8 this is predivestiture -- Well, we have 10 years 9 depreciation left on our current plan, so we aren't 10 going to touch it until then, and by the way, whenever 11 we do get around to deploying fiber-optic technology, we will manufacture it and do it ourselves. 12

13 I think that's essentially what we are going 14 to be back to if we let Qwest remonopolize the local 15 network by deploying fiber, and that's really over time 16 is exactly what this copper retirement issue could do if you adopt Qwest language. They could literally put 17 18 an inch of fiber in every loop or put a fiber distribution panel right next to their distribution 19 20 frame in the central office and run a fiber 21 cross-connect and claim they have no unbundling 22 obligations to any of their local plant anymore. 23 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: What will you have us 24 do about that?

MR. NEWELL: Our proposal is that we would

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maintain access to an alternative service that could be provided over those facilities. We don't want access to the whole broadband capabilities of whatever they deployed to take advantage of any next-generation facilities they deploy.

б We will deploy our own next-generation new 7 facilities if the economics make sense. We just don't 8 want to lose customers because of a road construction 9 project or because Qwest decides, Well, capacity out in 10 this neighborhood is becoming a problem. There is a 11 new development or whatever, so we are just going to 12 convert all these customers to a fiber facility, and 13 when they do that, if we don't have access to the fiber 14 to provide DSL, those consumers don't have a choice as 15 to if they want DSL service, broadband service.

16 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Isn't your argument a 17 consequence of how the FCC has drawn lines around fiber 18 broadband, other things, and you are seeking to remedy 19 those lines through us?

20 MR. NEWELL: Not really, and that's the 21 reason our proposal is as narrow as it is to try to 22 steer clear of the specific FCC rulings with respect to 23 broadband loops, next-generation loops.

They made it clear that they want to promote the deployment of fiber to the home and fiber to the

curb, and the way they've chosen to do that, like it or
 not, is let the bells remonopolize those facilities.
 That's the decision, and so we've steered clear of
 those fiber-to-the-home and fiber-to-the-curb loops for
 that reason.

6 What the FCC clearly was not doing was, and 7 we discussed this in our brief, they were clearly not 8 talking about routine network grooming and maintenance 9 projects. There is no discussion, no analysis of why 10 they want to encourage that by relieving unbundling 11 obligations.

12 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Your time is up.13 Mr. Devaney?

MR. DEVANEY: Thank you, Chairwoman. Before I get into the merits of the argument, I want to, I guess, express some disgruntlement that Covad is suggesting that Qwest is acting improperly by deploying fiber.

As the Commission is aware, the Act, the FCC -- the Act is structured and the FCC has emphasized that the deployment of fiber is supportive in the advance of telecommunications services, a critical part of the Act, and Chairman Powell and the other FCC commissioners have been on a march for quite awhile now to encourage carriers to deploy fiber to really advance

telecommunications services to people throughout this country, and to suggest that Qwest is somehow acting improperly by deploying fiber is something we have to take exception to.

5 This issue of copper retirement goes hand in б hand with the policy of encouraging the deployment of 7 fiber. Simply put, if we can't retire our copper 8 facilities, we have reduced incentive to deploy fiber, 9 because if you deploy fiber and you have to leave 10 copper in the ground, you have to maintain both and 11 incur the costs of maintaining both. So there is the investment incentive here that really underlies the 12 13 FCC's ruling, very clear ruling in the TRO, that ILEC's 14 have a right to retire copper facilities.

15 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So you would take
16 Professor Wiser's story and turn it around.

MR. DEVANEY: Exactly. And I also wanted to 17 18 really emphasize the context of this issue. It sounds 19 like a very complicated issue with potentially major 20 consequences, but very important, and the evidentiary 21 record supports this, not once in the state of 22 Washington has Qwest ever retired a copper loop that 23 resulted in discontinuance of a service for a Covad customer. Moreover, not once in our entire 14-state 24 region have we ever retired a copper loop that resulted 25

in discontinuance of service for a Covad customer.
 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Are those two
 statements supported in the record of this proceeding?
 MR. DEVANEY: Ms. Doberneck testified on
 behalf of Covad acknowledged that, and in our brief, we
 cite to that portion of the transcript.

7 Equally significant, Ms. Doberneck testified 8 that this issue could only potentially affect a handful 9 of customers in Washington, and I think the number was 10 even something less than ten. So we are not talking 11 about a major issue that's going to affect large 12 numbers of customers. In fact, we are talking about an 13 issue that's never arisen and involves at most a 14 handful of customers.

15 That said, on legal grounds, we feel like the 16 arbitrators' report is exactly on point, because in the Triennial Review Order, it's undisputed. The FCC gave 17 18 ILEC's the right to retire copper facilities. Nowhere 19 in there is there a suggestion that we can only retire 20 facilities if we provide an alternative service, which 21 is what Covad has proposed, that we can only retire if 22 we provide them with an alternative service.

It does not increase the current amounts they
pay to Qwest. I'm emphasizing that point for a reason.
Today for DSL service in Washington, Covad pays Qwest a

recurring monthly rate of \$3.96. Under their proposal,
 if we had to provide this alternative service, which is
 nowhere found in the Triennial Review Order, we
 couldn't recover anything more than \$3.96 a month.

5 I don't know what this alternative service is 6 because they haven't proposed any contract language 7 that defines it, but let's say hypothetically as we 8 discussed in our brief that it costs us ten dollars a 9 month to provide. Under their proposal, and they admit 10 this, we would only be able to recovery \$3.96.

11 As the Commission is aware under the Act, 12 specifically Section 252(d)(1), we as an ILEC have a 13 right to recover the costs we incur to provide 14 unbundled elements in interconnection, and their 15 proposal flatly contradicts that by denying us cost 16 recovery and also denying us a profit, which we are 17 also entitled to under the Act. To us, that's a fatal 18 flaw in their proposal, in addition to the fact that nowhere in the TRO can you find support to this 19 20 alternative service requirement.

Final point on this issue goes to the notice question. We are more than happy and have proposed in our own language that we will live with the requirements of the FCC in providing notice, and in particular --

1	CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Don't you have to?
2	MR. DEVANEY: We do. But in particular,
3	51.327 sets forth the notice requirements, and while
4	one could call it a preexisting obligation, it's one we
5	accept. So I just wanted to make it clear to the
6	extent the Commission was thinking of enumerating the
7	obligations the FCC has set forth, we are very
8	comfortable with that, and our language indicates that
9	we will comply with all FCC notice requirements.
10	COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Isn't there a
11	disagreement between the parties here as to
12	specifically what notice Qwest has to provide?
13	MR. DEVANEY: The one area of disagreement I
14	can detect on the notice issue goes to the question of
15	whether when we retire a copper loop, do we have an
16	obligation to say to Covad, We are retiring a copper
17	loop on Elm Street, and by the way, you are providing
18	service to a customer on Elm Street, and your customer
19	is going to be affected by this retirement.
20	We don't think we should have to do that
21	because number one, we don't know what services Covad
22	is providing to those customers in all cases. Two, we
23	don't think we should be put at risk of saying their
24	customer service is or is not affected by the
25	retirement of a loop. That is something they can

determine when we let them know that we are retiring a
 loop on Elm Street. They can go to their own records
 and say, Oh, we are providing Joe Jones this service
 that's going to be affected by this retirement.

5 We don't think that's our obligation. We are 6 going to give them enough information by saying we are 7 retiring that loop on Elm Street so they can figure out 8 whether their own customer is affected.

9 We don't think we need to go that extra step 10 to say, Yes, Joe Jones is affected by that retirement. 11 That's something they can do, and we don't like to take 12 the risk of maybe getting it wrong. What if we say Joe 13 Jones isn't affected but he is? That's not an area we 14 want to dabble in, and I think that's where we 15 fundamentally disagree.

16 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: If that's true, Mr. Devaney, what's the point of Subsection 6 of the 17 18 FCC's rule where it deals with the description of a 19 reasonably foreseeable impact to the plan changes? 20 Your point is to what appears to be four and 21 five, location where the changes are going to take 22 place, and then as to five, a description of the type 23 of changes that are planned, and that's just saying we 24 are going to change something on Elm Street, but then

the FCC goes further and says, Well, you've got to tell

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them what you think the reasonably foreseeable impact
 would be.

3 That's kind of fuzzy language. It's 4 ambiguous as to what that might be, but it seems as if Qwest isn't willing to take that next step --5 MR. DEVANEY: Well, I think for example, one б 7 could say that means that you can talk about the types of services that would be affected by the retirement in 8 9 the notice. I don't think it goes so far as to saying 10 you identify for Covad whether Joe Jones is affected. 11 We are not willing to go that extra step, but 12 giving impacts such as, Here are the types of services 13 that could be affected, that's closer to something 14 that's reasonable, but identify specific customers, 15 which is what they want us to do --16 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: However we decide it, do you agree that we should determine rather precisely 17 18 what information you do have to provide? MR. DEVANEY: We certainly are comfortable 19 with that, certainly if there is specificity --20 21 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: If we leave it in the 22 generalized language of the statute, and I assume the 23 two parties will continue to argue about what that 24 means.

25

MR. DEVANEY: That's a fair point.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I have a question on 1 2 that, because if we say in this order that we will put 3 out that you must follow the FCC rule and you must 4 provide, quote, a description of the reasonably foreseeable impact of the plan changes -- that's the 5 б level of the agreement -- then wouldn't it be a factual 7 matter, a violation of the agreement, if sometime in 8 the future you put out a notice, someone, some party such as Covad says, You didn't give us a description of 9 10 the reasonably foreseeable future impact of the plan 11 changes.

12 So what I'm trying to draw here is the 13 agreement is going to have some level of specificity, 14 but surely it wouldn't be as specific as whatever the 15 facts require when you go around to Elm Street and say 16 whatever it is you have to say. In a way, I'm taking 17 the adverse side of Commissioner Hemstad's question, 18 but this is an agreement. It's not a specific time and 19 place contractual agreement.

20 So there is only so far we are able to go in 21 terms of specificity. What level is that? Even if we 22 went further than this and said, Such as, then we could 23 fill out further detail on this provision, and still 24 there would be ultimately factual issues to whether the 25 ILEC did or didn't, in the real world sense, give the

1 kind of notice that we require.

2	MR. NEWELL: I think for Covad it's pretty
3	cut and dry. All we need to know is do we have
4	customers on the loops you are retiring, because the
5	way Qwest provides the notice today, it lists
6	distribution areas, which is not how Covad or anyone
7	else tracks customers. It's not information that we
8	have that's readily searchable for us. We would have
9	to go to a Qwest database and perform a major research
10	project to even understand if we had a customer.
11	CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So if it's just
12	customers then, that's a little different, Mr. Devaney,
13	then saying, Your customer will lose service. Is there
14	a problem with us requiring that you include a list of
15	customers affected? Do you know who the customers are?
16	MR. DEVANEY: I honestly don't know the
17	answer to that, whether we have the ability to say
18	there is a Covad customer that would be affected by the
19	retirement of a specific loop.
20	COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: This is a question to
21	Mr. Newell or maybe both. Your point was you would
22	have to research the Qwest database. Won't Qwest have
23	to do the same thing? Doesn't it become an issue of
24	who does the search?

25 MR. NEWELL: Yes, but not to an equal agree.

Qwest is able to search its circuits by DA much easier 1 2 than Covad can, as I understand it. In fact, we 3 believe that originally, prior to some policy changes 4 at Qwest, they were actually running these checks and determining if there were CLEC lines that were impacted 5 б by retirement, and they are just no longer doing that. 7 Not to the same degree. It's not a major 8 research project for Qwest. They are already involved in a major research project by doing the retirement. 9 10 These are fairly big deals when they happen, and also, 11 the FCC rule puts the obligation on the ILEC to 12 determine the reasonably foreseeable impact, so to the 13 extent there is research to be done, we believe it 14 should be up to the ILEC at least to determine our 15 customers, and we will determine whether our service is 16 impacted by what they describe as the retirement. We don't need Qwest to do that for us. 17

18 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Mr. Devaney, we 19 started eating into your time.

20 MR. DEVANEY: I just have one additional 21 point to make that Mr. Reynolds helped me with, and 22 that is that Qwest leases on a wholesale basis loops to 23 Covad, and what Covad does with those loops and the 24 customers for whom it provides those loops is a matter 25 between Covad and its customers, and while we know the

1 general area where a loop is being used by Covad, we 2 don't know who their specific customers are.

3 So for us to be obligated to say, Tell us 4 which of our customers are affected, I don't think we can do. We can certainly tell them, There is a loop in 5 б this area of town that's being retired, and they have 7 the addresses of their customers. I have a hard time 8 believing it's an extensive research project. When we 9 say there is a loop being retired on Elm Street, they 10 can look and see if they have customers on Elm Street 11 and make a decision about whether their customer is 12 going to be affected.

13 I'm not disputing we have an obligation to 14 provide for impacts, talk about locations, but you've 15 got to draw a line at some reasonable point, and I 16 don't think that line is at the level of customer 17 identification.

18 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Thank you. Shall we move to Issue No. 5? Issue No. 5 is channel 19 regeneration. This one is ten minutes per side. 20 21 MR. NEWELL: Thank you, Chairwoman. 22 Essentially, I think it will be easier to start with a 23 description of what we are talking about to make sure 24 that we all are on the same page. Some of us are so close to it that we assume things, assume knowledge 25

1 that is a little unfair.

2 Within a central office, occasionally one 3 carrier, one CLEC will want to cross-connect to another 4 CLEC to cooperatively provide a service. Depending on how far away their collocations are in a central 5 б office, a circuit will have to be boosted or 7 regenerated in order to make that connection, and that 8 requires regeneration equipment. If CLEC's are 9 required to place that equipment themselves, which 10 Qwest says they will allow under Qwest's collocation 11 policy --

12 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Required or allowed 13 you mean? You said CLEC's are required to place it 14 themselves.

15 MR. NEWELL: Required due to the technical 16 issues. Qwest will not force someone to place regeneration, but as a practical engineering matter, 17 18 you have to, and you have to place it somewhere close to mid span between the two collocations to make it 19 20 work, which means under Qwest policies, they are not 21 just going to allow you to throw that regeneration 22 equipment into a cable rack. You have to buy another 23 collocation mid span to regenerate the service.

And first of all, there is no guarantee that there will be space available where you need it to be.

Second of all, it's a cost-prohibitive remedy to
 provide a cross-connect. It's the equivalent of
 saying, Go build your own copper loop plant. It's just
 not practical. As a practical matter, if the CLEC is
 faced with that decision, they are not going to
 cross-connect with another CLEC.

7 Qwest maintains that they don't have to 8 provide a wholesale cross-connection product. They do 9 have a retail product. They have considerable freedom 10 as to how they price that product or whether they are 11 going to offer it at all, and we believe that's 12 improper.

13 It is a vital collocation element. It's 14 subject to 251(c)(6) of the Act, which governs 15 collocation, or just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 16 terms, and it's clearly discriminatory for a CLEC to have to incur that type of expense when Qwest itself 17 18 wouldn't have to incur that expense, and it creates a 19 market disproportion where it is much easier to connect 20 with Qwest's network and purchase services from Qwest 21 than it would be to connect to another CLEC that's 22 collocated and purchase services from them or work in 23 partnership with them. That's clear discrimination. 24 That should be remedied under 251(c)(6).

25 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You said it would be

prohibitively expensive for Covad or AT&T on a cross-connect. You said it would be prohibitively expensive for the two of you to somehow pay for that regeneration expense. Did you say that?

MR. NEWELL: It's not the regeneration 5 б expense. It's the expense under Qwest's collocation 7 policies to buy the space to place that. The minimum 8 amount of space you could buy is one bay, which is 9 grossly more space than you would need to place the 10 equipment. You would have to buy a separate power 11 lead. You have to pay a separate monthly charge for a 12 collocation space just to regenerate the signal that 13 Qwest could regenerate on their own frame for pennies.

14 You are essentially taking a relatively 15 inexpensive service, one that this commission ruled, at 16 least in the ILEC to CLEC context, should just be rolled into common cost, and there shouldn't be a 17 18 specific rate for it. You are taking that element and 19 you are deciding that it's okay for a CLEC to incur 20 thousands and thousands of dollars, I think a 21 collocation is going to run. Even a one-bay 22 collocation is at least twenty thousand dollars. 23 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Thank you for that 24 answer, the sort of economic argument you are making.

On the issue of terminology, I am really

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confused; that is, what is wholesale and what is 1 2 retail? I was thinking of this analogy, and I don't 3 know if it is an appropriate analogy, but if Dell 4 computers buys a chip from Intel, I think to Dell, that's a wholesale purchase. They are buying wholesale 5 6 from Intel to put into their computers to ultimately 7 sell retail, but from Intel's point of view, that's a retail sale, that Dell is Intel's end-use customer. 8 It's done as soon as it sells. 9

10 And I'm just having trouble with what is 11 wholesale and retail here. From Covad's point of 12 view -- well, I'm really not certain, and I'll just ask 13 both of you this. Frankly, I'm surprised that the FCC 14 had a retail tariff for this, so that says to me there 15 are some kind of company purchasers, maybe ISP, I don't 16 know, that buy retail under an FCC tariff, that surely they aren't ultimate end users. 17

18 MR. NEWELL: You make an excellent point, and 19 what you've picked up on is the shifting use of the 20 terminology.

At least the way I'm using it, I think of access service, at least when I'm talking about this issue, that's what I'm calling retail, but in actuality, it's probably more precise to call them non-UNE wholesale services, non-Telecom Act wholesale

services, and primarily, they are used by interexchange carriers that collocate to provide long-distance service. They have a history much longer than unbundled elements under the Act, and what Qwest has said is, You can purchase the product we provide to the ISP's that we provide at a non-TELRIC rate at essentially a marked-up rate.

So that's the genesis of the FCC tariff 8 9 element. We maintain that it is a vital collocation 10 element, so it's a 251(c)(6) element. What the 11 arbitrator's report seemed to say was, Yes, we agree 12 that it is a Telecom Act 251(c)(6) service. It doesn't 13 say that specifically, but it seems to be leaning that 14 direction, and then note there is no TELRIC rate that's 15 been established by this commission that could be 16 charged, and that's where we part ways with the 17 decision.

This commission has considered the issue of pricing regeneration and has decided to roll it into common cost, and there is no reason that this regeneration between CLEC's can't be rolled into those common costs too and be treated in the exact same way as ILEC-to-CLEC regeneration.

24 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: Mr. Newell, I want to go25 back to a statement you made as to how Qwest can

1 provide the same service that you just described that 2 the CLEC's would have to undertake, and if they could 3 regenerate the same signal from their own mainframe, I 4 guess, they are not required then to install the same 5 cogeneration equipment that the CLEC's would have to 6 install?

7 In other words, wouldn't Qwest have to do the 8 same thing that the CLEC's would have to do to 9 regenerate that signal?

10 MR. NEWELL: You have economy-of-scale issues 11 first, but physically, it's the same service, but like 12 I said, first you have the economy of scale, and also, 13 Qwest doesn't have to pay for collocation space in its 14 own central office, so --

15 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: I agree with that, but 16 physically, wouldn't Qwest have to perform the same 17 functions as the CLEC's would, only in this 18 circumstance, they would be performing them within the 19 context of the CLEC's facilities?

20 You would be asking Qwest to install their 21 equipment on your facilities to provide the service, 22 and I'm trying to get to the cost issue in a general 23 way. Wouldn't Qwest incur the same costs? You are 24 essentially saying economy of scale. Maybe that means 25 they can buy the equipment at a less expensive price,

1 and there is that kind of economy of scale.

2 MR. NEWELL: It really isn't about the cost 3 of the regeneration equipment. It's the cost imposed 4 by the Qwest collocation policies of paying for the 5 space and whether the space is even available that 6 create the problem.

7 We are not here arguing, We don't want to pay 8 whatever it costs to buy a regeneration box. We can 9 pay for a regeneration box. What we can't pay is a 10 discriminatory rate or rate that ends up being 11 discriminatory to buy space and the power and all of 12 that to place the equipment, and when Qwest provides 13 the service, all they do is run a jumper to their frame 14 to the regeneration equipment and a jumper back to the 15 next space.

16 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I think we are done on 17 that one, or your time is up anyway.

18 MS. WAXTER: Interestingly,

19 Mr. Newell's almost entire argument you will not find 20 in the record. There was no record evidence with 21 respect to the cost that Covad would incur to set up a 22 separate collocation mid span between two CLEC 23 collocation spaces.

And I think it's important though to understand that we are talking really two different

1 connections here. There is a direct connection where 2 you've got CLEC A and CLEC B, and either of those 3 CLEC's can run a connection directly from their 4 collocation spaces to the other where they don't have 5 any interaction with any kind of Qwest equipment. 6 That's called a direct-connect.

7 There is also a CLEC-to-CLEC connection which 8 can go through an ICDF, or an interconnection 9 distribution frame, and in that instance, CLEC A and 10 CLEC B would take their own facility, run it to a 11 common facility, and in that case, they can ask Qwest 12 to run a jumper between those two facilities on the 13 ICDF.

14 Now, the regeneration parameters surrounding 15 each of those two connections is very different. On 16 the first one I described, the direct connection, a CLEC, either of those CLEC's can regenerate the signal 17 18 from their own collocation space if that distance is 19 required by the ANSI standards, and even though these 20 signals will be boosted before it really needs to be 21 boosted or regenerated, it can still carry a longer 22 distance.

Now, what Mr. Newell was talking about is on that direct connection, if a CLEC chose to instead of boosting a signal from a collocation space but chose

instead to pick a mid span or something in between the 1 2 two collocation spaces that they would need to 3 essentially purchase or set up their own repeater in 4 their own collocation space. Again, in that direct connection, Qwest has nothing to do with that 5 б interconnection, if you will, between the two CLEC's. 7 On the ICDF, the second one, Qwest can be 8 asked at that point to when they run the jumper to boost the signal, if need be, and it's that instance 9 10 that the CLEC would, in essence, purchase a product out 11 of the interconnection tariff which would include the 12 regeneration of the signal. So there are two very 13 different situations. In one, Qwest is involved. In 14 one, Qwest is not involved. 15 The important thing to note is that when 16 looking at the FCC's Fourth Advanced Services Order, very simply, it does not require Qwest to provide a 17 18 connection or to provision a connection between two CLEC's if Qwest permits the CLEC's to do it themselves. 19 20 Now, I've described for you that 21 direct-connect, and Qwest says to the two CLEC's, You 22 can connect yourself. You don't have to touch a Qwest 23 facility. You can provision it yourself, and because Qwest permits the CLEC's to do that, we have no 24 requirement to provide a connection or to provision a 25

connection because we tell the CLEC's they can do it
 themselves.

3 And not to oversimplify the issue, but that's 4 really the issue, and to get to your question about the terminology of wholesale versus retail, I do agree with 5 Mr. Newell. It really surrounds the pricing of it and 6 7 what the FCC requires, and if the FCC required Qwest to 8 provision a cross-connect and to price it at a TELRIC rate, then we probably would be talking about something 9 10 very different, but the Fourth Advanced Services Order 11 clearly says we don't have to do that if we let them do 12 it themselves.

13 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Just to help me out on 14 this, I thought it was helpful to try to define 15 "retail," weird as it sounds, to be non-Federal Act 16 required services. Did you agree with that 17 paraphrasation?

MS. WAXTER: I do. Mr. Newell said that the difference in the pricing between a wholesale and a retail product is the wholesale is at TELRIC and the retail is at a marked-up rate. It's actually a market rate, not a marked up.

23 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I actually thought he
24 said "market." I heard "market."

25 MS. WAXTER: That's how we would characterize

1 it certainly.

2 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So is another way to 3 think of this is that the retail rates are the old 4 style of the FCC setting a tariffed rate, but the basis 5 nowadays for the FCC accepting the tariffed rate is not 6 the old cost-of-service methodology. It's some other 7 methodology, maybe perhaps even market.

8 MS. WAXTER: Actually, I haven't been around 9 telecom that long, so I'm not sure I can give you an 10 historical perspective.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You have helped me.
 Thank you.

13 MS. WAXTER: I would also mention though that 14 if Covad truly felt a CLEC-to-CLEC connection, which 15 includes regeneration, was a wholesale service that 16 should be priced at a TELRIC rate, they certainly could 17 have and would have raised it in any one of the cost 18 dockets that occurred in any of the states, and they 19 have not done so, and especially have not done it in 20 Washington, yet they have participated in the 21 cost-docket cases.

22 So the CLEC-to-CLEC connection, which 23 includes regeneration, has not come up in a cost 24 docket, has not been TELRIC rated, and simply because 25 the FCC doesn't require it.

1 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Aren't they starting 2 at an earlier point, which is they say there is a 3 wholesale rate, zero, which is a TELRIC rate, and this 4 is a wholesale product and we want to buy it?

MS. WAXTER: Thank you for bringing that up, 5 б actually, because I think throughout the arbitration 7 proceeding, Covad has actually confused and attempted 8 to blend an ILEC-to-CLEC connection with a CLEC-to-CLEC 9 connection, and they are two very different scenarios, 10 and as I understand it, the rate that Mr. Newell, that 11 Covad has discussed with respect to being TELRIC-rated 12 is actually the ILEC-to-CLEC connection, which in 13 Washington is zero-rated at this time, but it's very 14 different than a CLEC-to-CLEC connection.

15 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What about the 16 question of how you treat yourself? Is there an issue 17 of discrimination here then?

MS. WAXTER: Qwest will boost a signal if need be when it is connecting itself to another CLEC or itself to itself. I'm not sure about that second scenario, but it will boost a signal if need be. Similarly, I don't think there is a

discrimination issue, because what we are saying to
Covad is, You can boost your signal too. We don't
police or tell you what you can or cannot put in your

collocation spaces, so if you want to put repeater
 equipment in there, go to it.

3 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What if the span is 4 too long and it requires the company buy a new cage 5 for a lot of money that Qwest would not have to do if 6 it had such a long span?

7 MS. WAXTER: If I'm understanding your 8 question correctly, the ANSI standards set what the 9 span is so the span is the span is the span. If Qwest 10 had a connection they had to make at the same distance 11 that Covad would have to make, both parties would have 12 to do the boosting. If your question is directed to 13 the location of the collocation space; is that where 14 you are going?

15 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: My question was 16 assuming, I'm not sure appropriately, but it was 17 assuming that Covad couldn't make the booster or the 18 improvement without buying a new location in the 19 building for that purpose, which costs a lot of money, 20 which Qwest would not have to do because it doesn't 21 need to buy collocation from itself. At least that was 22 the argument I heard Mr. Newell make, and I wondered 23 what your response was.

MS. WAXTER: As I understand it, Qwest is not required to, and I hope I'm going to say this right,

but Qwest is not required to provision CLEC connections 1 2 in the same way it provisions its own, if you will, so 3 there is not a discrimination issue. 4 Qwest would still have to boost the signal, would still have to have the equipment somewhere in its 5 б central office to do the boosting of the signal. The 7 fact that Covad or another CLEC would have to purchase 8 that equipment and put it somewhere doesn't create a 9 discrimination issue. 10 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So you are saying that 11 even though Qwest could do it more cheaply than Covad, 12 it's not a discrimination problem. 13 MS. WAXTER: That's correct. 14 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I think we are up on 15 time for that one. That gets us to our last issue, 16 which is the payment issue, Issue No. 8. This is ten minutes a side. Mr. Newell? 17 MR. NEWELL: Thank you. Before I start, I'll 18 19 just note to Ms. Waxter's point about the fact that 20 Covad or no one else had raised the regeneration issue 21 in prior cost proceedings, there is a discussion as to 22 why no one did that in our petition for review. 23 Everyone was led to believe that the wholesale product 24 did include regeneration, but I won't bore you with 25 details of that now. It's in the brief.

With respect to billing, what Covad did on
 the record in this proceeding was lay out some very
 specific, very problematic issues with respect to Qwest
 bills that make them difficult to reconcile
 electronically, which causes Covad to incur the time
 and cost of a manual review.

7 The general standard for billing between 8 carriers is that bills should be electronically 9 verifiable. Qwest's position is they are verifiable. 10 They are just not verifiable in the same format that 11 all the other bells provide the bills.

12 The ALJ found that these were serious 13 problems and suggested that rather than adopt Covad's 14 proposal, it would give them enough time for manual 15 verification. It should take the issue to the Change 16 Management Process and have Qwest make the changes to 17 its system to bring it in line with industry norms.

18 Since the hearing in this matter, the 19 decision in this matter, Qwest has rejected our request 20 to do that, so to the extent this problem was going to 21 get solved, it's going to get solved in this 22 arbitration proceeding and not likely through the 23 Change Management Process unless something happens in 24 the escalation procedures.

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Our point is if the bills continue to be what

1 they are today, we need more time to review them
2 because we have to engage in a manual verification
3 process for a lot of these items because they are not
4 able to be electronically verified.

5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Why is your request to 6 extend from 30 to 45 days? I think your request would 7 be to have a different -- well, the request you just 8 made to Qwest, but that you would want us to -- strike 9 that.

10 You would want to arbitrate or negotiate the 11 issue of how you were going to verify the bills. In 12 other words, I would think that you would be saying, 13 Yes, 30 days is a standard amount of time for anybody 14 to pay their bills, but meanwhile, Qwest, you need to 15 send us a bill we can verify in 30 days, as distinct 16 from, If you are going to send us this kind of bill, we need 45 days to verify it. 17

18 MR. NEWELL: That's an excellent question. I think under the arbitrator's decision in this case, she 19 20 seemed to agree that the Change Management Process is 21 the only forum to take up that billing format issue. 22 If this commission were to order that, I believe that 23 would go into the Change Management Process as a regulatory change that would be mandated that would 24 have to be made, and certainly, we would be overjoyed 25

1 if that happened.

2 I think our position was that since anything 3 that would have to be done would have to go there CMP, 4 that rather than fight that battle in a forum that when you are in direct conflict with the incumbent LEC, the 5 б Change Management Process is not a very useful process. 7 It's a great collaborative process when everybody has 8 the same goal, but when there is resistance from Qwest, 9 it's not a particularly useful process. So our thought 10 was in the meantime until this is fixed, if ever, we 11 just need more time to try to verify these manually.

12 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: Mr. Newell, aren't there 13 provisions within the contract that allow for a 14 reconciliation of any particular bill so that payment 15 could be made within a 30-day time frame? I don't know 16 whether it would have to be notice of some problem with the bill would have to be given under the agreement. I 17 18 don't know whether that's required in 30 or 60 days, 19 but isn't that really a period in which the

20 reconciliation can be done?

I'm assuming we are not talking about either have to pay one hundred percent of the bill or zero of the bill. The question is whether you have to pay some small fraction of the bill. Isn't that really -- well, it seems to me that's at least maybe not a totally

satisfactory remedy to Covad, but at least it's a
 remedy in dealing with this issue that you are talking
 about.

4 MR. NEWELL: Here's the problem. Until you 5 verify the bill, you don't know how much to pay, so you 6 can blindly pay something, and if you are wrong, which 7 inevitably you will be every month if you are doing it 8 blindly, if you overshoot, you are paying too much and 9 you have to wait for your refund, and if you 10 undershoot, you are paying late-payment charges.

And to your point about the dispute period, that's true, and if you extend the payment deadline, that extends the dispute deadline as well and gives enough time that we expect most months, we'll be able to verify the bill within 45 days and make the payment, and if there is a dispute, we'll have it identified and laid out.

18 But there may be months here and there where 19 we will need that additional dispute period after a 20 payment to identify disputes, but that's not a very 21 efficient way, month to month, to handle bill 22 verification. Monthly disputes is not acceptable, and 23 paying the invoices blindly is not acceptable either. 24 COMMISSIONER OSHIE: I know it doesn't exactly work this way in the real world, but it seems 25

as if you need 45 days, you have 30, and you will be 1 2 able to reconcile at least two thirds of the bill at 3 that point. I mean, we are talking about percentages 4 here, and it just squeezes it down a little more, and I understand the principle, and I think just as a 5 б practical matter, how big of an issue really is this? 7 MR. NEWELL: It's a huge issue, and it's laid 8 out in the record that it creates obsolete compliance 9 issues, because when you report financials and you 10 represent that you have clean books, part of that is 11 knowing what you are paying your vendors and whether 12 that's the correct amount. If you don't have time to 13 know before you pay them and you are incurring late 14 payment charges or you are losing the use of that 15 money, you have a problem. 16 The other point I should make on the 45-day

interval, and one of the criticisms that we heard from Qwest on this is if you have 45 days, now you have overlapping billing cycles, because we are going to send you a bill every 30 days, and the answer to that is that's fine. We are not going to spend 45 days reviewing the bill.

Often what happens is there is a question.
There is something that needs to be clarified with
Qwest that takes a few days for those answers to come

back, and it might not be every month that we need more 1 2 than 30 days, but there will be months when we do, and 3 we want that time and not have to pay interest charges, 4 but the sole source of it is there is a way to provide these invoices with the circuit identifications with 5 6 the USOC's the way all the other bells do, but Covad's 7 need to be electronically verified. 8 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Why wouldn't you take 9 the 45 days every time, because then you get the float? 10 It seems to me that you would be kind of silly not to 11 take the 45 days because Qwest is --12 MR. NEWELL: My point was not that we 13 wouldn't take the 45 days each billing cycle --14 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But you need the 45 15 days. 16 MR. NEWELL: We wouldn't necessarily need it, but that's true of any time frame. That's true of 30 17 18 days. There is a float involved in 30 days, and depending on the complexity of the bill at 30 days, you 19 20 might not need 30 days to do the review. 21 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Thank you. 22 Ms. Waxter? 23 MS. WAXTER: First of all, let me go to the 24 question you asked Mr. Newell with respect to why not arbitrate the issue with bill content, essentially, in 25

until this particular proceeding, and the answer to
 that is this is not the proper place to arbitrate the
 content of a bill.

4 The Change Management Process, CMP, is the place to arbitrate that because it is a collaborative 5 effort, all CLEC's who will be affected, and since all 6 7 CLEC's get the same bill, essentially, all should have 8 a say in the process as far as what the bill content 9 would be, and so an individual arbitration proceeding 10 is not the place to discuss the content of the bill or 11 whatever billing questions or issues Covad may have --12 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Can you answer this? 13 Let's say that's true, that it should not be done 14 individually. It should be done generically, but the 15 Change Management Process I'm not certain is guaranteed 16 to produce that.

17 My bottom-line question is what is your obligation, if any, to produce a bill that is 18 19 verifiable within 30 days? If you were, and I'm not 20 saying you are, handing everybody a bill that was full 21 of X's and O's and was fully indecipherable and nobody 22 knew what it even said other than maybe the bottom 23 line, you owe \$100, is that any violations of something 24 or not? It surely would be in our retail world. 25 MS. WAXTER: As far as whether it's an actual

violation of something, I would say the FCC would have some say in the matter. During the 271 process when Qwest was seeking approval for long distance, the FCC did scrutinize its billing systems and its output and whatnot and made the recommendation and gave Qwest 271 approval.

7 So the FCC has looked at the bills and looked 8 at what's contained in them and looked at whether the CLEC's can verify those bills, and certainly also 9 10 decided that 30 days is a reasonable payment date 11 because that is the industry standard. The FCC did not 12 make that determination, but certainly, the industry 13 standard is that 30 days is reasonable for payment due 14 dates.

15 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I'm not sure you
16 answered the Chair's question. What if the CLEC's were
17 getting bills they can't decipher?

18 MS. WAXTER: I think my answer was I don't 19 know if there is any governing body that's going to 20 say, Qwest your bills are terrible, but there is the 21 CMP process, and the CMP does have a dispute resolution 22 process where if the CLEC's are dissatisfied with the 23 response they get to any request, they can take it 24 through the dispute resolution process, and I don't know what the very last point or at what point you've 25

gone through the dispute resolution process and there is still an issue, but I know that the CMP document itself leaves out the process that CLEC's and ILEC's can follow if there is a dispute.

5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But actually, that becomes fairly important, because ultimately, if the б 7 Change Management Process is whatever Qwest ultimately 8 wants to agree to it can and what it doesn't want to agree to it doesn't. That's very different than if 9 10 ultimately, a CLEC can walk into a commission, whether 11 it's a federal one or a state one, and say, We just 12 can't get bills that can be worked through in the 13 industry standard of 30 days.

14 Don't you agree that there is a reasonable 15 difference there, who is the ultimate authority? MS. WAXTER: I do, and that question wasn't 16 asked and it's not in the record. Although, what is in 17 18 the record, and I certainly would be happy to 19 supplement with at least some statement from Qwest, the 20 CMP document is in the record. I'm sure it's outlined 21 in there, and hopefully, there is something in that 22 document. 23 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: CMP, Change Management

24 Process?

25 MS. WAXTER: Yes.

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COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Qwest has rejected 1 2 doing that. What is your response to that? 3 MS. WAXTER: After the hearing on this matter 4 but not until October, in mid October, Covad for the first time did submit a change request to the change 5 management forum, and Qwest looked at that, and they do б 7 what they do with all change requests when they come 8 in, which is they go through a level of effort 9 determination, and they determine what the level of 10 effort would be to implement that change request. 11 Again, this is evidence that's not in the 12 record, but for the sake of discussion here, the level 13 of effort that was determined for the change request 14 that Covad requested was close to a million dollars. 15 It was just over nine hundred thousand, and one of the 16 provisions of the CMP document is that Qwest can decline or deny a change request based on financial 17 18 infeasibility, and looking at the request and the nine 19 hundred thousand dollars, Qwest chose to deny that 20 change request because of financial infeasibility. It 21 is the first time that any CLEC has ever requested this 22 particular change in its billing process. 23 Again, Covad has the opportunity to run 24 through the dispute resolution process with respect to

25 that, and again, as long as we are talking about

evidence that's not in the record, I'll just mention 1 2 that this specific request that Covad made was just to 3 include a circuit identification number for 4 line-sharing bills. It wasn't an overhaul of their bills itself, and I'll also mention, and this is in the 5 record, that admittedly on Covad's behalf, Megan 6 7 Doberneck stated that the majority of Qwest's bills are 8 reviewable electronically, so we really are talking 9 about a very small portion of its bills that they seem 10 to have problems with.

11 May I make one comment just before we 12 conclude, and that is we've had a lot of discussion 13 about the 30-day payment period, and Covad sort of drew 14 into the same argument their request for extended 15 remedy times, and that's on the discontinuance and 16 disconnect, and I would just like to reiterate to this 17 commission that the rationale behind extending a 18 payment due date is very different than the rationale 19 behind extending the remedies that Qwest might have in 20 the event of a nonpayment.

21 Consequently, Qwest's position is that Covad 22 has really presented no evidence to support their 23 request to extend the remedies, the continuance date 24 and the disconnection date.

25 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I think that brings us

1	to a conclusion. Thank you very much. Your arguments
2	were very well put on very complex issues, and it is
3	hard for us to tune into these extremely detailed,
4	technically-laden arguments, and you did an outstanding
5	job. So we will take all your arguments under
6	advisement and issue an appropriate order in an
7	appropriate time.
8	(Oral argument concluded at 3:45 p.m.)
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