

**Exh. DCG-15C  
Dockets UE-170033/UG-170034  
Witness: David C. Gomez  
CONFIDENTIAL VERSION**

**BEFORE THE WASHINGTON  
UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION**

**WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND  
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,**

**Complainant,**

**v.**

**PUGET SOUND ENERGY,**

**Respondent.**

**DOCKETS UE-170033 and  
UG-170034 (*Consolidated*)**

**EXHIBIT TO  
TESTIMONY OF**

**David C. Gomez**

**STAFF OF  
WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND  
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION**

***WUTC v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., Dockets UE-111048 and UG-111049, prefiled direct testimony of David E. Mills, Exhibit No. \_\_ (DEM-1CT), page 19:13 through 21:6.***

**CONFIDENTIAL PER PROTECTIVE ORDER – CONFIDENTIAL VERSION**

1 projects based on:

- 2 (i) wind resource information provided in pre-construction  
3 energy assessments; and  
4 (ii) previous analysis conducted for PSE related to these or  
5 nearby projects.

6 **Q. What were the results of this evaluation?**

7 A. DNV-GEC's analysis indicates that the capacity factor and annual energy  
8 estimates at both Hopkins Ridge and Wild Horse would have been reduced if the  
9 evaluation methodology used today had been applied to the original analyses.  
10 Based on the latest methodology, the estimated capacity factors for Hopkins  
11 Ridge and Wild Horse would be reduced to 32.6 percent and 30.2 percent,  
12 respectively.

13 **Q. How has the evaluation methodology changed?**

14 A. Industry wide, capacity factor is strongly influenced by the production availability  
15 of the turbines, the reliability of the wind resource itself, and externalities, such as  
16 transmission availability. In 2006, Global Energy Concepts ("GEC") performed a  
17 study comparing pre-construction energy estimates for 24 wind power facilities  
18 across North America having a combined 99 facility-years of operation to actual  
19 first year production. The results clearly show reduced actual production relative  
20 to expectations due to:

- 21 1) over-estimation of gross energy production due to wind  
22 speed estimating bias; and

1                   2)     energy estimate process bias (losses higher than estimated).

2                   Examination of the causes shows that many effects, both meteorological and  
3                   mechanical, were not quantitatively evaluated in the uncertainty analysis  
4                   performed as part of pre-construction energy analysis. For example, turbine  
5                   availability or power performance may have been assumed to be fixed at  
6                   relatively high levels, while actual operating experience indicates that these levels  
7                   decline somewhat over the operating life of the facility. In some cases, entire  
8                   categories of losses were not considered or were underestimated. For example, at  
9                   some projects, weather losses were evaluated based on expected icing downtime,  
10                  while actual operations have shown that more energy is lost through other  
11                  weather-related problems such as lightning, hail, weather-related faults, and  
12                  reduced site access. As the differences between pre-construction energy estimates  
13                  and actual production performance have gradually been recognized, developers  
14                  and consultants alike have refined their wind resource analyses.

15   **Q.     What are the wind resource capacity factors included in the rate year power**  
16   **costs?**

17   A.     PSE's prior rate cases have included the original capacity factors based upon the  
18           Garrad-Hassan pre-construction estimates for Hopkins Ridge and Wild Horse.  
19           For this rate proceeding, however, PSE used DNV-GEC's updated capacity  
20           factors for both Hopkins Ridge and Wild Horse as inputs to the AURORA model:  
21           **32.6** percent and **30.2** percent, respectively. DNV-GEC's lower capacity factors  
22           for Hopkins Ridge and Wild Horse reduced the wind generation included in the

1 AURORA model by 29,532 and 35,327 MWhs, respectively, for a total reduction  
2 of 64,859 MWhs. The AURORA model replaces the lost wind generation with  
3 market purchases, resulting in an increase to power costs which are mitigated by  
4 lower wind integration costs calculated in the “Not in Models” calculation  
5 discussed below. As a result, the rate year power costs increased approximately  
6 \$2.0 million.

7 **B. Wind Integration Costs**

8 **1. Wind Integration Overview**

9 **Q. What are wind integration costs?**

10 A. Generally, wind integration costs incurred by PSE, internally and through BPA,  
11 are equal to the opportunity costs of having to reserve capacity to balance wind  
12 generation. In essence, generation capacity that may have been dispatched but for  
13 the presence of wind is withheld from the energy market. Conversely, generation  
14 that would not have been dispatched, but for the presence of wind, may be  
15 committed into the market. Rate year power costs include the cost of integrating  
16 PSE’s wind resources and include wind integration costs paid to BPA, as well as  
17 internal wind integration costs.

18 **Q. Does the integration of wind present any unique challenges for PSE?**

19 A. Yes. Wind generation is an intermittent and non-dispatchable generation resource.  
20 Although the variability can be managed in a manner similar to managing PSE’s