EXHIBIT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ (RCC-6T) DOCKET NO. UE-111048/UG-111049 2011 PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC. GENERAL RATE CASE WITNESS: RALPH C. CAVANAGH

## BEFORE THE WASHINGTON STATE UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND	) DOCKET NOS. UE-111048
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,	) and UG-111049 (Consolidated)
	)
Complainant,	)
	)
VS.	)
	)
PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.,	)
	)
Respondent.	)
	)

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Staff witness Elgin raises what I believe to be unjustified concerns about the "complexity" of decoupling, citing the Commission's reference in its Policy Statement to the possibility of "unreasonable administrative burdens." But the Commission was addressing potential joint applications for full and partial decoupling by dual fuel utilities, which are not an issue in this proceeding. I also argue that witness Elgin is incorrect in suggesting that more frequent rate cases would represent "a form of decoupling," since this would do nothing to break the linkage between retail electricity use and recovery of a utility's authorized nonproduction costs.

Finally, I show that the rate design changes advocated by Kroger witness Higgins as an alternative to decoupling could be justified only if the Commission concluded that utility customers currently had excessive incentives to save energy. This seems inconceivable in light of the Commission's consistent and well-justified support for aggressive utility efforts to help customers improve the energy efficiency of their buildings and equipment.

#### П. UTC STAFF RESPONSE TO BENCH REQUEST

#### 0. What is your general reaction to the UTC Staff response to the Bench **Request on Full Decoupling?**

Α. I disagree strongly with Staff's recommendation to substitute "a well-defended attrition adjustment" for full decoupling, but I appreciate Staff's careful and good-faith effort to address the design issues associated with full decoupling. I see much common ground there with my own testimony.

### 0. Why do you disagree with the Staff's preference for attrition adjustments over decoupling?

that more frequent rate cases (which is what Staff appears to mean by "a well-defended attrition

As explained further below in my response to Ken Elgin's testimony, I believe

adjustment") would be much more complex than full decoupling, while achieving none of its principal objectives and sharing the deficiencies of PSE's lost revenue recovery proposal. Assuming that the Commission does not choose this alternative to full decoupling, however, I believe that Staff has provided much of value on designing a full decoupling mechanism in the body of its response. I disagree with the Staff analysis on only a few points, as explained below. Α. Summarize your areas of agreement with the Staff Response. Q. Staff describes a per-customer decoupling mechanism that would "remain in place until modified or cancelled by the Commission." I agree. My testimony, like Staff's Response, argues for a middle course between system-wide decoupling and class-by-class decoupling.<sup>2</sup> Staff's proposal is slightly more comprehensive in coverage than mine, but I certainly would not oppose Staff's recommendation to "includ[e] all customers." Staff's recommended earnings test is essentially the same as mine.<sup>4</sup> Staff and I agree that full decoupling will not reduce utility managers' incentive to reduce costs.<sup>5</sup> Staff's approach to conservation achievement seems generally reasonable to me, <sup>6</sup> although I hope that Staff would join also in my specific emphasis on "strong low-income savings results and implementation of energy efficiency programs across all sectors."<sup>7</sup> I appreciate Staff's concerns about the lack of data to perform analysis of benefits <sup>1</sup> See Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (Staff Response to Bench Request on Full Decoupling), pp. 7-8. <sup>2</sup> Compare Staff Response, p. 9 with Exhibit No. (RCC-1T), p. 11. <sup>3</sup> My proposal excludes less than 140 very large customers accounting for only about 4 percent of Puget's projected revenues from energy charges. Exhibit No. (RCC-1T), p. 13: 9-15. <sup>4</sup> Compare Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (Staff Response to Bench Request on Full Decoupling), pp. 10-12 with Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (RCC-1T), pp. 16:1-5. Compare Exhibit No. (Staff Response), pp. 12-13 with Exhibit No. (RCC-1T), p. 27:13-22. <sup>6</sup> Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (Staff Response), pp. 13-14. <sup>7</sup> Exhibit No. (RCC-1T), p. 11:4-5. 24 Prefiled Cross-Answering Testimony of Ralph C. Cavanagh Exhibit No. (RCC-6T) NW Energy Coalition Page 3

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1 to low-income customers from PSE conservation programs, and I note that my direct testimony 2 proposes a specific remedy as part of an independent evaluation of the decoupling mechanism.<sup>8</sup> 3 Staff also offers what I view as reasonable recommendations on periodic reports to the 4 Commission and service quality.<sup>9</sup> 5 0. Where do you disagree with Staff? 6 Staff believes that full decoupling justifies a prospective reduction in PSE's A. authorized rate of return, and I strongly disagree, <sup>10</sup> although I hope that Staff would join my 7 8 recommendation that "the company should pass through to customers any cost savings 9 associated with changes in its capital structure following adoption of the decoupling mechanism (e.g., a shift in the equity/debt ratio)."11 I also don't agree with Staff that it is appropriate to 10 11 include in the mechanism an automatic reduction in authorized revenue per customer after three 12 years, <sup>12</sup> given my conclusion that PSE gains no inherent advantage from substituting per-13 customer revenue decoupling for "the status quo, which effectively allows PSE's annual fixed-14 cost revenue requirement to grow in proportion to its retail sales instead of its customer count."<sup>13</sup> 15 Staff's proposal here would inflict an automatic penalty for adoption of per-customer 16 decoupling, whereas my aim is relative neutrality. Finally, Staff proposes to include in full 17 18 <sup>8</sup> Compare Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (Staff Response), p. 15 with Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (RCC-1T), pp. 18-19. 19 (Staff Response), pp. 19-21. On the issue of service quality, I agree also with the additional approaches identified by the Regulatory Assistance Project, Exhibit No. 20 (RCC-7), p. 49. 21 <sup>10</sup> Compare Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (Staff Response), pp. 9-10 with Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (RCC-1T), pp. 19-20. 22 <sup>11</sup> Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (RCC-1T), p. 19:15-17. <sup>12</sup> Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (Staff Response), p. 6. 23 <sup>13</sup> Exhibit No. (RCC-1T), p. 12. 24 Prefiled Cross-Answering Testimony of Ralph C. Cavanagh Exhibit No. (RCC-6T) 25 NW Energy Coalition Page 4

term "decoupling" itself is rooted in the notion of separating the utility's incentive to increase profits through increased sales by breaking the link between – that is, by decoupling – revenues from sales." <sup>19</sup>

#### IV. KEVIN HIGGINS'S TESTIMONY FOR KROGER CO.

#### Q. What is your response to Kevin Higgins's opposition to revenue decoupling?

A. Mr. Higgins simply recites traditional objections to revenue decoupling, without citing or addressing the Commission's Policy Statement, which takes those same objections fully into account.<sup>20</sup> The Commission has moved past Mr. Higgins's reflexive opposition in its conclusion that "a properly constructed full decoupling mechanism . . . can be a tool that benefits both the company and its ratepayers." And his specific objections to decoupling for nonresidential customers fly in the face of the Commission's conclusion that "[g]enerally, a full decoupling proposal should cover all customer classes."

# Q. Do you support Mr. Higgins's recommendation to substitute rate design changes for full decoupling?

A. No. Mr. Higgins wants to shift more fixed cost recovery into charges that do not vary with electricity consumption.<sup>23</sup> But that is tantamount to arguing that PSE's current rate structure creates excessive rewards for saving energy. Certainly Mr. Higgins's proposal would reduce those rewards, at a time when the Commission and the legislature are clearly on record in support of more, not less, energy efficiency effort and investment across the PSE system.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Exhibit No (RCC-7), Regulatory Assistance Project, Revenue Regulation and
Decoupling: A Guide to Theory and Application (June 2011), p. 49.
<sup>20</sup> Exhibit No (KCH-3T), pp. 19-25.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Policy Statement, p. 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Compare Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (KCH-3T), p. 21:7-18 with Policy Statement, p. 18, item 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_ (KCH-3T), pp. 22-23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See, e.g., Policy Statement, pp. 1-9, and sources cited there.

Q. Does this conclude your testimony? A. Yes. Prefiled Cross-Answering Testimony of Ralph C. Cavanagh Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_\_(RCC-6T) NW Energy Coalition
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