Exhibit No. ___ (AMM-3)

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. UE-14_____

DOCKET NO. UG-14_____

EXHIBIT NO._____(AMM-3)

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REPRESENTING AVISTA CORPORATION

I. DESCRIPTION OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES

Q. What is the purpose of this exhibit?

A. Exhibit No.___(AMM-3) presents capital market estimates of the cost of equity. First, I examine the concept of the cost of equity, along with the risk-return tradeoff principle fundamental to capital markets. Next, I describe DCF, ECAPM, and risk premium analyses conducted to estimate the cost of equity for reference groups of comparable risk firms. This exhibit also presents alternative tests to confirm that the end-results of my primary analyses are reasonable and do not exceed a fair ROE.

A. Overview

Q. What role does the rate of return on common equity play in a utility's rates?

A. The return on common equity is the cost of inducing and retaining investment in the utility's physical plant and assets. This investment is necessary to finance the asset base needed to provide utility service. Competition for investor funds is intense and investors are free to invest their funds wherever they choose. Investors will commit money to a particular

investment only if they expect it to produce a return commensurate with those from other investments with comparable risks.

Q. What fundamental economic principle underlies any evaluation of investors' required return on equity?

A. The fundamental economic principle underlying the cost of equity concept is the notion that investors are risk averse. In capital markets where relatively risk-free assets are available (*e.g.*, U.S. Treasury securities), investors can be induced to hold riskier assets only if they are offered a premium, or additional return, above the rate of return on a risk-free asset. Since all assets compete with each other for investor funds, riskier assets must yield a higher expected rate of return than safer assets to induce investors to hold them.

Given this risk-return tradeoff, the required rate of return (k) from an asset (i) can be generally expressed as:

$$k_i = R_f + RP_i$$

where: R_f = Risk-free rate of return, and
RP_i = Risk premium required to hold riskier asset i.

Thus, the required rate of return for a particular asset at any point in time is a function of: 1) the yield on risk-free assets, and 2) its relative risk, with investors

demanding correspondingly larger risk premiums for assets bearing greater risk.

Q. Is the cost of equity observable in the capital markets?

A. No. Unlike debt capital, there is no contractually guaranteed return on common equity capital since shareholders are the residual owners of the utility. Because it is unobservable, the cost of equity for a particular utility must be estimated by analyzing information about capital market conditions generally, assessing the relative risks of the company specifically, and employing various quantitative methods that focus on investors' current required rates of return. These various quantitative methods typically attempt to infer investors' required rates of return from stock prices, interest rates, or other capital market data.

B. Comparable Risk Proxy Group

Q. How did you implement quantitative methods to estimate the cost of common equity for Avista?

A. Application of quantitative methods to estimate the cost of equity requires observable capital market data, such as stock prices. Moreover, even for a firm with publicly traded stock, the cost of equity can only be estimated. As a result, applying quantitative models using observable market data only

produces an estimate that inherently includes some degree of observation error. Thus, the accepted approach to increase confidence in the results is to apply the quantitative methods such as the DCF and ECAPM to a proxy group of publicly traded companies that investors regard as risk-comparable.

Q. What specific proxy group of utilities did you rely on for your analysis?

A. In order to reflect the risks and prospects associated with Avista's jurisdictional utility operations, my DCF analyses focused on a reference group of other utilities composed of those companies included by The Value Line Investment Survey ("Value Line") in its Electric Utilities Industry groups with:

1. S&P corporate credit ratings of "BBB-" to "BBB+;"
2. Value Line Safety Rank of "2" or "3";
3. Value Line Financial Strength Rating of "B+" or higher;
4. No involvement in a major merger or acquisition; and,
5. No recent cuts in dividend payments.

These criteria resulted in a proxy group composed of 25 companies, which I refer to as the "Utility Group."

Q. How did you evaluate the risks of the Utility Group relative to Avista?

A. My evaluation of relative risk considered four objective, published benchmarks that are widely relied on in the investment community. Credit ratings are assigned by independent rating agencies for the purpose of providing investors with a broad assessment of the creditworthiness of a firm. Ratings generally extend from triple-A (the highest) to D (in default). Other symbols (*e.g.*, "BBB+") are used to show relative standing within a category. Because the rating agencies' evaluation includes virtually all of the factors normally considered important in assessing a firm's relative credit standing, corporate credit ratings provide a broad, objective measure of overall investment risk that is readily available to investors. Although the credit rating agencies are not immune to criticism, their rankings and analyses are widely cited in the investment community and referenced by investors. Investment restrictions tied to credit ratings continue to influence capital flows, and credit ratings are also frequently used as a primary risk indicator in establishing proxy groups to estimate the cost of common equity.

While credit ratings provide the most widely referenced benchmark for investment risks, other quality rankings published by investment advisory

services also provide relative assessments of risks that are considered by investors in forming their expectations for common stocks. Value Line's primary risk indicator is its Safety Rank, which ranges from "1" (Safest) to "5" (Riskiest). This overall risk measure is intended to capture the total risk of a stock, and incorporates elements of stock price stability and financial strength. Given that Value Line is perhaps the most widely available source of investment advisory information, its Safety Rank provides useful guidance regarding the risk perceptions of investors.

The Financial Strength Rating is designed as a guide to overall financial strength and creditworthiness, with the key inputs including financial leverage, business volatility measures, and company size. Value Line's Financial Strength Ratings range from "A++" (strongest) down to "C" (weakest) in nine steps. Finally, Value Line's beta measures a utility's stock price volatility relative to the market as a whole. A stock that tends to respond less to market movements has a beta less than 1.00, while stocks that tend to move more than the market have betas greater than 1.00. Beta is the only relevant measure of investment risk under modern capital market theory, and is widely cited in academics and in the investment industry as a guide to investors' risk perceptions. Moreover, in

my experience Value Line is the most widely referenced source for beta in regulatory proceedings. As noted in *New Regulatory Finance*:

> Value Line is the largest and most widely circulated independent investment advisory service, and influences the expectations of a large number of institutional and individual investors. … Value Line betas are computed on a theoretically sound basis using a broadly based market index, and they are adjusted for the regression tendency of betas to converge to 1.00.[1]

Q. How do the overall risks of your proxy group compare with Avista?

A. Table AMM-2 compares the Utility Group with Avista across four key indicators of investment risk:

TABLE AMM-2
COMPARISON OF RISK INDICATORS

	S&P	Value Line		
	Credit Rating	Safety Rank	Financial Strength	Beta
Utility Group	BBB	2	B++	0.74
Avista	BBB	2	A	0.70

Q. What does this comparison indicate regarding investors' assessment of the relative risk associated with your Utility Group?

A. As shown above the "BBB" rating corresponding to Avista is identical to the average credit rating for the Utility Group. Similarly, the

[1] Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports* at 71 (2006).

average Value Line Safety Rank for the Utility Group is the same as that assigned to the Company. With respect to Value Line's Financial Strength and beta measures, the average values for the Utility Group indicate slightly less risk than for Avista. Considered together, this comparison of objective measures, which consider a broad spectrum of risks, including financial and business position, and exposure to firm-specific factors, indicates that investors would likely conclude that the overall investment risks for Avista are generally comparable to those of the firms in the Utility Group.

C. Discounted Cash Flow Analyses

Q. How are DCF models used to estimate the cost of equity?

A. DCF models attempt to replicate the market valuation process that sets the price investors are willing to pay for a share of a company's stock. The model rests on the assumption that investors evaluate the risks and expected rates of return from all securities in the capital markets. Given these expectations, the price of each stock is adjusted by the market until investors are adequately compensated for the risks they bear. Therefore, we can look to the market to determine what investors believe a share of common stock is worth. By estimating the cash flows investors expect to receive from the stock in the way of future dividends and capital gains, we can calculate their required

rate of return. In other words, the cash flows that investors expect from a stock are estimated, and given its current market price, we can "back-into" the discount rate, or cost of equity, that investors implicitly used in bidding the stock to that price.

Q. What market valuation process underlies DCF models?

A. DCF models assume that the price of a share of common stock is equal to the present value of the expected cash flows (i.e., future dividends and stock price) that will be received while holding the stock, discounted at investors' required rate of return. That is, the cost of equity is the discount rate that equates the current price of a share of stock with the present value of all expected cash flows from the stock.

Q. What form of the DCF model is customarily used to estimate the cost of equity in rate cases?

A. Rather than developing annual estimates of cash flows into perpetuity, the DCF model can be simplified to a "constant growth" form:[2]

[2] The constant growth DCF model is dependent on a number of assumptions, which in practice are never strictly met. These include a constant growth rate for both dividends and earnings; a stable dividend payout ratio; the discount rate exceeds the growth rate; a constant growth rate for book value and price; a constant earned rate of return on book value; no sales of stock at a price above or below book value; a constant price-earnings ratio; a constant discount rate (*i.e.*, no changes in risk or interest rate levels and a flat yield curve); and all of the above extend to infinity.

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{k_e - g}$$

where: P_0 = Current price per share;
D_1 = Expected dividend per share in the coming year;
k_e = Cost of equity;
g = Investors' long-term growth expectations.

The cost of equity (K_e) can be isolated by rearranging terms:

$$k_e = \frac{D_1}{P_0} + g$$

This constant growth form of the DCF model recognizes that the rate of return to stockholders consists of two parts: 1) dividend yield (D_1/P_0), and 2) growth (*g*). In other words, investors expect to receive a portion of their total return in the form of current dividends and the remainder through price appreciation.

Q. What steps are required to apply the DCF model?

A. The first step in implementing the constant growth DCF model is to determine the expected dividend yield (D_1/P_0) for the firm in question. This is usually calculated based on an estimate of dividends to be paid in the coming year divided by the current price of the stock. The second step is to estimate investors' long-term growth expectations (*g*) for the firm. The final step is to sum the firm's dividend yield and estimated growth rate to arrive at an estimate of its cost of equity.

Q. How was the dividend yield for the Utility Group determined?

A. Estimates of dividends to be paid by each of these utilities over the next twelve months, obtained from Value Line, served as D_1. This annual dividend was then divided by a 30-day average stock price for each utility to arrive at the expected dividend yield. The expected dividends, stock prices, and resulting dividend yields for the firms in the Utility Group are presented on page 1 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-6).

Q. What is the next step in applying the constant growth DCF model?

A. The next step is to evaluate long-term growth expectations, or "*g*", for the firm in question. In constant growth DCF theory, earnings, dividends, book value, and market price are all assumed to grow in lockstep, and the growth horizon of the DCF model is infinite. But implementation of the DCF model is more than just a theoretical exercise; it is an attempt to replicate the mechanism investors used to arrive at observable stock prices. A wide variety of techniques can be used to derive growth rates, but the only "*g*" that matters in applying the DCF model is the value that investors expect.

Q. Are historical growth rates likely to be representative of investors' expectations for utilities?

A. No. If past trends in earnings, dividends, and book value are to be representative of investors' expectations for the future, then the historical conditions giving rise to these growth rates should be expected to continue. That is clearly not the case for utilities, where structural and industry changes have led to declining growth in dividends, earnings pressure, and, in many cases, significant write-offs. While these conditions serve to depress historical growth measures, they are not representative of long-term expectations for the utility industry or the expectations that investors have incorporated into current market prices. As a result, historical growth measures for utilities do not currently meet the requirements of the DCF model.

Q. What are investors most likely to consider in developing their long-term growth expectations?

A. Implementation of the DCF model is solely concerned with replicating the forward-looking evaluation of real-world investors. In the case of utilities, dividend growth rates are not likely to provide a meaningful guide to investors' current growth expectations. This is because utilities have significantly altered their dividend policies in response to more accentuated

business risks in the industry.[3] As a result of this trend towards a more conservative payout ratio, dividend growth in the utility industry has remained largely stagnant as utilities conserve financial resources to provide a hedge against heightened uncertainties.

As payout ratios for firms in the utility industry trended downward, investors' focus has increasingly shifted from dividends to earnings as a measure of long-term growth. Future trends in earnings per share ("EPS"), which provide the source for future dividends and ultimately support share prices, play a pivotal role in determining investors' long-term growth expectations. The importance of earnings in evaluating investors' expectations and requirements is well accepted in the investment community, and surveys of analytical techniques relied on by professional analysts indicate that growth in earnings is far more influential that trends in dividends per share ("DPS"). Apart from Value Line, investment advisory services do not generally publish comprehensive DPS growth projections, and this scarcity of dividend growth rates relative to the abundance of earnings forecasts attests to their relative influence. The fact that securities analysts focus on EPS growth, and that

[3] Payout ratios for the electric utility industry have declined from approximately 80% to approximately 65%. The Value Line Investment Survey (Nov. 1, Nov. 22, & Dec. 20, 2013; Sep. 15, 1995).

dividend growth rates are not routinely published, indicates that projected EPS growth rates are likely to provide a superior indicator of the future long-term growth expected by investors.

Q. Do the growth rate projections of security analysts consider historical trends?

A. Yes. Professional security analysts study historical trends extensively in developing their projections of future earnings. Hence, to the extent there is any useful information in historical patterns, that information is incorporated into analysts' growth forecasts.

Q. Did Professor Myron J. Gordon, who originated the DCF approach, recognize the pivotal role that earnings play in forming investors' expectations?

A. Yes. Dr. Gordon specifically recognized that "it is the growth that investors expect that should be used" in applying the DCF model and he concluded:

> A number of considerations suggest that investors may, in fact, use earnings growth as a measure of expected future growth."[4]

[4] Gordon, Myron J., "The Cost of Capital to a Public Utility," *MSU Public Utilities Studies* at 89 (1974).

Q. What are security analysts currently projecting in the way of growth for the firms in the Utility Proxy Group?

A. The projected EPS growth rates for each of the firms in the Utility Group reported by Value Line, Thomson Reuters ("IBES"), and Zacks Investment Research ("Zacks") are displayed on page 2 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-6).[5]

Q. Some argue that analysts' assessments of growth rates are biased. Do you believe these projections are appropriate for estimating investors' required return using the DCF model?

A. Yes. In applying the DCF model to estimate the cost of common equity, the only relevant growth rate is the forward-looking expectations of investors that are captured in current stock prices. Investors, just like securities analysts and others in the investment community, do not know how the future will actually turn out. They can only make investment decisions based on their best estimate of what the future holds in the way of long-term growth for a particular stock, and securities prices are constantly adjusting to reflect their assessment of available information.

[5] Formerly I/B/E/S International, Inc., IBES growth rates are now compiled and published by Thomson Reuters.

Any claims that analysts' estimates are not relied upon by investors are illogical given the reality of a competitive market for investment advice. The market for investment advice is intensely competitive, and securities analysts are personally and professionally motivated to provide the most accurate assessment possible of future growth trends. If financial analysts' forecasts do not add value to investors' decision making, then it is irrational for investors to pay for these estimates. Those financial analysts who fail to provide reliable forecasts will lose out in competitive markets relative to those analysts whose forecasts investors find more credible. The reality that analyst estimates are routinely referenced in the financial media and in investment advisory publications (*e.g.*, Value Line) implies that investors use them as a basis for their expectations.

The continued success of investment services such as Thomson Reuters and Value Line, and the fact that projected growth rates from such sources are widely referenced, provides strong evidence that investors give considerable weight to analysts' earnings projections in forming their expectations for future growth. While the projections of securities analysts may be proven optimistic or pessimistic in hindsight, this is irrelevant in assessing the expected growth that investors have incorporated into current stock prices, and any bias in

analysts' forecasts – whether pessimistic or optimistic – is irrelevant if investors share analysts' views. Earnings growth projections of security analysts provide the most frequently referenced guide to investors' views and are widely accepted in applying the DCF model. As explained in *New Regulatory Finance*:

> Because of the dominance of institutional investors and their influence on individual investors, analysts' forecasts of long-run growth rates provide a sound basis for estimating required returns. Financial analysts exert a strong influence on the expectations of many investors who do not possess the resources to make their own forecasts, that is, they are a cause of *g* [growth]. The accuracy of these forecasts in the sense of whether they turn out to be correct is not an issue here, as long as they reflect widely held expectations.[6]

Q. Have other regulators also recognized that analysts' growth rate estimates are an important and meaningful guide to investors' expectations?

A. Yes. FERC has expressed a clear preference for projected EPS growth rates from IBES in applying the DCF model to estimate the cost of equity for both electric and natural gas pipeline utilities, and has expressly rejected reliance on other sources.[7] As FERC concluded:

> Opinion No. 414-A held that the IBES five-year growth forecasts for each company in the proxy group are the best available evidence of the short-term growth rates expected by the investment community. It cited evidence that (1) those forecasts

[6] Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports, Inc.* at 298 (2006) (emphasis added).

[7] *See, e.g., Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.*, 99 FERC ¶ 63,011 at P 53 (2002); *Golden Spread Elec. Coop. Inc.*, 123 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2008).

> are provided to IBES by professional security analysts, (2) IBES reports the forecast for each firm as a service to investors, and (3) the IBES reports are well known in the investment community and used by investors. The Commission has also rejected the suggestion that the IBES analysts are biased and stated that "in fact the analysts have a significant incentive to make their analyses as accurate as possible to meet the needs of their clients since those investors will not utilize brokerage firms whose analysts repeatedly overstate the growth potential of companies."[8]

Similarly, the Kentucky Public Service Commission has also indicated its preference for relying on analysts' projections in establishing investors' expectations:

> KU's argument concerning the appropriateness of using investors' expectations in performing a DCF analysis is more persuasive than the AG's argument that analysts' projections should be rejected in favor of historical results. The Commission agrees that analysts' projections of growth will be relatively more compelling in forming investors' forward-looking expectations than relying on historical performance, especially given the current state of the economy. [9]

More recently, the Public Utility Regulatory Authority of Connecticut noted that:

> The Authority used growth in earnings exclusively based on the record of this docket showing that financial literature supports security analysts' EPS growth rate projections as superior for use in a DCF analysis. Response to Interrogatory FI-106. The Authority takes note that long-term, there is not growth in DPS without growth in EPS. Market prices are more highly influenced

[8] *Kern River Gas Transmission Co.*, 126 FERC ¶ 61,034at P 121 (2009) ((footnote omitted).
[9] *Order*, Case No. 2009-00548 at 30-31 (Jul. 30, 2010).

by security analyst's earnings expectations then expectations in dividends. The Authority agrees with Ms. Ahern that "the use of earnings growth rates in a DCF analysis provides a better matching between investors' market price appreciation expectations and the growth rate component of the DCF."[10]

Q. How else are investors' expectations of future long-term growth prospects often estimated for use in the constant growth DCF model?

A. In constant growth theory, growth in book equity will be equal to the product of the earnings retention ratio (one minus the dividend payout ratio) and the earned rate of return on book equity. Furthermore, if the earned rate of return and the payout ratio are constant over time, growth in earnings and dividends will be equal to growth in book value. Despite the fact that these conditions are seldom, if ever, met in practice, this "sustainable growth" approach may provide a rough guide for evaluating a firm's growth prospects and is frequently proposed in regulatory proceedings.

The sustainable growth rate is calculated by the formula, $g = br+sv$, where "b" is the expected retention ratio, "r" is the expected earned return on equity, "s" is the percent of common equity expected to be issued annually as new common stock, and "v" is the equity accretion rate.

[10] *Decision*, Docket No. 13-02-20 (Sep. 24, 2013).

Q. What is the purpose of the "sv" term?

A. Under DCF theory, the "sv" factor is a component of the growth rate designed to capture the impact of issuing new common stock at a price above, or below, book value. When a company's stock price is greater than its book value per share, the per-share contribution in excess of book value associated with new stock issues will accrue to the current shareholders. This increase to the book value of existing shareholders leads to higher expected earnings and dividends, with the "sv" factor incorporating this additional growth component.

Q. What growth rate does the earnings retention method suggest for the Utility Group?

A. The sustainable, "br+sv" growth rates for each firm in the Utility Proxy Group are summarized on page 2 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-6), with the underlying details being presented on Exhibit No.___(AMM-7). For each firm, the expected retention ratio (b) was calculated based on Value Line's projected dividends and earnings per share. Likewise, each firm's expected earned rate of return (r) was computed by dividing projected earnings per share by projected net book value. Because Value Line reports end-of-year book values, an adjustment was incorporated to compute an average rate of return over the

year, consistent with the theory underlying this approach to estimating investors' growth expectations. Meanwhile, the percent of common equity expected to be issued annually as new common stock (s) was equal to the product of the projected market-to-book ratio and growth in common shares outstanding, while the equity accretion rate (v) was computed as 1 minus the inverse of the projected market-to-book ratio.

Q. Are there significant shortcomings associated with the "br+sv" growth rate?

A. Yes. First, in order to calculate the sustainable growth rate, it is necessary to develop estimates of investors' expectations for four separate variables; namely, "b", "r", "s", and "v." Given the inherent difficulty in forecasting each parameter and the difficulty of estimating the expectations of investors, the potential for measurement error is significantly increased when using four variables, as opposed to referencing a direct projection for EPS growth. Second, empirical research in the finance literature indicates that sustainable growth rates are not as significantly correlated to measures of value, such as share prices, as are analysts' EPS growth forecasts.[11]

[11] Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports, Inc.*, at 307 (2006).

The "sustainable growth" approach was included for completeness, but evidence indicates that analysts' forecasts provide a superior and more direct guide to investors' growth expectations. Accordingly, I give less weight to cost of equity estimates based on br+sv growth rates in evaluating the results of the DCF model.

Q. What cost of equity estimates were implied for the Utility Group using the DCF model?

A. After combining the dividend yields and respective growth projections for each utility, the resulting cost of equity estimates are shown on page 3 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-6).

Q. In evaluating the results of the constant growth DCF model, is it appropriate to eliminate estimates that are extreme outliers?

A. Yes. In applying quantitative methods to estimate the cost of equity, it is essential that the resulting values pass fundamental tests of reasonableness and economic logic. Accordingly, DCF estimates that are implausibly low or high should be eliminated when evaluating the results of this method.

Q. How did you evaluate DCF estimates at the low end of the range?

A. I based my evaluation of DCF estimates at the low end of the range on the fundamental risk-return tradeoff, which holds that investors will only take on more risk if they expect to earn a return to compensate them for the greater uncertainty. Because common stocks lack the protections associated with an investment in long-term bonds, a utility's common stock imposes far greater risks on investors. As a result, the rate of return that investors require from a utility's common stock is considerably higher than the yield offered by senior, long-term debt. Consistent with this principle, DCF results that are not sufficiently higher than the yields available on less risky utility bonds must be eliminated.

Q. Have similar tests been applied by regulators?

A. Yes. FERC has noted that adjustments are justified where applications of the DCF approach produce illogical results. FERC evaluates DCF results against observable yields on long-term public utility debt and has recognized that it is appropriate to eliminate estimates that do not sufficiently exceed this threshold. The practice of eliminating low-end outliers has been

affirmed in numerous FERC proceedings,[12] and in its April 15, 2010 decision in *SoCal Edison*, FERC affirmed that, "it is reasonable to exclude any company whose low-end ROE fails to exceed the average bond yield by about 100 basis points or more."[13]

Q. What interest rate benchmark did you consider in evaluating the DCF results for Avista?

As noted earlier, S&P has assigned a corporate credit rating of "BBB" to Avista. Companies rated "BBB-", "BBB", and "BBB+" are all considered part of the triple-B rating category, with Moody's monthly yields on triple-B bonds averaging 5.25% in December 2013.[14] Based on my professional experience and the risk-return principle that is fundamental to finance, it is inconceivable that investors are not requiring a substantially higher rate of return for holding common stock.

Q. What else should be considered in evaluating DCF estimates at the low end of the range?

A. As indicated earlier, while long-term bond yields have declined substantially in response to the Federal Reserve's stimulus policies, it is generally expected that long-term interest rates will rise as the economy returns

[12] *See, e.g., Virginia Electric Power Co.*, 123 FERC ¶ 61,098 at P 64 (2008).
[13] *Southern California Edison Co.*, 131 FERC ¶ 61,020 at P 55 (2010) ("*SoCal Edison*").
[14] Moody's Investors Service, http://credittrends.moodys.com/chartroom.asp?c=3.

to a more normal pattern of growth. As shown in Table 2 below, forecasts of IHS Global Insight and the EIA imply an average triple-B bond yield of approximately 6.6 percent over the period 2014-2018:

TABLE 2
IMPLIED BBB BOND YIELD

	2014-18
Projected AA Utility Yield	
IHS Global Insight (a)	6.04%
EIA (b)	5.75%
Average	5.89%
Current BBB - AA Yield Spread (c)	0.71%
Implied Triple-B Utility Yield	**6.60%**

(a) IHS Global Insight, U.S. Economic Outlook at 25 (Nov. 2013)
(b) Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014, Early Release (Dec. 16, 2013)
(c) Based on monthly average bond yields from Moody's Investors Service for the six-month period Jul. 2013 - Dec. 2013

The increase in debt yields anticipated by IHS Global Insight and EIA is also supported by the widely-referenced Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, which projects that yields on corporate bonds will climb 250 basis points through 2018.[15]

[15] *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, Vol. 32, No. 6 (Jun. 1, 2013).

Q. What does this test of logic imply with respect to the DCF estimates for the Utility Group?

A. As highlighted on page 3 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-6), low-end DCF estimates ranged from sixteen of the individual DCF estimates ranged from -2.7% to 7.4%. In light of the risk-return tradeoff principle and the test applied by FERC it is inconceivable that investors are not requiring a substantially higher rate of return for holding common stock. As a result, consistent with the upward trend expected for utility bond yields, these values provide little guidance as to the returns investors require from utility common stocks and should be excluded.

Q. Do you also recommend excluding estimates at the high end of the range of DCF results?

A. Yes. The upper end of the cost of common equity range produced by the DCF analysis presented on page 3 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-6) was set by a cost of equity estimates of 25.6 percent. When compared with the balance of the remaining estimates, this value is clearly implausible and should be excluded in evaluating the results of the DCF model for the Utility Group. This is also consistent with the precedent adopted by FERC, which has established

that estimates found to be "extreme outliers" should be disregarded in interpreting the results of the DCF model.[16]

Q. What cost of equity is implied by your DCF results for the Utility Group?

A. As shown on page 3 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-6) and summarized in Table 3, below, after eliminating illogical low- and high-end values, application of the constant growth DCF model resulted in the following cost of equity estimates:

TABLE 3
DCF RESULTS – UTILITY GROUP

	Cost of Equity	
Growth Rate	**Average**	**Midpoint**
Value Line	9.8%	11.3%
IBES	9.7%	10.0%
Zacks	9.5%	10.0%
br + sv	8.6%	9.5%

D. Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model

Q. Please describe the ECAPM.

A. The ECAPM is a variant of the traditional CAPM, which is a theory of market equilibrium that measures risk using the beta coefficient. Assuming investors are fully diversified, the relevant risk of an individual asset

[16] See, *e.g.*, *ISO New England, Inc.*, 109 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 205 (2004).

(*e.g.*, common stock) is its volatility relative to the market as a whole, with beta reflecting the tendency of a stock's price to follow changes in the market. A stock that tends to respond less to market movements has a beta less than 1.00, while stocks that tend to move more than the market have betas greater than 1.00. The CAPM is mathematically expressed as:

$$R_j = R_f + \beta_j(R_m - R_f)$$

where: R_j = required rate of return for stock j;
R_f = risk-free rate;
R_m = expected return on the market portfolio; and,
β_j = beta, or systematic risk, for stock j.

Like the DCF model, the ECAPM is an *ex-ante,* or forward-looking model based on expectations of the future. As a result, in order to produce a meaningful estimate of investors' required rate of return, the ECAPM must be applied using estimates that reflect the expectations of actual investors in the market, not with backward-looking, historical data.

Q. Why is the ECAPM approach an appropriate component of evaluating the cost of equity for Avista?

A. The CAPM approach, which forms the foundation of the ECAPM, generally is considered to be the most widely referenced method for estimating the cost of equity among academicians and professional practitioners, with the

pioneering researchers of this method receiving the Nobel Prize in 1990. Because this is the dominant model for estimating the cost of equity outside the regulatory sphere,[17] the ECAPM provides important insight into investors' required rate of return for utility stocks, including Avista.

Q. How does the ECAPM approach differ from traditional applications of the CAPM?

A. Myriad empirical tests of the CAPM have shown that low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted. In other words, the CAPM tends to overstate the actual sensitivity of the cost of capital to beta, with low-beta stocks tending to have higher returns and high-beta stocks tending to have lower risk returns than predicted by the CAPM. This empirical finding is widely reported in the finance literature, as summarized in *New Regulatory Finance*:

> As discussed in the previous section, several finance scholars have developed refined and expanded versions of the standard CAPM by relaxing the constraints imposed on the CAPM, such as dividend yield, size, and skewness effects. These enhanced CAPMs typically produce a risk-return relationship that is flatter than the CAPM prediction in keeping with the actual observed

[17] *See*, *e.g.*, Bruner, R.F., Eades, K.M., Harris, R.S., and Higgins, R.C., "Best Practices in Estimating Cost of Capital: Survey and Synthesis," *Financial Practice and Education* (1998).

risk-return relationship. The ECAPM makes use of these empirical relationships.[18]

As discussed in *New Regulatory Finance*, based on a review of the empirical evidence, the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the ECAPM, which is represented by the following formula:

$$R_j = R_f + 0.25(R_m - R_f) + 0.75[\beta_j(R_m - R_f)]$$

This ECAPM equation, and the associated weighting factors, recognize the observed relationship between standard CAPM estimates and the cost of capital documented in the financial research, and correct for the understated returns that would otherwise be produced for low beta stocks.

Q. How did you apply the ECAPM to estimate the cost of common equity?

A. Application of the ECAPM to the Utility Group based on a forward-looking estimate for investors' required rate of return from common stocks is presented on Exhibit No.___(AMM-8). In order to capture the expectations of today's investors in current capital markets, the expected market rate of return was estimated by conducting a DCF analysis on the dividend paying firms in the S&P 500.

[18] Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports* at 189 (2006).

The dividend yield for each firm was obtained from Value Line, and the growth rate was equal to the consensus earnings growth projection for each firm published by IBES, with each firm's dividend yield and growth rate being weighted by its proportionate share of total market value. Based on the weighted average of the projections for the 405 individual firms, current estimates imply an average growth rate over the next five years of 10.1%. Combining this average growth rate with a year-ahead dividend yield of 2.3% results in a current cost of common equity estimate for the market as a whole (R_m) of approximately 12.4%. Subtracting a 3.9% risk-free rate based on the average yield on 30-year Treasury bonds for December 2013 produced a market equity risk premium of 8.5%.

Q. What was the source of the beta values you used to apply the CAPM?

A. I relied on the beta values reported by Value Line, which in my experience is the most widely referenced source for beta in regulatory proceedings. As noted in *New Regulatory Finance*:

> Value Line is the largest and most widely circulated independent investment advisory service, and influences the expectations of a large number of institutional and individual investors. … Value Line betas are computed on a theoretically sound basis using a

> broadly based market index, and they are adjusted for the regression tendency of betas to converge to 1.00.[19]

Q. What else should be considered in applying the ECAPM?

A. As explained by *Morningstar*:

> One of the most remarkable discoveries of modern finance is that of a relationship between firm size and return. The relationship cuts across the entire size spectrum but is most evident among smaller companies, which have higher returns on average than larger ones.[20]

Because empirical research indicates that the ECAPM does not fully account for observed differences in rates of return attributable to firm size, a modification is required to account for this size effect.

According to the ECAPM, the expected return on a security should consist of the riskless rate, plus a premium to compensate for the systematic risk of the particular security. The degree of systematic risk is represented by the beta coefficient. The need for the size adjustment arises because differences in investors' required rates of return that are related to firm size are not fully captured by beta. To account for this, Morningstar has developed size premiums that need to be added to the theoretical ECAPM cost of equity estimates to account for the level of a firm's market capitalization in

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[19] Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports* at 71 (2006).
[20] *Morningstar*, "Ibbotson SBBI 2010 Valuation Yearbook," at p. 85 (footnote omitted).

determining the ECAPM cost of equity.[21] These premiums correspond to the size deciles of publicly traded common stocks, and range from a premium of 6.0% for a company in the first decile (market capitalization less than $254.6 million), to a reduction of 37 basis points for firms in the tenth decile (market capitalization greater than $17.6 billion). Accordingly, my CAPM analyses incorporated an adjustment to recognize the impact of size distinctions, as measured by the average market capitalization for the respective proxy groups.

Q. What cost of equity is indicated for the Utility Group using the ECAPM approach?

A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-8), a forward-looking application of the ECAPM approach resulted in an average unadjusted ROE estimate of 10.7 percent.[22] After adjusting for the impact of firm size, the ECAPM approach implied an average cost of equity of 11.7 percent for the Utility Group, with a midpoint cost of equity estimate of 11.5 percent.

Q. Did you also apply the ECAPM using forecasted bond yields?

A. Yes. As discussed earlier, there is widespread consensus that interest rates will increase materially as the economy continues to strengthen. Accordingly, in addition to the use of current bond yields, I also applied the

[21] *Id.* at Table C-1.

[22] The midpoint of the unadjusted ECAPM range was 10.8%.

ECAPM based on the forecasted long-term Treasury bond yields developed based on projections published by Value Line, IHS Global Insight and Blue Chip. As shown on page 2 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-8), incorporating a forecasted Treasury bond yield for 2014-2018 implied a cost of equity of approximately 10.8% for the Utility Group, or 11.8% after adjusting for the impact of relative size. The midpoints of the unadjusted and size adjusted cost of equity ranges were 10.9% and 11.6%, respectively.

E. Risk Premium Approach

Q. Please briefly describe the risk premium method.

A. The risk premium method of estimating investors' required rate of return extends to common stocks the risk-return tradeoff observed with bonds. The cost of equity is estimated by first determining the additional return investors require to forgo the relative safety of bonds and to bear the greater risks associated with common stock, and by then adding this equity risk premium to the current yield on bonds. Like the DCF model, the risk premium method is capital market oriented. However, unlike DCF models, which indirectly impute the cost of equity, risk premium methods directly estimate investors' required rate of return by adding an equity risk premium to observable bond yields.

Q. How did you implement the risk premium method?

A. I based my estimates of equity risk premiums for electric utilities on surveys of previously authorized ROEs. Authorized ROEs presumably reflect regulatory commissions' best estimates of the cost of equity, however determined, at the time they issued their final order. Such ROEs should represent a balanced and impartial outcome that considers the need to maintain a utility's financial integrity and ability to attract capital. Moreover, allowed ROEs are an important consideration for investors and have the potential to influence other observable investment parameters, including credit ratings and borrowing costs. Thus, this data provides a logical and frequently referenced basis for estimating equity risk premiums for regulated utilities.

Q. Is it circular to consider risk premiums based on authorized returns in assessing a fair ROE for Avista?

A. No. In establishing authorized ROEs, regulators typically consider the results of alternative market-based approaches, including the DCF model. Because allowed risk premiums consider objective market data (*e.g.*, stock prices, dividends, beta, and interest rates), and are not based strictly on past actions of other regulators, this mitigates concerns over any potential for circularity.

Q. How did you implement the risk premium approach using surveys of allowed rates of return?

A. Surveys of previously authorized rates of return on common equity are frequently referenced as the basis for estimating equity risk premiums. The rates of return on common equity authorized utilities by regulatory commissions across the U.S. are compiled by Regulatory Research Associates and published in its *Regulatory Focus* report. On page 3 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-9), the average yield on public utility bonds is subtracted from the average allowed rate of return on common equity for electric utilities to calculate equity risk premiums for each year between 1974 and 2013. Over this 38-year period, these equity risk premiums for electric utilities averaged 3.53 percent, and the yield on public utility bonds averaged 8.69 percent.

Q. Is there any capital market relationship that must be considered when implementing the risk premium method?

A. Yes. There is considerable evidence that the magnitude of equity risk premiums is not constant and that equity risk premiums tend to move inversely with interest rates.[23] In other words, when interest rate levels are

[23] *See, e.g.*, Brigham, E.F., Shome, D.K., and Vinson, S.R., "The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity," *Financial Management* (Spring 1985); Harris, R.S., and Marston, F.C., "Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts," *Financial Management* (Summer 1992).

relatively high, equity risk premiums narrow, and when interest rates are relatively low, equity risk premiums widen. The implication of this inverse relationship is that the cost of equity does not move as much as, or in lockstep with, interest rates. Accordingly, for a 1 percent increase or decrease in interest rates, the cost of equity may only rise or fall, say, 50 basis points. Therefore, when implementing the risk premium method, adjustments may be required to incorporate this inverse relationship if current interest rate levels diverge from the average interest rate level represented in the data set.

Finally, it is important to recognize that the historical focus of the risk premium studies almost certainly ensures that they fail to fully capture the significantly greater risks that investors now associate with providing utility service. As a result, they are likely to understate the cost of equity for a firm operating in today's utility industry.

Q. What cost of equity is implied by the risk premium method using surveys of allowed ROEs?

A. Based on the regression output between the interest rates and equity risk premiums displayed on page 4 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-9), the equity risk premium for electric utilities increased approximately 41 basis points for each percentage point drop in the yield on average public utility

bonds. As illustrated on page 1 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-9), with the yield on average public utility bonds in December 2013 being 4.88 percent, this implied a current equity risk premium of 5.15 percent for electric utilities. Adding this equity risk premium to the yield on triple-B utility bonds of 5.25 percent produces a current cost of equity of approximately 10.4 percent.

Q. What cost of equity was produced by the risk premium approach after incorporating forecasted bond yields?

A. As shown on page 2 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-9), incorporating a forecasted yield for 2014-2018 and adjusting for changes in interest rates since the study period implied an equity risk premium of 4.59 percent for electric utilities. Adding this equity risk premium to the average implied yield on triple-B public utility bonds for 2014-2018 of 6.60 percent resulted in an implied cost of equity of approximately 11.2 percent.

A. Flotation Costs

Q. What other considerations are relevant in setting the return on equity for a utility?

A. The common equity used to finance the investment in utility assets is provided from either the sale of stock in the capital markets or from retained earnings not paid out as dividends. When equity is raised through the

sale of common stock, there are costs associated with "floating" the new equity securities. These flotation costs include services such as legal, accounting, and printing, as well as the fees and discounts paid to compensate brokers for selling the stock to the public. Also, some argue that the "market pressure" from the additional supply of common stock and other market factors may further reduce the amount of funds utility nets when it issues common equity.

Q. Is there an established mechanism for a utility to recognize equity issuance costs?

A. No. While debt flotation costs are recorded on the books of the utility, amortized over the life of the issue, and thus increase the effective cost of debt capital, there is no similar accounting treatment to ensure that equity flotation costs are recorded and ultimately recognized. No rate of return is authorized on flotation costs necessarily incurred to obtain a portion of the equity capital used to finance plant. In other words, equity flotation costs are not included in a utility's rate base because neither that portion of the gross proceeds from the sale of common stock used to pay flotation costs is available to invest in plant and equipment, nor are flotation costs capitalized as an intangible asset. Unless some provision is made to recognize these issuance costs, a utility's revenue requirements will not fully reflect all of the costs incurred for the use of

investors' funds. Because there is no accounting convention to accumulate the flotation costs associated with equity issues, they must be accounted for indirectly, with an upward adjustment to the cost of equity being the most appropriate mechanism.

Q. Is there a theoretical and practical basis to include a flotation cost adjustment in this case?

A. Yes. First, an adjustment for flotation costs associated with past equity issues is appropriate, even when the utility is not contemplating any new sales of common stock. The need for a flotation cost adjustment to compensate for past equity issues been recognized in the financial literature. In a *Public Utilities Fortnightly* article, for example, Brigham, Aberwald, and Gapenski demonstrated that even if no further stock issues are contemplated, a flotation cost adjustment in all future years is required to keep shareholders whole, and that the flotation cost adjustment must consider total equity, including retained earnings.[24] Similarly, *New Regulatory Finance* contains the following discussion:

> Another controversy is whether the flotation cost allowance should still be applied when the utility is not contemplating an imminent common stock issue. Some argue that flotation costs

[24] Brigham, E.F., Aberwald, D.A., and Gapenski, L.C., "Common Equity Flotation Costs and Rate Making," *Public Utilities Fortnightly,* May, 2, 1985.

> are real and should be recognized in calculating the fair rate of return on equity, but only at the time when the expenses are incurred. In other words, the flotation cost allowance should not continue indefinitely, but should be made in the year in which the sale of securities occurs, with no need for continuing compensation in future years. This argument implies that the company has already been compensated for these costs and/or the initial contributed capital was obtained freely, devoid of any flotation costs, which is an unlikely assumption, and certainly not applicable to most utilities. … The flotation cost adjustment cannot be strictly forward-looking unless all past flotation costs associated with past issues have been recovered.[25]

Q. What is the magnitude of the adjustment to the "bare bones" cost of equity to account for issuance costs?

A. There are a number of ways in which a flotation cost adjustment can be calculated, but the most common methods used to account for flotation costs in regulatory proceedings is to apply an average flotation-cost percentage to a utility's dividend yield. Based on a review of the finance literature, *New Regulatory Finance* concluded:

> The flotation cost allowance requires an estimated adjustment to the return on equity of approximately 5% to 10%, depending on the size and risk of the issue.[26]

Alternatively, a study of data from Morgan Stanley regarding issuance costs associated with utility common stock issuances suggests an average

[25] Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports, Inc.* (2006) at 335.
[26] Roger A. Morin, "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports, Inc.* at 323 (2006).

flotation cost percentage of 3.6 percent.[27] Multiplying this 3.6 percent expense percentage for by a representative dividend yield of 4.2 percent produces a flotation cost adjustment on the order of 15 basis points.

II. OTHER ROE BENCHMARKS

Q. What is the purpose of this section?

A. This section presents alternative tests to demonstrate that the end-results of the ROE analyses discussed earlier are reasonable and do not exceed a fair ROE. The first test is based on applications of the traditional CAPM analysis using current and projected interest rates. The second test is based on expected earned returns for electric utilities. Finally, I present a DCF analysis for a low risk group of non-utility firms, with which Avista must compete for investors' money.

B. Capital Asset Pricing Model

Q. What cost of equity estimates were indicated by the traditional CAPM?

A. My applications of the traditional CAPM were based on the same forward-looking market rate of return, risk-free rates, and beta values discussed

[27] *Application of Yankee Gas Services Company for a Rate Increase*, DPUC Docket No. 04-06-01, Direct Testimony of George J. Eckenroth (Jul. 2, 2004) at Exhibit GJE-11.1. Updating the results presented by Mr. Eckenroth through April 2005 also resulted in an average flotation cost percentage of 3.6%.

earlier in connections with the ECAPM. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-10), applying the forward-looking CAPM approach to the firms in the Utility Group results in an average theoretical cost of equity estimate of 10.2 percent, or 11.1 percent after incorporating the size adjustment corresponding to the market capitalization of the individual utilities.

As shown on page 2 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-10), incorporating a forecasted Treasury bond yield for 2013-2017 implied a cost of equity of approximately 10.3 percent for the Utility Group, or 11.2 percent after adjusting for the impact of relative size.

C. Expected Earnings Approach

Q. What other analyses did you conduct to estimate the cost of common equity?

A. As noted earlier, I also evaluated the cost of common equity using the expected earnings method. Reference to rates of return available from alternative investments of comparable risk can provide an important benchmark in assessing the return necessary to assure confidence in the financial integrity of a firm and its ability to attract capital. This expected earnings approach is consistent with the economic underpinnings for a fair rate of return established by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Bluefield* and *Hope*.

Moreover, it avoids the complexities and limitations of capital market methods and instead focuses on the returns earned on book equity, which are readily available to investors.

Q. What economic premise underlies the expected earnings approach?

A. The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity. If the utility is unable to offer a return similar to that available from other opportunities of comparable risk, investors will become unwilling to supply the capital on reasonable terms. For existing investors, denying the utility an opportunity to earn what is available from other similar risk alternatives prevents them from earning their opportunity cost of capital. In this situation the government is effectively taking the value of investors' capital without adequate compensation. The expected earnings approach is consistent with the economic rationale underpinning established regulatory standards, which specifies a methodology to determine an ROE benchmark based on earned rates of return for a peer group of other regional utilities.

Q. How is the expected earnings approach typically implemented?

A. The traditional comparable earnings test identifies a group of companies that are believed to be comparable in risk to the utility. The actual earnings of those companies on the book value of their investment are then compared to the allowed return of the utility. While the traditional comparable earnings test is implemented using historical data taken from the accounting records, it is also common to use projections of returns on book investment, such as those published by recognized investment advisory publications (*e.g.*, Value Line). Because these returns on book value equity are analogous to the allowed return on a utility's rate base, this measure of opportunity costs results in a direct, "apples to apples" comparison.

Moreover, regulators do not set the returns that investors earn in the capital markets, which are a function of dividend payments and fluctuations in common stock prices- both of which are outside their control. Regulators can only establish the allowed ROE, which is applied to the book value of a utility's investment in rate base, as determined from its accounting records. This is directly analogous to the expected earnings approach, which measures the return that investors expect the utility to earn on book value. As a result, the expected earnings approach provides a meaningful guide to ensure that the

allowed ROE is similar to what other utilities of comparable risk will earn on invested capital. This expected earnings test does not require theoretical models to indirectly infer investors' perceptions from stock prices or other market data. As long as the proxy companies are similar in risk, their expected earned returns on invested capital provide a direct benchmark for investors' opportunity costs that is independent of fluctuating stock prices, market-to-book ratios, debates over DCF growth rates, or the limitations inherent in any theoretical model of investor behavior.

Q. What rates of return on equity are indicated for utilities based on the expected earnings approach?

A. Value Line's projections imply an average rate of return on common equity for the electric utility industry of 10.4 percent over its 2016-2018 forecast horizon.[28] Meanwhile, for the firms in the Utility Group specifically, the year-end returns on common equity projected by Value Line over its forecast horizon are shown on Exhibit No.___(AMM-11). Consistent with the rationale underlying the development of the br+sv growth rates, these year-end values were converted to average returns using the same adjustment factor discussed earlier and developed on Exhibit No.__(AMM-7). As shown on

[28] The Value Line Investment Survey (Nov. 1, Nov. 22 & Dec. 20, 2013). Recall that Value Line reports return on year-end equity so the equivalent return on average equity would be higher.

Exhibit No.___(AMM-11), Value Line's projections for the Utility Group suggest an average ROE of approximately 9.7 percent, with a midpoint value of 10.8 percent.

D. Low Risk Non-Utility DCF

Q. What other proxy group did you consider in evaluating a fair ROE for Avista?

A. Consistent with underlying economic and regulatory standards, I also applied the DCF model to a reference group of low-risk risk companies in the non-utility sectors of the economy. I refer to this group as the "Non-Utility Group".

Q. Do utilities have to compete with non-regulated firms for capital?

A. Yes. The cost of capital is an opportunity cost based on the returns that investors could realize by putting their money in other alternatives. Clearly, the total capital invested in utility stocks is only the tip of the iceberg of total common stock investment, and there are a plethora of other enterprises available to investors beyond those in the utility industry. Utilities must compete for capital, not just against firms in their own industry, but with other investment opportunities of comparable risk. Indeed, modern portfolio theory

is built on the assumption that rational investors will hold a diverse portfolio of stocks, not just companies in a single industry.

Q. Is it consistent with the *Bluefield* and *Hope* cases to consider investors' required ROE for non-utility companies?

A. Yes. The cost of equity capital in the competitive sector of the economy form the very underpinning for utility ROEs because regulation purports to serve as a substitute for the actions of competitive markets. The Supreme Court has recognized that it is the degree of risk, not the nature of the business, which is relevant in evaluating an allowed ROE for a utility. The *Bluefield* case refers to "business undertakings attended with comparable risks and uncertainties." It does not restrict consideration to other utilities. Similarly, the *Hope* case states:

> By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.[29]

As in the *Bluefield* decision, there is nothing to restrict "other enterprises" solely to the utility industry.

In the early applications of the comparable earnings approach, utilities were explicitly eliminated due to a concern about circularity. In other words,

[29] *Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.* 320 U.S. 391, (1944).

soon after the *Hope* decision regulatory commissions did not want to get involved in circular logic by looking to the returns of utilities that were established by the same or similar regulatory commissions in the same geographic region. To avoid circularity, regulators looked only to the returns of non-utility companies.

Q. Does consideration of the results for the Non-Utility Group make the estimation of the cost of equity using the DCF model more reliable?

A. Yes. The estimates of growth from the DCF model depend on analysts' forecasts. It is possible for utility growth rates to be distorted by short-term trends in the industry, or by the industry falling into favor or disfavor by analysts. The result of such distortions would be to bias the DCF estimates for utilities. Because the Non-Utility Group includes low risk companies from many industries, it diversifies away any distortion that may be caused by the ebb and flow of enthusiasm for a particular sector.

Q. What criteria did you apply to develop the Non-Utility Group?

A. The comparable risk proxy group was composed of those U.S. companies followed by Value Line that:

1) pay common dividends;

2) have a Safety Rank of "1";

3) have a Financial Strength Rating of "B++" or greater;

4) have a beta of 0.60 or less; and

5) have investment grade credit ratings from S&P[30].

Q. How do the overall risks of this Non-Utility Group compare with the Utility Group and Avista?

A. Table 4 compares the Non-Utility Group with the Utility Group and Avista across the four key risk measures discussed earlier:

TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF RISK INDICATORS

	S&P	Value Line		
	Credit Rating	Safety Rank	Financial Strength	Beta
Non-Utility Group	A	1	A+	0.59
Utility Group	BBB	2	B++	0.74
Avista	BBB	2	A	0.70

As shown above, the average credit rating, Safety Rank, Financial Strength Rating, and beta for the Non-Utility Group suggest less risk than for Avista and the proxy group of utilities. When considered together, a comparison of these objective measures, which consider a broad spectrum of risks, including financial and business position, relative size, and exposure to company-specific

[30] Credit rating firms, such as S&P, use designations consisting of upper- and lower-case letters 'A' and 'B' to identify a bond's credit quality rating. 'AAA', 'AA', 'A', and 'BBB' ratings are considered investment grade. Credit ratings for bonds below these designations ('BB', 'B', 'CCC', etc.) are considered speculative grade, and are commonly referred to as "junk bonds". The term "investment grade" refers to bonds with ratings in the 'BBB' category and above.

factors, indicates that investors would likely conclude that the overall investment risks for the Utility Group and Avista are greater than those of the firms in the Non-Utility Group.

The eight companies that make up the Non-Utility Group are representative of the pinnacle of corporate America. These firms, which include household names such as Colgate-Palmolive, McDonalds, and Wal-Mart, have long corporate histories, well-established track records, and exceedingly conservative risk profiles. Many of these companies pay dividends on a par with utilities, with the average dividend yield for the group approaching 3 percent. Moreover, because of their significance and name recognition, these companies receive intense scrutiny by the investment community, which increases confidence that published growth estimates are representative of the consensus expectations reflected in common stock prices.

Q. What were the results of your DCF analysis for the Non-Utility Group?

A. I applied the DCF model to the Non-Utility Group using the same analysts EPS growth projections described earlier for the Utility Group, with the results being presented in Exhibit No.___(AMM-12). As summarized in

Table 5, below, application of the constant growth DCF model resulted in the following cost of equity estimates:

TABLE 5
DCF RESULTS – NON-UTILITY GROUP

	Cost of Equity	
Growth Rate	**Average**	**Midpoint**
Value Line	11.2%	11.1%
IBES	11.1%	11.4%
Zacks	11.2%	11.6%

As discussed earlier, reference to the Non-Utility Group is consistent with established regulatory principles. Required returns for utilities should be in line with those of non-utility firms of comparable risk operating under the constraints of free competition.

Q. How can you reconcile these DCF results for the Non-Utility Group against the significantly lower estimates produced for your group of utilities?

A. First, it is important to be clear that the higher DCF results for the Non-Utility Group cannot be attributed to risk differences. As documented earlier, the risks that investors associate with the group of non-utility firms - as measured by S&P's credit ratings, Value Line's Safety Rank, Financial Strength, and beta – are lower than the risks investors associate with the Combination Group and Avista. The objective evidence provided by these observable risk

measures rules out a conclusion that the higher non-utility DCF estimates are associated with higher investment risk.

Rather, the divergence between the DCF results for these groups of utility and non-utility firms can be attributed to the fact that DCF estimates invariably depart from the returns that investors actually require because their expectations may not be captured by the inputs to the model, particularly the assumed growth rate. Because the actual cost of equity is unobservable, and DCF results inherently incorporate a degree of error, the cost of equity estimates for the Non-Utility Group provide an important benchmark in evaluating a fair ROE for Avista. There is no basis to conclude that DCF results for a group of utilities would be inherently more reliable than those for firms in the competitive sector, and the divergence between the DCF estimates for the group of utilities and the Non-Utility Group suggests that both should be considered to ensure a balanced end-result. The DCF results for the Non-Utility Group suggests that the 10.1 percent requested ROE for Avista's utility operations is a conservative estimate of a fair return.

Q. Please summarize the results of your alternative ROE benchmarks.

A. The cost of common equity estimates produced by the various tests of reasonableness discussed above are shown on page 2 of Exhibit No.___(AMM-4), and summarized in Table 6, below:

TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE ROE BENCHMARKS

	Average	Midpoint
CAPM - Current Bond Yield		
Unadjusted	10.2%	10.3%
Size Adjusted	11.1%	11.0%
CAPM - Projected Bond Yield		
Unadjusted	10.3%	10.4%
Size Adjusted	11.2%	11.1%
Expected Earnings		
Industry	10.4%	
Proxy Group	9.7%	10.8%
Non-Utility DCF		
Value Line	11.2%	11.1%
IBES	11.1%	11.4%
Zacks	11.2%	11.6%
Reuters	11.1%	11.4%