



**UTC INQUIRY ON CONSERVATION
INCENTIVES (INCLUDING DECOUPLING)
Report to the State Energy Strategy Advisory
Committee**

Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission

October 5, 2010

Recent Commission Activity on Conservation, Renewables

- Inquiry on Conservation Incentives (U-100522)
- Inquiry on Renewables (UE-100849)
- Approval of Conservation Targets under I-937 (UE-100177, UE-100176, UE-100170)
- Smart Grid Report Rule (UE-090222)
- Inquiry on Electric Vehicle Issues (UE-101521)
- Approval of Utility Conservation Tariffs

Commission Inquiry on Conservation Incentives

Participants engaged in policy development:

Utilities

- Avista Corporation
- Cascade Natural Gas Corporation
- Northwest Natural Gas Company
- PacifiCorp
- Puget Sound Energy

Ratepayer Advocates

- Industrial Customers of NW Utilities
- Northwest Industrial Gas Users
- Public Counsel, Office of the Attorney General

Commission Inquiry on Conservation Incentives

Participants (cont):

Government

- Northwest Power and Conservation Council
- Staff, Washington State House of Representatives
- Staff, Washington State Senate
- Washington Department of Commerce
- Washington Department of Ecology

Commission Inquiry on Conservation Incentives

Participants (cont):

Energy and Environmental Community

- Alliances Northwest
- Cost Management Services, Inc.
- Fluid Market Strategics
- Natural Resources Defense Council
- Northwest Energy Coalition
- Northwest Energy Efficiency Alliance
- OPower
- The Energy Project
- The Mountaineers

Commission Inquiry on Conservation Incentives

PURPOSE:

- Better understand the balance between the recovery of a utility's lost revenue due to conservation and the benefits and costs to rate payers
- Examine possible conservation mechanisms and the pros and cons of each

Commission Inquiry on Conservation Incentives

SPECIFIC ISSUES:

- The effects of conservation on utility service and revenues
- How “lost margin” may affect utilities’ conservation efforts
- What principles should govern recovery of lost margin
- What impacts recovery of lost margin may have on ratepayers
- What other regulatory incentives should be considered
- What options, other than regulatory incentives, exist for achieving conservation

Commission Inquiry on Conservation Incentives

Commission Process:

- Initial framing of issues (comments from parties and Commission summary)
- Initial work session (May 4)
- Initial and reply comments
- Second work session (June 29)
- Final statements of positions on four issues:
 1. “Full decoupling”
 2. Recovery of “lost margin” due to conservation
 3. Direct incentives
 4. Independent administrator of conservation programs

Commission Inquiry on Conservation Incentives

Procedural options for policy:

- Order in rate case or other adjudication
- Rule
- Policy Statement

Setting of Rates

“In order to control aggregate revenue and set maximum rates, regulatory commissions such as the WUTC commonly use and apply the following equation:

$$R = O + B(r)$$

In this equation, R is the utility's allowed revenue requirements;

O is its operating expenses;

B is its rate base; and

r is the rate of return allowed on its rate base.”

-- *POWER*, 104 Wn.2d at 808-09.

Decoupling Background

- In setting rates, the Commission determines the utility's estimated future load.
- Actual load can vary from estimate, either up or down, based on a number of factors, including weather, economic factors, or consumer usage patterns.

Decoupling Background (cont.)

- Therefore, a utility may sell more or fewer therms or kWh in a given period.
- Uncertainty is reflected in the utility's risk profile, which is taken into account when the Commission sets the utility's rate of return.

Setting of Rates – Fixed and Variable Costs

- A utility has fixed and variable costs.
- Many variable costs are covered by “tracker” mechanisms, such as the purchased gas adjustment (PGA) mechanism or an electric utility power cost adjustment mechanism (PCAs or ERMs).

Setting of Rates – “Lost Margin”

- Utilities impose both a per customer (fixed) charge and a volumetric (variable) charge based on the amount of energy consumed.
- However, a utility does not cover all of its fixed costs with its per customer charges. For example, Northwest Natural Gas Company charges a per customer charge of \$7.00, but its per customer fixed costs are closer to \$22.

Setting of Rates – “Lost Margin”


- The volumetric rate, which is based on the amount of energy consumed, includes a portion of the total fixed costs.
- If total usage equals the expected levels, the rate design allows for revenue sufficient to recover all costs and earn the authorized rate of return.

Setting of Rates – “Lost Margin” (cont.)

- If usage decreases:
 - the utility may not recover its full expected revenues, thus experiencing an erosion of its expected earnings.
 - Earnings erosion may result in not earning its authorized “rate of return.” This is “lost margin.”

Setting of Rates – “Lost Margin” (cont.)

- Lost Margin and Fixed costs: Revenues must be reduced to the point of “breakeven” before fixed costs are not recovered.



Setting of Rates – “Lost Margin” (cont.)

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- Just as “lost margin” reduces a company’s earnings, there are factors that generally increase a company’s earnings between rate cases (sometimes termed “found margin”).
 - Examples include growth in customer base, increased plug load, or other increases in customer usage.

Setting of Rates – “Lost Margin” (cont.)

- If usage increases:
 - the utility will recover its full expected revenues, plus it will experience increased earnings.
 - Greater earnings may result in earning more than its authorized “rate of return.”

Previous UTC Approved Decoupling Programs

- Avista
 - Allows recovery for Avista's programmatic and educational programs
 - Replaces pilot program
- Cascade
 - Pilot program to be evaluated in September 2010
- PSE PRAM (approved in 1991; terminated in 1996)

Policy Options

Options considered:

1. “Full decoupling”
2. Recover “lost margin” due to conservation
3. Direct incentives
4. Independent administrator of conservation programs

Decoupling Issues

Issues raised in Inquiry:

1. Offsets (“found margin”)
2. Measurement (EM & V)
3. Impact on rate of return
4. Need in light of requirement to meet conservation goals
5. Earnings test
6. Other mechanisms to compensate for lost margin
 - a. Incentive rate of return
 - b. Pro forma adjustment to reflect future decrease in load

Conservation Incentives

Threshold issues raised by stakeholders:

- Are direct incentives different from decoupling or lost margin recovery? Can they substitute for decoupling?
- Need for incentives if there is a mandate to acquire all “cost-effective” conservation?

Conservation Incentives

Examples:

- PSE incentive mechanism
- Put conservation expenditures in rate base

Elements of UTC Policy Statement

Four topics:

1. Partial decoupling
2. Full decoupling (electric or gas utilities)
3. Direct incentives
4. Other

Partial Decoupling

- Applicable to gas utilities only
- Reconciles only a percentage of the difference between expected and actual revenues (*i.e.* a utility might be allowed to recover 90 percent of revenue shortfall from decreased sales)
- Only the portion of decreased sales directly attributable to programmatic and non-programmatic conservation is eligible for recovery (“limited decoupling”)
- “Found Margin”
- Earnings Test
- Impact on ROR

Full Decoupling

- Applicable to both electric and gas utilities
- Reconciles any difference between expected and actual revenues regardless of the underlying cause of the difference
- “Found Margin”
- Earnings Test
- Impact on ROR

Full Decoupling

- At this time, 12 states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of full decoupling for electric utilities.
- Some state commissions have adjusted utilities' ROE to reflect reduced risk resulting from decoupling.
- Other commissions are considering adjustments to ROE in future rate cases.

Direct Incentives

- I-937 requires utilities to set conservation targets every two years and to meet those targets within the following two year period.
- Commission receptive to proposals establishing incentives to utilities to acquire additional cost-effective conservation at levels exceeding these targets.

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- Nothing in policy statement limits utilities ability to make other specific proposals.

QUESTIONS?