

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

In the Matter of the)
) Docket No. UT-003013
Continued Costing and Pricing of)
Unbundled Network Elements, Transport,)
Termination, and Resale)
_____)

PART A RESPONSE TESTIMONY

OF

REX KNOWLES

On Behalf of

NEXTLINK Washington, Inc.

July 21, 2000

1 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, EMPLOYER, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

2 A. My name is Rex Knowles. I am a Vice President Regulatory for NEXTLINK, 111 East
3 Broadway, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. I previously provided direct
4 testimony in this proceeding on behalf of NEXTLINK Washington, Inc. (“NEXTLINK”),
5 on whose behalf I am providing this response testimony.

6 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR RESPONSE TESTIMONY?**

7 A. The purpose of my response testimony is three-fold. First, I apply the general principles I
8 discussed in my direct testimony for cost recovery for competing local exchange company
9 (“CLEC”) access to incumbent local exchange company (“ILEC”) operations support
10 systems (“OSS”) to the proposals made by Qwest Communications Corporation, f/k/a U
11 S WEST Communications, Inc. (“Qwest”) and Verizon Northwest Inc., f/k/a GTE
12 Northwest Incorporated (“Verizon”). Both Qwest and Verizon propose to recover
13 primarily embedded costs of modifying their networks to permit CLEC access, rather than
14 the forward-looking costs that Congress, the FCC and this Commission have authorized
15 ILECs to recover for providing unbundled network elements (“UNEs”). Both ILECs also
16 seek recovery of costs that should be shared with, or offset by corresponding costs
17 incurred by, CLECs. NEXTLINK therefore recommends that the Commission reject the
18 ILECs’ OSS cost proposals.

1
2 The second area I cover in my response testimony is collocation costs. With the
3 exception of cage enclosure, building modification, and cable splicing, NEXTLINK does
4 not dispute the prices Verizon proposes for collocation elements. Many of Qwest's
5 proposed prices, on the other hand, are grossly inflated and patently unreasonable. Qwest
6 continues to base its proposed rates on assumptions that are unsubstantiated or bear no
7 relationship to reality or forward-looking costing principles. I address some of these
8 assumptions and propose that Qwest's rates be established at a level no higher than the
9 collocation rates proposed by Verizon.

10
11 Finally, I briefly address Verizon's loop conditioning proposal. This issue was not
12 assigned to Part A of this proceeding until July 17, and NEXTLINK has not had sufficient
13 opportunity to evaluate Verizon's proposal prior to filing this testimony. I will
14 supplement this testimony, to the extent permitted, after undertaking that evaluation, but
15 in the meantime, NEXTLINK opposes loop conditioning charges that are many times
16 higher than the rates the Commission established in the previous cost proceeding.

17 **I. OPERATIONS SUPPORT SYSTEMS**

18 **Q. DO QWEST'S AND VERIZON'S PROPOSALS COMPLY WITH THE**
19 **GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO COST RECOVERY FOR CLEC**

1 **ACCESS TO ILEC OSS THAT YOU OUTLINED IN YOUR DIRECT**
2 **TESTIMONY?**

3
4 A. No, neither ILEC proposal complies with those principles.

5
6
7 **Q. HOW DO THE ILECs' PROPOSALS FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE FIRST**
8 **PRINCIPLE YOU DISCUSSED?**

9
10 A The first principle I discussed is that cost recovery for OSS as an unbundled network
11 element is limited to total element long-run incremental cost ("TELRIC") plus a
12 reasonable share of forward-looking common costs. Neither Qwest nor Verizon even
13 attempt to restrict their cost estimates to forward-looking costs. While I understand that
14 the FCC's TELRIC rules have once again been vacated by the Eighth Circuit Court of
15 Appeals, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ("NARUC")
16 issued a statement in the wake of the appellate court's decision confirming that the court
17 upheld the FCC's requirement that unbundled network elements ("UNEs") prices be
18 based on forward-looking costs. Accordingly, NEXTLINK continues to believe that
19 Qwest's and Verizon's proposals to recover embedded OSS development costs through
20 rates for OSS access as a UNE is fundamentally inconsistent with the pricing principles
21 established by Congress, the FCC, and this Commission.

1 **Q. WHAT ABOUT THE SECOND PRINCIPLE?**

2
3 **A** The second principle is that to the extent that ILECs incur non-TELRIC costs to make
4 OSS access available, the ILECs should recover those costs from all customers, not from
5 CLECs alone. Consistent with this principle, I understand that the parties in a proceeding
6 before the California Public Utilities Commission have developed a cost recovery
7 mechanism for OSS development costs that would establish an end-user surcharge, rather
8 than a charge that would impose those costs entirely on CLECs. Both Qwest and
9 Verizon, however, propose to recover their entire OSS development costs from CLECs in
10 direct contravention of this principle.

11 **Q. DO THE ILECs ADDRESS THE THIRD PRINCIPLE YOU DISCUSSED?**

12
13 **A** No. The third principle is that CLECs also incur costs to comply with federal legal
14 requirements, and CLECs should be entitled to recover their costs from the ILECs to the
15 same extent that the ILECs are authorized to recover those costs from the CLECs.
16 Neither ILEC acknowledges that CLECs incur many of the same costs for which the
17 ILECs seek recovery. To the contrary, both Qwest and Verizon would impose their entire
18 OSS modification costs on CLECs without any offer to compensate the CLECs for the
19 costs they incur to modify their systems to be able to access the ILECs' OSS.

20

1 Indeed, the ILECs add insult to injury by seeking recovery of costs for developing OSS
2 processes for ordering and provisioning interconnection facilities that benefit both
3 interconnecting carriers. CLECs, as well as ILECs, are obligated to interconnect their
4 networks, and CLEC and ILEC customers alike benefit from the ability to exchange calls
5 over those facilities. The ILECs, however, have not historically ordered interconnection
6 facilities from other carriers, and the ILECs, as the established providers, obtain a market
7 advantage if calls cannot be completed to or from CLEC customers. A CLEC, therefore,
8 must place orders for the interconnection facilities that the ILEC provides, as well as
9 provide the necessary facilities on the CLEC's side of the interconnection point without
10 an order from the ILEC. Qwest and Verizon have included costs to develop the systems
11 to process and provision those orders for interconnection facilities among the OSS
12 development costs that they seek to recover from CLECs, and Qwest would impose its
13 OSS surcharge on every service order, including service orders for interconnection
14 facilities.

15
16 The ILECs, having required the CLECs to place orders for the interconnection facilities
17 the ILEC provides for the mutual exchange of traffic, now propose that the CLECs pay
18 for the ILECs' ability to accept and process those orders. In other words, CLECs not only

1 must do part of the ILECs' work for them but must pay for the privilege of taking on
2 more than the CLECs' share of the responsibility to ensure that sufficient trunk capacity
3 exists between the carriers. Such a proposal is discriminatory and patently unfair.

4 **Q. AND THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE?**

5
6 A The fourth principle is that any authorized OSS cost recovery should ensure that each
7 entity contributing to that cost recovery is responsible only for the costs attributable to
8 that entity's use of other carrier's OSS. Neither Qwest nor Verizon make any such effort,
9 but simply total all their OSS development costs and spread them indiscriminately among
10 all CLECs. A CLEC ordering UNEs, for example, should not be required to pay for
11 resale OSS development, but the ILECs' proposals would impose just such a requirement.

12 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE**
13 **ILECs' OSS COST RECOVERY PROPOSALS?**

14
15 A Yes, I do. One of the problems with cost recovery based on embedded costs is the
16 inherent necessity to determine the amounts actually spent and whether those amounts are
17 properly accounted and allocated. The problem is even more acute under the
18 circumstances presented here, where the ILECs have every incentive to impose additional
19 costs on their competitors. The Commission cannot determine the accuracy and propriety
20 of Qwest's and Verizon's embedded OSS development costs without a third-party audit
21 verifying the accuracy of those costs and their allocation to activities reasonably related to

1 OSS development. No such audit has been performed on either Qwest's or Verizon's
2 cost calculations. The lack of verified and verifiable data underscores the need to base
3 OSS prices on forward-looking, rather than embedded, costs.

4 **Q. WHAT DOES NEXTLINK RECOMMEND WITH RESPECT TO THE ILECs'**
5 **OSS COST RECOVERY PROPOSALS.**

6
7 A. NEXTLINK recommends that the Commission reject the ILECs' proposals and require
8 the ILECs to refile proposals in conformance with the principles I have discussed above.
9 Specifically, the Commission should require the ILECs to file proposals for UNE rates for
10 OSS based solely on appropriate forward-looking costs. If the ILECs seek recovery of
11 non-forward-looking costs, such as OSS development costs, the Commission should
12 address that request as it would a request from any other regulated utility seeking to
13 recover the costs of a one-time, unforeseen event – by opening a separate docket to
14 develop a competitively neutral cost recovery mechanism that will spread those costs
15 across all Washington ratepayers, as California is in the process of doing.

16 **Q. WHAT DOES NEXTLINK RECOMMEND IF THE COMMISSION PERMITS**
17 **THE ILECs TO RECOVER THEIR EMBEDDED OSS DEVELOPMENT COSTS**
18 **FROM CLECs?**

19
20 A In that case, NEXTLINK recommends that the Commission disallow any cost recovery
21 for OSS development related to interconnection facilities and permit each CLEC to
22 recover the costs it has incurred to modify or construct its OSS to be compatible with the

1 ILECs' modifications, including construction of electronic gateways. As I discussed in
2 my direct testimony, the Commission should presume that each CLEC's costs are equal
3 to the costs incurred by each of the ILECs. The CLECs and the ILECs should then be
4 authorized to impose the same charge per local service order ("LSR") for the same
5 specified period of time, or until all costs have been recovered, whichever occurs first.

6 **Q. WHAT ABOUT QWEST'S PROPOSAL TO IMPOSE CHARGES PER SERVICE**
7 **ORDER?**

8
9 A. Under no circumstances should the Commission adopt such a rate design. Even Qwest
10 concedes that rates based on service orders bear no reasonable relationship to OSS costs
11 incurred on a service order basis. In addition, a "service order" is a Qwest convention,
12 not an industry standard, and thus the definition and number of Qwest service orders
13 generated by industry standard LSRs or access service requests ("ASRs") is subject to
14 change or modification at Qwest's sole discretion. Qwest has yet to comprehensively
15 identify the "service orders" subject to Qwest's proposed surcharges that would result
16 from the different ASRs, LSRs, or other types of requests CLECs submit to Qwest.
17 Accordingly, any OSS charges should be on a per LSR basis, as Verizon has proposed,
18 and at a level no higher than the rate Verizon has proposed.

19 **II. COLLOCATION**

20 **Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE COLLOCATION RATE PROPOSALS**

1 A. Verizon’s Cage Enclosure element represents the costs to construct the fencing and gate
2 surrounding a CLEC’s physical collocation space. Verizon proposes rates that range
3 from \$5,693.57 (for a cage up to 100 square feet) to \$11,446.04 (for a 400-500 square
4 foot cage), based on a cost per square foot of fencing material. These rates are excessive
5 for construction of chain link fencing. As Mr. Sobieski testified in the prior cost docket,
6 NEXTLINK obtained a bid of less than \$7,000 for the construction of ten contiguous 100
7 square foot cages with gates. Qwest and Verizon criticized Mr. Sobieski’s derivation of
8 individual cage costs from this bid for assuming economies that would not exist when
9 cages are constructed individually, but Verizon’s proposal to base cage construction costs
10 on an average cost per square foot of fencing suffers from the opposite problem. Invoices
11 Qwest has provided from actual collocation cage construction demonstrate that cage
12 construction costs are less than \$5,000, including dust partitioning to protect surrounding
13 equipment during construction and installation of lighting and electrical outlets.
14 Accordingly, Verizon’s proposed Cage Enclosure rates are two to three times higher than
15 the level that would be reasonable.

1 Building Modification

2 **Q. WHAT ARE NEXTLINK’S CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO VERIZON’S**
3 **PROPOSED BUILDING MODIFICATION CHARGE?**

4
5 A. Verizon proposes a monthly recurring charge of \$162.65 for Building Modification,
6 which includes costs for (a) site modification to the central office to accommodate
7 collocation (including demolition of existing structures, dust partition for protection of
8 surrounding equipment during construction of collocation space, and minor modifications
9 to heating, ventilation and air conditioning (“HVAC”) systems); (b) security (including
10 storage security for Verizon equipment and central office security access); (c) lighting
11 fixtures for the collocation space; (d) electrical outlets for the collocation space; and (e)
12 grounding bar for collocated equipment. As I will discuss, the Building Modification
13 charge should be eliminated and these costs recovered, to the extent that CLECs are
14 responsible for these costs, through other collocation rate elements.

15
16 Site Modification, Lighting, and Electrical Outlets. Several of the costs included in
17 Verizon’s proposed Building Modification charge should be included with the Cage
18 Enclosure or corresponding element for cageless collocation space construction: site
19 modification (including demolition, dust partition, and minor HVAC modification),
20 lighting, and electrical outlets. By excluding these activities from the Cage Enclosure

1 element and costing them on a stand-alone basis, Verizon is eliminating the economies
2 realized when all of these functions are performed as part of a single construction project.
3 The addition of Verizon's cost estimates for these activities to its Cage Enclosure rate,
4 however, would more than double Verizon's proposed rate for a Cage Enclosure up to
5 100 square feet – a rate that is already twice as high as it should be. With the possible
6 exception of minor modifications to the HVAC, all of these activities can be conducted
7 for under \$5,000, as the Qwest contractor invoices demonstrate. Accordingly,
8 NEXTLINK proposes that the Commission require Verizon to include site modification,
9 lighting, and electrical outlet in the Cage Enclosure element at the rates that Verizon
10 currently proposes to charge for the fencing alone. For cageless collocation, Verizon
11 should establish a separate rate that recovers the applicable costs as part of the cageless
12 collocation site preparation.

13
14 Security. The Building Modification charge includes costs for Storage Security and
15 Security Access, but those costs should be shared with all users of the Verizon central
16 office, including Verizon, in proportion to their use of that central office. The FCC has
17 precluded ILECs from imposing more stringent security measures on CLECs than the
18 ILECs impose on its own employees and contractors. The costs of modifying the security

1 arrangements in the central office, therefore, should be apportioned between Verizon and
2 collocating CLECs, not leveled entirely on the CLECs. Indeed, Verizon appears to
3 allocate the entire costs of these modifications to each CLEC. NEXTLINK proposes that
4 the Commission require Verizon to spread these security costs among all users of the
5 central office, including Verizon, in proportion to that use and to recover each collocating
6 CLEC's proportional share of those costs through a separate security rate element.

7
8 Grounding. Providing a grounding bar for grounding collocated equipment is the other
9 cost that Verizon currently includes in its proposed Building Modification charge.

10 Verizon's supporting documentation also appears to impose the entire costs of a bar used
11 for multiple collocators onto each collocating CLEC. The Commission should require
12 Verizon to spread these costs among all collocating CLECs through a separate rate
13 element for Grounding.

14 Fiber Cable Splicing

15 **Q. WHAT ABOUT FIBER CABLE SPLICING?**

16
17 A. Verizon proposes a nonrecurring charge for Fiber Cable Splice of \$65.29 per fiber to
18 splice fiberoptic cable used by the CLEC to connect the equipment in its collocation
19 space with the rest of its network. NEXTLINK pays its outside contractor \$28 per splice,

1 which is less than half of Verizon's proposed Fiber Cable Splice charge. The
2 Commission should not permit Verizon to impose a charge that is more than double the
3 market rate for the same service.

4 **Qwest**

5 **Q. ARE QWEST'S PROPOSED RATES REASONABLE?**

6
7 A. No. Qwest, too, has modified its original proposal, but Qwest continues to rely on
8 assumptions and unsubstantiated information with which NEXTLINK and other CLECs
9 took issue in the last cost proceeding. Specifically, NEXTLINK opposes Qwest's
10 proposed rates for the following elements: (1) entrance facilities; (2) space
11 construction/dc power; (3) DS-0, DS-1, and DS-3 terminations; and (4) fiber splicing.
12 NEXTLINK also objects to Qwest's failure to permit, or propose a reasonable price for,
13 CLEC-to-CLEC cross-connections at the central office.

14 Entrance Facilities

15 **Q. WHAT IS QWEST'S PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO ENTRANCE**
16 **FACILITIES?**

17
18 A. "Entrance facilities" is the element that enables a CLEC to connect its collocated
19 equipment with the rest of its network. Fiberoptic cable from the CLEC's network is
20 routed through the point of interconnection ("POI") between the companies' networks,
21 into the Qwest central office, and over cable racking to the CLEC's collocation space.

1 Qwest offers CLECs the option of having Qwest provide the fiber from the POI to the
2 collocation space (Standard Shared, CLEC POI, or Cross-Connection Entrance Facilities)
3 or having Qwest pull CLEC-provided fiber from the POI to the collocation space
4 (Express Fiber Entrance Facilities). Qwest proposes the following charges for each type
5 of entrance facility:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Non-recurring</u>	<u>Recurring</u>
Standard Shared (per fiber)	\$1,241.75	\$6.98
CLEC POI (per fiber)	\$1,682.33	\$3.17
Cross Connect (per fiber)	\$1,622.28	\$3.39
Express (per cable)	\$7,589.47	\$7.47

12 **Q. WHY IS NEXTLINK OPPOSED TO QWEST’S PROPOSED RATES FOR**
13 **ENTRANCE FACILITIES?**

14
15 A. On their face, Qwest’s proposed prices are exorbitant. Qwest’s proposed rate of
16 \$7,589.47 in nonrecurring charges for Express Fiber Entrance Facilities, for example, is
17 approximately *7 times higher* than the rates Verizon proposes for the equivalent element.¹
18 Qwest’s proposed rates for entrance facilities are not even internally consistent. Qwest’s

¹ Verizon proposes the following nonrecurring charges for Fiber Cable Pull: \$606.30 per project for Engineering, \$1.32 per linear foot for Place Innerduct (\$264 for 200 feet), and \$0.73 per linear foot for Labor (\$146 for 200 feet). Verizon also has a separate element for construction of dedicated cable racking used for fiber, power, and terminations (“Overhead Superstructure” at \$2,482.64 per project), a proportion of which would be attributable to fiber entrance facilities.

1 proposed nonrecurring charges are virtually double its FCC tariff nonrecurring rate, while
2 the proposed recurring charges are as much as 7 times higher than the tariff rate.

3 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES?**

4
5 A. Unfortunately, Qwest does not provide sufficient information to explain why its proposed
6 rates are so much higher than Verizon's proposed rates. At least some of the discrepancy,
7 however, is attributable to the assumptions on which Qwest relies to calculate its
8 proposed rates. Qwest, for example, continues to assume that entrance facility costs will
9 be shared among only 3 collocating CLECs. Information that Qwest provided in response
10 to NEXTLINK's data requests indicates that an average of over 7 CLECs collocate in
11 each Qwest central office in which at least one CLEC is collocated in Washington.
12 Modifying this assumption to reflect reality would reduce Qwest's proposed rates by over
13 one-half.

14
15 Qwest also assumes that the cable racking for almost half of the assumed distance
16 between the cable vault and the CLEC collocation space is dedicated to the exclusive use
17 of collocating CLECs. When asked to substantiate this assumption in a data request,
18 Qwest responded that it "is in the process of gathering supporting information and will
19 supplement this data request at a later time." Qwest Response to NEXTLINK, et al. Data

1 Request No. 01-19. NEXTLINK has received no such supplementation and thus cannot
2 verify Qwest's assumption.

3 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER CONCERNS SPECIFIC TO ENTRANCE**
4 **FACILITIES?**

5
6 A. Yes. A significant portion of Qwest's proposed charges for Entrance Facilities are the
7 costs associated with constructing a manhole outside the central office that is dedicated to
8 the use of CLECs (the "CLEC POI") or used by all carriers, including Qwest, to route
9 fiber and copper cables through "manhole 0." Verizon permits CLECs to construct their
10 own manhole and conduit into the central office. Qwest indicated during central office
11 field visits conducted as part of collocation workshops in Utah that it was considering
12 whether to offer this option, but Qwest has not proposed any such option in this docket.
13 Consistent with its determination that CLECs should be permitted to self-provision
14 collocation facilities in areas under CLEC control, the Commission should require that
15 Qwest permit CLECs to self-provision the portion of the Entrance Facilities element
16 outside the central office itself.

17 Space Construction/DC Power

18 **Q. WHAT DOES QWEST PROPOSE FOR SPACE CONSTRUCTION?**

19
20 A. Qwest has bundled together several collocation elements into a single element called
21 "Space Construction." These elements include construction of the collocation cage or

1 equipment racks for cageless collocation and providing both ac and dc power, grounding,
2 lighting, and HVAC. Qwest contends that this new mega-element was developed in
3 response to CLEC desires for more predictable and less confusing collocation pricing.
4 While I agree that CLECs, as well as the FCC, have raised concerns about pricing
5 collocation elements on an individual case basis (“ICB”) or a “per foot” or other
6 incremental basis, bundling several elements into one does not address those concerns.
7 To the contrary, bundling only frustrates CLECs’ attempts to determine exactly what they
8 are paying for. Indeed, in response to a data request asking Qwest to explain the
9 calculation of, or otherwise support its cost estimates for caged expense inputs, Qwest
10 stated that it “is in the process of gathering this data and will supplement this response
11 when the information is available.” Again, NEXTLINK has received no such
12 supplemental response, and thus cannot fully evaluate or respond to Qwest’s proposal
13 without this additional information.

14
15 **Q. HAVE YOU MADE AN EVALUATION BASED ON THE INFORMATION THAT**
16 **IS AVAILABLE?**

17
18 A. Yes. Again, I begin with a comparison of Qwest’s proposal with Verizon’s proposed
19 collocation rates. Qwest proposed rates of \$49,517.77 (nonrecurring) and \$72.98
20 (recurring) for a 100 square foot cage and one 40 amp feed for dc power, while Verizon

1 proposes nonrecurring charges of \$8,423.58 and recurring charges of \$212.68 for
2 approximately the same elements.² Even though Verizon's recurring charges are higher
3 than Qwest's, Qwest's overall proposed prices are several times higher than Verizon's
4 proposed rates and impose most of those costs up front, rather than over time.

5 **Q. WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THESE DIFFERENCES?**

6
7 A. Currently available information suggests several contributing factors. As discussed
8 above, cage construction, including dust protection for surrounding equipment and
9 installation of lighting and electrical outlets, costs less than \$5,000 based on Qwest's own
10 contractor invoices. The cost estimates Qwest used to develop the rate for the Space
11 Construction for caged collocation are more than double that amount.

12
13 More generally with respect to both caged and cageless collocation, Qwest presumably
14 constructed its collocation cost study consistently, and accordingly would have developed

1 ² The corresponding Verizon elements are Cage Enclosure (\$5,693.57 nonrecurring), DC Power
2 (\$2,730.01 nonrecurring), and Environmental Conditioning (\$73.35 recurring). In addition, a
3 portion of Verizon's recurring charge for DC Power would correspond to the costs included in
4 Qwest's Space Construction element, which I have estimated by subtracting Qwest's proposed
5 recurring charge for Power Plant Usage from the Verizon rate ($\$512.93 - \$373.60 = \$139.33$). A
6 portion of Verizon's proposed Building Modification charge also corresponds to Qwest's
7 proposed Space Construction element, but as I discussed, those costs should be included in
8 Verizon's Cage Enclosure charge.
9

1 its Space Construction costs – particularly the grounding and ac and dc power costs –
2 using the same assumptions it used to estimate Entrance Facilities costs, *e.g.*, 3
3 collocators per central office and approximately half of the cable racking dedicated to
4 those 3 collocators. These assumptions would improperly inflate Qwest’s Space
5 Construction cost estimates just as they inflate the Entrance Facilities cost estimates.

6
7 Qwest also continues to use the same deficient method of determining costs for ac and dc
8 power on which it relied in the prior cost proceeding. Qwest averages cost data from five
9 central offices – only one or two of which are in Washington – to develop a per foot price
10 for power cables and installation. Qwest then multiplies this per foot price by an assumed
11 distance. In the case of dc power feeds, the assumed distance is between the collocation
12 space and the battery distribution fuse board (“BDFB”), essentially an intermediate circuit
13 breaker, (for runs of 60 amps or less) or the main power distribution board (“PDB”) for
14 the central office (for runs of 60 amps or more).

15
16 There are several problems with this methodology. First, the cost estimates for the
17 Washington central offices are consistently and substantially lower than the average of
18 the cost estimates of the five central offices that Qwest selected. When asked to explain

1 how each of the selected offices is representative of some or all of Qwest's central offices
2 in Washington, Qwest stated, "U S WEST has data from all the job orders not only in
3 Washington, but for all the U S WEST region." Qwest Response to NEXTLINK, et al.
4 Data Request No. 01-020. This answer bears no relationship to the question asked, and
5 NEXTLINK can only assume that Qwest either cannot or will not provide an explanation.
6 Qwest's power cable and installation cost estimates, therefore, bear no demonstrable
7 relationship to the costs Qwest incurs in Washington.

8
9 Qwest similarly refused to provide any information about the lengths of power cables
10 installed between the BDFB or PDB and the collocation spaces in its Washington central
11 offices to substantiate its distance assumptions. In response to a request for this
12 information Qwest stated only, "This will vary and will depend on the size of the cages
13 and or the cageless collocation area." Qwest Response to NEXTLINK, et al. Data
14 Request No. 01-006. Data that Qwest provided in the previous cost proceeding, however,
15 indicates that the distance between the PDB and the collocation space on which Qwest
16 bases its cost estimate is approximately 48% longer than the actual average distance
17 between those points in Qwest's Washington central offices. Correspondingly, Qwest's
18 cost estimates based on an average price per foot multiplied by the assumed distance are

1 overstated by almost half.

2 Terminations

3 **Q. WHAT HAS QWEST PROPOSED FOR TERMINATIONS?**

4
5 A. Terminations are the elements necessary to connect a CLEC's collocated equipment with
6 ILEC unbundled loops, including DS-1 and DS-3 loops. Qwest proposes to install cables
7 from the CLEC collocation space to blocks on an intermediate distribution frame ("IDF").
8 Qwest will then run cross connects on the IDF to access DS-1 or DS-3 loops or to the
9 COSMIC frame to access DS-0 (voice grade) loops. In sharp contrast to its proposal to
10 combine multiple elements into Space Construction, Qwest proposes to replace the
11 element formerly called Expanded Interconnection Channel Termination ("EICT") with
12 four Termination subelements: (1) Cable; (2) Cable Placement; (3) Block (DS-0), Panel
13 (DS-1) or Connector (DS-3); and (4) Block, Panel or Connector Placement. Each of
14 these subelements, in turn, has two sets of nonrecurring and recurring charges, one per
15 block and one per termination. The total of the non recurring subelement prices for DS-0
16 is \$1,859.88 per block and \$27.11 per termination. If a CLEC were to order 100 DS-0
17 terminations, therefore, the total nonrecurring charges under Qwest's proposal would be
18 \$4,570.88. Nonrecurring rates for 28 DS-1 terminations would be \$6,411.06, while the
19 rates for a single DS-3 termination would total \$817.80.

1 **Q. HOW DO THESE RATES COMPARE TO VERIZON'S PROPOSALS?**

2
3 A. Consistent with other collocation elements, Qwest's proposed rates are significantly
4 higher than the rates Verizon has proposed. Verizon proposes four elements that in
5 combination are equivalent to Qwest's Terminations subelements: (1) Facility
6 Pull/Termination Engineering; (2) Facility Pull; (3) Cable Termination; and (4) Facility
7 Cable. The nonrecurring charges for 100 DS-0 terminations Verizon has proposed would
8 total \$622.24 – over *7 times less* than the rates Qwest has proposed. Qwest's proposed
9 rates are over 10 times higher than Verizon's proposed rates for 28 DS-1 terminations
10 (\$595.32) and more than double the single DS-3 termination rates Verizon has proposed
11 (\$370.39).

12 **Q. CAN NEXTLINK ACCOUNT FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES?**

13
14 A. No, we cannot. The information that accompanies Qwest's proposals does nothing more
15 than give conclusory cost numbers without providing any data on how those numbers
16 were developed. Once again, I would expect Qwest's unrealistic assumptions of 3
17 collocators per central office and exaggerated cable lengths to be contributing factors.
18 NEXTLINK engineers have informed me that these terminations should be no more than
19 the rates that Verizon has proposed.

20 Cable Splicing

1 **Q. WHAT DOES QWEST PROPOSE WITH RESPECT TO CABLE SPLICING?**

2
3 A. Qwest proposes two nonrecurring charges for Cable Splicing: \$515.79 per set-up
4 (essentially preparing the cable for splicing) and \$38.08 per fiber spliced. As I discussed
5 above, NEXTLINK's outside contractor charges only \$28 per fiber spliced, without any
6 set up charge. Even Verizon's proposed rate of \$65.29 per fiber spliced is lower than
7 Qwest's combined rates for Cable Splicing if 18 or fewer fibers are spliced on a single
8 occasion. Neither Qwest nor Verizon should be permitted to impose super-market rates
9 for collocation services or facilities, and Qwest, like Verizon, should be entitled to charge
10 a total of no more than \$28 per fiber for Cable Splicing.

11 **Q. WHAT DOES NEXTLINK RECOMMEND WITH RESPECT TO**
12 **COLLOCATION COSTING AND PRICING?**

13
14 A. NEXTLINK recommends that the Commission reject Qwest's proposals with respect to
15 the collocation elements I have discussed and establish rates for those elements that are at
16 the same level that Verizon has proposed, except for Cage Enclosure, Building
17 Modification, and Cable Splicing elements. With respect to Cable Splicing, NEXTLINK
18 recommends that the Commission establish a single nonrecurring charge of \$28 per fiber
19 spliced for both Qwest and Verizon. Verizon's Building Modification charge should be
20 eliminated and site preparation, lighting, and electrical outlet costs should be included in
21 the Cage Enclosure element at Verizon's proposed rates for Cage Enclosure, while

1 security and grounding costs attributable to each collocating CLEC should be recovered
2 through separate elements.

3 CLEC-to-CLEC Cross-Connection

4 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER CONCERNS WITH QWEST'S COLLOCATION**
5 **PROPOSAL?**

6
7 A. Yes, I do. Qwest does not include any element or provision for permitting CLECs that
8 are collocated in a Qwest central office to cross-connect their collocated facilities. While
9 Qwest formerly permitted such CLEC-to-CLEC cross-connection, Qwest recently
10 informed NEXTLINK that such cross-connection would no longer be permitted. As
11 closure of the merger between Qwest's parent corporation and U S WEST, Inc.,
12 approached, however, Qwest indicated that it was reviewing this policy and would likely
13 permit some form of CLEC-to-CLEC cross-connection. The Commission should require
14 that Qwest permit CLEC-to-CLEC cross-connections and establish a cost-based rate for
15 such cross-connections.

16 **Q. WHY IS IT NECESSARY FOR COLLOCATED CLECS TO INTERCONNECT**
17 **THEIR NETWORKS AT THE ILEC CENTRAL OFFICE?**

18
19 A. CLEC-to-CLEC cross-connections at the ILEC central office permit CLECs to interconnect
20 their networks more efficiently and to access facilities and services provided by other
21 CLECs. CLECs with limited network facilities may find it more economical, as well as

1 efficient, to exchange local traffic via such cross-connects, rather than constructing much
2 more costly outside plant to interconnect their networks. In addition, a facilities-based
3 CLEC may be collocated in several ILEC central offices and would offer private line or
4 transport services between those central offices to other CLECs, such as data CLECs that
5 rely on leased network facilities. The only way a CLEC can provide such private line or
6 interoffice transport services to other CLECs is to cross-connect with those CLECs at the
7 central office where they are all collocated. Qwest's refusal to permit such cross-
8 connection thus serves to increase CLECs' network costs and to further monopolize the
9 local exchange market.

10 **Q. WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR CLECs TO CROSS-CONNECT THEIR**
11 **COLLOCATED EQUIPMENT?**

12
13 A. Very little. The ILEC (or CLEC if allowed to self-provision) would simply run a cable
14 from its collocation space to the other CLEC's collocation space. The CLECs generally
15 could use existing cable racking to route the cable, particularly if the collocation space is
16 in the same area of the central office. Appropriate costs would therefore be limited to the
17 cost of the cable, a proportional cost of the cable rack, and the labor required to install the
18 cable. Although Verizon does not have a specific rate for this service, Verizon permits
19 CLECs to cross-connect at the Verizon central office. The Commission should require
20 Qwest to provide, and establish appropriate rates for, the same option.

1 **III. LINE CONDITIONING**

2 **Q. HAS NEXTLINK HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EVALUATE VERIZON'S**
3 **PROPOSAL FOR LINE CONDITIONING CHARGES?**

4
5 A. No. Based on the initial prehearing conference order in this proceeding, NEXTLINK
6 understood that line conditioning would be addressed in Part B, rather than Part A,
7 despite Verizon's decision to file testimony on that issue in Part A. The Commission's
8 Third Supplemental Order dated July 17, 2000, however, determined that loop
9 conditioning costing and pricing will be addressed in Part A. NEXTLINK has not had
10 sufficient opportunity since the entry of the Third Supplemental Order to evaluate
11 Verizon's line conditioning proposal and supporting testimony. Accordingly,
12 NEXTLINK intends to request additional time to supplement its response testimony to
13 address this issue.

14 **Q. DO YOU HAVE A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF VERIZON'S PROPOSAL?**

15
16 A. Yes. Verizon proposes nonrecurring charges of between \$926.49 and \$1,866.12 to
17 remove bridged taps and load coils from a loop to permit digital transmission over that
18 loop. The Commission previously determined that cost-based nonrecurring charges for
19 Qwest and Verizon should be set at \$304.12 for cable unloading and \$147.37 for bridged
20 tap removal. Verizon's proposal to impose charges that are 4 to 12 times higher than the
21 rates previously established for undertaking the same function is patently unreasonable.

1 Indeed, Verizon's proposed loop conditioning rates exceed the average investment for an
2 entire loop. Verizon cannot credibly claim that it costs more to condition an existing loop
3 than to build a new one. Accordingly, the Commission should reject Verizon's loop
4 conditioning proposal.

5 **Q. DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

6 **A. Yes, it does.**