

**EXHIBIT No. ____ JB-1T
DOCKET NOS. UE-240004/UG-240005
2024 PSE GENERAL RATE CASE
WITNESS: JUSTIN BIEBER**

**BEFORE THE
WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION**

**WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,**

Complainant,

v.

PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.,

Respondent.

**Docket No. UE-240004
Docket No. UG-240005**

**PREFILED RESPONSE TESTIMONY OF
JUSTIN BIEBER
ON BEHALF OF THE KROGER CO.**

AUGUST 6, 2024

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1 **RESPONSE TESTIMONY OF JUSTIN BIEBER**

2

3 **I. INTRODUCTION**

4 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

5 A. My name is Justin Bieber. My business address is 111 E Broadway, Suite
6 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.

7 **Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

8 A. I am a Principal for Energy Strategies, LLC. Energy Strategies is a private
9 consulting firm specializing in economic and policy analysis applicable to energy
10 production, transportation, and consumption.

11 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying?**

12 A. My testimony is being sponsored by The Kroger Co. ("Kroger") on behalf
13 of its Fred Meyer Stores and Quality Food Centers divisions. Kroger is one of the
14 largest retail grocers in the United States and operates approximately 50 facilities
15 that are served by Puget Sound Energy ("PSE" or the "Company"). These
16 facilities purchase approximately 130 million kWh annually from PSE, and are
17 primarily served on Electric Rate Schedules 25, 26, and 31.

18 **Q. Please describe your professional experience and qualifications.**

19 A. My academic background is in business and engineering. I earned a
20 Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Duke University in 2006
21 and a Master of Business Administration from the University of Southern
22 California in 2012. I am also a registered Professional Civil Engineer in the state
23 of California.

24 I joined Energy Strategies in 2017, where I provide regulatory and
25 technical support on a variety of energy issues, including regulatory services,
26 transmission and renewable development, and financial and economic analyses. I
27 have also filed and supported the development of testimony before various state
28 utility regulatory commissions.

29 Prior to joining Energy Strategies, I held positions at Pacific Gas and
30 Electric Company as Manager of Transmission Project Development, ISO
31 Relations and FERC Policy Principal, and Supervisor of Electric Generator
32 Interconnections. During my career at Pacific Gas and Electric Company, I
33 supported multiple facets of utility operations, and led efforts in policy,
34 regulatory, and strategic initiatives. Prior to my work at Pacific Gas & Electric, I
35 was a project manager and engineer for heavy construction bridge and highway
36 projects.

37 **Q. Have you testified previously before this Commission?**

38 A. Yes, I testified before this Commission in PSE's 2022 general rate case,
39 Docket No. UE-220066 and Docket No. UE-220067.

40 **Q. Have you filed testimony previously before any other state utility regulatory**
41 **commissions?**

42 A. Yes. I have testified in regulatory proceedings on the subjects of utility
43 rates and regulatory policy before state utility regulators in Colorado, Indiana,
44 Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
45 Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

46

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II. RECOMMENDATIONS

49 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

50 A. My testimony addresses PSE's proposed electric rate design for Schedule
51 26. Absence of comment on my part regarding a particular issue does not signify
52 support (or opposition) toward PSE's filing with respect to the non-discussed
53 issue.

54 **Q. Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations.**

55 PSE's proposed Schedule 26 electric rate design understates the basic
56 customer charge and the demand-related charges relative to the underlying costs
57 while overstating the energy-related charges. I recommend moderate changes to
58 the Company's proposed Schedule 26 rate design that will make progress towards
59 aligning the rate design with the underlying cost components while also
60 employing gradualism and mitigating the intra-class rate impacts that would result
61 from a more significant movement towards cost-based rates at this time.

62

III. SCHEDULE 26 ELECTRIC RATE DESIGN

64 **Q. Please explain PSE's electric rate design proposal in this case.**

65 A. Witness Christopher T. Mickelson explains that PSE's electric rate design
66 proposal is a strategic approach that is intended to realign rates over the multiyear
67 rate plan ("MYRP") periods. The proposal includes up to a 30% increase in
68 monthly customer charges and demand charges to keep these charges within the
69 respective cost of service study results. Simultaneously, Mr. Mickelson explains

70 that the energy components will experience flat rate increases for each tier within
71 the classes.¹

72 **Q. What justification does PSE provide to support its electric rate design**
73 **proposals.**

74 A. Mr. Mickelson explains that the pricing proposals are driven by a forward-
75 looking perspective considering industry trends and legislative mandates,
76 particularly the clean energy transformation act. According to Mr. Mickelson,
77 PSE aims to provide precise pricing signals to incentivize the right investments on
78 both sides of the meter which requires pricing components such as customer
79 charges, demand charges, and energy charges to be aligned with the results of the
80 electric cost of service studies. He explains that PSE's objective is to reduce cross
81 subsidization, address inequities, and establish accurate pricing signals for
82 efficient grid utilization.² Mr. Mickelson also emphasizes the importance of
83 increasing the basic customer charge to be cost-based³ and utilizing demand
84 charges to send more accurate price signals, incentivize efficient use of grid assets
85 and minimize cross-subsidies.⁴

86 **Q. Please describe the Company's proposed Schedule 26 rate design.**

87 A. Mr. Mickelson explains that for the first year of the MYRP, the Company
88 proposes to increase the customer charge and seasonal demand charges by 30%
89 and assign the remaining increase to the energy charge component. Similarly, for
90 the second year of the MYRP, Mr. Mickelson explains that the Company

¹ Prefiled Direct Testimony of Christopher T. Michelson, p. 28.

² *Id.* p. 29.

³ *Id.* pp. 31-32.

⁴ *Id.* pp. 32-37.

91 proposes to increase the customer charge and seasonal demand charges by 30%
 92 and assign the remaining decrease to the energy charge component.⁵ Table JB-1
 93 summarizes the Company’s proposed Schedule 26 rates.

94 **Table JB-1**
 95 **PSE Proposed Schedule 26 Rates**

	Units	Test Year	MYRP 2025	MYRP 2026
Basic Charge	Bills	\$109.08	\$141.80	\$184.35
Energy Charge	kWh	\$0.057457	\$0.072321	\$0.072173
Winter Demand	kW	\$12.23	\$15.90	\$20.67
96 Summer Demand	kW	\$8.15	\$10.60	\$13.77

97 **Q. What is your assessment of PSE’s proposed Schedule 26 rate design?**

98 A. PSE’s proposed Schedule 26 rate design is not aligned with cost. Although
 99 PSE’s rate design proposal does make movement to better align rates with cost
 100 causation, reduce cross subsidies, and send more accurate price signals, the
 101 proposed Schedule 26 rate design would still continue to understate the customer
 102 and demand-related charges relative to the underlying costs while overstating the
 103 energy-related revenues. Table JB-2 below compares PSE’s proposed Schedule
 104 26 revenues relative to total cost by classification compared to the underlying cost
 105 by classification in PSE’s proposed electric cost of service study.

106 **Table JB-2**
 107 **PSE’s Proposed Schedule 26**
 108 **Proportion of Costs and Revenues by Classification**

	Cost of Service	MYRP 2025	MYRP 2026
Customer	7.9%	0.9%	1.2%
Energy	54.2%	68.9%	63.0%
Demand	37.9%	30.2%	35.9%
109 Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

⁵ *Id.* p.49.

110 As can be seen in Table JB-2 above, the proposed customer and demand
111 revenues are below PSE's underlying cost of service while the energy charges are
112 greater than cost.

113 **Q. How do PSE's proposed Schedule 26 basic charges compare to the cost of**
114 **service?**

115 A. Despite Mr. Mickelson's claim that PSE's proposed basic charge is cost-
116 based,⁶ the proposed basic charge for Schedule 26 is substantially below cost.
117 Mr. Mickelson explains that the basic charge is intended to cover a subset of
118 customer-related costs including the cost of meters, service drops, meter reading,
119 meter maintenance, and billing.⁷ According to PSE's electric cost of service
120 study, the Schedule 26 cost-based basic charge would be \$566.02,⁸ which is
121 substantially higher than the proposed Schedule 26 basic charges of \$141.80 for
122 MYRP 2025 and \$184.35 for MYRP 2026.

123 **Q. Please explain how you calculated the Schedule 26 proportion of costs by**
124 **classification from PSE's electric cost of service study?**

125 A. The proportion of costs and revenues by classification in Table JB-2 above
126 were derived from PSE's electric cost of service study with one adjustment to
127 remove the non-firm energy sales from the energy-related cost. Specifically, I
128 started with PSE's proposed costs by classification⁹ and subtracted the non-firm
129 sales from the energy-related cost of service.¹⁰ This adjustment was necessary to
130 account for the fact that the Company receives revenues for these non-firm sales

⁶ *Id.* p. 31.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ See 240004-05-PSE-WP-CTM-5-COS-Model-24GRC-02-2024.xlsx, 'Basic Charge' tab, line 51.

⁹ See 240004-05-PSE-WP-CTM-5-COS-Model-24GRC-02-2024.xlsx, 'UnitCost' tab, lines 45-47.

¹⁰ See 240004-05-PSE-WP-CTM-5-COS-Model-24GRC-02-2024.xlsx, 'Summary' tab, line 8.

131 that offset the necessary revenue requirement to be recovered through base rates.
132 I then calculated the relative proportion of customer, energy, and demand related
133 costs relative to the total cost of service. These calculations are also provided in
134 the workpapers to my response testimony.

135 **Q. From a customer's perspective, why should it matter if PSE proposes**
136 **customer and demand charges that do not fully recover its customer and**
137 **demand-related costs?**

138 A. If a utility proposes customer and demand charges that are below the cost
139 of service, it is going to seek to recover its class revenue requirement by over-
140 recovering its costs in another area, most typically through levying an energy
141 charge that is above the variable energy cost, which is the case with PSE's
142 proposed rate design. For a given rate schedule such as Schedule 26, when
143 demand charges are set below cost, and energy charges are set above cost, those
144 customers with relatively higher load factors are required to subsidize the lower
145 load factor customers within the class. Similarly, when customer charges are set
146 below cost, relatively larger customers are required to subsidize the relatively
147 smaller customers within the class.

148 **Q. Why is it important for rate design to be representative of underlying cost**
149 **causation?**

150 A. Aligning rate design with underlying cost causation improves efficiency
151 because it sends proper price signals. For example, setting a demand charge below
152 the cost of demand understates the economic cost of demand-related assets, which

153 in turn distorts consumption decisions, and calls forth a greater level of
154 investment in fixed assets than is economically desirable.

155 At the same time, aligning rate design with cost causation is important for
156 ensuring equity among customers, because properly aligning charges with costs
157 minimizes cross-subsidies among customers. As I stated above, if customer or
158 demand costs are understated in utility rates, the costs are made up elsewhere —
159 typically in energy rates. When demand charges are understated, higher-load-
160 factor customers (who use fixed assets relatively efficiently through relatively
161 constant energy usage) are forced to pay the demand-related costs of lower-load-
162 factor customers. When customer charges are understated, larger customers are
163 required to pay the customer-related costs for smaller customers. This results in
164 cross-subsidies that are fundamentally inequitable.

165 **Q. Does the Company recognize the importance of aligning rate design with the**
166 **underlying costs?**

167 A. Yes. As I explain above, aligning rates with the actual cost of service,
168 embedding fairness in rate structures, and sending accurate price signals are
169 important rate design objectives for the Company.

170 **Q. What is your recommendation with respect to the Schedule 26 rate design?**

171 A. Ideally, the demand related charges, energy related charges, and customer
172 charges would be aligned with the respective underlying cost components.
173 However, in some circumstances, full movement towards cost-based rates in a
174 single step should be tempered in order to mitigate potential intra-class rate
175 impacts and take into consideration the well-accepted rate making principle of

176 gradualism. Therefore, I am proposing moderate changes to PSE’s proposed
 177 Schedule 26 rate design that will make progress towards aligning the rate design
 178 with the underlying costs while also employing gradualism and mitigating the
 179 intra-class rate impacts that would result from a more significant movement
 180 towards cost-based rates at this time.

181 Given the circumstances of this case, I recommend that the rate increase
 182 for Schedule 26 should be accomplished by increasing the customer and demand
 183 charges relative to the Company’s proposed rates and decreasing the proposed
 184 energy charge. My recommendation would be revenue neutral relative to the
 185 Company’s proposed rate design for Schedule 26 and will not have any impact on
 186 any other rate schedules. The revenue verification for this rate design is presented
 187 in Exhibit JB-2 and summarized in Table JB-3 below.

188 **Table JB-3**
 189 **Kroger Proposed Schedule 26 Rate Design Compared to PSE Rates**
 190 **At PSE’s Proposed Revenue Requirement and Revenue Allocation**

			PSE		Kroger	
	Units	Test Year	MYRP 2025	MYRP 2026	MYRP 2025	MYRP 2026
Basic Charge	Bills	\$109.08	\$141.80	\$184.35	\$218.16	\$436.32
Energy Charge	kWh	\$0.057457	\$0.072321	\$0.072173	\$0.071114	\$0.068453
Winter Demand	kW	\$12.23	\$15.90	\$20.67	\$16.27	\$21.63
191 Summer Demand	kW	\$8.15	\$10.60	\$13.77	\$10.84	\$14.42

192 **Q. How does your recommended rate design improve the alignment between**
 193 **charges and the underlying cost?**

194 A. My proposed rate design would improve the alignment between charges
 195 and the underlying cost components by increasing the recovery of customer and
 196 demand related costs through the customer and demand charges while decreasing
 197 revenue recovery through variable energy charges.

198 To be clear, my recommended improvements to the Schedule 26 rate
199 design would not result in cost-based rates. However, it would improve the
200 alignment between the charges and underlying costs. This is an intentional
201 component of my proposal that employs gradualism to mitigate the intra-class rate
202 impacts that may result from a more significant movement towards cost at this
203 time.

204 Table JB-4 below shows the Schedule 26 rate schedule revenues relative
205 to total costs by classification that would result from my recommended rate
206 design, at PSE's proposed revenue requirement.

207 **Table JB-4**
208 **Kroger Proposed Schedule 26**
209 **Proportion of Costs and Revenues by Classification**

	Cost of Service	MYRP 2025	MYRP 2026
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Customer	7.9%	1.3%	2.8%
Energy	54.2%	67.7%	59.7%
Demand	37.9%	30.9%	37.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

210
211 Table JB-5 below provides the classification of revenues relative to total
212 cost for my recommended Schedule 26 rate design compared to PSE's proposed
213 rates. As can be seen in Table JB-5, my recommended modifications to the rate
214 design would make gradual movement towards aligning rates with the underlying
215 cost components.

216
217
218

Table JB-5
PSE and Kroger Proposed Schedule 26
Proportion of Costs and Revenues by Classification

	Cost of Service	PSE		Kroger	
		MYRP 2025	MYRP 2026	MYRP 2025	MYRP 2026
Customer	7.9%	0.9%	1.2%	1.3%	2.8%
Energy	54.2%	68.9%	63.0%	67.7%	59.7%
Demand	37.9%	30.2%	35.9%	30.9%	37.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

219

220 **Q. Have you prepared a bill impact analysis of your recommended changes to**
221 **the Schedule 26 rate design?**

222 A. Yes. My bill impact analysis is presented in Exhibit JB-3 and illustrates
223 the total bill impacts to customers that would result from my recommended
224 Schedule 26 rate design at the Company's proposed revenue requirement. The
225 bill impacts for the various customer load profiles lie within a relatively small
226 range relative to the class average rate increase for each year of the MYRP.

227 **Q. Your proposed rate design results in a slightly different bill impacts for**
228 **customers with different load profiles. Is this a reasonable result?**

229 A. Yes, it is a reasonable result. My proposed rate design reflects a cost-
230 based difference while providing gradual movement towards cost-based rates. As
231 I explain above, I am not proposing full movement towards cost-based rates in
232 this case. Instead, my proposed rate design makes *gradual* movement towards
233 aligning rates with cost causation and reduces, but does not eliminate, the existing
234 intra-class subsidy. This is a reasonable result because it strikes a balance
235 between two important rate-making principles – improving the alignment between
236 rates and the underlying cost components while employing gradualism.

237 **Q. Your proposed Schedule 26 rate design was calculated using PSE's proposed**
238 **revenue requirement. How should your proposed rate design be**
239 **implemented if the Commission adopts a revenue requirement that is less**
240 **than PSE's request?**

241 A. To the extent that the Commission approves a lower revenue target, I
242 recommend that each of my recommended base rate charges contained in Exhibit
243 JB-2, and summarized in Table JB-3, should be reduced by an equal percentage
244 amount in order to recover the approved revenue target.

245 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

246 A. Yes, it does.

**BEFORE THE
WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION**

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**PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.,
Respondent.**


**Docket No. UE-240004
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AFFIDAVIT OF JUSTIN BIEBER


STATE OF UTAH)
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

Justin Bieber, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:

1. He is a Principal with Energy Strategies. L.L.C., in Salt Lake City, Utah;
2. He is the witness who sponsors the accompanying testimony entitled "Response Testimony of Justin Bieber;"
3. Said testimony was prepared by him and under his direction and supervision;
4. If inquiries were made as to the facts and schedules in said testimony he would respond as therein set forth; and
5. The aforesaid testimony and schedules are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.


Justin Bieber

Subscribed and sworn to or affirmed before me this 6th day of August, 2024, by Justin Bieber.


Notary Public

