

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

In the Matter of the

CONTINUED COSTING AND PRICING  
OF UNBUNDLED NETWORK  
ELEMENTS, TRANSPORT,  
TERMINATION, AND RESALE

Docket No. UT-003013 (*Part D*)

QWEST'S REPLY BRIEF  
August 13, 2002

**QWEST CORPORATION'S PART D  
REPLY BRIEF**

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1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 In its opening brief, Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") emphasized a fundamental difference between  
3 its approach to the costing and pricing issues in this docket and that of the competitive local exchange  
4 carriers ("CLECs"). Qwest's cost studies and proposed prices are forward-looking, but they also are  
5 grounded in the company's real-world experience of maintaining a network and providing CLECs with  
6 interconnection services and access to unbundled network elements ("UNEs"). By contrast, the CLECs'  
7 advocacy is premised upon unrealistic assumptions about what it takes to operate a network and provide  
8 wholesale services and is designed to drive down prices to a level that would deny Qwest the full  
9 recovery of its costs that it is entitled to under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the Act").

10 The parties' post-hearing briefs are further confirmation of these different approaches to the  
11 costing and pricing issues in this docket. At virtually every turn, the CLECs criticize Qwest for relying on  
12 actual experience in developing the inputs and assumptions that are used in its cost studies. As the  
13 CLECs would have it, the term "forward-looking," as used in connection with cost studies, should  
14 preclude Qwest and the Commission from relying on this type of real-world, actual experience in  
15 developing prices that meet the Act's "just and reasonable" requirement.

16 Reliance on actual experience and the incorporation of reality into Qwest's cost studies does not  
17 mean, as the CLECs contend, that Qwest's studies produce estimates that reflect embedded costs.  
18 Qwest's cost studies do not produce embedded cost estimates. The studies use state-of-the art network  
19 designs and the least-cost, forward-looking technologies that are currently available. The fact that Qwest  
20 often uses these same designs and technologies in its own network does not mean that they are  
21 inappropriate for use in a forward-looking study. In addition, the CLECs' claim that Qwest's studies  
22 produce estimates of embedded costs ignores the fact that Qwest applies forward-looking productivity  
23 and inflation factors to the investment included in its studies. The use of those factors clearly differentiates  
24 the investment in Qwest's studies from Qwest's embedded costs.

25 An additional theme that underlies many of the CLECs' arguments is the claim that the  
26 Commission should resolve the costing and pricing issues in this docket with a singular focus on doing

1 whatever is necessary to make it easier for CLECs to compete in Washington's local exchange market.  
2 Qwest urges the Commission to respond cautiously to this theme. To be sure, the Commission's pricing  
3 decisions in this docket should support competition in the local exchange market. But that objective is  
4 achieved not by a decision-making process designed to establish the lowest possible prices, but, rather,  
5 by application of principles that lead to cost-based prices, send the proper economic signals to the  
6 market, and ensure that Qwest will recover its costs in compliance with the Act.

7 If the Commission continues to adhere to sound economic principles for the costing and pricing of  
8 network elements, Qwest will receive proper compensation for its large and ongoing network  
9 investments, and CLECs will receive pricing signals that will encourage them to use an efficient mix of  
10 resale, unbundled elements, and construction of their own facilities. This result, which is achieved through  
11 objective application of cost-based pricing principles, will lead to the greatest benefits for Washington  
12 consumers.

## 13 II. REPLY TO WORLDCOM

14 WorldCom's post-hearing brief raises a number of issues to which Qwest will reply. Qwest fully  
15 addressed all of the disputed issues in its opening brief, and a lack of reply to one or more points raised  
16 by WorldCom should not be interpreted as a concession by Qwest on the issue. However, there are  
17 several points raised by WorldCom to which a reply is necessary for clarification purposes. These issues  
18 include nonrecurring costs (specifically the use of subject matter experts and the proper assumptions  
19 regarding OSS and flow through); factors; collocation issues; multiplexing; customized routing; "UNE-P  
20 new" nonrecurring costs; branding; access to poles, conduits and rights of way; and directory listings.

21 **Nonrecurring Costs:** WorldCom criticizes Qwest's nonrecurring costs, claiming that Qwest  
22 violated TELRIC principles by basing its cost estimates on Qwest's "current experience" (WorldCom  
23 Brief, p. 8), that Qwest assumed inefficient operations and excessive time to perform functions (Id.), and  
24 that Qwest inappropriately relied on subject matter experts for time estimates instead of time and motion  
25 studies.

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***TELRIC Assumptions***

WorldCom misinterprets Qwest’s evidence regarding the use of time estimates based on Qwest’s “current experience.” WorldCom takes this one phrase out of context and uses it in an attempt to prove that Qwest’s estimates are purely historic and not forward looking. WorldCom attempted to do the same thing during the cross-examination of Ms. Million. (Tr. 4139-40). However, it is clear from both the prefiled testimony and exhibits, and the testimony at hearing that WorldCom’s interpretation is incorrect.

While Qwest has used its actual experience as a *basis* for the estimates, the estimating process does not stop there. Qwest modifies the times based on its actual experience to present a forward looking view, by accounting for process and system improvements that will be implemented within 12-18 months. (Tr. 4140-41). Indeed, the Commission recently recognized that Qwest’s work time assumptions for the interconnect service center have significantly decreased over the past years.<sup>1</sup> The Commission-ordered work time of six minutes is still less than Qwest’s forward looking assumptions. Thus, it is wrong to assert that Qwest’s nonrecurring cost estimates do not reflect forward-looking assumptions and inputs.

***Subject Matter Experts***

With regard to subject matter experts, WorldCom reiterates its complaint that the use of subject matter experts is not the correct way to obtain work time estimates. WorldCom states that Qwest relies on in-house experts, and in some cases only one in-house employee to provide time estimates. (WorldCom Brief, p. 9). WorldCom fails to explain why it is improper to rely on the people who actually perform or supervise the work to obtain time estimates, and further fails to explain why the use of subject matter experts is improper. WorldCom’s advocacy on this point is irreconcilably at odds with its recommendation that the Commission should instead rely on the testimony of WorldCom’s own “experts” – individuals who are not currently performing the work about which they render an opinion, and who in many cases have never performed the work tasks.

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<sup>1</sup> Docket No. UT-003013, Part B Order, ¶ 120.

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***Flow Through/Fallout***

WorldCom complains that Qwest improperly applies fallout percentages, and states that fallout must be viewed in the context of the total provisioning process, not individual process steps. (WorldCom Brief, p. 11). It is unclear whether this criticism is leveled at a particular aspect of Qwest’s cost studies, or is simply a general observation. WorldCom did not identify a particular task or set of tasks that it claimed were treated improperly with regard to fallout assumptions. Thus, Qwest simply reiterates its response to this issue, as explained by Ms. Million.

WorldCom’s argument simply identifies two ways that fallout rates could be applied in a study. One is to apply the fallout rate at the level of work steps, the other is to apply the rate once to the entire process. WorldCom gives an example that it claims show that Qwest’s studies and methods of reflecting fallout results in 100 additional work item computations, compared to 10 additional computations when applied the way WorldCom advocates. (WorldCom Brief, pp. 10-11). This is not a legitimate comparison. WorldCom’s example merely shows that the fallout rate can be applied differently from one study to another and will produce a different result. In one case WorldCom applies a hypothetical 10% fallout rate to each work step in each order, and in the other WorldCom applies the 10% rate once to each order. These are two entirely different approaches; individual work steps and orders do not share a common denominator. A valid analysis would be to apply fallout rates individually to the number of minutes in each work step in each order, and compare that to applying the weighted-average fallout rate once to the total number of minutes in each order. This approach places the items being compared on the same basis and allows for a meaningful analysis. The result of such an “apples to apples” comparison is that each method produces the same amount of fallout in minutes.

The real issue to be addressed by the Commission with regard to fallout is whether it is more appropriate to estimate an average fallout rate that is applied once to the total minutes of processing time for each order, or to provide individual fallout rates for the work steps performed for each order. Qwest believes that it is a better and more accurate approach to apply fallout rates individually to work steps for two reasons.

1 First, fallout rates, as well as mechanization rates, vary from one work activity to another because  
2 of the involvement of different systems and different process flows in each step. In other words, the  
3 activities and process flows that take place in the Interconnect Service Center are entirely different and  
4 unrelated to the activities in the Loop Provisioning Center, except to the extent that one “hands off” to the  
5 other in the overall process of provisioning a loop. Assuming an overall fallout rate may make for a  
6 simpler study. However, it ignores the fact that over time process improvements may occur in one center  
7 and should be reflected in the study, but may have no impact on other centers or processes. Qwest’s  
8 approach provides a more accurate and effective way to reflect forward-looking process improvements  
9 in its nonrecurring charges.

10 Second, the time estimates and probabilities that Qwest uses in its nonrecurring cost study are  
11 provided by the subject matter experts for each of the centers or work processes. These people have  
12 responsibility for the processes based on their often considerable experience. They work day-to-day in  
13 the centers where the work steps are performed, and they are involved in evaluating and implementing  
14 process and system improvements in their groups. By assigning fallout and mechanization probabilities at  
15 work-step levels, Qwest is able to provide a more accurate estimate of the activities associated with each  
16 process or work center. Developing an overall fallout rate would require assembling the inputs from each  
17 of the individual subject matter expert and calculating a weighted average to apply across all work steps  
18 and centers. This approach would not allow the Commission to evaluate or judge the efficiencies  
19 reflected in Qwest’s nonrecurring cost studies at any level of detail.

20 ***OSS***

21 WorldCom asks this Commission to follow the example of other commissions and order Qwest  
22 to incorporate WorldCom’s 2% “fallout” proposal into Qwest’s non-recurring cost studies. WorldCom  
23 suggested that this will reflect a forward looking, cost efficient process. (WorldCom Brief, p. 13).  
24 WorldCom’s proposal goes well beyond the normal discussion of “fallout” or flow-through by suggesting  
25 that Qwest should experience only 2% fallout through the entire ordering and provisioning processes.  
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1 Qwest witness Ms. Albersheim explained that the normal discussion of flow through generally  
2 revolves around the electronic ordering process only, and that the provisioning process is not included in  
3 these discussions. (Ex. T-2200, pp. 9-10). There are inherently manual processes involved in the  
4 provisioning of many products, some of which will never be eliminated even in a forward-looking  
5 environment. Ms. Albersheim also explained that it is not appropriate to view flow-through beyond the  
6 ordering process, as once CLEC orders pass through the Qwest provided ordering interfaces, CLEC  
7 orders enter into the same downstream systems as those used by Qwest, and there is then no distinction  
8 regarding how Qwest and CLEC orders are provisioned.

9 WorldCom suggests that other commissions agree with its position on “fallout,” but a closer  
10 reading of the commission orders cited by WorldCom shows otherwise. For example, the Michigan  
11 commission concluded in its order that it should set the fallout rate at 2% as an incentive to Ameritech to  
12 make further improvements to its systems since Ameritech had no plans to make any further  
13 enhancements.<sup>2</sup> The same is true of the Connecticut order cited by WorldCom. The Connecticut  
14 commission also used the 2% fallout rate to serve as an incentive to Southern New England Telephone  
15 Company to make system enhancements since the ILEC in that case had demonstrated that it had no  
16 intention of improving its systems.<sup>3</sup>

17 The circumstances of Ameritech and Southern New England Telephone Company at the time of  
18 the Michigan and Connecticut orders do not match Qwest’s. Qwest has made continuous improvements  
19 to all of its systems and has every intention of continue making improvements going forward. (Ex. T-  
20 2201, p. 6). Qwest recognizes the need to make these improvements and to take advantage of  
21 technological advancements to improve efficiency. Such improvements benefit Qwest as well as the  
22 CLECs. Qwest needs no further incentive to continue to improve the efficiency of its systems.

23 WorldCom also cites a Massachusetts commission order in support of its advocacy for an end-  
24 to-end ordering and provisioning fallout rate of 2%. The Massachusetts commission did order a 2% rate,

25 <sup>2</sup> See Michigan PUC Case U-11831 (November 1999) at 41-42. (The Michigan order cited by WorldCom was incorrectly  
labeled as Case No. U-11280. The Correct Case No. was U-11831 for the order issued November 1999).

26 <sup>3</sup> See Connecticut PUC, Docket 97-04-10 decision (May 1998) at 129-132.

1 but it did not intend that rate to apply end-to-end, nor did the commission intend the rate to apply to all  
2 orders. The commission made this clarification in a subsequent decision in the same docket cited by  
3 WorldCom.<sup>4</sup> The commission clarified that the 2% fallout rate should only apply to electronic orders, and  
4 that it should not apply to orders that will require some manual intervention. “We did not expect Verizon  
5 to remove Coordination Bureau costs from orders that would normally be handled manually, such as hot  
6 cuts.”<sup>5</sup> Thus, the Massachusetts commission had a much narrower view of appropriate application of  
7 flow through, a view more in line with Qwest’s proposed rates.

8 Finally, WorldCom claims that Qwest does not reflect efficiencies that would be achieved by  
9 forward-looking OSS. (WorldCom Brief, p. 14). This claim is remarkable in light of the fact that  
10 WorldCom’s witness agreed that each of Qwest’s OSS identified was a forward-looking system. (Tr.  
11 4911-12). While WorldCom went on to claim that there exist certain other systems (workforce  
12 managers) that would link these systems and allow more efficient processing, WorldCom failed to identify  
13 any such systems that are currently available and/or that function as claimed. Further, WorldCom failed  
14 to account for the additional costs that implementation of such hypothetical systems would entail. Thus,  
15 WorldCom would have the Commission reduce work times based on imagined efficiencies to be  
16 achieved by equipment that is still under development and that has failed field trials, and would not  
17 provide for any cost recovery for the implementation of those systems on a network-wide basis. The  
18 Commission should reject such suggestions out of hand. WorldCom’s analysis also ignores the evidence  
19 offered by Ms. Million and Ms. Albersheim that the proposed flow-through rates in Qwest’s non-  
20 recurring cost studies are forward looking and reflect rates that are not yet achieved for a number of  
21 products.

22 Therefore, this Commission should adopt the flow through rates defined in Qwest’s non-recurring  
23 cost studies, as Qwest has shown that they are forward looking, and appropriately applied to the ordering  
24 process.

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25 <sup>4</sup> See Massachusetts, D.P.U./D.T.E. 96-73/74, 96-75, 96-80/81, 96-83, 96-94 Phase 4S (September 2000).

26 <sup>5</sup> Id.



1           **Factors:** WorldCom inexplicably raises a number of issues in its opening brief that Qwest  
2 believed had been addressed to WorldCom’s satisfaction by Ms. Gude’s rebuttal testimony, Exhibit T-  
3 2210. These issues include the allegation of improper compounding of factors (WorldCom Brief, pp. 17-  
4 18), as well as allegations regarding reductions in the expense factors that WorldCom claims should result  
5 from merger-related cost savings. (Id., pp. 19-20).

6           With regard to the compounding issue, WorldCom’s brief merely recites Mr. Gose’s testimony  
7 that, since the simple summation of Qwest’s directly assigned, directly attributed and common cost  
8 factors produces a result that is less than the applied value, that a “compounding” error has occurred.  
9 However, as Ms. Gude explained, this simplistic analysis is flawed. (Ex. T-2210, pp. 9-10). If  
10 WorldCom had reviewed Qwest’s cost factor development documentation, WorldCom would have  
11 realized that sequential application of cost factors does not lead to erroneous mathematical compounding  
12 when factors are appropriately derived. Qwest’s Expense Factor User Manual, filed on November 9,  
13 2001 in support of its cost studies, explains the three major factor groups: Directly Assigned, Directly  
14 Attributed, and Common.<sup>6</sup> It describes that each of these major factors are “cumulative” in how they are  
15 applied, and that the denominator of one factor is dependent on the denominator and numerator of the  
16 previous factor, thereby lowering its effect. Thus, the costs resulting from the sequential application of  
17 Qwest’s factors do not erroneously compound, e.g. inflate, the final cost result, and accordingly, Mr.  
18 Gose’s algorithm issue regarding the “compounding” of costs is without merit in this proceeding.

19           WorldCom also claims that Qwest’s factors should be reduced as a result of savings and  
20 efficiencies gained through the Qwest/U S WEST merger. As Ms. Gude explained, this claim is  
21 erroneous for several reasons. First, WorldCom’s calculation of merger-related headcount reductions is  
22 vastly overstated. (Ex. T-2210, pp. 14-15). Second, merger-related changes in expenses would not  
23 have an effect on the costs modeled in this docket, and would not all be related to in-region  
24 telecommunications operations. (Id., p. 16). Third, the factors employed for purposes of this docket

25 <sup>6</sup> See Exhibit 2021, EXPENSE FACTOR MODULE – TELRIC 99V2.doc, dated December 1999 (e.g., pages 2, 16, and 24).

1 reflect lower than actual costs, and are lower than would be produced under a current calculation. (Id.,  
2 pp. 17-20). Thus, WorldCom's proposal regarding merger-related changes is not well taken.

3 **Collocation Issues:** Collocation issues in this docket include CLEC to CLEC interconnection.  
4 Qwest's opening brief anticipated and addressed all of the issues raised by WorldCom regarding  
5 collocation, and Qwest will respond to only a few points here. WorldCom disputes Qwest's proposed  
6 charges, arguing, among other things, that Qwest's cable racking assumptions are not forward looking.  
7 (WorldCom Brief, p. 27). WorldCom claims that collocators should be assumed to be next to each  
8 other, or across an aisle, and that the general collocation cost study should have captured costs for cable  
9 racking between the CLECs. The simple fact is that Qwest's collocation cost study did capture some  
10 cable racking costs, but specifically did not include assumptions for sufficient cable racking to connect  
11 CLECs to each other. Qwest's assumption of the need for a modest amount of additional cable racking  
12 is reasonable, and should be accepted.

13 WorldCom also disputes the nonrecurring charge for the CLEC to CLEC cross connection,  
14 claiming that the work times are excessive. (WorldCom Brief, p. 31). WorldCom assumes, without  
15 supporting evidence, that a circuit design for a CLEC to CLEC connection will take less time than a  
16 traditional high capacity circuit. However, Mr. Hubbard explained why this is not necessarily the case.  
17 (Ex. T-2154, p. 19). The back up information explains why the circuit design assumptions are  
18 appropriate for CLEC to CLEC connections as well as other types of circuit design activities. (Ex. C-  
19 2024, p. 61). Further, the back up information indicates that although the information was originally  
20 gathered in 1998, it was verified as being appropriate to use in 2000. Thus, it was appropriate to use in a  
21 filing that was made in 2001. On this same topic, WorldCom makes a statement that is somewhat  
22 puzzling – WorldCom states that the fact that Qwest did not modify the work times “calls into question  
23 the veracity of the statement, [that the work times are forward looking] given the change in Qwest's OSS  
24 systems since then.” (WorldCom Brief, p. 31). It is unclear what change in Qwest's OSS WorldCom is  
25 referring to. Qwest does not believe that any OSS changes necessarily impact the actual circuit design  
26 process, which is a manual process that is always performed by a design engineer. Other aspects of the

1 ordering and provisioning process related to circuit design are already assumed to be mechanized most of  
2 the time. Thus, it is unclear what additional mechanization WorldCom expects to see, or in which  
3 systems.

4 **Multiplexing:** WorldCom challenges Qwest's nonrecurring charge for multiplexing,  
5 recommending a reduction of the work time estimates for installation and disconnection. (WorldCom  
6 Brief, pp. 40-41). WorldCom's reductions are significant, eliminating 700 minutes from the installation  
7 and over 500 minutes from the disconnection. WorldCom claims that these reductions represent  
8 redundant work items and/or that they reflect the elimination of the verify/check/validate functions.  
9 However, a closer look at WorldCom's adjustments reveals that they are not well taken. Of the 700  
10 minutes that WorldCom removes, 166 are attributed to validate, verify and check items. (Ex. 2271, p.  
11 6). All of the other minutes that are removed are attributed to "other" in column "F" on Exhibit 2271.  
12 As discussed in Qwest's opening brief, WorldCom never identified why those adjustments were made,  
13 other than the use of the 50% reduction due to claimed, but unproven, systems improvements.

14 Additionally, WorldCom's claim that the activities are "redundant" is incorrect. Review of  
15 Qwest's nonrecurring cost study clearly shows that Qwest uses probabilities of 28 or 29, as appropriate,  
16 to reflect the number of orders that are actually processed for an M1-3 multiplexing order – one order for  
17 the high side (DS3) and 28 orders for the low side (28 DS1s per DS3). (Exhibit 2023, p. 58). Thus, the  
18 activities are not redundant, but necessary to process the entire order. The small amounts of time  
19 reflected for each of the work items that occur 28 or 29 times indicate that the time estimates already  
20 assume that the items are being processed in bulk rather than individually. In addition, Qwest has  
21 assumed various mechanization rates in the cost study for this element as appropriate, further reducing the  
22 overall time. WorldCom's unsupported adjustments should be rejected.

23 **Customized Routing:** WorldCom challenges Qwest's customized routing proposal, and alleges  
24 that Qwest's conduct in implementing customized routing is in violation of the parties' interconnection  
25 agreement. Qwest disputes that allegation and believes that a review of the record will reveal that it is  
26 entirely without substance. WorldCom had improperly tried to shoehorn its specific dispute about

1 customized routing into this generic cost proceeding, over Qwest's objection. Nevertheless, Qwest  
2 responded to WorldCom's allegation and innuendo during the hearing, and will do so again here.

3 WorldCom's evidence in the case establishes that WorldCom requested customized routing only  
4 weeks before the hearing in this docket, and that the parties were still in the process of conducting  
5 implementation meetings when the hearing was held. WorldCom has not established any violation of the  
6 parties' interconnection agreement, and indeed its proposal is at odds with that interconnection  
7 agreement. Under the terms of the parties' agreement, WorldCom is permitted to designate only  
8 "unique" trunks for customized routing. Some of WorldCom's feature group D trunks are unique, and  
9 others are shared. Qwest agrees to customized route traffic to WorldCom's unique FGD trunks.  
10 WorldCom insists on reading language into the interconnection agreement that simply is not there. Qwest  
11 explained, during the hearing, that WorldCom's actual request was for 411 presubscription, an issue that  
12 is currently under consideration by the industry and the FCC. The Commission here does not have a  
13 record upon which to require 411 presubscription, and does not have a record from which to conclude  
14 that WorldCom's position has any merit whatsoever.

15 One other point that bears reply is WorldCom's insistence on its allegation that Qwest somehow  
16 tried to represent that a Commission order prevented it from complying with WorldCom's request.  
17 (WorldCom Brief, p. 45). WorldCom provides no citation to the record in support of this claim. Indeed,  
18 there is none. During the hearing Mr. Craig, who was present at the meeting where this representation  
19 was allegedly made, was asked about this issue. WorldCom's counsel repeatedly attempted to obtain an  
20 admission to that effect, but Mr. Craig emphasized that Qwest had never said that there was a regulatory  
21 prohibition against the request, only that there was a concern about whether such an order existed. (Tr.  
22 4682-83). It is unclear why WorldCom insists on misrepresenting the meetings between the parties in this  
23 manner, but WorldCom's lack of candor about the conversations and transactions between the parties  
24 should be a caution against adopting WorldCom's view of the facts on disputed points.

25 **UNE-P New:** The nonrecurring charge for UNE-P new service was discussed in Qwest's  
26 opening brief. There, Qwest pointed out that WorldCom's proposed work time adjustments were

1 unsupported, speculative, and so lacking in specificity that Qwest was unable to explore with the  
2 WorldCom witness which work times and probabilities were adjusted and why.

3 In WorldCom's opening brief, WorldCom unveils a new approach at criticizing Qwest's  
4 estimates. WorldCom claims that Qwest has provided (in discovery) a detailed list of work steps  
5 underlying the overall function performed at the loop provisioning center. (WorldCom Brief, p. 55).  
6 However, this is essentially a criticism of the fact that the time estimate has been performed for an overall  
7 function rather than the underlying detailed steps, and that each and every task is not assigned a precise  
8 increment of time. This is exactly at odds with WorldCom's criticism elsewhere that Qwest had broken  
9 tasks down into increments that are too small. (WorldCom Brief, p. 33. "Qwest's subject matter  
10 experts appear to have provided time estimates for very small activities that were considered mutually  
11 exclusive, rather than providing time estimates to complete overall functions"). Thus, WorldCom leaves  
12 itself free to criticize information that is detailed, claiming that the level of detail inflates the time, and  
13 information that is not detailed enough, claiming that there is not enough information to ascertain the  
14 reasonableness of the time estimates. This is clearly a pleasant enough position for WorldCom to be in,  
15 but the Commission should not indulge this obviously results-oriented advocacy.

16 **Branding:** WorldCom complains about Qwest's proposed rates for branding operator services  
17 and directory assistance. WorldCom asks the Commission to establish TELRIC rates for branding, but  
18 provides the Commission with no citation to any legal authority allowing the Commission to impose such a  
19 pricing requirement on a service that is not a UNE. Qwest will provide branding, but because Qwest also  
20 provides customized routing, Qwest is not required to provide branding at TELRIC rates, since operator  
21 services and directory assistance are not UNEs. Qwest's legal analysis regarding this issue is set forth in  
22 its opening brief and will not be repeated here. However, WorldCom apparently misunderstood two  
23 aspects of Qwest's proposal, which Qwest will clarify here.

24 WorldCom claims that Qwest is proposing ICB pricing for branding. (WorldCom Brief, p. 60).  
25 This is not correct. There are no elements of Qwest's pricing proposal that are ICB for branding.  
26 WorldCom further claims that Qwest will assess the branding nonrecurring charge twice, once for

1 operator services and once for directory assistance, even though the same taped announcement could be  
2 used for both services. (Id., p. 62). This is also incorrect. Ms. Malone clarified in March 2002, (months  
3 before the hearing) that if the same taped announcement was used for both services, Qwest would assess  
4 the nonrecurring charge only one time (Ex. T-2131, p. 9).

5 **Access to Poles, Conduits, and Rights of Way:** WorldCom challenges Qwest's rates for  
6 access to poles, conduits and rights of way. Qwest has proposed separate nonrecurring rates for the  
7 database inquiry and the field inspections necessary to process each request for access. At the heart of  
8 WorldCom's challenge is the allegation that the "information contained in its [Qwest's] databases is  
9 unreliable." (WorldCom Brief, p. 63). While Qwest cannot agree with the use of the word "unreliable",  
10 with its attendant negative connotations, Qwest does agree that field conditions can change in ways  
11 beyond Qwest's control such that the database information does not always match the conditions in the  
12 field. Qwest explained how this can happen in its testimony, in its opening brief, and in its Part B petition  
13 for reconsideration. WorldCom has never addressed these concerns, and has never explained how  
14 Qwest is to keep its databases current without field verifications. If it is the CLEC request for access that  
15 necessitates a field verification in a particular instance, it is appropriate that the CLEC pay the costs, just  
16 as Qwest pays when its own network needs drive the field verification. Contrary to WorldCom's  
17 assertion, Qwest is not asking CLECs to pay to "clean up Qwest's databases." Rather, Qwest is asking  
18 the cost causer in each case to be responsible.

19 **Directory Listings:** In its opening brief, Qwest anticipated and responded to WorldCom's  
20 unfounded arguments that DAL listings must be provided "at cost," whatever WorldCom means by that  
21 phrase. Qwest will not repeat its analysis here.

22 However, Qwest will briefly reply to two of WorldCom's arguments regarding the propriety of  
23 Qwest's proposed reload rates. WorldCom's analysis is internally inconsistent. While WorldCom  
24 argues at length that all DAL listing rates should be cost based (citing FCC decisions that do not, in fact,  
25 mandate cost-based pricing), WorldCom ignores its own logic and explicitly instructs the Commission to  
26 disregard the fact that "Qwest incurs programming costs when reloads are furnished since the data needs

1 to be extracted from Qwest's databases." (WorldCom Brief, p. 85). Instead, WorldCom urges the  
2 Commission to compel Qwest to provide the reload service for free since WorldCom has already paid  
3 for the data once. (Id.). Such advocacy is neither cost-based nor market based, it is purely result-  
4 oriented.

5 In addition, WorldCom argues that the reload charge should be lower since Qwest avoids certain  
6 setup costs it assumes Qwest recoups through its initial listings. WorldCom's analysis is flawed for  
7 several reasons. First, since DAL listings are not UNEs, Qwest does not assert that its proposed rates  
8 are TELRIC. Thus, WorldCom's argument about reduced costs to Qwest is irrelevant. Second, to the  
9 extent Qwest is "recouping" new account set-up costs, it does so through its separate one-time set up  
10 fee. (Ex. 2056, § 10.6.4). Finally, WorldCom's argument overlooks the fact that Qwest does in fact  
11 charge 20% less for reloads than it does for the initial loads. (Id., §§ 10.6.1, 10.6.2).

12 Qwest's rate design is logical and fairly treats CLECs. The Part D record is bereft of any  
13 evidentiary support for WorldCom's arguments that Qwest's DAL listings rate structure is discriminatory  
14 or in any way unlawful. Based on the legal analysis set out in Qwest's opening brief and the Part D  
15 record, the Commission should approve each of Qwest's proposed DAL listings rates.

### 16 III. REPLY TO COVAD

17 Covad's post-hearing brief raises three issues to which Qwest will reply. Covad challenges  
18 Qwest's proposals for loop installation with cooperative testing, unbundled packet switching, and  
19 miscellaneous charges.

20 **Cooperative Testing:** Covad asserts that "Qwest should compensate competitors, or at least  
21 not charge them, for the testing costs that Qwest has forced CLECs to bear in order to minimize the costs  
22 created by Qwest's own provisioning problems." (Covad Brief, pp. 10-11). Covad claims that Qwest  
23 has forced it into ordering cooperative testing by delivering poor quality loops when it orders basic  
24 installation. Covad, however, has not provided any information concerning the quality of loops provided  
25 when it ordered a basic installation, nor has any Covad witness testified that basic installation did not  
26

1 provide acceptable loops. Far from supporting the claim that Qwest delivers bad loops, Covad's  
2 testimony supports the value of cooperative testing in resolving mutual problems.

3 Covad cites several Verizon cases in which other Commissions have ordered a zero dollar  
4 amount for cooperative testing. (Covad Brief, pp. 13-15). In those cases, however, cooperative testing  
5 was mandatory; Verizon did not offer basic installation without this service.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the Maryland  
6 case involved only cooperative testing with line shared loops that were previously installed and  
7 presumably worked for voice. This case involves only optional cooperative testing for stand-alone loops.  
8 In circumstances where the CLEC has the option to order loops without testing, as is the case here, the  
9 CLEC who demands additional cooperative testing should be assessed the incremental cost of that  
10 additional activity.

11 Covad also cites an order from Massachusetts in support of its argument. (Id, p. 15). This order  
12 merely reaffirms the Massachusetts' Department of Telecommunications and Energy's previous decision  
13 requiring Verizon to "share in the cost of cooperative testing by absorbing all of its own costs associated  
14 with its test, as the CLECs do with respect to their own testing,"<sup>8</sup> However, cooperative testing was also  
15 mandatory in this case, not optional as it is in Washington.

16 In 2001, Covad also made essentially the same argument before the Pennsylvania Public Utility  
17 Commission as it does here.<sup>9</sup> That commission rejected those arguments and permitted Verizon to  
18 impose a cooperative testing charge whenever Verizon performs continuity testing at the request of a  
19 CLEC.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the commission found that such charges were "reasonable and not susceptible to

20 <sup>7</sup> See, e.g., Order No. 76852, *Arbitration of Rhythms Links, Inc. and Covad Communications Co. vs. Bell Atlantic-*  
21 *Maryland, Inc. Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Case No. 8842, Phase II (Md.  
P.S.C. April 3, 2001) at 38-39; Decision and Order, *Board's Review of Unbundled Network Elements Rates, Terms and*  
*Conditions of Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc.*, Dkt. No. TO00060356 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. Nov. 20, 2001) at 199.

22 <sup>8</sup> See *Investigation by the Department of Telecommunications and Energy on its own Motion into the Appropriate*  
23 *Pricing, based upon Total Element Long-Run Incremental Costs, for Unbundled Network Elements and*  
*Combinations of Unbundled Network Elements, and the Appropriate Avoided-Cost Discount for Verizon New*  
*England, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Massachusetts' Resale Services in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts*, Dkt. No. D.T.E.  
01-20 (Mass. D.T.E. July 2002) at 239.

24 <sup>9</sup> See *Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc.*, R-00005261, R-00005261C0001, A-310696F0002, *et al.*, Opinion and Order  
25 (Pennsylvania PUC Sept. 4, 2001) at 19.

26 <sup>10</sup> See *Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc.*, R-00005261, R-00005261C0001, A-310696F0002, *et al.*, Interim Order and Opinion  
(Pennsylvania PUC June 8, 2001); *recon. denied Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc.*, R-00005261, R-00005261C0001, A-  
310696F0002, *et al.*, Opinion and Order (Pennsylvania PUC Sept. 4, 2001).



1 providing Verizon with a disincentive to provide quality service to the CLEC."<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, within  
2 Qwest's incumbent service territory, state commissions in Arizona and Colorado have also approved  
3 rates for testing and coordinated installation.<sup>12</sup>

4 **Unbundled Packet Switching:** Covad begins its discussion of unbundled packet switching  
5 ("UPS") by pointing out that this Commission previously rejected Qwest's architecture for UPS wherein  
6 DSLAMs are placed remotely at the feeder distribution interface ("FDI"). However, the Commission  
7 made that determination in Part B of this docket<sup>13</sup> on the basis of language in the FCC's Line Sharing  
8 Reconsideration Order about line sharing over DLC facilities. In addition, the Commission discussed  
9 Covad's claim that Qwest's "DA Hotel" proposal would only provide CLECs the ability to share the  
10 distribution portion of the loop but not the feeder portion. It is important to remember that Qwest's DA  
11 Hotel proposal as presented in Part B of this docket was in the early stages of development at that time.  
12 It should be clear by now that neither Qwest's UPS proposal nor its proposal for remote terminal  
13 collocation limit a CLEC's ability to access the feeder portion of the loop if the CLEC desires.

14 Nowhere in its discussions of Qwest's DA Hotel proposal for Part B did Covad mention the  
15 FCC's Order Clarification.<sup>14</sup> In the Order Clarification, the FCC clarified that "the *Line Sharing*  
16 *Reconsideration Order* in no way modified the criteria set forth in the Commission's *UNE Remand*  
17 *Order* regarding the unbundling of packet switching functionality."<sup>15</sup> Thus, UPS continues to be required  
18 only in circumstances where: 1) the ILEC has deployed DLC systems; 2) there are no spare copper  
19 loops capable of supporting xDSL services the CLEC seeks to offer; 3) the ILEC has not permitted the  
20 CLEC to deploy a DSLAM in the remote terminal; and 4) the ILEC has deployed packet switching for

21 <sup>11</sup> *Id.*

22 <sup>12</sup> See Phase II Order, *Investigating into QWEST Corporation's Compliance with Certain Wholesale Pricing*  
23 *Requirements for Unbundled Network Elements at Resale Discounts*, Docket No. T-00000A-00-0194, Decision No.  
64922, at 33-34 (ACC June 12, 2002); Commission Order, *In The Matter of U S WEST Communications, Inc.'s Statement*  
24 *of Generally Available Terms and Conditions*, Docket No. 99A-577T, Decision No. 01-1302, at 14-15 (CPUC Nov. 13,  
2001).

24 <sup>13</sup> Docket No. UT-003013, Part B Order, (dated June 21, 2002), ¶ 35.

25 <sup>14</sup> *In the Matter of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and*  
*Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 98-147  
and CC Docket No. 96-98 (rel. February 23, 2001) (Order Clarification).

26 <sup>15</sup> Order Clarification, ¶ 1.

1 its own use. Further, the FCC's discussion of these requirements in the *UNE Remand Order* at  
2 paragraphs 303 and 304 contemplated DSLAMs as a component of packet switching and specifically  
3 declined to adopt definitions of packet switching that excluded DSLAMs from the packet switching  
4 functionality. There is simply no basis for the Commission to reject a DSLAM-based UPS architecture  
5 when that architecture has been specifically accepted by the FCC in its orders.

6 Covad goes on to argue that Qwest's UPS rates must be rejected because they do not represent  
7 the least-cost architecture and are therefore not TELRIC-compliant. Covad claims that NGDLC is the  
8 least-cost forward-looking architecture, yet provides no alternative evidence supporting its conclusion. In  
9 contrast, Qwest proposed a cost study based on the remote deployment of DSLAMs and also provided  
10 a comparison to an NGDLC solution. That comparison (Exhibit C-2074) shows that NGDLC is not the  
11 least-cost solution. If Covad truly believes NGDLC is a less costly solution, it should have presented a  
12 cost comparison of its own.

13 Covad does attempt to argue that Qwest's investment of \$514 per subscriber compared to the  
14 NGDLC investment of \$123 per subscriber for SBC's Project Pronto proves that NGDLC would offer  
15 the least-cost solution for providing UPS. However, there is nothing in the record that supports \$123 as  
16 a verifiable cost per subscriber under the NGDLC architecture. Covad presented no evidence of the  
17 basis for the investment number it cited, nor did it provide any actual evidence regarding SBC's estimate  
18 of demand. Thus, there is no way to determine whether the figures provided by Covad's witness, Mr.  
19 Donovan, during the hearings are anything more than pure speculation.

20 In addition, Covad's discussion of NGDLC as the least-cost solution appears to assume that  
21 NGDLC with DSLAM functionality at the DLC would be deployed 100% throughout the network.  
22 However, this assumption is inconsistent with the assumptions contained in the models that this  
23 Commission relied upon in setting Qwest's unbundled loop rates. Those models assumed that only 40-  
24 60% of the network would be provisioned using a DLC architecture, and they most certainly did not  
25 include assumptions that "one piece of equipment at one location [could] perform both the voice and data  
26 muxing functions" as suggested in Covad's brief on page 21. Therefore, in order to be consistent with the

1 Commission's existing assumptions about the way Qwest's network would be configured in a forward-  
2 looking environment, there is a significant amount of additional equipment that would need to be installed  
3 in that network and included in the cost for NGDLC to be a viable UPS solution. It would be  
4 inappropriate for the Commission to allow Covad's suggested architecture to be used for UPS without  
5 also providing Qwest with adequate recovery for the additional cost of assuming that architecture in the  
6 loop network. In contrast, Qwest's proposed solution is the least-cost choice, not because of Qwest's  
7 embedded network as suggested by Covad, but because of the forward-looking network assumptions  
8 contained in other decisions already made by this Commission.

9 Covad also claims that Qwest's UPS product may not be competitively viable or sufficient  
10 because it covers an unspecified bit rate which will not support Covad's needs and does not include a  
11 loop. (Covad Brief, p. 24). Qwest did not specify a bit rate because the CLEC can run whatever rate it  
12 wants through the virtual channel which shares a digital pipe with other Qwest and CLEC services  
13 between the DSLAM and the ATM switch port. At peak times, all services in a virtual channel may face  
14 restricted bandwidth. If Covad wants a committed bit rate, it may order a subloop feeder of the  
15 appropriate size to connect the DSLAM to the ATM port and a dedicated loop of the same size. Qwest  
16 offers a variety of options for the CLEC to include a loop in the UPS configuration of its choice. In short,  
17 Qwest provides an end-to-end service, which can be configured to provide committed bit rate service  
18 through the purchase of the proper UNEs.

19 Covad does not actually challenge Qwest's remote terminal collocation cost study for remote  
20 deployment of DSLAMs, nor provide the Commission with verifiable costs of its own. Instead, it claims  
21 that it should be permitted to buy UPS or some version of "line sharing over fiber" wherever Qwest has  
22 deployed its own remote DSLAM, and at a price based on a network that doesn't exist either in reality  
23 or in the forward-looking network configurations for loops. It asks the Commission to make such a  
24 determination because, it argues, no CLEC can afford to provide DSL through remote collocation of its  
25 own DSLAM. Nevertheless, the FCC confirmed in its Order Clarification that its rules regarding an  
26 ILEC's obligation to provide UPS continue to provide the appropriate test, and that the inability of

1 CLECs to remotely deploy DSLAMs is based on space limitations and not cost. The Act requires a  
2 TELRIC-based offering, and Qwest's proposal is consistent with that requirement.

3 **Miscellaneous Charges:** Covad challenges Qwest's proposed "Miscellaneous Charges."  
4 Covad claims that Qwest did not provide cost support for these charges, and did not define how the  
5 charges would be applied, and that because of those failings, Qwest should not be permitted to assess  
6 any of the listed charges. (Covad Brief, p. 25).

7 In support of its claim that Qwest did not provide cost support for the charges, Covad cites to a  
8 transcript reference of "5/21/02 (Easton)," page 153. (Covad Brief, fn. 67). Covad may have confused  
9 this proceeding with the Minnesota cost docket, in which hearings began on May 21, 2002. There were  
10 no cost docket hearings in Washington on May 21, 2002, and there is no relevant "page 153" in this  
11 record. Indeed, in Washington, Covad did not ask Mr. Easton any questions about these charges.

12 Qwest's miscellaneous charges are supported by the cost study contained in Exhibit 2023, and  
13 the back up information provided in Exhibit C-2024, pages 357-8. The application of the miscellaneous  
14 charges is defined in the SGAT, Exhibit 2059. Miscellaneous charges are defined in SGAT §4.40(a),  
15 and addressed in §9.1.12 and in various other sections of the SGAT. Thus, there is no basis for Covad's  
16 allegation that Qwest failed to provide cost support for the charges or that there is no definition as to how  
17 the charges would be applied.

#### 18 **IV. REPLY TO STAFF**

19 Commission Staff's post-hearing brief raises two issues to which Qwest will reply. First, Staff  
20 challenges Qwest's use of subject matter experts, contending that subject-matter expert testimony cannot  
21 be substituted for properly conducted time and motion studies. Staff further contends that Qwest's work  
22 time estimates are not forward looking. Second, Staff incorrectly states that Qwest did not provide cost  
23 support for its customized routing proposal.

24 **Subject Matter Experts:** Many of the issues regarding subject-matter expert testimony have  
25 been addressed in response to WorldCom's brief above. However, it is important to reiterate that time  
26

1 and motion studies will not provide the Commission with a more accurate, reliable, or forward-looking set  
2 of work time estimates than currently exist from reliance on subject matter experts.

3 By their very nature, time and motion studies are backward looking, and measure only activities  
4 as they are or have been performed in the past. (Ex. T-2052, pp. 6-7). Time and motion studies do not  
5 lend themselves to estimation of complex and variable work functions. (Ex. T-2154, pp. 2-7). Rather,  
6 they are best suited to measuring repetitive, assembly line type work. (Id.). Furthermore, they are  
7 expensive and time consuming to conduct. Thus, it is difficult to understand any basis upon which such  
8 studies would be required, when they are demonstrably in violation of TELRIC costing principles, and  
9 otherwise of limited value.

10 Indeed, the only way to cure the “backward looking” nature of a time and motion study would be  
11 to engage one or more subject matter experts to adjust the results of the study to incorporate forward  
12 looking assumptions. Furthermore, the only way to conduct a time and motion study of complex and  
13 variable activities would be to engage one or more subject matter experts to adjust the results of the study  
14 to incorporate simplifying assumptions and/or probabilities of occurrence for the variables. This would  
15 result in a reliance on the opinions of subject matter experts that is as great as it is today.

16 Qwest’s subject matter experts are already instructed to incorporate forward-looking  
17 assumptions when they provide their estimates. (Ex. C-2024, p. 21). Additionally, they exclude  
18 problems encountered during the processing of the service order, supplements to the initial order, and  
19 maintenance and repair times. (Id.). A time and motion study would capture all of these additional work  
20 times, which would then have to be removed or otherwise adjusted out.

21 Staff contends that Qwest cannot accurately reflect changes in times due to technological or other  
22 improvements, citing Ms. Million’s response to a question from Dr. Gabel. (Staff Brief, p. 7). However,  
23 Staff overlooks other important testimony from Ms. Million, where she did specifically identify  
24 assumptions in the cost study (based on SME estimates) that reflect efficiencies not yet achieved. For  
25 example, Ms. Million identified one element where Qwest’s actual (experienced) flow through was 5%,  
26 but the cost study assumption is 85%. (Tr. 4329-30).

1 A time and motion study would thus only increase Qwest's administrative costs, and provide no  
2 material benefit to the Commission or the CLECs. Qwest again asks the Commission to reject the  
3 various parties' requests that Qwest be ordered to conduct such studies.

4 **Customized Routing:** Staff states that Qwest did not provide cost support for customized  
5 routing, citing Ms. Million's testimony at page 4184 of the transcript, lines 6-8. (Staff Brief, p. 11). This  
6 is incorrect. The cited testimony actually addresses the fact that Qwest did not provide cost studies for  
7 directory assistance and call branding, not customized routing. Qwest's customized routing proposal is  
8 supported by the nonrecurring cost study, Exhibit 2023, pages 510-513 and the back up documentation  
9 contained in Exhibit C-2024, pages 614-621.

10 **V. CONCLUSION**

11 For the reasons stated, Qwest requests that the Commission adopt the costs and rates that  
12 Qwest has proposed.

13 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of August, 2002.

14 QWEST

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