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BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

In the Matter of the  
CONTINUED COSTING AND PRICING  
OF UNBUNDLED NETWORK  
ELEMENTS, TRANSPORT, TERMINA-  
TION, AND RESALE

Docket No. UT-003013 (Part B)  
QWEST'S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE  
TO PETITIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION  
AND REHEARING OF THE 32ND SUPPLE-  
MENTAL ORDER

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Qwest files this Answer in response to the Petitions for Reconsideration and Rehearing filed by AT&T and XO, TRACER, and Covad. Qwest urges the Commission to deny the requests for both reconsideration and rehearing because these parties have presented no basis for the Commission to either reconsider its decisions or rehear the issues. The challenges to the Commission's decisions on reciprocal compensation, TIFs, fill factors, and consistency of loop cost estimates merely restate the parties' hearing positions, and rehash arguments that have already been considered and rejected. Qwest also responds to one issue raised in Verizon's Petition, and supports Verizon's request that the Commission reconsider or clarify its decision with regard to the requirement to file time and motion studies in Part E.

**II. DISCUSSION**

**A. Reciprocal Compensation**

AT&T/XO request reconsideration of two Commission rulings relating to reciprocal compensation. First, they contend that the Commission erred in not allowing CLECs to recover both the

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SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

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1 end office and tandem switching rates in all circumstances, even where a CLEC only performs end office  
2 switching. Second, they argue that the Commission improperly excluded Internet traffic from the relative  
3 use calculations that all parties agree should be used to determine responsibility for paying for  
4 interconnection facilities.

5 The Commission's rulings on these issues are correct. In challenging the rulings, AT&T/XO offer  
6 the same arguments that the Commission has already considered and rejected. There is no evidentiary or  
7 legal justification for AT&T's/XO's challenges, and the Commission should affirm its rulings on both  
8 issues.

9 **1. The Commission Properly Established a Two-Tiered Rate Scheme Relating to**  
10 **Tandem Switching.**

11 AT&T's/XO's challenge to the Commission's ruling establishing a two-tiered rate scheme for  
12 tandem switching is premised on the position that a CLEC is entitled to the tandem switch compensation  
13 rate for *all* ILEC traffic that the CLEC terminates on its network. The Commission correctly rejected this  
14 position by relying on FCC Rule 711 and the fundamental principle that rates for transport and  
15 termination of local telecommunications traffic must be symmetrical.<sup>1</sup>

16 As the Commission correctly observed, by requesting the tandem rate for all ILEC traffic,  
17 AT&T/XO are seeking asymmetrical termination rates.<sup>2</sup> If an ILEC has large volumes of traffic  
18 terminating at a single end office, it would use direct end office trunking and would not route the traffic  
19 through a tandem switch. Based on the principle of rate symmetry, when a CLEC has the analogous  
20 situation – where there are direct trunks between a Qwest end office and a CLEC switch, for example –  
21 the CLEC likewise should be permitted to charge only the end office rate. If a CLEC were permitted to  
22 charge the tandem rate in this circumstance, the rate would not be symmetrical with the ILEC's rate and,  
23 moreover, the CLEC would receive compensation in excess of its costs.

24 Allowing a CLEC to recover more termination costs than it incurs also would violate the

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>1</sup> See 32nd Supplemental Order (“Order”) at ¶¶ 102-105.

<sup>2</sup> See *id.* at ¶¶ 103, 105.

1 requirement in FCC Rule 709(a) that state commissions "shall establish rates for transport and termination  
2 of local telecommunications traffic that are structured consistently *with the manner that carriers incur*  
3 *those costs . . .*"<sup>3</sup> This provision requires that a CLEC's termination rates reflect the cost efficiencies  
4 associated with the use of direct trunking, since the use of such trunking relates directly to the "manner" in  
5 which costs are incurred.

6 AT&T/XO contend that the two-tiered rate scheme the Commission ordered violates the  
7 "geographic comparability" criterion in FCC Rule 711(a)(3), but in advancing that argument they ignore  
8 altogether the rate symmetry requirements of that very Rule that undermine their position. In particular,  
9 Rule 711(a)(1) provides:

10 [S]ymmetrical rates are rates that a carrier other than an incumbent LEC  
11 assesses upon an incumbent LEC for transport and termination of  
12 telecommunications traffic *equal* to those that the incumbent LEC  
assesses upon the other carrier for the same services. (Emphasis added).

13 AT&T/XO are demanding that this Commission, in violation of this Rule, impose upon the ILECs  
14 *unequal* termination rates by charging the tandem rate in circumstances where the ILECs could not  
15 charge that rate.

16 There also is no merit to AT&T's/XO's suggestion that the Commission relied improperly on the  
17 FCC's *Local Competition Order*<sup>4</sup> in ordering the two-tiered rate scheme. To the contrary, the  
18 Commission properly relied on paragraph 1090 of the *Local Competition Order* as evidence that not all  
19 calls terminating on a CLEC's network must be priced at the tandem rate.<sup>5</sup> The FCC instructs in that  
20 paragraph that state commissions must determine

21 whether *some or all calls* terminating on the new entrant's network  
22 should be priced the same as the sum of transport and termination via the  
incumbent LEC's tandem switch. (Emphasis added).

23 This provision implicitly validates the Commissions ruling that not all calls terminated by CLECs would be

24 <sup>3</sup> 47 C.F.R. § 51.709(a) (emphasis added).

25 <sup>4</sup> First Report and Order, *In the Matter of the Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the*  
*Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-98 & 95-185, FCC 96-325 (rel. Aug. 6, 1996) ("*Local Competition*  
*Order*").

26 <sup>5</sup> See Order at ¶ 103.

1 subject to the tandem rate, as does paragraph 1086 of the *Local Competition Order*, also cited by the  
2 Commission.<sup>6</sup>

3 Accordingly, there is a sound legal and evidentiary basis for the two-tiered rate structure the  
4 Commission adopted. AT&T's/XO's claim that the Commission's ruling is without support is plainly  
5 wrong.

6 **2. The Commission Correctly Concluded that Payment for Local Interconnection  
7 Facilities Should Be Determined Based Upon the Local Traffic Flow Over Those  
8 Facilities.**

9 The Commission correctly ordered that cost sharing for interconnection facilities should "be  
10 determined according to the relative *local* traffic flow over that facility."<sup>7</sup> Because the FCC has ruled that  
11 Internet traffic is interstate, not local, the Commission properly excluded that traffic from the calculation of  
12 relative use.<sup>8</sup>

13 In arguing that the Commission should reverse itself, AT&T/XO rely on the flawed contention that  
14 the FCC's reciprocal compensation rules apply not only to local traffic but also to interstate Internet  
15 traffic. The FCC rules that implement the reciprocal compensation obligations set forth in section  
16 251(b)(5) of the Act expressly exclude interstate access traffic from the "telecommunications traffic" that  
17 is subject to reciprocal compensation.

18 FCC Rule 701(a) establishes that reciprocal compensation applies to the "transport and  
19 termination of telecommunications traffic," and Rule 701(b)(1), in turn, defines "telecommunications  
20 traffic" as *not* including interstate access traffic:

21 (b) *Telecommunications traffic.* For purposes of this subpart,  
22 telecommunications traffic means:

22 <sup>6</sup> See *id.* at ¶ 104.

23 <sup>7</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 113 (emphasis in original).

24 <sup>8</sup> See *id.*; see also Order on Remand and Report and Order, *In the Matter of Implementation of the Local  
25 Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic*,  
26 CC Dkt. Nos. 96-98 & 99-68, FCC 01-131, at ¶¶ 52, 57, 65 (rel. Apr. 27, 2001) ("*ISP Order II*"), remanded, *WorldCom, Inc.  
v. FCC*, 288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recent remand of  
the *ISP Order II* does not affect the FCC's determination that traffic bound for ISPs is interstate in nature. Rather, the  
court's remand turns on its determination that section 251(g) of the Act cannot provide the basis for the FCC's  
conclusion that reciprocal compensation is not owed for ISP-bound traffic. See *WorldCom, Inc.*, 288 F.3d at 434.

1 (1) Telecommunications traffic exchanged between a LEC and a  
2 telecommunications carrier other than a CMRS provider, *except for*  
3 *telecommunications traffic that is interstate* or intrastate exchange  
4 access, information access, or exchange services for such access.<sup>9</sup>

5 Consistent with this definition, the concept of each carrier paying for its relative use of  
6 transmission facilities, which is set forth in FCC Rule 51.709(b), does not apply to interstate traffic.  
7 Because the FCC has established unequivocally that Internet traffic is interstate access,<sup>10</sup> the Commission  
8 correctly concluded that this traffic should not be part of the relative use calculations.

9 The Commission's ruling is supported further by the FCC's conclusion that Internet traffic is within  
10 the FCC's exclusive jurisdiction.<sup>11</sup> That ruling precludes state commissions from including this traffic in  
11 compensation calculations for interconnection facilities. Compensation for the facilities associated with  
12 this interstate traffic is within the sole province of the FCC.

13 The correctness of the Commission's ruling on this issue is confirmed by decisions from the  
14 Colorado and Oregon commissions that discuss the legal principles and policy reasons for excluding  
15 Internet traffic from relative use. The Oregon Commission adopted the following ruling of the arbitrator in  
16 an arbitration between Qwest and Level 3 Communications:

17 The same arbitrage opportunities that the FCC cites with respect to the  
18 termination of ISP-bound traffic, apply in the allocation of ILEC facilities'  
19 costs on the basis of relative use by the traffic originator, because an  
20 ILEC customer who calls an ISP generates an identical number of  
21 minutes-of-use over facilities on the ILEC side of the POI as over the  
22 CLEC's terminating facilities. The overall thrust of the language of the  
*ISP Remand Order* is clearly directed at removing what the FCC  
perceives as uneconomic subsidies and false economic signals from the  
scheme for compensating interconnecting carriers transporting Internet-  
related traffic. Since the allocation of costs of transport and entrance  
facilities is based upon relative use of those facilities, ISP-bound traffic is  
properly excluded, when calculating relative use by the originating  
carrier.<sup>12</sup>

23 <sup>9</sup> 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(c) (emphasis added).

24 <sup>10</sup> *ISP Order II* at ¶ 57.

25 <sup>11</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 82.

26 <sup>12</sup> Arbitrator's Decision, *In the Matter of the Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, with Qwest Corporation Regarding Rates, Terms, And Conditions for Interconnection*, ARB 332 (Or. P.U.C. Aug. 15, 2001) at quoted in Commission Decision, *In the Matter of the Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996*,

1 In reaching the same conclusion in a separate arbitration between Qwest and Level 3, the  
2 Colorado Commission relied on principles of cost causation:

3 When connecting to an ISP served by a CLEC, the ILEC end-user acts  
4 primarily as the customer of the ISP, not as the customer of the ILEC.  
5 The end-user should pay the ISP; the ISP should charge the cost-causing  
6 end-user. The ISP should compensate both the ILEC (Qwest) and the  
7 CLEC (Level 3) for the costs incurred in originating and transporting the  
8 ISP-bound call. Therefore, we agree with Qwest that Internet related  
9 traffic should be excluded when determining relative use of the entrance  
10 facilities and direct trunked transport.<sup>13</sup>

11 Consistent with these decisions and the applicable FCC rules, the Commission properly required  
12 the exclusion of Internet traffic from relative use. AT&T's/XO's exception to that ruling should be denied.

13 **B. Qwest's Cost Studies**

14 **1. Probability of Manual Orders**

15 AT&T/XO ask the Commission to require Qwest to separate all of its nonrecurring charges to  
16 reflect whether the CLEC ordered the element electronically or via facsimile. They claim that such an  
17 outcome is consistent with the 17th Supplemental Order in UT-960369 (AT&T/XO Petition at ¶ 8).  
18 Qwest opposes this request, and believes that the Commission has correctly allowed Qwest to assess a  
19 single nonrecurring charge that is calculated using appropriate assumptions regarding the relative  
20 probabilities of manual versus mechanized orders.

21 On this issue it is important to remember that Qwest is seeking recovery of properly calculated  
22 TELRIC costs – it is not seeking recovery of its actual, or historic costs of order processing – indeed, if  
23 Qwest were, the CLECs could be counted on to protest. Yet, when it appears as though the CLECs  
24 might gain some cost advantage by advocating “actual” costs, they can also apparently be counted on to  
25 do so. The CLECs are asking that they only be charged for electronic ordering when they submit an  
26 order via IMA, and that those carriers who submit via facsimile be charged a different rate. Qwest's

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with *Qwest Corporation Regarding Rates, Terms, And Conditions for Interconnection*, ARB 332, Order No. 01-809  
(Or. P.U.C. Sept. 13, 2001) at 4 n.3.

<sup>13</sup> Initial Commission Decision, *In the Matter of the Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to Establish an Interconnection Agreement with Qwest Corporation*, Dkt. No. 00B-601T, Decision No. C01-312 (Colo. P.U.C. March 30, 2001) at 36.

1 testimony in this and other phases of the proceeding has consistently emphasized the fact that Qwest  
2 employs forward-looking assumptions regarding the ordering process. This is true with regard to the  
3 probabilities of mechanized orders as well, where Qwest has generally used assumptions regarding  
4 mechanized ordering and flow through that are higher than Qwest has actually experienced, thus  
5 producing a lower cost.<sup>14</sup> If Qwest were now to be required to produce actual costs, its cost studies  
6 would look much different. One of the main points of conducting a nonrecurring cost study is to produce  
7 a cost and price for an activity based on averages and somewhat simplified or generalized assumptions  
8 about the actual process. To the extent that the CLECs are now advocating a more granular approach,  
9 the whole process would change.

10 Qwest notes that it has submitted many nonrecurring costs and prices since the 17th  
11 Supplemental Order, and all of them, with the exception of UNE-P, have been structured in the way that  
12 the CLECs now oppose. Qwest asks that the Commission affirm its holding in paragraph 129 of the  
13 Order.

## 14 2. TIFs

15 AT&T/XO and TRACER all challenge the Commission's conclusions regarding Qwest's TIFs.  
16 At paragraphs 10-15 of their Petition, AT&T/XO discuss Qwest's TIFs and argue that since they are  
17 based on actual experience, they are not TELRIC. Qwest provided information in response to a bench  
18 request illustrating the trend in TIFs that showed that there was very little fluctuation in them year over  
19 year.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, the TIFs used in Qwest's studies are forward-looking, since they are not reasonably  
20 anticipated to change significantly in the future.

21 These parties also claim that the Commission inappropriately disregarded Mr. Weiss's testimony,  
22 and incorrectly characterized Mr. Weiss's experience as being with a "small" company as opposed to a  
23 "mid-sized" company (AT&T/XO Petition at ¶ 14). First of all, it is largely irrelevant whether Mr.  
24 Weiss's experience is with a small company or a mid-sized one, since neither would be comparable to

25 <sup>14</sup> See, e.g., Tr. 4314-16, Part D

26 <sup>15</sup> Response to Bench Request #25.

1 Qwest. Second, although Mr. Weiss may have characterized the company as mid-sized, he gave more  
2 detailed information with regard to the size of the company during cross examination, describing the  
3 approximate number of lines the company had as 20,000, served from one central office (Tr. 3568-70).  
4 The Commission is certainly free to consider this testimony and reach a conclusion that the company is  
5 properly described as “small” in comparison to Qwest, which has approximately 25 million lines in 14  
6 states.

7 The other arguments raised in paragraph 14 are logically flawed and should be rejected. For  
8 example, AT&T/XO argue that if a small company has less buying power with regard to equipment, it  
9 must also have less buying power with regard to engineering and installation. Leaving aside the fact that  
10 there is no record to support this assumption, common knowledge allows one to conclude that it is simply  
11 not true. A large company may have significant buying power because of its purchase of large volumes of  
12 material or equipment and attendant volume discounts. However, in a side-by-side installation, there is no  
13 basis to assume that each company would not incur the same \$40-\$50/hour for installation of the discrete  
14 pieces of equipment.

15 At bottom, AT&T/XO are simply unhappy with the Commission’s decision not to rely on the  
16 opinion of their witness. However, given the multiple opportunities these parties had to support that  
17 opinion with data, but never did so, it is hardly surprising that the Commission would look elsewhere for  
18 reliable information. The parties here do nothing more than to ask the Commission, again without  
19 supporting data, to rely on their witness’s opinion. The Commission should again decline to do so.

20 **3. Fill Factors**

21 TRACER, at paragraphs 3-4 of its Petition, challenges the Commission’s conclusions regarding  
22 proper fill factor, and argues that the Commission did not properly consider the issue of aggregating  
23 demand from multiple end users at a single location. However, as is clear from the record, the  
24 Commission did consider that issue, and Qwest has properly accounted for it in its cost studies. The data  
25 Qwest used for end-user demand was on a per-location basis and so already reflects the aggregation  
26 occurring at each location. As Ms. Million described in her testimony and on the stand, the average



1 number of DS1s per location in the state of Washington is less than 3 (Tr. 2028). This is why Qwest  
2 weighted the architectures into the model that provide for 4 channels per location instead of the OC3  
3 system that provides 84 channels per location. It should be noted that end-users will determine  
4 aggregation, not Qwest or the CLEC, when DS1s are purchased. So if sales can be made to building  
5 owners who wish to provide service to tenants, then there may be greater opportunity for aggregation.  
6 However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Qwest’s consideration of the ability to aggregate  
7 demand is incorrect or unrealistic.

8 TRACER also argues, at paragraphs 5-7 of its Petition, that the Commission should reconsider  
9 TRACER’s argument about using 100% fill for fiber. TRACER cites the same FCC orders that it cited in  
10 its closing briefs. Those orders address universal service issues, not pricing for UNEs. TRACER gives  
11 no reason why the Commission should reach a different conclusion now than it did in the Order.  
12 TRACER cites the testimony given by Mr. Buckley and claims that Qwest “mechanically applied” a 65%  
13 fill. This mischaracterizes Mr. Buckley’s testimony – a review of the transcript at 2057-2059 shows that  
14 Mr. Buckley describes in detail the various fills used in the cost studies, and describes the difference  
15 between fiber sheath fill and electronics fill. He also notes that Qwest used an ordered fill for fiber sheath,  
16 and there is nothing in TRACER’s petition to show that the fill was incorrectly applied or that using the  
17 Commission-ordered value was improper.

18 AT&T/XO argue, at paragraphs 17-19 of their Petition, that Qwest only used one architecture in  
19 the cost study to develop costs for DS3s. However, the model that was submitted also calculates the  
20 cost for entrance facilities. AT&T/XO’s argument has been made before, and simply does not apply  
21 here. Entrance facilities are designed to carry traffic to the central office and so require larger pipes and  
22 designs that include a lot of capacity, whereas DS3 capable loops only go to end-user customers with  
23 low demand per location. The design used to calculate DS3s is for low demand situations and is the least  
24 cost methodology under those circumstances. It would not be appropriate to use the high-demand  
25 designs for entrance facilities because the costs would be higher if the fills for DS3 capable loop demand  
26 were used.

1           **4. Consistency of Loop Cost Estimates**

2           This issue, raised by AT&T/XO, is again a repeat of arguments already addressed in the Order.  
3 AT&T/XO do not seek clarification of any point, they do not raise any mistakes of fact or law, and they  
4 do not make any new arguments. One important point that they do not address, however, is that the high  
5 capacity loops that were the subject of Part B were indeed not the same loops that were the subject of  
6 the first cost proceeding. In fact, their own witness readily agreed that the first cost proceeding did not  
7 include any costs for fiber based loops. Tr. 3782. Furthermore, since these parties did not introduce  
8 their own cost models, and primarily addressed the TIF and fill assumptions in Qwest's study, it is difficult  
9 to see their arguments now as anything more than a request for another bite at the apple. Indeed, for all  
10 of their claims that loop cost estimates must be consistent, they have not presented any information that  
11 would lead to the conclusion that the costs produced in Part B are not consistent with the costs in the first  
12 docket.

13           **5. Time and Motion Studies**

14           Verizon asks the Commission to clarify that it may use actual data instead of time and motion  
15 studies in future dockets. Qwest supports this request. As more fully developed in the Part D record,  
16 time and motion studies do not provide forward-looking information and are not suited to the types of  
17 activities that Qwest performs in the ordering and provisioning processes. Additionally, it is unclear how  
18 they would be compared against Qwest's current nonrecurring cost studies in any meaningful way since  
19 Qwest's nonrecurring cost studies exclude items that are out of the ordinary, while a time and motion  
20 study would measure actual activity. Furthermore, they are expensive and time consuming to prepare,  
21 and Qwest does not have either the staffing or any plans to conduct such studies. It would be especially  
22 inappropriate to condition OSS cost recovery on the presentation of time and motion studies. The OSS  
23 expenditures for which recovery is sought are mandated by the Act to provide CLECs access to Qwest's  
24 OSS. These OSS modifications may or may not reduce nonrecurring work times in the ordering process  
25 – they may simply enable access to new UNEs, or otherwise improve the CLECs ability to access  
26 Qwest's systems. Thus, Qwest asks that the Commission not require time and motion studies, but that

1 the Commission continue to evaluate its nonrecurring costs by review of current and past estimates from  
2 subject matter experts.

3 **6. Covad's Petition**

4 With regard to Covad's Petition, Qwest simply responds that it may be premature to open a new  
5 docket to consider line sharing over digital loop carrier and unbundled packet switching. As Verizon  
6 points out, the determinations that these elements are UNEs subject to the unbundling requirements of the  
7 Act have been remanded to the FCC, with the line sharing requirements vacated as well as remanded.<sup>16</sup>  
8 To the extent that Qwest is still obligated to provide those elements as UNEs, Qwest believes they are  
9 fully and adequately addressed in Part D. The Commission should proceed to a decision in Part D, and  
10 otherwise await the outcome of the proceeding at the Court of Appeals and the FCC before expending  
11 additional resources on determining costs and prices for line sharing and packet switching, when it is  
12 uncertain whether either element will be ordered to be unbundled when that question is finally decided.

13 //

14 **III. CONCLUSION**

15 For the reasons stated, the Commission should deny the petitions for reconsideration filed by  
16 AT&T/XO, TRACER, and Covad, and should clarify its requirements with regard to time and motions  
17 studies as addressed herein.

18 DATED this 18th day of July, 2002.

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16 *United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC*, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

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