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               BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
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                   TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION
     WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
                                     )Docket No. TO-011472
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    TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,
                                    )Volume XI
                   Complainant,
                                     )Pages 1207-1308
 4
            v.
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     OLYMPIC PIPE LINE COMPANY,
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     INC.,
                   Respondent.
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                        Oral argument in the above matter
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     was held on January 24, 2002, at 1:13 p.m., at 1300
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     Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, Olympia, Washington,
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    before Administrative Law Judge ROBERT WALLIS,
     Chairwoman MARILYN SHOWALTER, Commissioner RICHARD
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    HEMSTAD, and Commissioner PATRICK OSHIE.
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                        The parties were present as
     follows:
18
                        OLYMPIC PIPE LINE COMPANY, INC.,
     by Steve Marshall, Attorney at Law, One Bellevue
     Center, Suite 1800, 411 108th Avenue, N.E., Bellevue,
19
     Washington 98004.
20
                        TESORO REFINING AND MARKETING
21
     COMPANY, by Robin Brena, Attorney at Law, 310 K
     Street, Suite 601, Anchorage, Alaska 99501.
22
                        TOSCO CORPORATION, by Edward A.
23
     Finklea, Attorney at Law, 526 N.W. 18th Avenue,
     Portland, Oregon 97209.
24
    Barbara L. Nelson, CCR
25
     Court Reporter
1208
                        THE COMMISSION, by Donald Trotter
     and Lisa Watson, Assistant Attorneys General, 1400
     Evergreen Park Drive, S.W., P.O. Box 40128, Olympia,
     Washington 98504-0128.
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INDEX OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT: MARKED: OFFERED: ADMITTED: 49-R 1211 -- 1211

JUDGE WALLIS: Let's be on the record, please. We're convened this afternoon in the hearing room of the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission to hear oral argument on the matter of the interim request for rate relief of the Olympic Pipe Line Company in Docket Number TO-011472. We appreciate the parties' flexibility. This argument had originally been scheduled yesterday, but a matter came up that Commissioners could not avoid, and we have rescheduled it for today.

A couple of preliminary matters. The transcripts initially delivered to the parties have been replaced. The initial transcripts I believe were misdesignated as to the volume number. I don't know whether there was any change in the pagination, but to the extent that there is any confusion and to the extent that parties wish to make any citations in argument, because those revisions were received only a matter of minutes or hours ago, if you would state

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     the citation with the date and the page number that
    you're aware of, then we can make any changes. If
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     it's more than the volume number, please submit a
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     corrected citation tomorrow. That would be very
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    helpful for us.
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               One other administrative matter is that Mr.
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     Brena has submitted a revised Exhibit Number 49, a
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     single-page document entitled Chapter 81.08 RCW
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     Securities, which is substituted for the initial
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     exhibit. Number 49-R is received in evidence.
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               The parties will have the following
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     allocation of time, and we will do our best to let
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    you know five minutes before the expiration of your
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     time. The company, 55 minutes, of which it reserves
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     20 minutes for rebuttal; the intervenors, 35 minutes,
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     which they've allocated 20 minutes to Mr. Brena and
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     15 to Mr. Finklea; and 25 minutes for the Commission
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     Staff.
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               As our final preliminary matter, let's go
     around the room and ask for appearances at this time,
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     and then we'll begin argument. The company.
              MR. MARSHALL: Thank you. I'm Steve
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    Marshall of Perkins Coie, representing Olympic Pipe
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    Line Company.
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               MR. BRENA: Good afternoon, Robin Brena, on
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    behalf of Tesoro Refining and Marketing.
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               MR. FINKLEA: Good afternoon. Ed Finklea,
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     of Energy Advocates, L.L.P., on behalf of Tosco.
               MR. TROTTER: Donald T. Trotter and Lisa
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     Watson, Assistant Attorneys General, for the
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     Commission Staff.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you all very much.
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    Mr. Marshall.
              MR. MARSHALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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     think I'll try to stand up here, so I can use the
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     exhibit. And if I get away from the mike, just let
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    me know, I'll try to speak up a little bit.
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              JUDGE WALLIS: You're away from the mike,
     Mr. Marshall.
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              MR. MARSHALL: Away from the mike? Well,
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     this may not work. Maybe I'll have to sit down after
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     all.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: I think you can pick it up,
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     and I'm afraid you'll have to lift the base with it.
               MR. MARSHALL: Well, I'll try to do what I
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     can by sitting down, then.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Okay.
               MR. MARSHALL: First of all, I guess I'd
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     like to introduce a couple of people here from
     Olympic Pipe Line Company, if I may. Mr. Batch,
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     President of Olympic Pipe Line; Mr. Beaver, who acts
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     as chief outside counsel to the company; and I
     thought that Mr. Cummings would be here. He's been
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     in Washington, D.C., on an oil pipeline safety
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     matter, and I expect him coming here pretty soon.
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25 Cindy Hammer is a controller for Olympic Pipe Line,

and Pam Brady, who is an executive assistant from Olympic Pipe Line. Thank you.

JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you, Mr. Marshall.

MR. MARSHALL: I became involved in this not much before the Commission itself became involved in this, and I've tried to look at this case from the perspective of the Commission and the perspective of the state. What to do. As Staff has said, this is a unique case, and I agree.

It's clear that the pipeline is important for the state. It's able to take tanker trucks off the road and barges off of Puget Sound. It costs less than the existing alternatives. It's not essential, as water and power, but it is important, and there's no question about it.

It's equally clear that the safety of the public must be the first priority. The pipeline must be maintained and operated in a safe manner. I've lived in the state, except for three years, all my life, lived and grew up in the Olympia area, and the safety of this has to be the primary public interest concern of the Commission, because, in fact, we can do without this pipeline. There are areas of the state where we don't have pipelines carrying oil products.

But to do these things, though, requires us to attract capital and talent. And the first thing I wanted to address was talent, because that was the first thing that I wanted to find out about before I agreed to take on this matter. What was the management of this company, where was it going to take this company.

There's new management of Olympic and there's been new management since the summer of 2000, since July of 2000. And I have up here on this one exhibit that you all may recall from the cross-examination when the new management came in, in terms of what was happening with the throughput of the company.

New management is a factor that the Commission ought to consider. It was mentioned in the recent Avista case, Docket UE-010395, Sixth Supplemental Order, page ten.

It's not easy to run a pipeline right. BP Pipelines of North America is one of the best anywhere. The necessary talent to run a pipeline safely is also not easy to obtain. You've seen the extensive safety background of Mr. Batch in his original testimony, 1-T, his connections with safety prior to working with BP Pipelines at Amoco, his 20

1 years in the business focusing on safety, health, and 2 other areas, you've read his testimony about the BP

safety philosophy. And simply stated, it's no

4 accidents, no harm to people, no damage to the 5 environment. And that's at page six of his 6 testimony, 1-T.

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areas.

So BP came in in the summer of 2000, and replaced the prior Equilon management at the low point in terms of throughput, after the Whatcom Creek accident. And this, just so that -- I think that you can all probably see this fairly well. Things had been going along with high throughput and, because of events that we all know about, the throughput has dropped off.

And the new management came in in July of 2000. And the first thing they did is they devoted themselves to getting the pipeline up to standards, testing the pipeline with the latest equipment, making sure the communities and the public were well aware of what they were doing, well-informed, and it would not restart segments of that pipeline unless they passed new management standards. That's at page nine of Batch Exhibit 1-T.

They didn't come to the Commission asking for help, financial help to get this back up and 1216

running at that time. They wanted to devote all their energy, and they did, to making sure that this pipeline got back up to as safe a condition as quickly as possible.

Now, we've provided testimony on the federal, state, and local standards that apply. The new federal standards include high-consequence areas, operator qualifications, integrity, management standards, and federal law specifically requires community outreach and information, and that's all in Mr. Batch's testimony, around page eight of 1-T.

These are not insignificant items. The new federal standards, when we talk about operator qualifications, integrity, management standards, high-consequence areas, those are all imposing, particularly the high-consequence areas. A lot of costs. High-consequence areas means urban, built-up areas. When this pipeline was built, much of the area through which it flows was not heavily developed. You can take judicial notice of the development in western Washington over the last couple of decades, and now we have high-consequence

New standards are even being proposed as we're meeting here on the interim case. There is an

open docket by this Commission itself on new standards to be imposed. Those new standards will have to be met. These standards, existing ones and new ones and the standards that BP brings to this, cannot be met without new capital.

At the request of BP pipelines, BP/ARCO has already loaned new capital. I'd like to turn to the new capital part now. Since the summer of 2000,

since this time when BP Pipelines came in as the new management, BP/ARCO has placed \$52 million of new capital at risk in the form of loans, Equilon has 43 million in loans, nearly \$97 million of capital at risk.

The tens of millions of dollars that BP/ARCO has made since June of 2000 truly is capital at risk. It did not have to make these loans. It simply didn't. It didn't have to do a thing in the summer of 2000, if it chose not to. No one else did.

Also, in the summer of 2000, as this next line on the chart shows, BP/ARCO bought an additional 25 percent of the shares of stock from GATX for \$7 million, putting even more of its own capital at risk. Again, it didn't have to do this, didn't have to put that capital at risk, it didn't have to buy these initial shares, and no one else did at that

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Now, based on the price of those shares, Olympic's total net worth or total worth was only 28 million, if you multiply the 25 percent of the GATX shares by seven, you get to 28. There's been a suggestion that maybe more was paid because it was a control premium, so maybe 28 is too high.

So in other words, at a time when Olympic was worth, at most, 28 million, BP/ARCO put in an additional 59 million of its own new capital at risk. It placed twice as much at risk than the entire company was worth.

Now, what's a company worth that's regulated? A company's worth, that's regulated, based on its discounted cash flow value. I mean, its only source of income and value is really what somebody will allow in rates, and if you have customers that will buy the product that's being sold.

So clearly, there is an issue with not only the throughput and the questions about what the rates are going to be in terms of what the value, what the underlying net worth of the company's going to be.

What is Olympic trying to do with this capital. Well, it put a lot of capital to work right 1219

away to get the pipeline to the point where it is right now, stabilized, getting the throughput up as far as it could. It is under an 80 percent restriction right now for pressure. It's working to make sure that it can get up to a hundred percent.

restriction right now for pressure. It's working to make sure that it can get up to a hundred percent.

But the simple fact of the matter is that when throughput is down because of high fixed costs, the price per barrel, the cost to move a barrel of oil, will have to go up, and the reverse is true. As you get the throughput up, the price per unit goes down. So if all things were equal, operating at lower throughput would require a rate increase just

13 for that fact alone. So it's in everybody's interest

14 to get that throughput back up. And BP focused on 15 safety and it's focusing on increasing throughput. When throughput stabilized, it came in --16 17 thought it stabilized and it came in and started to 18 look for rate relief, trying to figure out what's the 19 right price given the situation it confronted. And 20 it still continued to work to increase the throughput 2.1 through additives and all that reduced the friction 22 of the pipeline so that it's able to get through the 23 pipeline, at 80 percent pressure, about 91 percent of 24 the throughput that it had historically. 2.5 So it's working that issue as hard as it 1220 1 can, but in order to complete what it needs to do, we 2 have submitted -- Mr. Batch has submitted the 2002 3 capital budget of about 23.8 million. Last year's 4 budget was almost that much. Coming up, we're 5 looking at approximately 23.8 million, although Mr. 6 Batch has testified that his Exhibit 10, Tab Three to 7 that, and I have an extra copy. You all probably remember -- you probably all remember this, but I do 8 9 want to refer to that again. I think there are 10 copies for everybody. It has a well thought out plan 11 for what it would like to do this year in terms of 12 added capital expenditures. 13 JUDGE WALLIS: This is Exhibit 10. 14 MR. MARSHALL: This is part of Exhibit 10. It's the last portion of Exhibit 10 to Mr. Batch's 15 16 exhibits. 17 JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you. 18 MR. MARSHALL: In this interim rate 19 request, what we're seeking here is the ability to 20 attract the necessary capital in the form of 2.1 additional loans. We're not seeking the interim 22 relief to pay for this entire amount; we're seeking 2.3 to get enough commitment to be able to go and obtain 24 the necessary additional loans to carry through 2002. And we need to do this without waiting, because you 25 1221 1 have a window of opportunity to get permits and to do 2 the things that need to be done. So if we were to wait until August or later on to do this, we would 3 4 miss the construction window, the other windows for 5 trying to do this. This is why you try to prepare 6 this. We're a bit pushing the envelope right now. 7 Now, the testimony shows that Olympic 8 cannot borrow from third parties because of a 9 restriction in the Prudential note that limits the 10 borrowing to just the existing shareholders. By the way, that restriction enabled ARCO to loan the money 11 12 that it did, the 52 million that it did. Without 13 having that in the Prudential note, there would have 14 been a problem, as Mr. Fox had testified. 15 It's also in dispute in this case that 16 Equilon will not loan Olympic additional money. So 17 realistically, Olympic is looking at being able to

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borrow only from BP and ARCO.

But the intervenors put witnesses on the stand and said Olympic cannot attract money from Wall Street because of its financial condition. We agree. I think that proves the point. It proves the need for this interim emergency rate relief.

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These witnesses say that an additional \$4.4 million that we're seeking in the six months of 1222

interim rates won't have any effect on Wall Street, but the testimony here is clear. Mr. Howard Fox testified if the Commission approves the full amount, the requested interim rates, he would recommend that BP/ARCO loan Olympic the amounts necessary to fully fund the 2002 capital budget.

And I was trying to look down at my notes to be able to get that correctly, but I'm going to hand out to the Commission his actual testimony in question and answer form from the transcripts, so you all may see exactly what Mr. Fox said.

The question he was asked was, If this Commission were to give the amount of rate relief requested for this interim case, what would be your recommendation to the people you make recommendations to on loans from ARCO to Olympic? Answer: Without a tariff increase? Question: Assuming the interim rate relief is granted in this proceeding in full. Oh, I'm sorry. Question: In full. What would your recommendation be with respect to the remaining amounts of the ARCO revolving credit? Answer: I would. I would recommend loaning enough to get certainly the capital program complete in 2002. Mr. Fox also testified that the Commission Staff recommendation of 20 percent, if that is

granted and nothing more, the financial impact would be that it would not even be able to cover the outstanding interest, the accruing interest on the debt. And that's at page 909 to -- excuse me, 908 to 909 of the testimony of Mr. Fox.

He said, and I can pass this out, too, he says, We're looking at a long-term solution, at least from my narrow perspective. I'm concerned, at my position, for what does the long-term look like for Olympic Pipe Line. When I run the numbers and when I even use conservative assumptions, even with a 20 percent increase with both the FERC and Washington State, Olympic still needs a hundred million dollars. It needs a hundred million dollars over the next five to seven years. No tariff increase, it needs something like 180 million.

The real issue here is how do we attract capital. And I think what you have received in the testimony in this case is a clear statement from Mr. Fox that if the interim rate relief of this approximately \$4.4 million over the next six months is granted, they would be able to get the funding to do the 2002 capital budget, the capital budget that

has to be up and running, has to be starting to be 25 put in place early on.

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Of this amount, of the \$4.4 million, the Tosco share, as we've had testimony, would be about 527,000, the Tesoro share would be 633,000.

Mr. Elgin said this case is unique, and indeed it is. It's the first pipeline case before the Commission, it's the first Title 81 interim rate case, it's the first interim case to involve a parallel federal proceeding on common facilities, on shared facilities. This case is unique. Because it's unique, the appropriate standard may also be unique.

In the recent Avista case that I just mentioned, the Commission said, quote, Rigid adherence to the usual forums the Commission upholds the same rates simply will not solve the urgent problems faced by Avista and its customers. Were we to consider ourselves unduly with forum, we would hamper our ability and our ability to address the very real substance of the problems before us. is not to say we should ignore the well-established principles that are a familiar part of the rate-making process.

Past Title 80 cases, of course, have applied the PNB standards, and the Avista case also reviewed those standards in the context of that

unique setting. And with that in mind, I'd like to turn to the PNB standards, because I believe Olympic meets those, but even if it didn't, I believe that this case has unique properties that ought to be taken into account.

Thank you for bearing with me. I've placed on the floor the actual standards in the PNB case, and then I've placed up on the easel a quick summary of how Olympic has met those standards. And the first standard, of course, is --

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Counsel, I think you might have reversed those.

MR. MARSHALL: Oh, I did. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Wallis.

The first question is an adequate hearing, and we're in the midst of the hearing. This case, stretching over the Thanksgiving and other holidays, has been a challenge for everybody. I can't count how many documents have been produced and how many data requests have been answered. I think Mr. Batch actually refers to it. I've lost track, to be frank, but a lot of effort has gone on and into this to produce a lot of information very quickly.

A technical conference was held on December 4th, at which Olympic brought in a number of people 1226

1 to answer questions as quickly as could be. volumes of testimony here, so I think the hearing 3 factor has been met.

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In fact, I want to come back to that, because there's a question about what we might want to consider for the future in terms of what, at least for oil pipeline situations, would be a more streamlined process.

Olympic's financial condition, the next item, and its need for safety-related capital improvements for 2002 of 23.8 million does constitute an actual emergency, and relief is necessary to prevent gross hardship and gross inequity.

On that 2002 capital budget, I think it's important to note that nobody challenged that budget. Mr. Batch was available for cross-examination. The budget that you see here, he was asked no questions about any item on this list by anybody that I can recollect.

There was a statement by Mr. Brown, one of the witnesses for Tosco and Tesoro, that I would be remiss in not mentioning, because he thinks that maybe what we should have done is we should have deferred some of the under-boring through the ground, underneath streams, for earthquakes. And he said, at

pages 1174 and 1175 of his testimony -- this is the only area that was mentioned at all. He said, Some of those capital expenditures, if you look at the list of projects that are included, include boring under a river and put the pipeline there and to avoid the possibility that an earthquake or a landslide will occur.

You know, that may be something that ought to be done from a safety standpoint, but certainly I don't believe that it's something that's going to affect the outcome of this case. You're not dealing with 2002 capital expenditures. I think that if we have an earthquake, as we did not more than 12 months ago, of the nature that would disrupt a pipeline and put oil into a creek, we would be facing the permanent shutdown, potentially, of the entire pipeline system.

I don't think there's any testimony that's credible that would indicate that doing this safety-related measure as soon as it could be done is in the least bit unnecessary or imprudent or is capable of being deferred. I think if people did not do this, they would be criticized heavily in the event that we have an earthquake in between now and the time that's completed.

So apart from that one question about earthquake-related boring underneath streams, nobody has questioned any of these items on this list. Staff, to its credit, has said they don't question any of these items. They're not taking issue with anything in the capital budget whatsoever. As we said, that has to be done, it has to be done in a

timely way. It's also needed to improve the throughput, as Mr. Batch testified in his rebuttal testimony.

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The third bullet on this relates to the financial indices. There are a number of things that are undisputable. One thing that's undisputed is there have been no dividends paid since 1997. Mr. Fox has testified that he doesn't believe that any dividends will be paid years into the future.

There's a negative rate of return, negative book equity. Olympic is unable to pay accrued interest on its existing debt. It's prohibited by its note with Prudential from seeking outside sources of capital, been refused new loans from Equilon, it's in default on its existing loans, except for the loan from Chase, and potentially from Prudential. It may not be in default on the payment part of the Prudential loan, but -- because they've kept up with

the payments, but there are these issues that Mr. Fox has testified, ongoing discussions with Prudential being very unhappy with the loan and trying to do a workout or something to get out of that loan.

And Olympic has financed its needed improvements for the last three months of the year 2001 from a combination of IRS refund, and partly because of the interim relief granted from the FERC. It was able to continue and complete its capital budget for 2001. But it's here because that money is -- there's an absolute need for additional loans.

Denial of the interim relief would cause clear jeopardy to the utility, it would be detrimental to the public, because these projects could not be completed, these uncontested, undisputed projects. The interim relief and the continued safety-related capital investments that would result from the relief is in the public interest. The safety-related investments in the pipeline will stay in Washington State. If Tosco and Tesoro are granted their desires, that money does not stay in the state. The safety investments will be made and they will stay here, they'll be put in the ground, they'll be put into physical assets, they'll be used to improve the throughput and get this pipeline back up to

standards as fast as it can.

Now, the final issue in this public interest arena is whether to make the refunds or the interim rate relief refundable. That's an issue that we talked about at the prehearing conference, and I remember Commissioner Oshie asking these questions about, Well, if we made it refundable, how would you pay it back.

Mr. Fox, I think, has addressed that by saying if you give the interim rate relief requested, then there will be the loans from BP/ARCO to complete the capital-related projects. There are ways of

13 adjusting rates in the future so that those loans can be -- or the interim rate relief can be repaid. And 14 I think that, with the pendency of the general case, 15 16 the Commission can monitor whether that commitment 17 has been honored and whether that will create any 18 risk and then modify that if that becomes a concern. 19 We've looked at this issue some more and 2.0

thought about it some more, and we believe the rates should be made subject to refund for a couple reasons.

One, the FERC rates in effect are subject to refund. This is a parallel that we think probably should be maintained. Thinking about this, we don't 1231

want and don't wish the interstate shippers to inadvertently subsidize the intrastate shippers or vice versa. So making the full amount of this request, which, again, is parallel to the request made at the FERC, if we make it parallel completely and have it subject to refund avoids that potential issue. And I think that's significant.

There's a U.S. Supreme Court case that we've cited talking about how pipelines are financed and whether there are federal preemption issues. That's all avoided with making these parallel.

Second, if the rates are subject to refund, and this is probably most important, they are, by definition, fair, just, and reasonable. And I say that because the Commission has just said that here recently in the Avista case.

I jotted this down from the Avista order that I mentioned before in Docket UE-010395, at page 33. And the Commission, in its order, one of its final points in its findings stated, quote, The rates that result from this order are subject to refund and are, with that condition, just and reasonable rates.

JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Marshall, you have about five minutes remaining.

MR. MARSHALL: Thank you.

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COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Well, I'd just make the comment that it doesn't follow, I think, from that statement that, ipso facto, that if a rate is made subject to refund, it is automatically fair, just, and reasonable. For example, what if we made -- raised the rates 10,000 percent subject to refund? In the meantime, the shippers have to pay it.

MR. MARSHALL: Your point is well taken, and I'm not trying to imply that we can go outside of what's within a zone of reasonableness. I completely agree with you, and I'm not trying to make the point that anybody can come in with any kind of rate and seek that, but if you think about it for a minute, there are only three outcomes when you combine this case with the general case.

16 First would be if the full interim rate 17 relief is granted, and then, at the end of the

general case, there's no refund required, because everything has been proven and it's considered to be fine. In that case, the rates are fair, just, and reasonable.

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Second is that the full amount has been, in the interim, has been granted and that some portion of it or all of it is subject to refund. And if the funds are there to do it, then the rates will be fair

1 just, and reasonable. They'll be paid back in that 2 event.

Then the third outcome -- and that's where it gets into the reasonableness, because if you do too much and it can't be paid back under any reasonable set of circumstances, that might not be appropriate.

The third circumstance would be -- and this is where I think we come back to the notion of what are the appropriate standards in an oil pipeline situation -- that if interim rates are not granted at the amount requested or at a lower rate and, at the end of the day, it turns out that those rates should have been granted because of what the general rate case is, during that period of time, Olympic has been denied those rates. So therefore, the rates in that period of time -- and taking into account that I understand there's regulatory lag, and those are built in, but regulatory lag carries with it a cost, and somebody bears that cost, and that cost that can be avoided should be avoided.

Now, if, in an interim case, a rate is subject to refund, I think it does change some the issue about how much do we have to bore in and delve into issues. In other words, how much of a showing

and how detailed do things have to be made and how much time needs to be taken to get to that point, because you have a very fluid and changing financial situation, as you heard from Mr. Fox.

Things are changing, even as we progressed in this case, with the Prudential -- while we're thinking about trying to figure out what do we do with Sea-Tac, do we sell it or not sell it. It would be a problem to sell it, perhaps, because it takes away some revenues, but then, again, if you can use that to handle a note issue that you have with Prudential, do you do that. These are realtime things that need to be handled quickly.

So I wanted to come back to the issue about how should oil pipeline cases be handled, in particular. Should it be under Title 81. Should Title 81 automatically accept the Title 80 type standards, or should there be more flexibility.

And I'm not suggesting anything more here than just that we ought not to impose factors on an industry that may differ from other cases that we've had in the past just because that may be the way --

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     take from the Avista case, at the very beginning of
     the case, there was a very firm notation from the
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     Commission about how government actions in California
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     and by the FERC have made a bad situation worse in
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     the energy arena.
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               And I share the Commission's concern about
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    how people in Washington, D.C. may not understand how
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     we're set up out here, how our transmission and
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     energy markets all work. And I guess the same thing
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     applies here, too. There are a lot of issues related
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     to oil pipelines, their financing, their history,
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     their regulatory history, as well as the financial
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    history, that frankly I'm just beginning to
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    understand. And what I do understand is that it is
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     significantly different in many ways from anything
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     that I've been used to before.
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               So I want to not only go through the PNB
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     standards here, but suggest that we, as in the Avista
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     case, apply these standards in a flexible way,
    realizing that this is a unique case, realizing that
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    we have a unique set of circumstances, a unique
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    problem to be addressed in the public interest.
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    of course, the Commission, because of its public
    interest factor, always can use that public interest
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    factor to achieve the necessary flexibility that it
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               I'm going to put on the board one --
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Marshall, your time has
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     expired.
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               MR. MARSHALL: Okay. I will then defer.
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               CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Why don't you leave
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     us with the six points, rather than our own words.
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              MR. MARSHALL: Ah. I do have these in
     eight and a half by 11 form that I will hand out,
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 7
     too, so that you can refer to those.
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              JUDGE WALLIS: We want to give you our full
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     attention, Mr. Brena.
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              MR. BRENA: Well, I certainly appreciate
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     that intention. I was going to hand out some packet
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     that has everything together, bullets and tracks
     along the argument.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you.
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               MR. BRENA: Now if I can find my opening
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     paragraph, I will start.
               JUDGE WALLIS: The justice for whom I
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     clerked said that lawyers are infinitely resourceful.
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    Mr. Brena, finding a podium, you have indeed proved
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    that.
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               COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Is your mike on?
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               MR. BRENA: I hope so. It's up.
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               COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: It should be up.
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               CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: The little red
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    button.
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               MR. BRENA: I will try to speak up, as
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well. I have the curse of being soft-spoken. 3 JUDGE WALLIS: If you're ready, Mr. Brena, 4 you may proceed. 5 MR. BRENA: Thank you. First, good 6 afternoon. It's been kind of a long and arduous 7 interim hearing, so I appreciate the Commission's 8 patience and flexibility in this regard. 9 Emergency relief is an extraordinary remedy 10 that should be used only where an actual emergency 11 exists and the relief requested is necessary to 12 prevent gross hardship and gross inequity. Emergency 13 relief is a useful tool to starve off impending 14 disaster only in cases where the denial of that 15 relief would cause clear jeopardy. 16 Emergency relief should not be used to send 17 signals to anyone, but to solve problems. Emergency 18 relief should not be a solution for cash flow 19 problems caused by owners who have dividended out a 20 hundred percent of their net income for a decade and 2.1 then burdened the common carrier with unrealistic levels of affiliated short-term debt unrelated to the 2.2 23 service being provided to the ratepayers, and then 2.4 come in and complain about the burden of the debt and 25 request emergency rate relief. That debt has nothing 1238 1 to do with ratepayers. It is not our problem. It is 2 a self-created problem for them. Emergency relief --3 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Counsel, just a 4 personal request, but I think if you refer to it as 5 interim relief, it's going to be more accurate. We 6 have distinguished emergency relief from interim 7 relief. The standards may be similar, but call it 8 whatever you want, but what we're talking about is 9 interim relief, and that's really the proceeding 10 we're in, as distinguished from a request for relief outside of a general rate case. 11 12 MR. BRENA: Thank you. 13 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Which might be 14 extraordinary, might be emergency, might be urgent, 15 whatever it is, but this is interim relief. 16 MR. BRENA: Okay. I appreciate the distinction. Interim relief should not be a 17 mechanism for owners who wish to avoid or to transfer 18 their risk of ownership onto their ratepayers. 19 20 Emergency relief should not be a mechanism for 21 shipper funding of future capital improvements equal 2.2 to 35 percent of total net plant in one year for 23 owners who have unlimited financial resources and a 24 pipeline which today, with decreased throughput, has 25 record levels of revenue, has record levels of 1239 accounts receivable, has a current credit facility 2 equal to \$20 million available that the chairman of 3 the board can just approve, and a pending multi-million dollar sale of terminal facilities 5 which have been paid for by ratepayers and they expect to close this month.

This is not an appropriate use for interim relief. Interim relief should not be a mechanism to allow a common carrier to participate in the debt marketplace which does not exist for companies with owners unwilling to invest equity, for a company unwilling to audit its books and records, and even present to the debt community reliable financial records.

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Finally, interim relief should not be a mechanism to effect a rate increase without any demonstration that the current rates are unjust and unreasonable.

Mr. Marshall's last point was if it's refundable, it's just and reasonable. That's not the standard. That's not true. The reason that he had to say that is because nowhere in this case had they put on any evidence of what a just and reasonable rate should be. They haven't instructed the Commission about how the public balance should be

struck between the carrier's interest and the shipper's interest. The shipper only has to pay a just and reasonable rate. If that isn't enough, that's an owner problem.

Shippers do not have to pay more than a just and reasonable rate, and this Commission and many other commissions have defined just and reasonable rate many, many times, and it is never defined purely within the context of carrier need. It is defined in terms of the cost of providing the actual service to the ratepayer, a reasonable return on their investment and the recovery of their investment. That is what a just and reasonable rate is.

This Commission has held that interim relief needs to meet the standard for just and reasonable rates. Their case is completely absent any evidence whatsoever as to what a just and reasonable rate should be.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Well, on that point, doesn't that get at -- we obviously aren't going to make a final determination here on just and reasonable rates. That's what the rate case is about. But for interim purposes, where did Tesoro and Tosco challenge the reasonableness of the

expenditures to be made? Doesn't what is a just and reasonable rate get at what are reasonable expenses to pay for?

MR. BRENA: We don't challenge the capital expenditures. They haven't demonstrated that they don't have funding now, they haven't demonstrated that the existing rates aren't sufficient, they haven't demonstrated -- they haven't advanced to this Commission a cash flow statement for 2002 that shows that they can't make it with no rate increase whatsoever. They have not provided you with any

information whatsoever that demonstrates that there's any linkage whatsoever between the rate requested, the relief requested, and their ability to fund. The basis for their emergency, and that's illustration aid number three in the packet, I have gone through the record and their story has changed as to what they want this money for, how much they need, what they're going to use it for, but in all fairness to them, there seems to be three different arguments. One is they have this huge debt in default; the second is they have an inability to attract capital; the third is what about these 2002 capital expenditures.

I'd like to address each of those

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arguments. Exhibit Number 4, is their claim of debt in default. First of all, their general rate case, that the Chairwoman properly pointed out that this interim rate should be considered within, their general rate case doesn't have any of this debt in it. Their debt expense in their general rate case is a million dollars, but yet they're in here asking for interim relief based on \$9 million, a huge inconsistency between what they're telling you should be the basis for their rates long-term and what they're in here on an expedited basis to do.

The \$43 million Equilon note, I'd like everybody in this room to raise their hand that thinks that that's going to get paid in the next five years. It's not. It's tied up in litigation. The debt was unrelated to the service provided. In the exhibits, I've shown that part of that debt was the Cross-Cascades, part of it was Bayview. Neither one are facilities even in service today. The Equilon debt is not a ratepayer problem; it's an owner problem.

The ARCO notes -- and by the way, all this debt that they're in here asking for interim relief to cover, they didn't come before you and let you know that they were going to borrow it. They didn't

comply with your regulations and your statutes saying there should be a public interest finding. They went ahead and did it, and now come in later and ask for ratepayers to pay more to cover the debt that should never have been incurred in the first place, because it shouldn't be on this affiliate -- it shouldn't be -- it shouldn't exist at all. It's completely unrelated to service.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Counsel, on that particular point, there was some back and forth during the hearing on what the statute says and what it didn't say. It seemed like the appropriate place is oral argument to address that question, but what is your view of what the statute requires Olympic Pipe Line to do with respect to either loans from outside sources or loans from shareholders?

MR. BRENA: What they did do with regard to earlier debt, which is come before this Commission and file for approval. That is my interpretation.

The \$42 million in ARCO debt, nobody's -- you know, you loan \$70 million to a company that's partially shut down and you want it back in three months and you come back later and say that, because of this debt, you need rate relief. I don't think so.

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Nobody is treating any of this debt as though it's in default. Nobody is treating any of this affiliated debt as though it's in default. There's an interest step-up right in the note up to 12 percent. They're collecting it at seven and accruing it on their books at seven. There's no notice of default. I asked him, has anybody sent you a notice of default. He asked me back, Are you including e-mail. You don't get a notice of default by e-mail.

No action to collect, no objective indication by any party that they are treating this debt as though it's in default. They hide behind words, technical default. Well, if you read all the covenants, we're in default. Nobody is treating this debt as though it's in default. What they have done is they loaded it up with affiliated debt unrelated to their ratepayers. They were going to put a long-term program in place and they failed. It's not a basis to come before this Commission for interim relief.

There's no indication in the record of all of their -- of their willingness or intention to actually pay any of this debt or interest back if they get the interim relief. The problem that

they've identified to come in here for interim relief for, interim relief is not going to be used to solve. There is an absolute disconnect between what they're asking from you and what they're going to do with the money. We're heavily in affiliated debt, help us out here. What are you going to do with the money. Go spend it on future capital improvements. There is an absolute disconnect between the problem they identify and their intended use of the funds.

The \$10 million credit facility, you know, most of this debt was used to pay for one-time expenses associated with Whatcom Creek, and none of this should be a ratepayer problem. You can't go out and incur debt for prior period losses and then burden future ratepayers with it. It's not right. It's not the way rates are set.

The \$10 million ARCO credit facility, you know, I'd like to participate -- I'd like to hear the series of conversations that had to occur for them to approve it. It seems to me that Mr. Fox phones up the chairman of the board, he asks for the money, he

makes, as assistant treasurer for Olympic, he makes a recommendation as on the finance committee for ARCO, then the chairman of the board says yes or no to a \$20 million loan that comes out of the ARCO

miscellaneous account. Nobody believes this money isn't available.

And Mr. Elgin, when asked, Is the money available, he says, Yeah, I think it's available and nothing Mr. Fox said convinced me differently. I asked him specifically, quotes, the quote's in the quote section, Did you ask him for a sum certain and was received, no. They haven't applied for a single loan, they haven't asked for a specific sum of money. They have done nothing to help themselves whatsoever. And their owners are sitting back there refusing to contribute equity. But yet they're in here saying let's make all this a ratepayer problem.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: This might be an appropriate place to stop and ask the question that we got into in the hearings, but if there are shareholder owners, also the shippers, who have debt, but no equity, but nobody else has equity -- in other words, their debt is lower on the totem pole than anybody else, because there's no equity to be above, what is the implication of that? In other words, why should we be worried, if we should, that this company has no equity if those who would have it have the lowest status of credit?

MR. BRENA: The biggest single safety issue

that this company faces today is the lack of equity investment. Why you should be worried is what happens today if tomorrow Whatcom Creek happens again. This company can't respond. And its owners are going to sit out there and say, Make it a ratepayer problem, we're not going to put money in. What if there's petroleum rushing into these rivers that they're boring under. How are they going to

come up with the money.

This is not a ratepayer problem; it's an owner prudency and responsibility issue. And the biggest single risk to safety that Olympic Pipe Line

presents to this Commission in this state is the failure of their owners to be responsible owners and stand behind this pipeline and give it the resources necessary to fully participate as a common carrier pipeline.

 $\mbox{\tt JUDGE WALLIS:}\mbox{\tt Mr. Brena, you have five minutes.}$

MR. BRENA: Oh, ouch. My learned colleague just yielded me five. Thank you. Thank you very much. Their nonaffiliated debt. They come in and file, Sunday night before hearing, a big emergency with Prudential that they want to draw this Commission into doing. What was the emergency?

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They're in default under the Prudential. Have they got a notice of default? No. I didn't ask about e-mail. They didn't audit their books and records in three years and Prudential is sick of them. Well, who blames them? I would be sick of them, too, if I loaned them money and a condition of the loan was that they had to audit their books and records. I had to know if they were making or losing money, and they won't go do it. That is the only default under Prudential that they can cure in a heartbeat. Go do their job.

I mean, BP Pipelines, one of the most sophisticated pipelines in the world, they've owned this thing for two years and they can't get an audit and they force nonaffiliated debt into default. And then they're looking at \$1,200 a day in payments? You know, at some point, you just got to call something for what it is. They need to do their job better with regard to their financial management of this company.

They may be doing wonderful things on safety, and Tesoro is not here to oppose safety, but their financial management of this company is terrible. No notice of default to Prudential.

They come in with a plan. Well, we're

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going to close on Sea-Tac and we're going to pay off \$15 million of the debt. And they asked you to approve it and we can do it in a month. Look at the last page of Mr. Fox's supplemental testimony to this Commission. We can do this all in a month, close Sea-Tac and pay off Prudential note, at the same time as they're in here asking you for interim relief because they can't fund four or \$5 million that they would raise in interim relief from all their shippers, including affiliated shippers.

At the same time as they're doing that, the day before hearing, they come forward and say we're going to pay off a \$15 million note when the only default is they won't audit their books and records, and we're supposed to believe they have a real emergency that requires them to get that \$4 million. They just showed you how to pay off 15 in a month. They don't have an emergency.

The Chase Manhattan debt. They went into an executive session for an hour, when you look at the minutes, and came back, rolled it over, unaudited books, no equity, with a parent guarantee. They could go out and get a billion dollars tomorrow with a parent guarantee.

Their inability -- the second of the three

1 bases are inability to attract capital. Well, of
2 course they can't attract capital. First, they
3 haven't made any efforts to do it, they haven't made
4 any efforts to waive the Prudential requirement, they
5 won't audit their books and records, they won't put

in a penny of equity. They want to just play this affiliated short-term debt game and then try and use it as a leverage point to force their ratepayers into higher rates. They won't offer a parent guarantee, and there's no credible evidence that their current rates are inadequate.

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Well, what a surprise that they can't go out and borrow money. It's impossible to borrow money if you run a company like that. I couldn't get a house loan like that. And the same with internal capital. What efforts have they made? They haven't even phoned up and asked for a specific sum to draw down the ARCO line of credit, from their assistant treasurer to the chairman of the board. No efforts to speak of at all. It's available and it's there.

And what about equity investment? The problem with this company is there isn't any and there should be. Then they say they can't fund their improvements without the interim relief. That's just not true. They haven't put -- they haven't shown you

what their net income will be next year.

They're making money now. They are making \$4 million a month. That is 36 percent above their revenue level for the last decade at lower throughput. That is 16 percent above the maximum revenue they have ever collected. They are realizing the highest revenue stream that this pipeline has ever realized, and they have more ways to realize more. If they put Bayview online, it would be nice to do, they can have 35 to 40,000 barrels a month. That's a half a million dollars.

JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Brena, five minutes. MR. BRENA: Five minutes, okay. Look at that chart. He took it down, but did you notice July? In the month of July, they ran 9.6 million barrels through this facility. They had the pressure restriction on. They ran 9.6 million barrels. They're running a million barrels less right now. Why? Have they explained it? No. Why, if you run it through in one month, can't you run it through in the next month? I don't know. I tried to explore that. I don't know.

A million barrels a month. There is a million and a half -- there's 2.2 million barrels between Bayview and their running in July that 1252

they're leaving on the table and they still have record revenues. Record revenues.

Their accounts receivable, \$39.7 million. For the last ten years, they've averaged about three. They are 800 percent above their accounts receivable compared with the highest level of their accounts receivable in the history of the pipeline. They are 900 percent above the average, and they can't figure out how to fund the sale of the Sea-Tac terminal.

10 Fifteen million dollars of ratepayer money that they're going to realize within the next month, under their own testimony, and they can't figure out how to fund \$4 million?

The ARCO line of credit, \$20 million with a phone call. And they can't figure out how to raise the money? External financing with a corporate guarantee. Unlimited amounts of resources available to them. When it was to their advantage, they rolled over Chase in a heartbeat in a two-hour -- after going into executive session for an hour, they rolled over \$30 million debt with a parent guarantee. They can't do that now? Of course they can.

Equity investment. The biggest single problem facing this Commission is their unwillingness to step up. Of course they can and of course they

should and of course this Commission should not give them a penny until they do.

The idea of ratepayer financing is a false concept. Ratepayers shouldn't pay for things up front. We did that for Bayview. It hasn't been in service for three years. They've been depreciating it and charging us a rate and it's not even online yet. You don't pay for things ahead of time, you don't have the ratepayers pay for them once up front and then include them in their rates in the future by an addition to rate base. That's what they're here to do. Force our shippers to give us a loan that we don't intend to pay back so we can make capital improvements that then we're going to add in their rate base and make them pay again for.

Well, we shouldn't have to pay for these improvements once in interim relief and once in the permanent relief. The way that things ought to be financed is they ought to put their money up. And when they put their money up and they put the investment in, we have to pay it back to them. We don't have to pay them the investment and then pay it back to them. That's not right. How much time do I have?

JUDGE WALLIS: A minute and a half.

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MR. BRENA: Thank you. Ratepayers aren't here and shouldn't be required to pay forced loans into this company. I have listed in my illustrative aid nine that allowing emergency relief in this case would be bad precedent for this Commission to do, because there's no emergency, there's no claimed impact or existing service, there's no claimed impact to safety, there's no real cost-cutting efforts on their part, and the emergency's self-created with affiliated debt. Affiliated debt. When I hear the word affiliated, I hold it to a higher standard, and so should the Commission, because you have in the past.

The emergency relief is unrelated to their claimed emergency. It's not going to solve their

16 affiliated debt problem. Their claimed emergency is the owners' and common carriers' responsibility and 17 18 not the ratepayers. 19 And finally, you just cannot ignore their 20 improving financial condition. Their record 21 revenues, their record accounts receivables, their 22 pending sale of Sea-Tac, \$20 million in ARCO line of 2.3 credit. And when I asked Staff, I said, If I could 2.4 show you how they could come up with this money to 25 make this, would you change your recommendations? 1255 1 Mr. Elgin said, Yes, we would. I think that I have. 2 JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Brena, that ends your 3 time. 4 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Before you sit down, 5 I just want one more answer to my question. You 6 sprinkled throughout your arguments here the need for 7 notice and approval by the Commission of debt, and 8 I'm staring at RCW 81.08.040, and I see that certain 9 kinds of indebtedness must be filed with the Commission. I just don't see the words approval, and 10 if I can't see it, just tell me where it is. 11 MR. BRENA: Well, no, I don't. It requires 12 13 them to file it and state why it's in in the public 14 interest. When I reviewed how the Commission had 15 handled their prior debt, there was an affirmative 16 finding by the Commission with the prior debt that 17 they requested approval of was in the public 18 interest. And so that's where I got it from, the practice, rather than the statute. 19 20 MR. MARSHALL: In 1994, the statute was expressly amended and the requirement to seek 21 22 approval from the Commission was ended. There was 2.3 also questions about the transition. Calls were made 24 on these notes in terms of what notice had to be 25 required. But the prior note that Mr. Brena's 1256 referring to that did obtain Commission approval was 1 2 done prior to 1994. 3 MR. BRENA: And allow me to --4 MR. MARSHALL: Prior to changing the 5 statute, Your Honor. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: And my question did 6 7 go to what does the law require today? 8 MR. BRENA: Well, it requires them to file 9 it. 10 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Okay. 11 MR. BRENA: And to have an affirmative 12 statement that it's in the public interest. And what 13 that allows you to do in your oversight capacity is 14 if you see something getting out of line like this, 15 to use your investigatory or other regulatory powers 16 to be sure that what's going on underneath it is 17 truly in the public interest. 18 Without that notice filing, without an 19 opportunity to be aware of the amount of affiliated

transactions going on out there, you'll find yourself

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21 in a situation like we're in today, which is that 22 there's no equity in a company that's transporting petroleum products through the center of your state, 2.3 24 and you weren't made aware of the debt that did it. 25 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Thank you. 1257 1 JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Finklea, you have ten 2 minutes. MR. FINKLEA: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 4 Commissioners, Good afternoon. I am Ed Finklea, 5 representing Tosco. I'm going to address just a 6 couple of the issues that were not addressed by Mr. 7 Brena. Tosco does concur with Tesoro and with Staff 8 that Olympic has not met the burden of proving the 9 need for an interim rate increase under the 10 Commission's traditional standards. 11 We believe that the precedent in this 12 proceeding is important, because the 13 undercapitalization by this company is a situation 14 that, as Mr. Brena has just explained, is serious and 15 is one that the Commission should not assume could 16 never happen again, and therefore, we believe that 17 the traditional analysis is the way to start in 18 addressing the request for interim relief, and that 19 your own Staff, as well as the shippers, have made a 2.0 very compelling case that the standards for an 21 interim rate increase have not been met. 22 The Staff, however, has put forward, other 2.3 than the traditional analysis, Tosco commends Staff 2.4 for going beyond the traditional analysis in this 25 situation, and we want to reserve most of my time to 1258 1 address the Staff analysis, because we believe the 2 Staff has put forward something that needs to be 3 considered, as well as adjusted. 4 Basically, we have two issues with the 5 Staff analysis. One is the treatment of the FERC 6 revenue and the other is the treatment of Bayview. 7 First of all, let me just say that we view 8 the Staff analysis essentially as an attempt to come 9 to some middle ground. I think the Staff would 10 concur that it is a novel financial ratio analysis that they have put forward, it's one that, in 11 12 traditional rate-making, wouldn't apply here, because 13 the company doesn't have any equity, and because we 14 don't have audited books. 15 Normally, to do a financial ratio analysis, 16 you would expect that the utility you're analyzing 17 has equity and has audited books. Both of those things are missing here. It also ignores the actual 18 19 ability to fund improvements, as Mr. Brena has just 20 outlined. 21 That -- recognizing all that, I want to 22 spend the balance of my time on the two issues of 23 FERC revenue and Bayview, and then discuss 24 conditions.

The FERC revenue issue is essentially this.

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The Staff is trying to calculate what cash flow the 1 company needs, and we believe that the Staff 3 understates Olympic's actual current cash flow and 4 thus overstates its immediate need for funds to meet 5 the interest coverage in its analysis. And the 6 reason for that is it ignores the FERC revenue. 7 FERC revenue is real cash today. There is no way 8 that the company will incur any refund obligation to 9 customers within the next six months.

I unfortunately have done FERC gas pipeline cases for years, and there were refund checks cut last year for a case that was filed in 1993. When the checks would ever be cut, when you have a final, final decision out of FERC, their process is a long and involved one and -- when something is finally final. I think we can safely assume it's well beyond 2003 before any refund checks would be cut. So in our view, this FERC revenue should be recognized and is certain cash for Olympic for the foreseeable future.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But I'd like to stop I just find very problematic if one on that. jurisdiction can look to another, then it begins to make a lot of difference who goes first, whether you think of this as interstate jurisdictions -- say a

given utility is in three states, or federal/state jurisdiction. In general, we're each trying to stand on our own --

MR. FINKLEA: Correct.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: -- feet. And doesn't that go for interim, as well. Clearly, when you look at an emergency, you have to say, Well, how do you divide an emergency in three pieces, say, or two pieces, two jurisdictional pieces. And if it's been solved in one jurisdiction, does that mean it went away in the other. What kind of public policy would that be if we kind of hang back and let somebody go first and then our ratepayers don't have to deal with that emergency.

MR. FINKLEA: Well, we're only to this level of analysis, because first Staff has concluded that they haven't met the standard for an interim, and then has forwarded a different approach than what the Commission has ever used in order to assess whether an interim is necessary, and if so, how much.

So we're only here because we've already decided, at least the Staff has decided and we concur with Staff, that the standard for interim relief has not been met by the applicant. That recognized, what the Staff is doing with a coverage approach, with its 1261

-- again, we commend them for having done this, but what they're doing is trying to forecast cash flow, so we have to take the whole company as it is.

We don't have a jurisdictional split

filing, unlike -- there are utilities that do jurisdictional split filings, but we don't have that here. What we have is this filing, it's a whole company filing, for purposes of its requested interim relief.

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JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Finklea, four minutes.
MR. FINKLEA: Thank you. But I think that
answers your question. The other aspect of it is the
Bayview terminal. And that is where I want to spend
a couple minutes, as well. Bayview terminal is a \$22
and a half million investment. It was included in
the Staff's analysis as investment that should be
covered by the calculation, but Staff recognized that
Cross-Cascades should be excluded. We think Bayview
falls into the same category as Cross-Cascades in
that it is not serving the public at this time.

The terminal has -- the record shows that the terminal has been bypassed, it's not serving its intended function on the oil pipeline system, and Mr. Elgin recognized and the record cites here, pages 1123, lines two through 15, as well as page 943,

lines nine through 25, that Bayview has had some depreciation taken, but, again, there will be a debate in the general rate case as to whether Bayview should be excluded or included in rate base, but that it is, by the record that we have before us today, it's not a facility that's serving the public. It falls into the same category as Cross-Cascades.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I just want to stop you there. Are you arguing that an asset that is put into rate base legitimately and is ongoing and then shuts down for some reason should no longer be considered in rate base? Isn't that stranded cost? Or are you arguing this is something that never should have been there to begin with and so it's not there now?

MR. FINKLEA: I'm just finding that, for purposes of this unique calculation that Staff has put forward, where it's coming up with an interest coverage figure on investment that's, quote, serving the public, that it did the right thing when it recognized the Cross-Cascades is not serving the public, even though there is debt to support Cross-Cascades, it's on Olympic's books. But both Cross-Cascades and Bayview fall into this category of facilities that aren't serving the public and,

therefore, for this unique calculation, that, as well as Cross-Cascades, should be excluded.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But the question, what distinguishes those two things, is that one arguably is already in rate base, the other never was. So then the question to you is should that distinction make a difference when calculating, you know, an alternate formula? Isn't it -- if something originally went into rate base in a legitimate

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     fashion and shuts down and essentially becomes
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     stranded cost, why -- the question is why should that
    be excluded? Is it just because it's not operating,
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     in which case how do you distinguish it from general
     stranded cost?
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              MR. FINKLEA: Well, if it's serving the
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    public, if it's stranded cost because it's
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    uneconomic, I think that's different than if it's
     stranded because it's physically not being used to
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     serve the public. Many utilities in our region have
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     stranded costs at any given time, given what happens
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    with the market. But we're talking about a physical
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     asset that has been bypassed.
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               CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: In other words,
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    because there was a decision not to use it, that's
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     what makes it different?
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               MR. FINKLEA: I believe that that's a very
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    real distinction. Our Exhibit 138 recalculated
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     Staff's analysis and comes to a figure of 11.97
    percent. Tosco believes that if the Commission were
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     to decide to adopt Staff's compromised method of
     calculating a need for an increase, that the maximum
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     increase that can be supported by the record is 11.97
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    percent.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Finklea, that pretty
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    much wraps up your time.
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               MR. FINKLEA: Could I have one minute to
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     just mention that we do believe that -- and we've had
     discussion during the case about conditions being
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     placed on emergency relief, and we feel very strongly
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     that if any interim relief is to be granted, that
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     there should be conditions, including the submittal
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     of a plan, the company coming forward with making
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    real equity investment, having an unqualified
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     auditor's letter, having assurances that the 2002
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     capital improvements will actually be made, and
    having the refundability of any interim backed up by
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    unqualified owner guarantees of the amounts to be
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    refunded.
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               COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: What was the last
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    point?
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               MR. FINKLEA: That any interim relief be
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    backed up by unqualified owner guarantees. There's
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    been some concern.
               CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: That the refund
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    provision be backed up.
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               COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Guaranteed refund.
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               MR. FINKLEA: Guaranteed by the owners,
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     rather than simply being out there, finding ourselves
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     in six months taking a number in the oil pipeline
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    version of Enron.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you, Mr. Finklea.
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               COMMISSIONER OSHIE: Just one question,
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    Your Honor. Mr. Finklea, on an audit, there hasn't
    been an audit completed, I think, since 1998. Is
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     that the last audit that was completed?
               MR. FINKLEA: I believe that's correct.
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               COMMISSIONER OSHIE: So they've got the
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     other financial records of '99, 2000, 2001. Now,
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    your recommendation for conditions that there be
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     audits completed for those three years before the
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    relief is granted or that those audits be initiated
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    and that somehow it would be -- the relief requested
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     would be subject to the completion of the audit
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    within a certain time period?
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              MR. FINKLEA: My sense is that the timing,
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     if you're going to grant any interim relief, it's to
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    be granted before the general rate case is completed.
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     I believe, through the course of the general rate
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     case, the Commission could require these other things
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     to be addressed, and have, so that by the time you're
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    making a final decision in July or August, that all
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     of this is in, but you make it clear to the company,
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     in granting anything, that those conditions will be
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    met, so that they have obligations that come after
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     they actually get the money.
               COMMISSIONER OSHIE: Okay, thank you.
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               MR. FINKLEA: I think that's the only
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    practical solution.
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               COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I have one further
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     question, and this is just a memory refresher. How
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    much money will flow to the company from the FERC
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     order?
               MR. FINKLEA: Eight million dollars,
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     roughly.
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              MR. BRENA: Do you mean as a result of the
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     increase?
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               COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Interim, yes.
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              MR. BRENA: Four point four million is the
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     amount that Staff factored out for the last six
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     months period, and that increase went into effect in
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     September, so it really represents revenue from
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     September, October, November and December now.
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               COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: It's 4.4 million
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     through December? I don't understand.
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               MR. BRENA: Through November.
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               COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: All right. How much
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    would it be, then, for the period to the conclusion
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     of our case in chief?
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               MR. BRENA: Annualized, it's 14.8 million.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Trotter.
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               MR. TROTTER: I just have one sheet. Thank
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     you, Your Honor. My name is Donald T. Trotter. I'm
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     the Assistant Attorney General assigned to represent
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     the Commission Staff in this docket as to this oral
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     argument.
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               The Staff recommendation is that the
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     Commission grant interim rate relief in an amount no
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    more than 19.48 percent to intrastate rates subject
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    to refund.
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20 I think it's important at the outset to 21 step back for a moment and recognize a couple things about interim rate relief. It is short-term, and in 2.2 23 this case, particularly short because of the shorter 24 suspension period. 25 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Mr. Trotter, can you 1268 1 slow down just a little bit? 2 MR. TROTTER: Yes. Second, it is intended 3 to address an actual emergency. The focus is on the 4 protection of the company's ability to finance, and 5 as this Commission stated recently in its PSE 6 decision this fall, last fall, interim relief is 7 related to and consistent with the company's filing 8 for general rate relief. The standards are 9 well-known, they're on the chart, but they -- a fair 10 reading is that they assume that there are specific 11 objective financing criteria, that there's a 12 connection between the interim rate relief sought and 13 the ability to meet those criteria. 14 That's, when you go back and look at the 15 orders in which the Commission has granted interim 16 rate relief, the companies have made that 17 demonstration. 18 All parties in this case advocate that these standards apply. Mr. Marshall alluded to the 19 20 fact a different standard might apply, perhaps, but 21 they haven't proposed that. So at this point, all 22 parties are going under the assumption that the standards that the Commission has applied should 2.3 24 apply in this case. 25 Now, it is true that the Commission 1269 1 recently stated that those standards should not be 2 applied formalistically, and Staff noted that and did 3 not apply them formalistically, nor can they be 4 applied formalistically here, but the debt issue, 5 none of it is publicly traded. 6 There are restrictions in the Prudential 7

There are restrictions in the Prudential note that prohibit any additional external or internal financings, so the only available capital to Olympic as of this time is the \$20 million left on the Prudential revolving credit line. There are no objective criteria or factors that must be met for ARCO to loan on that credit facility.

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Also, in this connection, you need to recognize the context in which this company has been operating for the last couple of years in terms of its financings. It received money under that ARCO credit line, \$10 million, while it was in default on other ARCO loans, or at least it wasn't paying other ARCO loans, which would have violated the very note under which they got the \$10 million. There's a condition there that says they must be current on their other payments. They weren't, and they still got \$10 million.

They issued the Equilon note, I believe

that was less than a 90-day note, in the amount of 1270

1 \$43 million. They had no ability to pay that note when it was issued, they had no ability to pay that 3 note when it came due. This is not rational behavior, it's not defensible financial behavior, 5 they haven't explained why they issued that money 6 when they did and why they did it.

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So what we are left with is truly an irrational situation, and what do you do in the face of these facts, the uncontested facts of their ability to finance while in violation of covenants and their financing short-term notes when they have no ability to pay them in the amounts in the tens of millions of dollars.

Added to this is the interesting testimony of Mr. Fox, where he indicated that when he discussed financing with someone at ARCO or BP Pipelines or someone, the issue was whether we will get them the money. Mr. Fox is, I believe, the treasurer or assistant treasurer for Olympic Pipe Line, but he also has a capacity in BP Pipelines, and he's speaking to the chairman of the board of Olympic Pipe Line, who has the signatory authority over that \$20 million credit line.

So this case comes down to subjectivity. What will it take for us to convince Mr. Fox to 1271

favorably recommend a loan. He said in his testimony that currently he was inclined not to recommend the loan. So in the face of that type of -- that's at transcript 914. So in the face of this situation, Staff decided it was necessary to apply some objectivity.

Now, I'd like to turn your attention to our oral argument exhibit, and no one on the record contested any of these figures. The currently outstanding debt, which includes accrued interest, is around 150 million. The debt, less the accrued interest, so just the principal outstanding, is 141.8. The net investment, by contrast, is only 98 million, and that includes -- let's be clear here. That includes their actual net carrier plant property through the year 2000, which was the last FERC Form Six. It added in their entire budget for 2001 to get to year end 2001. And that's all explained on Exhibit 134 and in Mr. Elgin's testimony in the area noted.

So in addition to there being no connection between the company's ability to finance and its ability to meet conditions in those existing notes, there's also no connection between the capital that they have outstanding and the assets that is being 1272

1 funded by that capital.

2 So Staff tried to apply objective criteria. It made a connection between the assets that Olympic

has that are serving the public and matched that to 5 the same level of debt financing those assets, and 6 then, beyond that, applied a one and a half times 7 interest coverage test to give them the full amount 8 of the interest associated with the debts associated 9 with the assets, plus 50 percent more.

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In doing so, and if you look at Exhibit 137, Mr. Colbo's analysis, he looked at the company's current operating result. And as is well demonstrated by the throughput chart, this company was moving very little product until last summer. So obviously, the test period, if you're looking at the first six months of 2001, is not representative. So Mr. Colbo doubled the results for 2001, the last six months, and made two or three adjustments that we think were very reasonable. And so we are giving, number one, full effect to all of the investment that the company has projected through 2001. And all the operating expenses, with two or three exceptions, that they were forecasting on an ongoing basis based on a more representative time frame. That's a very 25 reasonable, objectively reasonable approach. 1273

The end product is a recommendation that makes a connection between interim rate relief, the operating assets on the company's books, and its ongoing operating expenses.

The company, by contrast, criticized Staff by saying that we're not allowing them to recover interest on the debt above the ninety-eight bar on our exhibit here. They said the debt is what it is. Well, in the general rate case, they're going to try to convince you that the debt is what it isn't, because they're calling 86 percent of it equity in the general rate case. That's a fundamental disconnection between their interim case, that it is what it is, and the general rate case, that it is what it isn't.

If the policy that you enunciated in the recent PSE decision, which is solid and correct, that there needs to be this connection and consistency, their case doesn't have it.

Now, there were three items that the Staff looked at, and Mr. Colbo's analysis removed some image building expenses. We didn't have time to take out all the lobbying and the other expenses that are normally removed. The Staff also reflected a somewhat lower wage and salary level, already higher

than what is typical. We haven't had a chance to audit their entire adjustment. And also, their power supply budget was reduced. They're asking for the actual request that Puget Sound Energy is asking for that hasn't been approved yet.

So we looked through the other adjustments, to the extent we could, in the very short time period allowed, and made some practical adjustments, but

albeit preliminary. But it certainly should stand 10 the test of reasonableness, given the context of this 11

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The cases that we've cited in our statement of authorities here, particularly Items Five, Six, Seven and Eight, regarding the relationship between invested capital and assets serving the public, this is a very important concept. Mr. Marshall indicated that the value in which rates will be set is determined by the Commission. Well, it is, and this Commission has never set rates based on total invested capital. The company, on the other hand, is basing their case on that very condition.

We noted that the company's case for interim relief is inconsistent with its general case in its equity ratio request. Mr. Batch called this, quote, a remarkable disparity, unquote, transcript

731 to 732, and he's absolutely correct. There's also, as our chart shows, no connection between invested capital and the assets on which this company is currently being operated.

Even the company's general rate case, they're asking for a rate base of around 107 million. So again, their interim case, which is based on the need to recover interest associated with 150 or \$141.8 million, is completely inconsistent with their rate base, the base upon which they want to earn a return in the general rate case.

We don't know what the company spent the money on that is in excess of ninety-eight on our chart. There were no financing notices filed. And we agree with whoever said that Title 81 only requires a notice filing. But those notice filings are very important, because it does give a heads up to the Commission about what this company is doing. They didn't comply.

Mr. Schink, on behalf of Olympic, testified, at transcript 988, that you invest for a return and assets providing service. This chart shows unequivocally and in an uncontested way that Olympic invested for something else above that ninety-eight bar. Under the law, traditional law of

1 utility regulation, they're simply not entitled to a return on that.

3 But we also agree with others who have 4 stated that a central problem in this case is that 5 there's no connection made between the rate relief 6 sought and the ability to access that \$20 million 7 credit facility. Mr. Fox said, Well, if Olympic gets 8 62 percent, he'll make a recommendation, but Mr. 9 Batch said he didn't know how much money it would 10 need to, quote, send a signal. That's transcript 11 607. He also talked about a signal to the investment 12 community, at transcript 717, but we are focused here 13 really on what is Mr. Fox going to do and how will

Mr. Peck respond. That's a very uncomfortable and subjective situation. And they haven't given defensible objective criteria necessary to make that happen.

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What the Commission should not do is send a signal that the company will be entitled to a return on investments and assets to serve the public that it didn't actually make, and that is the problem that's addressed in our exhibit here.

There was some controversy over the 1.5 coverage factor that Mr. Elgin defended. Mr. Fox said that that should be an after-tax number and it

really ought to be 2.5. Well, I think it's very clear, if you look at Exhibits 66 and 64, that EBIT, earnings before interest and taxes, is exactly that, it's a pre-tax calculation. That's a fundamental principle of financial analysis.

Mr. Schink says the factor ought to be 2.6, based on a BBB rating. That's wrong, also. Exhibit 66 shows that as equity increases, coverage requirements increase, and those ratings assume equity. Olympic has none.

Mr. Elgin summed it up best at transcript 1083, where he says, calculating based on his 1.5 recommendation, if you assume there was 50/50 capital structure, 50 percent equity, for all intents and purposes, given the same earnings before income tax, that's a coverage of 3.0. So you can't look at the factor in isolation. It's related to the equity capitalization. They have none. The 1.5 is eminently reasonable.

On the issue of debt equaling equity, there may be one and only one context in which that's true, and that's the lineup in the bankruptcy court to the extent the equity owner and the debt owner are the same individual. But certainly, as this Commission is well aware, from a financial market point of view,

equity is different than debt. That's why equity costs more, because it's a more risky form of capital.

And from both a regulator and customer perspective, when the Commission sets rates, it's looking to a balance of safety and economy in the capital structure. And it balances safety with economy, so there is a balance between equity ratio and a debt ratio. They are very distinct forms of capital from a financial market point of view, a regulator point of view, and a customer point of view.

One piece of testimony that I thought was interesting was Mr. Schink's statement at transcript 965. He said the problem is not capitalization; it's revenue. But that just causes us to ask many more questions. Revenue to pay for what? To pay for past losses that this company financed? Is it to pay for

assets in the ground? Just what is it to pay for.
Is it for legitimate capital purposes or not. That's
the critical question. I think that is intimately
related to capitalization, as our exhibit here shows.
The Staff's analysis, again, is based on
the company's most recent budget, it gives them
virtually all of their budgeted expenses, with a

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 couple of well-reasoned exceptions. It assumes that all of the projects that they've added through 2001 are reflected and financed by the instruments that are existing. So it is our belief that a prima facie showing that it's objective, it's reasonable, and it makes sense from a regulatory perspective, and it's defensible.

Now, there was some discussion about a couple of issues that I'd like to weigh in on here, and one has to do with the FERC revenue issue. We cite in our statement of authorities the Louisiana Public Service case, the case is under Items 11 and 12. And we strongly recommend that the Commission indeed treats this company as a -- conceptually, as a completely intrastate company, and then FERC can treat it as a completely interstate company and set their rates accordingly. That's the construct that the company has relied on in their general rate case, that's the construct Mr. Colbo used.

Now, in reality, it's true they have that revenue coming in from FERC. We think that the Commission, and I think, Chairwoman Showalter, you focused on it. I think if you say, Well, FERC gave the money, so we don't, now you're starting -- and the converse could be true -- you start treading on

some jurisdictional issues, and I become very uncomfortable with that.

FERC has no business setting intrastate rates, we have no business setting interstate rates, and what we've done is separated those for purposes of our analysis.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: What about the issue of, in an interim environment, really what you have is cash flow, how much cash they need. What is your response to that in this context?

MR. TROTTER: Well, I agree one hundred percent that, in fact, their cash flow is better than Staff has portrayed it because of the existence of the FERC revenue stream. And certainly, in an interim emergency situation, one school of thought could be, Well, let's recognize that, because it's real. But I come right up against the jurisdictional split, and I think if you go -- start down that path, it causes more problems than it solves.

So for this Commission, we cited a
Commission order, Item 12, the water power case from
That wasn't an interim rate relief case, but
was an emergency surcharge case, and there the

Commission said, not with federal jurisdiction so 25 much, but with other states, we're going to let them 1281

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do what they want to do with their piece, but we need to look out for our piece and treat it on its own.

JUDGE WALLIS: Five minutes.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: One of the dilemmas here is, however, in practical matter, there are only four shippers. You're not talking about a different set of shippers for intrastate and interstate; they're the same four, or they're acting as servants for the others.

MR. TROTTER: I agree. I think that's the evidence. I just think that intrastate rates need to stand on their own and interstate rates need to stand on their own, and when you start to blur that line, it gets into some thorny legal issues.

Counsel for Olympic, in their case authority, has cited a couple of cases, Hunt Wesson and Westinghouse, I think are the two. These are tax cases. I'm not really convinced they're applicable, but there is a problem when states attempt to go beyond their border, and that's my concern. But I don't disagree with the facts, but it's a combined legal and policy question. I think, on the policy side, the Commission has gone with what I perceive as being the legal side of it.

One other thing that was interesting from

the testimony, I believe it was Mr. Fox that said that he was looking for a long-term solution. That's transcript 909, but they're not offering one.

As you recall in the Avista case recently, the emergency rate relief case, the company had a plan. They came in with analysis of every project they were undertaking going forward and how they were prioritizing those and doing hard evaluation of every single one of them, they were slashing their operating budgets, executive salary reductions, and so on. They had financial criteria they had to meet, they had a financial plan going forward. Those are always -- they're in a changing environment, too, on a daily basis, but that's the type of analysis that you're entitled to. That's the type of analysis that we expect.

We didn't get that in the direct case. The focus was on external financing. We found out later that that's not the issue at all. That's this ARCO note. But Staff did the best it could with what it had and applied objectivity where subjectivity reigns. And we think that the Staff recommendation is sound, it's defensible, and it should be adopted. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Can I ask the

question, I might have asked this at hearing, but 1283

1 it's the Staff's -- is it the Staff's position that a 20 percent interim increase alone itself is enough to

carry the company in decent condition pending the outcome of the rate case, or are you assuming that with that 20 percent, ARCO or Prudential or somebody 5 will kick in some more money, and so that is, there's 7 another piece of the equation? 8 MR. TROTTER: It's 19.48 percent. 9 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I know, I'm rounding, but --10 MR. TROTTER: I couldn't resist. 11 12 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I forgot to mention 13 that I was going to round. MR. TROTTER: I understand the question. 14 15 Because there is no objective criteria, it's not 16 possible for anyone to say, and even the company 17 didn't say it, that at least Mr. Batch didn't -- he 18 didn't know how much money it would take. Mr. Hanley 19 said 62 percent wouldn't do it. 20 What Staff's analysis does, if you look at 21 the chart, what assets does the company have in 2.2 service, what's financing that, and how much is needed to get them one and a half times EBIT. The 2.3 24 company's going to have to do some work. They have a 2.5 lot of debt that's not funding assets in the ground. 1284 1 That's their problem. Regulation is not designed to 2 address that, so they're going to have to be 3 decisive. They're going to have to make the hard decisions, whatever they are, to deal with that, and 5 that really is not something that regulation ought to 6 take care of. 7 So I can't tell you if this will convince 8 Mr. Fox to tell Mr. Peck to give the money, and that 9 Mr. Peck will say okay. I don't know, because that's 10 too subjectivity-based. But I think it's the best 11 that you can do, given the facts and total context of 12 this case so far. 13 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So is a way to put it that you are saying that the 20 percent is 14 15 justified, not more than that, and that given that 16 the shareholders can look at that and then they can 17 decide, Okay, we've got 20 percent for the time 18 being, are we going to release some more of our 19 loans, in which case it adds to the 20 percent for 20 the time being, or they say not worth it and they 21 shut down. 22 Now, in that latter choice, we don't know 2.3 what the company would do. Do we need to consider at 24 all that possibility? That is, is it in the public 25 interest that Olympic Pipe Line be shut down because 1285 1 the owners don't perceive the amount to be enough, 2 even though we would have decided that's all that's 3 justified? 4 MR. TROTTER: We have not addressed the 5 bankruptcy issue or the shutdown issue, but let me point out a couple of things. Mr. Marshall said that

Olympic paid seven million for a 25 percent -- excuse

9 and he stated that the pipeline was worth 28 million. 10 Well, we've given a return on 98 million. Someone 11 should be able to operate this line earning a fair return on 98 million. If Olympic can't do that, 12 13 someone else will, and someone else should. 14 Remember, this is a monopoly. Price 15 competition is virtually nonexistent. There's 16 over-nominations on the line, the customers have more 17 product to put on it than it could possibly ship. It 18 should be a money-making venture. This -- I do 19 agree, BP Pipelines has a good reputation, they're 2.0 putting procedures in place that ought to be in 21 place. We haven't examined the details of it all, 22 but they're a good company, and we hope it's them. 23 But if it's not, everyone must comply with federal 24 and state law. Someone will. 25 Given the risk profile, the investment, 1286 1 there should be someone that's willing and able to operate the pipeline with a rate base or an 3 investment base in this range. JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you, Mr. Trotter. 4 MR. TROTTER: Thank you. 5 JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Marshall, back to you. 6 7 MR. MARSHALL: Thank you. This does come 8 down to who will step up to the plate and provide money to take care of keeping this pipeline up and 9 10 operating in accordance with the highest safety needs 11 of the state. 12 ARCO/BP did step up to the plate after the 13 Whatcom County accident. They have loaned \$52 14 million following that explosion, and no one forced 15 them to do that. That's capital at risk. People are 16 saying they're not willing to step up to the plate. 17 That's stepping up to the plate. They've also put in more of their capital at risk by taking out GATX, and 18 19 that's making Olympic worth, at most, 28 million. 20 didn't say that's what they were worth. That's at 21 most. 22 Mr. Trotter was interesting in saying, 2.3 Well, it's somewhat irrational what ARCO/BP have done. They've loaned money when notes have been in 2.4 25 default, they've loaned money when people aren't 1287 1 paying back the accrued interest, they're loaning 2 money when there's everything at risk, when there's 3 all these lawsuits out there, and they are, they have 4 been. 5 And as Mr. Fox testified in -- I think it's 6 902 of his testimony, at the very beginning, that was 7 easy to get ARCO to start putting in some money, step 8 up to the plate to do that. But then there became 9 questions. How will this existing debt be treated 10 going forward. Will that ever be repaid under 11 regulation. Will the intervenors here allow this to 12 be recovered.

me, ARCO paid seven million for a 25 percent share,

And it raises the question about irrationality even more. Why would a rational economic actor invest another penny in this if the existing debt will not be repaid, if accrued interest will not be repaid. If the signal is instead of attracting capital, we're going to impose conditions, we're going to seek refunds of things that you've 2.0 already gotten from the FERC, we're going to make your life -- we're going to pull you through several knotholes to try and get you there, why would anybody, looking at this with other investment 2.4 opportunities, think that it's a rational thing to do to loan additional funds?

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 That's all Mr. Fox was saying. He wasn't saying that he could make the decision, because the decision-maker on loaning additional funds isn't in the room. Mr. Fox can't make that decision, Olympic can't make that decision. It can ask and it has been asking, but, as Mr. Fox identified, the nature of those discussions have been increasingly negative, and they have been increasingly negative because there have been increasingly negative signals from the intervenors here. The intervenors are going to oppose the FERC case, they're going to seek refunds.

This money that the intervenors have relied upon for cash flow, the \$4 million a month that they're now saying are coming in, record amounts, those are dependent on the FERC order in September that increased those tariff rates, but they're all subject to refund, and it's clear as can be that the intervenors are going to seek the refund, because they sought to prevent that interim amount from going into effect.

We've attached to Mr. Batch's testimony, supplemental testimony, as Exhibit 8 the FERC order on rehearing. Why was there a rehearing? There was a rehearing because Tosco and Tesoro sought a rehearing, sought to prevent those interim rates from

going into effect, sought the rates from going into effect at FERC at all.

And I would just like to sum up, because I think this is -- there is an issue here of what to do when you have a situation as we do between different jurisdictions that are proceeding in a parallel course over common facilities.

We cited the Schniedewind case as the -THE REPORTER: I'm sorry, the what?
MR. MARSHALL: Schniedewind case. I'll
get you the exact spelling. I couldn't do it out of
memory. It's a 1998 U.S. Supreme Court case that
talks about how financings in this oil pipeline
situation are to be handled, and that may frankly
have been the reason why the law was changed in 1994
dealing with approval of financings.

But the simple fact of the matter is that

18 some of these issues about whether there's an 19 emergency and what to do about the emergency have been addressed earlier, and there is an order out 2.0 21 specifically -- I'm reading from the FERC order --22 denying Tesoro's request for rehearing issued on 23 November 20th, 2001, just a day before we had the 24 prehearing conference in this matter. 2.5 Specifically, in this proceeding, Olympic's 1290 1 circumstance of a major interruption in operations 2 due to an explosion, the requirement for increased 3 inspection and repairs, the other increases in 4 operating costs, together with a decrease in the 5 throughput subsequent to the explosion of the 6 pipeline produced a sharp increase in cost and 7 reduction in revenues. Revenue lost during a 8 suspension period is lost forever. To have suspended 9 the rate increase for seven months would have 10 produced a harsh and inequitable result in these 11 circumstances. Further, Tesoro has asserted no 12 anticompetitive circumstances and the Commission has 13 no good reason to believe the rate increase imposes 14 an undue burden and hardship on the shippers. 15 Tesoro's economic interests are fully protected 16 because the entire rate increase is subject to 17 revision at the conclusion of the hearing and it 18 will, to the extent part or all of the rate increase 19 is found to be unjust and unreasonable, receive 20 refunds with interest, as prescribed in the 2.1 Commission's regulations. 22 It is odd that Tosco and Tesoro are 23 opposing a rate increase subject to refund in 24 interim. They call it a forced loan. You would 25 think that they would want to step up to the plate, 1291 1 too, because it's in their economic interest to keep 2 this pipeline going. 3 There was only one company that wanted to 4 keep the pipeline going and was willing to put in 5 equity in the form of loans. Let's say you have a 6 house in which you have equity and a landslide 7 disrupts that house. Whether you call it additional 8

equity or a loan to yourself, you're putting in capital to keep that place open and operating. And that's what ARCO/BP have done. They have kept this operating.

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And people can say, well, it's debt and equity. When we talk about debt and equity in the Avista situation, we're talking about debt that is not shareholder debt. We're talking about equity that's shareholder and debt that goes out to other people. Here you have \$97 million put in, 52 million from BP/ARCO, 45, 43 from Equilon of debt, but it is new capital at risk. It is not owed to third parties. It is at risk.

21 And I think to say here, as intervenors 22 have done, that these folks are not willing to step up to the plate and do what's right, you have to take that into consideration, because that's not credible. And it shows what's going to happen and it shows why

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the signal must be made very clear from the Commission, in my view, that those kinds of arguments are detrimental to the public interest.

If there hadn't been that infusion of new capital at risk following this explosion, I doubt that this pipeline would be up and running today. Where would the money come from? It wasn't going to come from Tosco or Tesoro. They still don't want to put money in, even subject to refund. They've made that perfectly clear. They don't want to step up to the plate. They want somebody else to do that.

Now, when you have an accident, I think there's an underlying assumption here that it's your fault. You fall off a ladder, you break your collarbone, you go into the hospital, and they say, You know, you've got some other problems here. Now that we've got you in here and looking at you, you've got some kidney problems, you've got some circulatory problems, it's going to cost you a lot of money to get back up and running safely. You can't go back to your job, you can't go back to full production here till we fix these other things. That's one of the circumstances we find this company in right now.

Much of what's being done, and it's shown in this exhibit that we have here, is totally

unrelated to the Whatcom County explosion, but it's the process of additional focus, additional doctor's orders, so to speak, additional restrictions on your activity. You're not going to be up to a hundred percent until you do the following physical therapy.

Now, there's only one place and one company that's been willing to step up to the plate, again, and do this. The signal that should be provided is not a signal that is going to work against the public interest; it's one that will work for the public interest.

Interim rates should be approved to the full amount, which is \$4.4 million, and I had to round that up to get to that. This is not, as FERC pointed out, an undue hardship or a rate shock to Tosco and Tesoro. It is a minimum amount, it is a minimum signal. And you have a commitment from Mr. Fox that if that minimum signal is sent, then they will do something that may appear to other people to be irrational. That is, they will actually loan some additional money without any guarantee that that money will be repaid in the future or that the money they've already loaned will be repaid.

We are at the end and in the end result test about trying to attract capital, and I would add

trying to attract talent, as well. I think

intervenors here in this case have taken the step of trying to drive out capital and drive out talent, and that is not in the public interest.

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There's a question about unqualified audits from 1999. 1999 was the year of the explosion at Whatcom Creek. There are a few issues that need to be resolved. As you might expect, there were a lot of things that occurred at that time, but Mr. Fox has addressed it and said there are some issues here about how money was spent when the changeover occurred between Equilon and BP Pipelines. That is trying to be done, but there's no effort not to have an unaudited financial statement.

The fact of the matter is that there are lawsuits between Equilon and others about what they did when they operated that pipeline. Did they operate it safely and cause a problem or did third parties cause a problem? But, as you know, if you're in litigation, whether that litigation is meritorious or not, it's going to cause you a lot of problems, including the possibility that you won't get a clean, unaudited financial statement.

24 Similarly, with the Equilon note, there is 25 an issue about that note being in litigation. But as

Mr. Fox also indicated, at page 900 of his testimony, the dispute over the 45 million will only vary -- he said, I would be very surprised if it varied more than \$3 million, frankly.

So hints that that money isn't really owed to anybody, isn't really real debt out there are also incorrect. Those are the kinds of things that happen when you have an accident, when you have disputes over what happened and who is going to be responsible. You have issues about audited statements and so on.

But there's been every effort by Mr. Batch, in particular, to say I'm going to stay focused on the job of getting this pipeline in operation safely. I think BP isn't just any pipeline operator; it is the premier pipeline operator. We could go and look around and try to find other operators, but I think the public interest has also highly suggested that BP Pipelines, with its high standards, is the pipeline operator that you need to have here for the public interest.

There were a lot of other issues, like the Sea-Tac sale, which is -- Mr. Brena said is going to close at the end of the month. That wasn't the testimony. It's doubtful whether that may be closed

at all. There's not even a purchase and sale agreement that's been negotiated, and particularly when he indicated his surprise at a statement made that when you sell it, you don't get to keep the money anyway to do things like paying off the note.

They go to the ratepayers, the shippers.

There's no desire to try to sell facilities like that, but for the financial issues that are involved here.

There's a need for a long-term financial plan. I would agree with Mr. Trotter completely on that. That's absolutely essential to have. But I think it starts here with let's get this interim case behind us. It has taken us more time and money, more focus and effort than anybody could possibly, on the Olympic side, have anticipated. It would have been nice for all that money to have gone to safety and to put it in more equity, but it didn't.

I think that after this proceeding is over, that there should be that effort and the company has made a commitment to make that effort to come up with a long-term financing plan to do, after it's done on the safety side, to do the kind of thing on the financial side that it's done there, too.

There's every desire by Olympic to do what

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needs to be done, but it can't -- it's not going to come free. There has to be a question, what would an economically rational actor do confronted with these circumstances if it won't get repaid for existing loans, existing debt, existing interest, if it won't get dividends, and there's been no prospect of dividends indicated. What incentive, what would attract that capital to continue to do what they had been doing.

At some point, somebody has to ask, and I'm not suggesting that there's been any testimony here; I'm just suggesting that this is a matter of common sense. Somebody has to ask when will you stop putting in more money without any hint or guarantee that the existing amounts or even the amounts that you put in next will be recovered.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I'd like to ask you to respond fairly specifically to the Staff recommendation that is not at the level of -- obviously, it wouldn't send the same signal as a rate three times as high, but they have built their case up from, you know, with a different analysis than you started with. But, essentially, what they are saying is this is the amount that should cover your 2001 or 2002 expenses, based on the revenue that you have

received in the last six months and using this 1.5 coverage ratio.

Why isn't the Staff recommendation enough to tide you over till we proceed or conclude the general rate case?

JUDGE WALLIS: The clock has four minutes time.

8 MR. MARSHALL: Okay. I think the Staff 9 increase amounts to about 30 percent of the \$4.4 10 million, which, if you do the math, it's certainly 11 less than \$2 million. That's what Staff would consider to be a good signal. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Well, no, I don't think they're talking about a signal; they're talking about what's justified. And I believe I can get off of the word signal. We're going to be constrained by a lot more than what's a signal. So the question is why isn't that enough to address temporary circumstances pending a conclusion of the rate case? MR. MARSHALL: Because it doesn't cover existing debt. And if what you're trying to do is a attract additional loans, additional capital from the very same people that you say that you're not going 2.4 to cover their existing debt and you're basically telling them that you won't cover their existing debt, so therefore, you ought to loan more. I mean, the real question, I think it's been put fairly by Mr. Trotter, is what would BP do confronted with the rate increase that they would make. And the answer is they would have to act in an economically rational way. And I think what Staff has done is to say, gee, we've taken out a number of things, we've made a number of assumptions here. And when we make those assumptions, and those assumptions have been contested in terms of what's in and what the coverage ratios ought to be and all that. you put those back in, as Mr. Fox has done and as George Schink has done, Dr. Schink has done, you get it up to a much higher level. You get it up to a level where the company has come in.

So we don't contest the overall general approach, and we appreciate the way that they're going about doing it, but the coverages have to be different and you have to account for, as Mr. Fox and Mr. Schink have, more of the actual expenditures and all that they have.

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CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But, you know, and the question -- you both use the words rational and irrational. And in this situation, you have BP in, I think, four or five roles. You're a shipper, you're

a shareholder, you're a creditor, you're an operator, and maybe you're an affiliate, I'm not sure. And it may be that, from the point of view of any one of those roles, something is not rational or economic, but when you step back one step, it's only one company that's in all of those roles, and isn't the bottom line that whatever increase you get, either interim or permanent, at that point, you're just BP operating with all your hats and you decide, it seems to me rationally, not irrationally, that probably there's been rational behavior here, but probably rational depending on one of these many roles. And I don't know in the end which role might dominate.

MR. MARSHALL: And you know what, and I can't speak for BP/ARCO. I don't represent BP/ARCO;

I represent Olympic, which is owned in part by

17 BP/ARCO, I'll grant you that, and one of those owners 18 of Olympic has stepped up and given a number of loans; the other has stopped. And one is in the role 19 of helping to supply the operator of this to help 20 21 supply good management, people who are talented and 22 have capability of operating the pipeline safely.

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But the problem here is that the only evidence we have as to what BP/ARCO will do would be from Mr. Fox. Even Mr. Fox can't make that decision. 1301

And I don't want to try to guess what would happen. I'm suggesting that we do have to look at it from the standpoint of what do we do to attract capital. Well, we attract capital by trying to find out what would be the conditions under which you can attract capital. A sufficient amount of capital under reasonable terms is something that this Commission has used as the touchstone all along.

And I know that we can look at what the investments are and we can look at rate base and we can try to figure out what are these issues worth, and I think, in the end, it's worth a lot to the state to have that pipeline continue in safe operation.

It really isn't a monopoly, though, because there have been alternative transportation, out of necessity, following the accident. More than half of the refined product, according to Staff's testimony, is already transported, even today, by tanker truck and barges. It's at a higher cost. We don't know exactly what that cost is because that hasn't come forward.

So there are alternatives for others to use, and the real question will come down to will one actor, one of the four refineries bear the cost of 1302

providing a service at a regulated rate to the other three refineries when all four refineries have other existing alternative transportation modes available. And I don't know. I mean, it's an interesting question.

The one question we don't have to worry about is will giving this rate provide an anticompetitive effect here, because there won't be dividends paid. BP/ARCO is not going to come out of this with more cash because it's taken out some money that it doesn't deserve from these other three refineries. I think that part is clear.

When you get back and you look at the 1983 memorandum in the file from Mr. Colbo about the history of regulation of oil pipelines, you find that, at the heart, oil pipeline regulation is unique and it was designed to prevent the kind of ability to give rebates and give refunds back, it was an anti-Rockefeller type of situation, the kind of situation where railroads found themselves in where a favored shipper would get rebates.

22 Then what happened here, because the FERC 23 and law requires no discrimination between shippers. 2.4 It won't happen and there won't be any dividends 25 given, so there's not going to be an economic 1303 1 advantage to BP/ARCO. The only remaining question is 2 what do we do to attract additional capital when no 3 one else is willing to step up to the plate. 4 And I agree. I think this case is so 5 unique and I find it difficult to try to square this 6 with what I understand from electric and water and 7 other cases, because it isn't like a normal 8 debt-equity situation, it isn't normal, these 9 throughput and deficiency agreements. It isn't 10 normal because you don't have retail rates regulated. There are a lot of anomalies and differences. But at 11 12 the end of the day, the real question still has to 13 come down to the basic touchstone of attracting 14 capital, sufficient capital and reasonable terms. 15 JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Marshall, your time has 16 expired. 17 MR. MARSHALL: Thank you. JUDGE WALLIS: Our reporter, I think, needs 18 19 a brief recess. 2.0 (Recess taken.) 2.1 JUDGE WALLIS: Let's be back on the record, 22 please. The time for argument has concluded, but 23 let's see if the Commissioners have additional 24 questions. 25 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I have one question 1304 1 for Mr. Marshall. Would the company be able to have 2 available for the general rate case, in an 3 appropriate time frame, an audit of the books? 4 MR. MARSHALL: I spoke to Mr. Fox yesterday about this very issue. I said, Well, help me 5 6 understand what this real issue is. He said it's 7 actually a fairly minor issue about amounts on books, 8 and he thinks that that can be resolved here in a 9 relatively short time. But he's gone back to the 10 auditors and said, Look, this has created an issue. 11 So I believe I can represent to you, Commissioner Hemstad, that that will be resolved and we will have 12 13 audited financial statements. 14 And it's only because '99 is hung up that 15 the others get hung up. You know, you hang up one and then it stacks up, like the freeway. So not only 16 17 can we get you audited statements here, I believe in 18 the next couple weeks, certainly before -- much 19 before the end of the general rate case, before, I 20 think, Commission Staff has to put on their rate 21 case, but we can get you the closing numbers for the 22 2001 year, which unfortunately are nowhere near as 2.3 rosy as the predictions were when we made them in November, unfortunately. But we will be amending and 25 providing additional data. 1305

The data requests are already out there. We're under an obligation to update the financial data as we get new data. As month by month are closed, we will get that to the Commission Staff and to the intervenors as that goes along.

And Cindy Hammer, the controller here, is working to make sure that we -- as soon as we get new financial information, that goes to all the parties quickly. In fact, I think last week we had Mr. Colbo and Mr. Twitchell up visiting with Cindy Hammer and looking at those updated financials.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I'll accept your representation. I have one question for Mr. Trotter, and I don't know if anyone has other questions for Mr. Marshall. All right.

Mr. Trotter, the Bayview investment is included in the \$98 million net investment figure, and I guess, could you give me a brief description as to why?

MR. TROTTER: Mr. Elgin testified that the reason the Staff concluded it was, it was placed into service, it was depreciated -- and it was a depreciable asset and it was being depreciated.

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MR. TROTTER: It's Staff's understanding that it was operational. It was being used to serve shippers. There was a document, I don't have the cite, but it said it was ready to serve, and then someone made the assumption, well, maybe it was ready, but it didn't actually serve. But it's our understanding that it actually was in service and providing service to shippers.

The Staff could not reach a definitive conclusion on its proper status in the short period of time that we've had. So Mr. Elgin said, because it was in service and is on their depreciation schedules and so on and is being depreciated, that he would include it.

The testimony was that, from Mr. Batch, that there is a plan to incorporate it into their operations. That's transcript 588. He didn't have a current schedule for that, but that it was going to be incorporated into operations. How it's going to be treated for rate-making purposes under Staff's case, we don't know. Property held for future use. If it turns out it is stranded plant, there might be appropriate recovery, like an abandoned project. That doesn't mean it's not going to be recovered. It might be amortized over a period of time or it might

1 be excluded from the rate base.

But we're just not there yet and we make no judgment, so we assume the status quo ante, which is that it was carrier property.

MR. MARSHALL: May I address that very

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    briefly?
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               COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Well, I think I have
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     the answer I wanted as to why Staff was doing what it
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               MR. MARSHALL: I was just going to add that
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     it was definitely in service, moving millions of
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    barrels of product. The explosion of Whatcom County,
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     as Mr. Batch indicated, put that temporarily offline.
     It has been used to store diesel fuel and to store
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    water for the testing and for other adjunct purposes,
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     as Mr. Batch testified on cross-examination, and they
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    do, like everything else with this pipeline, as soon
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     as they get other things up and running, that will
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     also be incorporated back in.
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               The only reason has been all of the issues
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     relating to the various tests and so forth that have
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    been done.
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               MR. BRENA: Commissioner Hemstad, I just
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    want to make one brief comment, and that is is that
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    Mr. Batch was cross-examined on this point
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     specifically with regard to whether or not it had
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    been in service, and if I could refer you to the memo
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     that was in the second quarter of 1999 that indicated
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     it was not yet in service and remind you that, in
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     1999, in mid-year was when Whatcom Creek happened,
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     and it was clear that it has not been in service yet.
     So there's a period of perhaps a month, and in my
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     cross-examination of Mr. Batch, I believe that the
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     record indicates they used diesel for testing and
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     that they used it to store some water and it's never
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    been fully in service, and the things that Mr.
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    Marshall has represented about moving millions of
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    barrels and being fully in service is just simply not
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     in this record.
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               MR. TROTTER: Can I just say see transcript
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     650.
               MR. BRENA: I have the quote section in my
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    handout that includes a section on Bayview, and allow
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    me to add it's unequivocal in the record that it's
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    not in service now.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Are there other questions?
    Very well. With that, I want to thank all of the
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     participants, and this session is concluded.
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               (Proceedings adjourned at 3:39 p.m.)
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