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     BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION
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                          COMMISSION
   In the Matter of the Petition of )
   PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.
                                     ) DOCKET NO. UE-000966
   for a Declaratory Order on the
   Service Area Agreement between ) VOLUME I
   Puget Sound Energy, Inc., and ) Pages 1 - 47
   the City of Tacoma
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              A prehearing conference in the above matter
   was held on August 2, 2000, at 10:36 a.m., at 1300
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    South Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, Olympia,
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   Washington, before Administrative Law Judge ANN
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   RENDAHL.
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              The parties were present as follows:
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              PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC., by MARKHAM A.
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   QUEHRN, Attorney at Law, Perkins Coie, 411 108th Avenue
   Northeast, Suite 1800, Bellevue, Washington 98004-5584.
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              WASHINGTON PUD ASSOCIATION, by JOEL C.
18
   MERKEL, Attorney at Law, 999 Third Avenue, Suite 2525,
    Seattle, Washington 98104.
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              CITY OF TACOMA, d/b/a TACOMA POWER, by MARK
   L. BUBENIK, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Post Office
20
    Box 11007, Tacoma, Washington 98411.
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              TACOMA POWER, by DONALD S. COHEN, Attorney at
   Law, Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson &
   Daheim, 600 University Street, Suite 2100, Seattle,
23
   Washington 98101.
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              CITY OF LAKEWOOD, by DANIEL B. HEID, City
    Attorney, 10510 Gravelly Lake Drive Southwest, Suite
   206, Lakewood, Washington 98499-5013.
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# WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, by JEFFREY D. GOLTZ, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 1400 South Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, Post Office Box 40128, Olympia, Washington 98504-0128. б Kathryn T. Wilson, CCR 25 Court Reporter

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 JUDGE RENDAHL: Let's be on the record. Good morning. This is a prehearing conference In the Matter of the Petition of Puget Sound Energy, Incorporated, for a Declaratory Order on the Service Area Agreement 5 between Puget Sound Energy, Inc., and the City of Tacoma, Docket No. UE-000966. This prehearing conference is being held on Wednesday, August 2nd, in the year 2000 pursuant to due 9 10 and proper notice to all parties and interested 11 Ypersons. I'm Ann Rendahl, an administrative law judge 12 for the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, and I'll be presiding this morning. 13 14 like to take appearances, and let's start with counsel 15 for Puget Sound Energy. 16 MR. QUEHRN: My name is Mark Quehrn, counsel 17 for Puget Sound Energy. 18 MR. MERKEL: My name is Joel Merkel, and I'm 19 an attorney for the Washington PUD Association. 20 JUDGE RENDAHL: Before we continue, I'd like 21 counsel to state their name, their address, and if you could, also your telephone number and fax number. 22 23 Let's go back to Mr. Quehrn. 24 MR. QUEHRN: My address is 411 108th Avenue 25 Northeast, Bellevue, Washington, 98004; phone number,

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    area code (425)453-7307, and my fax number is (425)
    453-7350.
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              MR. MERKEL: My address is 999 Third Avenue,
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    Suite 2525, Seattle, 98104; phone number,
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    (206)389-8222, and the fax number, (206)223-3929.
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              JUDGE RENDAHL: For City of Tacoma?
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              MR. BUBENIK: Mark Bubenik. I'm representing
   the City of Tacoma doing business as Tacoma Power, and
    my address is P.O. Box 11007, Tacoma, 98411; phone
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   number, (253)502-8218; fax, (253)502-8672. As I
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    indicated earlier, we are making a limited appearance
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    in this matter for contested jurisdiction in this
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   matter.
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              MR. COHEN:
                          My name is Donald Cohen,
    C-o-h-e-n, Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson
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    and Daheim, PLLC, 600 University Street, Suite 2100,
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    Seattle, Washington, 98101; phone, (206)676-7531; fax,
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    (206)676-7575, and I, like Mr. Bubenik, am representing
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    the City of Tacoma doing business as Tacoma Power, and
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   we are here in a limited appearance capacity.
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              MR. HEID: I'm Dan Heid. I'm the city
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    attorney for Lakewood, and the address of Lakewood City
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   Hall is 10510 Gravelly Lake Drive Southwest, Suite 206,
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   Lakewood, Washington, 98499. The telephone number is
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(253)589-2489, and the fax number is (253)589-3374.

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City of Lakewood is a potentially interested party. I don't know that I could tell you today what that interest may be because we are pending some legal and some elective or political issues right now, and it may 5 make a difference on that interest. JUDGE RENDAHL: I think we will discuss that 7 further as we go along. Commission staff? MR. GOLTZ: I'm Jeffrey Goltz with the 9 Attorney General's office, and I'm appearing pursuant 10 to Paragraph 9 of the prehearing order. My address is 11 1400 South Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, P.O. Box 12 40128, Olympia, 98504. Phone number is area code (360) 13 664-1186. Fax is (360)586-5522. 14 JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. I realize that 15 under the statute for petition's for declaratory ruling 16 and the notices the Commission issued in early July in 17 the matter that the Commission has given an opportunity 18 to cities of Tacoma and Lakewood to state whether they 19 are interested in consenting to this declaratory ruling 20 process or what their position is in the case, and both 21 cities have requested a deferral at that time to 22 determine their positions, and I also note that the PUD 23 Association did file a statement of fact and law, and 24 I'm wondering at this time, Mr. Merkel, whether the PUD

25 Association wishes to intervene formally in the

proceeding. MR. MERKEL: Yes, Your Honor; although, I would say we are primarily in the jurisdictional question, and if this should eventually work its way 5 into some sort of an evidentiary hearing about the contract, I would not expect the PUD Association would 7 have any desire to put on a case about that. It would be primarily this question of Commission jurisdiction. 9 JUDGE RENDAHL: But I take it the Association 10 is not necessarily entering a limited appearance as are 11 the cities of Tacoma and Lakewood. 12 MR. MERKEL: The Association itself is not a 13 utility. The Association is a separate corporation, a 14 trade association, and I think what they are concerned about is this jurisdictional question of does the 15 16 Commission regulate utilities. The Commission, I don't 17 think, would ever claim to regulate an association, but 18 since we have an interest only in the jurisdictional 19 question, I would be willing to limit our appearance to 20 that question. 21 JUDGE RENDAHL: I think it's a matter of your client's preference. I'm just curious as to whether you wish to remain an interested party in this 22 23 24 proceeding or become an intervenor, and if you do wish to become an intervenor, now is the time to make that

request. And I noted in your petition, in your statement of fact and law, you stated that if it did become an adjudicated proceeding, your client would be interested in becoming an intervenor, so I'm merely 5 trying to establish at this time whether your client wishes to become an intervenor in this matter. MR. MERKEL: As to the factual hearing that you might end up having to have about the contract, no. 9 JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. I understand, 10 Mr. Bubenik, that at this time, Tacoma is not consenting to the Commission's jurisdiction but just 11 12 appearing for this prehearing conference; is that 13 correct? 14 MR. BUBENIK: That's correct. 15 JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Heid, would that be the 16 same for the City of Lakewood at this time? 17 MR. HEID: There are positions that may 18 change with respect to the City, but I don't have 19 authority to say that at this point. 20 JUDGE RENDAHL: Let's proceed to discussion 21 on the issue of the status of the case and the 22 interested persons and the parties' positions on 23 whether the Commission should convert this matter from declaratory ruling proceeding to an adjudication. I'll 24 25 start with Mr. Quehrn.

MR. QUEHRN: Thank you. I think with respect to the issue of converting this from a declaratory ruling to an adjudication, we almost necessarily have to talk first about the jurisdictional question. 5 think there is a relationship between the two, and it certainly seems to be the primary focus of the other parties that are here, so I guess respecting the desire to hearing the order that you have suggested, I think I would like to talk a little about the Tanner case and 9 10 the statute, because ultimately on the conversion 11 question, our motion will be is that if the matter that has been raised in the petition does lie within the 12 13 primary jurisdiction of the Commission, then whether 14 it's in one proceeding or another proceeding doesn't 15 render the Commission's jurisdiction. It's just 16 whether or not it's appropriate to hear it as a 17 declaratory ruling distinct from an adjudication, so 18 what I'd like to do is talk about the jurisdictional 19 question first, if I may. 20 JUDGE RENDAHL: Go ahead. 21 MR. QUEHRN: One thing I prepared and I think 22 I have enough copies, is I made copies of the statute 23 that we will be talking about this morning, Chapter 24 54.48 RCW, and also a copy of the Tanner decision, and for just ease of reference, I would like to distribute

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Tacoma.

these, one to the Bench, one to the parties, because I would like to focus in on some statutory language as well as some language of the case. JUDGE RENDAHL: Please go ahead. 5 If you refer to the packet that MR. QUEHRN: I distributed, the first attachment is a copy of the 7 statute that pertains to agreements between -basically for service area agreements, and what I would 9 like to focus on for a moment is the language of 10 RCW 54.48.030, which states, and as I've paraphrased it 11 in this little cover sheet here, that any public 12 utility is hereby authorized to enter into agreements 13 with any one or more other public utility for the 14 designation of the boundaries of adjoining service 15 areas with each such utility, and it goes on to say in 16 the statute that those designated boundaries shall be 17 observed, so there isn't an affirmative obligation in 18 the statute that indicates that once these boundaries 19 have been established, boundary area agreements, that 20 the statute requires the parties to those agreements 21 observe those boundaries. I would also just note, and 22 I don't believe this is contested by Tacoma, that as "public utility" is defined for purposes of the 23 statute, that it would include both PSE, my client, and 24

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I'd then like to turn briefly to the language of the Tanner decision, which the case in its entirety is the second attachment, and specifically what the case holds, and this is at Page 6, it says, "The UTC 5 has jurisdiction not only to approve or disapprove service area agreements but also to apply and interpret relevant statutes where a dispute arises pursuant to such an agreement and to issue appropriate orders." 9 And similar language appears on the next page of the 10 case, which I've sort of excerpted in this handout, but 11 what I really want to focus on here is the Commission's 12 jurisdiction not only to approve or disapprove service 13 area agreements but to, quote, "apply and interpret 14 relevant statutes when a dispute arises and to issue 15 appropriate orders." 16

Just to be very straightforward here, our pleadings raise facts that we believe are in dispute arising under the service area agreement. The statue in this instance, 54.48.030, says that the parties to these agreements shall observe these agreements and specifically shall observe the designated boundaries. 22 This is, if you will, the relevant statute that is to 23 be interpreted in this proceeding and pursuant to the 24 express language of the Tanner case that that interpretation, at least as an initial matter, is to be

heard by this body. I'm not sure that from a jurisdictional standpoint there is a lot more to add at this point. That is essentially where we are approaching this in terms of seeking our relief with the Commission. 5 me just skip then to the first you ask is about the conversion. It is our understanding that under the 7 declaratory judgment procedure that we filed as the petition for declaratory judgment that we filed that 9 10 if, in fact, the parties to this proceeding do not 11 consent that the Commission cannot proceed to hear this 12 as declaratory judgement matter. That's why when the 13 issue of consent seemed to become an issue, we 14 subsequently filed or requested it be converted to some other type of proceeding. And again, if you start with 15 16 the fundamental assumption that the supreme court has 17 vested a jurisdictional question or addressed a 18 jurisdictional question in this dispute lies with the Commission, the question then becomes, where do we go? 19 20 I think in this instance if you look at the 21 Commission's general authority under RCW 80.01.040(1), 22 this is clearly a duty that has been prescribed by law 23 for the Commission to discharge, and the duty, again, 24 being as defined by the Tanner court to interpret these agreements and relevant statutes. If you then go on to

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RCW 80.01.050, there is authority to hold a hearing to discharge this duty, and then if you go to the Commission's own rules, I think we have three choices. We thought when we filed this petition -- and 5 I guess we still feel that a declaratory order most closely fits what we are asking for. If, however, 7 consent is not provided, we suggested two other options. We suggested the adjudicatory proceedings provisions set forth in 480.09.400. I think the other 9 10 thing we suggested was it could be viewed as a 11 complaint proceeding; although, I will concede that I 12 think the language for adjudicatory proceedings is broader and probably a more favorable alternative for 13 14 conversion. 15 So that's a very quick summary of how we view 16

So that's a very quick summary of how we view the jurisdictional question and then how we view it procedurally as being heard by the Commission. Thank you.

JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. Mr. Merkel?
Actually, I'd like to hear from the City of Tacoma
first on this and then Mr. Merkel.

MR. BUBENIK: Your Honor, the City will ask Mr. Cohen to make the argument. However, with respect to the emphasis of the argument, I believe it will

5 probably focus on the statute exempting municipalities,

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RCW 80.04.500, which will be handed to Your Honor and counsel assuming we can approach the Bench. JUDGE RENDAHL: Why don't we go off the 4 record while you do that. 5 (Pause in the proceedings.) 6 JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Cohen? 7 MR. COHEN: Thank you, Your Honor. The one statute that was not mentioned in the previous 9 discussion is this 80.04.500, which goes directly to 10 the jurisdictional question of the Commission with respect to municipal utilities, and I've presented a 11 12 highlighted version. I don't mind if anybody reads the 13 rest of it, but it seemed the relevant part, and 14 counsel has copies now. 15 Basically, the title of it is, Application to 16 Municipal Utilities, and it states: Nothing in this 17 title shall authorize the Commission to make or enforce 18 any order affecting contracts, affecting any electrical plant owned and operated by any city or town. 19 20 Tacoma Power believes this is basically the 21 end of the story. The issue of how Tanner relates to that, I think Mr. Merkel is more conversant with that 22 than I, but Tanner is distinguishable, as he points 23 24 out, in his submission. Tanner Electric, in fact,

sought intervention by the Commission. It's not a

1 utility owned by a city or town, and the Tanner
2 situation involved an attempt to enforce a service area
3 agreement against Puget, which nobody would doubt was
4 regulated by the UTC, but Mr. Merkel can go into this
5 in more detail, so it's Tacoma's position that there is
6 no jurisdiction by the Commission to whether you call
7 it a declaratory order or whether you call it an
8 adjudicative order. There is no jurisdiction on the
9 Commission to enforce whatever order might be entered
10 against Tacoma Power on this matter.

If Your Honor would wind up ruling to the contrary and this proceeded in some way to an evidentiary hearing, and I think counsel admitted there are going to be factual issues in dispute regarding that, that if that were to occur and the jurisdictional issue were not first resolved on appeal, if it went contrary to Tacoma Power's position, then I think we agree with counsel that an adjudicative proceeding is probably the appropriate one, but we differ at the first step.

JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Cohen, let me ask you, you state there would be no jurisdiction for the Commission to enforce an order against Tacoma, but do you believe that there is no jurisdiction for the Commission to issue an order in this matter, leaving

out the issue of enforcement? MR. COHEN: Mr. Bubenik points out the language of the statute says, to make or enforce an order affecting, so I use the word "against" because 5 that's the nature of what the Puget Sound Energy petition really at its essence is trying to do, but 7 this says, make or enforce affecting any electrical plant owned by a city or town. 9 JUDGE RENDAHL: Would this statute, 10 RCW 80.04.500, apply to Chapter 54.48 as well? 11 MR. COHEN: There is no indication that it 12 Your Honor knows that the Commission's doesn't. 13 authority on service area agreements themselves is to 14 approve Puget Sound Energy's participation in the service area agreement. There is no indication that 15 16 anything beyond that has ever been within the 17 Commission's jurisdiction with respect to the service 18 area agreement. At least that's what 54.48 says. 19 JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. Do you have any 20 additional comments at this time? 21 MR. COHEN: No, I don't. Thank you. 22 JUDGE RENDAHL: I'll take comments from 23 Mr. Heid and then Mr. Merkel and then Commission staff. 24 MR. HEID: I'd like to back up a little bit 25 in terms of some of the history that prompts the City

of Lakewood to appear as a potentially interested party. City counsel passed an ordinance placing on the ballot a measure which would seek approval and ratification of a decision to condemn and acquire --5 well, to acquire and potentially condemn the electric distribution system of Puget Sound Energy within the 7 City of Lakewood. City of Lakewood is served by three electric utility service providers at this time and has 9 contacted and been in communication with each of the 10 three, Lakeview Power and Light, the City of Tacoma, 11 and Puget Sound Energy.

12 The ordinance seeks only to condemn and 13 acquire, seeks ratification of the condemnation of the 14 Puget Sound Energy portion. The City has been in 15 communication with representatives of the three 16 utilities in terms of the operation and the management 17 of the electric utilities should its acquisition 18 proceed. If that is pursued and this body rules that 19 the service area agreement has effects on the City of 20 Lakewood's new acquisition, which would be prospective, 21 that's a concern that would limit how the City could do 22 what it may need to do or may intend to do through 23 contract. Again, those are options that no decisions 24 have been made at this point nor has the vote been 25 rendered. It's currently on the ballot for September

19th. There are ongoing discussions with the City and various individuals that may change that, but that is the current status, and I have to express the City's concern if this Court were to rule something that would impact that. I don't know if there are any questions 5 I'm trying not to talk too much. 7 JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you for giving us the history on the record. I appreciate that. Mr. Cohen? 9 MR. COHEN: May I mention one thing that 10 Mr. Heid's comments reminded me of that relate to 11 jurisdiction but also relate to his comments? 12 JUDGE RENDAHL: Please do. 13 MR. COHEN: There is another related 14 jurisdictional issue and that is whether this matter is 15 ripe enough a dispute so that it would not be purely 16 asking the Commission to issue an advisory opinion. 17 Again, this is a secondary jurisdictional argument. 18 Just historically, in federal court litigation, Puget 19 Sound energy took the position that the Lakewood 20 situation -- this was earlier this year -- that the 21 Lakewood situation was not ripe and would be purely an 22 advisory ruling, and they were successful and there was 23 a judgment entered to that effect. 24 It would probably be Tacoma Power's position 25 here that Puget Sound Energy either is collaterally

estopped on the ripeness issue or judicially estopped. They would probably arque that circumstances have changed, but they really haven't. As Mr. Heid pointed out, everything is sort of if, if, if. If the election goes one way, if the Lakewood City Counsel decides to 5 proceed in a certain way, if they decide to proceed in 7 a certain way, if the Tacoma Utility Board and city counsel decide to proceed in a certain way, and if the 9 numbers penciled out make sense and so forth. 10 I'm making the argument that Puget made in 11 the federal court that was, at least Judge Burgess at 12 that time found persuasive, and Puget Sound Energy has 13 embarked on an effort to express its view to the public 14 and the City of Lakewood on this matter prior to the 15 election. I'm not begrudging them that, but their 16 position is that this is not something that they would 17 want to see occur, the municipalization, the 18 condemnation of their facilities by Lakewood, so it 19 further throws things into greater disarray. So there 20 is this sort of second level jurisdictional question 21 that relates to ripeness, advisory opinion, if that's something we need to get to, and I wanted to make sure 22 23 that we didn't sandbag Your Honor on that one. 24 JUDGE RENDAHL: Is there a written opinion by 25 Judge Burgess on that matter?

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             MR. COHEN: Yes.
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             JUDGE RENDAHL: Is that something the City of
   Tacoma can provide to the Commission and all the other
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   parties?
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             MR. COHEN: Sure.
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              JUDGE RENDAHL: Mr. Merkel?
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             MR. MERKEL: Thank you, Your Honor. I think
   that we need to find a procedure or some sort of
   process that will allow us to resolve the
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   jurisdictional question first. That's the primary
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   issue, and if we can do that, then I think the other
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   issues in the case kind of will logically sort
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   themselves into some sort of, if it had to go to that
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   point, into an adjudicative process, at which point the
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   PUD Association would probably not be involved, so I
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   think we need to focus first on this jurisdictional
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   question. Whether we do that as a declaratory ruling,
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   and it seems to me that's the logical thing to do,
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   leave it as a declaratory ruling for purposes of
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   resolving the jurisdictional question first.
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             As to the Tanner case, first of all, let me
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   say that the Court's ruling, if you carefully read it,
   there is quite a bit of language about Commission
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   jurisdiction, most of which is dicta, because that was
25 not necessary for the Court's decision. What
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1 ultimately happened in the Tanner case is that it was
2 sent back for retrial based on an improperly granted
3 summary judgment. Actually, at the trial court, Tanner
4 argued that the Commission, when we went back for
5 retrial, and I represented Tanner at that time, still
6 do, actually, we argued that the trial court should
7 send it back to the Commission because the Commission
8 had primary jurisdiction, and the trial court declined
9 to do that, but all the language in the case about
10 Commission jurisdiction is largely dicta.
11 Specifically, I think it's important to

Specifically, I think it's important to recognize that Tanner did go to the Commission in the first instance to ask that the service area agreement, that Puget be compelled to comply with the service area agreement. It was a case of a utility coming in, seeking to get the Commission to act to enforce an agreement against a regulated utility.

We have exactly the reverse case here in
which the regulated utility is seeking to come into the
Commission and asking the Commission to exercise
extraordinary jurisdiction which it has not, to my
knowledge, exercised in the 80 or so years that public
power agencies have been around in Washington state. I
can't think of another case in which the Commission has
entered an order binding on a municipal cooperative or

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publicly owned utility, so this is really, I think, an extraordinary remedy that Puget is seeking here and really strikes me more as legislation than as a judicial remedy.

5 I agree with Don completely that 80.04.500 and for the PUD Association, 54.16.040, and for 7 cooperatives, 54.48.040, specifically exempt those utilities from Commission jurisdiction. 54.48 was 9 really intended to deal with the question of immunizing 10 utilities from the antitrust laws by allowing these 11 service area agreements to have some sort of premature, 12 and to qualify under the state action, exemption of the 13 federal antitrust lawsuit. It had nothing to do with 14 broadening the Commission's jurisdiction over publicly or cooperatively owned utilities and should not be so 15 16 interpreted. I don't think it was interpreted by the 17 supreme court that way and should not be interpreted by 18 the Commission.

I made reference in my statement of law and fact to the Commission's legislative electricity study in December of 1988, some two years after the Tanner decision, in which the Commission made exactly that statement that the Commission does not obtain jurisdiction by overunregulated utilities or self-regulated utilities merely by reason of these

service area agreements. That's all I had to say, but just to go back to the primary thing, I think we need to find a way to resolve the jurisdictional question first, and then I 5 think things will sort themselves out from there. JUDGE RENDAHL: I have a few questions. 7 stated that you believe we should leave this as a declaratory ruling proceeding to resolve the 9 jurisdictional issues. However, the statute as I read 10 it states that an agency may not enter a declaratory 11 ruling that would substantially prejudice the rights of 12 a person who would be a necessary party and who does 13 not consent in writing the determination of the matter 14 by a declaratory ruling proceeding. If Tacoma and Lakewood do not consent, my 15 16 question is, how do we proceed in a declaratory ruling 17 matter on their jurisdiction in the matter? 18 MR. MERKEL: That's definitely a problem, 19 unless some way can be worked out that there is, in 20 effect, a limited appearance that they are consenting 21 to a declaratory ruling for the limited purpose of deciding whether the Commission has jurisdiction, and I 22 23 don't know that Tacoma or others would find that 24 acceptable, but I think it would have to be -- to the

extent they are going to give consent, it has to be

limited to just determining this issue, I would think. Otherwise, you would have to convert it, and if that's the way you have to go, then so be it.

JUDGE RENDAHL: Does Tacoma have any position on that question?

MR. COHEN: Your Honor, I may be less conversant with procedures than either of these two gentlemen, but I guess all three of us agree that we ought to address this jurisdictional issue up front in someway. I frankly was thinking of the adjudicative if we get into an evidentiary side of this thing. On the other hand, I don't quite understand in the context of the jurisdictional issue what the difference really might be in terms of it being a declaratory or an adjudicative proceeding.

JUDGE RENDAHL: As I understand it, and I quess I would like any thoughts -- maybe I'll turn to Mr. Goltz and then I'll ask a few more questions, but as I understand it, a declaratory ruling proceeding is an adjudicative proceeding, but the statute under the Administrative Procedure Act does require consent for interested parties, for potentially necessary parties for an agency to issue an order, and that is not necessarily the same in adjudicative proceedings, but Mr. Goltz, if you have any thoughts on the

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1 jurisdictional issue, I would appreciate them at this 2 time.

MR. GOLTZ: I have some, and I will have to say, however, as will probably become apparent, that it 5 is not clear, but a couple of general principles first. First, I agree with Mr. Merkel that if the Commission were to assert jurisdiction and issue an order directed without the consent of the cities here, that would be 9 somewhat of a dramatic departure from past 10 understandings. That is not to say, and that may not 11 be the result here, but the point is that there is that history of sort of hands off the public utility 12 13 district, the municipal utilities.

Going sort of to the framework for how we are to determine whether or not the Commission really has jurisdiction, you asked in the notice to address the issue of whether this should be converted. The term "conversion of proceeding" is kind of a term of art and statutorily authorized in the Administrative Procedure Act in 34.05.070 entitled, "Conversion of Proceedings," but I don't think that relates here. That provision relates to if an agency commences an adjudication and then switches to a rule making or vice versa, it allows the movement between one or the other.

One could say, and in many cases, declaratory

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rulings have many of the elements of an adjudicatory proceeding, but if you look at the declaratory order statute in the APA, it says in 34.05.240(4), it references that RCW 34.05.410 through .494 -- only to 5 the extent an agency so provides by rule of order, and I quess those references to statutes in the APA are adjudicative provisions, and I don't see that in the Commission's declaratory order Rule 480.09.230, but 9 that doesn't necessarily mean that we end there. I 10 think it would be possible to issue a declaratory order 11 if there is consent. There really has to be consent, I 12 believe, even under the Tanner decision. I think the 13 Tanner decision is somewhat confusing on the point, but 14 what the Court was telling the Commission was if there is, in effect, an opportunity or necessity to declare 15 16 the rights and obligations of a regulated company like 17 Puget, and it's possible to do that in a declaratory 18 order proceeding, that's not what Puget is asking here. 19 They aren't asking for necessarily what their rights 20 are. They are saying what are the limitations, what 21 are the restrictions on the City of Tacoma, and so they are asking for an order to be issued directed to the 22 23 City of Tacoma, and I think it's problematic whether 24 that can be done without their consent under the

declaratory order statute or under the Commission rule

implementing that statute. I'm not sure that's the end of it, and let me tell you why I think that's true. Here is the argument that I think would have to be adopted in order for the 5 Commission to assume jurisdiction. It wouldn't technically be a conversion of the proceeding to an 7 adjudication. It would be, in effect, treating the petition as a complaint under 80.04.110, and whether 9 that requires a withdrawal and refiling or whether it's 10 just between the Commission and Puget -- they say, 11 "Well let's treat our petition as a complaint" -- I'm 12 not sure, but basically, that allows a complaint by 13 anybody against a public service corporation -- those 14 are the words -- where they allege that that 15 corporation has done any act or claim to be in violation of any provision of law, any provision of law 16 17 or any order or rule of the Commission. 18 Now, if you go back to the definition section 19 on 80.04, we don't find "public service corporation" 20 defined. We find "public service company" defined, and 21 if one is to assume that is a drafting oversight in 22 1911, and those happen from time to time, and I know 23 it's happened in the 1990's. I don't see why it 24 couldn't have happened in 1911, but the definition there includes city or town, public service counsel.

example.

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City or town providing electrical service is a public service company, and we may assume, perhaps, that that also means they are a public service corporation under 4 110.

5 Now, the cities put forth 80.04.500 as saying, But no, what 80.04.110 in the definition section, what jurisdiction that gives to the Commission over cities and town, 80.04.500 takes away. I don't 9 think that's true, and the language here states that, 10 Nothing in this title should authorize the Commission 11 to make or enforce any order affecting rates, tolls, 12 rentals, contracts, and they focus on the term 13 "contract," and a service area agreement is a type of 14 contract, and therefore, we can't do anything about it. 15 I think that probably the proper analysis of 16 that is a contract in the context of the other terms in 17 that sentence, rates, tolls, rentals, charges, or 18 service, and those are really principles of a just and 19 generous -- one would have to read contracts the way 20 the Commission frequently deals with contracts, which 21 is a special rate type of contract, the contract for 22 utility -- for provision of a service at a given rate 23 as opposed to generally applicable tariffs, for 24

So with 80.04.500 not applicable, arguably

80.04.110 is applicable, but one has to determine that the term "any provision of law" described in 80.04.110 includes the provision of law cited by Puget, which is 54.48.030, stating that any public utility, which in 5 this case includes city or town, after they make one of these agreements, shall observe them. I think that's a fairly close question, and I think before Tanner, I would have said that's probably not true, because obviously, the term "any provision of law" as used in 9 10 80.04.110, it can't mean literally any provision of 11 law. The Commission doesn't have jurisdiction over 12 Puget Sound Energy regarding employment laws they may 13 have. This isn't the forum for those. It has to be a 14 provision of law within the context of the Commission, but after Tanner, I think that's a much closer issue 15 16 only because despite the distinctions in Tanner, that 17 is to say, it was the Court's order asked for by Tanner 18 regarding the obligations of Puget, not the reverse 19 cases we would have here. 20 There seems to be some strong indication that 21

There seems to be some strong indication that these sorts of matters can be adjudicated before the Commission, so I think it's a very close question, and anyway, that's the nub of the analysis, I think, is the meaning of the term "any provision of law" in 80.04.110, and I apologize for that being somewhat

l elaborate or convoluted, but I would be happy to put that in writing if you wish us to do that. Other than that, I have no other comments.

MR. QUEHRN: Your Honor, I suspect you don't really want to turn this into oral argument this morning. I would request, however, since the statements of law and fact that were asked to be provided were never provided and we are hearing some of these issues for the first time, with the exception of Mr. Merkel's brief, just a brief opportunity to respond to some of the points that have been made by the City of Lakewood in particular and also to Mr. Goltz.

JUDGE RENDAHL: I was going to ask you to do that, and if you could make them brief, I would appreciate it.

MR. QUEHRN: The first thing I would like to point to, and I think this was also sort of implicit in a question that you asked, I had considered Mr. Cohen's argument based upon 80.04.500 even before we filed this petition, and I would like to refer you just back to his handout and emphasize the first four words of the statute: "Nothing in this title," and that, I think, qualifies all that follows.

We are not asserting jurisdiction based upon anything in this title. We are asserting jurisdiction

based upon the other statute that I cited this referred to as interpreted by the Washington State Supreme Court, so I do not believe that 80.04.500 divests the Commission jurisdiction in this instance, and I would 5 rely on the supreme court case, Tanner, to that point. It was also referenced, I think, a couple 7 times both by Mr. Merkel and I believe also by Mr. Cohen that somehow this is different because the party involved here is not a party that the Commission 9 10 otherwise has general jurisdiction over, nor did they 11 over Tanner. Yeah, there are some factual differences 12 between the two cases. I would agree to that, but the 13 fact that the parties were, if you will, had different 14 status under the laws of the Commission was true in 15 Tanner just as it's true here. 16 I think a very important point that ultimately runs to all that we are talking about, it was suggested that somehow the unambiguous statement of jurisdiction in Tanner that runs to both approval and

ultimately runs to all that we are talking about, it
was suggested that somehow the unambiguous statement of
jurisdiction in Tanner that runs to both approval and
disapproval of these agreements and then essentially
interpreting them and enforcing relevant statutes, when
we read the quote -- I would like to go back to Page 6
and read the preceding sentence into the record. What
the Court says, quote, "This case highlights the
reasons for and the importance of the review process

for administrative decisions. At issue here is not the alleged breach of simple contract between two parties but the alleged breach of service area agreement entered into by public utility and a rural electrical cooperative." My point is simply that the Court, in introducing this jurisdictional statement, highlighted this as perhaps one of the most important issues it was deciding, and I don't think you can then turn around and fairly characterize that as dicta.

We want to make it real clear that we are not

We want to make it real clear that we are not seeking any sort of order or remedy or relief, vis-a-vis the City of Lakewood in this instance. I understand somewhat Lakewood's concerns, but what we are looking at is an interpretation of a service area agreement between Tacoma and Puget Sound Energy. Very quickly, a couple other issues, the judge requested -- I think you received a copy from a federal district court order issued in an antitrust case. I think Mr. Cohen pointed out two things. One, circumstances have changed factually, and also, I think it was a different set of legal issues that we were addressing in that instance.

Finally, I want to make sure, I guess, that I understood something correctly from Mr. Goltz. We do not dispute that consent is required to proceed under

the declaratory judgment statute. We do not believe, however, that consent is required to the subject matter jurisdiction of this Commission over service area agreements in interpreting disputes arising under 5 service area agreements. There is absolutely nothing in the Tanner case that would suggest that any such consent is required, and, in fact, to infer that I think just guts the holding, and that leads me to my last point, I think. 9 10 I think I followed Mr. Goltz's tour through 11 the procedural niceties of some of the rules he looked 12 at, and I appreciate that analysis. Again, I think 13 it's not all that sophisticated at one level. 14 80.01.040 specifically states that the Commission shall 15 exercise all powers and perform all duties prescribed 16 by law, and we have a very clear prescription of 17 authority by the supreme court. As to the procedure, I 18 would again just point to the first sentence of 19 48.09.400, quoting again, "Persons involved in an actual case or controversy -- " I think counsel back and 20 21 forth have acknowledged that there will, in fact, be facts and controversy here. Reading on, "-- within the jurisdiction of the Commission," reading on, "can avail 22 23 24 of themselves of an adjudicatory proceeding pursuant to

this rule." There are some exceptions. I don't think

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any of the exceptions apply in this instance, and I didn't hear the exceptions argued.

JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. I'd like to take a break, but I'd first like to have the parties briefly address the issue that was raised in the notice of the prehearing conference, given that the cities of Tacoma and Lakewood did not provide any statement of fact or I guess the question is, essentially, is there a dispute of fact or is it a dispute of law in this 10 matter? Do you dispute the facts that were presented by Puget Sound Energy?

11 12 MR. COHEN: Your Honor, I think there will be 13 if we get pass the jurisdictional issue, yes. 14

JUDGE RENDAHL: There will be a dispute of

15 fact.

16 MR. COHEN: Yes. It will relate to issues of 17 intent concerning the service area agreement. They 18 will relate to whether -- this is probably a mixed sort 19 of legal and factual question about whether the service 20 area agreement in this instance actually fits within 21 the statutory framework of 54.48, which is linked to avoiding duplication of facilities, which, I think, we 22 23 will have some differences of opinion on, and it's sort 24 of mixed question of law and fact, so yes, there will 25 be, perhaps not on the jurisdictional question though.

00034 1 I wouldn't think so offhand. JUDGE RENDAHL: I'd like to take a 10-minute break and then back on the record. 4 (Recess.) 5 JUDGE RENDAHL: We are back after a brief break. I quess I have one question to all the 7 participants: Does anybody wish to provide a written statement about their jurisdictional argument at this 9 point, or are you satisfied with the discussion on the 10 record this morning? 11 MR. COHEN: Your Honor, I think we probably 12 13 14 15

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24 25 would like the opportunity, and it would take guidance from you of whether you wanted it on both facets, at least as I mentioned about the jurisdictional issue, the ripeness as well as sort of the statutory jurisdiction side of it, or purely the one we focus more of our time on.

JUDGE RENDAHL: I think that's your decision as to which facets you wish to address, but if the participants wish to provide written statements, would a week from today be too much burden, or would 10 days be better for the parties? I'm anticipating, given that you've all heard each other's arguments this morning, I'm anticipating just one round of briefing on the jurisdictional issue.

MR. QUEHRN: Your Honor, I have a question. When you say the "jurisdictional question," I view that purely as a subject matter jurisdictional question, not necessarily addressing -- assuming we decide that, say, 5 in the affirmative that the Commission does have some jurisdiction, I think there is a procedural question that remains, and that is, how does the Commission go about to discharge that? Is it in the context of a 9 declaratory judgment proceeding? Is it in the context 10 of a adjudicatory process under the rule? Where they 11 seem to get kind of bound up is with this notion of 12 consent. Before I answer your question, maybe you 13 could clarify a little bit, are we talking about the 14 pure jurisdictional question as, again, we portrayed it 15 as what the Tanner decision means? 16 JUDGE RENDAHL: I would like to hear all 17 facets of this matter, the, as you call it, the subject 18 matter jurisdiction question as well as the issue of consent and in what form of proceeding this should be 19 held. I think, as you state, they are all somewhat 20 21 intertwined, and I think it's appropriate to include all of those issues, and again, the question of whether 22 seven or ten days, given that it's the summer, and we 23 24 do have a statutory time line that we are working 25 under, so I would like to have things filed within a

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10-day period, but again, my question to you all is schedule wise, how does that work? MR. COHEN: At the risk, I hope, of not

offending Your Honor, Tacoma Power isn't used to be 5 down in front of a Commission. We heard everybody say 80 years of this and that, and when we start talking about issues that are of this magnitude, and I mean substantive magnitude, including form of proceeding, 9 basic jurisdiction, some of these other things -- the 10 City has also retained another lawyer, whose name I'll 11 give to the court reporter, who is involved in this 12 also, and I do not believe, with all due respect, that 13 seven to ten days is adequate to address these things. 14 These things are of critical importance to cities, and 15

I'm sure Mr. Merkel will agree from his point of view. 16 Am I mistaken that time periods can be extended for

17 good cause? 18

JUDGE RENDAHL: Yes. The statute does provide that time periods may be extended for good cause, and the Commission does understand the importance to all the parties and the importance in resolving the matter, and I believe that under the 23 declaratory ruling proceedings, there is an interest in 24 resolving things as quickly as possible so there is that competing issue, so not to dismiss the importance

of the issue to your client, it is important to the Commission as well. It's a very important matter. What time frame would be workable for the City of Tacoma?

MR. COHEN: I think three weeks. We are talking, and you will see this in the papers when we talk about the ripeness issue, what is the pressing need here? As Mr. Heid pointed out, there may be an election on the 19th. There may not be. It may go one way or the other way. This petition may go away, as it relates to the City of Lakewood.

JUDGE RENDAHL: Let's be off the record for a moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE RENDAHL: While we are off the record, we discussed events and the City of Tacoma and if, in fact, anything occurs that would make this matter moot that the parties will immediately advise the Commission of that.

of that.

On the issue of briefing in this matter on
the jurisdictional issue, understanding the importance
to all the parties and understanding the summertime and
parties' schedules, I believe three weeks is a bit long
given that the parties gave a fairly eloquent
explanation this morning on the record of their

positions on jurisdiction. I do believe that two weeks would be appropriate, and the Commission, I think, has an interest in resolving this jurisdictional issue fully and fairly and also quickly so that we can 5 proceed, if, in fact, the Commission does make a decision that requires this matter to go on in an 7 adjudicative or declaratory proceeding that we can do so quickly and fairly. Mr. Bubenik? 9 MR. BUBENIK: Excuse me, Your Honor. 10 Mr. Cohen will be away the second week and unable to 11 work on the brief, so we would request your 12 reconsideration of three weeks to allow for a briefing. 13 MR. QUEHRN: Your Honor, I'm sorry. At this 14 point, we've had weeks already transpire wherein 15 statements of law and fact were due and not provided. 16 We've heard some discussion today, and again, I would 17 go back to my other statement. 18 As I started thinking through my 19 understanding of what we were briefing, the ripeness 20 question came back in. I think we need to move this 21 matter along, and I think if we are going to have a briefing schedule here, we also have to have a real 22 clear statement of what it is we are briefing, or we 23 24 need to treat this as a dispositive motion and have a

moving parties brief and reply brief. Otherwise, I'm

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just afraid ships are going to pass in the night, and then we are going to come back here in two weeks and say, "Wait a minute. I didn't think that was in the realm of things that we were supposed to address affirmatively."

I'm getting very concerned about affording more time and also running off and writing briefs unless there is a very clear and definitive statement of what we are briefing.

JUDGE RENDAHL: First, as to what I would like to see the parties brief, I would like to have the parties' interpretation of RCW 54.48.030 or the Chapter 54.48, and the interpretation of Tanner and whether the Commission has jurisdiction to decide a dispute between a regulated public utility and a municipal public utility over the service agreement, regardless of who brings that matter to the Commission.

Secondly, I would like the parties' positions on the question of if under the declaratory ruling statute, 34.05.240(7), if the City of Tacoma as a necessary party chooses not to provide consent to a declaratory ruling proceeding, how should the Commission proceed in this matter to resolve the issues of jurisdiction and the other issues in this case.

Third, if there are any issues, such as

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issues.

ripeness, that the parties wish to raise, they are free to raise those issues. Mr. Quehrn, is that concise enough? MR. QUEHRN: Until we got to the last 5 question, and I guess I would only say if issues are raised -- you said any issues any party wants to raise. If I don't anticipate all of those issues, I would certainly be in a position where I would want to go 9 back and ask for an opportunity to respond. Ripeness 10 has been raised, and we will address that. Maybe we 11 could just see if there are any other issues, could we 12 just get them on the table now? 13 JUDGE RENDAHL: Yes. Why don't we go back to see if any other parties have any other issues. 14 believe, as in other proceedings, if there is an issue 15 16 of surprise that would come up in briefings, then 17 parties are always offered an opportunity to respond to 18 issues of surprise, so I will give another opportunity very briefly for participants here to state any other 19 20 issues they might address in this jurisdictional 21 briefing, but again, if there is an issue of surprise, 22 anyone will be offered an opportunity to -- and then 23 again, within a very short turnaround time. 24 say within a week in response -- to address those

MR. QUEHRN: I would raise one other that we would be prepared to address affirmatively and that is the -- and Mr. Merkel and I were talking about this during the break. I understood the PUD Association's 5 interest in this to run primarily to the jurisdictional question, and I also understood Mr. Merkel to say that 7 if we get past the jurisdictional question, there is not an interest in PUD to get into interpretation of the contract. If that's the PUD's Association that 9 10 their interest is limited to jurisdiction only, then I 11 think that is an issue that we don't need to deal with in terms of briefing at this standpoint. 12 13 If the PUD Association, however, has interest 14 beyond purely and simply the jurisdictional question, I think there is then their sufficient interest in this 15 16 proceeding question comes before us, and I would like 17 to have that on the list subject to Mr. Merkel's 18 clarification that it is jurisdiction only, in which instance I don't think we have anything to brief. 19 20 JUDGE RENDAHL: I'm not sure I followed you 21 on the last point, but I'll let Mr. Merkel respond and 22 then maybe hear more. 23 MR. MERKEL: I think what he's talking about 24 is that he and I during the break had a discussion

about what the Association was interested in, and I

said it was primarily the jurisdictional question, but that if we somehow got beyond that that the Association might have an interest in submitting a brief on interpretations of municipal law or the contract. 5 particular in my statement, I said that law and fact, that I was concerned about contracting away police powers or contracting away municipal authorities to go into the utility business might be a void agreement, 9 and if we got beyond the jurisdictional issue, I might 10 want to submit a brief on that question, but I don't 11 think that would be covered in what you've asked for. 12 I think that is way beyond the jurisdictional question, 13 and that does not arise until the Commission is 14 actually looking at the contract and deciding what the 15 parties intended and whether that kind of agreement is 16 lawful, so I would not intend to brief that on this 17 brief due in either 14 or 21 days. 18 JUDGE RENDAHL: My understanding at this 19 point is we are just discussing, Mr. Quehrn, the 20 jurisdictional issue and that any further briefing or 21 statements of law and fact that any parties may wish to provide, if we do get beyond this issue of 22 23 jurisdiction, I think we will address that down the 24 line. 25

I do want to get your ideas on scheduling

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should we need to go further. I realize that may seem somewhat tentative; however, I need to work with the commissioners in the event we need to go on and at least try to schedule potential hearing times with 5 them, so once we resolve this issue of the 6 jurisdictional brief, I would like to talk about 7 scheduling.

Mr. Cohen, what date are you considering is best for you for filing this jurisdictional brief? You had said three weeks, and I'm looking at my August calendar, and I'm wondering if we could be discussing dates.

13 I apologize for asking for MR. COHEN: 14 consideration. Three weeks from today would take it to 15 the 23rd.

JUDGE RENDAHL: Yes. I'm wondering if that's the date you are requesting or some other date?

17 MR. COHEN: We'll live with that. Certainly, 18 we'll live with anything Your Honor does, but I'm going 19 20 to be away that whole previous week, and it's not 21 something that I can change around. I guess, Your 22 Honor, if I may make a comment that doesn't go

23 specifically to the schedule, but it does relate to it.

24 I quess I still am struggling with the sort of -- I

25 understand the Commission has an interest in resolving

issues as expeditiously as possible, but I don't see the emergency nature, because whether or not --JUDGE RENDAHL: This has been pending since the 22nd of June when Puget Sound Energy filed this, 5 and I believe the City of Tacoma has requested at least a three-week delay to file a response to the consent issue, and we are well beyond that time period. Understanding it is summer and people have schedules 9 that they need to meet, the declaratory ruling statute, 10 RCW 34.05.240, specifies that within 30 days after 11 receiving the petition the Commission has to take some 12 action, which the Commission did by setting this 13 prehearing conference, and after doing that, it says no 14 more than 90 days after receipt of the petition it has 15 to enter an order or decline to enter an order or take 16 some action, and the time limits may be extended for 17 good cause. That 90-day period ends on September 20th, 18 and I think the Commission would like to stay within as close as possible to that 90-day period, so that is, in 19 20 a sense, the issue of urgency, and good cause is, in 21 this case, the importance of the matter to all the parties and to the jurisdictional issue, but I think we 22 23 do want to resolve this as quickly as possible. I think if we can, in fact, have the parties 24 25 file their jurisdictional statements by the 23rd, no

later than the 23rd, certainly, and if there is any issue of surprise in any briefings that any parties provide, then certainly within a week after that by the 30th, I would expect any responses, but I would like to 5 talk about scheduling this matter further, and assuming we do get beyond the jurisdictional question and, in fact, the Commission chooses to proceed, I would like to know what your schedules look like for September 9 for an adjudicative proceeding or declaratory proceeding, however we proceed in this proceeding. 11 Let's be off the record for a scheduling discussion. 12 (Discussion off the record.) 13 JUDGE RENDAHL: While we were off the record, 14 we had a discussion about briefing deadlines as well as 15 further scheduling, and the issues of the 16 jurisdictional briefing as we discussed earlier in 17 terms of the contents of those briefings will be due on 18 Wednesday, August 23rd, by the end of the day here at the Commission, and if there are any matters of 19 20 surprise that are raised in that single round of 21 briefing, then parties will have an opportunity to 22 address those issues a week later on the 30th. 23 However, I'm not giving that opportunity as a standard 24 response time. I believe we've had sufficient

25 discussion this morning on what jurisdictional issues

are, and I don't expect to have any issues of surprise, but if there are any, there is that opportunity. Then we will schedule a prehearing conference either on Wednesday, September the 13th, or Thursday, September the 14th, and Mr. Goltz and Mr. Merkel will 5 advise me of their schedule and we will plan 7 accordingly, and I will send out a prehearing conference order that will set forth that schedule for 9 the next prehearing conference in the event we need 10 one. The Commission will take under advisement the arguments on jurisdiction and render a decision 11 12 following briefing. Are there any other matters that 13 we need to discuss here this morning? 14 MR. COHEN: I think we forgot to thank Your 15 Honor for rescheduling this conference, so I wanted to 16 express our appreciation on that one. 17 JUDGE RENDAHL: That's no problem. 18 MR. COHEN: The other thing I think we wanted 19 to do for the record is Tacoma Power had retained 20 another attorney, and is it appropriate to give the 21 court reporter his information as well? 22 JUDGE RENDAHL: Why don't you read that 23 information into the record now. 24 MR. COHEN: His name is John A. Cameron, 25 Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 1300 Southwest Fifth

00047 Avenue, Suite 2300, Portland, Oregon, 97201; telephone, (503)778-5206; fax, (503)778-5299. JUDGE RENDAHL: Thank you. Given that there are three counsel representing the City of Tacoma, 5 please designate one of you to be the person that the Commission will serve matters on to and that other parties will serve, and then you can distribute amongst yourselves just for ease of paper distribution. 9 should be the primary contact to the Commission? 10 MR. BUBENIK: I will do that, Mark Bubenik. 11 MR. GOLTZ: I just wanted to confirm that the 12 issue of ripeness is a legitimate issue for this 13 jurisdictional briefing? 14 JUDGE RENDAHL: Yes. Having looked at the declaratory ruling statute, I think there is also an issue of -- in sub 1, 34.05.240 sub 1(b) that there is 15 16 17 an actual controversy arising from the uncertainty such 18 that a declaratory order will not be merely an advisory 19 opinion. I think that issue is appropriate under the 20 statute and so please address your comments on that 21 issue. Are there any other matters to come before us 22 this morning? Hearing none, we will be in recess until 23 the next prehearing conference, if we shall need one.

(Prehearing conference adjourned at 12:30 p.m.)

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Thank you very much.