BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION MCIMETRO ACCESS TRANSMISSION SERVICES, INC. Complainant, v. U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Respondent. NO. UT-971063 BRIEF OF COMMISSION STAFF The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission Staff (“Staff”) submits this brief in support of its request that the Commission issue an order requiring US West Communications, Inc. (“US West”) to comply with state and federal laws, which mandate local exchange competition, and comply with its interconnection agreements with MCImetro Access Transmission Services, Inc. (“MCImetro”). Because this is the first complaint alleging violations of interconnection decisions and agreements in Washington, the Commission should send a strong message to US West that it must comply with its obligations to interconnect with its competitors. I. BACKGROUND A. The Law and Policy of the State of Washington Require Local Exchange Competition The Washington Legislature has made competition in telecommunications markets a matter of state policy. RCW 80.36.300. The Washington Supreme Court reiterated this policy in Electric Lightwave, Inc. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm’ n, 123 Wn.2d 530, 869 P.2d 1045 (1994), where the court rejected the argument that exclusive franchise service areas in the telecommunications industry were the law in Washington. Thus, it is state policy to promote competition in the local exchange. The Commission regulates, in the public interest, the rates, services, facilities, and practices of public utility companies, including telecommunications companies. RCW 80.01.040. In so regulating, the Commission must implement the state policy favoring competition in the telecommunications markets. In keeping with its mandate to promote competition in the local exchange, the Commission entered into a proceeding to decide the “terms and conditions under which competitors for local exchange service will interconnect their networks in order to exchange traffic between their customers.” Fourth Supplemental Order Rejecting Tariff Filings and Ordering Refiling; Granting Complaints, In Part, Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission v. US West Communications, Inc., (“Interconnection Case”), Consolidated Docket Nos. UT-941464, -941465, -950146, -950265, at 6 (Oct. 31, 1995). In that order, the Commission explained how interconnection is necessary to ensure competition in the local exchange: Technically and economically efficient interconnection of the incumbent LEC and new entrant [alternative local exchange company] ALEC networks is essential to the emergence of a competitive local exchange market. Denial of technically and economically efficient interconnection arrangements creates a barrier to entry. The Commission is persuaded that ALECs should have considerable flexibility to configure their networks in a manner they deem suitable. Id. at 45. In the Fourth Supplemental Order, the Commission directed US West to file interconnection tariffs. Id. at 97-99. In addition, the Commission expressly rejected the contention that a company’s obligation to interconnect is limited to the availability of facilities: The Commission will not allow any carrier, regardless of the terms offered to its own customers, to condition its obligation to interconnect at meet points and to complete local calls delivered by originating carriers on the availability of facilities. Ninth Supplemental Order Rejecting Tariff Filings, Interconnection Case, at 19 (March 13, 1996). This complaint involves the Commission’s orders in the Interconnection Case as well as the statutes and rules governing telecommunications companies in the State of Washington. B. Local Exchange Competition Is Mandated by Federal Law In addition to the laws and policies of the State of Washington requiring competition in the local exchange, Congress also has mandated local competition on a national level. On February 8, 1996, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Act”), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq, became law. The purpose of the Act is to: [P]rovide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition . . . . H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1996). As an incumbent local exchange carrier, US West is obligated by the Act to, among other things, interconnect with competitive providers, such as MCImetro. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2). US West must interconnect its network with MCImetro “at any technically feasible point” and the interconnection provided by US West must be “at least equal in quality” to the interconnection it provides to itself. Id. The Act provides that telecommunications companies will provide interconnection pursuant to agreements that are negotiated by the parties, arbitrated by state commissions, or both. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a) and (b). The agreements must be consistent with the Act and state law and policy. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e). C. The Interconnection Agreements Between US West and MCImetro 1. The September 1, 1995 Interconnection Agreement The September 1, 1995, agreement was executed between MCImetro and US West pending the outcome of the Interconnection Case. Exh. 10 at 1. Under this agreement, US West initially was to provide one T-1 trunk for termination of local traffic and two T-1 trunks for origination and termination of interexchange toll traffic from US West’s tandem switch to MCImetro’s Class 5 switch. Id. at 2. This agreement also provided that the parties may order additional quantities of the above as growth may require. In addition to these facilities, the agreement clearly contemplated that either party might order more than eight DS1s. Id. This agreement was effective September 1, 1995. 2. The Interim Agreement MCImetro and US West entered into an interim interconnection agreement pending execution of a definitive agreement pursuant to the Act. Exh. 11 at 2. The interim agreement was effective August 26, 1996 and superseded the provisions of the September 1995 agreement. Id. at 4. Among other things, this agreement provided that both parties would work toward the development of joint forecasting for traffic utilization over trunk groups. In situations where one party’s requirements exceed forecasted quantities for forecasted locations, the facilities would be provisioned as available, with the further agreement that the parties would use their best reasonable efforts to meet the requirements as quickly as possible. Id. at 5. If MCImetro’s and US West’s forecasts were to vary by more than 24 DS0 trunks, the parties would try to reconcile the difference to within 24 DS0s. However, should the parties not be able to reconcile the difference, the trunk groups would be provisioned at the higher forecast. Id. This agreement also provided that US West would “to the greatest commercially reasonably extent possible” make available additional trunking facilities at the Seattle and Tacoma tandems. Id. at 32-33. In situations where capacity shortage may occur at the tandems, the agreement provided for direct end-office trunking (DEOT). 3. The Definitive Agreement MCImetro and US West entered into an interconnection agreement that was the result of negotiation and arbitration pursuant to the Act. This agreement was effective August 20, 1997. This agreement also provided for forecasting and provisioning of trunk groups. Exh. 12, Attachment 4. This agreement is on appeal to the United States District Court, Western District of Washington. It has not been stayed. D. MCImetro’s Complaint On June 24, 1997, MCImetro filed a complaint against US West alleging, among other things, that US West failed to provide adequate interconnection facilities to accommodate the interconnection of its telecommunications network with MCImetro’s network. MCImetro asks the Commission to order US West to provide sufficient and adequate facilities to permit interconnection in a reasonable, efficient, and timely manner, and to notify MCImetro of predicted capacity constraints in advance. MCImetro also asked the Commission to order US West to reduce the blocking experienced by MCImetro’s customers to a level no greater than the blocking experienced by US West’s end-use customers. In addition, MCImetro requested that the Commission find that US West subjected MCImetro to unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage and failed to provide MCImetro with nondiscriminatory access to non-competitive services. Finally, MCImetro asks the Commission to impose penalties against US West for its violations of the public service laws. Compl. at 14-15. II. ARGUMENT A. US West Failed to Comply With Its Obligation to Provide Interconnection 1. MCImetro’s First Request for Interconnection at the Seattle Tandem (Compl. ¶¶ 11-19) On March 5, 1996, MCImetro requested nine DS1s for local one-way outgoing traffic from its switch in Seattle to US West’s local tandem switch in Seattle. Exh. 41. Rather than provision this order, US West informed MCImetro that it did not have sufficient ports to fill the order. Exh. 44. US West did not have sufficient capacity in March of 1996 to fill this order even though the September 1, 1995 interconnection agreement put US West on notice that MCImetro would likely order at least 8 DS1s. Exh. 10. As explained by Staff witness David Griffith, US West’s lack of facilities has a negative effect on competition: [I]f the incumbent local exchange company does not have adequate trunks, there will be an adverse impact on both the incumbent’s customers and the customers of its competitors. In this instance, MCImetro must use US West’s trunk network for completing calls between MCImetro’s customers and US West’s customers. If MCImetro cannot obtain any trunks from US West, it will be impossible for MCImetro to provide service. On the other hand if US West does provide trunks, but cannot fully meet MCImetro’s requests for peak loads, service quality will suffer. In either case, MCImetro and other carriers, cannot compete effectively. Exh. T-108 at 4-5, ll. 18-21, 1-5. Concerned about the lack of capacity, MCImetro informed US West that it was delaying customer orders and experiencing customer blockage in a letter dated April 3, 1996. Exh. 43. Thus, US West was fully aware that its failure to provision the order adversely impacted MCImetro’s attempts to compete in the local exchange. Despite this knowledge, US West canceled MCImetro’s order for nine DS1s on the grounds that MCImetro had failed to provide US West with a forecast and because MCImetro did not provide US West with its “NXX” numbers for the trunks. See Exh. T-29 at 3. US West’s cancellation of this order was unreasonable. First, the order was placed on March 5, 1996, and on that day US West informed MCImetro that it could not provision the order due to lack of ports. Exh. T-40 at 5. Based on discussions with US West, MCImetro understood that the order would be filled on April 17, 1996, after US West completed its tandem port augment. Exh. 44. This date was later changed to April 21, 1997. Having told MCImetro that the March 5, 1996, order could not be filled because of capacity exhaust, US West informed MCImetro for the first time on April 17, 1996 that it had canceled the order. Prior to that date, MCImetro had no indication that there were any problems with its order and was simply waiting for US West to address its capacity shortages. It was unreasonable for US West claim it could not complete an order because of its capacity problems and then, following communication with MCImetro regarding the resolution of these problems, cancel the order for totally unrelated reasons and keep the fact of the cancellation a secret from MCImetro for 43 days. Second, it was unreasonable for US West to cancel the order for lack of a forecast. By the terms of the September 1, 1995 interconnection agreement US West was on notice that MCImetro likely would be seeking at least eight DS1s. Exh. 10 at 2. In addition, nothing in the September 1, 1995 agreement required forecasts, and nothing in the agreement would allow US West to cancel an order because MCImetro did not submit a forecast. In any event, MCImetro provided US West with a forecast on March 7, 1997 and a revised forecast on April 15, 1996. Exhs. 44; C-45. Third, US West should not have canceled the order for lack of MCImetro’s “NXX” numbers. US West did not need the numbers in order to provide the trunks. MCI had requested one-way outgoing trunks and MCImetro’s NXX numbers are not needed to route outgoing calls from MCImetro to US West. Exh. T-65 at 10-11. Further, US West did not even request the NXX numbers until April 23, 1996, after it had informed MCImetro that it had canceled the order. Exh. 44. MCImetro resubmitted its order for the nine DS1s on April 17, 1996, and also submitted two other orders, one for 15 additional DS1 one-way outgoing trunks, and another for two DS1 two-way IXC trunks. Exh. 44. The resubmitted order was rejected for yet another reason. US West’s fourth excuse for failing to provision the order was because its tandem could not support B8ZS clear channel capacity. Exh. 44. US West earlier had informed MCImetro that its entire network was B8ZS ready. Id.; see also Exh. 33 (US West told MCImetro prior to March 5, 1996 that it should be “no problem” to have DS1 trunks designed B8ZS). US West communicated this problem to MCImetro on April 22, 1996. MCImetro supplemented its order for a lesser quality alternative to B8ZS. Notwithstanding US West’s delays and excuses, US West finally installed the trunks on May 14, 1996. Exh. T-40 at 8. MCImetro had waited 70 days for its order to be filled. 2. MCImetro’s Second Request for Interconnection at the Seattle Tandem (Compl. ¶¶ 20-31) On August 19, 1996, MCImetro informed US West that it would need additional capacity at the Seattle tandem in mid-September. Exh. T-40 at 9. US West’s response to MCImetro was that US West still had no port capacity at its Seattle tandem, and had no plans to increase capacity in the near future. Id. As set forth in the Interim Agreement, in situations where capacity is exhausted at the tandem, the parties agreed to an end office trunking plan to enable traffic to be completed between the companies’ subscribers. Exh. 11 at 34. As provided by the agreement, MCImetro proposed direct end-office trunks (“DEOT”) as an interim solution to the tandem capacity problem. Exh. T-40 at 9. DEOT would allow MCImetro to bypass US West’s constrained tandem by purchasing trunks that would connect directly to US West’s end-offices. Id. While DEOT would allow traffic to flow between US West’s subscribers and MCImetro’s subscribers, it was not an ideal solution. DEOT is more expensive for MCImetro than interconnecting at the tandem. By using DEOT, MCImetro would be required to purchase interconnection to most, if not all, of US West’s end-offices in the Seattle area. On the other hand, interconnection at a single point, such as the tandem, would allow MCImetro to cover the same geographic area with a single connection. Id. Thus, US West’s failure to interconnect with MCImetro at the tandem increased MCImetro’s cost of entering the local market. Even though the parties had agreed in the Interim Agreement to use DEOT when the tandem was at capacity, US West was not prepared to implement DEOT. US West agreed to the DEOT solution, after a two week dely to consider the proposal. Id. at 10-11. Prior to ordering the DEOTs, MCImetro needed information from US West in order to make the best and most efficient choice of US West end-offices for direct trunking. Id. at 11. MCImetro requested US West provide it with end-office recommendations based on actual traffic data for call originating on US West’s network and terminating on MCImetro’s network. US West was either unwilling or unable to provide this information. Therefore, on November 26, 1996, MCImetro ordered DEOTs to the five US West end-offices with the largest number of access lines. MCImetro also believed DEOTs to these end-offices would alleviate some of the blocking problems it had been experiencing. Id. at 12-13. US West did not fill the orders for the DEOTs. Instead, US West informed MCImetro that it could not complete the orders because of port constraints at the end offices. MCImetro witness Robert Iannotta aptly described MCImetro’s dilemma: US West’s refusal to provide capacity at its tandem or in the requested end offices created a “Catch-22” situation for MCImetro: Unable to get the necessary capacity from US West at the Seattle tandem that it needed to provide service, MCImetro undertook an expensive and time intensive solution only to be told that there was no capacity at the end offices. Id. at 13, ll. 13-17. The DEOTs finally were delivered on January 8, 1997. MCImetro originally had informed US West that it needed capacity beginning in mid-September. MCImetro’ s planned interconnection, another small step in the direction toward local exchange competition, was delayed by US West for over three months. The DEOTs were delayed over 24 days from the date they were ordered. This delay exceeds US West’s standard provisioning intervals. Exh. 100. Even when MCImetro’s requests for DEOTs were installed, significant blocking occurred, which resulted in MCImetro requesting additional DEOTs, which were installed at intervals exceeding US West’s standard provisioning intervals. Id. at 14-15. The blocking continued and MCImetro discovered that US West did not have the complete NXX dialing codes loaded for the MCImetro’ DEOTs in its switches, even though MCImetro had provided the numbers to US West. Id. at 16. As a result, the end-office switches were continuing to route the calls to US West’s overloaded tandem. Ironically, it was to avoid the blocking at this tandem that MCImetro had implemented the more expensive DEOT solution. Because of the significant blocking problems, MCImetro cut its sales plans for the Seattle market. Exh. T-20 at 8. This result is the exact opposite of the intent of the federal Act and state policy to promote local competition. 3. MCImetro’s Request for Interconnection at the Tacoma Tandem (Compl. ¶¶ 32-35) Early in 1997, MCImetro entered the Tacoma market when it ordered and received 48 circuits between its switch in Seattle and US West’s Tacoma tandem. Id. at 18. However, as in Seattle, MCImetro experienced significant blocking problems at US West’s Tacoma tandem and requested additional capacity. And again, US West failed to provide adequate facilities. MCImetro ordered additional capacity on June 3, 1997. Id. US West informed MCImetro the Tacoma tandem was out of port capacity and that US West did not intend to address the capacity problem until at least October 31, 1997. Id. at 19. Although MCImetro had provided US West with its forecasted needs on May 1, 1997, US West was totally unprepared to provide additional capacity in June. US West suggested DEOT for Tacoma. While DEOT was an alternative to interconnection at the tandem, it was not MCImetro’s preference because it is more expensive, and as detailed below, DEOT would cause further delay. In order to facilitate DEOT, MCImetro needed to purchase a DS3 transport facility from MCImetro’s Seattle switch to US West’s Tacoma central office, which would be used to transport the traffic from the DEOTs to MCImetro’s switch. Id. MCImetro ordered the DS3 on June 18, 1997, and US West gave MCImetro a delivery date of June 26, 1997 for the DS3. Id. However, US West canceled that order because it could not be filled in accordance with US West’s tariff. Id. at 20. The tariff issue was a billing issue and for several months MCImetro, MCI Telecommunications Corporation and US West worked out the details. When the billing details were resolved, MCImetro again requested the DS3 and US West gave a delivery date of September 10, 1997 for the facility. US West did not deliver the DS3 as promised, but rescheduled the delivery date to December 4, 1997, because it did not have sufficient interoffice facilities. Id.; see also Exh. 57. However, US West was able to deliver the DS3 on November 5, 1997. Id. With the installation of the DS3, MCImetro was finally ready to order the DEOTs in Tacoma. The delivery of these trunks was delayed. Id. at 20. US West finally installed trunks to the Tacoma tandem on November 10, 1997. However, the delays and insufficient capacity had a devastating impact on MCImetro’s ability to enter the local market. As stated by MCImetro witness Drew Londgren: MCImetro believes that it could be providing service to more customers if US West provided sufficient network capacity. While the number of customers grows slowly, MCImetro has had to revise downward its sales plan to take into account the barriers to market entry that MCImetro has had to overcome. Exh. T-1, at 7. This result is contrary to the pro-competitive policies of Congress, the Washington Legislature and the Commission. B. US West Failed to Incorporate MCImetro’s Forecasts Into Its Own Network Forecasts and Otherwise Failed To Adequately Forecast for Network Growth As in any industry, forecasting demand is important in telecommunications. However, forecasts, by their nature, will rarely be exact: The art of forecasting has always required the inclusion of unknown factors, because forecasting is an attempt at predicting the future. Some factors are considered to be somewhat of an unknown quantity because they may not be fully quantifiable. However, these factors are relevant and are known to have an impact on the final results. Exh. T-108 at 8, ll. 7-13. In an attempt to shift the focus of MCImetro’s complaint from US West’s failure to provide adequate facilities, US West witness, Craig Wiseman testified that US West was a victim of unanticipated demand and was unable to meet the unprecedented growth requirements on its network. Mr. Wiseman cited the growth in the internet, CLEC interconnection and long-term number portability as unanticipated demands on its network. Exh. 110 at 2. None of these factors justifies US West’s failure to have adequate capacity. As Mr. Griffith explained, US West has known for years that there will be local exchange competition. The Electric Lightwave decision was issued in 1994 and the Commission issued its order in the Interconnection Case in 1995. Nor did the Telecommunications Act of 1996 take anyone in the industry by surprise. US West knew CLEC interconnection was forthcoming yet did not have the capacity in place. Likewise, the rapid growth of the internet has been known for years. US West should have taken these factors into consideration when building its facilities, both for the sake of competitors and its own subscribers. Mr. Wiseman also mentioned long-term number portability. However, this was not in place in the Seattle and Tacoma areas during the timeframe of the complaint. Long-term number portability cannot excuse US West’s failure to have adequate capacity. MCImetro and US West provided for forecasts in the Interim Agreement. This agreement, which was in effect from August 26, 1996 to August 20, 1997, provided that the parties would try to reconcile their forecasts: If differences in quarterly forecasts of the parties vary by more than 24 additional DS0 two-way trunks, the companies shall meet to attempt to reconcile the forecasts to within 24 DS0 trunks. If the parties are unable to reach such a reconciliation, the Local Interconnection Trunk Groups will be provisioned to the higher forecast. Exh. 11 at p. 5. The parties anticipated that they would exchange forecasts, and in the event the forecasts differed, the higher forecast would be used. This agreement also included a provision to alleviate the affects of over-forecasting: At the end of three months, the utilization of the Local Interconnection Trunk Groups will be reviewed and if the average CCS utilization for the third month is under 75 percent (75%) of the capacity, either party may issue an order to resize the trunk group, which shall be left with not less than 25 percent (25%) excess capacity. In the event that such resizing is necessary, the party whose higher forecast was used as the basis for the original provisioning will reimburse the other party for the expense of resizing based upon applicable tariff rates for service installation charges. Id. at 5-6 MCImetro provided forecasts to US West. See Exhs. C52, C-53, C-54; see also, Exh. 10 at 2. Because US West did not have capacity at the Seattle and Tacoma tandems or at its end-offices, it is clear that US West did not incorporate MCImetro’s forecasts into its own forecasts for network management and growth. In failing to incorporate MCImetro’s forecasts into its network plans, US West ensured that it would not have capacity available to fulfill MCImetro’s requests. C. US West’s Refusal to Expand its Facilities for CLEC Interconnection Was Dictated By Company Policy Rather than comply with state and federal law and policy directing local exchange competition, US West instituted a company policy designed to ensure that competition would either not take hold or, if attempted, would not be successful. This company policy is set forth in Exhibit C-94: ***Confidential *** See also Exh. C-116. The documents that contain this policy statement are used for planning additional network capacity. As these documents reveal, ***Confidential*** Despite the fact that US West may go through the motions of entering into interconnection agreements, it clearly does not intend to comply with its legal obligation to interconnect. D. CLEC Demands on US West’s Network Are Nominal And Are Not an Excuse for US West’s Refusal to Accommodate MCImetro’s Requests for Interconnection It is clear from the record in this case that CLEC demands on US West’s network are not so great as to justify US West’s refusal to fill MCImetro’s orders or US West’s delay of those orders. Highly confidential evidence in the record shows that ***Confidential*** See Tr. Vol. 9, pp. 830-36; Exh. HC-124, HC-141. Staff witness Mr. Griffith’s review of highly confidential US West internal documents highlighted this fact: The data revealed that during that time frame USWC added to its Tacoma tandem switch well over 1,000 new tandem trunks while MCI had only requested 120 tandem trunks. At the same time USWC had more than 5,000 trunks terminating on the tandem. Since movement of customers to MCI’s network would have relieved some of the congestion pressures on US West’s network, it is difficult to understand why US West refused to accommodate MCI’s requests. Exh. T-109 at 5. By adding over 1,000 new tandems, US West added 42 DS1s, while MCImetro had requested only 5 DS1s. This data reveals that when capacity is available, its is not used to accommodate the interconnection requests of CLECs. This exemplifies US West’s corporate policy not to proactively engineer its network for CLECs. E. US West’s Refusal to Interconnect With MCImetro Violates the State Constitution, State and Federal Law, the Commission’s Orders, and Its Interconnection Agreements with MCImetro 1. US West Violated the Washington Constitution The Washington Constitution requires telecommunications companies to transmit each other’s messages without delay or discrimination. Wash. Const. art. XII, § 19. US West’s failure and refusal to interconnect with MCImetro is a violation of the Washington Constitution. 2. US West Violated State Law Various provisions of state law require US West to interconnect with other telecommunications companies and prohibit anticompetitive and discriminatory behavior between companies. US West’s constitutional requirement to interconnect is reiterated in RCW 80.36.200, which requires all telecommunications companies to “receive, transmit and deliver, without discrimination or delay” the traffic of other carriers. Under state law, US West is required to perform its obligation to interconnect with MCImetro in a “prompt, expeditious and efficient manner” and maintain its network so that its facilities are “modern, adequate, sufficient and efficient.” RCW 80.36.080. US West also must provide “suitable and proper facilities and connections” as demanded. RCW 80.36.090. US West failure to have adequate facilities for interconnection and its refusal to interconnect in a timely manner, if at all, violates these statutes. US West also is prohibited from treating its competitors in an anticompetive and discriminatory manner. US West is prohibited from subjecting another carrier to “any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.” RCW 80.36.170. US West also is prohibited from granting to itself an “undue or unreasonable preference or advantage” with respect to access to noncompetitive services, nor may it subject MCImetro with any “undue or unreasonable prejudice or competitive disadvantage” with respect to such access. RCW 80.36.186. US West severely prejudiced and disadvantaged MCImetro when it refused to interconnect in a timely manner and when its inadequate tandem capacity required MCImetro to interconnect using the more expensive DEOT. US West’s clear advantage to itself is illustrated by the fact that when capacity is available, US West uses that capacity for itself and will not accommodate CLEC interconnection. US West’s has violated RCW 80.36.170 and .186. 3. US West Violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 The Act requires ILECs, such as US West, to interconnect with CLECs. Although US West entered into negotiations with MCImetro and participated in the arbitration of the interconnection agreement, US West has not complied with the provisions of that agreement. US West’s failure to interconnect with MCImetro as requested is a violation of the Act and is contrary to the stated purpose of the Act. 4. US West Violated the Commission’s Orders in the Interconnection Case. Under the provisions of the Commission’s orders in the Interconnection Case, US West is responsible for building and maintaining its facilities up to the meet point for exchanging traffic. Interconnection Case, 4th Supp. Order, at 46. US West has failed to provide the facilities necessary in order to exchange traffic between its end-use customers and MCImetro’s end-use customers. The record in this case is replete with evidence that US West conditions interconnection on the availability of facilities. This is in direct violation of the Commission’s Ninth Supplemental Order in the Interc