JUDGE CAILLE: Let's go back on the record.

Okay. We have reconvened after our afternoon recess,

and we are in the process of the cross-examination of

Mr. Kelley, or Dr. Kelley. And Mr. Thompson, are you

ready to resume?

MR. THOMPSON: Yes, I am.

JUDGE CAILLE: Thank you.

Q. Dr. Kelley, at page 22 of your testimony, lines 15 through 17, you said, Dial-around services are being promoted heavily with the use of numerous brands not associated with the established carriers, although the use established -- excuse me. Although they use established carriers -- actually, I've got a -- it's written out incorrectly. Maybe you should read the sentence, beginning, Dial-around services.

MR. CROMWELL: What page was that, again? MR. THOMPSON: It's page 22, lines 15

18 through 17.

THE WITNESS: Dial-around services are being promoted heavily with the use of numerous brands not associated with the established carriers, although the established carriers are providing the services in many cases.

Q. Okay. Does WorldCom advertise its dial-around services? First of all, what are

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- WorldCom's dial-around services?
- WorldCom has a Telecom USA affiliate, a subsidiary that has these dial-around services
- through 10-10-325, and quite honestly, I don't carry those numbers around in my head. 5
- 6 Okay. 10-10-220, 10-10-321, does that Ο. 7 sound right?
 - Α. Could be.
- 9 Okay. Would you agree that those numbers Ο. 10 represent brand names?
 - Α. Sure.
 - Okay. Do you know what portion of the dial Ο. -- what share of the dial around market is controlled by those WorldCom offerings?
 - I don't have direct knowledge. I saw a number somewhere in this record of 45 percent, but I don't have firsthand knowledge.
- 18 Okay. On the topic of brand, at page 23 of your testimony, at the bottom of page and then 19
- 20 carrying over, you said, There is evidence that the
- 21 established brand names of the major carriers are
- becoming less important. A significant portion of the advertising by AT&T, MCI WorldCom, and Sprint is 22
- 23
- 24 now devoted to products that do not carry an
- 25 established brand name. In addition to the new

1 facilities-based entrants I described above, there 2 are literally hundreds of resellers offering service 3 under their own brand name.

Could I ask you, please, to take a look at Exhibit C-36?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. We asked you for -- Staff has asked you for support in our data request here for the portion of your statement that a significant portion of the advertising of the Big Three companies is now devoted to products that don't carry an established brand name.

And as your backup for that point, you supplied us the list of, I guess -- well, why don't you explain what it is, I guess, since you provided it?

A. These are data that come from this Tele-trend. I believe these are the Tele-trend data, or Competitrack, I'm sorry, Competitrack data, which is a company that -- evidently, they have people who read the newspaper and watch television and, through other means, record how much advertising is going on and what people are paying for it. And Charles Rivers Associates, a consulting firm in Washington that's working on this case for Sprint, acquired that

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- data and pulled from the database the data that you have here, which I relied upon.
 - Q. Okay. And I take it the point is to show that some products of the Big Three carriers have advertising dollars devoted to them, but they don't carry an established brand name; is that right?
 - A. The established brand name of the carrier -- ultimately providing the service; right.
- 9 Q. Okay. Can you provide a couple of 10 examples, maybe, so I can understand what you're 11 talking about?
 - A. Okay. On -- it looks like the Bates stamp ends in 254, for advertiser MCI. About the middle of the page, there's long distance dial-around, and it gives dollars and share of their advertising in that category or subcategory.
 - Q. Okay. Was that the -- do you think that refers to the 10-10 offerings that we were talking about earlier?
- 20 A. I believe they do. Dial around is when you 21 don't use your PIC carrier; you dial the 10-10 code 22 to get to another carrier.
- 23 Q. Okay. So they don't carry the MCI brand, 24 but --
- 25 A. The established brand name.

- Q. I see. Okay. But they may -- certainly, they may qualify, I mean, I think you said earlier that you would concede that maybe 10-10-220 is a brand; right? I mean, it's just not the same brand as --
- 6 A. Yeah, they came in and established a new 7 brand.
 - 0. 0kay.
 - A. Just as Qwest came in and established a brand and Bell Atlantic is now coming in and establishing its brand in the West, and so yes.
 - Q. Okay. I just wanted to clarify that point. Based on the totals that we see for the three companies, for example, looking at the bottom line for MCI WorldCom, which is on the next page, ending 255, are you aware of whether any of the -- what I'll refer to as the emerging carriers have spent anywhere near the amounts that these three companies have to establish their brand names through advertising?
 - A. I'm just trying to remember whether those data were extracted from this data set, and sitting here now, I don't recall that they were, so --
- Q. So in other words, you just can't make a comparison based on this document, is what you're saying?

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- 1 A. Right, I believe this document is MCI, 2 Sprint and AT&T.
 - Q. Right, but I guess I'm asking you, just based on your knowledge of the industry, if you can make any kind of a comparison of these three firms compared to, say, Qwest or something?
 - A. Not to be quantitatively precise. I mean, I do see ads by Qwest on the television. I think I've seen some Williams ads, so they are out there advertising.
- 11 Q. But I mean, you just don't have specific 12 knowledge of how much they're spending?
- 13 A. I don't. It may well be that the data we 14 supplied to you can be mined to extract that; we just 15 haven't done it.
- 16 On page 25 of your testimony, you talked 17 about the issue, the difference between rates for 18 in-state calls versus state-to-state calls. lines 16 through 18, you said, In an intensely 19 20 competitive environment, firms cannot risk losing the 21 business of consumers who make a high portion of in-state calls. Higher prices for in-state calls are 22 likely explained by higher access charges; correct? 23
 - A. Correct.
 - Q. Does Washington State have different

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- 1 intraLATA and interLATA access charges, to your
 2 knowledge?
 - A. Not to my knowledge.
- Q. Is there a major cost differential, other than access charges, between intrastate interLATA and intraLATA -- interLATA, intraLATA calling, other than --
- 8 A. I think I lost your inters and intras 9 there.
- 10 Q. Sorry. Is there a cost differential 11 between inter and intraLATA, other than access 12 charges, because there is no access charges, is there 13 some cost differential between the two?
- 14 A. Between intrastate interLATA and intrastate 15 intraLATA; is that the question?
 - Q. Right.
 - A. Not that I'm aware of.
- 18 Q. Okay. Does MCI WorldCom offer different 19 intraLATA and interLATA rates in its MCI Everyday and 20 MCI Everyday Plus plans?
 - A. I don't know.
- Q. Okay. Well, if I would suggest to you that they did, can you explain to me why they might do that?
- A. Well, you'd have to explain to me what the

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   plans are.
             Okay. Let's take a look at Exhibit 80,
         Q.
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   please.
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             Eight-zero?
         Α.
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         Ο.
             Right.
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             I'm afraid I don't have it.
        Α.
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             MS. HOPFENBECK: I'm going to object to the
   question prior to getting to the document. This
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   witness has stated that he's not familiar with the
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   plans. The question calls for this witness to
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   speculate as to the reasons why there is a
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   differential in the plans. We don't have any
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   foundation established that this witness can do that.
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   In fact, he cannot do that, based on his previous
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   testimony, and I'd object to the question on that
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   basis.
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             Ms. McMahon will be able to answer this
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   question and give the Commission the relevant
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   evidence which would be the reason, in fact, that
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   there is a differential in the rate.
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             MR. THOMPSON: Well, I'd like to ask them
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   both, and I think, given the fact that the witness,
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   Dr. Kelley, is offering an opinion about why there's
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   a difference in certain rates. And particularly, I
   guess -- well, about in-state and out of state rates,
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1 it certainly seems to me that, again, as an economist 2 in the field, he ought to have an opinion about the 3 subject.

MS. HOPFENBECK: Dr. Kelley has not rendered an opinion concerning the differential rates charged by any carrier between intraLATA and interLATA in-state rates. The sole opinion stated in his testimony is that higher prices for in-state calls relative to interstate calls are likely explained by higher access charges. So this is beyond the scope of his testimony, as well.

MR. THOMPSON: I think that the witness is responding to a statement by Dr. Blackmon in his testimony that -- essentially indicating that there might be -- essentially that the market is currently on thin ice in the sense that there are structural -- there are flaws, there are structural flaws that cause certain segments of pricing not to be driven down to margin of cost, and I think this is the same issue, whether it's not the identical issue.

JUDGE CAILLE: The objection is overruled.

- Q. Okay. On --
- 23 A. I'm sorry. I don't have a copy of that 24 exhibit.
 - Q. I could just tell you, maybe, what the rate

00446 1 is. How about that? I'd rather look at it. Α. 3 Q. Okay. 4 JUDGE CAILLE: Could you give us the 5 reference again, Mr. Thompson? 6 MR. THOMPSON: It's Exhibit 80. 7 THE WITNESS: Okay. I have the exhibit. Okay. I think that most of the information Q. 9 is on the second page of this price list, as you can 10 see from the top, MCI Telecommunications Corporation 11 Washington Price List Number Three. On the second 12 page, it sets out the applicable terms for MCI 13 Everyday Plus. And there's a heading for monthly 14 account fees of \$4.95 a month, and then an intraLATA 15 -- excuse me, interLATA rate of 11 cents and an 16 intraLATA rate of eight cents. 17 Α. I see it. 18 Do you see that? Okay. Do you have an Ο. 19 20

- opinion about why MCI WorldCom might charge different permanent rates for interLATA and intraLATA calls?
- 21 Well, again, I can only speculate. Let's 22 assume that access charges are the same, and I think 23 I agreed to assume that with you, and many other 24 costs are going to be similar. If that were -- both 25 those things were true, I would say that this might

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1 have something to do with the specific marketing 2 objective.

For example, I know that in many states the opportunity to provide dial one intraLATA calls is a fairly recent phenomena, and therefore a carrier trying to take away business from US West might price the intraLATA calls almost promotionally for a while at a lower rate with the intention of raising them later to make them equal to interLATA. That's all speculation on my part.

- Q. Do you think it might be a response to greater competition, then, from US West in the intraLATA segment?
- A. No. I would say it a little bit differently. It's a response to the fact that, for the first time recently, IXCs have been given the opportunity to compete with US West intraLATA on more even footing.
- Q. Okay. But they're trying to take away -- one of the reasons might be that they're trying to take away customers from US West?
- 22 A. Sure.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. That's all I have for you, Dr. Kelley. Thank you.

JUDGE CAILLE: Excuse me, Mr. Thompson,

00448 were any of the exhibits -- do you have an exhibit to offer? MR. THOMPSON: Yeah, I think there's only one exhibit that was not previously admitted that I'd like to move admission of, and that's Number 109. I think all the rest were responses to data requests and were mentioned by Ms. Hopfenbeck yesterday as part of the documents that were stipulated into the 9 record. 10 JUDGE CAILLE: Is there any objection to 11 the admission of Exhibit 109? 12 MS. HOPFENBECK: No objection. 13 MR. CROMWELL: No objection, Your Honor. 14 JUDGE CAILLE: Mr. Thompson, what about 15 Exhibit Number 30? I think -- did you reference that 16 during your cross-examination? 17 MR. THOMPSON: Oh, thanks for catching 18 that. Yes, I'd like to move for admission of that, 19 as well. 20 JUDGE CAILLE: Is there any objection to 21 the admission of Exhibit Number 30? 22 MS. HOPFENBECK: No. And Your Honor,

Exhibit 30 has already -- is part of the stipulated

JUDGE CAILLE: Oh, it is, okay.

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exhibits.

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             MR. THOMPSON: I actually didn't have it on
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   my list, but --
             MS. HOPFENBECK: Oh, I didn't?
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   apologize. That was one of those I left out.
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             JUDGE CAILLE: One more, Exhibit C-29. Is
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   that not offered?
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             MR. THOMPSON: I don't think we've referred
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   to that yet.
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             JUDGE CAILLE: All right.
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             MR. THOMPSON: Thank you.
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             JUDGE CAILLE: Mr. Cromwell.
             MR. CROMWELL: Yes. If I may?
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             CROSS-EXAMINATION
   BY MR. CROMWELL:
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        Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Kelley.
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             Good afternoon, again.
        Α.
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            I will try to minimize repetition, if
   possible. In your testimony, you cited to the growth
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   of the Internet as a relevant factor affecting
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   telecommunication markets, did you not?
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             I did.
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             Are you familiar with the phrase voice over
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   IP, or VoIP?
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        Α.
            I am.
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        Q.
            And are you aware of what share of the
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- 1 Washington long distance mass market is taken by VoIP 2 products?
 - A. I am not.
- Q. Would you estimate that it is less than one percent?
- 6 A. I don't know. I would agree it's probably 7 small at this point.
- 8 Q. Probably significantly less than one
 9 percent?
 - A. I don't know.
- 11 Q. In your opinion, is voice over the Internet 12 products likely to play a price constraining role in 13 the mass market for intrastate long distance in 14 Washington during the next 12 months?
- 15 A. Well, again, in terms of Internet time and 16 telecommunications time, 12 months can be an 17 eternity.
- 18 Q. In this instance, I'm referring to the 19 literal 12 months?
 - A. The calendar years?
- 21 O. Yes.
- A. Literal 12 months and Moore's law and all of that, I think I've said my expectation is it's
- 24 going to take some time to bring IP voice up to the
- 25 quality of current circuit switched voice, and it may

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well take a year, so I guess I'll agree with you. Okay. Would you think that likely in the next two years, two calendar years?

A. I think much more likely, yes. Whether 5 it's likely or not now, I think it could well be a

factor in two years.

Just to be clear, I'm not asking whether --Ο. when, as you described it, voice over Internet telephony or IP telephony is the same level of 10 quality as switched voice capability, but rather when those products are likely to play a price constraining role in the mass market or intrastate long distance in Washington.

Do you believe that is likely to occur with -- I suppose the assumption in my question being, based upon what you've said already, that that level of quality would have been reached and that it would take some measurable amount of time for those products to affect the market, as the foundation of the question relates?

20 21 I think I lost you somewhere along the Α. 22 line. I mean, let me say that the market -- we start 23 from a position in which the market's competitive,

24 and Dr. Blackmon agrees with that. When will

25 Internet voice be a significant choice for consumers.

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- I think, you know, in the next two years, it could well be. We have AOL marketing with Talk.com right now, and they've acquired a lot of customers. I cite that in my testimony. And AOL I can see 5 transitioning very neatly and quickly to an Internet voice product with the customer base that it's 7 already built.
 - Just so that I'm clear, you believe that it Ο. is possible, from that time window of one year to two years, well, for 24 months, that they could play a role in the market?
 - Certainly possible. Α.
 - But you don't have an opinion on whether or not that role would be a price constraining one?
- Well, I mean, as I said, the market's constrained by existing competition. When are these guys going to be a factor in the market and start taking customers away along with all the other 19 carriers who are taking customers away in significant numbers, I don't know, but certainly within two years, there's a feasibility.
- 22 Q. Let me ask perhaps a more fundamental question, Dr. Kelley. In your opinion, what 23 24 percentage of market share would a company in the 25 market we've been discussing need to -- what percent

of market share would need to be acquired in order to constrain the pricing of AT&T and merged WorldCom, who presumably will each have more than a third of the market?

A. I don't think I can answer that question, because market share is only one of the things you would look at. There are lots of firms in the market with -- lots of firms with capacity, and you know, in theory, a firm with zero market share and a lot of capacity could constrain market. That's the first point I'd make.

The second point I'd make is, again, we have to go back to the point that the market is competitive already.

- Q. So in your opinion, it's possible for a company that has less than a half of one percent of the market to constrain the pricing of AT&T?
- A. I said theoretically possible. There are economic models that would show you that, that I wouldn't necessarily subscribe to, but there are economic models that would show you that.
- Q. Going from the realm of the theoretical to the realm of what we have in Washington, what do you think, in your opinion, would be likely in the actual realm, rather than the theoretical one?

A. I have to answer that in terms of the elasticity of supply of other firms. You're asking me, basically, to assume a counterfactual, that MCI and Sprint together might be able to exercise some market power, and what would it take to turn that around. And it's counterfactual, because I don't think they can exercise such market power.

Well, it would take a firm with capacity to complete calls, to transport calls, to switch calls, to bill calls and to market calls, and there are lots of firms out there today that have that capacity.

Q. I have to apologize, Dr. Kelley. I'm just trying to avoid duplicating some of my questions with Mr. Thompson.

It is also your testimony, is it not, that growth in the long distance transmission capacity of the emerging carriers is a materially competitive factor?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And you believe that growth in capacity has allowed emerging carriers to, and I quote, attract customers from the major long distance carriers, end quote?
 - A. Emerging carriers, yes.
 - Q. And when you said that, who did you mean

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- 1 when you said the major long distance carriers?
 - A. Can I ask where we are here?
- Q. Certainly. It's in your rebuttal testimony, page nine, lines 12 to 23, I believe.
- 5 Actually, I gave you my copy of your testimony, so 6 I'm going off my notes.
 7 A. Yeah, I guess the major long distance
 - A. Yeah, I guess the major long distance carriers there, I was referring to AT&T, MCI, Sprint.
 - Q. i.e., the Big Three?
 - A. I don't like to use that word, but --
 - Q. It's common for others to use that phrase?
- 12 A. The biggest of the three, the biggest three 13 of the rest.
 - Q. Is it common in the industry for that term to be used to reference AT&T, MCI and Sprint?
 - A. I've heard that term, certainly.
- 17 Q. When you also made that statement in your 18 testimony, which specific customers were you 19 referring to?
- A. Well, I think all customers. Later on in my testimony, which we talked about already, there's specific data about mass market residential customers, but also large business customers.
- Q. And is it your testimony, Dr. Kelley, that the growth in long distance transmission capacity is

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- relevant to the decision-making of mass market customers?
- That the existence of capacity is -- are Α. you reading from here? 5
 - No, it's a question.
 - Okay. The question is is it relevant to customers that carriers have capacity, and I guess the customers don't care who's carrying their calls, but the fact is that the fact -- given that there's capacity out there, there are carriers who can use it, there are carriers who own the capacity or carriers that resell the capacity that can provide choices to consumers, and that's relevant to them.
 - Speaking hypothetically --Q.
 - Α. Sorry I'm speaking so fast.
 - I'm sorry. Speaking for a moment, hypothetically, Dr. Kelley, is it economically sustainable for a reseller of any type of product to undercut the prices of the company from whom it is purchasing that product when competing with that originating company in a relevant market?
 - Yes. Α.
 - How would that be economically sustainable? Ο.
- We're talking about a hypothetical that 25 probably doesn't have anything to do with the

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- existing long distance market, but if the vertically integrated carrier that is the one who has the wholesale and the retail, is charging a very high retail margin, then a reseller can undercut it.
 - Q. When purchasing services from that company?
 - A. Sure. If it's buying services for a dollar from a company that's charging \$2, and the reseller only has costs of 50 cents, it can undercut it.
- 9 Q. Dr. Kelley, I'd like to return a moment to 10 our prior discussion of US West and RBOC entry. Your 11 testimony also addressed competitive entry by the 12 RBOCs, did it not?
 - A. It did.
 - Q. And do you have an opinion on when US West will receive its Section 271 approval from this Commission and the FCC?
 - A. I was in the room yesterday when we were discussing this with Mr. Porter, I believe. And if my recollection is correct, I mean, it looks like not in a year, but maybe in two years.
- Q. Are you basing your testimony now upon what 22 Mr. Porter said?
- A. Well, I don't have an exact recollection.
 I know you had a colloquy with him about that and you
 talked about the schedule and the fact that US West,

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- 1 you know, certainly isn't there yet. It's going to 2 take a while.
- Q. My question was whether you had an opinion on that matter. Do you have -- is that something you have an opinion on?
- A. I do, and it's based on the following. US
 West is merging with Qwest. Qwest is a long distance
 carrier that's building a very large nationwide
 network, some of which it's selling off in this part
 of the world because of the restrictions in the '96
 Act, but Qwest has an interest in becoming a major
 long distance player, and they are becoming a major
 long distance player all over the country.

My belief is that when Joe Nacchio takes over US West, he's going to explain to them that if Bell Atlantic New York can do it, they can do it, and they ought to do it.

- 18 Q. Are you familiar with Mr. Nacchio's 19 business practices?
 - A. I am.
- Q. And do you believe he will be successful in changing the corporate structure of US West sufficient to make that happen?
- A. I think the market test shows that he is a very strong-willed person.

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Q. When do you believe it is likely to occur?
A. I don't know when the merger's going to be consummated. Obviously, it will take some time for the dynamic that I hypothesized here to work its way out, but within that two-year framework we're talking about, I think it could occur.

7 There's another thing that's happening here, and that is it's taking much longer than anybody thought, when the '96 Act passed, for the 9 10 RBOCs to get authority, but we do have Bell Atlantic 11 in New York, we have Southwest Bell in Texas, who is 12 at the FCC, but hasn't cleared the hurdles yet. 13 What's going on here is a learning experience. 14 as the Section 271 is being administered by the 271, 15 it appears that a critical element is the ability to 16 do OSS. And once we get two or three carriers who 17 know how to do it, have learned how to do it and have 18 vendors who have helped them do it, I expect 19 something like a domino effect.

Q. Recognizing that you believe it to be counterfactual, I think was your phrase, I would ask you to express an opinion on how much market share US West would need to acquire in the long distance mass market to constrain pricing of AT&T and the merged WorldCom?

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- In that -- again, in the counterfactual, Α. you know, as both Dr. Blackmon and I agreed, the market's competitive now. Counterfactual situation that it were not, if the BOCs came in, it wouldn't 5 take long at all. The BOCs have demonstrated the capacity to acquire customers very quickly. 7
 - How long is not long at all? Ο.
 - Α. Within months, and maybe even days. mean, the grant of the authority in this hypothetical situation could be enough.
 - Dr. Kelley, in your testimony, you state that emerging carriers have captured a significant share of the residential pre-subscription and direct-dial long distance minutes, do you not?
 - Α. Correct.
- 16 What does significant mean in this context, Ο. 17 sir?
- 18 Well, I'm relying, I think, on FCC data on this point, and I'm looking for my exhibit. But I 19 20 believe, as of 1998 -- maybe I should just try to 21 find it.
- 22 I guess, just to clarify, what I'm really Ο. 23 getting at is your definition of significant in this 24 context?
- 25 Α. Twenty percent is certainly significant,

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- 1 and they're at that range in '98, and that's a long, 2 long time ago.
 - Q. So you'd consider 20 percent significant?
- 4 A. Yes.
 - Q. And would 10 percent be significant?
- 6 A. Yes.
 - Q. Why?
- 8 A. If the competitors have -- again, it's an 9 elasticity of supply issue. If the competitors have 10 the capacity for transport, the switching capacity, 11 the marketing capacity and the billing capacity, yes.
 - Q. And extrapolating what appears to be your opinion regarding the other factors, with capacity elasticity and the others taking it down to one percent or less?
- 16 A. Yeah, if I'm looking at elasticity of 17 supply here in this counterfactual situation.
- 18 Q. You stated that the established brand names 19 of major carriers are becoming less important, did 20 you not?
 - A. I did.
- Q. And in your opinion, is this also true of the long distance mass market?
 - A. It is.
- Q. Do the companies assign value to the brand

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- 1 names?
- A. I'm not sure I understand the question.
- Q. Do the petitioners have names that are branded?
 - A. They do.
- Q. And do you have knowledge on whether or not they ascribe monetary value to the existence of those brand names?
- 9 A. I don't know. There's some accounting 10 issue in there. They may not.
 - Q. Do you think it's a marketing issue?
 - A. Do I think what is a marketing issue?
 - Q. The value of a brand?
 - A. The -- I mean, the question was do the companies ascribe value. I don't know. If you're asking me do the brands have value, I would say the answer is probably yes, and I would say that events in the long distance market demonstrate that other companies can build valuable brands, as well.
- Q. Let's look at the other side of that coin. How do mass market customers assign value to a brand?
- A. Brands -- I mean, looking at -- if you're looking at economic theory, brands convey information about, for example, quality. And one of the reasons I believe that, you know, the existing brand names

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are becoming less valuable is the Internet that we talked about earlier. Information is much easier to acquire. The customer switching data we've all seen show the customers are trying different brands.

MCI has tremendous churns, people going in and out of their brand. So they are sampling other brands and acquiring information about the brands, and they can do it at fairly low cost in telecommunications through dial-around, which is 10 basically zero cost or through pre-subscribing to another carrier, which is obviously inherently easy to do.

- Dr. Kelley, in your opinion, is the residential long distance market a distinct market? I'm trying to remember what I said.
- 15 16 think --17
 - It's not keyed off your testimony. I'm Ο. just asking you your opinion.
- 19 Yeah. I think we tend to think as -- it's 20 not an antitrust analysis, per se, but we tend to 21 think of residential and small business being -- I mean, having a set of demand characteristics that 22 23 might be different than large business.
- 24 MR. CROMWELL: Thank you for your time, Dr. 25 Kelley. I have no further questions.

00464 1 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 2 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PASCARELLA: 4 Q. 5 6 Good afternoon. 7 Ο. 9 10 11

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- Good afternoon, Dr. Kelley. My name's Pat Pascarella. I'm an attorney with SBC.
- On page 43 of your testimony, there's a question, and the answer carries over onto the next page. The question is, Will the merger eliminate potential competition between MCI WorldCom and Sprint in the local exchange market?

Could you define potential competition for me, as you interpreted it to answer that question?

- Potential competition refers to a situation where there is -- a company may have the capacity, in a broad sense, to serve a market, but has not yet entered the market. And in economics, there is a view that potential competition can constrain the prices of the firms that are in the market.
- 20 Your answer to that question in your 21 affidavit and your testimony here was no. I look back a few pages, though, on page 40, and I see 22 another statement that you made, and I'm trying to 23 24 understand why these aren't inconsistent statements, 25 and I want to give you the opportunity to tell me

1 what I'm missing.

You say, at the top of page 40, in reference to a question that deals with broadband wireless as a local exchange alternative, you say that MCI WorldCom could, of course, develop an independent alternative to Sprint's ION service. Wouldn't that make MCI a potential competitor of Sprint's?

- A. Yes. The question on page 43 is will the merger eliminate potential competition. And I don't want to -- angels dancing on the head of a pin here, but potential competition and a potential competitor are two different things.
- Q. Okay. So when you were answering the question on page 43, what you meant was that the merger won't eliminate all potential competition --well, why don't you tell me what you meant? If MCI WorldCom is a potential competitor of Sprint, how does the merger not eliminate potential competition between them?
- A. There are a lot of broadband players out there, Covad, Rhythms Net, NorthPoint, and a bunch of them. Those generally compete with ION-type services. And so a merger between two potential competitors for that niche in the market would not

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1 have an anticompetitive effect.

- Q. I'm not talking about the anticompetitive effects, and you might want to look harder at the question on page 43, because it says, Potential competition between MCI WorldCom and Sprint.
 - A. Oh, okay.
- Q. Taking a closer look at the question, now, is your answer to that question still no?
- 9 Yes, with -- interpolated between the next 10 sentence, the point that, no, it will not eliminate 11 any competition that could potentially constrain 12 behavior in the market. Sprint could build CLEC 13 facilities, and that's what I talked about in this 14 answer on page 43 and page 44. The fact is they 15 haven't, but the fact is lots of other people have. 16 Therefore, the merger between them does not constrain 17 or eliminate potential competition.

MCI could be a DSL carrier or develop an ION-like service, but since there are other carriers out there that can do it and are doing it, it doesn't eliminate potential competition.

- Q. But MCI is a potential competitor?
- A. Yeah.
- Q. Let me ask you a bigger question. Longer, anyway. You said you were here yesterday for some of

Mr. Porter's testimony. And we heard from Mr. Porter and from some other witnesses that this merger is necessary to assure the viability in the marketplace of MCI and Sprint. You used that word, viability. 5 And there's some folks that look at the merger and they say, well, the result of this merger 7 is that there's some increase in concentration. I won't characterize it, but some would characterize it 9 as a significant increase in concentration in some of 10 the markets. And in response to that, WorldCom and 11 Sprint say, no, the merger of these two companies and 12 any anticompetitive effects that would result from 13 that will be disciplined by this array of 14 significantly, in most cases, smaller carriers that 15 are either not yet in the market or just in the 16 process of entering the markets at issue here. 17 And I'm having trouble understanding how, 18 in a marketplace where the second and third largest 19 long distance companies in the United States have to 20 merge to remain viable, we can expect that combined 21 entity to be disciplined by much smaller companies 22 with much fewer offerings and much smaller areas of 23 qeographic coverage? 24

A. Okay, sure. Let me try and think about the shortest way to say this.

Q. It was a long question. You're entitled to a long answer.

A. MCI and Sprint and AT&T are obviously large players in the mass market. They are looking in the near future at the prospect for BOC entry. And in the state of New York, they are incurring that entry. Their view is, I would take it from the colloquys that you had yesterday, that in order to be an effective competitor for all of the customers in that mass market, which is what they want to do, they have to have a local alternative. And they view their merger through the synergies that are derived, particularly the MMDS and the ability to -- I'm sorry, I'm going too fast.

They look at the merger because it provides them opportunities in MMDS and through UNEs as something that will help them compete with the RBOCs for those mass market customers who have a strong preference for bundled services.

preference for bundled services.

I think what happens is if we get that kind of entry from MCI and Sprint, and if AT&T is successful -- and that's the other leg of this argument. AT&T is out there developing their own alternative, you're going to have three viable facilities-based local companies that can provide

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bundled service. And then, the next step, and this is very key, the next step is once you get facilities-based competitors providing local service, then you have happening in the local market, 5 hopefully, what has happened in the long distance market, where MCI sells capacity to its competitors. Because it thinks it's a reasonable thing to do. It would rather sell that capacity to its competitors 9 than not sell its capacity to those competitors, 10 because if MCI doesn't, someone else will. 11 In the current state of the market, the 12 RBOCs don't care about selling capacity to their 13 competitors, because they know no one else will. 14 at the end of the day, if we can get viable 15 facilities entry from MCI/Sprint -- WorldCom, I 16 guess, /Sprint, AT&T and the RBOCs, the RBOCs are 17 going to wake up one morning and say, Hey, if we 18 don't cooperate with the resellers and make available 19 to them a reasonable way to provide bundled services 20 to mass market customers, we're going to lose 21 business to WorldCom-Sprint and to AT&T, so that's 22 the dynamic I have in mind here. 23 Why would, if we accept your assumption

that neither the RBOCs nor AT&T are interested in the

wholesale market, just for purposes of this

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- discussion, if we accept that, why would MCI have the incentive to offer wholesale product? Do they have different incentive than AT&T and the RBOCs in that situation?
- 5 A. I think you can't look at one carrier in 6 isolation there; you have to look at the market. And 7 at some point, and I hope it's three viable 8 facilities-based carriers who have sunk investment 9 dollars into the market and built capacity. At some 10 point, they're going to look around and say, Hey, if I don't sell, somebody else will.
 - Q. So all these other carriers that we list in here, there's one listed as being changed today from 59 to another number, and we identified lots of long distance carriers in there.
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. What's the point of identifying all these carriers if the point of your affidavit is to explain why this merger is procompetitive?
 - A. I lost you there. I'm sorry.
- Q. Okay. Either they will discipline the market or they won't.
 - A. The local market.
- Q. Well, let's talk about the long distance market. Well, let me start again with you. We have

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- 1 spent, in the last two days, a great deal of time
 2 talking about what some people refer to as second
 3 tier carriers, but --
 - A. Emerging carriers.
- Q. Emerging carriers. And you seem to believe they have a restraining effect on some market segments that are relevant, for purposes of looking this merger; is that correct?
 - A. Some, if not all.
 - Q. Okay. Which segments, which markets?
- 11 A. I guess we have to go back to the basics. 12 These carriers have capacity to transport calls, to 13 switch calls, to bill calls and to market to 14 customers, small and large.
- Q. Which specific product markets are you talking about? For example, are we talking about the mass market long distance?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Okay.
- 20 A. And large business market.
- Q. Long distance?
- 22 A. Long distance.
- Q. Okay. Any other markets that these
- 24 carriers are likely to be able to restrain the price
- 25 of a combined WorldCom-Sprint?

A. I think -- if you're getting at the local issue, I think local competition is a big player game. If you're going to play with US West in the local market in Washington, other than fiber loops and core areas, you're going to need to be big. And I see AT&T trying to do that with cable, and I see MCI and Sprint merging in order to try to do that with wireless.

I don't necessarily see -- I was going to say Qwest, but that doesn't work anymore. I don't necessarily see Frontier having a leg into local mass markets. Certainly they're going to build fiber loops in big cities, and technology may involve in wonderful ways to change that in the future. But, you know, for the next few years, I see local competition as a big player game.

- Q. You're familiar with the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines?
 - A. I am.
- Q. Under the guidelines, is a merger specific efficiency in Market A gained from the merger weighed against an anticompetitive effect of the merger in another market?
- A. My understanding is that it would not be, but my understanding is, you know, guidelines are

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guidelines. They're not necessarily what a court would decide. I'd also point out this Commission has a public interest test that they're looking at, which would be a different test.

Q. What I was trying to do was focus our earlier discussion a little bit -- strike that.

Is it your opinion that this merger is necessary to the viability of MCI and Sprint -- WorldCom and Sprint, excuse me, in the long distance markets? I can rephrase that for you. Will MCI and Sprint, in your opinion, remain viable competitors in the long distance market without this merger?

- A. We're talking about a broad long distance market?
- Q. You define it, and then answer the question. How's that?
- 17 Yeah, I think MCI, Sprint and others are 18 going to be viable RBOC entry, at least I hope and 19 expect that they will, and if the 271 standards are 20 applied appropriately, perhaps they will. In terms 21 of the mass market, I think that there is a concern 22 that they won't be able to compete for customers who 23 want bundles, and maybe for a lot of business 24 customers who want bundles, unless they have that 25 local entry vehicle.

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- Q. Okay.
- A. I would also point out that, you know, that UNE competition, UNE loops, that's good, that's a fine thing, but facilities-based competition is better.
- Q. In this marketplace, it's better to own the facility than it is to be leasing someone else's?
- 8 A. In this marketplace, yes. In a marketplace 9 where there's a choice of local carriers, it wouldn't 10 be as important.
 - Q. Why is that?
 - A. Because the local competitors would compete with each other for the business of companies who want to use local facilities that they provide.
 - Q. Are you aware of any plans by WorldCom or Sprint to provide voice via MMDS?
- A. My understanding is that it was not MCI's original intention to do that with MMDS, but that it was Sprint's intention, beginning with ION, to do that. And part of this depends on the discussion we were having about Internet voice and the time it takes to develop that technology to make it comparable in quality to circuit switched voice.
- Q. Do you have in mind any possible time horizon for a voice offering via MMDS?

- That would be better directed at the Α. companies, but -- I hope I'm not making this up. thought I heard Mr. Kapka say within a year or two. 4
 - When you talk about MMDS as a local option, is that the time horizon you have in mind?
- 5 6 Well, MMDS, I mean, you can build it today. 7 And there are trials out there today, and I fully expect the FCC to grant two-way licenses and, you 9 know, the service will go forward. And it will start 10 as a broadband offering. And then ION will be developed and deployed over it, and ION has voice $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right) \left($ 11 12 capabilities. And I expect at some point, you know 13 -- I'm not George Gilder, I don't predict future 14 technologies, but at some point, IP voice will be 15 developed and be viable and be used.
- 16 You used in your affidavit, for instance, Ο. 17 on page eight, the term all distance and the term bundled markets. Could you tell me how you define those two terms? I'm sorry, on page eight. It would 18 19 20 be on line 10 and 11.
- All distance refers to the fact -- I may Α. 22 discuss it in here later, that with technological 23 change, you will be buying a circuit to your home or 24 buying a pipeline, and you would use that pipe for 25 all of your calls, and your calls would not be priced

separately depending on whether they happen to be local or long distance, maybe some day, even international.

A bundled market means that you're taking, in today's terms, a service, like local, and purchasing a package with wireless or with long distance similar to this US West offering that Mr. Kapka showed us earlier today, all the ways you communicate in one neat little bundle. That's what a bundle is.

- Q. So you had an example of a bundled offering there. Do you have any examples of all-distance offerings?
- A. I think it's the wireless players are providing all distance today. You can buy from any number of carriers a bucket of minutes. And it doesn't matter whether those are local or long distance, they count towards your bucket.
- Q. Any other offerings? Any other all-distance offerings?
- A. Well, the Internet is an all-distance offering, isn't it. Twenty dollars a month, all you can eat. You can go to a web site in Moscow or you can go to a web site down the street.
 - Q. Okay. Any others?

- A. That's all that come to mind right now.
- Q. Okay. On page -- I guess it's page 14. It carries over onto page 15. You're talking about the investments of competing carriers, and you say the investment in fiber is sunk. As an economist, what is the significance to you of that fact, the fact being that the investment is sunk?
 - A. Sunk investment is one which, once made, can't be recouped or is difficult to recoup. And the significance is that once you sink an investment, you have a huge incentive to use it, as much as you can. The incremental -- if you will, the incremental cost is, for the sunk portion of investment, is effectively zero. There's no opportunity cost.
 - Q. Would you expect that incentive to be different as between, say, a company -- say Frontier and Sprint, or is a sunk cost a sunk cost?
 - A. Well, it's easy to say a sunk cost is a sunk cost, and you're asking me to infer how carriers in a market, in different positions in a market, might behave, and I want to leave open the possibility that there might be differences. I haven't analyzed that or seen the relevant article.
- Q. Absent some other factor, a carrier with a sunk cost in investment would have a fairly high

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1 incentive to sell the service that uses that 2 investment; correct?

- A. Correct.
- Q. Can you think offhand of any factors that would chill that incentive?
 - A. If the firm had market power.
- Q. On page 17 of your testimony, you're referring to Dr. Blackmon's affidavit up at the top part of the page there. And at line four, you say, He bases his finding on the claim that resellers cannot be expected to constrain the prices of their own suppliers.

Do you disagree with that statement, the statement being resellers cannot be expected to constrain the prices of their own suppliers?

- 16 Well, we went through a hypothetical with 17 Public Counsel in which that could be. But if you're 18 asking me the reality of today's communications 19 market, long distance, they don't need to, because we 20 have a competitive situation and you can buy 21 wholesale capacity at competitive rates and retail is priced at competitive rates. If you think you can get into a niche and compete, you just go ahead and 22 23 24 do it.
 - Q. So a supplier of capacity cannot restrain

1 -- let me try that again. A supplier of capacity -- 2 one more time. It's getting late. I'll try to wrap 3 up real quick.

A. I'm trying to give you short answers.

Q. I appreciate that. Look for me, if you will, on page 19. Maybe you just want to clear this up, but I didn't understand. There's a question at line 10 that says, How does technological change impact the ability of carriers to maintain prices above cost. And your answer is that, quote, All customers, residential, small business, and large business, have a growing number of alternatives because of the emergence of new carriers with a new network capacity on which they can rely and because of changes in technology.

Then you go on to say, quote, These alternatives increasingly will constrain the ability of the merged MCI WorldCom-Sprint to raise prices to large customers.

We started talking about residential, small business and large customers, then we seem to have limited the constraining effect of these alternatives to just large customers. Was that intentional?

A. No. Thank you for picking that up. I think it will have effect of constraining prices

- 1 across the board.
 - Q. So your affidavit's incorrect right now with regard to the answer --
- A. Well, no, the answer is correct, but I didn't mean to exclude smaller customers.
- Q. Okay. So that's just what we might call a typographical error. You just omitted smaller and -- A. Momentary brain spasm.
- -- residential and small business customers 9 10 from that sentence. On page 20, you use Winstar as 11 an example as a broadband data network that's growing 12 in importance to users, and you say that Winstar serves Seattle and is competing for local long 13 14 distance, Internet and data traffic. Do you know whether or not Winstar provides long distance and 15 16 data over the same network?
 - A. I don't know specifically.
- 18 Q. Do you know whether Winstar owns its own 19 network?
- 20 A. I believe they're leasing capacity from 21 others.
- Q. Do you know who the others are?
- 23 A. I don't recall. I think it's on their web 24 site.
- Q. On page 24, I think we might have another

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- typo here. Did you mean to say, on lines five through seven, that Bell Atlantic, GTE, SBC and US West have established and will recognize brand names in Washington? I know that's not a quote, but it's 5 the implication I take from that sentence.
 - Bell Atlantic and SBC are just entering in Washington. I mean, certainly for large customers, they're well-known. For smaller customers, they may not be.
- 10 MR. PASCARELLA: I think I'd better stop 11 there. Thanks, Dr. Kelley.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Our turn?

JUDGE CAILLE: Yes.

EXAMINATION

16 BY CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER:

I think my first line of inquiry has to do with your testimony on page 25, lines 17 to 18. This is where you said higher prices for in-state calls are likely explained by higher access charges. As I read the debate that's in the testimony and also in the questioning today, it goes something like this. Dr. Blackmon thinks there is a competitive problem in

23 24 this state, and your response is, Well, no, not

25 really. Differences in prices between state-to-state

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1 calls and in-state calls can -- are likely explained 2 by higher access charges.

Whereupon, Dr. Blackmon or Mr. Thompson says, Well, but then what about comparing in-state 5 intraLATA and interLATA where there is no difference in access charges, and yet, there is a difference in WorldCom's prices, what do you say about that? And I'm not sure what your answer was. But I think the 9 implicit question, and maybe the statement in Dr. 10 Blackmon's testimony is since it's not access 11 charges, because that's not different, couldn't it be 12 that there are different market pressures in the 13 intraLATA and interLATA, and that that's the 14 explanation for the difference, is that there's 15 something different going on. 16

Do you agree with that, that in addition to cost, which is what access charges is about, there's also, on the other side of the equation, market pressures. So couldn't market pressures be part of the explanation for why a company might charge a different rate intraLATA, that is, a lower rate intraLATA and a higher rate interLATA, in a state where there's no difference in access charges?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Long question, short answer. That was

1 good.

- A. But let me say they are certainly different in the sense that, for a long time, intraLATA was not 4 -- you didn't have equal access for intraLATA, so the incumbent sort of had a leg up there. And that's changed, and I speculated that -- Ms. McMahon might be able to help us here. I speculated the company was looking at, you know, a marketing way to try to make up ground in the intraLATA market. And I guess 10 --
 - Q. Are you talking about US West or --
 - A. No, MCI WorldCom, with those rates we looked at, was trying to make up ground in that segment. And then we could also talk about McDonald's again, where the Commissioner pointed out different firms have different strategies and they price bundles of service differently and elements differently, maybe on the basis of demand, and the economics of that, of course, are entirely correct. I just -- I guess my point is, as you move towards, you know, in a competitive situation, those things sort themselves out and consumers have the options they need at the prices that they deserve.
 - Q. Well, but then it appears, anyway, that intraLATA in-state is pretty competitive, but --

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intraLATA?

A. Well, actually -Q. But what about interLATA in-state?
Doesn't, on the surface, anyway, doesn't it seem as if it's, for some reason, less competitive than

6 No, I guess -- I guess, using my logic, the 7 opposite is true, that because intraLATA is less competitive, because it was historically dominated by US West, you have carriers trying to build share 9 10 there. Just like a new store comes into town and --11 Whole Foods came into Boulder, Colorado, and for 12 three weeks, they were selling groceries dirt cheap 13 and built up a huge clientele. People got used to 14 going there, saw that it was a nice store, clean 15 aisles and friendly salespeople, and they raised

their prices up to normal levels.

Q. So you're saying that the lower prices intraLATA is an indication of a lack of competition?

A. Could be, in the short-run situation.

Economics can do wonderful things here.

Q. It could suggest that companies who are permitted to do so, anyway, are charging lower than their cost. Is that what you're suggesting?

A. On a promotional basis. It happens all the time, yeah.

- Q. But they're competing against a company, i.e., US West, that, at least in regulatory theory is not supposed to be doing that, and so I suppose you'd be suggesting that the nonregulated companies are charging below cost in order to compete with a company that maybe has different costs, but shouldn't be charging the lower cost?
 - A. Yeah, you wouldn't expect to see companies charging below marginal cost, but you could see them, for promotional purposes, lowering rates below their normal rates for marketing reasons that we discussed.
 - Q. Then, now, back in the interLATA, does the fact that companies are required to -- not companies, that consumers are required to purchase their state-to-state provider, their services from the same state-to-state provider as intrastate, interLATA provider -- I probably didn't state that too well, but customers have to use the same provider for both state-to-state and in-state interLATA?
 - A. Right, two-PIC option.
- Q. Wouldn't that -- isn't that a little -isn't it probable that the in-state interLATA
 business is a bit of a tail and the others a dog, and
 that the tail isn't wagging the dog, but the in-state
 interLATA market is part of a much larger picture;

i.e., the national state-to-state market, and that it genuinely could be the case that you're not getting the same kind of competition as you would if that was the universe?

That is, if every provider in the in-state interLATA market were independent of the state-to-state market in terms of what they were able to provide, don't you think you would see a little bit different dynamics going on?

A. Theoretically, yes. And your question sort of raised another issue for me, in terms of how to think about this, and that is, you know, the two-PIC system interLATA, being interLATA, whether it's intrastate or interstate, could lead -- and I'm speculating here about the company and how it does business, but could lead to motivations to price so that their billing systems worked more efficiently. So that might be a factor here.

But I think, to get back to your question, I think there are lots of competitors out there with the ability to enter and try transport and switching and billing and marketing, and I would expect competitive forces to send the right prices out there eventually.

Q. Okay. Switching to a different topic, on

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page 39 of your testimony, on line 19, you say that MMDS provides better propagation characteristics. don't know what that means. What does that mean? Okay. I'll do my best to explain it, and 5 Mr. Porter could probably, with his technical background, explain it better, but the higher you go in the frequency range, the more likely it is that you will get something called multi-path distortion, 9 which means that the signal goes out from the radio, 10 and at very high frequencies, it bounces all around. 11 And then, when you have the receiver over here, it 12 may not be able to figure out which signal it's 13 supposed to be picking up, the direct signal from the tower or signals that are bouncing off buildings and 14 15 the ground and trees. 16 And the higher you are up in the frequency

And the higher you are up in the frequency range, the more that problem exists. The lower you are, the less that problem exists, so that, for PCS, around two gigahertz, it's not much of a problem.

MMDS happens to be located in a good place in the spectrum, because it's just a little bit above PCS, and well below the 38 gigahertz broadband. So the technological challenge to get good signals out of an MMDS system is not as great for other broadband wireless systems. I hope I haven't told you about

- 150 percent of what I know about it, but that's my understanding.
 - Q. No, I think what this means to me, then, is the statement here is that MMDS has some physical characteristics that are advantageous to physical delivery of the product?
 - A. Exactly right.
 - Q. I thought it might have to do with marketing or something, so thank you for that. And while we're on this topic, I am a little confused about what Sprint and WorldCom think the merger will do to the relationship of ION to MMDS. I understand that Sprint has an ION product and I understand that the companies think that they will be better poised to deliver MMDS, and I'm not sure how this all adds up.
 - Is it that ION is a service, it's a bundling service, and if MMDS is available, then that kind of service is easier to deliver, or not -- just tell me what you think on that question.
- A. Here's the way I look at it. ION is a 22 broadband service, and it doesn't care what kind of a 23 pipe it rides on. It can ride on DSL copper to a 24 home, it can ride on broadband wireless, it can ride 25 on fiber built out to a large business customer. MCI

has extensive local facilities, certainly much more extensive than Sprint in terms of big businesses in metropolitan areas, and MCI does not have a product comparable to ION, so that, after the merger, ION can be marketed to MCI's customer base using its existing fiber facilities.

The other, and I think more significant fact, is that MCI has MMDS licenses in certain parts of the country, and Sprint has MMDS licenses in certain parts of the country and they don't overlap. After the merger, MCI will be very -- I should be saying WorldCom, but it will be very easy to use the WorldCom wireless MMDS facilities that they build to deploy ION more rapidly. So that's a huge advantage.

Then, the other thing is, when you merge ——
I think I talk a little bit about it in the
testimony. When you merge their customer bases, the
companies have found, for example, in New York, it's
easier to sell a local service to an existing
customer than to cold call on someone who's not your
customer. So I think you'll be able to market these
broadband ION services more readily and more cheaply.

Q. Okay. Last line. At one point in your answers to Mr. Pascarella, you posited a world in the future where the RBOCs are in the game, in the long

1 distance game, AT&T is in the game with its cable, 2 and Sprint and WorldCom is in the game, meaning the 3 local -- meaning the bundling game, I think, with its 4 ION MMDS.

And I think that this world you're drawing here is a way for three different entities with three different technologies or approaches or facilities to compete in, and then I'm not sure -- in the local/long distance or bundled, including local business; is that what you meant?

- A. All of the above.
- Q. And by local, do you mean voice and data?
- A. Yes. Eventually, yes.
- Q. All right. I'm following that world, but then, when I look at each of those elements, nothing is actually here in front of us. The RBOCs, US West, is not yet in the long distance, it has not yet merged with Qwest, and that issue is actually before us, and we also sit on the 271.

AT&T does have cable in some parts of this state, but not all and not in -- doesn't have the local. It has cable TV, but that's it, in some very major markets, including Seattle. So it hasn't yet reached this future stage you're talking about.

25 And then Sprint-WorldCom obviously have not

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1 yet merged, but also neither one has actually 2 produced this or is acting on, in Washington, anyway, 3 this new technology.

So I understand the dynamic you're laying out, but you know, you have to ask the question either is this vaporware that's promised at some later date, or even if it is a reality at a later date, what about right now?

9 And one question I have is would it make 10 sense for this Commission to impose some kind of 11 conditions on the merger, for example, in the long 12 distance area pending entry into the long distance 13 market by an RBOC, for example. I mean, that is, you 14 justify this merger based on a future that isn't 15 actually here, so even assuming we're going to get 16 there in the future, we're not there now. So is it 17 appropriate for this Commission to safeguard some of 18 these other areas, such as long distance, until 19 there's that instantaneous competition that you're 20 envisioning from US West?

A. I believe that we have long distance competition. It's vigorous and it's vibrant, for all of the reasons we've been talking about today and we talk about in my testimony. And you know, the biggest problem we have in telecommunications, and

it's the same problem we've always had, is the last mile. And the sooner, the quicker, and the better we get last-mile competition, the better off we're all going to be.

I would say, based on my analysis, that by approving this merger, you're going to provide the opportunity for WorldCom and Sprint to deploy these assets more rapidly, more efficiently, to solve that last mile problem. And I think that's the key issue for the Commission and for the telecommunications industry in general.

If US West isn't complying with their 1996 Act obligations so that they can get in the long distance market, it's even more important to grant this merger quickly, because you need that facilities competition push on that.

- Q. But you shifted over to the focus on the local, and I'm not saying that's not an important issue, but what about --
 - A. Yeah.
- Q. -- the long distance, what about the Coeur d'Alene area that will go, I think I understood, in residential long distance, from three providers to two major providers. Now, that, I think maybe we were looking at fiber-based companies and not

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- 1 resellers at that particular point in time.
- A. Right, right. And GTE serves Coeur d'Alene. They're a market player. They may well have fiber there, but I couldn't find it, so I didn't count it.
 - Q. But I take it from your testimony that you're just not concerned about the long distance market, so the focus, from your point of view, and you would urge from our point of view, be on the local, and that goes in a positive direction --
 - A. Yeah.
 - Q. -- as a result of the merger. We shouldn't worry too much about long distance?
- A. I guess I don't want to be on the record as being not concerned about long distance. It's an important market and an essential market, but I'm not concerned about market power being exercised in it.

 And yes, focus on the biggest problem in telecommunications which is the last mile. And the
- telecommunications, which is the last mile. And the ability that the competitors will have to solve that problem through merging their complementary assets.
- 22 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Okay. Thanks.

EXAMINATION

24 BY COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD:

Q. Well, you may be covering a lot of ground

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Yes.

- several times here. I'll try to limit my questions here. In your testimony and in your cross-examination here, you put a lot of emphasis on the increase in capacity, but I take it that that 5 focuses primarily on the long distance markets? 6
 - Ο. And I take it you don't see a significant distinction in evaluating that capacity in differentiating between retail and wholesale?
 - I think retailers are going to have access to that capacity, because there's a lot of it out there and companies want to use it, so I'm not worried about the retail side of things.
 - Q. All right. And so whether the capacity, say, is absorbed by the so-called Big Three, with increase in demand, or retailers -- resellers could step in, or I suppose these increasing wholesalers, with their increasing capacity, could step into the retail market relatively easily. All of that could happen?
 - Right. And what we have going for us is Α. technological change, which means that fiber today can be lit to carry a lot more capacity than fiber five years ago.
 - Q. And from, I think, your response to a

question under cross-examination, is it fair to say you would apply the HHI to overall capacity, rather than to, as Dr. Blackmon does, to revenues? Well, it's legitimate to do both, and both 5 will provide you information. My problem with Dr. Blackmon's analysis is that he stops there, and I would start there. I think the Justice Department uses HHI analysis as a screening device and, you know, they see a high HHI, based on their guidelines, 9 10 they say, Oh, you better get some more information 11 here, we better look at this more carefully. 12 And as I discussed in my testimony, the 13 Department will look at factors like the ease of 14 entry and the availability of capacity to do a 15 complete analysis before they reach a decision. 16 Well, is it your sense that there will, in 17 fact, be more participants, say, in a couple years 18 because of this increased capacity, or do you look at 19 it where you don't have to answer that, because it offers potential competition, and that's sufficient? 20 21 Well, there's already a lot of capacity Α. 22 built, planned and being built by a lot of firms, and 23 I would say that we don't have a problem. And I 24 would say that if problems were to emerge, capacity

were short, it's sort of a self-revealing thing. The

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1 competitors in the market have revealed they can get 2 the capital and the rights of way to build the fiber 3 that the market needs to provide services that 4 customers want.

- Q. Well, then, the second half of this is the local market, and I take it from your broad, generalized testimony here that this merger is important in order to have the kind of bundling needed, all-distance marketing and the like, and the merger is essential for that to occur?
- A. Yeah, I guess I would start a step back from that and say local competition, per se, is a very good thing, with or without bundling. But given that sooner or later the RBOCs are going to find their way in, then it's critical that we have more than one facilities-based bundle available.
- Q. And is the capacity question relevant to that at all?
- A. Local capacity, I believe, yes. The capacity I talked about most often in the testimony refers to long haul fiber. I think the local fiber that's going in is important and significant, but that technology is not going to be there for the mass market.
 - Q. Okay, all right. So essentially, the

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capacity discussion is separate from or segregated from the debate going on here about local service viability or separable --

- Yeah, I think so. I mean, clearly, the Α. merger between WorldCom and Sprint will enable them to build the capacity to serve local more effectively and more rapidly, but it's not -- you're right, it's not the long distance capacity argument I've been talking about.
- Ο. And you see the -- well, the merger being necessary to protect, say, Sprint, as -- call it the weaker party here, or Sprint's viability is at risk if a merger like this doesn't occur, apparently, for it to be able to compete effectively in the local market, or both?
- 15 16 Yeah, I think, as we discussed, Sprint, Α. 17 before MMDS, had not done a lot in the local market. 18 They don't have nearly the collocations MCI has, they don't have local fiber networks that MCI has. In 19 20 terms of their viability, I mean, part of that is --21 what we heard from Sprint is that they didn't -- you know, they think if they didn't merge with MCI, 22 23 somebody else less pleasant would come along, and so 24 Sprint feels that they're not viable as an
- 25 independent company, because somebody's going to

- acquire them for their assets, and they see a good marriage with WorldCom.
 - Q. But all these other -- call them the capacity new entrants currently here or potentially coming, they don't have a similar kind of viability risk concern, because they're in the long distance market?
 - A. I think there will be a -- yes, there is an all-distance, and yes, there is a bundled market evolving, but there will, for some time to come, be customers who want to buy separate long distance services, so the risk isn't that that market will go away.
 - I think the opportunity is, with this merger, you're going to get local competition. And then, as we discussed, with enough local capacity put in and competitors in there trying to sell it, the long distance companies who do not have local capacity will be able to go into a local wholesale market, just as some of the resellers now are going into the long distance wholesale market, to get the inputs they need.
- Q. Well, I think this is a question that Mr. Pascarella was getting to. And on the one hand, the new entrants seem to be very aggressive and viable,

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but call them maybe nimble, but Sprint apparently is not. And that's not, from your perspective, an inconsistency?

No, the new entrants -- in a sense, the new Α. entrants have an advantage, in that they're building new fiber and they're putting all the new whiz-bang, gee-whiz technology in from the very beginning, and AT&T and MCI and Sprint have to go back and retrofit. I don't think that has a lot of competitive significance in the long run.

You know, I think -- and Sprint is out there as a long distance carrier, and basically the same market share they've had for the last several years. They've been focusing on wireless. Their wireless is doing quite well. I mean, we're not talking about a failing firm here we're trying to acquire. We're just talking about an opportunity to bring more competition and to maybe avoid a merger that wouldn't be as pro-competitive in the local market.

21 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I guess that's as 22 much as I can pursue there. Thank you. 23

EXAMINATION

24 BY COMMISSIONER GILLIS:

Q. As I understand, a part of your argument is

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Yes.

that the broad market trend is towards customers desiring bundled products or all-distance kind of products, and that the combined company being able to offer such products actually enhances competition, if 5 there was another player, a very capable player that can meet that customer demand. Is that -- am I 7 correct in understanding this part of your argument?

- Ο. And to be an effective competitor in that fashion, I suppose the merged company will have to reposition its product offerings relative to the offerings that they made as individual stand-alone companies. Would that be accurate?
- Yes, as they enter local markets, they will undoubtedly design products for those markets.
- Well, I mean particularly if they're after the markets desired -- the desired markets of customers wanting bundled products and all-distance type products.

For example, Mr. Kapka, he didn't say it directly, but I thought it was implicitly said that if it weren't for regulatory barriers, they'd want to 23 consider for the ION offering to be able to do 24 pricing similar to the cell phone type of pricing, 25 all-distance kind of pricing, for example. Is that

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the kind of thing you'd expect the company to want to pursue if they had the opportunity?

- A. I guess that's something they would pursue, or would consider, certainly.
- Q. Yeah. What about, for example, imposing minimum usage charges on low volume customers? Would that be consistent with a company that has opportunities to provide and make profit from bundled offerings? Is there more incentive to do that, I guess relative to the stand-alone companies that are engaged primarily in provision of access to the network?
 - A. Well, I really don't know what the incentives would be there. You know, customers who build networks have capacity they'd like to fill, and they can fill that capacity with a few calls from a lot of customers or a lot of calls from a few customers, and any way they can fill it, I think they're going to be happy to do that, and they're going to be in there marketing, looking at plans that attract as many minutes as they can.

Some companies might specialize in big customers and give an opportunity for other companies to come in and specialize with little customers. So at the end of the day, I would expect a result, you

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- know, related to counter-competition drives the market. I don't know if that answered your question.
- Q. Well, I mean, I guess you were in the room when Mr. Kapka and I were discussing this, and I think that he -- at least I understood him to agree with me that responsible economic recommendation to a profit-maximizing enterprise with multiple products is that you're going to want to charge the highest prices you can on the inelastic segment of the market and --
 - A. To the extent --
 - Q. -- access to the network is the essential piece that is inelastic?
- 14 I agree with that. The key point, though, 15 is that when you have competition, you know, that 16 competition is going to discipline the market and 17 keep the overall price levels reasonable. If you 18 have, you know, if you have an unconstrained 19 monopolist, they're going to price the least elastic 20 the most and they're going to make a lot of money. 21 If you have McDonald's, they're going to do what they 22 can to recover their fixed costs, but they have to do 23 it recognizing that Burger King and the local chain 24 are out there, too. So that's another reason why it's so important to have local competition.

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Correct me if I'm wrong, but it's my Ο. observation that, for every industry where we've gone through competitive reforms that were previously regulated monopolies, whether they be financial 5 industries, transportation industries, or even some areas of telecommunications, that at least 7 empirically their offerings to the customers that want just basic access to the service, whatever that may be, and that are not big users of that service, 9 10 have generally had their rates raised through fees or 11 particular restrictive terms and conditions or 12 whatever. Nothing sinister; it's just how an 13 efficient market operates. 14

And why would we expect something different in, I guess, the telecommunications world that we're talking about here?

A. In a competitive market, you'd expect customers to pay for the resources they use. That might not always be the case in a regulated market starting out because of historical and regulatory considerations. So you might see those price trends that you just discussed happen. But the advantage of bringing competition to a local market is that the overall price level is going to go down and people won't be required to pay more than economic cost.

Q. Well, I'm not arguing the advantages with you or disadvantages. What I'm actually leading to is to ask you if it is possible, given your earlier statement that a result of the merged company is to increase competition in the market segment, that responding to customer demand that's bundled and, what's the word, all-distance or whatever -- yeah, the high end of the mass market, I guess, actually may result in reduced competition in the low end of the market.

I recall us talking about these 30 to 50 percent of the population that are low-end users in the current economy, because the merged company's going to reposition itself. So it's no longer there to -- the focus is no longer to be at this lower end of the market, meaning there's one less competitor on that end. Is that a possible outcome of the merger?

- A. I would not say that's a likely outcome. I mean, it kind of goes back to the point that those customers deliver minutes, and minutes mean revenue. They mean filling up these huge pipes that they're building, and they're going to want that business.
- Q. And if you have a huge pipe, why would you want to go after somebody that just wants access to the network and makes five minutes of toll calls a

1 month and calls the neighbors two or three times.
2 I'm talking about my parents here. Anyway, what
3 would be your possible economic incentive to want to
4 go after those people?

- A. If you can get revenue from them. If you can fill up your -- get a lot of --
- Q. But the only revenue to be obtained is on the fixed minimum usage charge?
- A. I guess, as I said before, there are two models. I mean, you can go after a few customers, each of whom make a lot of calls, or you can go after a lot of customers, each of whom make very few calls, but at the end of the day, you're filling up your network and getting revenue.

In terms of how WorldCom looks at this or Sprint looks at this, I guess I don't know what their marketing plans are or what they're doing, but you know, I see out there companies offering no-fee plans, competitive rates. Bell Atlantic is one of them. So you know, somebody's looking out for those customers.

In terms of repositioning as you go into a bundled service market, it may well be those small customers who prefer it the most. They're the ones who want one bill to pay, because they don't carry

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that much. If they make three minutes or five minutes of calls a month, why should they write a separate check and put a stamp on it when they can get it all from one supplier. Those are exactly the customers who may be the biggest beneficiaries of competition for those bundled services.

- Okay. Well, let me ask you about something else, just quickly. Did you happen to see the RUS/NTIA report on broadband deployment that came out about a month ago or so?
 - No, I haven't seen it. Α.
- 11 12 One of the interesting aspects of that Ο. 13 report is that they had done a survey of where these 14 DSL and cable modem technologies are being deployed. And in general terms, markets of 50,000 and above 15 16 appear to be targets, feasible targets. And you 17 know, the real problem are markets 20,000 and below. 18 And there was some discussion of deploying the MMDS 19 technology in the Yakima area, which would probably 20 be welcome, but that's one of those 50,000 and above 21 markets. I don't know whether there's DSS service 22 there now or whether there's cable modem there, but 23 certainly the national trend would suggest those 24 technologies are also feasible in such marketplaces. 25 But this is really a question for you, as

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an economist, anyway, is that do you see any magic bullet in MMDS that's going to get to these hard-to-reach markets, the 20,000 or below that DSL and cable modems seem to be having trouble getting to?

- A. To specifically 20,000 or 30,000, something 7 like that?
- 8 Q. I just picked a number based on that 9 report. I mean, it could be 30,000, it could be 10 20,000, someplace.
 - A. So I don't know what the number is, but --
 - Q. But in small markets, low-density markets, you have the same problem spreading fixed cost?
 - A. But the advantage of MMDS, and this is why it's very good for underserved and less densely-populated areas, is the technology scalable. And what I mean by that is you just put up one stick. You put up a tower and put a radio on it and you're in business, and then you add customers, radio by
- 20 radio by radio, so it's very scalable.
 21 Whereas for cable, for example, you have to
 22 upgrade your whole plant. And you basically upgrade
 23 the whole plant at great expense, and there's a fixed
 24 upgrade cost, whether you get one customer or 100
 25 customers. So MMDS has that advantage. And with

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respect to DSL, of course, it has a 35-mile radius, and in a lot of small towns, you've got a central office maybe a long way away, and you've got a lot of loops that are too long for DSL, so MMDS can fill in and provide broadband to those customers in those kinds of areas.

COMMISSIONER GILLIS: Thank you.

EXAMINATION

9 BY CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER:

- Q. Can I ask a follow-up on that? Is that one stick per few customers dependent on the terrain? That is, does the one stick have to be looking out over a big flat area and you'd need two or three or four sticks if you were in more mountainous areas, even with fewer customers?
- 16 A. That's a good question, a good point. I 17 think hills and valleys, you might need to fill in a 18 little more. That's right.

(Recess taken.)

JUDGE CAILLE: Let's be back on the record after a short break. And we are now doing redirect of Mr. Kelley. Ms. Hopfenbeck -- I just blew your name.

MS. HOPFENBECK: Hopfenbeck. It's really hard at the end of the day.

00509 JUDGE CAILLE: Thank you. Yes, it is. 2 THE WITNESS: Sounds like a German beer. 3 MS. HOPFENBECK: Dr. Delley --4 JUDGE CAILLE: Thank you. You did that 5 just to make me feel good. 6 MS. HOPFENBECK: I'm thinking Touch 7 I'm saying Delley. America. THE WITNESS: Say Dr. Dan, for short. 9 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 10 BY MS. HOPFENBECK: Q. Dr. Kelley, would you please turn your 11 12 attention to Exhibit Number 30. It's in, I believe, 13 the notebook that's lying open there, and I believe 14 it's already turned to Exhibit 30. 15 Α. Yes. 16 Ο. You had some discussion with Mr. Thompson 17 about this exhibit. Now, as I understand what this 18 is is you were asked to identify which of the 19 carriers that you had listed in answer to another 20 data request response, provided voice 21 telecommunication services to end user business 22 customers in each LATA. And this also identifies 23 those carriers that provide residential retail 24 services; is that correct?

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Α.

That's correct.

- Okay. And this is all pertaining to Washington State. I'd like you to look down to Teleglobe. Teleglobe, it's indicated, there's an N, or no residential retail services there. Do you see 5 that?
 - Α. Yes.
- Are you aware of any reseller that uses Ο. Teleglobe's network to provide retail residential 9 telecommunications service in the state of 10 Washington?
- 11 Yes, I believe Excel has a relationship Α. 12 with Teleglobe.
- Okay. Now, you also list Williams 13 14 Communications here. Are you aware of any carrier that has a relationship with Williams that does now 15 16 or has announced intentions to use Williams 17 Telecommunications Network to provide services to 18 residential and small business customers in the state 19 of Washington?
- 20 Α. Yes, I believe that would be the party 21 sitting to your left, SBC. 22
- And for the record --Ο. 23 MS. ENDEJAN: I don't own a phone company.
- 24 Now, I notice that Touch America is not 25 identified on this list. Have you looked at any

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- 1 documents that would indicate whether or not Touch 2 America has a facilities-based presence in the state 3 of Washington?
 - A. They, in fact, do.
 - Q. And do you know whether Touch America is a company that provides retail services to end users in the state of Washington?
 - A. I believe they do.
- 9 Q. And do they offer those services to 10 residential and business users?
 - A. Yes, I believe they do.
- Q. Touch America -- you also indicated that
 Quest has announced a commitment or an agreement with
 Touch America to sell its network to Touch America in
 the event that its merger with US West is
 consummated; is that true?
- 17 A. I don't know if it's exactly structured 18 that way, but my understanding is that Qwest is 19 selling their network in US West states to Touch 20 America.
- Q. And Qwest currently provides residential long distance services to customers in Washington State; is that right?
- 24 A. Yes.
- Q. Now, I believe -- have you also looked at

- 1 any information that would tell you whether or not 2 ELI has facilities for long distance service in the 3 state of Washington?
 - A. They do.
- Q. Just to avoid any confusion, do you know why ELI and Touch America were not included on Exhibit 29 -- or excuse me, Exhibit 30?
- 8 A. I guess I made a mistake. They should have 9 been included.
- 10 Q. Now, I'd like to direct your attention now 11 to Exhibit 29 in that notebook.
 - A. Yes.
- 13 Q. Have you had an opportunity, prior to this 14 moment, to review this document?
- 15 A. Are these the work papers for Dr. 16 Blackmon's --
- Q. On the exhibit list, that document is identified as Long Distance Revenues Data, Washington Telecommunications Carriers. Yes, I believe they are.
- 21 A. I think I saw a version of this for the 22 first time last night.
- Q. Well, actually, since you're not really clear about whether it's this document, have you reviewed any information that would indicate the

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- 1 number of carriers out of the 500 that you mention in 2 your testimony that are registered to do business, 3 long distance business, in the state of Washington 4 that are actually in business?
 - A. I actually -- what I saw last night, I counted over 200 carriers with intrastate revenues.
 - Q. And what was the information that you reviewed last night?
- 9 A. It was a revised exhibit by Dr. Blackmon of 10 the worksheets on which his Herfindahl indexes are 11 based.
 - Q. What was the type of information contained on that document?
 - A. I believe it's intraLATA revenues of carriers in the state of Washington.
 - O. Did you mean intraLATA revenues?
 - A. I thought I said intrastate. If I said intraLATA, I meant to say intrastate. Thank you.
- 19 Q. Thank you. Now, I'd like to direct your 20 attention to Exhibit 100.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. You had some discussion about this document with Mr. Thompson, but I'd like to ask you, does this document indicate anything to you about the presence of any of the carriers listed in this document in the

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- long distance market in 1999?
- Well, yes. In the sense that if they're wholesale customers, they must be providing retail 4 services.
 - Ο. And with respect to the -- is it true that -- can you tell me of the companies that are listed in this document, who are those companies -- what are those companies identified on this page for? What are the revenues that are shown here?
 - Α. This is confidential.
- Yeah, I don't want you to identify the specific numbers, but just generically describe what 12 13 is depicted on Exhibit 100.
 - It's the wholesale revenues that these companies are paying to WorldCom for wholesale services.
 - So each of the companies listed on this Ο. exhibit are leasing wholesale long distance services from MCI WorldCom, or did in 1999; is that right?
 - Α. That's my understanding.
- Okay. Dr. Kelley, do you recall looking at Ο. 22 a confidential pie chart that indicated the market 23 shares of wholesale providers --
- 24 Α. Yes.
- 25 Ο. -- in your cross-examination done by Mr.

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   Thompson?
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              I do.
         Α.
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              And you indicated that you had something to
 4
    say about the significance of that document.
 5
    tell me what that is?
              Yes, and just very quickly and very simply,
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    it showed that, year over year, WorldCom's, MCI's
   share fell, and the shares of some of the smaller
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    carriers grew very significantly in percentage terms,
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    including the carriers who we know are building
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   nationwide networks.
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              JUDGE CAILLE: Just for the record, we are
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    speaking of Exhibit C-110.
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              MS. HOPFENBECK: I had 101 down. Just
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   reflects a little dyslexia. Thank you.
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              THE WITNESS: I'm not -- was it 110? It
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   was a --
              MR. THOMPSON: I don't think it was 110,
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   actually.
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              JUDGE CAILLE:
                             Oh.
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              THE WITNESS:
                            I think it was an earlier
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   number.
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              MR. THOMPSON: There was a pie chart, but
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              MS. HOPFENBECK: It is 110. Oh, no, it's
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00516 not 110. Twenty-five. Which pie chart are you MS. ENDEJAN: 3 talking about, then? 4 MR. CROMWELL: We have two votes for 5 Exhibit 25. 6 MS. HOPFENBECK: Okay. For the record, it 7 was Exhibit 25. JUDGE CAILLE: Okay. 9 Dr. Kelley, you were asked a number of 10 questions during your cross-examination regarding 11 incentives that carriers with sunk investment have to 12 resell the capacity associated with that investment. 13 Do you recall that cross-examination? 14 Α. Yes. 15 Now, I wanted to ask you, just to clarify Ο. 16 the record, whether or not, in your view, US West has 17 a different incentive vis-a-vis its sunk investment 18 in its local network than carriers with sunk 19 investment in the competitive long distance

facilities?

A. Yes, certainly, US West has many sunk investments, but they also have a great deal of market power, and that will be the difference.

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Q. And I'd like you just to elaborate a little bit more about that, just comparing the incentives

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1 that --

- A. Companies with market power will maximize their profits generally by restricting output.

 Companies in competitive markets maximize revenues and profits by selling more output. So they face very different incentives and get very different market results, even in the case of two markets, where there are sunk costs in both.
- 9 Q. Now, would US West's incentive, as a 10 company with market power, change, in your view, with 11 the entry of other facilities-based carriers into 12 that market?
 - A. Yes. And with sufficient significant entry, their incentives would look more like other firms, and they would then become more willing to search out multiple uses and multiple customers for their facilities.
- Q. And if that -- is there a difference, in your view, in terms of the ascent, can you state, as an economist, an opinion about whether US West's incentive would be greater or the same, depending on whether there were two facilities-based carriers in the local exchange market or three?
- A. Yes. It's hard to say with great specificity, but the more the merrier, and certainly

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- with three carriers, you're more likely to get a competitive outcome. US West is more likely to see the benefits of selling, reselling capacity to others than with two.
- Q. Now, you've also had discussions during the course of this cross-examination about, in general, whether resellers constrain prices?
 - A. Yes.
- 9 Q. And you seem to suggest that resellers of 10 local services may constrain prices of local services 11 to a different degree at present than resellers of 12 long distance services. Is that a fair statement of 13 your view?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. And why do resellers of long distance services constrain prices to a -- well, what is the difference, first of all?
- A. Long distance resellers have multiple potential suppliers of the basic underlying capacity they need to provide service. Local resellers have one choice only, and that's the monopoly telephone company.
- Q. And how does the difference in choices affect the ability of resellers to constrain prices in one market or the other?

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- A. In the case of local market, we have a basic problem to begin with, and that is, in most places, the resale discounts don't allow for profitable entry in the first place. But in any event, they're stuck with the price that US West charges, whereas in the long distance business, a reseller who doesn't feel like it's getting a good deal from WorldCom can go to Qwest or Williams or Frontier and try to cut a better deal. And so they have more ability to constrain prices.

 11 O. In the long distance market, are there and
 - Q. In the long distance market, are there any carriers that, to your knowledge, have entered the telecommunications market with the purpose of becoming a carrier's carrier?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. And who are those carriers?
 - A. Well, I think the one example I give is Williams. Now, many of them are providing carrier's carriers functions, but they may also be providing retail functions, like Level 3.
- Q. Now, the last line of questions I wanted to ask you is Chairwoman Showalter asked you some questions about whether you thought there were any conditions that this Commission might impose should it be concerned about long distance market

1 concentration in order to approve this merger. I 2 wanted to ask you a question about that.

MCI WorldCom has, in Mr. Porter's testimony, suggested a condition consisting of an agreement or a commitment not to increase the average effective rate, per-minute rate for in-state long distance services for a period of six months.

Now, I'll ask you, hypothetically, if this Commission were to adopt such a condition as a price cap, do you believe that that kind of a condition, first of all, would function to address the long distance market concentration concern should the Commission have such a concern?

- A. I guess I should say, first, it's a theoretical concern. I don't think there's a need for that concern, but certainly, you know, price cap gives you some assurance or comfort or whatever it is that consumers would be protected for a period of time.
- Q. Now, hypothetically, if WorldCom were willing to suggest extending that kind of a condition to, say, 18 months, when asked, 18 months after merger closing, do you have any reason to believe that even if US West is not in the market by what you think would be about spring of 2002, do you have

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reason to believe that, at that point in time, this Commission should continue to be concerned about long distance market concentration?

- A. No, because -- and I don't think there's a concern today.
- Q. What is your opinion about what is likely to happen in the long distance market in Washington State and around the nation between now and the spring of 2002, in addition to RBOC entry?
- A. In addition to RBOC entry, my analysis of the capacity and the networks of the emerging carrier shows that a lot of fiber is going into the ground and is continuing to be lit. So there will be more and more capacity as time goes on.

14 15 For example, I'll give you an example. 16 Level 3, everybody thinks of Level 3 as this 17 monolithic brand-new IP-based network, and it will 18 be, but in my research and in the analysis I've done 19 of where carriers have deployed fiber, I only have 20 them down for Dallas and Houston, because that's the 21 only place where I can verify they have truly lit their own fiber. Everywhere else, they're leasing 22 23 now and they're building, they're building a lot, but 24 by 2002, they will have their network done. My

Exhibit ADK-2 shows that they're going to be one of

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9 10

- 1 the biggest players. Today, they're not a very big 2 player.
 - Q. I have one other question. In your discussion with Commissioner Gillis, I believe you were discussing DSL technology and MMDS technology, and you referenced a 35-mile radius. Were you referring to MMDS as having that radius or DSL?
 - A. Oh, MMDS.
 Q. Okay, thank you. One other line. You also had a discussion during the course of your cross-examination with I think both Messrs. Cromwell
- and Thompson regarding your expectations about how much market share the RBOC would gain and in what period of time.
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. I'll ask you this. Are you aware of a 17 joint marketing program that Qwest and US West 18 entered into in the recent past called Buyers 19 Advantage?
- 20 A. I am.
- Q. Now, Buyers Advantage didn't last very long, but do you know how many customers Qwest gained and in what period of time that Buyers Advantage was in existence?
- 25 A. Yes, the newspaper accounts showed that

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   they had gained 130,000 customers in just three
   weeks.
             Do you know what portion of US West's total
        Q.
   customers -- I mean, of the total US West customers
 5
   that would represent in the region?
             US West, I believe, is around 20 to 25
 7
   million lines, so it would probably take me longer to
   get my calculator out than to --
9
             Is it about a half a percent in three
        Q.
10
   weeks?
11
        Α.
             Yes.
12
             MS. HOPFENBECK: I have no further
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   questions.
14
             JUDGE CAILLE: Any re-cross?
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             MR. THOMPSON: I just have a couple
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   questions.
17
           RECROSS-EXAMINATION
18
   BY MR. THOMPSON:
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- 19 Q. On Exhibit Number 30, that's the one 20 listing the various carriers in Washington State, you 21 discussed that you would --
 - A. Is it 29 or 30?
- Q. Thirty.

- A. Okay, 30. Thank you.
- Q. You suggested that you would add Touch

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America to that, to the list. Do you have any idea which LATAs they're in?

I believe -- I'm going on recollection here. I believe they're in the Spokane LATA. 5 They're -- Touch America is Montana Power, the electric utility. It's one of the things I talk 7 about in my testimony. One of the great things that's going on in the industry now is that the 9 electric companies are building a lot of capacity, 10 and obviously a Montana company would be closer to 11 Spokane than to Seattle, but it's something I'm going 12 on recollection: Again, I'll look it up.

Well, would you accept -- well --Q. MS. HOPFENBECK: Mr. Thompson, perhaps in the interest of time, we could refer him to Mr. Porter's Exhibit Number 2.

> MR. THOMPSON: Okav.

MS. HOPFENBECK: Which has a map of Touch America's facilities in the state of Washington.

19 THE WITNESS: I have it, and yes, they show 21 network in Spokane going down to Boise, and they show planned network from -- it's hard to tell on this 22 23 copy whether it's actually planned, but they show 24 network in Seattle.

> Q. Does that mean there's a point of presence

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- in the Spokane LATA?
- I would say yes. I mean, the map shows clearly they have offices there.
- Q. What about -- does Touch America, then, 5 offer residential service and retail, such as they'd have a Y in that column?
 - I believe they do. Α.
- 8 Ο. Okay. What about ELI? Do you have any 9 idea which LATAs?
- 10 Α. There's a map here. If not, I may have a 11 map. 12

MS. HOPFENBECK: Page one.

THE WITNESS: Electric Lightwave are listed in both Seattle and Spokane. And I think I mentioned in my testimony there's a local company building sort of local communications facilities throughout eastern Washington, and they're using -- I think they're using Touch America, I'm sorry.

- Okay. Do you know if ELI sells long 19 Ο. 20 distance services to anybody besides its own CLEC 21 customers?
- 22 I can't say for sure. I believe they do. Α. 23 I believe that they're a long distance carrier. 24 That's something I could look into for you.
- 25 Q. Well, okay. We can -- I'm not sure how

1 you'd look into that, but --

- A. Look at their web site.
- Q. Okay. I don't know if I'll have an opportunity to call you back tomorrow on that, but maybe if there is such an opportunity, I would ask you to do that.

But let's turn now to -- one other subject I wanted to touch on was the pie charts you made reference to, and that was Exhibit 25. And it's two pie charts apparently depicting wholesale revenue share for 1998 and 1999. And I think you made the statement that, to you, those depicted a trend of gain and share by other companies and loss by the Big Three. And would you acknowledge there's only two years represented there?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And it appears to me that AT&T stayed the same, Sprint stayed the same, Frontier stayed the same, Level 3 changed one percent, there was -- the only, I guess, large change, or I guess what might pass for a large change was between Qwest and WorldCom; correct?
- 23 A. Yeah, but that's -- I view Qwest as being 24 very significant here, because they're a company that 25 in this period is building a network.

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Okay. Would you -- I don't know if this is
        Q.
   the point to talk about it, but it's interesting to
   me, at least, the conclusion of the person writing
   this report, which is stated in the sentence
 5
   underneath there, and I probably can't say it. Maybe
   -- could I read it into the record or -- but at least
   this person's conclusion was that, from this, was
   that it may be difficult for MCI to capture
9
   incremental share because they're already the leader.
10
   Is that another conclusion you think that could
11
   validly be drawn from that data?
12
             Well, that's one conclusion. Clearly,
        Α.
13
   they're not getting any incremental share.
14
   losing incremental share. If you go to the next
15
   page, the analysis here says, Startups take most of
16
   market growth, focusing on Qwest, Frontier and Level
17
    3. And I guess, as I read this, it just gets better,
18
   the last page --
             MR. THOMPSON: Actually, that's all I have
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20
   for you, in the interest of time.
21
           RECROSS - EXAMINATION
22
   BY MR. CROMWELL:
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             One issue, Dr. Kelley. Looking at your
        Q.
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   resume, you were with the FCC as a senior economist
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from '79 to '82; is that correct?

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 1
             That's correct.
        Α.
 2
            And you were with the U.S. Department of
        Ο.
   Justice as a Staff economist from '72 to '79?
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             That's correct.
        Α.
 5
             Are you aware of any risk of
        Ο.
 6
   anticompetitive effect in the marketplace of a price
 7
        Α.
             Yes. If you take a price cap in
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   oligopolistic market, the concern we had at the FCC
10
   about FCC tariffs way back a long time ago is it
11
   could become a focal point for pricing.
12
             In other words, to be brief, there is a
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   risk that a price cap could, in fact, become a floor?
14
             Theoretical risk in the situation I
15
   described. In this situation, I don't think you have
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   to worry about it.
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             MR. CROMWELL: Thank you.
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             MR. PASCARELLA: Two minutes, Dr. Kelley.
           RECROSS-EXAMINATION
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   BY MR. PASCARELLA:
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             In response to one of the Commissioners'
        Q.
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   questions, you indicated that there was a group of
23
   consumers in Washington that will want to buy just
   long distance, in other words, kind of a la carte
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long distance for some time to come. Is that

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L accurate?

- A. Yes, that's my marketing prediction.
- Q. Okay. But you go on to say in your affidavit in here that with regard to this group, we shouldn't be worried about any anticompetitive effects of this merger, because there are plenty of emerging carriers to step up. In fact, you went through, I think with MCI's counsel, a bunch of folks that were either in the market or building capacity; is that true?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Under that theory, wouldn't it also be true that, I guess talking hypothetically, when eight months from now, WorldCom-Sprint come to this Commission and announce their intent to merge with AT&T, there won't be any anticompetitive concerns for that segment of the market at that time?
- A. I disagree with that jump, and I think we had some discussion about this issue as elasticity of supply. And Sprint is -- whatever percent of the market it is, it's less than 10. Three and a half, if you believe Dr. Hausman's numbers. Seven, I think I've seen seven. For a company to, you know, restrict -- to exercise market power, it means it restricts supply. So not all that much supply can be

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1 restricted with Sprint, and then, given the 2 elasticity of supply that exists because the other 3 carriers are there with transport and switching and 4 billing and marketing, they'll easily be able to come 5 in and take care of things.

Now, if you talk about AT&T, at 50 percent, acquiring 20 percent, you know, of combined

MCI-Sprint, or 27, or whatever it would be, then you have to have much more -- supply has to be much more elastic for me not to be concerned.

So I'm not here to -- some companies advocate a theory in economics called contestability, which you can be 100 percent and entry is easy, no barriers to entry, and you don't even have to worry about a hundred percent firm. I'm not saying that this market is contestable. I don't think there are many contestable markets. What I'm saying is that the elasticity of supply is such that for this merger, these market shares, you don't have to worry.

- Q. At what point, roughly -- you indicated certainly 70 percent would be too high -- would the elasticities in this market not be sufficient to allay your concerns about the effect on competition?
- A. I don't know if I could give you a point. I mean, I'm pretty confident I'd be concerned about

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1 AT&T. Something less than that, I would want to sit 2 down and do an analysis.

MR. PASCARELLA: Thank you.

EXAMINATION

BY CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER:

- Q. I just have one follow-up question on Exhibit 100. This is the list of wholesale customers of MCI. I'm not even sure you have to look at the --9 go ahead.
 - A. All right.
- 11 Q. I thought I heard you say that one 12 inference you draw from this chart is that if these 13 people, these companies are wholesale customers of 14 MCI, then they must be involved in retail service or 15 they wouldn't be buying wholesale?
 - A. Right.
 - Q. And my only question is, is that the necessary implication? Could any of these wholesale customers of MCI, for whatever reason, be also delivering -- turning around and delivering wholesale services to someone else?
- 22 A. Yes, that's certainly possible. I see 23 Williams on here.
- Q. Okay. So you can't draw the inference, 100 percent, anyway, that all of these wholesale

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customers mean that there is this much retail business going on. Ultimately, there would be, but you don't know among whom? Yes, right. Ultimately, I think there 5 would be. By definition, it has to be retailed at some point. So each minute stands for a retail 7 minute somewhere along the line. But you're right, there might be buy and sell among the carriers. 9 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Thanks. 10 JUDGE CAILLE: Any redirect? All right. 11 Mr. Kelley, you're excused. Thank you for your 12 testimony. 13 Just before we leave, I'd like to ask 14 WorldCom to supply a corrected exhibit of -- it's the 15 one where we're adding ELI and Touch America and the 16 Spokane LATA is incorrect. If you could do that, 17 plus we need a clear copy of page 10 of Exhibit 110, and six copies of the FCC exhibit that you're 18 19 supplying. All right. 20 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Just a comment on 21 that table. The question for that exhibit was what did you base your testimony on, and of course, I 22 23 think you probably gave the right table, but now the

testimony has been changed to add in some others. I

think it's appropriate to add to the exhibit.

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               MS. ENDEJAN: Your Honor, could I request,
    if she's making copies, if she could make more than
    six and provide copies to all Counsel?
               JUDGE CAILLE: Yes.
 4
 5
               MS. ENDEJAN: Thank you.
 6
               JUDGE CAILLE: If there's nothing further,
 7
    then?
 8
               MS. KIDDOO: Would you like to swear in Ms.
 9
    McMahon?
10
               JUDGE CAILLE: No, I need to pick up my
    child, so we'll do it first thing -- how about if we
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    do it at 8:20 tomorrow? Okay. Well, we're starting at 8:30, and I asked -- or 8:25.
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               (Proceedings adjourned at 6:18 p.m.)
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