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1	BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
2	TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION
3	In the Matter of the ) Investigation into )
4	U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.'s ) Docket No. UT-003022
5	) Volume XXXVIII
6	Compliance with Section 271 of ) Pages 5696 to 5812 the Telecommunications Act of ) 1996
7	) In the Matter of )
8	) Docket No. UT-003040 U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.'s ) Volume XXXVIII
9	Statement of Generally ) Available Terms Pursuant to )
11	Section 252(f) of the ) Telecommunications Act of 1996 )
12	·
13	A hearing in the above matters was held on
14	September 21, 2001, at 1:30 p.m., at 1300 South
15	Evergreen Park Drive Southwest, Room 206, Olympia,
16	Washington, before Administrative Law Judge ROBERT
17	WALLIS and Chairwoman MARILYN SHOWALTER, Commissioner
18	RICHARD HEMSTAD, and Commissioner PATRICK OSHIE.
19	The parties were present as follows:
20	AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
21	INC. XO WASHINGTON, INC., and ELECTRIC LIGHTWAVE, INC., by GREGORY J. KOPTA, Attorney at Law, Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 1501 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2600, Seattle,
22	Washington 98101.
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24	
25	Joan E. Kinn, CCR, RPR Court Reporter

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1	MCI/WORLDCOM, INC., by MICHEL SINGER NELSON,
2	Attorney at Law, 707 - 17th Street, Suite 4200, Denver, Colorado 80202.
3	QWEST CORPORATION, by LISA ANDERL, Attorney
4	at Law, 1600 Seventh Avenue, Suite 3206, Seattle, Washington 98191, and via bridge line by JOHN MUNN,
5	Attorney at Law, and CHARLES W. STEESE, Attorney at L 1801 California Street, 49th Floor, Denver, Colorado
6	80202.
	COVAD COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY by BROOKS E.
7	HARLOW, Attorney at Law, Miller Nash LLP, 601 Union Street, Suite 4400, Seattle, Washington 98101.
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05698 1 PROCEEDINGS JUDGE WALLIS: This hearing will please come to order. This is a session in the matter of Commission 3 4 Dockets UT-003022 and 003040 involving Qwest 5 Communications and its application for approval under 6 Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act and its 7 presentation of a matrix called an SGAT. 8 Let's begin the session this afternoon by 9 identifying the people on the Bench. My name is Bob 10 Wallis, and I'm the presiding Administrative Law Judge. Immediately to my right is Commission Chairwoman Marilyn 11 12 Showalter. To her right is Commissioner Richard 13 Hemstad. And to his right is Commissioner Patrick 14 Oshie. 15 Let's get appearances from the parties. If 16 your address and other information is as previously 17 stated, you need not restate it now. Please begin with 18 the proponent. 19 MS. ANDERL: Thank you, Your Honor. Lisa 20 Anderl representing Owest Corporation. I have

previously stated an appearance for the record, and we do also have in-house counsel on the conference bridge. I don't know if you want -
MR. STEESE: This is Chuck Steese and John

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MR. STEESE: This is Chuck Steese and John Munn, both on the conference bridge, and in-house on

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    behalf of Qwest.
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                JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you.
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                MR. KOPTA: Gregory Kopta of the law firm
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    Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, on behalf of XO Washington
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    and Electric Lightwave, and I'm also making a special
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    quest appearance for AT&T Communications of the Pacific
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    Northwest since Mr. Walters was not able to attend
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    today. I have not appeared on behalf of AT&T in this
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    docket prior to today and don't anticipate that I would
    be after today, but I'm filling in for him today.
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               MS. SINGER NELSON: Michel Singer Nelson on
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    behalf of MCI/WorldCom, and I'm taking the place of
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    Annie Hopfenbeck who has previously entered her
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     appearance on behalf of MCI/WorldCom.
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                JUDGE WALLIS: Do you expect to have a
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     continuing involvement in this docket?
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               MS. SINGER NELSON: Yes, I do, Judge.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: And is your contact
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     information the same as Ms. Hopfenbeck's?
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               MS. SINGER NELSON: It's the same, even the
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    phone number is the same. The only thing that's
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    different is the E-mail address.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: And yours is?
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               MS. SINGER NELSON: My E-mail address is
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michel.singer underscore nelson@wcom.com.

05700 JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you. 1 MR. HARLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. Brooks 3 Harlow appearing today on behalf of Covad Communications. 5 JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you very much. 6 Is there any person on the bridge line who 7 has not previously identified yourself who is intending 8 to appear in a representative capacity for a party and 9 state comments or argument this afternoon? 10 Let the record show that there is no 11 response. 12 As we were organizing our session earlier, 13 the parties indicated that they viewed the issues being 14 grouped in four general areas, and I'm going to 15 paraphrase here. One is obligation to build, one is 16 EELs, another is retail service standards, and a fourth 17 is commingling. The parties agree that Qwest is 18 challenging the initial order on the first three and 19 Mr. Kopta's clients on the third. The parties have agreed to split the time approximately on the following 20 21 basis, that is 90 minutes for the first issue, 30 minutes for each of the remaining 3, and to divide the 22 23 time between proponents and opponents equally, and if

there is more than one person on a side to divide it as

they agree amongst themselves. Is that satisfactory to

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    folks?
               MR. HARLOW: Yes, Your Honor.
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               MS. ANDERL: Yes.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Very well, let's begin with
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    Ms. Anderl then and the obligation to build issues. I
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    am going to ask you to identify clearly as you begin
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    which issues you are addressing. And as you go through
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    your argument or comments, please identify the paragraph
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    in the order and the paragraph or page in your brief so
    that we may follow along. Thank you.
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               MS. ANDERL: Thank you, Your Honor. Good
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    afternoon, Commissioners. Before I get started today, I
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    would like to distribute a packet of material. I have
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    had excerpted some relevant portions of some FCC
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    decisions to the extent that it makes it easier to
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    reference those and follow along during the argument. I
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    have also obtained or prepared copies for counsel.
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               These FCC decisions are in reverse
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    chronological order in the sense that the most recent
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    decision from just two days ago, which is the Verizon
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    Pennsylvania decision, the excerpt from that is on the
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    top, and then the oldest is on the bottom. It's not
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    necessarily organized in the order in which I'm going to
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    refer to them, but I will try to point you clearly to
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    the sections when we get there.
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As Judge Wallis described at the beginning of 1 the session today, there are three issues that Qwest has briefed that are very important to Qwest in connection with this initial order on Workshop III issues. Right 5 now we will be talking about the obligation to build 6 issue. I will be spending most of my time on that issue 7 as that, I believe, is the most critical issue for 8 Qwest, and there are a number of sub issues contained 9 within that broad overall description. They are 10 discussed generally in Qwest's brief at pages 2 through 11 25. And as I walk through the argument in more detail, 12 I will narrow down the brief pages and also the order 13 paragraphs that I'm referring to as we go through this. 14 As noted earlier, Mr. Munn and Mr. Steese are 15 on the conference bridge, and because of their 16 familiarity with events in other states, which is 17 somewhat greater than mine, I may consult with them from 18 time to time. However, let me begin now with the 19 discussion of the obligation to build issue. 20 The issues from the issues log that are 21 encompassed within this overall issue are the UNE, the CL2-15, UNE-C11, and EEL-5, which are grouped together 22 23 in the initial order at Paragraphs 65 through 80. Then 2.4 there is the CL2-18 issue, which is discussed in the 25 initial order at Paragraphs 81 through 88. There is the

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issue TR-14, which is discussed in the initial order at Paragraphs 152 through 157. And those latter two issues, CL2-18 and TR-14, both concern the obligation to add electronics to fiber, so they're related in that way, although they did come up in different contexts within the workshop. And then UNE-C21, which is in the initial order at Paragraphs 89 to 93.

As a broad summary of the argument before I go into the details, generally Qwest believes that the initial order expands the scope of its obligations to provide UNEs to beyond that which is required by the Act, the FCC rules, and even this Commission's prior decisions to the extent that this Commission has made decisions that have touched upon that issue. Qwest believes that this result potentially thwarts the public policy goals of the Act and the State of Washington. Additionally, as will be discussed in more detail later in the argument, the result is inconsistent with the result reached or preliminary result reached in nine other Owest jurisdictions.

Qwest will construct facilities in a number of instances, and I want to make sure that that's clear up front before we go into the detail. Qwest will construct facilities where it will be required to do so in order to meet its carrier of last resort obligation

to serve its retail customers, and it will also construct facilities for a CLEC if under the same circumstances it would construct facilities for itself or one of its retail or interexchange customers. 5 However, there is some language in the initial order 6 which appears to expand the scope of Qwest's obligation 7 to construct facilities even beyond that which I have 8 just described, and that is what we take issue with. 9 What we are asking for you to do here is to 10 modify the initial order in such a way as to approve 11 SGAT language that imposes an obligation on Qwest to 12 build for CLECs that is the same as but not greater than 13 the obligation Qwest has to build for itself and its own 14 customers. 15 Let me just point you briefly to some 16 examples of language in the initial order that were 17 troubling to Qwest and that led to the petition for 18 administrative review on this issue. In Paragraph 79, 19 which is on page 18 of the initial order, and it's a 20 lengthy paragraph, and I don't know that I can briefly 21 quote, but let me paraphrase and summarize what we believe that this paragraph holds. The initial order --22 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Ms. Anderl. 23 2.4 MS. ANDERL: Yes. 25

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Can you just give me

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     that -- oh, I see, I'm in an FCC order instead.
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               MS. ANDERL: This is not in what I
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     distributed.
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               CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: No, no, I've got our
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    order here.
               MS. ANDERL: Okay.
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               CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: It's just that I was
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    looking at the wrong order.
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               MS. ANDERL: Page 18.
               CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: And it was paragraph?
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               MS. ANDERL: Paragraph 79. That is the
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    discussion and decision section on the first three
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     issues concerning obligation to build. It appears from
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     the language in that paragraph that the initial order
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    holds that the terms, existing facilities or existing
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    network, which are used frequently in both the initial
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     order and in the FCC and Eighth Circuit decisions on
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     this point, that those terms, existing facilities and
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     existing network, mean the geographic scope of the
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    network rather than the actual facilities that are
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    deployed in the ground or over the air. We believe that
     this interpretation of the terms, existing facilities or
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     existing network, is overly broad and imposes an
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     obligation to build that exceeds the requirements of the
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    Act, and I will get into the legal framework and what we
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believe the Act and the FCC's orders hold in just a
minute.

Let me just point you to one other paragraph in the initial order, which potentially in our minds expands the scope of Qwest's obligation, and that's Paragraph 87. It's at page 20 and 21. This is in connection with the question of whether Qwest must add electronics to dark fiber in order to light the fiber. It's a kind of a subset of the obligation to build issue. And the initial order holds that Qwest must add electronics and notes there towards the end of the paragraph that the capital outlays required by the decision are no different from outlays that Qwest is currently required to make when its own customers request additional capacity.

If this means, if this language in the initial order means that Qwest just treat CLECs the same as other customers, we're fine with that. Qwest will do that. However, Qwest does not always add capacity upon request for its retail customers or its interexchange customers. It's infrequent that we're unable to meet a service request because of a lack of facilities, but it is correct that sometimes it does not happen that the service is provided or that capacity is added, and thus the order is broader than Qwest's current obligations

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and appears to be premised on an erroneous assumption. So it's kind of that's the context of what brings us before you today asking for relief. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Ms. Anderl, I might be 5 jumping in here too soon, so just tell me if I am. MS. ANDERL: Okay. 6 7 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But it sounds as if 8 you're saying there are times when Qwest in its 9 discretion does not respond to a request from a customer 10 or would be customer, and so likewise it should be able 11 to act in the same way if a CLEC makes that request. 12 MS. ANDERL: Precisely. 13 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But then my question 14 is, if it is, in fact, discretionary, how is that 15 discretionary decision made? Obviously sometimes Qwest 16 will build, so how do you get at the issue of Qwest 17 exercising its discretion in one way for itself and in a 18 different way for others? 19 MS. ANDERL: Well, typically the -- I mean 20 the threshold issue has to be are there any facilities 21 there that are available to be put into service for this customer, CLEC or end user. And if the answer is yes, 22 23 we'll do it. I mean there's no discretion there. If 2.4 the question is, there's no fiber in the ground or the

electronics are out of capacity, then we may, depending

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on what the provisions are in our special construction tariffs or the special construction provisions of the SGAT, and I will get to that in just a minute, offer to construct for either the end user or the interexchange carrier or the CLEC with a commitment from that customer that they will pay for the construction.

And in the SGAT, that special construction section is Section 9.19, and that was appended to our August 23rd brief, all of SGAT Section 9. We call those the SGAT Lites, which are just the pieces of the SGAT that are relevant to the particular discussion.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So is what you're saying is that because the situation, whether it was one of your customers or Qwest or a carrier, everybody, in fact, would be put in the same boat, that is you pay? Or would there be some other time where Qwest said, well, you know, I guess we sort of need to take this little area on, let's build?

MS. ANDERL: Well, we do have -- I mean one of the things that we have agreed to do in the context of this question of will we build is that we will share our network construction plans with the CLECs to some extent for some period in the future. So there isn't any danger of us saying to the CLEC, well, you know, gee, we're not planning on going there, you better pay

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us, and then all along we had been planning on going
there. So the CLECs have some visibility toward what
our future construction plans are, and if there is no
plan to add facilities in an area and there are no
facilities in the area and then the CLEC chooses to ask
us to construct, I think that that provides some pretty
significant safeguards that neither side is really
gaming the system to their advantage.

Okay, so now you know why we're before you in terms of what the initial order says. Let me just lay out briefly what we believe to be the relevant legal framework that we need to consider when we analyse these issues. I think the most relevant interpretations of the Telecom Act that we have on this issue are the Eighth Circuit decisions in the Iowa Utility Board cases. We do cite from and quote from those decisions fairly extensively in our brief, primarily at pages 5 and 6, but we believe that the Eighth Circuit in both Iowa Utilities Board decisions has stated unambiguously that the Act only mandates access to the ILEC's existing network. In other words, when the Act said, you must provide unbundled access to network elements, the Act only meant, and the Eighth Circuit has affirmed that it only meant, the copper and the fiber and the electronics that you have in place at the time that the request is

05710 made. 1 For example, in the first Iowa Utilities 3 Board case, the court held that Subsection 251(c)(3) of 4 the Act implicitly requires unbundled access only to an 5 incumbent LEC's existing network, not a yet unbuilt 6 superior one. I know we have heard that, not a yet 7 unbuilt superior network, a lot, but it -- I don't want 8 it through overuse to have lost its meaning. I think 9 it's still significant language. I know we have used it 10 a lot in the cost docket and probably a lot in these 11 SGAT proceedings but -- Mr. Kopta is barely able to 12 conceal his mirth but --13 MR. KOPTA: Unable to conceal his mirth. MS. ANDERL: But that's language from the 14 15 Eighth Circuit. That's the law. We think it's 16 important, and we think it does have meaning, and we 17 think that it provides a significant limitation and a 18 significant definition of what the ILEC's legal 19 obligations are. That was I guess back in 1997. 20 And then later in the order on, I'm not even 21 sure, I have lost the context, the next Iowa Utilities Board decision at 219.F3rd, the court discusses the need 22

for access to an ILEC's network. And in two paragraphs,

it uses the term existing facilities or existing network

four times. I don't think that those are accidental

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references, and I do believe that the court meant what's there, not what a CLEC might want an ILEC to provide, but that you, the CLEC, get exactly what the ILEC has for itself, and the court said that Congress knew it was 5 requiring the existing ILECs to share their existing 6 facilities and equipment. Congress did not expect a new 7 competitor to pay rates for a reconstructed local 8 network, but for the existing local network it would be 9 using in an attempt to compete. This to me speaks 10 clearly that there is no new construction involved for 11 the CLECs unless CLECS wish to pay for it themselves or 12 wish to have a third party do the construction. 13 Going on discussing the cost and pricing 14 standards that the Act imposes, the Eight Circuit said 15 that: 16 It is the cost to the ILEC of providing 17

It is the cost to the ILEC of providing its existing facilities and equipment that is relevant and that the competitor must pay.

And finally, the new entering competitor in effect piggybacks on the ILEC's existing facilities and equipment. It is the cost to the ILEC of providing that ride on those facilities that the statute permits the ILEC to recoup.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Is this the decision

from the Eighth Circuit that's on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court now? MS. ANDERL: Yes, it is, although I don't 4 believe that the question of whether it's an existing 5 network or whether construction might be required by the 6 ILEC is perhaps squarely at issue to the Supreme Court. 7 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I lost track, on 8 appeal, cert has been granted in front of the court? 9 MS. ANDERL: (Nodding head.) CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You say cert has been 10 11 granted, but not on this issue or what? 12 MS. ANDERL: I don't think the issue of an 13 ILEC's obligation to build is squarely teed up in that. 14 And, of course, the first Monday in October when the 15 court is back in session is just a couple of weeks away, 16 so I don't know, I don't have any real visibility to 17 when the Supreme Court gurus expect a decision on this 18 issue. I think we're all hoping this term. 19 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Well, I guess I mean I 20 can see what the Eighth Circuit is saying, and then when 21 I see certs granted, you say, well, all right, I wonder what the U.S. Supreme Court is going to say, but you're 22 23 saying they may say nothing on this issue? 2.4 MS. ANDERL: That's right. 25

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So then there we are

with the Eighth Circuit issue, and, of course, it isn't our circuit, but. MS. ANDERL: Well, and as I continued through the discussion of the legal framework, I think what you will see is that we believe that there are quiding and controlling FCC orders on this subject as well that reaffirm that that is a correct interpretation. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: All right. JUDGE WALLIS: Ms. Singer Nelson, did you wish to address the question of cert? MS. SINGER NELSON: No, I didn't, thank you, Judge. JUDGE WALLIS: All right. 

Judge.

JUDGE WALLIS: All right.

MS. ANDERL: And while the Eighth Circuit decisions are, of course, important and not to be discounted, I think that it is important to go back and remember the context that we're in right now, which is the 271 proceeding, and this State Commission is going to be asked to make a recommendation to the FCC, and it's the FCC who is going to ultimately determine compliance. And so I therefore think that the FCC decisions on this same issue are at least as important as the Eighth Circuit decision, and let me just talk to you briefly about some of the decisions from the FCC that we believe are very consistent with and perhaps

05714 even more clear than the Eighth Circuit's decision that it is access only to the existing network that is required. All the way back to the First Report and 5 Order, August 8th, 1996, and this excerpt is provided as 6 the backmost tab in the pamphlet that I handed out to 7 you, Paragraph 451 of the First Report and Order, and 8 there the FCC is specifically discussing the obligation 9 to provide the unbundled network element that is the 10 transport element. And they say very clearly there in 11 the last sentence of that Paragraph 451: 12 In this section, for example, we 13 expressly limit the provision of 14 unbundled interoffice facilities to 15

existing incumbent LEC facilities. Now I know that --

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I'm sorry, I don't want to lose the point, point me again to from where you were reading in the material you gave us.

MS. ANDERL: In the material I gave you, it should be the absolute last page, and there should be a Paragraph 451 on there.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: And read again the 23 2.4 sentence, I didn't find it.

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25 MS. ANDERL: I'm sorry, I said it was the

l last sentence, it's not, it's the middle sentence in that paragraph.

In this section, for example, we expressly limit the provision of unbundled interoffice facilities to existing incumbent LEC facilities.
COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Thank you.

MS. ANDERL: And that unbundled interoffice facilities is what we're referring to in this docket as the transport rate element or transport unbundled network element.

Now I know that when we hear from AT&T later, AT&T will say that this sentence by expressly saying you don't have to build transport means that you have to build everything else. We don't think that's the case, but we will get to that in just a minute.

Subsequent to this First Report and Order over five years ago, the FCC, of course, issued a new order defining the UNEs, the UNE Remand Order. That is in your tab entitled UNE Remand Order. There's an excerpt there that's released November 5th, 1999. And Paragraph 324 in that order speaks also to the transport element. Twice in that paragraph, the FCC clearly defines the obligation to provide that unbundled network element as limited to existing facilities. The

05716 Commission refers back and says: 1 In local competition, First Report and 3 Order, the Commission limited an 4 incumbent LEC's transport unbundling 5 obligation to existing facilities. 6 And then later in the last sentence of that Paragraph 324: 7 8 We do not require incumbent LECs to 9 construct new transport facilities to 10 meet specific competitive LEC point to 11 point demand requirements. 12 We believe that this is very clear that on 13 the transport element, and we will explain how it 14 extends to other elements as well, that there is no 15 obligation to add facilities. That means that there's 16 no obligation to place additional fiber in the ground, 17 and there's no obligation to add electronics. 18 Finally, in the collocation remand order that 19 the FCC just entered on August 8, 2001, also provided 20 for you as an excerpt in your materials, the FCC in 21 Paragraph 76 towards the latter half of that paragraph 22 references that: 23 Incumbent LECs are not required to

provide competitors with better

interconnection or access to the network

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05717 than already exists. 1 2 And they go on to explain that the 3 requirement that they have imposed in that paragraph relative to collocation: 5 Merely allows the collocater to use the 6 existing network in as efficient a 7 manner as the incumbent uses it for its 8 own purposes. 9 Now clearly this is not a decision on the obligation to build, and so I'm not suggesting to you 10 11 that this is language that is determinative. But I 12 think it's persuasive that when the FCC talks about this 13 in this context, it's almost implicit there's this 14 underlying assumption that it is the existing network. 15 And you hate to say, you know, it's so clear that it 16 almost goes without saying, but when you hear the FCC 17 discussing it like this, it seems that that is the base 18 line from which they're operating. And that coupled 19 with the other FCC decisions and the Eighth Circuit 20 decisions makes it clear at least to us that there is no 21 obligation beyond that which Qwest has already committed 22 and which is to provision that which we have and to add 23 facilities under certain circumstances, including when 2.4 necessary to meet the carrier of last resort obligation 25 and when a CLEC or a customer is willing to pay special

1 construction charges. Let me talk then briefly about what Qwest is 3 willing to do in order to build when it is required to 4 do so in order to meet its carrier of last resort 5 obligations. This is not so much of an issue in this 6 docket or in this phase of the proceeding, because I 7 think that where the carrier of last resort obligation 8 really comes into play is when we're discussing loops, 9 and loops are in Workshop IV, and we're not there yet. 10 But in Qwest's SGAT Section 9.1.2.1, which again was 11 appended to our August 23rd brief, Qwest makes it clear 12 that it will construct in circumstances where it is 13 necessary to do so in order to meet its carrier of last 14 resort obligation for an end user. 15 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: What was that 16 reference again? 17 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Maybe you could give 18 us the page number of the SGAT to start with. 19 MS. ANDERL: Sure, it's the SGAT Lite that 20 was filed with our brief, and it is Section 9.1.2.1. 21 It's on page 2. It starts, if facilities are not available, Qwest will build facilities. 22 23 And the reason I mention it is because I 2.4 think it's important for you to have that context now

and then also because it is here in Section 9, which

covers unbundled network elements in general. It just so happens that we pulled one of those unbundled network elements, loops, out and considered that in Workshop Number IV instead of here in this Workshop Number III. 5 In Washington, this SGAT section means that 6 if Owest would be required by the Commission to 7 construct facilities to serve an end user for the 8 provision of local exchange service, Qwest will 9 construct those same facilities to allow a CLEC to serve 10 that end user. Qwest's obligation to build facilities 11 is also set forth in its build policy, which is 12 something that I believe was made referenced or made a 13 part of the record in Workshop IV, but I can't be sure 14 of that, because I don't recall. But what I do want you 15 to know is that that build policy which memorializes 16 Qwest's obligation is one that can not be unilaterally 17 changed by Qwest and can not be changed at all unless 18 and until it goes through the CICMP or the carrier 19 change management process where all CLECs have a chance 20 to be involved. And that CICMP process was also 21 discussed in Workshop Number IV. 22 In Washington specifically, the carrier of 23 last resort obligation was addressed by this Commission 2.4 in a docket that was opened four or five years ago, Docket Number 961638. The Commission order in that 25

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docket was issued on January 16th, 1998. There the Commission refused to decide either the broad policy issues connected with the carrier of last resort obligation or specific carrier obligations in connection with that issue. One of the reasons that the Commission stated for declining to decide those issues at that time was, and I will quote here:

Because of the Commission's strongly held belief that critical public policy issues of this magnitude, breadth, and impact are not appropriate for resolution in the context of formal adjudication.

Yet that is exactly what the CLECs would have you do here is resolve those same issues by imposing an obligation to build of what we believe to be a greater magnitude than is required in an adjudication such as

18 this.

After the tariff docket was concluded in '96, the 961638 docket, the Commission determined that the carrier of last resort obligations ought to be considered in a rule making docket. They deferred the issue into a then open docket, which was Docket Number 970325, and then transferred the question to a docket for that issue alone, which was Docket 990301. That

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docket remains open, and no rule or order on the issue has yet been adopted or entered. Qwest believes that if the Commission does wish to wrestle with this issue, that would be the more appropriate forum to deal with it.

Finally, kind of along the same lines, the

Finally, kind of along the same lines, the FCC has repeatedly stated that 271 dockets are not the right place to resolve or decide new interpretive disputes, and I believe they have said that in virtually every order that they have entered in the 271 proceedings, most specifically and most recently in the Verizon Pennsylvania order, which is at the top of your packet. In Paragraph 92 of that decision, the FCC states:

15 As we have stated in other Section 271 16 orders, new interpretive disputes concerning the precise content of an 17 18 incumbent LEC's obligations to its 19 competitors, disputes that our rules 20 have not yet addressed and that do not 21 involve per se violations of the Act or 22 our rules, are not appropriately dealt 23 with in the context of a Section 271 proceeding. 2.4

25 Qwest believes that its current obligation to

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build as set forth in its SGAT and as Qwest requests be 1 approved in this proceeding is one clearly compliant with the Act, and that to the extent the CLECs wish a 4 greater obligation be imposed, that is a new 5 interpretive dispute that should not be resolved in this 6 docket. 7 That's kind of globally the obligation to 8 build. Within that obligation to build issue though, 9 there is the subset of adding electronics, and that was issues CL2-18 and TR-14. 10 11 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Ms. Anderl, before you 12 go there, has the FCC dealt with this issue in a 271 13 proceeding explicitly, that is over someone's 14 objections, they have approved a 271, or they did not 15 approve because that was missing? 16 MS. ANDERL: Yeah, actually they have, and 17 that's --18 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: If you're getting 19 there anyway, that's fine, you don't need to do that 20 21 MS. ANDERL: I am. 22 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Okay. 23 MS. ANDERL: But let me go ahead and respond 2.4 though to the question to the extent that people are

already looking at the Verizon Pennsylvania order. We

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believe it's been clear in other FCC orders prior to now, but two days ago on September 19th, the FCC did release this Verizon Pennsylvania order, which is a 271 order, which does approve Verizon's entry into the interLATA long distance business.

And I have only excerpted the three pages for you, pages 50, 51, and 52. And in Paragraphs 91 and 92, the FCC addresses something that's virtually identical to the issue that is raised here in terms of the willingness of a carrier to add electronics. This discussion here in the Verizon Pennsylvania order is in the context of providing high capacity loops, but high capacity loops, which are basically fiber, from the central office to an end user's premises with the electronics on either end are virtually the same as high capacity transport. The only difference is where the ends of the facilities are. On a loop, one end is at the customer, and one end is at the central office. With high capacity transport, each end is at a separate central office. But otherwise the element is the same in terms of physical construct and electronics on either end.

Here Verizon has refused to add electronics to provide high capacity loops as an unbundled network element and will only provide high capacity loops as a

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1	UNE if it has all the necessary equipment and
2	electronics present on the line and at the customer's
3	premises. CLECs claimed that this violated the
4	Commission's rules and ought to mandate a finding of
5	noncompliance and a denial of entry into the interLATA
6	business. Verizon stated, no, that it would provide the
7	loops when facilities were available, and that when
8	facilities were not available, customers could
9	potentially obtain the loops out of the tariff, the
10	private line transport tariff or whatever Verizon's
11	equivalent of that was. Additionally, Verizon agreed
12	that it would place line cards, if necessary, and
13	perform cross connection work, which Qwest will also do.
14	However, at the bottom of Paragraph 91, it says clearly:
15	In the event that spare facilities
16	and/or capacity on those facilities is
17	unavailable, Verizon will not provide
18	new facilities solely to complete a
19	competitor's order for high capacity
20	loops.
21	The FCC in Paragraph 92 goes on to say:
22	We disagree with commenters that
23	Verizon's policies and practices
24	expressly violate the Commission's
25	unbundling rules.
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And the FCC found that the way Verizon was providing service did not mandate a finding of noncompliance, so the double negative there reaches you to a grant of authority and finding of compliance with the checklist.

And again, you know, to kind of go back to what's the function of this docket, the function of this docket is to recommend to the FCC whether Qwest's performance meets what the FCC has said is required under the Act, and so we believe that this latest order makes it all the more clear that the obligations that Qwest has stated that it will assume for purposes of its obligation to provide UNEs more than satisfies that requirement.

JUDGE WALLIS: Ms. Anderl, we are looking at about 10 or 12 minutes remaining. If you want to reserve some of that time to respond, you may do so.

MS. ANDERL: Thank you, Your Honor.

That really is the adding electronics issue, and if I had more time, all I would probably do on this issue is go back and suggest that we look again at the language from the First Report and Order in Paragraph 451, which references that the ILEC is not required to build new transport facilities, and the UNE Remand Order at Paragraph 324, again suggesting that.

05726 I think one thing that is important maybe to 1 look at on this issue of adding electronics is the UNE 3 Remand Order at Footnote 292, and it is part of the packet that I gave you. 5 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What's the date of the 6 order? 7 MS. ANDERL: That's the November, let me just find my tab, November 5th, 1999. 8 9 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: And what paragraph? 10 MS. ANDERL: I apologize, I may not have 11 included that particular piece. I thought that I had 12 included the page that had the Footnote 292 in it. 13 Apparently I did not. I can provide that subsequent to 14 today, or if the Commissioners have their own copy, 15 Footnote 292 in the UNE Remand Order does very clearly 16 state, and we have this in our brief, that the CLEC is 17 expected by the FCC to add the electronics to light dark 18 fiber, and let me just give you the reference there. 19 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What number is it, 20 292? 21 MS. ANDERL: 292. I apologize, Your Honor, I 22 thought that I had captured that page to be bundled into

In Owest's brief we do site it and in our

In Qwest's brief, we do cite it, and in our

23 24 what was copied for you and bound, but I apparently did

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brief it is on page 23. And the reference is simply to a footnote in an FCC decision where it states that the carrier leasing the fiber is expected to put its own electronics and signals on the fiber.

Finally just on this issue of adding electronics, this is the section of the initial order wherein we have the language in Paragraph 87 which states that:

The capital outlays that Qwest is expected to incur to meet the requirements established in the order are no different than what is expected to be incurred in Qwest's meeting its obligation to its retail and interexchange customers.

And we disagree with that, because we believe that the obligation imposed by the initial order appears to be more ubiquitous than say what would be required under Qwest's private line transport tariff. Qwest's private line transport tariff in Washington is Number WNU41, and I know that, Chairwoman Showalter and Commissioner Hemstad, we did just have a number of issues presented to you maybe a year and a half ago in the AT&T access provisioning complaint that brought some of these provisions into play. The provisions that were

in place then when we were U S West and that remain in place today when we're Qwest do limit the obligation of the company to furnish private line services to where facilities are available.

5 And I think that if you will recall that the 6 evidence in that case showed that there were virtually 7 no orders that didn't get provisioned. Some were 8 delayed because of a lack of facilities, some may not 9 have been provisioned at all and were perhaps canceled, but the vast, vast, vast majority of private line 10 11 transport services were provisioned. And I think that's 12 important to remember, because I don't want the advocacy 13 in this docket to be interpreted as a, you know, 14 position by Qwest that we're going to walk away from our 15 obligations to serve our customers or our deployment of 16 a ubiquitous network. I think that the company does 17 deploy and augment as necessary. It is just that there 18 are times when the company is asked to provide private 19 line facilities where there is simply nothing there, and 20 under those circumstances, there has to be an 21 opportunity to either ask the customer to pay the cost 22 or to make a judgment about whether or not the business 23 will warrant deployment of additional capacity in an 2.4 environment especially where there is limited capital.

Let me just briefly summarize, and this is in

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our brief, so I don't want to spend a lot of time on it,
    but the other states who have ruled on the obligation to
    build issue, there are nine that we have received
    decisions from. In the multistate docket, the
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    facilitator, Mr. Antonuk, who is deciding the issues as
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    an initial matter for seven states, and then Nebraska
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    has as well adopted that initial outcome, so we have
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     eight states there wherein the initial recommendation is
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     that Qwest does not have an obligation to build beyond
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    that which it has accepted in its own proposed language
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    in the SGAT. And then a Colorado decision is also
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     consistent with that not imposing an obligation to build
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     on Qwest beyond that which I have described to you as
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    what Qwest is willing to agree to. The Colorado
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     decision was a staff recommended decision but now is
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     also a final decision as well.
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               CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: You say but only
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    Colorado is a final decision?
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               MS. ANDERL: Yes.
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                CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: The other ones are
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    pending?
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               MS. ANDERL: Yes. And, of course, we're here
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    in Washington, we don't have decisions from Utah,
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    Oregon, or Arizona yet, and we are not even this far
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along in South Dakota and Minnesota at all with the 271

docket, so that pretty much covers all of our states. 1 JUDGE WALLIS: I think that's just about 3 perfect timing, at least according to my watch, we're at the point where it's time to let the others speak. 5 MS. ANDERL: Your Honor, if I -- I have one 6 -- I have left out a couple of things that I wish I had 7 a chance to comment on, but I would like to add one 8 thing. And that is that the Colorado decision did 9 recommend that Owest add a sentence to its SGAT, and 10 Qwest has agreed to do so and will, of course, do so in 11 Washington as well. That sentence states: 12 Qwest will assess whether to build for 13 CLECs in the same manner that it 14 assesses whether to build for itself. 15 Thank you. 16 JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you. 17 Mr. Kopta. 18 MR. KOPTA: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 I'm a little puzzled, because what I'm 20 hearing Ms. Anderl represent is very similar to what we 21 had asked the Commission to do to begin with, which is to make sure that where Qwest has an obligation to build 22 23 that they build for both retail and competitor, and that 2.4 in those circumstances in which Qwest has the discretion 25 that Qwest build for CLECs the same as they would for

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1 end users.

The problem comes up, at least in practical 3 application, in circumstances in which, and there is testimony on the record, a CLEC approaches Qwest and 5 orders a particular facility. Qwest says, sorry, no 6 facilities available. The CLEC goes back to the 7 customer, and the customer says, okay, I will order it 8 from Qwest directly, and they do, and they get the 9 facility. Or alternatively, a CLEC may order the 10 facility as an unbundled network element. Qwest says, 11 sorry, no facilities, at which point the CLEC can order 12 it out of the tariff, and then Qwest says, okay, here 13 you go. That's the sort of thing that we're trying to 14 prevent, and that's the sort of thing that we believe 15 that the order prevents. 16

Qwest uses the nebulous term, carrier of last resort obligation. As even Qwest concedes, that's not a defined term, and we're not comfortable resting on Qwest's interpretation of that term, particularly given practical experience that Qwest believes that that gives it the right to deny facilities to CLECs where it would provision them to competitors.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Now how does the initial order -- where in the initial order is that prevented? What's the language?

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MR. KOPTA: Well, I think if you look at the 1 paragraphs that we have been focusing on, which are Paragraphs 79 and 80, what that order says is, at least in our view, what I suppose Qwest would call the carrier 5 of last resort obligation, that if Qwest is providing 6 service within a particular service territory, has 7 facilities between particular locations and those 8 locations reach exhaust, that Qwest is obligated to 9 augment those facilities to provide additional service 10 in response to customer request. I don't really see 11 that as particularly controversial. I think that's been 12 Qwest's obligation and U S West's obligation in this 13 state for time immemorial. 14

And then the order goes on to say in Paragraph 80, in those locations where there are no facilities, where Qwest hasn't built facilities, then Qwest may, you know, offer to build them but on the same terms that it offers to build it to other customers.

COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Well, what is your view -- how do you read the Colorado order on this issue and the disagreement here for the proposed other orders in the other states?

MR. KOPTA: Well, I think it's a little bit difficult because we're dealing with different records in different states. I was not involved in Colorado,

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and so I don't know the factual basis on which that commission made that particular determination. COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Would you concede that 4 the Colorado order is to be read as Ms. Anderl would 5 want us to read it here, or is that unclear? 6 MR. KOPTA: I can't concede or dispute that interpretation. All I see is what you all see, which is 7 a snippet out of the order. 8 9 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But in so far as the 10 Colorado decision resulted in an additional sentence 11 that will be in everybody's SGAT, is that sentence 12 satisfactory to you or not? 13 MR. KOPTA: Well, as I sit here and listen to 14 that sentence, and I heard it for the first time today, 15 it doesn't, and let me tell you why. When this issue 16 came up in the workshop, the discussion came about, 17 Qwest said, gee, we've got the same kind of process in 18 place to evaluate whether we're going to build 19 facilities, and when an end user customer comes in, we look at those, and when a CLEC comes in, we look at 20 those, but Qwest was not willing to represent that it 2.1

So, for example, if you're talking about a customer in a particular location and the CLEC says, we want a loop between the Qwest central office that serves

would reach the same decision.

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has already decided?

that location and the location, and Qwest says, sorry, no facilities, and the CLEC says, well, okay, let's see about building them, and then Qwest looks at it and says, gee, we've looked at it, there's no business, 5 okay, so we're not going to build it for you. The end 6 user could then approach Owest. Owest would say, sorry, 7 no facilities. The end user would say, well, how about building them. Then Qwest could go through the same 8 9 process and come up with a different result and say, 10 okay, yeah, we'll build it for you. And that's the 11 problem that we see is that while they may say that the 12 processes are the same, they will not represent that the 13 results are the same. 14 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What about the FCC's 15 order, if Qwest is confident that the FCC has virtually 16 decided this question already or they're confident that 17 even if it hasn't it's going to, they could simply 18 decide not to do this and file anyway with the FCC. And 19 so our insisting on this would be pointless unless we thought that the FCC really hasn't decided this, and 20 21 then if Qwest didn't comply, then they would get kicked back because this is a worthy issue. So what it really 22

MR. KOPTA: Well, as I read what the FCC

boils down to is how different is this than what the FCC

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decided in the Verizon Pennsylvania order, which is two days old, and granted, I'm sort of flying by the seat of my pants here, I think what the FCC said is, we didn't address this issue directly in our rules, and if we didn't, then we're not going to keep -- we're not going to use this one little piece to keep Verizon out of the long distance market in Pennsylvania.

MR. KOPTA: They might, but I think we've got a different situation here, because this is not just a 271 docket. As I look at the header, we've got two dockets here. One of them is the 271. The other is the SGAT. Qwest has filed an SGAT, which is a template agreement that it's willing to provide. There's a whole different section of the Act that deals with the SGAT, and Qwest is asking for this Commission to approve that SGAT, and, in fact, is relying on the legal obligations that it says are in the SGAT to support its 271 obligation, but they're not the same thing.

So this Commission could certainly say, sorry, we don't think you're in compliance with either federal or state law on this particular point, and we're not going to approve your SGAT until you modify it to be in compliance. And that doesn't have to go out to the

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FCC. The buck stops here with this Commission about whether they're going to approve that particular SGAT. So it would not be a useless exercise for this 4 Commission to require that there be a modification in 5 the SGAT, at least with respect to what's happening in 6 this state.

Now the FCC has its own what it's looking at when it's reviewing 271, which is -- I mean they're related, I'm not going to say that they're completely distinct, but they're looking at something different 10 than what this Commission is looking at. And basically what we're talking about here are matters of state law. I mean what does a carrier have to do, what do you have 14 to do to provide service, and we have state statutes that say, customers are entitled to service on reasonable demand and nondiscrimination, no unreasonable preference, you know, all kinds of state statutes that 18 govern, we think, this issue even without looking to the 19 Act. So in Section 252(f), which is the section of the Act that deals with the SGAT, it expressly says that 20 nothing in this section precludes the Commission from 21 22 looking to state requirements, including service quality 23 requirements.

And so if there, you know, regardless of whether there's a federal obligation, and it seems at

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best, at least based on the FCC's own view of its orders in the Verizon Pennsylvania decision, some confusion about whether the FCC is going to require that, there's certainly nothing that precludes this Commission from saying as a matter of state law that that's Qwest's obligation, to treat everybody the same whether they're a CLEC or whether they're an end user.

I think that addresses really most of the points or the major points. I think just to sort of clean up a couple of issues. On the Eighth Circuit's decision, I don't think the Commission should be left with the impression that the Eighth Circuit addressed the obligation to build issue. In our view, it didn't. The initial Eighth Circuit order, talking about the language that Qwest continues to quote, was specific to providing superior service quality. It didn't have anything to do with an obligation to build.

The language from the second order has to do with how do you calculate the costs, whether you're going to use the total element long run incremental cost or TELRIC standard that the FCC established, or whether you're going to look to I won't say an embedded standard but something like that, you know, what does it actually cost for what Qwest has in the ground today as opposed to what it would have if it were an efficient provider

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1 on a forward looking basis.

So that's what the Eighth Circuit was looking at in that language that's quoted in Qwest's brief. They weren't looking at whether there's an obligation to build. So I think we agree that there's not going to be that issue presented to the Supreme Court, but we disagree that the Eighth Circuit decided that issue. It's an undecided issue from our perspective on the federal judicial level and apparently a matter of some confusion before the FCC.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Is that your euphemism for when you disagree with what the FCC says?

MR. KOPTA: Well, I have the utmost respect for the FCC, and certainly reasonable minds can differ, and we would hope, given the importance of the issue, that they will deal with it head on. They, as they so often tend to do, are sidestepping it, because it is a difficult issue.

Just to also address the adding the electronics to the transport, I think we need to clarify something here. We're not talking about just dark fiber. Dark fiber is in a different workshop. It's sort of in the emerging services workshop. This was the UNE workshop, and what we were talking about here was transport. So the issue is, if Qwest has the capacity

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in the existing fiber between its central offices but it just doesn't have the capacity on the electronics, does Qwest need to increase the capacity of the electronics to be able to provide the transport? That's the issue. 5 And that's why the order says, well, if they 6 run out of capacity between their central office, 7 they're not going to be able to carry traffic between 8 their central offices either. It's going to max out, 9 and you're going to have call blocking. So what Qwest 10 is going to do in those circumstances is it's going to 11 increase the capacity. And if it's already got the 12 fiber, it doesn't need to add more fiber, it needs to 13 add more electronics. And so it's going to need to do 14 that for itself as well as for the CLECs. 15 So the order, all the order is saying is, 16 hey, you know, if you're going to have to add 17 electronics to increase the capacity, then that's what 18 you need to do, that is what exactly you would do if you 19 didn't have any CLECs and you found that you needed additional capacity. So all we're saying is, Owest, do 20 21 the same thing for competitors that you would do for 22

yourself. So again, I think that that's a fairly

straightforward and what should be an uncontroversial, at least from our view, ruling on the part of the

same position.

administrative law judge, that that only makes sense. I 1 mean if you're going to have to add capacity, you add capacity, and that's how you do it. The problem with requiring the CLEC to do it 5 is that the CLEC can't just add electronics. The CLEC's 6 got to go dig up the streets and put in fiber between 7 those central offices. So to address some of the 8 arguments in Qwest's brief that Ms. Anderl didn't bring 9 up today, the CLECs are not in the same position as 10 Qwest when it comes to building the facilities. Under 11 certain circumstance, they may be. If nobody has any 12 facilities from a Qwest central office out to some 13 location, somebody builds a plant out in the middle of 14 nowhere and there aren't any telecommunications 15 facilities out there and somebody's got to build it, 16 yeah, sure, okay, we're in the same position as Qwest 17 is. But if you're talking about a housing development 18 that somebody buys a lot and builds a new house and 19 Qwest has already got all the wires out to that subdivision, they just don't have a wire to that 20 21 particular house, or they run out of the wire from a 22 particular point in the network to that house, then they 23 can certainly add the facilities much more easily and 2.4 much more cheaply than can a CLEC, so we're not in the

1 And I think, again, that's what the order 2 recognizes, is that it's not only consistent with 3 nondiscrimination principles, but it's consistent with economic principles. I mean it doesn't -- a CLEC is not 5 going to order facilities from Qwest if it can build 6 them itself cheaper or close to the same cost. The 7 reason that a CLEC orders facilities from Qwest is 8 because it makes economic sense. And if it weren't for 9 the fact that Owest were a competitor, Owest I would 10 think would prefer to have the CLEC order facilities 11 from Qwest as opposed to building its own, because Qwest 12 is getting the money, is getting some money in this 13 transaction, whereas if the CLEC just provisioned the 14 facilities itself, Qwest would get nothing. 15 So again, it's not just nondiscrimination, 16 it's basic economics, that this Commission needs to step 17 in when the market is distorted, which it is when our 18 major competitor is also our major supplier, to make 19 sure that rational decisions are being made on the part 20 of Qwest in provisioning facilities. 21 And I think that's all I'm going to say, and 22 I will allow my cohorts to add whatever they would like 23 to say. 2.4 JUDGE WALLIS: Ms. Singer Nelson. 25 MS. SINGER NELSON: Thank you.

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I would echo everything that Mr. Kopta has already said. I agree with his argument. Then I wanted to go back and remind the Commission a little bit about what the standards are that apply to the issues that are before it today on access to unbundled network elements. The judge, the initial order in this case recognized those standards, applied them, and WorldCom believes that her decision is supported by the Act, the rules, and the record in this case.

The standards are set forth in Section 251(c)(3) and the FCC rules, primarily Rules 307 through 313. That is, 251(c)(3) requires access to unbundled network elements to be provided by the ILECs on just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. The FCC rules further define nondiscriminatory and just and reasonable. Nondiscriminatory is access to and quality equal as that UNE is provided between the CLECs, so all CLECs should be treated equally. The second standard is the access to the UNE and the quality of the UNE should be equal to what Qwest provides to itself or to its retail customers. And then finally, if there is not an equivalent retail service, the access to and the quality should allow an efficient competitor with a meaningful opportunity to compete.

One more overriding principle the Commission

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should remember when looking at these issues too is the intent of the Act is to promote the development of competition in the local exchange market here in 4 Washington. So if there is any ambiguity in the rules, 5 the FCC's orders on an issue, the Commission should look 6 back at that intent and apply that intent to its 7 interpretation of the words in the rules and in the FCC 8 orders.

Now I'm a little confused too based on Ms. Anderl's opening comments. She did say generally that Qwest is willing to provide UNEs on terms and conditions equal to what it provides to itself. The problem is when you get into talking specifics of SGAT language, as everybody has done in these workshops, you get into the application, specific application of those principles. And the language that the judge looked at in the workshop was more specific than just a general principle of whether Qwest is providing access equal to what it's providing to its retail customers. So we need to pay attention to what the judge did in this case specifically, because she had the contract language before her that was being addressed by the parties. There was, like for instance, on Section

9.1.2.1, the question on whether or not facilities

25 should be built is addressed in that section where just

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the opening clause saying, if facilities are not available, Qwest will build, et cetera, et cetera. When the parties started discussing that provision of the SGAT, then they raised a question as to how Qwest treats 5 its retail customers under those same circumstances. 6 That evidence wasn't clearly in the record, so that's 7 why the issue got broadened as to it and issues whether 8 or not Qwest should have an obligation to build 9 generally. It's not clear from the SGAT language that 10 Qwest is treating, as Mr. Kopta said, that Qwest is 11 treating CLECs equal to the way it treats itself or its 12 retail customers.

So that's why I would caution the Commission to give deference to the initial order in this case, because the judge was there with the parties examining the specific language at issue in the SGAT, and her order applies specifically to the language that was being discussed.

On the obligation to build, Rule 313(b) says that Qwest must build UNEs for CLECs on the same terms and conditions that it would build for itself or its retail customers. The judge's decision in this case on this issue in Paragraphs 79 and, yeah, 79 and 80 is consistent with that rule.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What rule is that,

05745 1 whose rule? MS. SINGER NELSON: It's the FCC Rule 313(b). 3 And then 309(c) of the FCC rules also 4 requires ILECs to replace UNEs provided to CLECs, and 5 this is consistent again with finding that ILECs have 6 the obligation to construct UNEs. 7 Qwest argues that Paragraph 324 of the UNE 8 Remand Order dictates that ILECs are not required to 9 build or construct facilities, but the Remand Order 10 provides a narrow exception to the rule. And in that 11 Remand Order, you can see if you examine it that new 12 transport facilities to meet specific competitive LEC 13 point-to-point demand requirements is the narrow 14 exception to the more general obligation that ILECs do 15 need to provide the facilities. And the ALJ recognized 16 the narrow exception where the judge stated that: 17 The existing network includes all points 18 that the ILEC currently serves via 19 interoffice facilities. 20 And she found that Qwest is not required to 21 extend to new points outside its service territory. So she properly read Paragraph 324 and applied it to this 22 23 case. But then she said: 2.4 Qwest is still required to provide

access to UNEs within its existing

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1 network even if it must construct 2 additional capacity to make those UNEs 3 available.

This interpretation is consistent with the requirement that Owest treat the CLEC's request like it would treat itself or its own customer's request, and it allows CLECs a meaningful opportunity to compete. Qwest provides services in its retail tariffs that require Qwest to build facilities. A CLEC can purchase those facilities actually under the retail tariff and Qwest would be obligated to build. The Act requires that wholesale customers be treated exactly the same as those retail customers are treated.

Finally, one other point is that CLECs are already paying for the build of new facilities in the price that they pay for UNEs. In Washington, as in most of the other Qwest states, in calculating UNE rates, a fill factor is used to ensure that a sufficient capacity is always available on the network. Once a certain percentage is achieved, once a certain percentage of fill is achieved, a new facility is built. For example, if a fill factor of 50% is used in calculating the UNE rates here in Washington, the CLEC pays for a whole facility where only 50% is used and 50% is unused.

25 There's that extra capacity built into the prices of the

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1 unbundled network elements. The reason for the fill factor is to ensure 3 that adequate capacity always exists on the network. Including fill in prices means that CLECs are charged 5 for building capacity, but with Owest's policy of not 6 adding capacity for CLECs when requested, only Qwest 7 benefits. It's getting paid in the wholesale prices, 8 and it can use that extra capacity at its discretion, 9 but with Qwest's policy, it's denying CLECs that same 10 opportunity. This is clearly inconsistent with the 11 Act's nondiscrimination provision. 12 And then in response to some of Ms. Anderl's 13 other comments, I think it's a bit of a 14 mischaracterization to say that eight other commissions 15 have already decided this issue in Qwest's favor, 16 because Judge Antonuk's decision is one decision in a 17 multistate proceeding. That decision is going to go 18 back to each of those commissions for review. It's just 19 a recommended decision of him. 20 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I think Ms. Anderl was 21 clear on that. 22 MS. SINGER NELSON: Okay. 23 One of the other arguments that Qwest makes 2.4 is that requiring Qwest to build is contrary to public

policy, because, and it's stated in their brief, that it

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would discourage facilities based competition. I would disagree with that statement. I think that it's -- the judge's decision in this case is consistent with public policy. The overarching public policy here is the encouragement of the development of competition, and that is not limited to competition in a facilities based market. There are three different avenues for the development of competition in the local exchange market, resale, unbundled network elements, and facilities based competition.

The Commission in this decision can encourage the development of unbundled network element based competition, and through that, it allows CLECs to get into the market at a cheaper -- in a cheaper way, in a way that's not as expensive as investing in a duplicative network of Qwest's network, allows CLECs to get in under that form of entry, allows them to get a base of customers, get a revenue stream that will enable it to go further and invest in the future and the facilities for telecom here in Washington.

So I don't think that encouraging UNE based competition is inconsistent with public interest. I think that it's consistent with the public interest, and it's consistent with Congress's intent in the 1996 Telecom Act.

05749 Now briefly on the --1 2 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: On that point, your 3 argument is it's in the public interest, but would you 4 agree that it does not encourage new facilities, at 5 least at that point in time? 6 MS. SINGER NELSON: I would -- I would say 7 that it encourages UNE-P or it encourages entry on the 8 basis of unbundled network elements. I wouldn't 9 necessarily agree that it discourages facilities based. 10 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: That wasn't my 11 question. 12 MS. SINGER NELSON: Oh. 13 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: It was that it does 14 not encourage. 15 MS. SINGER NELSON: Does not encourage, I 16 would agree with that. 17 On the issue of dark fiber, I agree with 18 Mr. Kopta's statements on that issue. The issue as 19 framed by the judge's decision here is whether or not 20 when there is an issue of capacity Qwest is required to 21 light existing dark fiber. That's not an issue of CLECs purchasing dark fiber and then asking Qwest to light it. 22 And the footnote that Ms. Anderl referenced in her 23 2.4 comments really went more to the latter issue. It went

to when a CLEC purchases dark fiber, does Qwest have an

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05750 obligation to attach electronics to it, footnote said 1 3 Here the issue is whether in the unbundled 4 transport section of the SGAT, when transport is -- when 5 facilities aren't available for transport but there's 6 dark fiber available there, whether Owest is obligated 7 to light the dark fiber in order to expand the capacity. 8 And I would say that the FCC order and the analysis of 9 the ALJ's decision -- well, the ALJ's analysis on that 10 issue is right on point. It's consistent with the FCC 11 order. It does require Qwest to light the capacity, 12 light the dark fiber in order to add the capacity to 13 serve the customers, just as Qwest would do if its own 14 customers needed additional capacity. 15 I think that's all I needed to address on 16 those two issues, thank you. 17 JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Harlow. 18 MR. HARLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 JUDGE WALLIS: Let's let Mr. Harlow make a 20 statement. 21 MR. HARLOW: Is the microphone on? 22 JUDGE WALLIS: I believe it is. MR. HARLOW: Thank you, Your Honor, and 23 2.4 Commissioner Oshie, it's a pleasure to appear before you

for my first time. I'm representing Covad

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Communications today, which is a CLEC that specializes in DSL service. And Covad concurs with AT&T and WorldCom, and particularly their analysis of federal 4 law, and I think that's all I need to say about it. 5 They have addressed it quite well in their briefs and 6 their oral arguments. 7 Both Mr. Kopta and Ms. Anderl alluded to state law, and I would like to take that a little bit 8 9 further just for a few minutes, the reason being state 10 law does play in here, and this is certainly not a 11 departure from prior Commission precedents. In fact, I 12 think it's a logical extension of prior Commission 13 orders, and I have two in mind, although I think there 14 are certainly others. Commissioner Hemstad may -- was 15 around for at least one of these cases, if not both. 16 The first one was the Commission's own 17 interconnection Docket UT-941464. In the Ninth 18 Supplemental Order, the Commission ordered that Qwest 19 then U S West build sufficient facilities for interconnection, and that was put into practice and 20 21 reaffirmed in the MCI Metro what we call the provisioning complaint case, Docket UT-971063, February 22 23 1999 Final Order. 2.4

And I think the existence of that second docket, the complaint case, kind of illustrates the

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difficulties you have in practice, which is that for reasons that are probably rational from Qwest's perspective, Qwest is not as motivated to build facilities that are used primarily or exclusively by its competitors as it is motivated to build retail facilities, and that can lead to problems.

You know, take a look at another scenario where we clearly went down the path of only, you know, on a space available basis of collocation in central offices. Think of all the disputes we have had where Qwest reported back there's, you know, we don't have the facility basically, we don't have any more space in the central office, which led to contested dockets and in many cases led to finding more space. And I think as a practical matter, if the ALJ's initial decision is overturned here, we're going to have the same practical problems.

But in any event, the Commission has a history of ordering Qwest to build facilities as necessary to facilitate competition. And while this is a little bit different issue, it's a logical extension of those orders. Clearly under state law, and I don't -- again, we agree that federal law supports the ALJ decision, but to the extent that there's any question at all about it, clearly under state law this Commission

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has the jurisdiction to order Qwest to build facilities for both retail and wholesale customers. And I have in mind, although there are certainly others again, RCW 4 80.36.260, which I think is entitled betterments but 5 also talks about extensions.

Owest suggests that we deal with the state law issues in a rule making docket, and the problem with that docket, particularly if it continues at the current pace, is it's unlikely to be resolved before Qwest files its 271 application with the FCC, at least on Qwest's timetable.

Finally --

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Can I stop you there.

MR. HARLOW: Certainly. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Just trying to sort of in my own mind get 271 authority distinct from SGAT authority and how state authority fits into that. I think I understand what the 271 process is and that it's really up to the FCC, and we're an advisor. But then here is this thing called an SGAT, and I understand that federal law says nothing prohibits us from exercising our state authority, but how is the SGAT joined? How, if there were something we wanted to inject or require Qwest to do under its SGAT because we said independent

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25 from anything under federal law, we think this is

important, tell me why it is appropriate for us to 1 inject that solely state requirement into the SGAT. 3 MR. HARLOW: Well, I think that the federal 4 requirements really set the minimum standard. At a 5 minimum, Qwest must comply with the requirements of 6 Sections 251 and 252 and the other requirements, 7 prerequisites of Section 271. But to the extent you 8 have a closed question, if you will, the overriding goal 9 is public policy, ensuring that it's in the public 10 interest to grant 271. And, of course, underlying that 11 is ensuring that the local markets are irreversibly open 12 to competition. And as we have illustrated, I think, 13 you know, you run the risk that the proper incentives 14 are not there if you don't -- if you overturn the ALJ 15 decision in this regard. 16 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Maybe -- my question 17 really -- maybe my question is what is an SGAT in a 18 legal sense? Is it something that is pursuant to 19 federal law under federal law, and we're really only 20 looking at federal law when we're deciding what's in an 21 SGAT? And then parallel in our state at our state level 22 we can have rules that based on our own authority 23 whatever we want that is -- doesn't -- isn't preempted, 2.4 or what -- is an SGAT a federally authorized document, 25 or is it a hybrid?

MR. HARLOW: I don't profess to be an SGAT 1 2 expert, but I think in this docket, and it's certainly been useful, the SGAT has been used as a vehicle to help 4 us get to where Qwest can be found to have opened its 5 markets. And I -- and I think in part that's been 6 because of the limited entry that's occurred to date. 7 Some of this is being done prospectively through the 8 SGAT on the assumption that, well, we haven't tested 9 this out but that, you know, if Qwest is contractually 10 bound to certain SGAT provisions, then the market can be 11 deemed open. I guess I'm really speaking for myself 12 there rather than --13 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Ms. Anderl, could I 14 get your response on the relationship of 271 to SGAT to 15 independent state authority that we might have? 16 MS. ANDERL: Sure. In a wonderful show of 17 cooperation between the ILEC and the CLEC, Mr. Kopta has 18 allowed me to review his copy of the Telecom Act. In my 19 hurry to leave the office, I left mine behind. 20 The SGAT is a document authorized and 21 explicitly contemplated under Section 252(f) of the Act, 22 and it is something that the state commissions are 23 authorized to review. It is something that the state 2.4 commissions are authorized to add state specific terms

to, I believe, under the explicit provisions of the Act.

It is not clear on what grounds a state commission could reject an SGAT, although it does say in the Act explicitly that the state commission can't affirmatively approve the SGAT until they find that it's in compliance 5 with the I believe 251 requirements of the Act. 6 Alternatively, as was done here, the state commission 7 can allow the SGAT to go into effect without 8 affirmatively approving it and then continuing its 9 review of the SGAT after it becomes effective. 10 I believe that the SGAT relative to the 271 11 obligation and your recommendation to the FCC only has 12 to contain that which is mandated by Section 271. And 13 so when you're asked by the FCC, does this SGAT and do 14 Qwest's legal obligations and, you know, Qwest's 15 performance and everything else comply with the terms of 16 the Telecom Act, you can't be looking at state law when 17 you answer that question. You need to look at the 18 relevant interpretations of the Act, either by the FCC 19 through its rules and orders or the courts. And the answer has to be based on what is required of the 20 21 incumbent under the Telecom Act, not under relevant 22 provisions of state law. 23 Now that said, can you impose additional 2.4 state law obligations on an ILEC? Yes. But I don't

know that I agree that it's appropriate to do it in

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conjunction with -- in the SGAT docket when that SGAT docket has been consolidated with the 271 docket where you're really trying to look at the two issues relative to one another.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But we do have two dockets, so could we say, if it came down to this, yes, we think the SGAT that the company proposed meets the minimum test, but we are insisting in the SGAT, not as a condition of 271 approval, but because we're insisting on it as a condition of our state authority to insist on it that you stick another provision in the SGAT; is that you just think it's inappropriate to do in this proceeding because we're really 271 focused?

MS. ANDERL: Yes, I do, and I think that really the record evidence and the analysis that the parties have engaged in in terms of developing a factual record and even briefing has really been more focused on the requirements of the Act as opposed to specific requirements under state law. And I think that there -- if parties were seeking to impose obligations that just arose under state law, you know, some may be obligations that could arise under either federal or state law, and then that's fine, because we have been thinking about federal law all along. But if someone wants to say, no, the Act doesn't require this, but we think there's a

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specific provision of Washington law that does require it, then I think you ought to undertake a little bit of a different analysis in terms of whether that's consistent with the policy goals of Washington, whether 5 that's really what the statute means given the context 6 in which the statutes were enacted, which was 1911, and 7 there was a monopoly environment and all of those other 8 kinds of things that I don't think have really been 9 brought forth in terms of engaging in a complete 10 analysis.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So you think if we determine that a provision like this is allowed by state law but not required by federal law that we should reserve that for some subsequent SGAT proceeding or rule making or some other something where we're looking at state law?

MS. ANDERL: Yes.

MR. HARLOW: And I have opened Pandora's box here, but I think Ms. Anderl did a good job kind of on SGAT 101. I wouldn't disagree with that. I do disagree with her conclusion, however, and this gets a little bit ahead of ourselves, but I think this is the best place to take it up anyway. And the reason is that at a minimum, and there may be other reasons as well, but at a minimum, if the state law has provisions or Commission

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precedent relating to opening up markets in this state to competition, if the Commission -- and the Commission finds -- either finds that Qwest hasn't complied with those and its SGAT falls short of those requirements or even further finds that Qwest, in fact, is violating those state law requirements, then I find it difficult to see how the Commission could conclude that it would be in the public interest to grant or to recommend granting 271 approval.

The states can go further. The federal requirements set a minimum standard, and if this state feels that those aren't sufficient with regard to Qwest and this state, then I think the 271 should not be recommended to the FCC. And I think this is the place to deal with it since we're dealing with specific SGAT provisions that we're taking up here.

Oh, what I wanted to say is to come back to my initial point, which is we think there's ample federal authority requiring the outcome that the ALJ reached.

And then finally as far as policy, again, Qwest is the carrier that because they're of the ubiquitous position in their territory, which is all we're talking about, Qwest is the carrier that's the most likely to be motivated to either build facilities

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or to augment or reinforce facilities, particularly in a case where you're just talking about adding electronics to existing fiber routes.

And so the most likely scenario when you have like the marginal customer or customers close to the margin, if a hypothetical customer comes and asks, let's say they go to the CLEC first and ask for service, the CLEC says, we can't provide it because it's not economical for us to build where you are. We have gone to Qwest, Qwest has said they're not going to build for us, so sorry. Now the customer goes to Qwest next, and you've got two outcomes there. Qwest either says, no, we're not going to build or augment to provide the service, or, great, we're going to, you know, we can do that, and they do build.

But because of the cart and the horse problem that you get if you overturn the ALJ decision, you've got a situation there where Qwest now has facilities, but they're the only one that can serve the customer, because the CLEC already had to say no. And the other scenario is the customer doesn't get served at all. And from a public policy standpoint, I don't think this Commission wants to incent either of those scenarios, either the scenario where the customer gets no service or where the customer can only get service from Qwest.

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1 Thank you, Commissioners.

JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Kopta, you looked like you were anxious to add a brief point at one juncture. Did you wish to do that?

MR. KOPTA: Yes, thank you, actually a couple of brief points, both in response to the Chairwoman's questions.

The first, sort of dovetailing again on, you know, what is the nature of the SGAT, certainly Qwest's view is rather myopic when it comes to 271. They filed the SGAT as a means of getting 271 authority, and so they don't want to be distracted by anything other than what's going to allow them to get authority to provide interLATA services in Washington.

But the SGAT itself is not so limited. It's an entirely different section, it's Section 252. And by filing the SGAT, Qwest essentially left open issues that are legitimately included in the SGAT, which also include matters of state law. This is not something that is so peculiar to Washington that it doesn't have anything to do with the Federal Act or even this proceeding.

These proceedings have been consolidated since the beginning. The SGAT is in form and intent essentially an interconnection agreement that any CLEC

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could come in and sign on the dotted line and take it from there. And so it needs to be a complete package when it's approved by this Commission, not piece parts saying, okay, well, here are all the piece parts that are required for 271 authority, and all the other piece parts, well, we will get around to those at some other point. I think the Commission shouldn't consider approving the SGAT until it feels that this is a document that reasonably captures Qwest's obligations under both federal and state law.

And so I do believe that this is the appropriate proceeding to deal with this kind of an issue, which, I think as we have talked about before, touches on both aspects of federal and state law. It's not something that's unique to the state of Washington.

The other issue that the Chairwoman raised was whether or not this policy would encourage facilities based competition as opposed to discouraging it, and I have a slightly different view than Ms. Singer Nelson, because my other clients being XO and ELI are facilities based carriers, and AT&T is too with having acquired the assets of TCG. And those carriers are necessarily limited by mugging, for a better term, to install only certain facilities. I mean they have fiber rings, they have some facilities to customer locations,

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but I think you actually encourage facilities based
competition by making Qwest facilities more available,
because they can be used in conjunction with a CLEC's
facilities and justify the investment.

If you've got to build a fiber ring and also every single spur off that fiber ring to a customer location, then that's a much more daunting task than to say, if I can build this fiber ring, if I can get into Qwest's central offices and get access to unbundled network elements, then I'm going to be able to serve a large number of people and potentially maximize my investment much sooner than I could if I have to duplicate all of Owest's network.

duplicate all of Qwest's network.

So from my point of view and my clients'
point of view, it does actually encourage the
development of facilities based competition. And to our
view, facilities based doesn't mean entirely your own
facilities. Again, going back to the economics of it,
it may not make sense to have three or four different
companies building loops to the same location.
Sometimes it would. I mean if you're talking about
building in downtown Seattle, it probably does. If
you're talking about a single residence out in the
neighborhood, maybe it doesn't. But the whole point of

the Act is to make the different tools available so that

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you can maximize the opportunities for companies that want to provide competing service to the most number of people in a particular area. Thanks. 5 JUDGE WALLIS: Ms. Anderl, did you wish to 6 make a very, very brief rejoinder? 7 MS. ANDERL: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. If 8 I need to steal time from the third issue, I will. 9 I just wanted to say a couple of things. 10 Mr. Kopta mentioned in his argument that, you know, 11 we're in a situation here where if Qwest is out of 12 transport capacity between two central offices and Qwest 13 would add capacity to meet its own needs, then it should 14 do so for the CLECs as well. That's not exactly what 15 we're talking about here, although it certainly may be a 16 subset, but that's not all of what we're talking here. 17 If Qwest is out of capacity on its own 18 network between two central offices and needs to add 19 transport facilities for its own network, it will do so. That will create spare capacity and will provide 20 facilities which CLECs will have available to themselves 2.1 22 as well. The point there though is that that is an 23 integrative planning process in terms of Qwest 2.4 evaluating all the needs and uses of the network, and it

lets Qwest make the right decisions in terms of serving

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its customers and utilizing both cash and facilities efficiently. And so we are kind of worried about CLECs being able to do that on a piece meal sort of a basis as opposed to being separate from the integrated planning process that Qwest uses to determine whether it adds its own transport facilities.

But even more seriously, what we're worried about is a situation where, for example, we have a DS3 transport facility between Renton and Maple Valley or something like that. And a DS3 is the equivalent of 672 voice grade lines. And a CLEC comes to us and says, you know, we think we're going to get a big customer out there in Maple Valley, and in order for us to bid that customer, and of course maybe the CLEC won't tell us all this detail but, you know, just to lay out the scenario, we need to have an assurance that we can provide that customer service, and so we want to be able to tell that customer that we can provide them with an OC-48 or optical carrier 48, which if I have done my math correctly is something like 32,000 plus or minus voice grade lines.

That could entail, if we were to meet that request for service, adding very expensive electronics on both ends of that transport route in Renton's central office and in the Maple Valley central office. Under

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the CLEC's advocacy today, we could be required to do
that, incur all of the costs, and then if the CLEC
doesn't obtain the customer or the customer ultimately
decides not to build a plant or a facility in that area,
Qwest would have no recourse. The CLEC could sign up
for that service for one month or not at all, and Qwest
would essentially have financed the job and be left with
absolutely no cost recovery.

And it's those types of scenarios that cause, well, as well, of course, as the explicit language in the FCC orders that says we don't have to build transport, so it's not just the factual scenario, but it's legal coupled with those types of facts that cause us to say that the legal decision was a good one to not require us to build transport, because these are the types of things you could potentially see. And so I just kind of wanted to illustrate that.

In response to a couple of things that Ms. Singer Nelson stated, I believe that she indicated that FCC Rule 313(b) states that Qwest must build facilities or build UNEs for CLECs. I don't believe that it does. It may well say that Qwest must provision, but the rule does not use the word build, or I think we would be having a completely different discussion here. Furthermore, Rule 309(c) cited by

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Ms. Singer Nelson indicating that Qwest must replace UNEs I think is clear on its face that Qwest must replace UNEs, not build new ones. And the analogy that sprung to my mind was if 5 you were to go to your insurance company and say, you 6 know, I have wrecked my car, now could you please 7 replace it based on the premium I have been paying you, 8 and the insurance company would say yes. Or 9 alternatively if you were to go to your insurance 10 company and say, I have been paying the premium, could 11 you just buy me a new car. And so I think there is 12 difference, the obligation to replace is very different

from the obligation to build anew.

Finally, a couple of things. Ms. Singer Nelson indicated that the Act requires that wholesale customers be treated exactly the same as retail. I think there are a number of reasons why that's incorrect, but perhaps the clearest illustration of that is simply the Verizon Pennsylvania decision where when Verizon refused to provide high capacity loops to wholesale customers but indicated it would provide those same services or facilities under tariff, the FCC said that was fine.

And last, the fill factor issue, I don't know that this is -- very brief oral argument is the right

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place or time to get into the whole discussion of fill factor, but the cost studies that are at issue in the cost docket compensate the ILEC or are designed to cost and price rate elements for the ILEC to recover the cost 5 of the network that is being envisioned in the cost 6 study. And so if there's a 100 pair cable that is 7 hypothesized in the cost study and the costs are 8 established and prices set so as to recover that cost, 9 that's fine, it does that. What a fill factor doesn't 10 do is anticipate digging a trench or adding a brand new 11 100 pair cable that was never imagined or contemplated 12 or hypothesized in the cost study. And so I don't think 13 that that fill factor discussion is accurate, and we can 14 get more into that in the cost docket, and I know that 15 the issue was discussed in greater detail in the loop 16 workshop addressing the checklist item number 4. 17 Thank you. 18 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Mr. Kopta, I just have 19 to ask you what your response is to the Maple Valley situation where the client -- where the company backs 20 21 out, is all the risk put on the ILEC in that situation? 22 MR. KOPTA: I'm glad you asked me for my response. Number one, I think that's an unusual 23

scenario. That's generally not going to happen. And

number two, I think we've got the cart before the horse

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in terms of what's going to happen in that scenario. The CLEC is not going to say, gee, I'm going to put a whole bunch of facilities out in some location in anticipation of signing up this customer, then when I 5 have those facilities in place, go to the customer and say, hey, how would you like to be served by me. I 6 7 think it's the other way around, and that's why there 8 have been a lot of problems from the CLECs' prospective. 9 They go out and they have a customer that says, gee, 10 sure, I would love to take your service. So they say, 11 great, okay, well, we need to get the facilities from 12 Qwest because Qwest already has facilities out to where 13 you are, because you've got phone service now in most 14 cases, so we're just talking about generally either 15 augmenting your service or replacing some or all of the 16 Qwest service. And they come to Qwest and they say, we 17 need to order these facilities to be able to provide 18 these services to that customer. Well, and that's when 19 they get the response, sorry, there aren't facilities there either because the customer wants more service 20 21 than it has now and Qwest doesn't have the facilities to 22 do it or for whatever reason the facilities that are in 23 place are not compatible with the type of service that 2.4 the CLEC wants to provide that customer.

So the more typical situation is going to be

that in which the CLEC already has the customer commitment, usually by a contract if it's going to be a customer of that size, and goes to Qwest to get the facilities after it's made the deal with the customer, not before in anticipation of being able to get the customer, because there's certainly no guarantee that a customer is going to sign up with the CLEC. I mean this is -- that's the reality of the marketplace, there's no guarantee whatsoever.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: I guess the question I'm asking is that the telecom company contracts with some big, you know, Intel come into town. There might be contractual relations, but if somebody backs out, usually the contract covers for that. But is this -- has Ms. Anderl described a situation where someone might back out and the ILEC is left holding the bag because they don't have a contractual relation either with the Intel or really with the CLEC in the sense that they just have to build, or is there recompense there?

MR. KOPTA: And again, we're talking about the two different scenarios. One is where Qwest already has the facilities and we're just augmenting them within its service area. And the other is where it's putting in new facilities, the Intel example. And again, the

order distinguishes between those two circumstances so

that if you've got a situation where there is a buildout to a new area, then Qwest can do the same thing that it would do to Intel, which is to say, hey, this is going to cost us a lot of money, CLEC, you're going to have to pay some of this up front so that we, you know, recover our investment, just as they would to Intel if Intel said, gee, you know, we want all of these services, but we want them up and running day one when we open the plant.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But what if Intel wants to go to Maple Valley then instead, it decided to go to -- what if it was Intel, I don't know who it was, I don't know why I said Intel, but it's Intel that wants the OC-48 and then decides, we can't make it. A lot of these deals are put together by a number of different pieces of infrastructure and governments and things like that, and it seems like in general you want the company that's taking on a risk to have some leverage over the situation, otherwise -- you don't want someone with no risk to be able to come into your -- another company and impose risk. And I'm just asking, in that situation, is it, is it that situation?

MR. KOPTA: No, it's not, I mean because in that situation, Qwest is already going to cover itself. If Qwest were going to serve Intel, Qwest would cover

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itself, I'm assuming. They're going to take a look at this, the amount of money that they're going to spend, and I think a reasonable company is going to say, we're 4 not going to on blind faith just put a whole bunch of 5 facilities out there and hope you guys follow through. 6 And what we're saying is, okay, do the same 7 thing with us. If we've got the deal to provide service 8 to Intel, then treat us as if, you know, we were Intel. 9 You know, impose those same kind of -- if they can do it 10 under their tariff or under whatever rules or 11 obligations that they have with respect to providing 12 service and say, you know, you've got to pay a certain 13 amount up front or you've got to pay a line extension 14 charge or whatever it is, okay, charge us that, the same 15 thing that you would charge them. So we're just saying, 16 put us in the same shoes. We're not trying to shift the 17 risk any more than what Qwest has already assumed. 18 JUDGE WALLIS: All right. 19 MS. ANDERL: Your Honor, may I briefly 20 respond. 21 I don't think that -- I don't think that 22 that's right. I don't think that the initial order 23 makes the distinction that Mr. Kopta thinks that it 2.4 does. Because in the Renton Maple Valley scenario, we

do have transport facilities between those two offices,

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and maybe we do have two fibers, and maybe all you have
     to do to increase the capacity to an OC-48 is to add
     electronics on either end of the fiber, and that is
    exactly the issue that we're talking about here where we
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    believe the initial order would require us at the CLEC's
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    behest to add those electronics, which are not a small
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    expense, and it would be different if we were serving
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    Intel, the end user. Because you're correct, we would
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    have a contractual recourse to them. And with the CLEC,
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    we believe that we would not, and yet we do believe that
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    Paragraphs 79 and 80 would require us to respond to the
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    request and provision the electronics. And there's
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    perhaps different interpretations.
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               JUDGE WALLIS: Are there any further
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    questions?
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               All right, let's be off the record for a
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    moment.
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                (Recess taken.)
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               JUDGE WALLIS: All right, let's be back on
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     the record please after a brief recess. Let's move into
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     the second issue, which for our purposes today is EELs.
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               Ms. Anderl.
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               MS. ANDERL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               Before I start, I would like to distribute a
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very short presentation, a power point type presentation

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that Qwest has used in other contexts that just kind of illustrates EELs and the relationship to special access. I have already distributed these to counsel.

JUDGE WALLIS: It's not intended to be an

JUDGE WALLIS: It's not intended to be an exhibit, but merely an illustrative guide to your discussion?

MS. ANDERL: Correct.

Just to kind of set things up a little bit here, EEL or E-E-L stands for enhanced extended loop, and it is an unbundled network element or a UNE as a result of the FCC's UNE Remand Order. They are a combination of a loop and transport, and you can see in the two slides that I presented to you, the first slide depicts a typical special access circuit, or we could also call it a private line circuit, and then the second slide depicts a typical EEL. And you can see that they are the same physical facilities and configurations, and that becomes important as we get into the discussion that we're about to have with the issues that we have with the initial order in connection with EELs.

The FCC has spent a considerable amount of time discussing EELs, and I provided to you entire copies of the two orders that they issued on this topic, the Supplemental Order which was released November 24th, 1999, and that's a very short order, and then the

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Supplemental Order of Clarification released June 2nd, 2000, which is also in FCC terms fairly brief, about 25 pages. There are two issues kind of under the general EELs topic. One is the shorthand that we're using is 5 the local use restriction, and that issue is identified 6 as EEL-1 and EEL-4. It's discussed in the initial order 7 at Paragraphs 91 through 103, and it's discussed in Qwest's August 23rd brief beginning at page 26. And 8 9 that's the one I'm going to talk about now. And then if 10 I have time, I would like to talk briefly about the ISP 11 traffic issue, which is the other issue under EELs, and 12 that is EEL-16. 13

The FCC's ruling with regard to EELs as an unbundled network element is that they can only be used if they are used to provide to the end user customer a significant amount of local exchange service, and the FCC states that very clearly in the Supplemental Order of Clarification at Paragraph 5. The FCC has also clarified that the ruling restricting the use of EELs is interim while the FCC considers the fourth further notice of proposed rule making. That was anticipated to be resolved more than a year ago, by June 30th, 2000. It is, however, still pending, and I do not have any wisdom about when we might hear from the FCC on that.

The issue as it pertains to this case

specifically with regard to EELs is whether the requirement that they only be permitted to be used when there is a significant amount of local exchange service, whether that applies only to conversions of existing special access circuits or to all orders for EELs, including new EELs. Now what you can see if you look at the illustrative document that I handed out to you is that carriers who currently are purchasing special access circuits from Owest under the retail tariff may wish to convert those to EELs.

Now because the physical configuration is the same, it would essentially just be a billing change. And because the rates are different, and as I will get into in a minute, the FCC determined that there could be a significant negative impact on universal service and the access charge regime in its entirety, the FCC limited the ability of CLECs and IXCs to convert those special access circuits to the EEL or the UNE loop combination.

The initial order appears to have held that the significant amount of local exchange service restriction applies only to conversion of existing special access circuits. However, Qwest believes that the law mandates that the significant amount of local exchange service restriction applies to all EELs,

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whether you're converting from an existing special access circuit or whether a carrier is ordering a brand new EEL in the first instance.

Let me just point you to the paragraphs in 5 the initial order that begin to discuss this, and those 6 are Paragraphs 98, 99, and 100. It appears as though 7 the initial order's ruling is based on a belief that 8 Qwest will not provide EELs or will not combine UNEs, 9 and the discussion in Paragraphs 99 and 100 seem to illustrate that point. However, this is simply 10 11 incorrect. Qwest will offer EELs. It is mindful of its 12 obligation to combine UNEs and has committed to do so in 13 the provision of EELs. Owest is merely asking here that the FCC's ruling in the Supplemental Order Clarification 14 15 be followed, and we believe that the Supplemental Order 16 Clarification of June 2nd, 2000, is on balance clear 17 that the local use restriction is more broadly 18 applicable than just to conversions of special access 19 circuits.

The order does in the introductory section talk about conversions of special access circuits to EELs. For example, in Paragraph 5, there is a sentence that contains the phrase, the IXC may not convert special access, and so there is a reference to the conversion there. And in Paragraph 6, the FCC also says

in setting up a limitation, they say, in order to convert special access services to combinations, a CLEC must do the following. However, I think the context is 4 important here. At the time the decision was written, 5 which was more than a year ago, conversion of special 6 access circuits to EELs was the primary issue. CLECs 7 have freely admitted, and I believe did so in the cost 8 docket here in Washington when the issue came up, that 9 they had been purchasing special access circuits from 10 the ILECs because EELs were not previously available, 11 thus they were most interested not in ordering new EELs, 12 but in converting their existing special access circuits 13 to EELs. And I believe that the FCC order simply 14 discusses the issue in that context. So those 15 references to conversion are in the introductory 16 section. 17 In the actual discussion and decision 18 paragraphs, it is clear that the local use restriction 19 applies to all EELs, including new orders. For example, in Paragraph 8 of the Supplemental Order Clarification, 20 21 the FCC clearly states: Until we resolve the issues in the 22 23 fourth FNPRM, IXCs may not substitute an 2.4 incumbent LEC's unbundled loop transport 25 combinations for special access services

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                unless they provide a significant amount
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                of local exchange service in addition to
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                exchange access service to a particular
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                customer.
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               Later in the same decision in Paragraph 21,
    the FCC states:
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                We now define more precisely the
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                significant amount of local exchange
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                service that a requesting carrier must
                provide in order to obtain unbundled
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                loop transport combinations.
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                In our mind, that language where it says
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    here's what we're going -- we're going to tell you what
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    you have to do in order to obtain an unbundled loop
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     transport combination means that the restriction applies
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     equally to conversions of existing circuits and to
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     orders for new circuits.
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                CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Ms. Anderl, I'm
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     looking for that, I thought you said Paragraph 21.
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               MS. ANDERL: Yes, Your Honor, let me tell you
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    where in Paragraph 21 that is. It starts at the end of
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    the second line, we now define more precisely.
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                CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Oh, yes, I see.
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                JUDGE WALLIS: Just a word, Ms. Anderl, but
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    time is fleeting by.
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MS. ANDERL: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 The rationale for the FCC imposing this 3 restriction is set forth nicely in Paragraph 7, and because of the time, Your Honors, I would encourage you 5 to read that. It is a very serious concern that the FCC 6 has with regard to the impact on universal service and 7 the access charge regime that could potentially occur if 8 these conversions were allowed without the local use 9 restriction. I believe that that policy consideration 10 and monetary consideration applies equally to orders for 11 new EELs as it would to conversions of existing special 12 access circuits, and I would encourage you to review 13 that prior to making your decision on this issue. 14 And, Your Honor, I apologize, we had 15 15 minutes per side on this. 16 The other issue under EELs, and I will try to 17 just take two minutes on this, is when a carrier then 18

The other issue under EELs, and I will try to just take two minutes on this, is when a carrier then goes to try to satisfy and prove that it has met the significant amount of local usage, there's a test set forth in the Supplemental Order of Clarification in Paragraph 22. There's one of three ways that a carrier can meet it, meet this significant amount of local usage test. And the question that arose in this workshop docket was whether ISP traffic or Internet services provider bound traffic can count as local traffic. To

really fully discuss that would take a long time. It's already squarely teed up for you in the cost docket, Part B, where the parties have filed two rounds of briefs on that. I think that the Qwest brief of August 5 23rd on this docket or in this workshop does lay out 6 clearly why we believe that it can't count as local 7 traffic, and I will just conclude my remarks there. JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you. 8 9 Mr. Kopta. 10 MR. KOPTA: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 I think probably the easiest thing is to look 12 at the diagram that Qwest has circulated as an 13 illustration. And we don't disagree that this is one 14 potential scenario, but I think I scratch my head a 15 little bit over the FCC orders, and I agree that I think 16 the FCC's concern was with the ILECs claiming that 17 special access would be circumvented and there would be 18 some big huge revenue loss to the ILECs and a 19 corresponding impact on universal services. But if you 20 look at this diagram, if the CLEC provides everything up 21 to Qwest's central office to, for example --22 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Now, I'm sorry, which 23 of the two? 2.4

MR. KOPTA: Well, either one, they're 25 basically the same.

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But if a CLEC were to be collocated in both 1 Qwest central office one and in central office two and provide its own entrance facility and dedicated transport between central offices and just obtain the 5 loop from Qwest, there would be no obligation to certify 6 that this is local. Similarly, if -- that the traffic 7 over the facilities is local. Similarly, if the CLEC 8 only obtained collocation in Qwest's central office one, 9 got the dedicated transport between the central offices 10 from Qwest as well as the loop and did its own 11 connection, then there would be no obligation to certify 12 they would be used for local service. 13

So I think that there are at best holes in what the FCC's concern was, and I think that the best explanation is that the FCC presumes that if you order a circuit out of a special access tariff that you're going to use it for special access. And if you want to change that, if you want to keep that same circuit and convert if into UNEs because it's really not going used for special access, then you have to certify to Qwest that it's actually being used for local service.

So that's what's going on here, which is why the FCC only talks about the certification in the context of conversion, because it was only natural to believe that orders from the access tariff are going to

be used for access. And it's only because the CLECs came in and said, well, this was the only way we could get them that the FCC said, well, all right, you can 4 change them over to UNEs, but you have to demonstrate to 5 the ILEC that you're going to use it for local service. 6 Now this all happened in the context of 7 restrictions on the ability of the FCC to require the 8 ILEC to actually do the combining of the elements, and 9 this Commission, as it's fully aware, decided early on 10 in the arbitrations that Qwest was obligated to do that, 11 a decision that the Ninth Circuit upheld. So since 12 before the FCC issued any of the orders in EEL dockets, 13 Owest has been obligated in the state of Washington to 14 provide combinations of unbundled network elements and 15 without requiring any certification that they're going 16 to be used for a particular type of service. That's the 17 basis of the Commission of the initial order, is saying, 18 you know, there's been arbitration, looked at this 19 issue, the Commission already concluded that Qwest is 20 obligated to provide the combinations of unbundled 21 network elements, and that's what they have to do. 22 So I think the basis is not so much on what 23 did the FCC decide or not decide. We had originally 2.4 argued that the FCC orders were clear, that it was only

in the context of conversions that the local usage

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restrictions apply. Qwest says that it's equally clear that it applies to both. I think the Commission said, well, we don't agree with either of those interpretations, and we believe that or the ALJ 5 recommends that the Commission say, we have already 6 addressed this issue with respect to new combinations 7 that are ordered initially as EELs, not converted, but 8 just like any other combination, whether it's, you know, 9 loop and transport or loop and switching or anything 10 else, that there isn't any certification requirement, 11 and therefore we're going to be consistent and require 12 Qwest to provide those combinations. I think it's as 13 simple as that. 14 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: But if we do stick 15 with the ALJ's recommendation, what effect does it have 16 on the, I don't know if gaming the system is the right 17 word, but what are the economic incentives in this 18 situation that Ms. Anderl presented? I mean all I can 19 see is two situations that look identical, and one is called typical special access circuit, and the other is 20 21 called EEL, and I presume one is cheaper than the other, which isn't terribly rational to do. 22

MR. KOPTA: Well, yeah.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: So that's number one. But then what is the economic incentive if we stick with

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this plan, in this situation, recognizing you threw some other possible situations?

MR. KOPTA: Well, I think the economic incentive is to stop buying facilities used for local exchange service out of the special access tariff, and I think that's what the CLECs want to do. The CLECs want to obtain unbundled network elements to provide local exchange service, and right now they can't in many instances. So the resort is to the special access tariff, which is because that's the way they can get those facilities, whether it's as a new facility or whether it's as an old facility.

And what CLECs are trying to do is to be able to say, at least while the FCC has everything else on hold, allow us to order new facilities that are going to be used for local exchange service as UNEs as opposed to out of the special access service. Don't make us keep buying out of the special access service tariff.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What effect will it have on universal service?

MR. KOPTA: It shouldn't have any, because these aren't being used for access, these are being used for local service, so Qwest should not be entitled. It's getting, for lack of a better word, a windfall of being able to charge special access prices for what

should be UNEs to provide local exchange service. With respect to the ISP traffic issue, we 3 have addressed this in the brief that we filed prior to the initial order being addressed. I don't want to 5 repeat that. I think our main focus is that there is an 6 exemption for ISP traffic. Owest does not provide them 7 service -- ISPs that is serviced out of the special access tariff. It doesn't charge them special access 8 9 rates. It provides them a local exchange service or 10 service out of their local exchange tariff. And so 11 that's all that the FCC was concerned about was making 12 sure that you were using these facilities for local 13 exchange service, and service to ISPs is local exchange 14 service, however you want to define the traffic 15 jurisdictionally because of the exemption, and 16 therefore, there was nothing in this order that says, 17 oh, by the way, ISP traffic is still considered 18 interstate, and you have to provision those services 19 over special access facilities if you're a CLEC but not if you're an ILEC. That just doesn't make any sense, 20 21 but I think we have made that point in our brief, and I won't discuss it any further. 22 23 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Well, I'm trying to 2.4 understand this. Some years ago, we had the issue in 25 front of us of what were then the different categories

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referred to as private lines depending upon who was served. And depending on who was served, there were different prices, and the whole issue was a line is a line is a line. And we said, that's right, a line is a 5 line is a line and priced similar. I guess this is a 6 recurrence of that issue again. The elements are 7 exactly the same, but they're differently priced. And 8 apparently the argument for that is it is required to 9 protect universal services, and that's apparently what 10 Paragraph 7 of the FCC order says. And you're saying it 11 doesn't have any effect on universal service? 12 MR. KOPTA: What I'm saying is that 13 facilities that are used for special access, I mean this 14 goes back to divestiture, and these facilities were the 15 ways that the local exchange companies that, you know, 16 the RBOCs a result of the breakup of AT&T were going to 17 make up the difference in the long distance revenues,

diverted interstate or interLATA.

And the problem has arisen because when CLECs started providing service, they needed the same type of facilities but couldn't get them as unbundled network elements, so the only way they could get them was out of the tariff. So that's really not a legitimate use of

they could charge access, and for the facilities they

could charge higher prices for traffic that's being

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the facilities, not from a CLEC's point of view. But from the ILEC's point of view, because the ILECs should make them available for local service out of a different set of rates, terms, and conditions than special access, because this isn't special access.

So I think what the FCC was trying to do is to say, well, gee, we're going to have to sort this mess out because these are not being used the way that we intended for them to, and we don't think that it's fair that CLECs should pay too much, but at the same time, we still have this system in place where we have special access, and special access helps to fund universal service, or at least that's the, you know, one of the claims, and therefore, you know, we don't want to do anything that's going to make sure that or that would harm the ILEC's ability to obtain special access when special access is being provided, and therefore we're going to kind of freeze the circuits that are there now and say, if you're going to convert these, you have to demonstrate that they are going to be used for local service, because we're going to presume that up until now, you ordered these out of the tariff because you were using them to provide special access.

But I don't think that the FCC was also saying, oh, by the way, now that you can order unbundled

network elements, that somehow because this one particular link could be used to bypass special access that you can't, that you have to somehow certify that it's not going to do that. Because there are other 5 facilities that can be used. The loop, just a high 6 capacity loop without connection to transport could be 7 used to bypass special access, a combination that the 8 CLEC makes itself of loop and transport could be used to 9 bypass special access, and yet the FCC doesn't say, 10 well, every time you order a UNE, you have to certify to 11 the ILEC that you're not going to use this for special 12 access. 13 So I think it's a temporary situation that 14 the FCC was trying to split the baby as best it could. 15 It did it by talking about what's in the pot today, not 16 what's going to be in the pot tomorrow. 17 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: And just remind me, 18 where in the proposed order or the draft order is this 19 discussed, or was it 94? 20 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: 91 to 103, was it? 21 MR. KOPTA: I think that's right, yes. 22 CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: Okay, thanks. MR. KOPTA: You still look puzzled, 23 2.4 Commissioner Hemstad. 25 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Well, maybe I'm mixing

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entirely different issues, but I recall on the argument
a line is a line is a line was a position of U S West at
the time and that it ought to be priced the same way.
Now why is this different? I look at your examples
here, and they're identical.

MS. ANDERL: Well, ultimately I don't disagree that that may be an outcome, that like services need to be priced alike. However, the Act, which came after our advocacy of a line is a line is a line, mandated an entirely different pricing standard, which is a pure cost pricing standard. And to the extent that some of these prices have historically been set at some measure over cost to provide a contribution to the company's joint and common costs, including to cover costs to serve in high cost areas, I think you can't flash cut, and that's all really the FCC is saying here as well.

This is in many ways no different from what your rule did with terminating access where the Commission and, well, Qwest filed a bifurcated terminating access charge where there is no cost based rate element, and then there's the universal services rate element, and so the total cost for terminating access is greater than the switching cost to terminate a call, but it allows for, it accepts the fact that there

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is still some universal service support in those charges, and that exists for special access as well as for switched access.

And I think that, you know, the FCC is clear here that this isn't going to stay this way forever, but I think that until we have kind of a more global solution to who gets the universal service funding, where does the money come from, how does a firm cover its costs when some of its prices are set on the new forward looking methodology and some of its prices are set based on the historic pricing structure that we have had, you know, then the right thing to do is, you know, for the rate payers and the company's well being, the right thing to do is to maintain the status quo while we sort it out.

And so I guess I'm agreeing with you that in, you know, in some ways, purely intellectually and philosophically, the line is a line is a line argument is still a good argument, but tempered by the reality of the situation. I think we still need to accept the two different pricing structures for now, especially when there are different services and different public policy goals that are affected through the different pricing.

JUDGE WALLIS: Ms. Singer Nelson.

MS. SINGER NELSON: WorldCom concurs in all

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the arguments that Mr. Kopta presented, and I have nothing to add, just to ask that the Commission adopt the initial order's recommendation on this issue, on the two issues addressed. 5 JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you. 6 Any further questions? 7 Very well, let's move on. MS. ANDERL: Thank you, Your honor. 8 MR. KOPTA: Your Honor, if you don't mind, 9 10 why don't we go ahead and do the other EEL issue now 11 since it seems to be fresh on everyone's mind. 12 JUDGE WALLIS: Very well. 13 MR. KOPTA: And I will lead off on that. 14 This has to do with EEL issues 13 and 15, and the 15 problem that we have is that at least from our review of 16 the initial order, this particular issue wasn't 17 addressed directly, so it wasn't so much taking issue 18 with what the initial order did. It's kind of saying, 19 whoops, this issue didn't get addressed in the initial 20 order, and we certainly want it to be addressed by the 21 Commission. 22 And in very simple terms, it's very similar 23 to the issue that the Commission has seen before in this 2.4 docket, which is when you have facilities that are used

for multiple purposes, how do you treat those. Or

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number one, do you allow it to be used, a facility to be used for multiple purposes, and number two, how do you treat the two different pieces that are being used on this same facility. And the context here is the use of the same facility to provide both an EEL and special access services.

And by way of illustration, again, you know, if we want to look at the special access circuit diagram that Qwest has circulated, if you have a DS3 transport between the two Qwest central offices, which would include 28 DS1 circuits, and then you have a loop that goes into the customer location, and let's just for simplicity say that it's also at a DS3 level, the CLEC wants to be able to provide both special access and local services to a particular customer and wants to be able to use Owest facilities to do that.

And what we're saying is that rather -- what we're proposing is that if you can use this same DS3 circuit to provide 14 DS1 circuits that are local service and 14 DS1 circuits that are special access circuits so that you can use the same facility for the different types of service, it's much more economically efficient to use one DS3 for both types of circuits. They are distinct circuits within the DS3 so that you can identify them. And you can price them according to

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the way that they should be priced, so that half of the DS3s in that example would be priced at special access rates, and half of the DS3s would be priced at UNE rates.

The alternative, which is what Qwest has proposed, is that you can only use that DS3 circuit for one service or the other, either for special access or for UNEs. So again, using the same example that I just did, Qwest would say, you have to have 2 DS3s, 1 DS3 that has 14 DS1s for the local service, and the other DS3 that has the 14 circuits for special access. So all of a sudden, the CLEC is now paying for duplicate facilities when it really only needs the one facility.

And this kind of harkens back to what we had discussed earlier on the obligation to build and the limitation on facilities. Not only is it economically inefficient, but what happens if Qwest says, well, gee, we have a DS3 that has the capacity that can take these circuits, but you can't use it for this other service, you would have to use a totally different circuit, but we don't have another circuit, so you can't provide the service. So a CLEC faced with that circumstance

22 23 generally in the past has said, okay, well, then we will

2.4 just buy the whole thing out of the special access

25 tariff and pay the full freight, because we need to

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provide the service even though it costs more to get the facility, and we don't think that that's appropriate. 3 And this Commission in other contexts has 4 agreed and said that when facilities are used for 5 multiple purposes, that when facilities can be used for 6 multiple purposes that they are, and that the pricing of 7 the facility ought to be apportioned accordingly. 8 That's basically our position. 9 JUDGE WALLIS: Ms. Singer Nelson, did you 10 have anything to add? 11 MS. SINGER NELSON: I have nothing to add. 12 JUDGE WALLIS: Ms. Anderl. 13 MS. ANDERL: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 Commissioners, we believe that the same 15 Supplemental Order Clarification that we have been 16 talking about addresses this issue as well. And in 17 Paragraph 28, I believe the FCC has pretty much taken 18 care of Mr. Kopta's argument, where as practical and as 19 nice a solution as he would like to see put in place has 20 simply been forbidden by the FCC, maybe not forever, but 21 for now. The Commission said: 22 We further reject --23 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: What --2.4 MS. ANDERL: Oh, I'm sorry, Paragraph 28 of

the Supplemental Order of Clarification.

05796 The Commission explicitly rejects the 1 suggestion that it eliminate the 3 prohibition on commingling, i.e., combining loops or loop transport 5 combinations. 6 And remember, a loop transport combination is 7 an EEL. 8 With tariffed special access services in 9 the local usage options discussed above. 10 I think that that's clear, that this is 11 exactly what Mr. Kopta is asking the Commission to 12 order, and it's contrary to what the FCC has rejected as 13 a suggestion when it was made by WorldCom. They go on 14 to state that they believe that allowing such 15 commingling could lead to some of the same problems that 16 they identified earlier, and then they conclude that 17 it's not a determination of how the issue will be 18 resolved for once and for all, but that it is the 19 solution that must be put in place now. 20 And I think that if what the CLECs want to do 21 is buy a DS3 and put both access service or a finished service and a UNE type traffic over it, I can't think of 22 23 a clearer example of combining finished services with 2.4 UNEs than that. That is exactly what Mr. Kopta's 25 clients are proposing, and I believe that's exactly what

is prohibited in Paragraph 28 of the FCC order. CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: And because the FCC 3 has prohibited it, do you think that binds us or that 4 we're entitled to make our own determination on that 5 question? 6 MS. ANDERL: I think that it binds you on 7 this particular issue. 8 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: And is the rationale 9 the same here as what we just discussed? 10 MS. ANDERL: Yes, it's to maintain the status 11 quo, because even this commingling, even though it would 12 preserve some measure of special access revenue, would 13 to some extent lead to an erosion of those revenues 14 because of the combining of the revenues and the 15 ratcheting of the rates that Mr. Kopta suggests the 16 CLECs want to do, in other words, only pay for half of 17 the facility at a special access rate and the other half 18 at UNE rates. COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: I assume that it has 19 20 some inherent economic inefficiency to it. Does it 21 have, in that sense from the CLEC's perspective, I mean providing services would be more costly than it would 22 23 otherwise have been. Is there any other, I guess I will 2.4 address this to either or both of you, is there any 25 other advantage that gives to Qwest as against the

CLECs, or is it just what the FCC is saying? In other words, I suppose to the extent that the CLECs are 3 economically disadvantaged, that inherently means an 4 advantage to Qwest when you're competing with them. Is 5 that a discomfiting aspect of this? 6 MR. KOPTA: Well, from our perspective, it 7 certainly is, and we disagree with the interpretation 8 Ms. Anderl has suggested in the FCC order. In our view, 9 combining means connecting. If you're talking about 10 combinations of elements, that means that a loop and a 11 transport combination, that means that they're 12 connected. These are not connected. This is like a 13 multilane highway that, you know, you have half the 14 lanes reserved for trucks and half the lanes reserved 15 for cars, and neither can go in the other's lane. 16 That's not what we believe the FCC meant when it was 17 saying combined. And, in fact, in the order, it does 18 say, it does reference, it uses the word connecting. 19 So that aside, I think assuming for purposes 20 of argument that the FCC does prohibit that sort of use 21 of facility, it disadvantages CLECs in two ways. One of 22 them is economically, which is that you can't use 23 facilities if you want to use them for multiple 2.4 purposes, because you essentially have to pay the 25 highest rate for that particular facility. And if you

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want to try and break out your traffic so that you're dedicating facilities to special access and some to UNEs, then not only do you increase the costs, but -- by 4 buying two facilities, but you run the risk that there 5 won't be facilities. You incur additional costs in 6 terms of grooming circuits over to the new facilities, 7 because you have to say, well, all right, if right now 8 we've got these running over the same pipe and we want 9 to pay a different rate for them, then we have to buy a 10 whole new facility, and then we're going to have to 11 switch them all over, and that causes not only economic 12 concerns, but customer disruption concerns. 13 And on a going forward basis, if you've 14 already got a facility that you're buying out of the 15 special access tariff that has capacity in it, you are 16

already got a facility that you're buying out of the special access tariff that has capacity in it, you are disincented to buy EELs, because you have -- you couldn't put them on that same circuit even though it has capacity, you would have to buy a whole other circuit, so essentially you're locked now into using the special access tariff to provide facilities to provide local exchange service. So there's no way out. I mean you can't get UNEs any more. You can only get them out of the special access tariff, because that's the road you had to go down before, and you can't get off that road, so that's really the crux of the issue from the

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    CLEC's perspective.
                MS. ANDERL: Your Honor, may I respond as
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    well.
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                Just two things, we don't think that this
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     advantages us in any way. We think it just maintains
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     the status quo. And I would also -- and it's not just
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    us, although that's clearly the entity whose interests
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     I'm here to represent, but I would turn your attention
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    to Paragraph 18 of that same FCC order, where the
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    Commission says that they're extending, the Federal
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    Communications Commission, says that they're extending
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     the restriction on using the UNEs for special access for
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     an independent reason as well and having nothing to do
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    really with the financial interests of the ILECs, but
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    having to do with the financial interests of the
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     facilities based competitive access providers, who are
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     separate entities who rely on, for their revenues, upon
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     the provision of special access, which is already a
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    bypass of Qwest's special access, and so it's probably
    priced somewhere less than what Owest prices its special
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    access for but more than Qwest will price its UNEs for.
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    And if CLECs and IXCs were permitted to go wholly to the
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    use of the UNEs from Qwest at the lower rates for the
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    special access, I think the FCC recognized and described
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    in this paragraph that that could be damaging to other
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facilities based carriers who were in essentially a mature industry and state of competition as well. MR. STEESE: Ms. Anderl, may I add one point? 4 This is Chuck Steese for Qwest. 5 MS. ANDERL: It's not my call, Mr. Steese. 6 JUDGE WALLIS: Yes, please proceed. 7 MR. STEESE: Going to the point raised by 8 Mr. Kopta concerning the separate lanes, this very issue 9 was presented to the FCC in this very proceeding. And 10 if you look at Paragraph 28, Footnote 79, AT&T and 11 WorldCom both claimed, if we get a DS3, we will 12 designate specific DS1s some for tariff service, other 13 for local service, and we will make sure to treat them 14 in that fashion, we won't mix and match. And the FCC 15 specifically rejected that proposal by WorldCom and AT&T 16 in that docket. They specifically found that would be 17 inappropriate. So what Mr. Kopta is talking about was 18 exactly the issue presented to the FCC and rejected 19 outright by the FCC. 20 JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Kopta. 21 MR. KOPTA: I think the order speaks for 22 itself. I mean Mr. Steese is referring to -- the only 23 reference in the FCC order is this footnote to these 2.4 comments, and they were -- the letters are rather 25 lengthy, and I don't believe that the FCC addressed that

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issue as Mr. Steese has outlined, and certainly the order, as I say, speaks for itself, and the Commission is perfectly capable of interpreting it the way that it believes it should be interpreted. 5 JUDGE WALLIS: Thank you. 6 Does this conclude the discussion on this 7 issue? 8 MS. ANDERL: Yes, for me. 9 JUDGE WALLIS: Very well, Ms. Anderl, please 10 proceed. 11 MS. ANDERL: The final issue that we would 12 like to address today is the issue addressed in the 13 initial order at Paragraphs 40 through 46, and the 14 question in the order is entitled, Qwest adherence to 15 wholesale and retail quality standards. It is issue 16 WA-CL2-5(b), and in Qwest's August 23rd brief, it's 17 addressed at page 36. 18 Briefly, the initial order requires Qwest to 19 amend its SGAT to state that it will comply with all State wholesale and retail service quality standards. 20 Qwest is here today asking for either a clarification or 21 22 a modification of this provision to the extent that it 23 imposes more than the Act requires or standards 2.4 different from what the Act requires. We believe that

the Act requires retail parity, and that retail parity

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issue is something I think that you will see a much greater detailed discussion of when we begin to talk to you about our actual performance.

Qwest earlier this month filed a pleading and 5 a number of attachments detailing its actual performance 6 in provisioning service under interconnection agreements 7 in the SGAT to CLECs, and we anticipate filing updates 8 on that. The real detailed discussion of whether Qwest 9 is meeting a benchmark that's set independent from 10 retail standards or whether it's meeting retail parity 11 probably is best reserved for the discussion in that 12 context. Here however, we're concerned that the 13 requirement of stating in the SGAT that we will comply 14 with all State wholesale and retail service quality 15 standards injects some confusion in terms of what 16 potentially is required and seems to be counter to the 17 retail parity or at least inconsistent with the 18 requirement that we operate at retail parity.

Let me just give you a couple of examples, and there are I guess examples where we could be not meeting the retail service quality standards but still operating at retail parity, and there could be examples of where we are meeting or exceeding the Commission's retail service quality standards for wholesale, but yet we wouldn't be at parity. In other words, if we were

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providing repair within 12 hours for our retail customers but 20 hours for our wholesale customers and the standard is 48 hours, well, we're meeting the retail service quality standard clearly, but we're still 5 probably because of the, you know, an 8 hour time 6 differential not at parity. And so we're concerned that 7 the use of a standard here that requires Qwest to meet 8 wholesale and retail service quality standards where not 9 all of the UNEs have a direct retail analog or the 10 retail service standards may not be directly applicable 11 or relevant in terms of really evaluating what's 12 important under the Act, which is Qwest's performance to 13 its wholesale vis-a-vis how it is actually performing to 14 its retail customers. 15

And so while we had proposed that we state that we will comply with all state wholesale service quality standards, and we certainly don't mean by that language to exclude a commitment to operate at parity, because that is what the Act requires, we don't think that necessarily inserting the words and retail capture that accurately, and so we would ask that that language just be removed.

And I guess the only other thing that I would add is that the FCC has in numerous 271 decisions stated that, and I'm just going to quote from the Bell Atlantic

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New York decision right now at Paragraph 58, the FCC 1 stated: 3 In this case, we conclude that to the 4 extent there is no statistically 5 significant difference between Bell 6 Atlantic's provisioning of service to 7 competitive LECs and its own retail 8 customers, we need not look any further. 9 Similarly, if there is no difference 10 between the Bell Atlantic provision of 11 service to competitive LECs and the 12 performance benchmark, our analysis is 13 14 In other words, what the FCC was saying there 15 is Bell Atlantic and the other parties had come up with 16 a fairly complicated and detailed set of performance 17 standards, which similar to what's happened here in the 18 Qwest region, and in some cases the standard was a 19 benchmark, in some cases the standard was retail parity, 20 and to the extent that Bell Atlantic was meeting those, 21 that's what was relevant, not a separate independent set of retail service quality standards that might apply in 22 23 terms of how a LEC provides service to an end user in 24 the state.

And that concludes my remarks on this issue.

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JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Kopta. MR. KOPTA: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm again a little troubled by Ms. Anderl's discussion. It sounds to me as though Qwest wants the ability to say, as long as we're providing the same level of service to both our wholesale and retail customers, that this Commission's inquiry is at an end even if that service falls below the retail service quality standards that this Commission has established, and I don't think that that's in the public interest or in the best interest of what this Commission is trying

to do in the state of Washington.

Certainly with respect to Qwest in particular, we all sat in the rule making a couple of days ago and talked about the long hard road to getting Qwest to the point where it's providing adequate retail service, and I don't think that we want to be in a position where we just say, as long as Qwest is treating everybody equally badly, then that's the only thing that we have to worry about.

Again, we come back to the distinction between Section 271 and Section 252(f), which addresses the SGAT. And the SGAT provision, Section 252(f), expressly mentions service quality standards in terms of what this Commission can do in the context of an SGAT.

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And I think that at a minimum for the public interest in this state, Qwest should be obligated to make sure that it provides wholesale customers the same level of 4 service as retail customers, and that level of service 5 should be at a certain threshold level. It's not good enough that they provide everybody the same service if 6 7 that service doesn't meet this Commission's standards. 8 And so that's why we think that it's critically 9 important to include this language in the SGAT to ensure that Qwest both provides parity and reaches a level of 10 11 service quality that this Commission believes is 12 acceptable.

CHAIRWOMAN SHOWALTER: What do you, what's your comment on the FCC's, well, the language that Ms. Anderl read from the New York case saying, that's what we're looking at, we're the FCC, and we're looking at if there's parity, case closed?

MR. KOPTA: Well, I would like to think that the FCC isn't so sanguine as to think, well, we don't care what the service level is in the state as long as everybody is getting the same level of service. I think the FCC is deferring to the state commissions, because that's your bailiwick to decide what level of retail service quality is acceptable. All the FCC is doing is looking at the Act and saying, it requires parity. The

Act doesn't require any particular level of service. That's historically been something that the states have dealt with, and so we don't need to do that. All we need to assume is that whatever level of retail service 5 quality the incumbent is providing, that's the same 6 level that they need to provide to the competitors. And 7 it's up to the state commission to decide whether that 8 same level of service is where it needs to be. 9 And this Commission has certainly taken a 10 strong stance on making sure that all carriers are 11 trying to be treated not only equally with the 12 incumbent, but that the end user customers are getting 13 the level of service that the Commission believes is 14 acceptable. And so this is just an incorporation of 15 that concept into the SGAT. 16 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Well, and I assume the 17 FCC was addressing the 271 only. 18 MR. KOPTA: That's correct. 19 COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: It wasn't addressing 20 the SGAT, which goes with state law standards. 21 Ms. Anderl, wouldn't you agree with that? 22 MS. ANDERL: Your Honor, I would have to 23 defer to Mr. Steese as to whether the Bell Atlantic New 2.4 York decision was a combined SGAT 271 application. 25 don't know, and I, of course, don't know what the New

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York retail service quality standards are, so maybe that answers the question. COMMISSIONER HEMSTAD: Sure. 4 MR. STEESE: I can respond, Chuck Steese on 5 behalf of Qwest. If you look, the New York standard was 6 based on a wholesale tariff, however, the same 7 provisions are in the Texas decision, the Oklahoma 8 decision, and the Kansas decision, all of which were 9 based on an SGAT, a form interconnection agreement, in 10 those states. And the exact argument that Mr. Kopta is 11 raising was specifically rejected again there. And this 12 is his words, this isn't how I would phrase it, if the 13 service is equally bad, that's not good enough, and that 14 is exactly what was rejected. You're not only looking 15 at 271. 16 For us to get 271 approval, we have to 17 satisfy the requirements of Section 251 of the Act. And 18 so it is not just a 271 issue. It is all aspects of the 19 Act. And to the extent our independent state rules, the 20 independent state rules are focused on the retail 21 standards and not dealing with wholesale standards. And 22 so we firmly believe that this is appropriate as 23 currently in our SGAT.

JUDGE WALLIS: Ms. Singer Nelson.

25 MS. SINGER NELSON: I guess I just have one

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thought to add. Focusing back on the standard that the Commission's looking at on whether or not the access to and the quality of the service provided, that UNEs provided are equal to what Qwest provides to itself. If 5 Qwest in the state of Washington is required to satisfy particular retail standards to service its customers but 7 yet it's not held to those same standards for the 8 wholesale customers, the wholesale customers are being 9 discriminated against vis-a-vis the retail customers, 10 and so that would violate that general standard of the 11 Act. 12 JUDGE WALLIS: Mr. Harlow. 13 MR. HARLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 Covad concurs with WorldCom and AT&T, and I 15 think that's all I need to say given the arguments they 16 have made. 17 JUDGE WALLIS: Any further questions? 18 Further comments from the parties? 19 MS. ANDERL: No, thank you, Your Honor. 20 JUDGE WALLIS: Is there anything further to 21 be accomplished today? 22 Very well, I want to thank everyone for your 23 presentations. They have been very helpful. 2.4 MS. SINGER NELSON: Judge, I'm sorry, I just

have one kind of piece of confusion that I have. I know

Ms. Anderl addressed in her briefs the issue of the distinction between EUDIT and UDIT, and the ALJ's decision or the recommended decision in this case, it seems to me that Qwest decided to defer that issue to the cost docket and seemed to imply that the carriers, the other carriers agreed to defer the issue to the cost docket; is that right?

MS. ANDERL: I don't know if we implied the latter. We definitely suggested that the EUDIT-UDIT distinction had a factual record that had been developed in the cost docket, and we recommended that the, I think in our brief, that the Commission consider the issue from this initial order in conjunction with when it considers the UDIT-EUDIT distinction in the Part B cost docket order, and we're hopeful that they will be resolved in a manner that's consistent. I don't know if the other parties agreed to that or not, but there definitely is a factual record for making the determination in the Part B cost docket.

MS. SINGER NELSON: Okay, and I just want to make it clear that WorldCom asks that the Commission adopt the initial order's recommended decision on the distinction, that there is not a distinction between EUDIT and UDIT, and then carry that holding into the cost docket in any pricing determinations that would be

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    made in that docket.
               JUDGE WALLIS: Very well, does that conclude
    our session?
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               MR. HARLOW: Covad concurs in WorldCom's
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    comment.
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               MS. ANDERL: And the only caveat that we
    would have is that our current prices as proposed, of
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     course, reflect the distinction, and we may in
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     subsequent phases of the cost docket if we are not to
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     prevail on this issue, we would have to redo our rates,
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    but you know that.
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               MR. KOPTA: Yeah, we don't disagree that it
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    should be consistent, it's just which comes first, and
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    AT&T concurs with WorldCom that the Commission should
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     decide it here as a matter of policy, and then we deal
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     with the cost implications in the cost docket.
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                JUDGE WALLIS: Very well, thank you all.
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                (Hearing adjourned at 4:45 p.m.)
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