Exh. JDW-24CTr Dockets UE-240006/UG-240007 Witness: John D. Wilson REDACTED

# BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,

DOCKETS UE-240006 & UG-240007 (Consolidated)

Complainant,

v.

AVISTA CORPORATION,

Respondent

REVISED CROSS-ANSWERING TESTIMONY OF

JOHN D. WILSON

ON BEHALF OF STAFF OF WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

**Power Costs** 

August 16, 2024

Revised August 29, 2024

CONFIDENTIAL PER PROTECTIVE ORDER – REDACTED VERSION

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1			I. INTRODUCTION
2			
3	Q.	What is the purpose of	your cross-answer testimony?
4	A.	My cross-answer testim	ony responds to the response testimony of AWEC witness
5		Bradley G. Mullins in E	xhibit BGM-1T and Public Counsel witness Robert L. Earle in
6		Exhibit RLE-1CT regar	ding Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM) costs.
7		I conclude by pr	oviding Staff's updated Net Power Expense (NPE)
8		recommendation for 202	25 NPE of \$175,484 and a Washington NPE Revenue
9		Requirement from \$113	,012.
10			
11	Q.	Have you prepared ex	hibits in support of your testimony?
12	A.	Yes. I sponsor Exh. JDV	W-25 through Exh. JDW-35C:
13		• Exh. JDW-25	Avista's Response to Staff DR No. 227 Supp. 2
14 15 16		• Exh. JDW-26	Avista's Response to Staff DR No. 227 Supp. Attach. A – 2024 WEIM Calcs
17 18 19		• Exh. JDW-27	ICE Futures Daily Market Report for Washington Carbon Allowance Vintage 2025 Futures
20 21		• Exh. JDW-28C	NPE Calculations
22 23		• Exh. JDW-29	Ecology Auction, December 2023
<ul><li>24</li><li>25</li></ul>		• Exh. JDW-30	Ecology Auction, March 2024
<ul><li>26</li><li>27</li></ul>		• Exh. JDW-31	Ecology Auction, June 2024
28 29 30		• Exh. JDW-32C	Staff DR No. 227 Confidential Attachment A, Exh. CGK 2-6 DR 227
31 32		• Exh. JDW-33	Attachment A Comparison to File

1 2		• Exh. JDW-34 Attachment A Comparison to File
3		• Exh. JDW-35C Confidential Attachment A CGK 2-6
4 5		The information contained in these exhibits is correct to the best of my knowledge and
6		belief.
7		
8		II. RESPONSE TO OTHER PARTIES' TESTIMONY ON WEIM
9		
10	Q.	Please summarize Public Counsel witness Earle's response testimony on the WEIM.
11	A.	Witness Earle alleges that Avista has underestimated EIM benefits, particularly the
12		benefit of participating in a 5-minute market as compared to an hourly market. To
13		establish the relevance of this, witness Earle states, "[t]he forecasted benefits from
14		participation in the EIM are part of the calculation of the ERM baseline." Witness Earle
15		later concludes that "Avista's estimate of EIM benefits should be rejected."2
16		
17	Q.	Are the forecasted benefits from participation in the WEIM part of the calculation
18		of the ERM baseline?
19	A.	No, in my review of Avista's net power expense (NPE) forecast, which is the ERM
20		baseline, I did not find that the WEIM benefits calculation referred to by witness Earle is
21		an input into the NPE forecast.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Earle, Exh. RLE-1CT at 25:7-8. <sup>2</sup> Earle, Exh. RLE-1CT at 29:15-16.

Q.	Why	would	that	be?
$\sim$ .	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	" Oulu	CIICC	<i>.</i>

It is not necessary for Avista to calculate benefits from the WEIM and include them in the NPE forecast, because Avista's modeling is designed to capture all market power transaction opportunities as part of its production cost forecast. Aurora does not differentiate between WEIM and other market platforms because it is unnecessary and likely impossible to determine precisely on which market platform a given power transaction might occur.

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#### Q. Do you have a position on whether Avista or Public Counsel have more accurately estimated WEIM benefits?

No. While it is interesting to speculate on the magnitude of the benefits of participation in A. the WEIM to Avista, the actual benefits estimate is immaterial to an NPE forecast and it is unnecessary for such a calculation to be performed in the future.

As I understand Avista witness Kalich's testimony, he presented an estimate of the benefits of WEIM participation in order to reassure the Commission and parties that the updated Aurora modeling method adequately forecasts the impact of WEIM participation on Avista's energy transactions.<sup>3</sup> While I agree that the most reasonable method for incorporating WEIM participation into the forecast is to use 5-minute modeling, I did not investigate the benefits calculation presented by witness Kalich because it would have been an unproductive use resources.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Kalich, Exh. CGK-1T at 4:10-6:7.

1	Q.	Please summarize AWEC witness Bradley G. Mullins' response testimony on the
2		WEIM.
3	A.	Witness Mullins' testimony does not contest that Avista's use of sub-hourly dispatch
4		captures the benefits of the WEIM – or at least that it captures those benefits described by
5		Avista witness Kalich. Witness Mullins does, however, testify that Avista has failed to
6		capture all WEIM benefits in its modelling. Witness Mullins determined that Avista's
7		modeling method excludes certain annual settlement charges from net power costs,
8		including revenue from California's greenhouse gas cap and trade program. <sup>4</sup>
9		
10	Q.	Do you agree that revenue from California's greenhouse gas cap and trade program
11		should be included in forecast NPE?
12	A.	No. Based on information consultations with witness Kalich, I understand that Avista
13		does not currently participate in California's greenhouse gas cap and trade program.
14		
15	Q.	Do you agree with witness Mullins that some other WEIM settlement charges are
16		inappropriately omitted from Avista's forecast NPE?
17	A.	Yes. In my response testimony, I also found that Avista neglected to consider congestion
18		and other WEIM charges and revenues in its NPE forecast, which I estimated to total
19		about \$1.4 million per year in non-energy benefits. After excluding the greenhouse gas
20		revenue that should not be included in an adjustment, witness Mullins' corresponding
21		estimate is \$0.9 million per year. <sup>5</sup>

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Mullins, Exh. BGM-1T at 53:15-54:10.
 <sup>5</sup> Mullins, Exh. BGM-1T at 54, Table 8.

1		While witness Mullins and I agree that Avista should include non-energy charges
2		that are not captured in Aurora's modeling of production costs, our interpretation of the
3		accounting codes that should or should not be included differs. As for my interpretation,
4		the information provided by Avista prior to filing my response testimony provided less
5		explanation and interpretation than the more detailed review of WEIM settlement charges
6		provided by Avista in a more recent discovery response. <sup>6</sup>
7		
8	Q.	What adjustment to Avista's NPE forecast should be made to account for WEIM
9		settlement charges that are not captured in Aurora?
10	A.	In a data request response, Avista provided a more detailed review of WEIM settlement
11		charges. The resulting adjustment is an increase in forecast NPE of \$0.5 million. 7 I have
12		reviewed the charge code assignments by Avista, and they appear reasonable.
13		
14	Q.	Did witness Mullins raise any other material issues regarding forecast NPE that are
15		not addressed in your response testimony?
16	A.	Yes. Witness Mullins testified that Avista should include an adjustment to reflect power
17		market margins at the California-Oregon Border (COB) market that have historically
18		been reflected in Avista's costs. Witness Mullins estimates that this would reduce the
19		revenue requirement by \$0.1 million.8
20		

Wilson, Exh. JDW-25 (Avista's Response to Staff DR No. 227 Supp. 2, Supplemental Response to (h)).
 Wilson, Exh. JDW-26 (Avista's Response to Staff DR No. 227 Supp. 2, Supplemental Attachment A).

<sup>8</sup> Mullins, Exh. BGM-1T at 44:15-46:12.

1	Q.	Do you have a position on the COB market adjustment?
2	A.	No. I would like to review Avista's rebuttal testimony on this point before forming an
3		opinion.
4		
5		III. STAFF POSITION ON POWER COST FORECAST
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7	Q.	Please summarize the development of Staff's position on the power cost forecast.
8	A.	The position described below is primarily based on issues raised in my response
9		testimony, Exhibit JDW-1CT. Because many of the positions in that testimony required
10		updated modeling by Avista, and Staff also wanted to consider the positions developed
11		by other witnesses before requesting that modeling, Staff filed Data Requests 227 and
12		230 to request Avista conduct further modeling after reviewing all parties' response
13		testimony.
14		Subsequent to filing Data Request 227, I consulted informally with Avista witness
15		Kalich regarding accounting data for WEIM costs. This consultation resulted in further
16		refinement of Staff's position.
17		
18	Q.	Please summarize Staff's position.
19	A.	Based on Avista's modeling in response to Staff DR-227 and DR-230, Staff recommends
20		that Avista's system NPE forecast be increased from \$175.1 million to \$175.5 million.
21		This \$0.4 million net adjustment is comprised of three large adjustments and several
22		small adjustments that happen to nearly balance out.

The recommended NPE includes the \$43.1 million cost of CCA allowances associated with forecast wholesale sales. If the Commission determines that those costs should not be included in NPE, then the system NPE forecast should be reduced to \$132.4 million.

Table 1: Staff-Recommended Adjustments to Avista's System Power Cost Forecast for 2025

	Adjustment	<b>Testimony Source</b>	Exh. JDW-28C <sup>9</sup>
		Exh. JDW-1TC	Source
Exclude portfolio error			
adjustment	(65,756,061)	14:15-15:3	B-12
BPA tariff update	215,064	37:18-19	B-13
Natural gas transportation			
rate update	935,267	37:21-22	B-14
Omitted financial contract	(450,000)	38:6-7	B-15
WEIM costs not in Aurora		38:16-24	
WEINI Costs not in Autora	302,855	JDW-25 at 2	B-16
	Not relevant in		
Lancaster PPA	2025	40:16-41:5	
Rattlesnake Flats Wind			
Project	Included below	41:8-15	
Correction to start fuel			
error in Aurora	Included below	38:1-4	
Dispatch Colstrip to			
marginal fuel cost	393,293	39:2-3:7	B-20
Include CCA allowance			
price in dispatch and			
market purchases	21,591,885	31:19-22	B-21
CCA allowance cost for			
market sales	43,128,017	31:19-22	B-22
<b>Total System Adjustments</b>	\$ 360,320		

As shown in Table 2, Avista's Washington NPE revenue requirement should be increased from \$112.8 million to \$113.0 million.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Tab Comparison.

Account	System NPE
555 PURCHASED POWER	187,848
557 OTHER EXPENSES	43,728
501 THERMAL FUEL EXPENSE	32,051
547 OTHER FUEL EXPENSE	122,244
565 TRANSMISSION OF ELECTRICITY BY OTHERS	28,547
Total Expense	\$ 414,419
447 SALES FOR RESALE	224,560
456 OTHER ELECTRIC REVENUE	14,375
Total Revenue	\$ 238,934
Total Net Expense	\$ 175,484
<b>Total Washington NPE Revenue Requirement</b>	\$ 113,012

In addition to including CCA allowance costs for market sales in forecast power costs, the other two largest changes are removing Avista's portfolio forecast error and including the CCA allowance price in dispatch and market purchases. Removal of Avista's portfolio forecast of \$65,756,061 from the net power cost forecast is the largest single adjustment and the adjustment amount is unchanged from my response testimony.<sup>11</sup>

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Q. Please summarize your review of Avista's modeling that includes the CCA allowance price in dispatch and market purchases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Wilson, Exh. JDW-28C (Tab DR230 PC Accounts).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Wilson, Exh. JDW-1TC at 14:15-15:3.

1	A.	Avista's modeling found that including a CCA allowance price of \$71.15 per ton
2		resulted in a net increase of \$73,333,559 in power costs. 12 While I did not identify
3		any results that cause me to question whether Avista modeled the CCA allowance
4		price as described, I identified some small problems with how Aurora committed
5		units.
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7 Please explain why you believe there may be some problems with how Aurora Q. commits units when a CCA allowance price is included in dispatch decisions.

Avista's modeling (using \$71.15 per ton) includes hours with negative net wholesale sales revenue. It is problematic to see a so-called "perfect foresight" production cost model include hours with negative revenue hours.

Wholesale sales revenue includes sales revenue (wholesale sales times Mid-C price) and the cost of emissions allowances. For purposes of understanding model performance, I used Avista's allowance price of \$71.15 per ton. While the number of hours with negative net wholesale sales revenue is significant, the total amount of negative net revenue is relatively small, just which is less than 1 percent of the total net revenue of . While it would be ideal to correct this issue, from the perspective of whether or not the overall NPE forecast is reasonable, I do not consider this to be such a material problem that it requires immediate action.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Wilson, Exh. JDW-28C (Tab DR227CompRev Cell F103); Exh. JDW-25 (Avista's Response to Staff DR No. 227 Supp. 2, Supp. Response 2 to (h)). I note that Avista may have done similar modeling in response to Staff DR No. 230, but the data provided appear to have been mislabeled, and I was unable to get clarification from Avista.

1		Aurora appears to have <i>committed</i> units even when revenues from those units
2		were negative. For example, during a 36-hour period from July 5 at 11 pm to July 8
3		at 11 am, Avista's model shows net wholesale sales revenue losses of
4		most of which were incurred during a 16-hour period in which
5		. It seems irregular that the model would commit units at a loss
6		for such an extended period of time.
7		I considered whether Aurora may have committed units based on fuel prices,
8		but dispatched units based on both fuel and CCA allowance prices. However, I
9		learned from Avista staff that the model settings were set to include CCA allowance
10		prices in unit commitment decisions. Unless there is a software bug, Avista should
11		investigate to identify whether there is another explanation for the problematic
12		dispatch results and correct the problem in future filings.
13		
14	Q.	Is the \$71.15 per ton allowance price representative of recent market prices?
15	A.	No. In response to a data request, Avista acknowledges that recent market prices are
16		lower, but argues that its modeled price level reasonable reflects future costs
17		considering the following factors:
18		"Ecology has substantially exhausted its APCR allowances by releasing them
19		ahead of schedule," <sup>13</sup>
20		• "[L]inkage to California is unlikely through 2025 or longer," 14

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$  Wilson, Exh. JDW-25 (Avista's Response to Staff DR No. 227 Supp. 2, Supp. Response 2 to (h)).  $^{14}\ Id.$ 

1	<ul> <li>"Recent market prices are lower but based on limited volumes,"<sup>15</sup> and</li> </ul>
2	• "Recent auctions have lower prices, as well, but are biased lower in the
3	Company's view due to the pending citizen's initiative to repeal the law."16
4	For the most part, these arguments are not reasonable because this
5	information is available to the market and is "priced in" to the market and auction
5	prices. <sup>17</sup> The only exception is the consideration of the pending citizen's initiative to
7	repeal the CCA. That adds an element of risk that Avista might reasonably consider

8 differently than the market in its evaluation of an appropriate CCA allowance price 9 forecast.

> However, it is clearly not the case that Avista has considered any of this information in deciding to use a CCA allowance price forecast generated in 2022, when none of this information was available. This post hoc justification should be disregarded by the Commission.

In the absence of a better proposal, it is reasonable to rely on published market forward pricing for CCA allowance prices, a practice that is consistent with other practices in Avista's power cost forecast.

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<sup>16</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The weighted-average CCA allowance price for auctions 4 (December 2023), 5 (March 2024), and 6 (June 2024) is \$35.85 per ton. This value is reasonably close to the ICE forward of \$38.09, which likely includes a small premium for risk mitigation. I consider the use of market forwards preferable to historical actual costs where available, but both are reasonable and one or the other may be preferred due to the circumstances in which the price forecast is being used. Wilson, Exhs. JDW-29, JDW-30, and JDW 31.

#### Q. How did you forecast CCA allowance costs?

A. Using the three scenarios in Table 3, I forecast the cost of allowances to be \$4.0 million for Avista's proposal, \$43.1 million for the CCA allowance market price, and \$44.3 million for the Ecology CCA allowance forecast price. The prices I used are \$25.33, \$38.09, and \$71.15 per ton, respectively, as shown in Table 3.

In reviewing, the Commission should note that (a) the price difference between the Avista Proposal and the other two cases also includes significant adjustments, including removing Avista's "portfolio forecast error" cost proposal, and (b) the Avista Proposal only applied the emissions price to two gas combustion turbine units in Idaho. Notwithstanding those important differences, the three model runs give an idea of the sensitivity of emissions to dispatch prices.

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Table 3: 2025 System NPE Forecast Using Varying Emissions Dispatch Prices<sup>19</sup>

Case	Emissions Price per Ton	Forecast System NPE	Forecast Emissions (tons)	Emissions Relative to Proposal
Avista				n/a
Proposal	\$25.33	\$175.1 million	3.8 million	
CCA				
Allowance				
Market	\$38.09	\$175.5 million	3.1 million	-18%
Ecology CCA				
Allowance				
Forecast	\$71.15	\$228.8 million	2.3 million	-39%

-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Avista did not include this cost in proposed NPE. I calculated it based on Avista's emissions price and the resulting emissions from the two Idaho combustion turbine units.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Wilson, Exhs. JDW-28C (Tab Comparison); JDW-32C; JDW-33; JDW-34; and JDW-35C.

1	The \$38.09 per ton CCA allowance market price is a recent forward market
2	price for CCA allowances, which traded at about \$38 per ton according to the ICE
3	forward for December 2025 from August 1, 2024. <sup>20</sup>
4	If Avista dispatches its system using a market price for CCA allowances, its
5	2025 emissions are forecast to be reduced by 18% relative to its proposal.
6	Since Avista's responses to Staff DR 227 and DR 230 did not include
7	calculations of allowance costs, as requested, my forecast calculates allowance costs
8	on an hourly basis using the following method.
9	1. Calculate load net of zero-emissions generation (hydro, wind, and solar). In
10	other words, all zero-emissions generation is allocated to load first.
11	2. If there is additional load, then load is served using the most carbon-intensive
12	generation dispatched during the hour, in the following order: Colstrip,
13	market purchases, gas units.
14	3. Remaining generation is allocated to wholesale market sales. <sup>21</sup>
15	4. Emissions are calculated using Ecology-approved emissions factors
16	(tons/MWh).
17	5. Emissions costs are calculated as emissions times the allowance price (\$/ton).
18	This method is suggested because it maximizes the benefits of no-cost CCA
19	allowances to retail customers.
20	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Wilson, Exh. JDW-27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> In the case of Avista's proposal, if gas generation was allocated to wholesale market sales, allowances were calculated based on the minimum (a) gas generation allocated to wholesale market sales and (b) generation of the two Idaho gas combustion turbine units. This simplified method should be approved on if the Commission approves Avista's proposal.

Q.	Is the use of a CCA	allowance market	price economically	y sound?
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A. Yes, considering the basic economics, it is cost-efficient for Avista and other

Washington utilities to include the cost of CCA allowances in their dispatch

decisions. If Avista can sell a carbon allowance for \$40 per ton, and it costs Avista

\$39 per ton to reduce its emissions, then the net benefit to Avista's customers is \$1

per ton. For this basic reason, economic principles argue in favor of using the market

price for CCA allowances in operational dispatch decisions.

In contrast, if Avista dispatches as if it can sell a carbon allowance for \$96 per ton, but it can only sell a carbon allowance for \$40 per ton, the \$56 per ton difference represents a loss of revenue that will increase Avista's NPE. The Commission may find this difference justified, but it should consider the implications of this market inefficiency in its decision.

I will also note that from a strict economics point of view, the quantity of nocost carbon allowances provided by Ecology to Avista should be irrelevant to Avista's dispatch decisions. As illustrated in the example above, decisions to dispatch can create costs or value in the form of carbon allowance revenue just as surely as they can also create costs or value in the form of market power transactions. However, this "strict economics" point of view does not consider risks associated with the lack of foresight of carbon allowance supply, demand, and prices.

1 Q. If Staff determines that AWEC witness Mullins' adjustment for the California-2 Oregon Border (COB) market should be adopted, what effect would that have? The following adjustments would be made to Staff's position:<sup>22</sup> 3 A. 4 • Revise System Account 447 from \$224,560 to \$224,820; 5 Revise System Total Revenue from \$238,934 to \$239,195; 6 Revise System Total Net Expense from \$175,484 to \$175, 224; and Revise Washington NPE Revenue Requirement from \$113,012 to \$112,844. 8 9 Q. What net power cost forecast are you supporting? 10 I am supporting 2025 NPE of \$175,484, as summarized in Table 2 and a Washington A. 11 NPE Revenue Requirement from \$113,012, as summarized in Table 2. 12 13 Does this conclude your cross-answer testimony? Q.

<sup>22</sup> Wilson, JDW-28C (Tab DR 230 PC Accounts).

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A.

Yes.