1	Q.	Please state your name, business address and present position with
2		PacifiCorp (the Company).
3	А.	My name is Donald N. Furman. My business address is 825 NE Multnomah,
4		Suite 2000, Portland, Oregon 97232. My present position is Senior Vice
5		President, Regulation and External Affairs.
6	Qual	ifications
7	Q.	Briefly describe your educational and professional background.
8	A.	I hold a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics from Northwestern University and
9		a Juris Doctorate degree from Lewis and Clark Law School. Before assuming my
10		present position with PacifiCorp, I served as Vice President of Transmission, Vice
11		President of Domestic Business Development, and President of the Company's
12		unregulated power marketing subsidiary.
13	Q.	What are your responsibilities as Senior Vice President, Regulation and
14		External Affairs?
15	A.	I oversee all regulatory matters, including rate cases, before six state utility
16		commissions and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. I am also
17		responsible for all of the Company's government relations activities at both the
18		state and federal level.
19	Purp	ose and Summary of Testimony
20	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony?
21	А.	My testimony describes changes in PacifiCorp's situation that make this filing
22		necessary. The Company faces high and fluctuating costs together with a need for
23		sustained and increased levels of new capital investment. The combination

1		challenges our ability to provide safe and reliable service at a reasonable cost and
2		this situation is likely to persist. We are presently earning only about 3.5 percent
3		on our equity capital. Now is the time for the Commission and the Company to
4		work together and address these issues. While the challenge is new, the basic
5		principles are not. My testimony reviews traditional ratemaking principles and
6		applies them in the form of new regulatory mechanisms that will help deal with
7		this situation on an ongoing basis.
8		This filing requests a significant increase in rates, nearly 18 percent. I
9		introduce the testimony of other Company witnesses who explain the cost
10		increases that have led to this rate request and I describe actions that PacifiCorp
11		has taken to keep prices low.
12	Pacif	iCorp's Situation
12 13	Pacif Q.	iCorp's Situation Please describe the extent of the changes affecting PacifiCorp.
		-
13	Q.	Please describe the extent of the changes affecting PacifiCorp.
13 14	Q.	Please describe the extent of the changes affecting PacifiCorp. The crisis in Western power markets in 2000 and 2001 changed the electricity
13 14 15	Q.	Please describe the extent of the changes affecting PacifiCorp.The crisis in Western power markets in 2000 and 2001 changed the electricity industry. At the same time, related markets for other forms of energy changed as
13 14 15 16	Q.	 Please describe the extent of the changes affecting PacifiCorp. The crisis in Western power markets in 2000 and 2001 changed the electricity industry. At the same time, related markets for other forms of energy changed as well. The after-effects have continued to ripple through the entire energy sector.
13 14 15 16 17	Q.	 Please describe the extent of the changes affecting PacifiCorp. The crisis in Western power markets in 2000 and 2001 changed the electricity industry. At the same time, related markets for other forms of energy changed as well. The after-effects have continued to ripple through the entire energy sector. Compared to the period of the late 1990s:
 13 14 15 16 17 18 	Q.	 Please describe the extent of the changes affecting PacifiCorp. The crisis in Western power markets in 2000 and 2001 changed the electricity industry. At the same time, related markets for other forms of energy changed as well. The after-effects have continued to ripple through the entire energy sector. Compared to the period of the late 1990s: Energy costs are now higher and more volatile;
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 	Q.	 Please describe the extent of the changes affecting PacifiCorp. The crisis in Western power markets in 2000 and 2001 changed the electricity industry. At the same time, related markets for other forms of energy changed as well. The after-effects have continued to ripple through the entire energy sector. Compared to the period of the late 1990s: Energy costs are now higher and more volatile; Environmental concerns and a strengthening economy require more

1		• Reliable service requires more investment in transmission and other
2		infrastructure;
3		• Interest rates are rising; and
4		• Accounting rules have changed, putting more pressure on utility financial
5		statements.
6		In addition, many companies like PacifiCorp also face increases in the general
7		cost of doing business, such as for pensions and benefits.
8		I will discuss each of these important developments in turn. The
9		consequence is that in order to provide reliable service at reasonable cost,
10		PacifiCorp is required to commit substantial amounts of new capital but our
11		ability to do so is under increased pressure.
12	Q.	Are energy costs now higher and more volatile?
13	A.	Yes, today's high energy costs are easy to see in everyday life. It is important to
14		understand that this situation is likely to persist. The 2005 Biennial Energy
15		Report: Issues and Analysis for the Washington State Legislature and Governor ¹
16		summarized the situation this way:
17 18 19 20 21		"Since 1999, average electricity prices have increased by a third, gasoline has increased over fifty percent, and natural gas has doubled. Petroleum and natural gas prices have been driven higher by numerous domestic and international events ranging from hurricanes in the Gulf Coast to rapidly increasing petroleum demand in China and India, to more rapid decline in natural gas well production than originally predicted. Overall, the supply

¹ State of Washington, Department of Community, Trade and Economic Development (CTED). See http://qa.cted.wa.gov/_CTED/documents/ID_1872_Publications.pdf

1		In an article in the Vancouver Daily Columbian dated January 23, 2005, ² Terry
2		Morlan, Manager of Economic Analysis for the Northwest Power and
3		Conservation Council, said:
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17		"[T]he region and nation are facing the greatest energy pessimism since the oil embargo of 1973. Turmoil in the Middle East that has contributed to high oil prices does not appear to have much hope of diminishing anytime soon. Many analysts of the domestic situation now expect that production of conventional natural gas in North America may be near its peak and unable to meet the needs of a growing economy. That is what happened to domestic oil production around 1970. Unconventional natural gas supplies, pipeline gas from Alaska, and imported natural gas in liquefied form (LNG) will be more expensive and take several years to come on line. In the meantime, natural gas prices are expected to remain high and volatile, exhibiting extreme sensitivity to weather and storage level variations."
18 19		Volatile prices for other forms of energy affect wholesale electricity prices. Even
20		after the end of the Western energy crisis of 2000 and 2001, wholesale power
21		prices have fluctuated markedly. The Direct Testimony of Mark Widmer shows
22		how the volatility of PacifiCorp's power costs has increased in recent years.
23	Q.	Without new regulatory mechanisms, how does this volatility affect
24		PacifiCorp?
25	A.	A large increase in cost reduces PacifiCorp's financial resources just as it would
26		for any other company. A large increase in costs can:
27		• Put pressure on deferrable programs;
28		• Increase the need for borrowing; and
29		• Reduce PacifiCorp's attractiveness to potential creditors and equity investors,
30		further increasing the cost of obtaining funds.

 $^{^{2}\} http://www.columbian.com/working/forecast/energy.cfm$

1		PacifiCorp buys a lot of energy so volatility in energy costs has a company-wide
2		impact. Mr. Widmer shows that PacifiCorp's Net Power Costs, primarily
3		composed of fuel and purchased power costs net of wholesale energy sales
4		revenue, are approximately \$830 million per year for the Company as a whole.
5		PacifiCorp has total annual retail sales of approximately \$2,500 million. Power
6		costs are between one-third and one-fourth of the total revenue requirement and
7		increases have a correspondingly large impact.
8		Many of PacifiCorp's non-power costs are fixed and others, while not
9		fixed, cannot easily be reduced without affecting service. Large construction
10		projects can require several years to complete. Additionally, PacifiCorp's system
11		requires ongoing maintenance and customer service. Large cost fluctuations
12		make management of these programs more difficult and may reduce the
13		Company's ability to deliver the level of service that our customers would wish.
14	Q.	Earlier you stated that environmental concerns and a strengthening economy
15		require substantial investment in electricity generation. Please describe the
16		environmental concerns to which you were referring.
17	A.	There are two main areas of environmental concern: air emissions and relicensing
18		our hydroelectric facilities. Regarding the first, PacifiCorp estimates that it will
19		spend between \$500 million and \$1.7 billion on capital and expenses related to
20		emission controls between now and 2025. The majority of PacifiCorp's existing
21		generation is fueled by coal. Coal has provided our customers with power at low
22		and stable costs for many years but environmental regulations now require
23		substantial investments to reduce emissions. The cost will depend on the

Direct Testimony of Donald N. Furman

Exhibit No.__(DNF-1T) Page 5

1		particular technologies that environmental regulators require. Costs could be
2		higher than the estimate since it does not consider the cost of potential regulations
3		to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. This issue and the Company's response to it
4		are described in PacifiCorp's 2004 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), which was
5		filed with the Commission in January 2005 (Docket No. UE-050095).
6	Q.	Are these costs reflected in the present rate request?
7	A.	No. Standard regulatory practice allows PacifiCorp to begin recovery in rates
8		only when investments are made and the equipment goes into service. PacifiCorp
9		finances investments using a combination of internal funds and borrowing.
10	Q.	Your estimate of the costs of air emission control costs covered a period of
11		twenty years. Are these costs a distant concern?
12	A.	No, work is already beginning. In July 2004, PacifiCorp approved a project that
13		will update and improve emission controls on its Huntington Unit 2, a 450
14		megawatt coal-fired power plant. Construction will have begun by the time this
15		proceeding is concluded.
16	Q.	You mentioned that PacifiCorp is relicensing its hydroelectric facilities.
17	A.	Yes. PacifiCorp is in the process of relicensing a number of its hydroelectric
18		projects. The IRP states that PacifiCorp has incurred over \$54 million of process
19		costs alone. New requirements contained in FERC licenses or decommissioning
20		orders could cost over \$2 billion over the next 30 to 50 years. In addition,
21		relicensing may result in operational restrictions that could increase net power
22		costs. About 90 percent of these relicensing costs relate to PacifiCorp's three
23		largest projects: Lewis River, Klamath River and North Umpqua.

- Q. 1
 - Is PacifiCorp planning to acquire new sources of electricity?

2	A.	Yes, in fact the Company is already acquiring new resources. PacifiCorp has
3		recently committed to the acquisition of natural gas-fired generating capability in
4		Utah, wind generation in Oregon and Idaho, long-term purchased power
5		contracts, and the output of large PURPA qualifying facilities in Utah. These
6		acquisitions are discussed in the Direct Testimony of Mark Tallman. Exhibit
7		No(DNF-2), taken from PacifiCorp's IRP, illustrates the need for new
8		resources now and over then next ten years. In total, we are presently in the
9		process of adding approximately 2,300 megawatts of resources to the system. In
10		addition, the IRP calls for the acquisition of some 2,600 megawatts of generation
11		and purchases plus approximately 200 megawatts of load control programs. Not
12		shown in the chart are approximately 230 average megawatts of energy
13		conservation that we have acquired and 200 average megawatts to be additionally
14		acquired over the next ten years. ³ New IRP generation, excluding the resources
15		that PacifiCorp is presently acquiring, is expected to require capital investment of
16		\$2.67 billion in inflation-adjusted 2004 dollars. ⁴
17	Q.	What is causing the need for new generation?
18	А.	The economy is growing again and consumers are using more power. In addition,
19		a number of PacifiCorp's existing long-term power purchase contracts will expire

- 19
- 20

and need to be replaced. The IRP concludes that PacifiCorp's energy sales will


³ Energy conservation programs are not shown because the IRP models them as reductions in energy sales and not as new resources. Nonetheless, they are an important part of the plan. See the IRP Technical Appendix, page 44.

⁴ IRP Technical Appendix, page 71.

grow by 2.1 percent per year over then next ten years.⁵ This compares to growth of only 1.3 percent per year from 1991 to 2003. Loads are expected to become more heavily concentrated on peak hours as well. Peak loads are expected to grow at 3.0 percent per year over the next ten years, a total increase of over 2,100 megawatts. At the same time, the capability of existing resources is expected to fall by approximately 2,300 megawatts, due mostly to the expiration of purchase contracts.⁶

8 Q. You mentioned that the economy is growing.

9 A. Yes. Economic growth is evident nationally and throughout PacifiCorp's service
10 area. The rebound of the economy in Washington State is particularly striking.
11 The following chart shows total employment in Washington State.⁷



employment

12

⁵ See PacifiCorp's IRP, page 44.

⁶ As shown in Exhibit No.__(DNF-2).

⁷ Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,

http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?series_id=LASST53000005&data_tool=%22EaG%22

1		Total employment retreated in 2000 and 2001 but has come back strongly since.
2		The most recent state economic forecast predicts continued strong employment
3		growth through the end of 2007. ⁸ PacifiCorp's IRP forecasts that peak electricity
4		load will continue to grow in our Washington service area at a rate of 1.8 percent
5		per year. Economic growth means jobs for the citizens of the state. Continued
6		growth requires a reliable energy infrastructure to support it and that requires
7		utility investment.
8	Q.	Could investments in new generation be avoided by an aggressive program of
9		energy conservation and renewable resources?
10	A.	No, but they can help. PacifiCorp's current IRP calls for substantial acquisition
11		of energy conservation and renewable resources. Those resources, while
12		important, have limited ability to meet our energy needs. To the extent that they
13		are economically available, renewable resources like wind resolve PacifiCorp's
14		acquisition challenge to only a limited degree because we need to acquire 100
15		MW of wind for every 20 MW of capacity requirement. The cost is uncertain
16		because of uncertainty surrounding Federal production tax credits for wind power
17		and uncertainty about the operational impact of adding large amounts of
18		intermittent resources. Wind is one of the alternatives but not a complete
19		solution.
20		Conservation, coupled with a mechanism for promptly recovering its costs
21		such as Washington's System Benefits Charge, can make a real contribution. I

⁸ Washington State Office of the Forecast Council, Preliminary February 2005 Economic Forecast, http://www.erfc.wa.gov/pubs/t0205.pdf

1		discuss regulatory mechanisms to support energy conservation programs, among
2		other things, later in my testimony.
3	Q.	Could PacifiCorp avoid investing in new generation by relying on third-
4		party power suppliers?
5	A.	Not entirely. While PacifiCorp does not hold a preference between buying power
6		from third-party suppliers or generating it from owned resources, recent
7		experience has demonstrated that third parties are not always willing or able to
8		economically supply power when and where needed. Certainly compared to the
9		period of the late 1990s, third-party developers have much less ability to finance
10		projects without long-term utility support. Washington State's 2003 Energy
11		Strategy Update ⁹ characterized the situation as follows:
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23		"Capital investment tightened considerably in 2001 and 2002. On the federal level, BPA has begun to approach the limits of its federal borrowing authority, a situation that could make it very difficult for the region to upgrade and expand its transmission system. Increased wholesale power costs, decline in demand, and the collapse of the wholesale spot market have threatened both public and private utilities' ability to borrow and caused their credit ratings to suffer. In the wake of the Enron collapse, the financial position of independent power producers is extremely precarious. Liquidity in the wholesale energy markets has also suffered limiting their potential to provide products and services, such as hedging instruments to utilities." (Section 2, page 5)
24		Power suppliers such as marketers and third-party generation owners now seem
25		much less willing to invest in projects without long-term firm commitments by
26		utilities. Such commitments represent financial obligations that burden a utility's
27		financial structure in ways similar to increased debt.


⁹ CTED, 2003 Biennial Energy Report, Energy Strategy Update: Responding to the New Electricity Landscape, February 2003.

Q.	Is generation the only area requiring substantial new investment by the
	Company?
A.	No, the Company is making substantial investments in its power transmission and
	distribution network as well. Reliability requires both adequate generating
	capability and adequate ability to deliver the power to consumers. The region's,
	indeed the nation's, energy infrastructure requires improvement. In a recent
	report to Congress, ¹⁰ the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said,
	"[O]ur energy supplies have witnessed problems, most notably in 2003 when the largest blackout in U.S. history left as many as 50 million people in the dark. Further, there have been indications that our energy infrastructure has not kept up with changes in our demand for energy as illustrated by the electricity sector's transmission constraints periodically limiting the flow of electricity in parts of the country." (page 2)
	Earlier, I quoted CTED regarding approaching limits on BPA's ability to finance
	new transmission. The broad trend that concerns the GAO applies to PacifiCorp's
	system as well. PacifiCorp's IRP identifies certain transmission investments
	related to growth and expansion of the system. These total \$462 million over the
	next ten years. ¹¹ Far larger in total are the many smaller investments not reflected
	in the IRP. Exhibit No(DNF-3) shows excerpts from PacifiCorp's most recent
	Form 10-K. Table 1 shows that PacifiCorp spends in excess of \$350 million per
	year of capital on its network.
	-

¹⁰ "Meeting Energy Demand in the 21st Century: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives," March 16, 2005. ¹¹ IRP Technical Appendix, page 71.

1	Q.	In total, how much capital spending does PacifiCorp expect in the next
2		several years?
3	А.	Exhibit No(DNF-3) shows that the Company's capital expenditure program is
4		increasing and will exceed \$1 billion per year by FY 2006. ¹²
5	Q.	Is this more than the funds generated by the Company's operations?
6	А.	Yes. Exhibit No(DNF-3) Table 2 shows that PacifiCorp was required to raise
7		over \$1.3 billion from new equity and long term debt in the fiscal years 2002-
8		2004. Even more funds will be needed in the future, as indicated in the Direct
9		Testimony of Bruce Williams.
10	Q.	Should the cost of this financing be of concern to the Commission?
11	A.	Yes. Interest rates are rising. At the macroeconomic level, trends in interest rates
12		are depicted in the following chart: ¹³

13



14

¹² The current fiscal year. PacifiCorp's fiscal year 2006 goes from April 2005 through March 2006.

1		After falling for three years, the bellwether Federal Funds interest rate rose for
2		most of 2004 and continues to rise in 2005. The Direct Testimony of Samuel
3		Hadaway shows that interest rates for corporate bonds are projected to increase
4		from about 5.3 percent to 6.2 percent by the second quarter of 2006. PacifiCorp
5		must expect to pay a higher return to meet future new capital requirements than it
6		has paid in the most recent past.
7	Q.	Does the amount that PacifiCorp must pay for funds depend on the strength
8		of PacifiCorp's financial statements?
9	A.	Yes. A key danger, one that would affect PacifiCorp's customers significantly, is
10		the possibility that PacifiCorp's debt could be downgraded. The relationship
11		between PacifiCorp's financial condition and its bond rating is discussed in the
12		Direct Testimony of Bruce Williams.
13	Q.	Have changes in accounting rules affected PacifiCorp's financial statements?
14	A.	Yes. Accounting rules are actively changing, affecting all companies. The
15		Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and other rule changes have increased a wide range
16		of requirements. Two accounting developments related to power procurement are
17		worth particular mention.
18		The first development is known as EITF 01-08. The Emerging Issues
10		
19		Task Force (EITF) of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has
19 20		Task Force (EITF) of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has issued an accounting determination related to "off balance sheet financing."

¹³Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,

1		lease. If they do, an evaluation must be performed using specific accounting
2		standards to determine if the lease is capital or operating. If it is designated to be
3		a capital lease, PacifiCorp would be required to record the value of the asset as
4		debt directly on its balance sheet. This new source of direct debt would require
5		PacifiCorp to add equity to the business in order to maintain its debt/equity ratio.
6		The cost of this equity can increase the effective cost of the resource contract.
7		Second, accounting rules now require that a utility's earnings reflect
8		changes in the overall value of market contracts. This can magnify the earnings
9		impact of volatile market prices since earnings are affected not just by changes in
10		today's costs but also by changes in price projections for the future.
11	0	Suppose that a particular contractual resource did not most the
11	Q.	Suppose that a particular contractual resource did not meet the
12	Q.	requirements of EITF 01-08 so that debt was not added directly to
	Q.	
12	ų.	requirements of EITF 01-08 so that debt was not added directly to
12 13	Q. A.	requirements of EITF 01-08 so that debt was not added directly to PacifiCorp's balance sheet. Could the contract still affect PacifiCorp's credit
12 13 14	-	requirements of EITF 01-08 so that debt was not added directly to PacifiCorp's balance sheet. Could the contract still affect PacifiCorp's credit rating?
12 13 14 15	-	requirements of EITF 01-08 so that debt was not added directly to PacifiCorp's balance sheet. Could the contract still affect PacifiCorp's credit rating? Yes. Major credit rating agencies and other members of the financial community
12 13 14 15 16	-	requirements of EITF 01-08 so that debt was not added directly to PacifiCorp's balance sheet. Could the contract still affect PacifiCorp's credit rating? Yes. Major credit rating agencies and other members of the financial community now view contractual resources as being like debt and will impute or infer debt on
12 13 14 15 16 17	-	 requirements of EITF 01-08 so that debt was not added directly to PacifiCorp's balance sheet. Could the contract still affect PacifiCorp's credit rating? Yes. Major credit rating agencies and other members of the financial community now view contractual resources as being like debt and will impute or infer debt on the purchaser's financial statements. These adjustments will then be used for
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	-	requirements of EITF 01-08 so that debt was not added directly to PacifiCorp's balance sheet. Could the contract still affect PacifiCorp's credit rating? Yes. Major credit rating agencies and other members of the financial community now view contractual resources as being like debt and will impute or infer debt on the purchaser's financial statements. These adjustments will then be used for ratio calculations and ratings purposes. Bruce Williams and Christy Omohundro

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FEDFUNDS/118

1		equity into account when considering new power supply alternatives. Regulatory
2		mechanisms can reduce this cost, however, as I describe later in my testimony.
3		
4	Rate	making Principles
5	Q.	You have discussed a long list of big industry challenges. What ratemaking
6		principles should the Commission apply in addressing them?
7	A.	The Commission should apply traditional ratemaking principles in ways
8		appropriate to today's situation. James C. Bonbright, who wrote the classic
9		exposition of ratemaking principles, ¹⁴ discusses four primary functions of public
10		utility rates. These are:
11		1. "The Production-Motivation or Capital-Attraction Function"
12		Regarding the meaning and significance of this function, it seems clearest to
13		quote Bonbright directly:
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25		"One of the most obvious functions of prices in general is that of motivating and enabling people to participate in the production and distribution of commodities This is also one of the most prominent and most widely recognized functions of public utility rates. Public utility companies are permitted to impose charges for their services largely in order to induce and enable them to supply these services and to make provision for their continuation and for their required expansion In public utility cases in which the general <i>level</i> of rates (as distinct from the rate structure) is at issue, the capital-attraction standard of reasonable rates tends to be accepted by commissions as the primary basis for their decisions." (Pages 92-3. Emphasis in original.)
26		Bonbright also notes:
27 28		"In one important respect, the capital-attraction role of utility rates differs from the similar role played by unregulated, competitive prices. A private,

¹⁴ Bonbright, Danielsen and Kamerschen, <u>Principles of Public Utility Rates</u>, Second Edition 1988, Public Utilities Reports, Inc. The first edition of this book was published in 1961.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	nonutility firm is under no legal obligation to expand output beyond the point that it deems desirable on grounds of profit maximization. But most utilities are under a legal duty to supply adequate service within their franchise territories. Hence, they lack the freedom enjoyed by private businesses to base their expansion program on an estimate of profitability." (Page 95)
8	2. "The Efficiency Incentive Function"
9	Here Bonbright refers to the function of prices to "impel rival producers to strive
10	to reduce their own production costs" (page 95.) Bonbright observes that the
11	"incentive-encouragement features of orthodox rate regulation are extremely
12	crude, and one may suggest that they are very ineffective in comparison with the
13	stimulation of direct and active competition. Whether or not the situation lends
14	itself to material improvement [by relating rates of return to estimates of
15	efficiency] is a controversial question" (page 96)
16	3. "The Demand-Control or Consumer-Rationing Function"
17	This refers to the function of price to signal to consumers the cost of a service. In
18	response, consumers may reduce or expand their consumption. "[P]ublic utility
19	rates are designed to avoid the necessity for overt rationing by making the
20	consumers, in effect, ration themselves." (page 97) Utility rates restrict "the
21	demand for service to those demands for which consumers are ready to cover
22	costs of rendition" (page 100)
23	4. "The Compensatory Income-Transfer Function"
24	This function deals with divergences of price from cost for the purposes of
25	transferring income. Low-income rates, for instance, would be justified under this
26	function. "Very wisely, in our opinion, the literature on utility and rate theory
27	generally supports" a standard under which prices merely offset costs. (page 103)

1	
2	There are clearly tensions among these functions. Issues presented in this filing
3	will highlight the tension between the Capital-Attraction Function and the
4	Efficiency Incentive Function. Regulatory mechanisms that reduce risk to the
5	Company provide a better environment for the attraction of capital but they may
6	also seem to reduce management's incentives for efficiency. I would make three
7	general observations regarding this tension:
8	• The present and likely future industry environment makes capital attraction
9	much more important than it has been. Regulation should respond to this and
10	favor capital attraction more than it has in the past.
11	• The present and likely future industry environment places more risk on the
12	Company than it has faced in the past. For the Company to remain in the
13	same risk position, new regulatory mechanisms to manage risk are needed.
14	• Placing risk on the Company is not an efficiency incentive if the Company
15	can do nothing about the risk. Power markets are outside of the Company's
16	control. While the Company does take actions to control its power costs and
17	will continue to have incentives to do so, too much uncontrollable risk can
18	lead to inefficient responses. It could cause the Company to focus on risk
19	control at the expense of building for the long term. More risk could be
20	counterproductive to the Efficiency Incentive Function.

1

2

Q. How should the Commission strike a balance among the ratemaking principles?

A. The Commission should authorize a rate of return that will allow the Company to
readily attract the capital it needs and provide a real opportunity to earn that rate
of return.

The Company is requesting that the Commission authorize a return of 6 7 11.125 percent on its equity capital. This request is described in the Direct 8 Testimony of Samuel Hadaway. It is in line with returns recently authorized for 9 other similar utilities around the country. This return is often referred to as the 10 "cost of equity." Even though the cost of equity is not treated as a cost in the 11 Company's accounting records, it is truly a cost in that it is the opportunity cost to 12 investors, the amount they could earn by investing in other utilities. As a real 13 cost, the Company should have a real opportunity to recover it. It is a given in 14 regulation that a utility should have an "opportunity to earn its authorized rate of 15 return." The "opportunity" must not be only a mathematical possibility. In the 16 Company's view, the "opportunity" to earn its authorized rate of return should 17 mean that if the Company behaves prudently, it can *expect* to earn its authorized 18 rate of return. As I have discussed earlier in this testimony, the Company will 19 require substantial new equity and debt in the coming years in order to provide 20 reliable service. Our proposed regulatory approach will help ensure that the 21 needed funds are available and the needed investments can be made.

1	Q.	Is this approach consistent with Washington State energy policy?
2	A.	Yes. It is not only consistent but I believe it is required. The 2003 Energy
3		Strategy adopts as a Guiding Principle, "Foster a predictable and stable
4		investment climate to facilitate adequate and efficient access to capital markets
5		for Washington's public and private energy industry." ¹⁵ The report notes:
6 7 8 9 10		"Electricity system investments, be they in generation, distribution, transmission, or energy efficiency, are by their very nature capital intensive. Consequently, access to capital markets is critical to the future viability of the state's electricity system."
11	Propo	osed Regulatory Mechanisms – PCAM, Decoupling and Revised Protocol
12	Q.	What regulatory mechanisms does the Company propose in this filing?
13	A.	PacifiCorp proposes three key regulatory mechanisms to support continued
14		reliable operations. PacifiCorp proposes:
15		• A new Power Cost Adjustment Mechanism (PCAM) to deal with volatility in
16		power costs;
17		• Development and adoption of a decoupling mechanism to support
18		implementation of energy conservation programs; and
19		• The Revised Protocol method of allocating PacifiCorp's costs among its state
20		jurisdictions.
21		The first two of these would implement new mechanisms while the third resolves
22		a long-standing issue of standard ratemaking.
23	Q.	Please summarize the PCAM that PacifiCorp proposes in this case.
24	A.	The proposed PCAM is very similar to Avista Corporation's Energy Recovery
25		Mechanism (ERM). It would establish a bookkeeping account into which would

1		be recorded ninety percent of the difference between (1) the level of power costs
2		authorized by the Commission when setting rates in this proceeding and (2) the
3		actual level of power costs. The account balance would be adjusted to reflect
4		changes in recovery of power costs through base rates. Amounts entered into the
5		account could be either positive or negative. PacifiCorp would file to recover
6		from or refund to customers the balance of the account when the balance exceeds
7		a specified threshold. The specifics of the PCAM would depend on the particular
8		form of decoupling agreed upon by the parties as I describe later in my testimony.
9		Christy Omohundro and Mark Widmer discuss the PCAM in greater detail.
10	Q.	Has PacifiCorp had a PCAM in Washington before?
11	A.	No. As I described earlier in my testimony, the combined effects of greater power
12		cost volatility and higher levels of investment make a PCAM necessary at this
13		time. PacifiCorp has filed or intends to file PCAMs in each of its jurisdictions.
14	Q.	How does the PCAM support the ratemaking principles that you have
15		discussed?
16	A.	The PCAM would improve the Company's ability to earn its authorized rate of
17		return. At present, unanticipated changes in power costs are not generally
18		recovered in rates at all since rates are based upon expected or normal power costs
19		and are not "trued up" to actual costs. The PCAM would do this - true up rates to
20		actual power costs, leaving a reduced portion of the volatility with shareholders.
21		The PCAM would strengthen the degree to which PacifiCorp's rates support the
22		Capital Attraction Function, as Christy Omohundro describes in her Direct

¹⁵ 2003 Biennial Energy Report, page 2-5.

1		Testimony, and lower the amount of debt inferred for contractual resources by
2		credit rating agencies and reducing the cost of new capital. The PCAM will not
3		have a material negative effect on the Efficiency Incentive Function because:
4		• Power cost volatility is largely outside the Company's control;
5		• Stronger regulatory sanctions related to prudence are available to the
6		Commission which are more directly focused on Company decisions and give
7		the Company incentives to control costs; and
8		• The Company will still bear a meaningful share of power cost risk.
9		The PCAM has no effect on the Income-Transfer Function.
10		The PCAM supports the Demand-Control Function of rates far more
11		strongly than existing regulation. Today, if power prices rose unexpectedly
12		consumers might never know it because unexpected power costs are generally not
13		reflected in rates. Consumers are in a position to influence power costs too, by
14		controlling the amount they use. Today consumers have no incentive to reduce
15		the amount they use when costs rise unexpectedly. The PCAM would improve
16		this situation by providing price signals that link the Company's actual costs to
17		the prices paid by consumers.
18	Q.	What is "decoupling"?
19	A.	"Decoupling" refers to regulatory mechanisms that reduce or remove the link
20		between a utility's revenue and its sales as a means of reducing or eliminating any
21		financial disincentives to DSM investment. Generally a decoupling mechanism
22		would specify a baseline revenue requirement formula, for instance related to the
23		number of the utility's customers. Differences between actual and baseline

1		revenues would be recorded into a balancing account to be later refunded to or
2		recovered from customers. If a utility implements a large, effective energy
3		conservation program, sales of electricity may fall. The utility would be
4		penalized for successful conservation efforts without decoupling.
5	Q.	Why is PacifiCorp proposing the development of a decoupling mechanism in
6		this proceeding?
7	A.	Decoupling was discussed in Docket No. UE-032065. In that proceeding, the
8		Commission ordered:
9 10 11 12 13		"PacifiCorp may propose a true-up mechanism, or some other approach to reducing or eliminating any financial disincentives to DSM investment. This could be in connection with a general rate proceeding such as the Company suggests will be filed sometime in 2005" (Order No. 06,¶ 69)
14		In the spirit of that finding, the Company proposes that a decoupling mechanism
15		be developed in this proceeding.
16		Apart from addressing the issue identified in the Commission's order, a
17		decoupling mechanism is appropriate for other reasons as well. Decoupling
18		supports the Efficiency Incentive Function of rates by removing a disincentive for
19		the utility to invest in conservation programs that are cost-efficient alternatives to
20		new generation. Decoupling also supports the Capital Attraction Function by
21		stabilizing revenues from year to year.
22		Decoupling is particularly appropriate when combined with a PCAM. A
23		utility's non-power costs tend to be more stable than its power costs. Today, for
24		instance, when a cold winter increases electricity usage, customers pay more - not
25		just for the power cost portion of their rate – but for all of it. While the utility's
26		power costs increase in such a situation, its non-power costs do not change much.

1		Thus, the increased costs borne by customers may exceed the actual cost increases
2		incurred by the utility. The effect of including a decoupling mechanism with a
3		PCAM is to stabilize the excess of revenues over power costs. The combination
4		of decoupling and a PCAM will result in prices paid by customers that more
5		closely reflect actual costs compared to standard ratemaking.
6	Q.	Why hasn't PacifiCorp proposed a specific decoupling mechanism in its
7		direct case?
8	A.	The Commission's order suggests that a decoupling mechanism should be
9		developed in consultation with other parties. A cooperative approach is
10		appropriate since a variety of specific mechanisms can be used to implement
11		decoupling and parties appear to have different views regarding those
12		mechanisms.
12 13	Q.	mechanisms. Has PacifiCorp considered any specific methods of decoupling?
	Q. A.	
13		Has PacifiCorp considered any specific methods of decoupling?
13 14		Has PacifiCorp considered any specific methods of decoupling? Over the years, PacifiCorp has reviewed decoupling mechanisms approved by
13 14 15		Has PacifiCorp considered any specific methods of decoupling? Over the years, PacifiCorp has reviewed decoupling mechanisms approved by commissions in the states we serve. From this experience, we conclude that the
13 14 15 16		Has PacifiCorp considered any specific methods of decoupling? Over the years, PacifiCorp has reviewed decoupling mechanisms approved by commissions in the states we serve. From this experience, we conclude that the decoupling mechanism needs to fit the utility's situation and previous precedent
13 14 15 16 17		Has PacifiCorp considered any specific methods of decoupling? Over the years, PacifiCorp has reviewed decoupling mechanisms approved by commissions in the states we serve. From this experience, we conclude that the decoupling mechanism needs to fit the utility's situation and previous precedent in that state. The California PUC, for instance, has generally used a similar
13 14 15 16 17 18		Has PacifiCorp considered any specific methods of decoupling? Over the years, PacifiCorp has reviewed decoupling mechanisms approved by commissions in the states we serve. From this experience, we conclude that the decoupling mechanism needs to fit the utility's situation and previous precedent in that state. The California PUC, for instance, has generally used a similar approach for many years. Tariffs of large utilities separately state charges for
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 		Has PacifiCorp considered any specific methods of decoupling? Over the years, PacifiCorp has reviewed decoupling mechanisms approved by commissions in the states we serve. From this experience, we conclude that the decoupling mechanism needs to fit the utility's situation and previous precedent in that state. The California PUC, for instance, has generally used a similar approach for many years. Tariffs of large utilities separately state charges for power costs and for other costs. Base rates (which exclude power costs) of these
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 		Has PacifiCorp considered any specific methods of decoupling? Over the years, PacifiCorp has reviewed decoupling mechanisms approved by commissions in the states we serve. From this experience, we conclude that the decoupling mechanism needs to fit the utility's situation and previous precedent in that state. The California PUC, for instance, has generally used a similar approach for many years. Tariffs of large utilities separately state charges for power costs and for other costs. Base rates (which exclude power costs) of these utilities are reviewed on a fixed three-year rate case cycle. The PUC approves

balance of the account is refunded to or recovered from customers the following
year. The power cost portion of rates in California is adjusted in a separate annual
process. The California PUC requires utilities to track their actual power costs in
a separate account and to fully pass them through to customers. These two
mechanisms together allow utilities to recover no more and no less than their
authorized base revenue requirements.

7

8

Q. Could adoption of a decoupling mechanism affect other aspects of the Company's filed case?

9 A. Yes it could, although parties may be able to develop a decoupling mechanism 10 that minimizes the impact. For instance, adoption of a full decoupling mechanism 11 like California's would be inconsistent with the PCAM we are proposing in this 12 proceeding, in two respects. First, the decoupling mechanism would duplicate a 13 base rate recovery adjustment which is already included in the PCAM we are 14 proposing. Second, the 90/10 sharing mechanism proposed in the PCAM is 15 inconsistent with "100 percent" decoupling. With an increase in sales, PacifiCorp 16 would be able to recover only 90 percent of the additional power costs and would 17 be unable to retain any of the added sales revenue. Some form of partial 18 decoupling might avoid this inconsistency. In discussions regarding decoupling, 19 parties will need to consider such effects.

20 **Q.**

How does PacifiCorp propose to resolve the decoupling issue in this

- 21 proceeding?
- A. PacifiCorp proposes that discussions of the decoupling issue occur concurrently
 with the initial phases of this case. All parties to this proceeding will be welcome

1		to participate in these discussions. PacifiCorp hopes and expects that discussions
2		will lead to a proposal acceptable to the Company and at least some of the other
3		parties in the case. If so, we propose to file testimony jointly with the agreeing
4		parties setting forth specifics of the proposal and the basis for recommending it to
5		the Commission. PacifiCorp suggests as a goal that the proposal be submitted at
6		the time that PacifiCorp files its rebuttal testimony in this proceeding.
7		Implementing a decoupling proposal does not typically require the filing of new
8		tariffs because only accounting procedures need to be established at the outset,
9		which will lead to rate changes after the mechanism is in operation.
10	Q.	Please briefly describe the Revised Protocol method of allocating
11		PacifiCorp's costs among state jurisdictions.
11		r actively by costs among state jurisdictions.
11	A.	Where possible, the Revised Protocol assigns costs to the state that is directly
	A.	
12	A.	Where possible, the Revised Protocol assigns costs to the state that is directly
12 13	A.	Where possible, the Revised Protocol assigns costs to the state that is directly responsible for them. Costs of distribution facilities and certain state-mandated
12 13 14	A.	Where possible, the Revised Protocol assigns costs to the state that is directly responsible for them. Costs of distribution facilities and certain state-mandated programs are assigned in this way. The majority of PacifiCorp's costs are not,
12 13 14 15	A.	Where possible, the Revised Protocol assigns costs to the state that is directly responsible for them. Costs of distribution facilities and certain state-mandated programs are assigned in this way. The majority of PacifiCorp's costs are not, however, directly caused by any particular state. In those cases, costs are
12 13 14 15 16	A.	Where possible, the Revised Protocol assigns costs to the state that is directly responsible for them. Costs of distribution facilities and certain state-mandated programs are assigned in this way. The majority of PacifiCorp's costs are not, however, directly caused by any particular state. In those cases, costs are allocated based on a state's share of system energy, peak demand, and other
12 13 14 15 16 17	A.	Where possible, the Revised Protocol assigns costs to the state that is directly responsible for them. Costs of distribution facilities and certain state-mandated programs are assigned in this way. The majority of PacifiCorp's costs are not, however, directly caused by any particular state. In those cases, costs are allocated based on a state's share of system energy, peak demand, and other factors. The particular allocation factors are different for different kinds of cost.
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	A.	Where possible, the Revised Protocol assigns costs to the state that is directly responsible for them. Costs of distribution facilities and certain state-mandated programs are assigned in this way. The majority of PacifiCorp's costs are not, however, directly caused by any particular state. In those cases, costs are allocated based on a state's share of system energy, peak demand, and other factors. The particular allocation factors are different for different kinds of cost. For instance, the Revised Protocol allocates the benefits of the Company's low-

¹⁶ The distinction between Pacific Power and Utah Power states refers to the merger, in 1989, between Pacific Power & Light and Utah Power & Light. Former

1		basis that considers monthly state loads and monthly resource operation. In this
2		manner, the costs of summer-peaking combustion turbines are allocated to
3		summer-peaking states. The Revised Protocol calls for the creation of a Standing
4		Committee composed of representatives from each state who will recommend
5		solutions to allocation issues that may arise over time. The Direct Testimony of
6		David Taylor contains full details of the Revised Protocol.
7	Q.	How was the Revised Protocol developed?
8	A.	The Revised Protocol is the result of extensive discussions lasting several years
9		and involving parties from the various states. This process was called the Multi-
10		State Process, or MSP.
11	Q.	Why did participants undertake this large effort?
12	A.	Previous agreements on allocation methods had broken down. States had adopted
13		differing allocation methods with the result that PacifiCorp was unable to recover
14		all of its prudently incurred costs. The size of the allocation "hole" was estimated
15		to be \$45 million per year. In addition, there was little consensus among the
16		states regarding how PacifiCorp should meet requirements for new resources or
17		who should pay for them. MSP was the first major initiative by which the
18		Company and its regulators worked together to address major regulatory issues
19		related to the need to acquire new resources.
20	Q.	What principles formed the basis of a solution?
21	A.	Participants seemed to recognize that a solution to MSP issues should:
22		a) promote economic efficiency;

Pacific Power states are California, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming. Former Utah

1		b) be equitable to PacifiCorp's customers and shareholders;
2		c) allow individual states to pursue policy initiatives without burdening
3		customers in other states;
4		d) permit continued effective regulatory oversight; and
5		e) not impede the provision of safe, adequate and reliable service by the
6		Company.
7		It seemed to be generally understood and agreed that the MSP should not result in
8		a disproportionate cost shift among states.
9	Q.	Have any other states adopted the Revised Protocol allocation method?
10	A.	Yes, the Revised Protocol has been adopted in the states of Idaho, Oregon, Utah
11		and Wyoming, which account for approximately 90 percent of PacifiCorp's retail
12		revenues. Only California, where it has not been filed, and Washington have yet
13		to adopt the Revised Protocol.
14	Q.	Has PacifiCorp previously presented the Revised Protocol in Washington for
15		consideration by the Commission?
16	A.	Yes, in Docket No. UE-032065. That proceeding did not result in an agreement
17		among parties regarding the appropriate allocation method. The Commission
18		ordered PacifiCorp to initiate discussions with Washington parties after the
19		Oregon and Utah commissions had issued orders on the proposed allocation
20		method. The Commission also ordered PacifiCorp to present a status report to the
21		Commission and, by October 31, 2005, to file a proposal to "resolve inter-
22		jurisdictional cost allocation in Washington." Parties discussed the issue in a

Power states include Idaho and Utah.

1 series of meetings and conference calls. These discussions were a good-faith 2 effort to develop a mutually acceptable allocation method for Washington but did 3 not result in agreement. PacifiCorp issued a status report on March 30, 2005, 4 which is included as Exhibit No. (DNF-4). The present filing includes 5 PacifiCorp's proposal to resolve the issue. 6 **Q**. Why should the Commission adopt the Revised Protocol in this proceeding? 7 A. The Revised Protocol improves PacifiCorp's ability to provide safe, adequate, and 8 reliable service, while at the same time reducing the share of PacifiCorp's costs 9 allocated to Washington customers. The Revised Protocol benefits Washington 10 customers. It is equitable for customers in all states and for shareholders. It 11 promotes economic efficiency because it permits and encourages continued 12 operation of PacifiCorp's system as an integrated whole. It is responsive to the 13 policy needs of individual states. Finally, the Revised Protocol is workable and 14 thus permits continued effective regulatory oversight. 15 Clearly, all of PacifiCorp's commissions together must set rates using 16 allocation methods that "add to 100 percent" in order for the Company to have a 17 reasonable opportunity to earn its authorized rate of return. Allocation methods 18 that, in practice, do not allow the Company to recover all of its prudently incurred 19 costs are inconsistent with the Capital-Attraction Function of rates. 20 **O**. Does the Revised Protocol allocation method provide quantifiable benefits to 21 PacifiCorp's Washington customers in this case? 22 A. Yes. The use of the Revised Protocol in this case reduces Washington's revenue 23 requirement by \$2.7 million, or 1.0 percent, as compared to the revenue

1		requirement resulting from the allocation method that PacifiCorp has previously
2		used in Washington. This is largely due to the special treatment of low-cost
3		hydroelectric resources and the method of allocating the costs of qualifying
4		facilities. Mr. Taylor provides additional detailed discussion in his testimony
5		related to the elements of the Revised Protocol and their impact in this filing.
6	Over	view of Cost Pressures
7	Q.	Describe the rate increase that PacifiCorp seeks in this case.
8	A.	Average rates would increase 17.9 percent from rates in effect today. Adjusted
9		for inflation, PacifiCorp's average Washington price would return to the levels of
10		1995. The Direct Testimony of William Griffith shows that even with this
11		increase, Pacific Power's average rate will remain low in a low-cost state.
12	Q.	Without an increase, what rate of return is PacifiCorp presently earning?
13	A.	Present rates produce a return on equity of 3.5 percent, as the Direct Testimony of
14		Paul Wrigley shows. This level of earnings will not readily attract the capital
15		needed for the Company's future operations. An 11.125 percent return on equity
16		is supported by Dr. Hadaway's testimony in this proceeding. Dr. Hadaway's
17		testimony indicates a range of appropriate levels of return on equity from 10.7 to
18		11.8 percent. The Company is requesting that the Commission approve a return
19		on equity near the center of that range.
20	Q.	Are there key factors other than power costs that contribute to the
21		Company's increasing cost structure?
22	A.	Yes. As previously discussed in PacifiCorp's 2003 general rate case (Docket
23		No. UE-032065), the Company continues to experience cost pressures related to

1 pensions, medical costs, and other employee costs. The Company is proposing to 2 recover \$53 million (on a total Company basis) in annualized test period pension 3 costs in this case. Mr. Rosborough will describe these costs in detail and explain 4 what the Company is doing to control these costs. 5 **O**. What is driving the significant increase in the Company's Net Power Costs? 6 I have already discussed a number of general factors. The forward markets for A. 7 electricity and natural gas currently reflect significantly higher prices in the future 8 than during recent history. Rising coal costs are also a factor. Higher retail load 9 requirements have also contributed to higher total Company Net Power Costs. A 10 number of additional factors also impact Net Power Costs, including new 11 purchases and the expiration of certain power purchase contracts. Mr. Widmer's 12 testimony describes the basis for the increase in Net Power Costs in more detail. 13 Given the impact of Net Power Costs on this rate application, are there **Q**. 14 investments that the Company should or could be making to moderate their 15 impact? 16 A. Yes. Earlier in my testimony, I referred to the resources that the Company is 17 presently acquiring and the future resources called for in the IRP. These 18 resources will reduce the exposure of our customers to rising and volatile 19 commodity markets, and to acquire them, the Company needs to be financially 20 healthy.

1

2

Q. Have past Company actions helped to keep prices low during the recent turbulence in the energy industry?

3 A. Yes. Over the years, the Company has taken several innovative actions that keep 4 our prices low today. For example, the Pacific Power & Light Company system 5 combined low cost Wyoming coal-fired generation with flexible hydro resources 6 in the Northwest. Adding the Utah Power & Light Company generation and 7 transmission system provided even more flexibility and additional markets to 8 dispose of excess energy and to import energy when needed. The Company has 9 also enjoyed significant benefits over the years from the low cost Mid-Columbia 10 long-term purchase agreements. PacifiCorp's diverse portfolio of renewable, 11 hydropower, and thermal resources has helped insulate customers in the past from 12 extreme market conditions and positioned the Company as one of the lowest cost 13 utilities in the nation.

14 More recently, the decision to acquire several new generation resources in 15 Utah helped to avoid millions of dollars in purchases and transmission costs, 16 while providing dispatch flexibility and other ancillary benefits. The Company's 17 increasing commitment to renewable resources – shown in acquiring the output of 18 the Invenergy and Eurus wind projects – increases fuel diversity and may lead to 19 less volatile energy costs over time. Prudent investments and power purchase 20 agreements such as these require a healthy balance sheet and assurance of cost 21 recovery. Such investments were possible only because the Company had the 22 financial strength to invest or to enter into long-term contracts.

1

2

Q. Can you provide any additional examples of recent investments made with the goal of retaining PacifiCorp's low-cost service?

A. Yes. PacifiCorp recently invested in converting the Bridger mine from a surface
operation to an underground mine. This investment will allow the Company to
continue to supply its power plants from mines that it controls. The Bridger plant
is a key resource for serving the entire system, and at very low cost. By making
the investment to take the mine from a surface operation to an underground mine,
the Company will be able to continue to control a low-cost source of fuel, close to
the plant, utilizing many existing assets.

10 Q. Please describe the Currant Creek resource and how it is reflected in this 11 case.

A. Currant Creek is a gas-fired combustion turbine project located south of Salt Lake
City. Phase One of Currant Creek results in a capacity of 280 megawatts and is
planned to be operational by the summer of 2005. Phase Two of the project,
planned for completion by early 2006, converts the plant to a combined-cycle
combustion turbine with a total capacity of 525 megawatts. Costs related to both
phases are included in this filing because both phases will be operational during
the rate-effective period.

19 Q. In addition to specific investments, how does the Company control costs?

20 A. PacifiCorp has developed extensive and rigorous processes for controlling costs.

- 21 Capital expenditures are controlled using layered processes that extend from
- 22 planning for the Company's capital needs, to deciding to implement specific
- 23 projects, through project completion, and after. Expenses are controlled by

- budgeting and planning processes that keep pressure on managers to absorb
 increasing costs through efficiency initiatives.
- 3 Q. Describe the process that the Company uses to control capital costs.
 4 A. Control of capital spending starts with the budgeting and planning processes.
- 5 These identify future situations in which the Company's total capital needs may 6 stress its financial resources and allocate capital investment to business units. The 7 budget process includes a rigorous review of possible major capital projects and 8 the level of spending on more routine capital items.
- 9 Regardless of budget authorization, major capital projects must be 10 individually approved by senior management before expenditures are made. 11 Senior management also oversees ongoing projects and conducts post-investment 12 reviews to audit that projects are completed on budget and on time and to assess 13 the benefits produced by the projects. As a member of senior management, I 14 participate in the review and approval of capital projects. The review process is 15 sufficiently rigorous to ensure, to the fullest extent possible, that PacifiCorp 16 undertakes the right projects and executes them well.
- 17 Q. Has the control process reduced the Company's customer service level?
- A. No. Parallel with its cost control initiatives, the Company has made improved
 customer service a priority. In fact, the Company was recently recognized for its
 excellent customer service. In a survey conducted by TQS Research, an
 independent survey group, PacifiCorp ranked number one with 86.4 percent of
 customers with at least one megawatt of demand "very satisfied" with the level of
 service provided to them. Many of the commitments made at the time of the

1		merger with ScottishPower addressed improved customer service. PacifiCorp has
2		met or exceeded all of these promises, resulting in better customer service across
3		customer classes. PacifiCorp's service quality commitments were recently
4		extended.
5	Q.	What capital structure does the Company propose to use for setting rates in
6		this proceeding?
7	A.	This filing is based on a capital structure comprising 49.4 percent long-term debt,
8		1.10 percent preferred stock, and 49.5 percent common equity. In order to
9		achieve this capital structure, PacifiCorp's parent company, PacifiCorp Holdings,
10		Inc. (PHI), will make four equity infusions totaling \$500 million by the end of
11		March 2006. These equity infusions are critical to enable the Company to
12		maintain credit ratios that support the continuance of our current 'A-' credit rating
13		during its current resource acquisition cycle.
14	Intro	oduction of Witnesses
15	Q.	Please list the Company witnesses and provide a brief description of their
16		testimony.
17	А.	The Company witnesses filing direct testimony are:
18		Samuel C. Hadaway, FINANCO, Inc., will testify concerning the Company's
19		return on equity. Based on a combination of DCF (Discounted Cash Flow) and
20		Risk Premium analysis, as well as a review of the current market, the electric
21		utility industry, and company-specific factors, Dr. Hadaway proposes a point
22		value for PacifiCorp's cost of equity of 11.125 percent.

1	Bruce N. Williams, Treasurer, will present a financing overview of the Company
2	and explain the need for the Company to increase the equity component of its
3	capital structure, in order to maintain credit ratings that support an "A-" rating.
4	He will present PacifiCorp's capital structure of 49.4 percent long-term debt, 1.10
5	percent preferred stock, and 49.5 percent common equity. He will also testify
6	concerning the Company's cost of debt and preferred stock. Mr. Williams will
7	show that the Company's embedded cost of long-term debt is 6.427 percent and
8	the embedded cost of preferred stock is 6.59 percent.
9	David L. Taylor, Principal Regulatory Consultant, sponsors the Company's
10	testimony describing in detail the Revised Protocol method of allocation. Mr.
11	Taylor also presents testimony on class cost of service and functional revenue
12	requirement.
13	Christy A. Omohundro, Managing Director, Regulation will present the Power
14	Cost Adjustment Mechanism proposed by the Company in this case, and the
15	manner in which the Company proposes to implement this mechanism.
16	Mark T. Widmer, Director, Net Power Costs, will describe the operation of the
17	GRID model, including the new VISTA model for hydro normalization, and the
18	calculation of net power costs. Mr. Widmer will also identify the major drivers
19	that are putting upward pressure on power costs and describe the volatility of
20	power costs that leads the Company to propose a PCAM.
21	Gregory N. Duvall, Managing Director, Planning and Major Projects, addresses
22	inter-jurisdictional cost allocation, including the allocation of power cost
23	variances under the Company's proposed PCAM. He also shows that the

1		Company's resource acquisitions of Craig, Hayden, Cholla 4, Foote Creek, West
2		Valley, Gadsby and Currant Creek generating units are prudent for purposes of
3		Washington rates.
4		Mark R. Tallman, Managing Director of Commercial and Trading, will describe
5		the Company's recent supply-side resource portfolio acquisitions. These include,
6		among others, the Currant Creek project, the acquisition of the output from the
7		Eurus Oregon Wind Power project, and the decision to continue the West Valley
8		lease.
9		Paul M. Wrigley, Regulation Manager, will present the Company's overall
10		revenue requirement based on the test period (twelve months ending
11		September 30, 2004), and known and measurable adjustments through the rate-
12		effective period. Mr. Wrigley will present the normalizing adjustments to actual
13		test period results related to revenue, operation and maintenance expense, net
14		power costs, depreciation and amortization, taxes and rate base.
15		Daniel J. Rosborough, Director of Employee Benefits, will testify to the
16		Company's increased pension and employee benefit costs. Mr. Rosborough will
17		also address the actions the Company is taking to control these rising costs.
18		William R. Griffith, Director of Pricing and Cost of Service, will present
19		testimony on three primary areas: 1) description of the Company's pricing
20		objectives, 2) the Company's proposed rate spread, and 3) the Company's
21		proposed changes in price design for the affected rate schedules.
22	Q.	Does this conclude your testimony?
23	A.	Yes.