BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. UE-240006

DOCKET NO. UG-240007

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF

ADRIEN M. MCKENZIE, CFA

REPRESENTING AVISTA CORPORATION

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ADRIEN M. MCKENZIE

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1	I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>
2	Q. Please state your name and business address.
3	A. Adrien M. McKenzie, 3907 Red River, Austin, Texas, 78751.
4	Q. Did you previously submit direct testimony in this case?
5	A. Yes, I did.
6	Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?
7	A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to the direct testimonies of
8	David C. Parcell submitted on behalf of the Staff of Washington Utilities and Transportation
9	Commission ("Commission"), David J. Garrett submitted on behalf of the Washington State
10	Office of the Attorney General, Public Counsel Section ("PC"), and Lance D. Kaufman
11	submitted on behalf of Alliance of Western Energy Consumers ("AWEC") concerning a fair
12	ROE that Avista Corp. ("Avista" or "the Company") should be authorized to earn on its
13	investment in providing electric and gas utility service in Washington. My testimony also
14	addresses the ROE comments of Lisa V. Perry submitted on behalf of Walmart, Inc.
15	("Walmart"). Hereinafter, I refer to these witnesses collectively as the "Other Witnesses."
16	A. Overview and Summary
17	Q. Please summarize the ROE recommendations of the Other Witnesses.
18	A. Mr. Parcell recommends an ROE of 9.50 percent for Avista, ¹ while Mr. Garrett
19	recommends an ROE of 8.50 $percent^{2/3}$ and Dr. Kaufman recommends an ROE of 9.25

¹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 6:2.

² Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 4:8.

³ Witness David Garrett in his testimony supports a Cost of Equity of 8.5 percent, and that is what I respond to throughout my testimony. However, PC witness Mark Garrett, who supports overall revenue requirement in his electric and natural gas models (Exh. MEG-3, Schedule 3.10 and Exh. MEG-4, Schedule 4.9), uses a ROE of 8.85 percent. Whether the ROE is 8.5 percent or 8.85 percent, my findings remain the same, as outlined in this testimony.

percent.⁴ Ms. Perry did not recommend a specific ROE; rather, she recommended that the 1 2 Commission consider customer impacts, ROEs awarded to other Washington utilities, as well 3 as ROEs awarded by other state regulatory commissions. 4 **Q**. What are the principal conclusions of your rebuttal testimony? 5 The ROE recommendations of the Other Witnesses fall below a fair and A. 6 reasonable level for the Company's electric and gas operations. My rebuttal testimony 7 demonstrates that: 8 The Other Witnesses' ROE recommendations fall below accepted benchmarks: 9 Adjusting national authorized ROEs for electric utilities to reflect current capital market conditions implies an ROE of approximately 10 10.43 percent. 11 12 Adjusting ROEs approved by the Commission in prior rate 0 13 proceedings for increases in bond yields implies a current cost of 14 equity of 10.43 percent. 15 o Adjusting Avista's current ROE to account for changes in capital costs implies a current cost of equity of approximately 10.84 16 percent. 17 18 Expected earned returns for the Other Witnesses' proxy groups fall 0 19 in the range of approximately **10.0 percent to 10.7 percent**. 20 The Other Witnesses' ROE analyses are undermined by errors and methodological 21 flaws, including: 22 • Failure to account for significantly higher capital costs, declining creditworthiness, and rising risk exposures, such as wildfires. 23 24 Errors in the specification of their proxy groups. Ο 25 Unsupported growth rate assumptions in the application of the 0 discounted cash flow ("DCF") model that do not reflect investors' 26 27 expectations. 28 Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") studies that rely on historic 0 29 backward-looking inputs that are not consistent with this method. 30 Subjective and unsupported beta calculations. 0 31 Failure to account for the impact of firm size in applying the

⁴ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 21:4-5.

1	CAPM.
2 3	 Arbitrary and unsupported exclusion of "outliers" and model results.
4	Q. What are your principal conclusions regarding the recommendations of
5	Staff witness Parcell?
6	A. There are key deficiencies in his quantitative applications that lead to a
7	significant downward bias in his conclusions. My rebuttal testimony demonstrates that:
8 9 10	• The screening criteria adopted by Mr. Parcell to arrive at his proxy group are arbitrary, unnecessarily restrict the size of the group, and undermine the reliability of his analyses.
11 12 13 14 15 16	• The flaws in Mr. Parcell's DCF analysis include reliance on historical data; including growth rates based on dividends and book value; his decision to average individual growth rates together and then compute a single DCF estimate for each company; computational shortcomings in his retention growth calculation; and subjectively excluding a 10.6 percent DCF result as an "outlier," while retaining values in the 7 percent range.
17 18 19 20 21 22	• Mr. Parcell's CAPM analysis also contains numerous flaws, most notably his reliance on historical data when the ROE estimation process is clearly forward-looking; adopting an improper methodology to calculate his historic market risk premium ("MRP"); reference to geometric means, which will always bias results downward; failure to account for the impact of firm size; and subjectively excluding a 10.7 percent CAPM result as an "outlier."
23 24 25 26 27	• Mr. Parcell's Comparable Earnings ("CE") approach also contains significant shortcomings due primarily to his repeated fault of relying on historical data in a process that is forward-looking; his problematic consideration of market-to-book ("M/B") ratios in his CE analysis, and his failure to apply an essential mid-year adjustment factor.
28 29	• My rebuttal testimony demonstrates that Mr. Parcell's risk premium approach is undermined by subjective bias due to his selective exclusion of available data.
30 31 32	• Finally, I respond to Mr. Parcell's misguided contention that Avista should not be offered an opportunity to recover flotation costs, which are a legitimate expense incurred to provide the equity capital.
33	Q. What are your principal conclusions regarding the recommendations of

34 PC witness D. Garrett?


1	A. Mr. Garrett's 8.50 percent ROE is extreme and the Commission should reject
2	his conclusions and recommendations in their entirety. My rebuttal testimony demonstrates
3	that:
4 5 6 7 8 9	• Mr. Garrett's DCF approach is compromised because he ignores projected earnings growth rates, which are widely and recognized as a superior basis to apply the DCF model; he relies on a "sustainable" growth DCF model that wrongly assumes investors anticipate every firm in the electric utility industry to mimic a long-term growth forecast for gross domestic product ("GDP"); he fails to screen his DCF result to remove illogical estimates.
10 11 12	• PC witness Garrett's CAPM application is compromised due to unreliable, illogical, and undocumented inputs, reliance on historical data that is inconsistent with the assumptions of this method, and failure to incorporate the size adjustment.
13 14 15	• Mr. Garrett's suggestion that Avista's capital structure would distinguish Avista's overall investment risk from other electric utilities is incorrect, and his "Hamada" adjustment to his CAPM results is deeply flawed and should be given no weight.
16 17	• PC witness Garrett's analysis is also undermined by his failure to apply the risk premium approach, which is a widely recognized methodology.
18	Q. What are your principal conclusions regarding the recommendations of
19	AWEC witness Kaufman?
20	A. Dr. Kaufmann's suggestion that Avista's ROE should be reduced from 9.40
21	percent to 9.25 percent makes no economic sense, in light of the objective evidence that
22	investors' required rate of return has increased significantly since the Company's last litigated
23	rate proceeding. Apart from the fact that Dr. Kaufman's recommendation violates
24	fundamental financial principles, my rebuttal testimony demonstrates that:
25 26	• The hodge-podge of return benchmarks cited by Dr. Kaufman are nonsensical and provide no meaningful basis to evaluate a fair ROE for Avista.

1 2	• There is no support for the assumptions of Dr. Kaufman's three-stage DCF model, which has no demonstrable connection to the expectations of investors.
3 4 5 6	• Like PC witness Garrett, Dr. Kaufman's constant growth DCF application is based on the misguided notion that investors expect growth for all utilities to converge to a long-term forecast of growth in GDP, which is the same fundamental flaw that undermines AWEC's three-stage DCF analysis.
7 8 9 10	• The Commission should reject Dr. Kaufman's subjective and results-oriented beta calculations, which run counter to those published by reputable source relied on be investors, subjectively ignore representative data, and incorporate unsupported adjustments.
11 12 13 14 15	• The two MRPs Dr. Kaufman used to apply the CAPM either lack any clear foundation or were based on illogical modifications to my methodology, which was predicated on the approach adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). In addition, Dr. Kaufman's CAPM results are downward-biased because he fails to account for the implications of firm size.
16	Q. What are your principal conclusions regarding the recommendations of
17	Walmart witness Perry?
18	A. While Ms. Perry does not conduct any analysis or provide an explicit ROE
19	recommendation, she expresses concern over Avista's ROE request based on a comparison
20	with historical allowed ROEs and consideration of customer impacts. My rebuttal testimony
21	demonstrates that:
22 23 24	• Comparisons with historical allowed ROEs, such as those cited by Ms. Perry, are overly simplistic and fail to account for the significant increase in long-term capital costs documented by objective capital market data.
25 26 27 28	• The cost of equity is established in competitive capital markets, and Ms. Perry's suggestion that Avista's ROE might be artificially suppressed to minimize customer impacts ignores the requirements of regulatory standards, as well as the long-term harm that can result if investor confidence is undermined.
29	Finally, my rebuttal testimony demonstrates that the Other Witnesses' criticisms of
30	my analyses are without merit.

1Q. Can you summarize how the ROE recommendations of the Other2Witnesses stack up against comparable benchmarks?

- A. Yes. Figure AMM-R1 below compares the Other Witnesses' ROE
 recommendations to the benchmarks supported in my rebuttal testimony.
- 5 6

FIGURE AMM-R1 ROE BENCHMARK COMPARISON



7

As illustrated above, the 8.50 percent to 9.50 percent ROE recommendations of the Other Witnesses fall approximately 93 to 193 basis points below national average authorized ROEs, once adjusted for current interest rates. This ROE disparity is even more evident when considering that utility bond yields have *increased* approximately 250 basis points since the Commission approved an ROE of 9.40 percent for Avista in its last litigated rate proceeding. These benchmarks illustrate that the Other Witnesses' ROE recommendations violate the Rebuttal Testimony of Adrien M. McKenzie Avista Corporation

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economic and regulatory standards underlying a fair ROE, while confirming the
 reasonableness of the 10.40 percent ROE requested by Avista.

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B. The Other Witnesses' ROE Recommendations Violate Economic Principles

4

Q. What is the basic conceptual framework underlying the cost of capital?

5 The cost of capital is premised on the concept that a dollar today is worth more A. 6 than a dollar in the future. The time value of money is a core principle of finance, and it 7 applies equally to investments in debt and equity securities. For both debt and equity 8 securities, the return required by investors can be conceptualized as a sum of several building 9 blocks, including 1) a risk-free rate to compensate for foregoing current consumption, 2) a 10 risk premium to account for uncertainty over the timing and payment of future cash flows, 11 and 3) a premium to compensate for the erosion in purchasing power due to expected price 12 inflation.

Q. Are there readily available benchmarks for general changes in capital
costs?

15 A. Yes. The yields on 30-year Treasury bonds are accepted as a guide to the risk-16 free rate. While yields on long-term Treasury bonds can be impacted by monetary policy 17 (e.g., quantitative easing) or a flight to safety in times of turmoil, they provide a directly 18 observable benchmark for underlying trends in capital costs. Similarly, utility bonds are 19 actively traded in the debt markets and the resulting yields offer a touchstone for the direction 20 and magnitude of the return utilities must offer to attract capital. Although not specific to 21 long-term capital costs, the target range for the Federal Funds rate established by the Federal 22 Reserve is also widely followed by investors as a metric for monetary policies and underlying 23 capital market conditions.

Q. Do the Other Witnesses agree that these benchmarks are relevant indicators in evaluating the cost of equity?

2

A. Yes. Mr. Parcell references Treasury yields and utility bond yields extensively in his testimony.⁵ He also identifies "The level and trend of interest rates" as one factor that "has an influence on the [cost of capital],"⁶ and he cites to the Federal Funds rate numerous times.⁷ Dr. Kaufman also references Treasury yields in his testimony.⁸ Meanwhile, Treasury yields and utility bond yields serve as direct inputs in the Other Witnesses' CAPM, ECAPM and risk premium models.⁹ The Other Witnesses clearly recognize the relevance of these interest rate benchmarks as indicators of current capital costs.

10

11

Q. How have these key indicators of capital costs trended since Avista's prior rate proceedings?

A. As I established in my direct testimony,¹⁰ trends in bond yields since the Stipulation in Avista's last rate proceeding and the Commission's order in Dockets UE-200900 and UG-200901 document a substantial increase in the returns on long-term capital demanded by investors. Table AMM-R1 below illustrates that the trends in key capital cost indicators identified in my direct testimony have been sustained:

⁵ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 5:22-6:1, 12:5-16, 42:20-43:13, 56:8-59:17, Parcell, Exh. DCP-4 at 2.

⁶ *Id.* at 10:3-7.

⁷ *Id.* at 14:1-17:2.

⁸ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 33, footnote 43.

⁹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 40:2-41:7, 56, Parcell, Exh. DCP-10, Parcell, Exh. DCP-16; Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 46:8-9, 52, Kaufman, Exh.LDK-5 at 9-12; Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 28:9-19, Garrett, Exh. DJG-8, Garrett, Exh. DJG-12.

¹⁰ McKenzie Direct at 34-35.

Series	(a) Sep. 2021	(b) Jun. 2022	Change (bp)	Jun. 2024	Change (bp)
Bond Yields					
10-Yr. Treasury Yield	1.37%	3.14%	177	4.31%	117
30-Yr. Treasury Yield	1.94%	3.25%	131	4.44%	119
Baa Utility Bond Yield	<u>3.19%</u>	5.22%	<u>203</u>	<u>5.83%</u>	<u>61</u>
Average	2.17%	3.87%	170	4.86%	99
Federal Funds Rate	0.13%	1.25%	113	5.38%	413

TABLE AMM-R1KEY CAPITAL COST INDICATORS

Sources: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/; Moody's Investors Service;

(a) Final Order 08/05 issued in Dockets UE-200900 and UG-200901 on September 27, 2021, and resolved a contested ROE.

(b) Full Multiparty Settlement Stipulation in Dockets UE-220053 and UG-220054 was filed with the WUTC on June 28, 2022.

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4	As shown above, key interest rate benchmarks cited by the Other Witnesses indicate
5	that investors' required return on debt securities has increased an average of 170 basis points
6	from September 2021 to June 2022, and another 99 basis points to June 2024. The midpoint
7	of the Federal Reserve's target range for the Federal Funds rate has increased 113 basis points
8	from September 2021 to June 2022, and another 413 basis points to June 2024. These trends
9	are also consistent with Mr. Parcell's observation that the Federal Reserve's increases in the
10	Federal Funds rate, which began in 2022, have "had a somewhat significant impact on short-
11	term interest rates and also impacted longer-term interest rates." ¹¹ The trends documented in

12 Table AMM-R1 above are illustrated in more detail in Figure AMM-R2 below:

¹¹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 15:18-20.




FIGURE AMM-R2 BOND YIELD TRENDS

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Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/; Moody's Investors Service.

- As is evidence in Figure AMM-R2, bond yields have increased markedly since the
 9.40 percent ROE was established by the Commission in September 2021.
- 6

7

Q. Mr. Parcell presents data on inflation and utility bond yields which he says are "indicative of a declining cost of equity capital."¹² Is he correct?

8 A. No. Mr. Parcell shows that inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index 9 ("CPI") and average yields on A-rated utility bonds have trended downward over five business 10 cycles beginning in 1975, but his data end in 2020, and so they do not capture the recent

¹² *Id.* at 12:17.

1 increase in capital costs, as shown above in Table AMM-R1 and Figure AMM-R2.

2


0.

Is inflation still well above the Federal Reserve's long-run target?

A. Yes. This can be seen in Figure AMM-R3 below, which shows CPI inflation over the past twelve months, as compared with the Federal Reserve's 2 percent inflation target.

6 7

FIGURE AMM-R3 CPI INFLATION RATE



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Source: https://www.bls.gov/bls/news-release/cpi.htm.

As the figure above clearly shows, CPI inflation has not been on a downward trend in recent months, and it remains well above the Federal Reserve's target long run inflation rate of 2 percent. As Chairman Power recently stated, "The inflation data received earlier this year were higher than expected," and, "If the economy remains solid and inflation persists, we're prepared to maintain the current range for the federal funds rate as long as appropriate."¹³


¹³ Federal Reserve, *Transcript of Chair Powell's Press Conference* (Jun 12, 2024). <u>https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20240612.pdf</u>.

- 1 **Q**. Do historical allowed ROEs, such as those cited by Mr. Parcell and Ms. Perry,¹⁴ provide a direct guide to capital market trends and investors' required returns? 2 3 A. No. The data on which these historical allowed ROEs were based does not 4 reflect investors' current requirements. As I discussed in my direct testimony,¹⁵ a review of 5 trends in key indicators since 2021 and the evidence presented in Table AMM-R1 and Figure 6 AMM-R2 above supports a finding that capital market conditions have changed dramatically, 7 and recent historical allowed ROEs significantly understate investors' current required 8 returns. 9 The disconnect between historically allowed ROEs and the recent increase in capital 10 costs is illustrated in the figure below. As shown there, authorized ROEs declined steadily 11 from 1990 until 2021, in line with falling interest rates. While the decline in ROEs was more 12 gradual than the decrease in bond yields, this is to be expected. As noted in my direct
- 12 gradual than the decrease in bond yields, this is to be expected. This noted in my direct 13 testimony and discussed in greater detail below, financial research supports the conclusion 14 that equity risk premiums rise as bond yields decline, which partially offsets the decline in 15 capital costs measured by changes in interest rates.

¹⁴ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 13:1-11; Perry Direct at 9-16.

¹⁵ McKenzie Direct at 29-37.

FIGURE AMM-R4 TRENDS IN AUTHORIZED ELECTRIC ROES AND BOND YIELDS



Source: Allowed ROEs from Exhibit AMM-11, page 2, updated to reflect 2023 and 2024Q1. Baa Utility bond yields from Moody's Investors Service and Mergent Public Utility Manual.

4	As the chart above demonstrates, the upward shift in capital costs that began in 2022
5	has been swift and dramatic. While it took 22 years for interest rates to fall by one-half, ¹⁶ the
6	Baa utility bond yield almost doubled in just 22 months. ¹⁷ Figure AMM-R4 also clearly
7	shows that although allowed ROEs made a modest move upward in 2023, they do not yet
8	reflect the sharp increase in utility bond yields that has occurred since early 2022. As RRA
9	recently noted:

10 [E]lectric and gas authorized ROEs are trending modestly higher as the high-11 interest-rate environment begins to impact authorized ROEs. The effect of 12 interest rate increases on authorized returns is not proportional, however, as

3

¹⁶ In 1990 the average yield on Baa utility bonds was 10.06 percent. It wasn't until 2012 that the average yield fell below 5.03 percent.

¹⁷ During December 2021, the yield on Baa utility bonds averaged 3.27 percent. Over the six months ending December 2023, monthly average bond yields ranged from 5.68 percent to 6.61 percent.

1 2 3 4	conce from	ators are slower to adjust ROEs upward than downward, and affordability rns persist as regulators contend with customer rate increases stemming significant but necessary capital investment in the energy transition g a period of high inflation. ¹⁸
5	Simila	arly, a recent Wall Street Journal article highlighted the cost pressures faced by
6	utilities and n	noted that, "Investors should exercise caution when picking up utility stocks." ¹⁹
7	As the article	observed, "Higher interest rates haven't only increased debt-financing costs for
8	utility compa	anies but also raised the cost of capital that they are expected to deliver."
9	Meanwhile, V	Value Line noted that historical allowed ROEs are "based on a historically low
10	and now out-o	of-date cost of capital." ²⁰ Value Line advised electric utility investors that, "New
11	commitments	should only be made when the midpoint of our annual total return projection is
12	at or above 12	2%." ²¹
13	Q.	What is the obvious conclusion from this observable evidence?
14	А.	The cost of capital-both debt and equity-has increased significantly since
15	Avista's curre	ently authorized ROE of 9.40 percent was set by the Commission's September
16	2021 order in	Dockets UE-200900 and UG-200901.
17	Q.	Have there been any changes in the risks of utilities or Avista that might
18	offset this cle	ear upward move in the cost of capital?
19	А.	No. My direct testimony documented the increasing challenges faced by
20	electric and g	as utilities, ²² with S&P revising its outlook on the utility sector to "negative" in

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<sup>21</sup> Id.
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¹⁸ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Major energy rate case decisions in the US – January-March 2024, Regulatory Focus (Apr. 19, 2024).

 ¹⁹ Jinjoo Lee, Utilities Get an Inflation Shock, Wall Street Journal (Jan. 3, 2024).
 <u>https://www.wsj.com/finance/investing/utilities-get-an-inflation-shock-cb821c4e</u>.
 ²⁰ The Value Line Investment Survey, Electric Utility (East) Industry (May 10, 2024).

²² McKenzie Direct at 29-37.

1 February 2024, noting that, "Credit quality for North American investor-owned regulated 2 utilities has weakened over the past four years, with downgrades outpacing upgrades by more than three times.²³ Similarly, Fitch concluded that its "deteriorating outlook" for the utility 3 4 sector "reflects continuing macroeconomic headwinds and elevated capex that are putting pressure on credit metrics in the high-cost funding environment."²⁴ Meanwhile, Avista's 5 credit ratings have remained unchanged, with S&P currently assigning a "negative" outlook 6 to the Company, warning investors of a potential downgrade to its BBB rating.²⁵ There is no 7 8 evidence that the significant increase in capital costs since the final order was issued in 9 Dockets UE-200900 and UG-200901 has been moderated by declining risk in the utility 10 industry generally, or for Avista specifically.

11

Q. What other considerations have impacted investors' assessment of the

- 12 risks associated with Avista's common stock?
- 13

A. As documented at length in my direct testimony,²⁶ investors have become

14 increasingly concerned over the exposure posed by wildfires. Warren Buffet highlighted the

15 risks to electric utility investors in his annual letter to shareholders, observing that:

16 [T]he regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero 17 profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California's largest 18 utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to 19 project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the 20 most stable industries in America. . . . It will be many years before we know

²³ S&P Global Ratings, *Rising Risks: Outlook For North American Investor-Owned Regulated Utilities Weakens*, Comments (Feb. 14, 2024).

²⁴ Fitch Ratings, Inc., North American Utilities, Power & Gas Outlook 2024 (Dec. 6, 2023).

²⁵ S&P noted that "Avista's weakening financial performance will cause its metrics to fall below our downgrade thresholds because of inflation, rising interest rates, and regulatory lag." S&P Global Ratings, *Avista Corp. 's Rising Risk Of Wildfires Is Negative For Credit Quality*, RatingsDirect (Aug. 22, 2023).
²⁶ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-1T at 12:16-14:11.

1 2	the final tally from forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. ²⁷
3	As Mr. Buffet concluded, "the final result for the utility industry may be ominous."28
4	Similarly, S&P recently highlighted increasing physical risk in the electric utility
5	industry, noting that, "Climate change and an increase in wildfire risks are threatening credit
6	quality." ²⁹ S&P cautioned investors that, "Since 2020, the number of structures destroyed by
7	wildfires in Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and Texas have all increased by
8	more than 100% compared to 2016-2019." ³⁰ Thus, Avista's ongoing exposure to wildfires
9	heightens investors' overall risk profile and the Company's need to buttress its financial
10	strength.
11	Q. Are the ROE recommendations of the Other Witnesses consistent with the
11 12	Q. Are the ROE recommendations of the Other Witnesses consistent with the increase in risk exposures and capital costs documented above?
12	increase in risk exposures and capital costs documented above?
12 13	increase in risk exposures and capital costs documented above?A. No. The Other Witnesses do not address the implications of declining utility
12 13 14	 increase in risk exposures and capital costs documented above? A. No. The Other Witnesses do not address the implications of declining utility credit ratings, increased financial pressures, or the heightened risk posed by wildfires. Nor do
12 13 14 15	 increase in risk exposures and capital costs documented above? A. No. The Other Witnesses do not address the implications of declining utility credit ratings, increased financial pressures, or the heightened risk posed by wildfires. Nor do their ROE recommendations reflect the significant upward trend in capital costs since Avista's
12 13 14 15 16	increase in risk exposures and capital costs documented above? A. No. The Other Witnesses do not address the implications of declining utility credit ratings, increased financial pressures, or the heightened risk posed by wildfires. Nor do their ROE recommendations reflect the significant upward trend in capital costs since Avista's last litigated rate proceedings. Mr. Parcell's 9.50 percent recommendation reflects a meager

 ²⁷ Berkshire Hathaway Inc., *Shareholder Letters* (Feb. 24, 2024).
 <u>https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2023ltr.pdf</u> (last visited Apr. 25, 2024).
 ²⁸ Id.
 ²⁹ S&P Global Ratings, Rising Risks: *Outlook For North American Investor-Owned Regulated Utilities Weakens*, RatingDirect (Feb. 14, 2024).

³⁰ Id.

stands to reason that the Company's ROE is now substantially higher.

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Q. Are PC's and AWEC's ROE recommendations particularly concerning?

A. Yes. While the cost of equity does not move one-for-one in lockstep with interest rates,³¹ it is inconceivable that Avista's ROE could have decreased when other capital costs have increased significantly. This evidence demonstrates that the ROE recommendations of PC and AWEC are unmoored from fundamental principles of finance and violate the basic, common-sense relationship between interest rates and the cost of equity. Objective data contradict Mr. Garrett's and Dr. Kaufman's ROE recommendations.

9

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Q. Staff references "expectations by investors that interest rates are expected to decline."³² Do independent forecasts support this view?

11 A. No. As illustrated in Figure AMM-R5 below, the most recent long-term 12 consensus projections from top economists published by Blue Chip document that long-term 13 bond yields are expected to remain elevated when compared to recent historical levels.

³¹ The evidence presented in my direct testimony indicates that allowed electric ROEs tend to increase about 57 basis points for every 100 basis point increase in utility bond yields. See Exh. AMM-11.
³² Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 16:19-20.




FIGURE AMM-R5 PROJECTED INTEREST RATES

Source: Wolters Kluwer, Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (Jun. 1, 2024); Moody's Investors Service; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.

4 This evidence contradicts Mr. Parcell's assertion and shows that long-term capital 5 costs-including the ROE-have increased substantially, and that investors expect these 6 higher capital costs to be sustained at least through 2030. The Other Witnesses' ROE 7 recommendations fail to account for these realities.

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Q. Does the prospect for changes in monetary policy over the coming year change this conclusion?

at the end of 2024, declining to 3.1 percent by the end of 2026.³³ This potential easing of

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A. No. At the conclusion of its June 2024 meeting, the FOMC indicated that the 11 participants anticipate that the appropriate level of the Federal funds rate will be 5.1 percent

12

³³ Federal Reserve, Summary of Economic Projections (Jun 12, 2024). https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20240612.pdf.

1 monetary policy presumably reflects the FOMC's view that inflation will be sustainably 2 reduced to its target level of 2 percent. But as Chair Powell has repeatedly noted, "Longerterm inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored."³⁴ In other words, expected 3 4 inflation rates incorporated into long-term bond and equity costs did not approach recent 5 historical changes in the CPI, and the impact of any moderation in the Federal Reserve's 6 policy rate would be subdued. This is consistent with the forecasts of leading economists 7 illustrated in Figure AMM-R5, and any expectations of future declines in the federal funds 8 rate on the part of market participants are already incorporated into current bond yields. 9 Moreover, while Chair Powell has observed that the Federal Funds rate "is likely at or

near its peak for this tightening cycle," he has also stressed that "the economy has surprised forecasters in many ways"³⁵ and made clear that, "We will need to see more good data to bolster our confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent."³⁶ Reuters reported that Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Lorie Logan "is still worried about upside risks to inflation" and concluded "it's too soon to really be thinking about rate cuts."³⁷ Similarly, CNBC noted that Federal Reserve Governor Michell Bowen states that "the time is not right yet to start lowering interest rates, adding that she would be open to raising if inflation

³⁵ Federal Reserve, *Transcript of Chair Powell's Press Conference* (Dec. 13, 2023). https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20231213.pdf.

³⁶ Federal Reserve, *Transcript of Chair Powell's Press Conference* (Jun 12, 2024). <u>https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20240612.pdf</u>.. *See also*, Federal Reserve, *Transcript of Chair Powell's Press Conference* (Dec. 14, 2022, Sep. 21, 2022). <u>https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm</u>.

 ³⁴ Federal Reserve, *Transcript of Chair Powell's Press Conference* (Jun 12, 2024).
 <u>https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20240612.pdf</u>. See also, Federal Reserve, *Transcript of Chair Powell's Press Conference* (Dec. 14, 2022, Sep. 21, 2022).
 <u>https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm</u>.

³⁷ Ann Saphir and Michael S. Derby, *Fed Official see inflation falling, signal no rush to cut rates*, Reuters (May 30, 2024). <u>https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/feds-williams-monetary-policy-well-positioned-lower-inflation-2024-05-30/</u> (last visited Jun. 20, 2024).

- doesn't pull back."³⁸ As Chair Powell recently concluded, "we don't think it'll be appropriate 1 2 to reduce rates and begin to loosen policy until we have more confidence that inflation is 3 moving back down to 2 percent on a sustainable basis.."³⁹
 - 4

Q. What do the facts indicate with regard to the Other Witnesses' ROE recommendations?

- 6 A. In light of these documented recent trends and forward-looking expectations 7 of recognized capital cost benchmarks, the ROE recommendations of the Other Witnesses are 8 demonstrably insufficient. Despite the fact that interest rates have increased substantially-9 which means the cost of equity has climbed—Staff is arguing that Avista's ROE should be 10 increased by a scant 10 basis points, while PC and AWEC are arguing that for a reduction. 11 These outcomes are not credible and would violate accepted principles of finance. The 12 Commission should reject Mr. Garrett's and Dr. Kaufman's ROE recommendations in particular on this basis. 13
- 14

Q. Mr. Parcell accuses you of being inconsistent regarding your assessment

15 of how interest rates impact required ROEs.⁴⁰ Is there any merit to this allegation?

- 16 A. No. In 2021 Mr. Parcell argued that "it cannot be maintained that low interest
- rates . . . are temporary and do not reflect investor expectations."⁴¹ I disagreed with Mr. 17
- 18 Parcell's position then, because as documented in my testimony, the prevailing view was that

³⁹ Federal Reserve, *Transcript of Chair Powell's Press Conference* (Jun. 12, 2024). https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20240612.pdf.

³⁸ Jeff Cox, Fed Governor Bowen says she's still open to raising rates if inflation doesn't improve (Jun. 25, 2024). https://www.cnbc.com/2024/06/25/fed-governor-bowman-says-shes-still-open-to-raising-rates-ifinflation-doesnt-improve.html (last visited Jun. 20, 2024).

⁴⁰ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 65-66.

⁴¹ Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Dockets UE-200900, et al., Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 56.

bond yields would increase dramatically over the 2021-2025 period.⁴² At that time, Blue Chip
was projecting that the 30-year Treasury yield would increase from 1.8 percent in 2021 to 3.1
percent in 2025. In fact, the actual increase in bond yields has far outstripped those
projections.

5 As documented in Figure AMM-R5, the widespread expectation of a dramatic shift in 6 bond yields that characterized capital markets in 2020 and 2021 is no longer evident. Thus, 7 there is no basis to question the ability of current bond yields to reflect investors' required 8 capital costs in the immediate future. Similarly, I stand by my prior testimony that a singular 9 focus on Treasury bond yields does not always provide a meaningful guide to returns for other 10 asset classes, such as utility bonds and stocks. In times of heightened uncertainty, for example, 11 Treasury bond yields may decline due to a "flight to safety," while such "risk-off" behavior 12 implies higher returns for more risky assets, such as common stocks. But the economic 13 environment has changed since the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021, as have financial markets and Federal Reserve policies.⁴³ 14

Finally, as much as it saddens me, there is no indication that the Commission's 9.40 percent ROE determination in Docket UE-200900 was influenced by my protestations regarding the implications of Federal Reserve monetary policies and interest rate projections in 2020-2021. In fact, the Commission suggested that my testimony in that proceeding "overly relies on higher risk projections as being more indicative of future results," and

⁴² Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Dockets UE-200900, et al., McKenzie, Exh. AMM-15T at 19:1-15.

⁴³ For example, in April 2021 the Federal Reserve was continuing to increase its holdings of Treasury securities by at least \$80 billion per month and of agency mortgage-backed securities by at least \$40 billion per month. <u>https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20210428a.htm</u> (last visited Jul. 26, 2024).

1 concluded that, "We do not observe. . . any evidence in the record that persuades us there is 2 yet any indication warranting a speculative upward adjustment of ROE based on fear that utility betas or interest rates will change precipitously to the detriment of regulated utilities."44 3 4 As a result, contrary to Mr. Parcell's suggestion, looking to changes in bond yields, and in 5 particular yields on utility bonds, provides a sound basis of comparison.

6

C. The Other Witnesses' ROE Recommendations Fail Benchmark Tests

7

8

О. Do allowed ROEs provide a benchmark to evaluate whether the recommended equity returns in this case are sufficient to meet regulatory standards?

9 A. Yes. Allowed ROEs provide a gauge of reasonableness for the outcome of a 10 cost of equity analysis. In considering utilities with comparable risks, investors will always 11 prefer to provide capital to the opportunity with the highest expected return. If a utility is 12 unable to offer a return similar to that available from other investment opportunities of 13 equivalent risks, investors will become unwilling to supply the utility with capital on 14 reasonable terms.

15

0. Do Staff and Walmart agree that allowed ROEs for other utilities are 16 relevant to the evaluation of a just and reasonable ROE for Avista?

17 A. Yes. For example, Mr. Parcell cites to recent nationwide authorized electric 18 and gas ROEs in his testimony.⁴⁵ Similarly, Ms. Perry cites to recent electric and gas ROEs 19 approved by the Commission, as well as average authorized electric and gas ROEs nationwide.⁴⁶ These references indicate that Staff and Walmart believe authorized ROEs are 20

⁴⁴ Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Dockets UE-200900, et al., Final Order 08/07 at 41.

⁴⁵ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 12:16-13:11.

⁴⁶ Perry, Exh. LVP-1T at 9-16.

relevant to evaluate to an evaluation of Avista's cost of capital.

2

3

Q. Do the historical allowed ROEs cited by Mr. Parcell and Ms. Perry provide a direct guide to a fair ROE for Avista under current capital market conditions?

A. No. The data on which these historical allowed ROEs were based does not
reflect investors' current requirements. As I have previously discussed, a review of trends in
key indicators since 2021 and the evidence presented in Table AMM-R1 and Figures AMMR2, AMM-R4, and AMM-R5 above supports a finding that capital market conditions have
changed dramatically, and recent historical allowed ROEs significantly understate investors'
current required returns.

10

11

12

Q. After adjusting for current financial market conditions, what does a comparison with recent allowed ROEs indicate with respect to the ROE recommendations and comments of the Other Witnesses?

13 It demonstrates that Mr. Parcell's, Mr. Garrett's and Dr. Kaufman's A. 14 recommendations significantly understate Avista's cost of equity in today's capital markets, 15 and that Ms. Perry's comments lack proper context. This is shown on Exhibit AMM-16. On 16 this exhibit I subtract the average Baa utility bond yield corresponding to the average allowed 17 ROE for vertically integrated electric utilities reported by RRA to compute the implied risk premium. As discussed in my direct testimony,⁴⁷ the equity risk premium expands as interest 18 19 rates decline and contracts as interest rates rise. Accordingly, I adjusted historical risk premiums to reflect the fact that interest rates are now higher than those corresponding to the 20 21 average allowed ROEs.

⁴⁷ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 24:12-25:20.

1	As shown on Exhibit AMM-16, adjusting historical average allowed ROEs from 2020
2	to Q1 2024 to reflect current capital market conditions results in an implied cost of equity of
3	10.43 percent for vertically integrated electric utilities. This result confirms that the Other
4	Witnesses' ROE recommendations are insufficient, and it illustrates that direct comparisons
5	between Avista's cost of equity and ROEs authorized for other utilities in recent years look
6	very different after properly accounting for current capital costs.
7	Q. Do past ROEs approved by the Commission also demonstrate that the
8	Other Witnesses' ROE recommendations are far too low?
9	A. Yes. Ms. Perry cites to ROEs approved for various Washington electric and
10	gas utilities in cases dating back to 2021.48 Explicit consideration of bond yield increases
11	since the conclusion of these rate proceedings further highlights the inadequacy of the Other
12	Witnesses' ROE recommendations.
13	Data for the two electric cases and four gas cases referenced by Ms. Perry are displayed
14	in Exhibit AMM-17. After adjusting for changes in bond yields, the current ROEs implied by
15	the findings in those cases range from 9.86 percent to 10.85 percent, and average 10.43
16	percent. Once adjusted for today's higher capital costs, these prior ROE findings for
17	Washington utilities provide additional confirmation that the ROEs proposed by the Other
18	Witnesses are understated.
19	Q. What would Avista's currently authorized ROE of 9.40 percent equate to
20	in today's capital markets?
21	A. After adjusting for current financial market conditions, Avista's currently

⁴⁸ Perry, Exh. LVP-1T at 10, 14.

1	approved ROE of 9.40 percent, which was authorized in September 2021, would be
2	substantially higher. The calculation supporting this conclusion is presented on Exhibit
3	AMM-17. The average yield on Baa utility bonds during Avista's last rate proceeding was
4	3.33 percent, and it is now 5.83 percent. Adding the adjusted risk premium of 5.01 percent to
5	the average Baa utility bond yield in June 2024 of 5.83 percent results in an implied cost of
6	equity of 10.84 percent for Avista in today's capital markets. This benchmark calculation
7	supports Avista's 10.40 percent ROE request. Even allowing for Staff's view of
8	"gradualism," ⁴⁹ this data further demonstrates that the ROE recommendations of the Other
9	Witnesses are far too low.
10	Q. What other evidence demonstrates that the ROE proposals of Mr. Garrett
11	and Dr. Kaufman are particularly extreme?
12	A. The ROE recommendations of PC and AWEC are also below the current
13	average allowed returns reported to investors for the utilities in their respective proxy groups.
14	Current authorized rates of return for the utilities in Mr. Garrett's and Dr. Kaufman's proxy

groups, as reported by Value Line, are summarized in the table below:

15

⁴⁹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 6:3-4, 26:3-4, 60:16-61:2.

		Allowed	Recommended	
	Proxy Group	ROE	ROE	
	Garrett	9.87%	8.50%	
	Kaufman	9.85%	<u>9.25%</u>	
	Average	9.86%	8.88%	
3	Source: The Value Line Inv	vestment Survey (A	pr. 19, May 10 and Jun. 7, 2024).	
4	While these historical ROEs	do not reflect	he higher returns required under	current
5	capital market conditions, they prov	vide further conf	irmation that the ROE recommen	dations
6	of PC and AWEC are insufficient.			
7	Q. What other benchm	ark indicates t	nat the Other Witnesses' recomm	nended
8	ROEs are too low?			
9	A. Expected earned rate	es of return fo	r other utilities provide another	useful
10	benchmark of reasonableness. T	he expected ea	arnings approach is predicated	on the
11	comparable earnings test, which dev	veloped as a dire	ect result of the Supreme Court de	ecisions
12	in <i>Bluefield</i> ⁵⁰ and <i>Hope</i> . ⁵¹ This test	recognizes that	investors compare the allowed RC	DE with
13	returns available from other alternation	ives of compara	ble risk.	
14	Importantly, the expected ea	arnings approacl	n explicitly recognizes that regula	itors do
15	not set the returns that investors earn	n in the capital m	arkets. Regulators can only estab	lish the
16	allowed return on the value of a uti	lity's investmer	t, as reflected on its accounting r	ecords.
17	As a result, the expected earnings ap	proach provide	s a direct guide to ensure that the a	allowed

TABLE AMM-R2

PROXY GROUP ALLOWED ROES

1

2

⁵⁰ Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) ("Bluefield").

⁵¹ Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) ("Hope").

1	ROE is similar to what other utilities of comparable risk will earn on invested capital. This
2	opportunity cost test does not require theoretical models to indirectly infer investors'
3	perceptions from stock prices or other market data. As long as the proxy companies are similar
4	in risk, their expected earned returns on invested capital provide a direct benchmark for
5	investors' opportunity costs that is independent of fluctuating stock prices, market-to-book
6	ratios, debates over growth rates, or the limitations inherent in any theoretical model of
7	investor behavior.
8	Q. Has the expected earnings approach been recognized as a valid ROE
9	benchmark?
10	A. Yes. This method predominated before market-based methods were adopted
11	by academic experts, and it has long been referenced and relied on in regulatory proceedings. ⁵²
12	For example, in approving an ROE for electric utility operations, the North Carolina Utilities
13	Commission recently concluded that:
14 15 16 17	In prior cases, the Commission has given significant weight to the results of the Expected Earnings methodology, which stands separate and apart from the market-based methodologies (e.g., the DCF or CAPM) also used by ROE experts. The Commission chooses to do so again in this case. ⁵³
18	Similarly, the Ohio Public Utility Commission is required by statute to consider
19	prospective earned rates of return in evaluating the impact of electric security plans. ⁵⁴
20	As S&P observed, "[h]istorically, there have been two approaches in calculating ROE
21	in regulatory proceedings, a comparable earnings approach and a market analysis. In a

⁵² See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, Utility Regulatory Policy in the U.S. and Canada, 1995-1996 (Dec. 1996).

 ⁵³ North Carolina Utilities Commission, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1187, et al., Order Accepting Stipulations, Granting Partial Rate Increase, and Requiring Customer Notice (Mar. 31, 2021) at 94.
 ⁵⁴ Ohio R.C. 4928.143(E).

1 comparable earnings approach, similar investments with similar risks are analyzed to 2 determine an appropriate ROE." A textbook prepared for the Society of Utility and 3 Regulatory Financial Analysts points out that the comparable earnings method is firmly 4 anchored in the regulatory tradition of the Bluefield and Hope cases, as well as sound regulatory economics.⁵⁵ New Regulatory Finance concludes that, "because the investment 5 base for ratemaking purposes is expressed in book value terms, a rate of return on book value, 6 7 as is the case with Comparable Earnings, is highly meaningful."⁵⁶ 8 What ROEs are implied by the expected earnings approach for the Other Q. 9 Witnesses' proxy groups?

A. As shown on Exhibit AMM-18 and summarized in Table AMM-R3 below, reference to the expected earnings approach implies an average cost of equity on the order of 10.4 percent for the utilities in the Other Witnesses' proxy groups. These book return estimates are an "apples to apples" comparison to the ROE recommendations of the Other Witnesses.

15 16

TABLE AMM-R3 EXPECTED EARNINGS ROES

Proxy Group	Average
Parcell	10.0%
Garrett	10.7%
Kaufman	10.7%
Average	10.4%

17

⁵⁵ David C. Parcell, *The Cost of Capital—A Practitioner's Guide*, Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts (2010) at 115-116.

⁵⁶ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 395.

Q. What other evidence indicates that the Other Witnesses' ROE recommendations fail to meet regulatory standards?

2

3 As discussed in my direct testimony,⁵⁷ expected rates of return for firms in the A. 4 competitive sector of the economy are also relevant in determining the appropriate return to 5 be allowed for rate-setting purposes. The idea that investors evaluate utilities against the 6 returns available from other investment alternatives—including the low-risk companies in my 7 non-utility proxy group—is a fundamental cornerstone of modern financial theory. Aside 8 from this theoretical underpinning, any casual observer of stock market commentary and the 9 investment media quickly comes to the realization that investors' choices are almost limitless. 10 It follows that utilities must offer a return that can compete with other risk-comparable 11 alternatives, or capital will simply go elsewhere.

In fact, returns in the competitive sector of the economy form the very foundation for utility ROEs because regulation purports to serve as a substitute for the actions of competitive markets. The Supreme Court recognized in *Hope* that the degree of risk, not the nature of the business, is relevant in evaluating an allowed ROE for a utility. The cost of capital is an opportunity cost based on the returns that investors could realize by putting their money in other alternatives, and the total capital invested in utility stocks is only the tip of the iceberg of total common stock investment.

- . .
- 19

20

Q. Do the Other Witnesses recognize the central concept that underpins your non-utility analysis?

21

22

- A. Yes. Mr. Parcell says:
- The opportunity cost principle provides that a utility and its investors should

⁵⁷ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-1T at 55:1-56:4; Exh. AMM-3 at 28:19-30:10.

1 2 3 4	be afforded an opportunity to earn a return commensurate with returns they could expect to achieve on investments of similar risk. The opportunity cost principle is consistent with the fundamental premise on which regulation rests, namely, that <u>it is intended to act as a surrogate for competition</u> . ⁵⁸
5	Mr. Parcell notes further that his CE method is derived from the "corresponding risk"
6	concept discussed in the <i>Bluefield</i> and <i>Hope</i> cases. ⁵⁹ In fact, Mr. Parcell's CE methodology
7	considers realized ROEs of unregulated companies (in the form of the S&P 500). As Mr.
8	Parcell states:
9 10 11	As an alternative, I also examine the S&P 500. This is a well-recognized group of firms that is widely utilized in the investment community and is indicative of the competitive sector of the economy. ^{60}
12	In other words, Mr. Parcell correctly recognizes that investors gauge their required
13	returns from utilities against those available from utility and non-utility firms of comparable
14	risk. My reference to a low-risk Non-Utility Group is entirely consistent with the guidance of
15	the Supreme Court and the principles outlined in Mr. Parcell's own testimony.
16	Mr. Garrett also cites to <i>Bluefield</i> and <i>Hope</i> , and further references <i>Wilcox</i> . ⁶¹ Mr.
17	Garrett summarizes this decision, saying that, "The Court found that 'the amount of risk in
18	the business is a most important factor' in determining the appropriate allowed rate of
19	return."62 Mr. Garrett goes on to state that "the cost of capital is driven by stock prices,
20	dividends, growth rates, and-most importantly-it is driven by risk."63 Meanwhile, Dr.
21	Kaufman also cites to Bluefield and Hope, and he likewise confirms that a fair and reasonable

⁵⁸ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 9:3-8 (emphasis added).

⁵⁹ *Id.* at 47:20-21.

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 50:27-29.

 ⁶¹ Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. of N.Y., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
 ⁶² Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 4:13-15.

⁶³ *Id.* at 6:25-7:1.

return depends on "whether the return is consistent with returns expected by investors for other investments of comparable risks." ⁶⁴ This testimony from the Other Witnesses recognizes that the standards for return on equity for regulated utilities allow for a comparison with the returns available to firms in the competitive sector of the economy, so long as they have corresponding risks.

6

Q. What are the results of your ROE analysis for the non-utility group?

A. As shown on page 3 of Exhibit AMM-14 to my direct testimony, the average ROEs for the non-utility group reported in my direct testimony range from 10.5 percent to 11.0 percent, and average 10.8 percent. Considering that a comparison of objective risk indicators shows my non-utility group to be less risky than the Utility Group or Avista,⁶⁵ these ROE results provide a conservative guideline for a fair ROE to the Company.

12

Q. What do these benchmarks you discuss imply with respect to the Other

13

Witnesses' ROE recommendations?

A. Consideration of regulatory standards and alternative benchmarks demonstrate
that the 9.50 percent, 8.50 percent and 9.25 percent ROE recommendations of Mr. Parcell,
Mr. Garrett and Dr. Kaufman, respectively, are below any reasonable estimate of Avista's cost
of equity.

18

II. <u>RESPONSE TO MR. PARCELL</u>

19

Q. What is the purpose of this section of your rebuttal testimony?

20

A. This section presents my evaluation of Mr. Parcell's quantitative analyses and

⁶⁴ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 24:14-15.

⁶⁵ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at Table 3.

1 responds to his criticisms of my ROE analysis.

2 0. How does Mr. Parcell arrive at his 9.50 percent recommended ROE for 3 Avista?

4 Mr. Parcell's recommended ROE was based on the results of four analyses.⁶⁶ A. 5 From his DCF analysis, he arrived at a range of 9.0 percent to 10.0 percent. His CAPM 6 resulted in an ROE of 10.7 percent. His third approach, the CE method, yielded a range of 7 9.0 percent to 9.5 percent. Finally, Mr. Parcell's risk premium analysis generated an ROE 8 range of 9.8 percent to 10.8 percent. Mr. Parcell ignores his CAPM outcome, claiming it to 9 be an outlier.⁶⁷ Based on his DCF and CE results, Mr. Parcell concluded that a fair ROE for 10 Avista is in a range of 9.5 percent to 10.0 percent. His 9.5 percent ROE recommendation 11 comes from the bottom end of this range "in order to recognize the risk-reducing attributes of 12 the MYRP ... as well as the Commission's long-standing principle of gradualism."68

13

Q. Did Mr. Parcell provide any explanation or evidentiary support for his 14 application of "gradualism"?

15 A. No. The concept of "gradualism" has customarily been referenced in rate 16 design, where movement to cost-based rates may engender rate shock. Mr. Parcell's general 17 appeal to "gradualism" provides no logical support for his 9.50 percent ROE recommendation. 18 Considering that utility bond yields are now about 260 basis points higher than when Avista's 19 existing ROE of 9.40 percent was approved by the Commission in a litigated proceeding, even 20 a gradual move towards a fair ROE requires far more than a 10 basis point increase. Moreover,

⁶⁶ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 5:15-18.

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 5:20-6:1.

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 6:2-4.

1	considering that Staff's 9.5 percent ROE recommendation falls below recent authorized ROEs
2	for electric utilities, his unsupported and misguided reference to "gradualism" does not result
3	in a reasonable ROE recommendation or address the Company's ongoing need to maintain its
4	financial integrity and attract capital.
5	Q. How might the principle of "gradualism" be at odds with the standards
6	set forth in <i>Bluefield</i> and <i>Hope</i> ?
7	A. In his testimony, Mr. Parcell outlines the standards set forth in this relevant
8	case law:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	The three economic and financial parameters in the <i>Bluefield</i> and <i>Hope</i> decisions – comparable earnings, financial integrity, and capital attraction – reflect the economic criteria encompassed in the "opportunity cost" principle of economics. The opportunity cost principle provides that a utility and its investors should be afforded an opportunity (not a guarantee) to earn a return commensurate with returns they could expect to achieve on investments of similar risk. The opportunity cost principle is consistent with the fundamental premise on which regulation rests, namely, that it is intended to act as a surrogate for competition. ⁶⁹
18	In my direct testimony and earlier in this rebuttal testimony, I have documented the
19	substantial increase in capital costs that has occurred since 2021. In a time of rising capital
20	costs, if gradualism prevents a utility's allowed ROE from rising to the level of returns that
21	investors can expect on investments of similar risk, then the "opportunity cost" principle
22	outlined by Mr. Parcell in the passage above will not be satisfied. In other words, investors
23	would be disincentivized to allocate equity capital to the given utility if they could earn a
24	higher return on alternative investments of similar risk, without waiting for "gradualism" to
25	take hold. Such an outcome, which could result from applying gradualism in the context of

⁶⁹ *Id.* at 9:1-8.

2

rising capital costs, would violate the financial and economic parameters of "comparable earnings, financial integrity, and capital attraction" as outlined by Mr. Parcell above.

- 3 4
- Q. Do you agree with Mr. Parcell that Avista should receive a lower ROE if a MYRP is approved for the Company?

5 A. No. The central question is not whether Avista's proposed MYRP has "riskreducing attributes," as Mr. Parcell claims.⁷⁰ Rather, it is whether approval of a MYRP for 6 7 Avista would differentiate the Company from the proxy groups that are the subject of the ROE 8 analysis. Mr. Parcell does not evaluate whether a MYRP for Avista would set it apart from 9 the average company in his proxy group, or whether Avista's regulatory mechanisms broadly 10 speaking distinguish the Company from other electric utilities. In this regard, Mr. Parcell 11 cannot say that a MYRP would afford any "risk-reducing attributes" to Avista that the other 12 proxy group companies do not also enjoy.

13 As discussed in my direct testimony and documented on McKenzie, Exhibit AMM-5,⁷¹ adjustment mechanisms, cost trackers, and future test years are widely prevalent 14 15 in the utility industry, along with alternatives to traditional ratemaking such as formula rates 16 and MYRPs. As S&P's RRA publication recently noted, "[MYRPs] are a common form of alternative regulation in the US."⁷² Mr. Parcell's suggestion that an MYRP—especially under 17 18 Staff's proposed single period rate plan-would distinguish the Company's overall 19 investment risks from its industry peers is simply unsupported. On the contrary, a wholistic 20 assessment supports a conclusion that Avista's regulatory mechanisms-including its

⁷⁰ *Id.* at 6:3, 25:3, 60:8.

⁷¹ McKenzie Direct at 16:9-19:15.

⁷² S&P Global, *Major energy utility cases in progress in the US*, RRA Regulatory Focus (Oct. 4, 2023).

1 MYRP—do not provide a basis to distinguish the risks of the Company from the proxy 2 utilities.

- 3
- 4

Q. Did the Commission explicitly adjust Avista's ROE downward to account for any "risk-reducing attributes" of SB 5295?

A. No. Avista's currently authorized ROE of 9.40 percent was originally awarded on September 27, 2021,⁷³ while SB 5295 was signed into law approximately five months earlier on May 3, 2021.⁷⁴ In their final order, the Commission determined "that a reasonable range of returns exists between 9.0 and 9.8 percent,"⁷⁵ and ultimately found "that it is appropriate to maintain Avista's ROE of 9.4 percent."⁷⁶ In other words, the Commission made no specific adjustment to Avista's 9.40 percent ROE on the basis of the Company's MYRP.

12

Q. Does Mr. Parcell selectively ignore specific results produced by his ROE

13 analyses?

A. Yes. As was mentioned, Mr. Parcell ignores his CAPM ROE of 10.7 percent, which he says "is currently an outlier due to Federal Reserve policy."⁷⁷ Beyond that, Mr. Parcell's final DCF range of 9.0 percent to 10.0 percent "excludes the singular highest DCF result" of 10.6 percent, which he characterizes as "an outlier." ⁷⁸ Mr. Parcell's selective

⁷³ Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Dockets UE-200900, UG-200901, and UE-200894 (Consolidated), Final Order 08 / 05 (Sep. 27, 2021) ("Final Order").

⁷⁴ <u>https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?billnumber=5295&year=2021</u> (last visited Jul. 24, 2024).

⁷⁵ Final Order at 39.

⁷⁶ Final Order at 41.

⁷⁷ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 5:21-22.

⁷⁸ *Id.* at 37:19, 38:7-8.

1 removal of values at the upper end of his ROE results appears to be results-oriented.⁷⁹

2

A. Proxy Group

Q. In arriving at his proxy group, Mr. Parcell eliminates utilities with market a market capitalization outside the range of \$1 to \$10 billion, as well as those with common equity ratios below 40 percent.⁸⁰ Are these legitimate criteria in arriving at a proxy group?

7 A. No. Mr. Parcell fails to demonstrate how these subjective requirements 8 translate into differences in the investment risks perceived by investors. Under the regulatory 9 standards established by *Hope* and *Bluefield*, the key factor to consider in establishing a 10 meaningful proxy group is the level of overall investment risk, not the total market value or 11 capital structure. Moreover, the extent to which a firm's market value or capital structure 12 impacts risks is already considered in the published ratings assigned by Moody's and S&P, 13 and there is no basis for Mr. Parcell to second-guess these objective risk measures. Mr. Parcell 14 presents no evidence to demonstrate a connection between the subjective criteria that he 15 employs and the views of real-world investors in the capital markets. The arbitrary nature of 16 the market value and common equity ratio tests proposed by Mr. Parcell is further illustrated 17 by the lack of any independent, objective findings to support his imposed thresholds.

- 18
- Q. What is your conclusion regarding the proxy group criteria used by Mr. Parcell?
- 20

19

Staff's screening criteria are unjustifiably narrow, and they result in a proxy

A.

⁷⁹ Mr. Parcell also says my "CAPM results are outliers and warrant no current weight in the ROE determination for Avista" on the simple basis that they "greatly exceed" his own CAPM results. Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 44:4-6.

⁸⁰ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 33:10-12.

1	group that is inappropriately small. The goal of the proxy group selection process should be
2	to include as many similar utilities as possible, not to unnecessarily eliminate companies based
3	on overly restrictive criteria. While adopting narrowly-tailored selection criteria might give
4	the illusion of precision, when overly selective criteria are applied, as is the case with Mr.
5	Parcell's analysis, the result is a constrained proxy group. Using a limited group of companies
6	increases the potential for error and potentially magnifies the impacts from even just one
7	extreme result. Whereas Staff's proxy group was composed of only 10 companies, my proxy
8	group consists of 22 companies.
9	Q. Do you agree with Mr. Parcell that it is necessary to eliminate firms that
10	have cut dividends in the past five years?
11	A. No. The DCF model is forward-looking and based on investors' future
12	expectations, not on data over an arbitrary five-year historical period. The fact that a utility
13	may have cut its dividends at some point in the past is irrelevant to an evaluation of investors'
14	current required rate of return. As FERC has concluded:
15 16 17	We agree that a three-year dividend yield screen would be inappropriate because the DCF model is based on investors' required return from current, not historical, estimates of dividend yield and growth. ⁸¹
18	Meanwhile, Staff suggests that Dominion Energy and CenterPoint Energy—which last
19	cut their dividends in 2020 and 2021, respectively—should be excluded on this basis. ⁸² It is
20	
20	inconceivable that a dividend cut three years ago could be relevant to investors' forward-

⁸¹ Coakley v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., Opinion No. 531, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 at para. 112 (2014).
 ⁸² Parcell, Exh. DCP-8.

1Q.Mr. Parcell also excludes Algonquin Power and Utilities, Inc.2("Algonquin") should be excluded because it has not yet been included in the Value Line3electric utility industry.⁸³ Is this a valid reason for excluding Algonquin from the proxy4group?

5 No. Inclusion in Value Line's electric utility group is a reasonable starting A. 6 point but is not a necessary condition for proxy group inclusion. The objective in assembling 7 a proxy group is not to find reasons to exclude individual companies; rather, it is to identify 8 all of the publicly traded utilities that investors would view as comparable-risk investment 9 opportunities. While Value Line's industry groups may serve as a useful springboard, this 10 single source is not the final arbiter that defines the universe of alternative opportunities 11 available to investors. Other well-recognized investment information sources relied on by 12 investors classify Algonquin as an electric or public utility,⁸⁴ and there is no basis to 13 distinguish between Algonquin and other firms accepted as comparable.

14

B. DCF Analysis

15 Q. First, does Mr. Parcell offer any specific criticisms of your DCF analysis?
16 A. No.

17Q.Mr. Parcell relies on historical growth rates to apply the DCF model. Is18this appropriate?

19

A. No. I do not believe that historical growth rates provide a meaningful guide to

⁸³ Id.

⁸⁴ See, Zacks Investment Research, Inc., which classifies Algonquin in its "Utility-Electric Power" industry group; Fidelity Investments, classifying Algonquin in the "Multi-Utilities" sector. Both of these industry classifications are identical to Avista.

investors' future expectations. As discussed in my direct testimony,⁸⁵ it is investors' future expectations—and not actual, historical results—that determine the current price they are willing to pay for common stocks. Historical growth rates can differ significantly from the forward-looking growth rate required by the DCF model. Moreover, to the extent historical trends for utilities are meaningful, they are already captured in projected growth rates, including those published by Value Line, IBES, and Zacks since securities analysts also routinely examine and assess the impact and continued relevance (if any) of historical trends.

8

9

Q. Is the downward bias inherent in historical growth rates for electric utilities evident in Mr. Parcell's DCF analysis?

A. Yes, it is. For example, consider the historical earnings per share ("EPS") growth measures displayed on page 3 of Exhibit DCP-9 to Mr. Parcell's testimony. As shown there, four of the ten historical EPS growth rates for the individual companies relied on by Mr. Parcell fall at or below 2.0 percent. Combining these companies' historical EPS growth rates with their adjusted dividend yields (Exhibit DCP-9 at 5) implies DCF ROEs in the range of 5.3 percent to 6.9 percent, which falls well below any credible estimate. As a result, these values provide no significant information regarding investors' expectations and requirements.

17

18

19

Q. Mr. Parcell asserts that investors have "A wide array of indicators . . . for estimating investors' growth expectations . . . all of which would be expected to have some impact on their decision-making process."⁸⁶ Do you agree?

20

No. As I discussed in my direct testimony, evidence indicates that investors

A.

⁸⁵ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 10:19-11:16.

⁸⁶ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 36:4-30.

rely primarily on EPS growth projections to form their expectations.⁸⁷ The continued success 1 2 of investment services such as IBES, Value Line, and Zacks, and the fact that projected growth 3 rates from such sources are widely referenced, provides strong evidence that investors give 4 considerable weight to analysts' earnings projections in evaluating future growth. Future 5 trends in EPS, which provide the source for dividends and ultimately support share prices, 6 play a pivotal role in determining investors' long-term growth expectations. The importance 7 of EPS in evaluating investors' expectations and requirements is well accepted in the 8 investment community, and surveys of analytical techniques relied on by professional analysts 9 indicate that earnings are far more influential than dividends per share ("DPS") or book value 10 per share ("BVPS").⁸⁸

The availability of projected EPS growth rates is also a key reason why investors favor this measure over DPS or BVPS. Apart from Value Line, investment advisory services do not generally publish comprehensive DPS or BVPS growth projections, and this lack of dividend or book value growth rates relative to the abundance of EPS forecasts attests to their relative influence. The fact that analyst EPS growth estimates are routinely referenced in the financial media and in investment advisory publications implies that investors use them as a primary basis for their expectations. As *New Regulatory Finance* observed:

18 The sheer volume of earnings forecasts available from the investment 19 community relative to the scarcity of dividend forecasts attests to their 20 importance. The fact that these investment information providers focus on 21 growth in earnings rather than growth in dividends indicates that the 22 investment community regards earnings growth as a superior indicator of 23 future long-term growth. Surveys of analytical techniques actually used by 24 analysts reveal the dominance of earnings and conclude that earnings are

⁸⁷ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 10:19-11:16.

⁸⁸ Stanley B. Block, A Study of Financial Analysts: Practice and Theory, Financial Analysts Journal (July/August 1999).

1	considered far more important than dividends. ⁸⁹
2	While I did not rely solely on EPS projections in applying the DCF model, ⁹⁰ my
3	evaluation clearly supports greater reliance on EPS growth rate projections than other
4	alternatives.
5	Q. Have other regulators recognized that analysts' EPS growth rate estimates
6	are a more meaningful guide to investors' expectations when applying the DCF model?
7	A. Yes. For example, the Regulatory Commission of Alaska ("RCA") has
8	previously determined that analysts' EPS growth rates provide a superior basis on which to
9	estimate investors' expectations:
10 11 12 13	We also find persuasive the testimony that projected EPS returns are more indicative of investor expectations of dividend growth than historical growth data because persons making the forecasts already consider the historical numbers in their analyses. ⁷⁹
14	The RCA has concluded that arguments against exclusive reliance on analysts' EPS growth
15	rates to apply the DCF model "are not convincing."80
16	Similarly, the Kentucky Public Service Commission has indicated its preference for
17	relying on analysts' projections in establishing investors' expectations:
18 19 20 21 22 23	KU's argument concerning the appropriateness of using investors' expectations in performing a DCF analysis is more persuasive than the AG's argument that analysts' projections should be rejected in favor of historical results. The Commission agrees that analysts' projections of growth will be relatively more compelling in forming investors' forward-looking expectations than relying on historical performance ⁸¹
24	Likewise, the Public Utility Regulatory Authority of Connecticut has also noted that

⁸⁹ *Id.* at 302-303.

 $^{^{90}}$ As discussed in my direct testimony, I also examined the "br+sv", sustainable growth rates for the companies in my proxy group.

"there is not growth in DPS without growth in EPS," and concluded that securities analysts'
 growth projections have a greater influence over investors' expectations and stock prices.⁹¹
 Similarly, FERC has expressed a clear preference for projected EPS growth rates in
 applying the DCF model to estimate the cost of equity for both electric and natural gas pipeline

5 utilities:

6 Opinion No. 414-A held that the IBES five-year growth forecasts for each 7 company in the proxy group are the best available evidence of the short-term 8 growth rates expected by the investment community. It cited evidence that (1) 9 those forecasts are provided to IBES by professional security analysts, (2) 10 IBES reports the forecast for each firm as a service to investors, and (3) the 11 IBES reports are well known in the investment community and used by 12 investors. The Commission has also rejected the suggestion that the IBES analysts are biased and stated that "in fact the analysts have a significant 13 incentive to make their analyses as accurate as possible to meet the needs of 14 15 their clients since those investors will not utilize brokerage firms whose analysts repeatedly overstate the growth potential of companies."⁹² 16

17

Q. Is there another shortcoming in Mr. Parcell's DCF analysis?

18

A. Yes. Another flaw in Mr. Parcell's DCF analyses is his decision to average all

19 individual growth rates, and then compute a single DCF estimate for each growth rate average.

20 Each individual growth rate represents a stand-alone estimate of investors' future

21 expectations, and each value should be evaluated on its own merits. The fact that an average

of several growth rates might produce a DCF estimate that could be considered reasonable

- 23 does not absolve the need to evaluate each underlying growth rate separately.
- For example, consider a utility with a dividend yield of 3.5 percent and three hypothetical growth estimates of 0.0 percent, 6.5 percent, and 14.0 percent. Under Mr. Parcell's method, the DCF estimate would be computed by adding the 6.8 percent average of

⁹¹ Decision, Docket No. 13-02-20 (Sept. 24, 2013).

⁹² Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 126 FERC ¶ 61,034 at P 121 (2009) (footnote omitted).

1	the three individual growth rates to the dividend yield, resulting in a cost of equity estimate of
2	10.3 percent. The problem with this method is that it disguises the fact that two of the
3	underlying growth rates—0.0 percent and 14.0 percent—do not provide a meaningful guide
4	to investors' expectations. Rather than averaging the good with the bad, each implied cost of
5	equity estimate (in this example, 3.5 percent, 10.0 percent, and 17.5 percent) should be
6	evaluated on a stand-alone basis. ⁹³ Mr. Parcell simply calculated the average of the individual
7	growth rates with no consideration for the reasonableness of the underlying data. Because
8	Mr. Parcell failed to perform this essential step, his DCF analysis included individual growth
9	rates that do not reflect investors' expectations.
10	Q. Does Mr. Parcell implicitly recognize the need to evaluate the economic
10	Q. Does with farcen implicitly recognize the need to evaluate the economic
10	logic of individual growth rates and the resulting cost of equity estimates?
11	logic of individual growth rates and the resulting cost of equity estimates?
11 12	logic of individual growth rates and the resulting cost of equity estimates?A.Yes. Mr. Parcell eliminated high and low First Call projected EPS growth rates
11 12 13	logic of individual growth rates and the resulting cost of equity estimates?A.Yes. Mr. Parcell eliminated high and low First Call projected EPS growth ratesfor Portland General Electric and OGE Energy, respectively, from his calculation of average
11 12 13 14	 logic of individual growth rates and the resulting cost of equity estimates? A. Yes. Mr. Parcell eliminated high and low First Call projected EPS growth rates for Portland General Electric and OGE Energy, respectively, from his calculation of average projected EPS growth rates,⁹⁴ and Mr. Parcell further notes on page 5 of Exhibit DCP-9 that,
11 12 13 14 15	 logic of individual growth rates and the resulting cost of equity estimates? A. Yes. Mr. Parcell eliminated high and low First Call projected EPS growth rates for Portland General Electric and OGE Energy, respectively, from his calculation of average projected EPS growth rates,⁹⁴ and Mr. Parcell further notes on page 5 of Exhibit DCP-9 that, "negative values not used in calculations." A negative growth rate would imply a DCF cost
11 12 13 14 15 16	 logic of individual growth rates and the resulting cost of equity estimates? A. Yes. Mr. Parcell eliminated high and low First Call projected EPS growth rates for Portland General Electric and OGE Energy, respectively, from his calculation of average projected EPS growth rates,⁹⁴ and Mr. Parcell further notes on page 5 of Exhibit DCP-9 that, "negative values not used in calculations." A negative growth rate would imply a DCF cost of equity that falls below a utility's dividend yield and Mr. Parcell is fully justified to exclude

⁹³ The implied cost of equity estimates are calculated as the sum of the dividend yield (3.5 percent) and the respective growth rates (0.0 percent, 6.5 percent, and 14.0 percent).
⁹⁴ Parcell, Exh. DCP-9 at 4.

1 Q. Can you show the downward bias in Mr. Parcell's constant growth 2 analysis?

3 A. Yes. For example, Mr. Parcell reports a prospective retention growth rate of 4 0.0 percent for NorthWestern Corp.⁹⁵ A growth rate of 0.0 percent implies a cost of equity equal to the dividend yield—in this case 5.2 percent.⁹⁶ This falls below prevailing yields on 5 Baa utility bonds and is clearly illogical. Similarly, Mr. Parcell averages 3.5 percent and 0.7 6 7 percent projected EPS growth rates for Black Hills Corp., but the lower of these two growth 8 rates, when combined with an adjusted dividend yield of 4.8 percent, implies a DCF ROE of 9 5.5 percent. This again falls below the prevailing yield on less risky utility bonds. As a result, 10 these and other illogical growth measures should have been removed from Mr. Parcell's 11 constant growth DCF analysis.⁹⁷

12

0. Are Mr. Parcell's retention growth rates understated?

13 Yes. Mr. Parcell bases his calculations of the internal, "br" retention growth A. rate on data from Value Line. As I explained in my direct testimony,⁹⁸ if the rate of return, or 14 15 "r" component of the internal growth rate, is based on end-of-year book values, such as those 16 reported by Value Line, it will understate actual returns because of growth in common equity 17 over the year.

18

Furthermore, Mr. Parcell uses the simplest form of the retention growth model, which 19 defines growth as a function of internally generated funds only. In applying this method, Mr.

⁹⁵ *Id.* at 3.

 $^{^{96}}$ *Id.* at 1.

⁹⁷ See e.g., a 1.5 percent BVPS historic growth rates for OGE Energy (Parcell, Exh. DCP-9 at 3), a retention growth rate of 1.8 percent for Avista (Parcell, Exh. DCP-9 at 2).

⁹⁸ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 12:18-13:6.

5	O. In arriving at his recommendation, Mr. Parcell narrows his DCF range to
4	omit the "sv" term leads to a further downward bias in his analysis.
3	value (the "sv" term). ⁹⁹ This is the form of the model that I use. Mr. Parcell's decision to
2	internally generated funds (the "br" term) and from issuances of equity at prices above book
1	Parcell should have used the "br $+$ sv" form of the model, which considers both growth from

Q. In arriving at his recommendation, Mr. Parcell narrows his DCF range to 9.0 percent to 10.0 percent.¹⁰⁰ What does this imply about his individual DCF results?

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6

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A. Mr. Parcell presents twelve mean and median values summarizing his DCF study results,¹⁰¹ including a 10.6 percent value he categorizes as an "outlier."¹⁰² These results are displayed in Figure AMM-R6, below:

⁹⁹ The "sv" factor recognizes that when new stock is sold at a price above book value, existing shareholders experience equity accretion. In the case of equity accretion, the increment of proceeds above book value leads to higher growth because it increases the book value of the existing shareholders' equity.

¹⁰⁰ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 38:5-6.

¹⁰¹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-9 at 5.

¹⁰² The 10.6 percent value is the only DCF result that Mr. Parcell regards as an "outlier." In other words, he does not consider DCF results in a range of 7.9 percent to 8.0 percent as outliers.




FIGURE AMM-R6 PARCELL DCF RESULTS

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Interestingly, only two of the twelve results fall within his recommended DCF range of 9.0 percent to 10.0 percent. The average of Mr. Parcell's twelve DCF results is 8.80 percent, which falls 117 basis points below the average ROE of 9.80 percent authorized for vertically integrated electric utilities in 2023.¹⁰³ Mr. Parcell's focus on the highest of his remaining DCF estimates is a pragmatic accommodation that stems from the inherent downward bias and unreasonable nature of the majority of his study results.

10

Is there any basis for Mr. Parcell's assertion that a 10.6 percent DCF result

11 is an "outlier"?

Q.

12

13

A. No. In Mr. Parcell's judgement, a range of 9.0 percent to 10.0 percent fairly represents the reasonable outcome of his DCF analysis. The 10.6 percent value that he labels

¹⁰³ S&P Global Market Intelligence, *Major energy rate case decisions in the US—January-December 2023*, RRA Regulatory Focus (Feb. 6, 2024).

1	an "outlier" is closer to the top of this range (60 basis points) than the four lowest values are
2	to the 9 percent bottom of his range (100 to 115 basis points). Thus, if any results are to be
3	considered "outliers," it is his DCF values in the 7.85 percent to 8.00 percent range.
4	C. <u>Capital Asset Pricing Model</u>
5	Q. What is the fundamental problem associated with Mr. Parcell's CAPM
6	analysis?
7	A. Like the DCF model, risk premium methods—including the CAPM—are <i>ex</i> -
8	ante, or forward-looking models based on expectations of the future. As a result, in order to
9	produce a meaningful estimate of investors' required rate of return, the CAPM must be applied
10	using data that reflects the expectations of actual investors in the market. However, while Mr.
11	Parcell recognized that "the [cost of capital] is an opportunity cost and is prospective
12	looking," 104 his application of the CAPM method is based entirely on historical-not
13	projected—rates of return. The primacy of current expectations is recognized by Morningstar
14	(subsequently Duff & Phelps, now Kroll), one of the sources relied on by Mr. Parcell to apply
15	the CAPM:
16 17 18 19 20	The cost of capital is always an expectational or forward-looking concept. While the past performance of an investment and other historical information can be good guides and are often used to estimate the required rate of return on capital, the expectations of future events are the only factors that actually determine cost of capital. ¹⁰⁵
21	Similarly, the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission has previously concluded that:
22 23 24 25	Relying on historic market returns introduces some highly questionable assumptions, which must be taken on faith. Specificlaly [sic], one must assume that marketplace returns experienced historically are what investors were expecting to receive and continue to guide investor expectations today. It also

¹⁰⁴ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 9:13-14.
¹⁰⁵ Morningstar, *Ibbotson SBBI*, 2013 Valuation Yearbook at 21.

1 2	assumes that asset relationships prevailing over the past 62 years continue today unchanged. ¹⁰⁶
3	By failing to look directly at the returns investors are currently requiring in the capital
4	markets, as I did on Exhibits AMM-9 and AMM-10 to my direct testimony, Mr. Parcell's
5	CAPM results significantly understate investors' required rate of return.
6	Q. Is there anything forward-looking about the CAPM data referenced by
7	Mr. Parcell?
8	A. No. Mr. Parcell bases his CAPM estimates on three alternative values of the
9	MRP. One value relies on data for the S&P 500 and 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds from the
10	period 1978-2023, while the other two figures rely on data for the S&P 500 and long-term
11	government bonds over the years 1926-2022. ¹⁰⁷ In other words, instead of directly
12	considering requirements in today's capital markets, Mr. Parcell is implicitly asserting that
13	events and expectations for the time periods covered by these historical studies are more
14	representative of what is likely to occur going forward.
15	The data that Mr. Parcell considers to inform his MRP run counter to his own
16	testimony, in which he identified the factors that affect the cost of capital:
17	At any given time, each of the following factors has an influence on the COC:
18	• The level of economic activity (i.e., growth rate of the economy);
19	• The stage of the business cycle (i.e., recession, expansion, or transition);
20	• The level and trend of inflation;
21	• The level and trend of interest rates; and,
22	• Current and expected economic conditions. ¹⁰⁸
23	It is hard to imagine how data from the 1920s and 1930s, or even from the 1970s, can

¹⁰⁶ Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, *Indiana Michigan Power Co.*, Cause No. 38728 (Aug. 24, 1990).
¹⁰⁷ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 41:2-21.
¹⁰⁸ *Id.* at 10:2-8.

influence the current cost of capital, as outlined by Mr. Parcell in the passage above. Ignoring
 current expectations in favor of historical averages runs counter to the assumptions underlying
 the use of the CAPM, which is a purely forward-looking model, and it also violates Mr.
 Parcell's own stated understanding of the factors that influence the cost of capital.

5

Q. Mr. Parcell relies on a geometric mean historical risk premium of 4.9 percent to inform his final MRP estimate.¹⁰⁹ Does this value make sense?

7

6

A. No. Adding a 4.9 percent geometric mean risk premium to Mr. Parcell's riskfree rate of 4.65 percent implies a return for the market as a whole of 9.55 percent. This value is only 5 basis points higher than his ROE recommendation of 9.5 percent for Avista. This value makes no economic sense and only serves to bias Mr. Parcell's CAPM results downward.

Is Mr. Parcell justified in relying on geometric mean returns when

12

13 applying the historical CAPM?¹¹⁰

0.

A. No. While both the arithmetic and geometric means are legitimate measures of average return, they provide different information. Each may be used correctly, or misused, depending upon the inferences being drawn from the numbers. The geometric mean of a series of returns measures the constant rate of return that would yield the same change in the value of an investment over time. The arithmetic mean measures what the expected return would have to be each period to achieve the realized change in value over time.

20 In estimating the cost of equity, the goal is to replicate what investors expect going 21 forward, not to measure the average performance of an investment over an assumed holding

 $^{^{109}}$ Id. at 41:17-21. 110 Id.

1 period. When referencing realized rates of return in the past, investors consider the realized 2 returns in each year independently, with the arithmetic average of these annual results 3 providing the best estimate of what investors might expect in future periods. New Regulatory 4 *Finance* affirmed this principle: 5 The best estimate of expected returns over a given future holding period is the arithmetic average. Only arithmetic means are correct for forecasting purposes 6 7 and for estimating the cost of capital. There is no theoretical or empirical 8 justification for the use of geometric mean rates of returns as a measure of the appropriate discount rate in computing the cost of capital or in computing 9 present values.¹¹¹ 10 11 Similarly, Morningstar concluded that: 12 For use as the expected equity risk premium in either the CAPM or the building 13 block approach, the arithmetic mean or the simple difference of the arithmetic means of stock market returns and riskless rates is the relevant number. ... The 14 geometric average is more appropriate for reporting past performance, since it 15 represents the compound average return.¹¹² 16 17 What does this imply with respect to Mr. Parcell's CAPM analyses? Q. 18 For a variable series, such as stock returns, the geometric average will always A. 19 be less than the arithmetic average. This confirms the downward bias built in to Mr. Parcell's 20 CAPM results. 21 **Q**. Are there other flaws that lead Mr. Parcell's CAPM results to understate 22 the cost of equity? 23 A. Yes. For two of the three values that he relied on to compute his MRP, Mr. 24 Parcell subtracted the average total return on long-term government bonds, which includes annual capital gains and losses, from the return on common stocks.¹¹³ This is incorrect and 25

¹¹¹ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Util. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 116-117, (emphasis added).

¹¹² Morningstar, *Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook* at 56.

¹¹³ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 41:17-21.

inconsistent with the findings of his own sources.¹¹⁴ As Duff & Phelps noted, "We measure
the realized risk premium by comparing the stock market returns during the specified period
to the *income return* on long-term U.S. government bonds."¹¹⁵ As Ibbotson Associates
explained:

5 Price changes in bonds due to unanticipated changes in yields introduce price 6 risk into the total return. Therefore, the total return on the bond series does not 7 represent the riskless rate of return. The income return better represents the 8 unbiased estimate of the purely riskless rate of return, since an investor can 9 hold a bond to maturity and be entitled to the income return with no capital 10 loss.¹¹⁶

In other words, using only the arithmetic mean *income* component of the long-term government bond return provides a more reliable estimate of the expected risk premium because investors do not anticipate capital losses for a risk-free security. Mr. Parcell, however, calculated his equity risk premium using the *total* return for Duff & Phelps' (now Kroll's) long-term government bond series. As a result, two of his three historical MRPs and the resulting CAPM cost of equity estimate are all understated.

17

Q. What MRP is reported by Kroll, the source that Mr. Parcell cites as

- 18 support for his historical returns?
- 19

20

A. In contrast to the 6.4 percent and 4.9 percent values that Mr. Parcell attributes to this source,¹¹⁷ as of December 31, 2023, Kroll reports a long-horizon equity risk premium

21 of 7.17 percent.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Mr. Parcell cites Duff & Phelps and Ibbotson Associates as former publishers of his data series at Exh. DCP-1T, footnote 48.

¹¹⁵ Duff & Phelps, 2018 Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital at 39 (emphasis original).

¹¹⁶ Morningstar, *Ibbotson SBBI 2008 Valuation Yearbook* at 77.

¹¹⁷ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 41:19-21.

¹¹⁸ Kroll, Cost of Capital Navigator.

1 **Q**. What cost of equity estimate results from Mr. Parcell's analysis when the 2 MRP actually reported by his own source is used? 3 A. Averaging Mr. Parcell's 7.82 percent MRP from Parcell, Exhibit DCP-10 with 4 the 7.17 percent long-horizon historical MRP reported by Kroll results in an average of 7.5 5 percent. Substituting this average MRP into Mr. Parcell's CAPM study results in an average 6 cost of equity for his proxy group of 11.7 percent. 7 Q. Mr. Parcell objects to your calculation of the MRP, which is used within 8 the CAPM and ECAPM analyses.¹¹⁹ How do you respond? 9 A. Within my MRP computation, I use a DCF approach that relies on analysts' 10 EPS growth projections to estimate the market return. Mr. Parcell's singular objection to my 11 MRP is that "McKenzie's 7.3 percent risk premium greatly exceeds the historic levels of risk 12 premiums (4.9 percent to 6.4 percent) that I cite in my CAPM analyses."¹²⁰ Beyond that, Mr. 13 Parcell doesn't find any flaws in my approach to estimating the MRP. But as indicated above, 14 the correct historical equity risk premium reported by Kroll is 7.17 percent, not the 4.9 percent 15 and 6.4 percent values cited by Mr. Parcell. Meanwhile Mr. Parcell also fails to note that my MRP is lower than his remaining value of 7.8 percent.¹²¹ And in any event, it is investors' 16 17 expectations of the future that matter in ROE estimation. Whether or not such projections 18 exceed historical MRPs is not the issue, as long as they reflect widely held expectations.

¹¹⁹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 44:21-45:4.

¹²⁰ *Id.* at 45:1-3.

¹²¹ *Id.* at 42:2.

1

Q. Has the forward-looking CAPM approach presented in your direct testimony been relied on by regulators and in the financial literature?

2 3

4

5

6

A. Yes. I based my CAPM approach on the methods used by the Staff at the Illinois Commerce Commission, whose witnesses have routinely relied on forward-looking market rate of return estimates to apply the CAPM. For example, one staff witness described an approach analogous to that used in my direct testimony.

7 Q. How was the expected rate of return on the market portfolio estimated? 8 A. The expected rate of return on the market was estimated by conducting a 9 DCF analysis on the firms composing the S&P 500 Index ('S&P 500'). ... 10 Firms not paying a dividend as of July 1, 2010, or for which neither Zacks nor Reuters growth rates were available were eliminated from the analysis. 11 The resulting company-specific estimates of the expected rate of return on 12 common equity were then weighted using market value data from Zacks 13 on July 2, 2010. The estimated weighted averaged expected rate of return 14 for the remaining 367 firms composing 80.21% of the market capitalization 15 of the S&P 500, equals 12.74 percent.¹²² 16

17 FERC has also adopted a forward-looking CAPM approach directly comparable to the

- 18 methodology applied in my direct testimony.¹²³ Similarly, studies reported in the financial
- 19 literature have relied on a similar DCF approach to estimate a forward-looking rate of return
- 20 for the S&P 500^{124}

¹²² *Direct Testimony of Michael McNally*, Illinois Commerce Commission, Docket No. 10-0467, filed October 26, 2010, at 27-29. The Illinois Commerce Commission relied on this CAPM approach in arriving at the authorized ROE in this proceeding. Illinois Commerce Commission, Docket No. 10-0467, Order (May 24, 2011) at 153.

¹²³ Ass'n of Bus. Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Opinion No. 569-A, 171 FERC ¶ 61,154 (2020) (Opinion No. 569-A) at P 260, vacated & remanded sub nom. MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, No. 16-1325 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

¹²⁴ R.S. Harris, and F.C. Marston, *Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts*, Financial Management (Summer 1992).

1Q.Are there other shortcomings associated with Mr. Parcell's application of2the CAPM?

3 A. Yes. Mr. Parcell failed to adjust for the impact of firm size. According to the 4 CAPM, the expected return on a security should consist of the riskless rate, plus a premium 5 to compensate for the systematic risk of the particular security. The degree of systematic risk 6 is represented by the beta coefficient. The size adjustment is needed because differences in 7 investors' required rates of return that are related to firm size are not fully captured by beta. 8 To account for this, Kroll (formerly Ibbotson Associates, then Duff and Phelps), which is the same source relied on by Mr. Parcell,¹²⁵ has developed size premiums that need to be added 9 10 to the CAPM cost of equity estimates to account for the level of a firm's market capitalization. 11 Accordingly, Mr. Parcell should have incorporated an adjustment to recognize the impact of 12 size distinctions between his proxy companies, as measured by the average market 13 capitalization.

14

Q. Does Mr. Parcell object to the size adjustment within your CAPM and

- 15 ECAPM models?
- 16 A. Yes. Mr. Parcell states:

17 ... the small size adjustment in the SBBI studies is based on the analysis of all
18 stocks, the majority of which are unregulated and include industries that are
19 much riskier than utilities. While it may or may not be true that on an overall
20 market basis, smaller publicly traded firms exhibit more risk than larger firms,
21 these smaller companies' stocks tend to be engaged in riskier businesses as a
22 whole than do larger businesses. Such is not the case for regulated utilities.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at footnote 48.

¹²⁶ *Id.* at 45:16-22.

1

Q. Is there any merit to Mr. Parcell's contention that a size adjustment should not be applied to utilities?

2

3 A. No. Of course there are any number of specific factors that distinguish a 4 utility's risks from other firms in the non-regulated sector, just as there are important 5 distinctions between the circumstances faced by airlines and drug manufacturers. But under 6 the assumptions of modern capital market theory on which the CAPM rests, these 7 considerations are reduced to a single risk measure-beta-which captures stock price 8 volatility relative to the market. Within the CAPM paradigm, the degree of regulation, the 9 nature of competition in the industry, the competence of management, and every other firm-10 specific consideration is boiled down to a single question; namely, how much does the stock's 11 price fluctuate in relation to the market as a whole? Beta is the measure of that variability, 12 and research demonstrates that beta does not fully account for the impact of firm size.

13 Mr. Parcell speculates that smaller companies "tend to be engaged in riskier businesses,"¹²⁷ but as Duff & Phelps noted, published size premia "are 'beta-adjusted,' 14 15 meaning that they have been adjusted to remove the portion of excess return that is attributable to beta, leaving only the size effect's contribution to excess return."¹²⁸ In other words, to the 16 17 extent that certain companies may be involved in riskier businesses, the beta coefficient within 18 the CAPM model already controls for that risk. The Kroll size premiums that I utilize adjust 19 the CAPM results for my proxy companies to account for the effects of company size beyond 20 individual company risk, as measured by beta.

¹²⁷ *Id.* at 45:20-21.

¹²⁸ Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook 2017, U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital, John Wiley & Son's, at 2-10 (2017).

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Q. Mr. Parcell compares risk measures for utilities across four categories based on relative size.¹²⁹ Is this comparison at all relevant?

A. No. Mr. Parcell's example does not refute the evidence cited by Kroll, or more broadly in the financial research. Contrary to the assumption underlying Mr. Parcell's comparison, the size adjustment required in applying the CAPM and ECAPM is not based on a presumed relationship between size and beta or any of the other risk indicators referenced by Mr. Parcell. Rather, it is based on the finding that *after controlling for risk differences reflected in beta*, the CAPM overstates returns to companies with larger market capitalizations and understates returns for relatively smaller firms.

Furthermore, Mr. Parcell's comparisons are limited to utility companies. Avista is competing for funds in the capital markets alongside firms from all segments of the economy. Limiting the comparison to utility companies does not constitute a rigorous test of the CAPM or paint a complete picture of the market conditions faced by the Company. In contrast to Mr. Parcell's narrow comparisons, published research by Kroll documents a very clear, consistent relationship between size and equity risk premiums, as illustrated in Table AMM-R4 below:

¹²⁹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 46:16-47:6.

TABLE AMM-R4 **DUFF & PHELPS SIZE PREMIUMS**

Companies Ranked by	Market Value of Common Equity		
Decile	Low End Breakpoint (\$M)	High End Breakpoint (\$M)	Size Premium
Mid Cap	3,011.22	14,820.05	0.66%
Low Cap	555.88	3,010.81	1.24%
Micro Cap	1.58	554.52	2.91%
Breakdown of CRSP Decil	es 1 - 10		
	1 36,942.98	2,662,326.05	-0.06%
	2 14,910.72	36,391.11	0.46%
	3 7,493.61	14,820.05	0.61%
	4 4,622.26	7,461.28	0.64%
	5 3,011.22	4,621.79	0.95%
	6 1,864.29	3,010.81	1.21%
	7 1,050.08	1,862.49	1.39%
	8 555.88	1,046.04	1.14%
	9 213.04	554.52	1.99%
1	0 1.58	212.64	4.70%
Breakdown of CRSP 10th	Decile		
10A	97.46	212.64	3.29%
10B	1.58	97.40	7.64%
10W	153.80	212.64	2.38%
10X	97.46	153.67	4.43%
10Y	57.82	97.40	6.22%
10Z	1.58	57.45	10.73%

CRSP Deciles Size Study - Data as of 12/31/2023

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The size adjustments shown in the righthand column range from a premium of 10.73 percent for the smallest firms in the 10th decile to a negative adjustment of 0.66 percent for 4 5 the largest firms in the 1st decile. Confirming the findings of Kroll, New Regulatory Finance 6 observed that "small market-cap stocks experience higher returns than large market-cap stocks 7 with equivalent betas," and concluded that "the CAPM understates the risk of smaller utilities, 8 and a cost of equity based purely on a CAPM beta will therefore produce too low an 9 estimate."130

¹³⁰ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 187.

1Q.Mr. Parcell also places a significant weight on a 1993 study by Annie2Wong.¹³¹ Does this article refute the need for a size adjustment in applying the CAPM3to a utility?

4 A. A closer examination of this research reveals that it is largely No. 5 inconclusive, and inconsistent with the CAPM. In fact, her results demonstrate no material 6 difference between utilities and industrial firms with respect to size premiums, and her study 7 finds no significant relationship between beta and returns, which contradicts modern portfolio 8 theory and the CAPM. A more recent Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance study by 9 Thomas Zepp, reconsiders Wong's evidence and concludes that "new information indicates there is a small firm effect in the utility sector."¹³² 10

11

12

Q. Is the size adjustment incorporated in your analysis consistent with how FERC applies the CAPM?

A. Yes. FERC has observed that "[t]his type of size adjustment is a generally accepted approach to CAPM analyses,"¹³³ and includes the size adjustment in the CAPM under its ROE methodology for electric utilities and natural gas and oil pipelines.¹³⁴ More recently, FERC affirmed its practice of including a size adjustment, concluding that "the size adjustment is necessary to correct for the CAPM's inability to fully account for the impact of

¹³¹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 46:1-13.

¹³² Thomas M. Zepp, *Utility stocks and the size effect—revisited*, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43 (2003) 578-582.

¹³³ Coakley v. Bangor-Hydro-Elec. Co., Opinion No. 531-B, 150 FERC ¶ 61,165 at P 117 (2015).

¹³⁴ Ass'n of Bus. Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Opinion No. 569-A, 171 FERC ¶ 61,154 (2020); Policy Statement on Determining Return on Equity for Natural Gas and Oil Pipelines, 171 FERC ¶ 61,155 (2020).

1 firm size when determining the cost of equity."¹³⁵ 2 **Q**. Mr. Parcell says that his CAPM ROE of 10.7 percent "is currently an outlier due to Federal Reserve policy,"¹³⁶ and ultimately ignores this result. How do you 3 4 respond? 5 Mr. Parcell offered this explanation for his decision to exclude his CAPM A. 6 results: 7 Over the past two years, the Federal Reserve has reversed this monetary policy 8 strategy, primarily in response to the increase in inflation rates, such that yields 9 on U.S. Treasury bonds now reflect the opposite effect of Federal Reserve 10 monetary policy (i.e., recent and current rates are upwardly biased). As a result 11 of this reversal of Federal Reserve, interest rates are equally reflective of "nonmarket" factors.¹³⁷ 12 13 I disagree with Mr. Parcell's contention that Treasury bond yields are "biased" or 14 reflect "non-market" factors. In fact, the Federal Reserve's monetary policies are a key 15 consideration impacting investors' return requirements and expectations; not just for Treasury 16 bonds, but for utility bonds and common stocks as well. Mr. Parcell is effectively asserting 17 that the CAPM approach should not be used to estimate the cost of equity unless Federal 18 Reserve policies remain neutral and no changes to interest rates can be foreseen. Apart from speculating that bond yields might fall in the future,¹³⁸ Mr. Parcell has provided no support 19 20 for this view. 21 Meanwhile, as discussed earlier, there is no support for Mr. Parcell's suggestion that 22 investors anticipate significant declines in Treasury bond yields, with the recent long-term

¹³⁵ Ass'n of Bus. Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Opinion No. 569-B, 173 FERC ¶ 61,159 at P 100 (2020).

¹³⁶ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 5:21-22.

¹³⁷ *Id.* at 43:4-8.

¹³⁸ Id.

forecasts of leading economists reflecting stable yields through at least 2030. As Mr. Parcell
 has stated previously, "Because the current yield is known and measurable, it reflects
 investors' collective assessment of all capital market conditions."¹³⁹ These "conditions"
 include their assessment of Federal Reserve monetary policies.

- 5
- 6

Q. Is there anything particularly remarkable about the 20-year Treasury bond yield used as the risk-free rate in Mr. Parcell's CAPM study?

7 A. No. A review of monthly averages from April 1953 reported by the Federal 8 Reserve Bank of St. Louis indicates that the 20-year Treasury bond yield was equal to or 9 greater than the 4.65 percent risk-free rate used by Mr. Parcell over 50 percent of the time. 10 The last time 20-year Treasury bond yields were approximately 4.65 percent was in the period 11 May-July 2008. Coincidentally, as a result of settlement conferences in August and 12 September 2008, a multiparty settlement was reached in Docket UE-080416 adjusting Avista's ROE to 10.2 percent.¹⁴⁰ During the third quarter of 2008, when Treasury bond yields 13 were slightly lower than Mr. Parcell's 4.65 percent risk-free rate,¹⁴¹ the average allowed ROEs 14 15 for electric and gas utilities were 10.47 percent and 10.49 percent respectively.¹⁴² These 16 benchmarks provide further confirmation that Mr. Parcell's 9.5 percent ROE recommendation 17 is downward biased and insufficient.

¹³⁹ Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Dockets UE-200900, et al., Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T (Apr. 21, 2021) at 52.

¹⁴⁰ Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Dockets UE-080416 and UG-080417, *Multiparty Settlement Stipulation* (Sep. 15, 2008).

¹⁴¹ The average 20-year Treasury bond yield for the third quarter of 2008 was 4.49 percent, versus Mr. Parcell's 4.65 percent, which suggests that the ROE would be slightly higher under todays' capital market conditions.

¹⁴² Regulatory Research Associates, *Major Rate Case Decisions—January 2007-December 2008 Supplemental Study*, Regulatory Focus (Jan. 12, 2009).

1	Q.	Is Mr. Parcell's 10.7 percent CAPM result an "outlier" when compared to
2	the results of	his other methods?
3	А.	No. Mr. Parcell's unfiltered DCF results range as high as 10.6 percent and he
4	considers risk	premium results in a range of 9.8 percent to 10.8 percent as meaningful in
5	evaluating his	ROE recommendation. ¹⁴³ Mr. Parcell's 10.7 percent CAPM is consistent with
6	these results.	
7	Q.	Mr. Parcell says that, "Over the past several years, I have not given the
8	CAPM result	ts weight in my final ROE recommendations." ¹⁴⁴ Is this accurate?
9	А.	No. In testimony filed with the Regulatory Commission of Alaska in April
10	2023, Mr. Par	ccell included his CAPM results in his final recommendation. As Mr. Parcell
11	explained:	
12 13 14 15 16	range incorp	upon these findings I conclude that the ROE for AEL&P is within a of 9.6 percent to 10.0 percent (9.8 percent mid-point). This range orates the respective upper ends of the discounted cash flow ("DCF"), 1 Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") and comparable earnings ("CE") es. ¹⁴⁵
17	Mr. Parcell sh	ould have remained consistent with his testimony from April 2023 and included
18	his CAPM re	sult in arriving at his final ROE recommendation. Mr. Parcell's unjustified
19	exclusion of h	is CAPM result biases his ROE recommendation for Avista downward.
20	In add	ition, Mr. Parcell's claim to have disavowed low CAPM results in Docket UE-
21	200900 is not	entirely accurate, given his conclusion that "they should be considered as one
22	factor in dete	rmining where, within the recommended range, the cost of equity for Avista

¹⁴³ Parcell, Exh. DCP-9 at 2; Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 59:27-28.
¹⁴⁴ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 42:19-20.

¹⁴⁵ Regulatory Commission of Alaska, U-22-078 AEL&P, *Prefiled Testimony of David C. Parcell on behalf of Regulatory Affairs & Public Advocacy* (Apr. 6, 2023) at 8.

should fall."¹⁴⁶ At the very least, this would suggest an ROE at the upper end of Mr. Parcell's 1 2 range.

3

4

D. Comparable Earnings Approach

Q. What are the results of Mr. Parcell's CE analysis?

5 A. Mr. Parcell applies his CE analysis by examining realized ROEs for groups of 6 proxy utilities, as well as unregulated companies. He also considers prospective returns for 7 his proxy utilities, but not for the unregulated companies. He determines an ROE range from 8 his CE analysis of 9.0 percent to 9.5 percent, with a midpoint of 9.25 percent.¹⁴⁷

9

Q. Are there similarities between Mr. Parcell's CE approach and your 10 expected earnings and Non-Utility DCF approaches?

11 A. Yes. Mr. Parcell applies his CE methodology to two proxy groups of utility 12 companies, as well as to the firms in the S&P 500, which he says "is a well-recognized group 13 of firms that is widely utilized in the investment community and is indicative of the competitive sector of the economy."¹⁴⁸ In a like manner, I apply my expected earnings 14 15 approach to my proxy group of utility companies and consider investors' requirements for a 16 reference group of low-risk companies in the non-utility sector of the economy through my 17 Non-Utility DCF approach.

18 We agree that rates of return available from alternative investments of comparable risk 19 (including unregulated firms) can provide an important benchmark in assessing the return 20 necessary to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the utility and its ability to attract

¹⁴⁶ Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Dockets UE-200900 & UG-200901 (Consolidated), Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 56:19-21.

¹⁴⁷ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 51:16-52:8.

¹⁴⁸ *Id.* at 50:27-29.

capital. As I discuss in my direct testimony, this approach is consistent with the economic
 underpinnings for a fair rate of return, as reflected in the comparable earnings test established
 by the Supreme Court in *Hope* and *Bluefield*.

4

Q. What issues do you have with Mr. Parcell's CE approach?

5 A. I have three primary issues with Mr. Parcell's CE approach: 1) he largely relies 6 on historical rates of return in his analysis; 2) his suggestion that M/B ratios provide a guide 7 to the reasonableness of returns is misguided, and 3) he omits the mid-year adjustment factor 8 necessary to convert Value Line's end-of-year data to average annual returns. As I detailed 9 earlier in my discussion of Mr. Parcell's DCF and CAPM analyses, setting Avista's ROE is a 10 forward-looking process, and Mr. Parcell's over-reliance on historical data is a flaw in his 11 methodologies. This same criticism applies to his CE analysis, which examines past data from 12 the period 2002-2023.¹⁴⁹ Estimating investors' required return depends on their future expectations, not on data over an arbitrary 22-year historical period. The operating and 13 14 financial environment faced by utilities, like Avista, is significantly different now than it was 15 in 2002. Reliance on such data weakens Mr. Parcell's CE analysis.

16

Q. Is Mr. Parcell's description of his CE model at odds with his use of historic

- 17 **data?**
- 18

A. Yes. Mr. Parcell describes the basis of his CE methodology as follows:

As previously noted, the ROE is an opportunity cost: the prospective return available to investors from alternative investments of similar risk. The CE method is designed to measure the returns expected to be earned on the original cost book value of similar risk enterprises.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ *Id.* at 49:10-11.

¹⁵⁰ *Id.* at 48:1-4.

1	Mr. Parcell's description of the ROE as an opportunity cost is correct, but his focus on
2	expected returns above is directly at odds with his use of 22 years of historic data within his
3	CE model. It is simply implausible that earned returns from, say, 2002 or 2006 could inform
4	what investors are expecting in today's capital markets.
5	Q. Mr. Parcell says that his "CE analysis also uses prospective returns and
6	thus is not backward looking." ¹⁵¹ How do you respond?
7	A. One look at Exhibit DCP-13 disproves the contention that Mr. Parcell's CE
8	analysis is not backward looking. On the first page of that exhibit, Mr. Parcell identifies
9	earned rates of return for ten unique utilities, including 207 data points based on historic
10	ROEs, and only 30 prospective values. The claim that Mr. Parcell's CE analysis "is not
11	backward looking" is plainly incorrect.
12	Q. What are your comments on Mr. Parcell's consideration of M/B ratios in
13	the context of his CE application?
14	A. Mr. Parcell uses the M/B ratio as a type of indicator as to the reasonableness
15	of the returns developed through his CE analysis. For instance, he says that since recent ROEs
16	of 9.3 percent to 9.4 percent have been accompanied by M/B ratios of 1.45 and over, and
17	current and prospective ROEs of 8.8 percent to 9.7 percent have been accompanied by M/B
18	ratios over 1.40, "it is apparent that authorized returns below this level would continue to
19	result in M/Bs of well above 100 percent." ¹⁵² He adds, "the fact that M/Bs substantially
20	exceed 100 percent indicates that historic and prospective ROEs of 9.0 percent to 9.5 percent
21	reflect earning levels that are well above the actual cost of equity for those regulated

¹⁵¹ *Id.* at 49:6-7.

 $^{^{152}}$ *Id.* at 51:20-21.

1 companies."¹⁵³

2	I strongly disagree with Mr. Parcell's suggestion that M/B ratios are a valid
3	consideration in setting the allowed rates of return for utilities. With M/B ratios for most
4	utilities above 1.0, Mr. Parcell is suggesting that, unless book value grows rapidly, regulators
5	should establish equity returns that will cause share prices to fall. Given the regulatory
6	imperative of preserving a utility's ability to attract capital, this would be a nonsensical result.
7	New Regulatory Finance concludes that, "This is certainly not a realistic or accurate view of
8	regulation," ¹⁵⁴ and notes:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	M/B ratios are determined by the marketplace, and utilities cannot be expected to compete for and attract capital in an environment where industrials are commanding M/B ratios well in excess of 1.0 while regulation reduces their M/B ratios toward 1.0. Moreover, if regulators were to currently set rates so as to produce an M/B of 1.0 the inevitable consequence would be to inflict severe capital losses on shareholders. Investors have not committed capital to utilities with the expectation of incurring capital losses from a misguided regulatory process. *** It is obvious that regulators, through their rate case decisions, and investors do not subscribe to the notion that utilities that have market prices above book value are over-earning
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30	In short, economic principles do not support the notion that the market value of utility shares should necessarily equal book value. A basic economic principle holds that, in the long-run, market value should equal asset replacement cost in a given industry. In the presence of inflation and absent significant technological advances, replacement cost exceeds original cost book value of assets. Consequently, it is quite reasonable for the market value of utility shares to exceed their book value and there is no reason to conclude that market value should equal book value when one recognizes that regulation is intended to emulate competition. ¹⁵⁵
31	The M/B ratio is determined by investors in the stock market, and a utility would be

¹⁵³ Id. at 51:21-52:3.
¹⁵⁴ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 376.

¹⁵⁵ *Id.* at 377-78.

1 foreclosed from attracting capital if regulators were to push the M/B ratio to 1.0 while other 2 firms command prices well in excess of 1.0 times book value. 3 Q. Is the simplistic view that regulation should result in an M/B ratio of 1.0 4 for utilities contradicted by other authoritative sources? 5 Yes. In a 1988 publication, James C. Bonbright noted that focus on M/B ratios A. 6 was unwarranted and outside the purview of regulators: 7 In the first place, commissioners cannot forecast, except within wide limits, the 8 effect their rate orders will have on the market prices of the stocks of the 9 companies they regulate. In the second place, whatever the initial market prices may be, they are sure to change not only with the changing prospects for 10 11 earnings, but with the changing outlook of an inherently volatile stock market. In short, market prices are beyond the control, though not beyond the influence, 12 of rate regulation. Moreover, even if a commission did possess the power of 13 14 control, any attempt to exercise it . . . would result in harmful, uneconomic 15 shifts in public utility rate levels.¹⁵⁶ 16 The well-known financial researcher Stewart C. Myers also observed the disconnect 17 between regulation and resulting M/B ratios: 18 [A] straightforward application of the cost of capital to a book value rate base 19 does not automatically imply that the market and book values will be equal. 20 This is an obvious but important point. If straightforward approaches did imply equality of market and book values, then there would be no need to 21 22 estimate the cost of capital.¹⁵⁷ 23 Similarly, Charles F. Phillips also recognized the divergence between the implications of theoretical models and real-world considerations: 24 25 Many question the assumption that market price should equal book value, believing that the earnings of utilities should be sufficiently high to achieve 26 27 market-to-book ratios which are consistent with those prevailing for stocks of

¹⁵⁶ James C. Bonbright, Albert L. Danielsen, and David R. Kamerschen, *Principles of Public Utility Rates* 334 (Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc., 1988).

¹⁵⁷ Stewart C. Myers, *The Application of Finance Theory to Public Utility Rate Cases*, Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Science 58-59 (Spring 1972).

1 unregulated companies.¹⁵⁸

2

Are adjustments based on M/B ratios a common feature in determining **Q**.

3 allowed ROEs for utilities?

4 A. No. While arguments regarding the implications of a M/B ratio greater than 5 1.0 are not uncommon, I am not aware of a single instance in recent history where a state 6 regulator has relied on M/B ratios as the basis to evaluate a fair ROE. Meanwhile, the fallacy 7 of relying on M/B ratios in evaluating cost of equity estimates has been explicitly recognized 8 and characterized by FERC as "academic rhetoric."¹⁵⁹ FERC concluded that "[i]f, all else 9 being equal, the regulator sets a utility's ROE so that the utility does not have the opportunity 10 to earn a return on its book value comparable to the amount that investors expect that other 11 utilities of comparable risk will earn on their book equity, the utility will not be able to provide investors the return they require to invest in that utility."¹⁶⁰ 12

13

14

Q. Earlier, in your discussion of retention growth, you criticized Mr. Parcell for making a computational error. Does he make the same mistake in his CE analysis?

Yes. In his calculations of the internal "br" retention growth rate, Mr. Parcell 15 A. 16 relied on end-of-year data from Value Line. I criticized Mr. Parcell for not converting this 17 end-of-year information to average annual amounts, which account for growth in common 18 equity over the year. The same principle applies to his CE analysis. Mr. Parcell neglected to 19 convert his CE results, based on Value Line data, from end-of-year values to average annual 20 amounts. This flaw leads to further downward bias in Mr. Parcell's results.

¹⁵⁸ Charles F. Phillips, The Regulation of Public Utilities-Theory and Practice 395 (Pub. Util. Reports, Inc., 1993) (internal quotes omitted).

¹⁵⁹ See, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 40 FERC ¶ 63,053 (1987) (Initial Decision).

¹⁶⁰ Coakley v. Bangor-Hydro-Elec. Co., Opinion No. 531-B, 150 FERC ¶ 61,165 at P 129 (2015).

1

E. Risk Premium Approach

- 2 0. What are the results of Mr. Parcell's risk premium approach? 3 A. Mr. Parcell applies his risk premium analysis by examining awarded ROEs for 4 electric utilities and the average yield on A-rated utility bonds from 2002 to 2023.¹⁶¹ From 5 this, he concludes that the utility risk premium is in a range of 4.84 percent to 5.10 percent.¹⁶² 6 Mr. Parcell adjusts his utility risk premiums downward to account for current utility bond yields being higher than average yields during his date ranges.¹⁶³ He determines an ROE 7 8 range from his risk premium analysis of 9.8 percent to 10.8 percent, with a midpoint of 10.3 percent.164 9 10 Q. Are there any issues with Mr. Parcell's implementation of the risk 11 premium approach? 12 A. Yes. Mr. Parcell subjectively chooses to truncate the data available to apply his risk premium approach by ignoring all observations prior to 2012.¹⁶⁵ By choosing a 13 14 truncated period for his risk premium study, Mr. Parcell unnecessarily introduces a subjective 15 bias that undermines the credibility of his analysis. Ibbotson Associates noted the pitfalls of 16 such a subjective approach: 17 Some analysts estimate the expected risk premium using a shorter, more recent time period on the basis that recent events are more likely to be repeated in the 18 near future ... This view is suspect ...¹⁶⁶ 19
- 20

¹⁶² Id.

Mr. Parcell's arbitrary exclusion of available data seriously undermines his analysis.

¹⁶¹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 57:6-21.

¹⁶³ *Id.* at 58:216 and Parcell, Exh. DCP-16 at 1.

¹⁶⁴ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 59:27-28.

¹⁶⁵ Parcell, Exh. DCP-16.

¹⁶⁶ Ibbotson Associates, 2005 Yearbook, Valuation Edition at 80.

1

Mr. Parcell criticizes your risk premium approach.¹⁶⁷ Are his criticisms Q. valid?

3

2

A. No. First, he suggests that data over the period 2011-2022 may be distorted. 4 And second, he claims that certain data from my risk premium study is not acceptable because, 5 "Current ROEs reflect a suite of favorable regulatory mechanisms that greatly enhance utilities' ability to recover costs, which is risk-reducing and thus warrants low ROEs."168 6

7 Neither of these points are persuasive. As shown on page 3 of Exhibit AMM-11 to 8 my direct testimony, the "R Square" of the data in my risk premium study, which measures 9 the relationship between interest rate levels and equity risk premiums, is about 0.89. This 10 indicates that about 89 percent of the variation in risk premiums over the years covered by my 11 study period is explained by variation in utility bond yields.¹⁶⁹ In this case, it is a "negative" or inverse relationship. That is, for every 100 basis point decrease in interest rates, the equity 12 13 risk premium increases by about 43 basis points (and vice versa). It is entirely consistent with 14 these results that the highest risk premium would exist over the 2011-2022 period because this 15 period coincides with the lowest bond yields. According to the strong inverse correlation 16 indicated by the statistics discussed above, this is exactly the relationship that would be 17 expected.

18 I also disagree with Mr. Parcell's second allegation—that the risk premium study is 19 not valid because regulatory conditions are not exactly the same as they were 30-40 years ago. 20 Regulatory mechanisms are only one consideration is evaluating a utility's risks. It is also

¹⁶⁷ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 54:14-55:2.

¹⁶⁸ *Id.* at 54:20-55:2.

¹⁶⁹ In addition to the relatively high R Square value, my regression's F Statistic indicates that my overall regression model is statistically significant beyond a 99 percent confidence level.

1 likely that utilities today face greater risk exposure related to cyber and physical threats, the 2 imperative to maintain reliability in response to a surge in new technologies and devices, 3 customer demand for more flexible and customized products, and the need to address 4 environmental concerns and the impact of more extreme weather events, including wildfires. 5 In fact, credit ratings for firms in the electric utility industry have generally declined over the 6 time period covered by my risk premium study, indicating greater, not lower risks overall. 7 For example, even as late as 2001, S&P reported the majority of firms in the electric utility 8 industry were rated single-A and above, with over 20 firms having double-A ratings.¹⁷⁰ A 9 blanket statement, with no supporting analysis, that the current climate faced by utilities is less risky than at any time in the past, is potentially false and misleading.¹⁷¹ Moreover, it is 10 11 contradictory to Mr. Parcell's observation that risk premiums implied for utilities have 12 increased and it ignores the fact that my risk premium analysis incorporates current capital 13 market data.

14

F. Other ROE Issues

Q. Do you agree with Mr. Parcell's criticisms of your expected earnings
 approach?¹⁷²

A. No. His primary concern with my expected earnings approach appears to be
that I did not consider M/B ratios as part of my analysis. I addressed this issue earlier in this

¹⁷⁰ Standard & Poor's Corporation, *Downgrades Dominate U.S. Utility Ratings in First Half; Negative Trend Likely to Continue*, RatingsDirect (Jul. 10, 2001). Currently, the average credit rating is triple-B and there are no publicly traded electric utilities with credit ratings above single-A.

¹⁷¹ Mr. Parcell presents no evidence of his own to document his supposition that changes in "factors other than interest rates" have a material effect on the behavior of equity risk premiums implied from authorized ROEs, and he adopted my regression results in his own risk premium study..

¹⁷² Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 52:21-53:23.

1 rebuttal testimony.

2 0. Mr. Parcell notes that expected ROEs for the proxy group companies are 3 higher than authorized ROEs.¹⁷³ Does this undermine your expected earnings analysis? 4 A. No. My ROE methods utilize forward-looking inputs wherever possible, and 5 my expected earnings analysis is no exception. The fact that the expected return on common 6 equity as sourced from Value Line is higher, on average, for my proxy group companies as 7 compared to their currently allowed ROEs simply indicates that investors are likely expecting 8 returns that exceed currently allowed returns. There is no dictate in finance that says future 9 expected returns must be equal to present or past earned or allowed returns, as Mr. Parcell's 10 criticism of my expected earnings method seems to suggest. The fact that expected earnings 11 results exceed authorized returns says nothing about the validity of my expected earnings ROE 12 estimate. 13 Mr. Parcell rejects your use of the ECAPM because he says it "ignores" **O**. each proxy company's actual beta and instead "assigns hypothetical betas to them."¹⁷⁴ 14

15 What is your response?

A. As I stated in my direct testimony,¹⁷⁵ the ECAPM is simply a variant of the traditional CAPM approach that is designed to correct for an observed bias in the CAPM result. The ECAPM reflects a refinement to adjust for a systematic tendency of low beta portfolios to over-earn and high beta portfolios to under-earn relative to the predictions of the CAPM capital market line. As one research study concluded:

¹⁷³ *Id.* at 53:16-18.

¹⁷⁴ *Id.* at 47:12-13.

¹⁷⁵ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 20:5-22:2.

1 The assertion that equity risk premiums are proportional to NYSE betas is 2 shown to result in a downward (upward) biased prediction of the cost of equity 3 capital for a public utility having an NYSE beta that is less (greater) than 4 unity.¹⁷⁶

- 5 The ECAPM addresses this observed bias.
- 6
- Q. Mr. Parcell objects to your recognition of flotation costs.¹⁷⁷ How do you
- 7 respond?
- A. Mr. Parcell argues against the inclusion of flotation costs because, "There has been no demonstration that Avista has or plans a public offering of common stock."¹⁷⁸ In fact, Avista has filed a prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning an ongoing "at-the-market" offering of common stock.¹⁷⁹ This is consistent with investors' expectations, as reflected in Value Line's projection that Avista will increase its common shares outstanding in every year of its forecast horizon.¹⁸⁰
- In my direct testimony, I explained why an adjustment for flotation costs associated with past equity issues is appropriate, even when the utility is not contemplating any new sales of common stock.¹⁸¹ A flotation cost adjustment in all future years is required to keep shareholders whole, and the flotation cost adjustment must consider total equity, including retained earnings. As noted in *Modern Regulatory Finance*:
- 19 20

21

The simple fact of the matter is that common equity capital is not free. Flotation costs associated with common stock issues are very similar to the flotation costs associated with bonds and preferred stocks. Flotation costs are

¹⁷⁶ Robert Litzenberger, Krishna Ramaswamy, and Howard Sosin, *On the CAPM Approach to the Estimation of A Public Utility's Cost of Equity Capital*, Journal of Finance, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May 1980).

¹⁷⁷ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 63:17-64:4.

¹⁷⁸ *Id.* at 63:17-18.

¹⁷⁹ <u>https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104918/000119312524133197/d825260d424b5.htm</u> (last visited Aug. 11, 2024).

¹⁸⁰ The Value Line Investment Survey, Avista Corp. (Jul. 19, 2024).

¹⁸¹ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-1T at 50-52.

1 incurred, and if they are not expensed at the time of issue, they must be recovered through a rate of return adjustment.¹⁸² 2 3 In other words, the flotation cost adjustment cannot be strictly forward-looking unless all past 4 flotation costs associated with past issues have been recovered. 5 Mr. Parcell also asserts that flotation costs, "to the extent that they occur, are known 6 to investors and thus are reflected in the stock prices of companies," and therefore in DCF 7 model results. This is akin to arguing that regulators could exclude a portion of a utility's 8 reasonable and necessary operating and maintenance expense from revenue requirements 9 because such actions would ultimately be "accounted for" in the stock price. Any regulatory 10 policy, however unreasonable or irrational, could by "justified" under Mr. Parcell's flawed 11 reasoning. Flotation costs are legitimate expenses and unless a discreet adjustment is made 12 to recognize them, they will not be recovered in the rate setting process. 13 Finally, Mr. Parcell's observation that sales of stock at prices above book value result 14 in accretion for existing shareholders is true, but completely unrelated to the recovery of 15 flotation costs. As discussed earlier, stockholders regard the potential for accretion as one

15 Instation costs. As discussed earlier, stockholders regard the potential for accretion as one 16 component of potential growth, not as a substitute for the recovery of legitimate expenses that 17 the utility must incur to obtain equity capital. I would also note that, in contrast to the past 18 proceedings referenced by Mr. Parcell, my flotation cost adjustment was based on the level of 19 costs actually incurred by Avista, and not on information derived from other utilities.

¹⁸² Roger A. Morin, *Modern Regulatory Finance*, PUR Books LLC (2021) at 329.

1	III. <u>RESPONSE TO MR. GARRETT</u>
2	Q. How does Mr. Garrett arrive at his 8.5 percent recommended ROE for
3	Avista?
4	A. Mr. Garrett provides DCF analyses that support an ROE range of 8.0 percent
5	to 8.2 percent and CAPM analyses that support cost of equity estimates ranging from 9.2
6	percent to 9.6 percent. ¹⁸³ Mr. Garrett excludes his 9.6 percent CAPM result, and averages the
7	three remaining ROEs to arrive at an ROE recommendation of 8.5 percent for Avista. ¹⁸⁴
8	Q. Does reference to Mr. Garrett's prior testimony illustrate that his ROE
9	recommendation is illogical?
10	A. Yes. The table below compares Mr. Garrett's 2019 ROE recommendation for
11	Southwestern Electric Power Company ("SWEPCO") and his 2023 ROE recommendation for
12	Public Service Company of Oklahoma ("PSO") with his recommendation for Avista in this
13	case.

¹⁸³ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 3:9-10, Figure 1.
¹⁸⁴ *Id.* at 3:12-4:8.

Rebuttal Testimony of Adrien M. McKenzie Avista Corporation Dockets UE-240006 & UG-240007

Date	Company	<u>Credit I</u> Moody's	<u>Rating</u> S&P	Recommended ROE	Baa Utility Yield
Jul-19	SWEPCO	Baa2	A-	9.00%	4.31%
Jul-24	Avista	Baa2	BBB	<u>8.50%</u>	<u>5.83%</u>
	Change			-0.50%	1.52%
Mar-23	PS Oklahoma	Baa1	A-	8.60%	5.54%
Jul-24	Avista	Baa2	BBB	<u>8.50%</u>	<u>5.83%</u>
	Change			-0.10%	0.29%

TABLE AMM-R5 COMPARISON OF GARRETT ROE RECOMMENDATIONS

Source

Arkansas Public Service Commission, Docket No. 19-008-U, *Direct Testimony of David J. Garrett* (July 16, 2019); Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, Cause No. PUD 2022-000093, *Responsive Testimony of David J. Garrett* (Mar. 7, 023); Moody's average yield for month preceeding filing date.

3

4 As shown above, in July 2019 Mr. Garrett recommended a 9.00 percent ROE for 5 SWEPCO when the average yield on Baa utility bonds was 4.31 percent. Despite the fact that 6 bond yields have increased more than 150 basis points, Mr. Garrett's ROE recommendation 7 for Avista is 50 basis points lower at 8.50 percent. Similarly, Mr. Garrett recommended an 8 8.60 percent ROE for PSO in March 2023 when the Baa utility bond yields averaged 5.54 9 percent. Since then, bond yields have increased almost 30 basis points and Avista is an 10 objectively riskier utility than PSO, but Mr. Garrett is recommending a lower ROE for Avista. 11 These outcomes violate basic principles of economic logic and provide further evidence that 12 Mr. Garrett's ROE recommendation should be rejected. 13 A. Conceptual Flaws 14 Q. Mr. Garrett dismisses firm-specific risk factors in the ROE estimation 15 process, stating that, "Market risk is the only type of risk that is rewarded by the market

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and is thus the primary type of risk the Commission should consider when determining the allowed return."¹⁸⁵ Do you agree?

3 A. Absolutely not. Mr. Garrett discussed two primary types of risk that affect equity investors: firm-specific risk and market risk.¹⁸⁶ He defines firm-specific risk as those 4 5 factors that affect individual companies, rather than the entire market. He lists financial risks 6 (due to differences in debt and equity levels) and business risks (all other operating and 7 managerial factors that may result in investors realizing more or less than their expected return 8 in that particular company) as examples of firm-specific risk. He describes market risk as 9 those factors that affect all firms in the market to some extent, such as interest rate risk, 10 inflation risk, the risk of major socio-economic events. I do not disagree with Mr. Garrett's 11 risk definitions.

Mr. Garrett goes on to say that investors can eliminate firm-specific risk through diversification, and for this reason, it is not part of their investment decision. Since market risk cannot be eliminated through diversification, it is the only type of risk that bears on the investment decision. Based on these assumptions, Mr. Garrett maintains that market risk is the primary type of risk the Commission should consider in setting the allowed return.

17 The problem with Mr. Garrett's risk discussion is that he is mixing apples (portfolio 18 theory) and oranges (the regulatory process). The goal of the regulatory process is not to build 19 a diversified portfolio, it is to estimate the ROE of a specific firm. To set a firm-specific ROE, 20 firm-specific risks must be considered. The landmark *Bluefield* case cited by Mr. Garrett as 21 setting forth the standards by which public utilities are allowed to earn a return on capital

¹⁸⁵ *Id.* at 14:1-3.

¹⁸⁶ *Id.* at 10:10-14:4.

- 1 investments states it clearly:
- 2 By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.¹⁸⁷ 3 4 Consider a utility with a service area that is highly concentrated and geographically 5 isolated. This utility faces the potential for uncertain and extreme weather, including exposure 6 to avalanches. It has one hydro-based generating facility and relies on a single transmission 7 path. It lacks a broad suite of regulatory recovery mechanisms and due to its reduced 8 economies of scale, it faces greater exposure to cash flow pressures associated with unforeseen 9 events, including the loss of key customers or changes in regulations. Under Mr. Garrett's 10 approach, these firm-specific risks would not be considered in the ROE estimation process. 11 In reality, the described risks conform closely to those faced by Alaska Electric Light & Power 12 Company and its firm-specific risks are explicitly considered by the RCA in setting its allowed 13 equity return. In fact, the RCA typically considers the implications of firm-specific risks in setting its ROE.¹⁸⁸ Mr. Garrett's risk philosophies are misapplied in this case and should be 14 15 rejected.
- 16

Q. Do you consider the issues you have just discussed to constitute fatal flaws

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A. Yes. These fundamental misconceptions underlying Mr. Garrett's ROE evaluation render it virtually meaningless and his 8.50 percent cost of equity estimate for Avista is not credible and should be dismissed. An authorized ROE of 8.50 percent for the Company would be extreme and punitive. Notwithstanding the fact that bond yields remain

in Mr. Garrett's approach?

¹⁸⁷ *Id.* at 5:8-10.

¹⁸⁸ In AEL&P's last litigated case concerning ROE, the RCA approved an ROE of 12.875 percent. U-10-29, Order No. 15 (Sep. 2, 2011) at p. 37.

elevated,¹⁸⁹ his recommendation is 130 basis points below the average allowed ROE for other
vertically integrated electric utilities in 2023 reported by RRA.¹⁹⁰ Such an outcome would
fall well below the returns available from comparable-risk investments and undermine the
financial integrity of the Company, conditions that violate the *Hope* and *Bluefield* regulatory
standards.

6

B. Discounted Cash Flow Model

7

Q.

What major technical flaws do you find in Mr. Garrett's DCF analyses?

A. Mr. Garrett implements two DCF models. In one version, he combines Value Line's projected growth rate in DPS with his estimate of dividend yield to produce an "analyst growth" DCF cost of equity of 8.2 percent.¹⁹¹ As discussed earlier in response to Mr. Parcell and also in my direct testimony,¹⁹² evidence supports the contention that investors rely primarily on EPS growth projections in forming their expectations.

13 The importance of earnings in evaluating investors' expectations and requirements is 14 well accepted in the investment community, and surveys of analytical techniques relied on by 15 professional analysts indicate that growth in EPS is far more influential than trends in other

16 measures.¹⁹³ As explained in *New Regulatory Finance*:

17 Because of the dominance of institutional investors and their influence on 18 individual investors, analysts' forecasts of long-run growth rates provide a 19 sound basis for estimating required returns. Financial analysts exert a strong 20 influence on the expectations of many investors who do not possess the

¹⁸⁹ Baa utility bond yields averaged 5.84 percent in 2023 and 5.85 percent in the first six months of 2024.

¹⁹⁰ S&P Global Market Intelligence, *Major energy rate case decisions in the US—January-December 2023*, RRA Regulatory Focus (Feb. 6, 2024).

¹⁹¹ Garrett, Exh. DJG-7.

¹⁹² McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 10-11.

¹⁹³ Stanley B. Block, A Study of Financial Analysts: Practice and Theory, Financial Analysts Journal (July/August 1999).

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resources to make their own forecasts, that is, they are a cause of g [growth].¹⁹⁴

If Mr. Garrett wanted to produce DCF results that incorporate forward-looking analyst
growth projections, he should have used EPS growth estimates from Value Line and other
sources, as I did in my direct testimony.

5 In the other more problematic version of the DCF model, Mr. Garrett combines a 6 generic estimate of growth in GDP with his estimate of dividend yield to produce a "sustainable growth" DCF cost of equity of 8.0 percent.¹⁹⁵ In other words, Mr. Garrett's 7 8 approach assumes that all his proxy utilities will immediately revert to the same long-term 9 rate of 3.8 percent in perpetuity.¹⁹⁶ This is clearly a nonsensical assumption. A cursory review 10 of individual company growth rate estimates from my Exhibit AMM-7 (page 2) shows that 11 securities analysts expect growth rates well in excess of 3.8 percent for most of the utilities in 12 the proxy group. Indeed, 47 of the 61 reported analyst growth rate projections in this exhibit 13 exceed 3.8 percent. Mr. Garrett ignores this evidence in his "sustainable growth" DCF 14 formulation.

15

Q. Are GDP growth rates relevant in applying the DCF model?

16

A. No. There are several reasons why GDP growth is not relevant in applying the

- 17 DCF model:
- Practical application of the DCF model does not require a long-term growth
 estimate over a horizon of 25 years and beyond—it requires a growth
 estimate that matches investors' expectations.
- 21 22

• Evidence supports the conclusion that investors do not reference long-term GDP growth in evaluating expectations for individual common stocks,

¹⁹⁶ Id.

¹⁹⁴ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 298.

¹⁹⁵ Garrett, Exh. DJG-7.

1 including those in the electric utility in	ndustry.
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The theoretical proposition that growth rates for all firms converge to overall growth in the economy over the very long horizon does not guide investors' views, and growth rates for individual stocks can and do exceed GDP growth.

6 In short, there is no evidence that investors assume all electric utilities will 7 immediately revert to a long-term GDP growth rate in forming their expectations for common 8 stocks. Mr. Garrett's "sustainable growth" DCF model is the most extreme example of 9 incorporating long-term growth into the DCF model and his resulting 8.0 percent estimate 10 from this approach should be given no weight.

11

12

Q. The DCF model assumes an infinite stream of cash flows. Why wouldn't a transition to GDP growth make sense?

13 A. This view confuses the theory underlying the DCF model with the practicalities 14 of its application in the real world. While the notion of long-term growth should presumably 15 relate to the specific firm at issue, or at the very least to a particular industry, there are no 16 long-term growth projections available for the companies in electric utility industry, or the 17 broader market. By applying the DCF model in a way that is inconsistent with the information 18 that is available to investors and how they use it, the use of GDP growth places the theoretical 19 assumptions of a financial model ahead of investor behavior. The only relevant growth rate 20 is the growth rate used by investors. Investors do not have clarity to see far into the future, 21 and there is little to no evidence to suggest that investors share the view that growth in GDP 22 must be considered a limit on earnings growth over the long-term.

Q. Are long-term GDP growth rates commonly referenced as a direct guide to future expectations for specific firms?

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A. No. Certainly, investors consider broad secular trends in economic activity as one foundation for their expectations for a particular industry or firm. But there is no evidence to support the idea that investment advisory services view GDP growth as a direct guide to long-term expectations for a particular firm—much less for every firm in an entire industry.

7 On the contrary, the financial media typically refers to three-to-five year EPS growth 8 forecasts for individual companies and rarely mentions long-term GDP forecasts. For 9 example, Value Line reports are routinely relied on as a reliable source of investment data and 10 analysis.¹⁹⁷ But despite Mr. Garrett's suggestion that GDP has a fundamental role in shaping 11 investors' expectations, Value Line does not even mention trends in GDP in its evaluation 12 growth rates for individual firms. Value Line's purpose is to inform investors of the pertinent 13 factors that could affect future expectations specific to each of the common stocks it covers. 14 If the long-term trajectory of GDP growth was relevant in investors' evaluation of common 15 stocks, Value Line and other securities analysts would highlight this in their analyses.

- 16
 Q.
 How much confidence would investors be likely to have on long-term GDP

 17
 projections?
- A. Very little. There are well-understood complexities and inherent inaccuracies involved in forecasting, and that such uncertainties are significantly compounded for a longterm time horizon. Consider the example of the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO"), which

¹⁹⁷ As noted in *New Regulatory Finance*, "Value Line is the largest and most widely circulated independent investment advisory service, and influences the expectations of a large number of institutional and individual investors." Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Util. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 71.

is the source of Mr. Garrett's long-term growth rate.¹⁹⁸ While the CBO publishes GDP
projections for the U.S. economy out to 2034, their forecast simply holds projected growth
constant after a five-year horizon.

4

5

- Q. Are there academic studies that recognize the shortcomings of adopting a generic long-term growth rate, such as GDP growth?
- 6 A. Yes. Professor Myron J. Gordon, who pioneered the application of the DCF 7 approach, concluded that reference to a generic long-term growth rate, such as Mr. Garrett 8 advocates, was unsupported.¹⁹⁹ More specifically, Dr. Gordon concluded that any assumption 9 of a single time horizon for a transition to a generic long-term growth rate was highly 10 questionable and failed to reduce error in DCF estimates.
- Instead, Dr. Gordon specifically recognized that, "it is the growth that investors expect that should be used" in applying the DCF model, and he concluded: "A number of considerations suggest that investors may, in fact, use earnings growth as a measure of expected future growth."²⁰⁰ Similarly, a subsequent paper co-authored by Professor Gordon concluded that:
- 16Analysts do not predict earnings beyond five years, which suggests that any17consensus of opinion among investors probably deteriorates quickly after five18years.²⁰¹

19 Dr. Gordon further concluded that "the consensus among investors is that the future

20 has a finite horizon of approximately seven years."²⁰² Meanwhile, a study reported in the

¹⁹⁸ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 23:16-18.

 ¹⁹⁹ Myron J. Gordon, *The Cost of Capital to a Public Utility*, MSU Public Utilities Studies (1974) at 100-01.
 ²⁰⁰ Id. at 89.

 ²⁰¹ Joseph R. Gordon and Myron T. Gordon, *The Finite Horizon Expected Return Model*, Financial Analysts Journal (May-Jun. 1997) at 52-61.
 ²⁰² Id

Journal of Investing determined that there is no correlation between stock market returns or earnings growth and GDP, suggesting that investors' expectations built into observable share prices are driven by valuation measures, and not expected economic growth.²⁰³ In other words, reference to long-term forecasts of GDP growth in applying the DCF model is inconsistent with investor behavior.

6

7

Q. Are there other recognized reference sources that dispute the view that investors anticipate growth for utilities to equal GDP?

8 Yes. Professor Roger Morin, the author of a recognized treatise on regulatory A. 9 finance, notes that, "I am not aware of any financial literature supporting the notion that that 10 [sic] utility earnings per share are expected to grow at the average growth of the economy; or 11 GDP.²⁰⁴ This reference source goes on to observe that "[t]he investment community does 12 not look to GDP growth over the next several decades when evaluating an investment in utility stocks."²⁰⁵ Instead, *Modern Regulatory Finance* states that "the use of GDP growth as a proxy 13 for expected growth in earnings is highly questionable as an input in a DCF analysis,"²⁰⁶ and 14 15 concludes that "current earnings growth forecasts are the appropriate growth rates to use in a DCF analysis."²⁰⁷ This is consistent with my testimony. 16

17

Q. Is there evidence that long-term GDP growth rates understate investors' expectations for electric utilities?

19

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A. Yes. Actual historical growth rates for individual firms in the utility industry

²⁰³ Joachim Klement, *What's Growth Got to Do with It? Equity Returns and Economic Growth*, Journal of Investing, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer 2015): 74:78.

 $^{^{204}}$ *Id.* at 486.

²⁰⁵ Id.

²⁰⁶ *Id.* at 488.

²⁰⁷ *Id.* at 486.

- refute the view that long-term growth is constrained by GDP. For example, half of the
 companies included in Value Line's electric utility industry groups achieved earnings growth
 over the last 10 years that exceeded Mr. Garrett's 3.80 percent GDP growth rate.²⁰⁸
- 4

Q. Do expectations for the utility industry support a reversion to GDP growth?

A. No. Growth rates for electric utilities are not expected to collapse into longterm growth. At least in part, growth in the electric utility industry is created by additional
infrastructure investment. Contrary to the assumption that growth trends will somehow mirror
GDP, investors recognize that the electric utility industry has entered a cycle of significant
capital spending on utility infrastructure.

11

12

Q. What underlying fundamentals support investors' conclusion that electric utilities are embarking on a period of growth that will outpace the economy as a whole?

- A. The need for additional infrastructure investment in the utility industry is being driven in large part by fundamental changes in generation mix and mandated transitions to renewable resources, with FERC noting that, "These shifts create a need for more transmission infrastructure to bring generation to load."²⁰⁹ Consistent with these observations, the Edison Electric Institute has stated that its members commit more than \$150 billion annually to electric utility infrastructure investment.²¹⁰
 - _____

²⁰⁸ The Value Line Investment Survey (May 10, Jun. 7 and Jul. 19, 2024).

²⁰⁹ Electric Transmission Incentives Policy Under Section 219 of the Federal Power Act, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 170 FERC ¶ 61,204, at P 27 (2020).

²¹⁰ Edison Electric Institute, Issues & Policy: *Finance & Tax*,

https://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/Pages/FinanceAndTax.aspx (last visited Jul. 17, 2024).

1	Similarly, the investment community also understands that utilities are facing the
2	prospect of a long-term commitment to infrastructure investment. For example, S&P
3	estimated that industry capex during 2024 and 2025 will total approximately \$173 billion and
4	\$177 billion, which amounts to an increase of more than 20% over 2022 levels. ²¹¹ As S&P
5	concluded:
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Multiple drivers are expected to impel elevated spending over the next several years, such as pent-up demand to replace and modernize aging infrastructure and the impact from the significant number of states having renewable portfolio standards that incorporate large expansions in low-carbon generation. Also, federal infrastructure investment plans to shift the nation's power generation network to zero-carbon sources by 2035 will come to fruition The nation's electric and gas utilities are investing in updating aging transmission and distribution, or T&D, systems; building new gas, solar and wind generation; and implementing new technologies, such as those associated with smart meter deployment, smart grid systems, cybersecurity measures and battery storage. ²¹²
17	The report further concluded that, "These considerable levels of spending are expected
18	to serve as the basis for solid profit expansion in the sector for the foreseeable future." ²¹³
19	Q. Is Mr. Garrett's dependence on GDP growth rates consistent with his own
20	description of the electric utility industry?
21	A. No. Mr. Garrett distinguishes between utilities and "high-growth" firms,
22	noting that, "For mature, low-growth firms such as utilities estimating the sustainable
23	growth rate is more transparent." ²¹⁴ In other words, because utilities "are already in their
24	'sustainable,' low growth stage," ²¹⁵ near-term growth rates—such as the securities analysts'

²¹¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Seismic shift in capex plans reported by utilities for 2023 through 2025, Financial Focus (Mar. 16, 2023).

²¹³ *Id.* (emphasis added).
²¹⁴ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 20:6-7.

 $^{^{212}}$ Id.

²¹⁵ *Id.* at 21:21.

growth rates considered in my DCF application—provide a reasonable guide to investors'
 expectations.

Q. What other information indicates that the long-term GDP forecast referenced in Mr. Garrett's "sustainable growth" DCF model is unlikely to equate with investors' growth expectations for common stocks?

6 A. As noted earlier, Mr. Garrett bases his DCF growth rate for every electric 7 utility on the long-term GDP projections of the CBO). But the purpose of the CBO is not to 8 serve as a resource for investors and its published projections are not likely to represent a 9 realistic proxy for investors' expectations. Rather, the CBO's role is to conduct independent 10 analyses of budgetary and economic issues to support the Congressional budget process and 11 its mission is to help Congress make effective budget and economic policy. In performing 12 these specific duties, the CBO's projections are based on the assumptions that current laws 13 governing taxes and spending will generally remain unchanged.

While assuming a continuation of prevailing fiscal policies may provide a useful baseline for legislators, this assumption is divorced from the realities faced by the investment community in assessing future expectations. For example, the June 2023 CBO source relied on by Mr. Garrett notes that it reflects economic developments through March 30, 2023, which "do not reflect the economic effects of administrative actions, regulatory changes, legislation, or economic developments after December 6, 2022, when that economic forecast was finalized."²¹⁶ As the CBO makes clear:

21 22 Budgetary outcomes are hard to predict, particularly over the long run. Even if federal laws remained unchanged, CBO's budget projections would be subject

²¹⁶ Congressional Budget Office, *The 2023 Long-Term Budget Outlook* (Jun. 28, 2023), at 13 <u>https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-06/59014-LTBO.pdf</u>.

to considerable uncertainty. If developments in the economy, demographics, or other factors that affect revenues and outlays diverged from the agency's projections, budgetary outcomes would diverge as well. That uncertainty increases over time because changes in factors that affect the budget are difficult to anticipate over long time horizons.²¹⁷ ***

CBO's long-term budget projections give lawmakers a point of comparison from which to measure the effects of policy options or proposed legislation; they are not predictions of budgetary outcomes. Moreover, the budget projections are uncertain because they depend on the agency's economic and demographic projections, which are themselves uncertain.²¹⁸ ***

13 CBO's budget projections are intended to show what would happen to federal 14 spending, revenues, deficits, and debt if current laws governing spending and 15 taxes generally remained the same. But even if federal laws remained unchanged over the next three decades, actual budgetary outcomes would 16 17 differ from CBO's projections because of unanticipated changes in economic conditions and in other factors that affect federal spending and revenues. 18 19 Moreover, those outcomes will depend on future legislative action, which 20 could increase or decrease budget deficits. The uncertainty in CBO's budget 21 projections increases in later years of the projection period because changes in 22 the economy, demographics, and a variety of other factors are more difficult to anticipate over longer time horizons.²¹⁹ 23

24 25 CBO's economic projections are subject to a high degree of uncertainty. For 26 instance, the possibility that growth in the labor force or in productivity could 27 be faster or slower than expected makes CBO's projections of labor market conditions and economic output uncertain. Other key sources of uncertainty 28 29 are future monetary policy and the path of interest rates. For example, uncertainty about the path of interest rates contributes to uncertainty about the 30 impact that higher deficits and debt would have on the economy. And 31 geopolitical events, such as the war in Ukraine, add to the uncertainty of the 32 economic outlook.²²⁰ 33

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Forecasts are inherently uncertain and the longer the forecast horizon the greater the

- 35 doubt as to the meaningfulness of the data. Mr. Garrett presents no evidence to support the
- 36 assumption that investors' anticipated growth for his proxy companies will be equal to long-
 - ²¹⁷ *Id.* at 5.
 - ²¹⁸ *Id.* at 10.
 - ²¹⁹ Id.
 - 220 Id.

1	term growth of the overall economy, but in any event, reliance on highly uncertain estimates
2	as to the state of the U.S. economy in 2053 must be discounted accordingly. Reliance on
3	CBO's forecasts undermines the relevance of Mr. Garrett's "sustainable growth" DCF model,
4	and his results from this application should be given no weight.
5	Q. Mr. Garrett submitted testimony on behalf of PC in Avista's most recent
6	rate proceeding in Washington. ²²¹ What were the Commission's conclusions regarding
7	his ROE analyses?
8	A. The Commission rejected Mr. Garrett's ROE analyses, including his reference
9	to a long-term GDP growth estimate from the CBO. In a December 12, 2022, final order, the
10	WUTC stated:
11	Avista witness McKenzie, on behalf of the Settling Parties, critiques Public
12	Counsel's analyses, arguing that they misapply risk philosophies and are
13	undermined by methodological flaws. We agree and note, first, flaws with
14	Public Counsel's over reliance on long-term forecast of Gross Domestic
15	Product (GDP) from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) due to CBO's
16	own characterization of its projections as "very uncertain" and exacerbated by
17	the unknown effects of the pandemic, and, second, Public Counsel's reliance
18	on a market risk premium based upon the assumption that a long term growth
19	rate would equal the then-current yield on United States' Treasury bonds.
20	During these consolidated proceedings, the CIP inflation increased to over 9
21	percent. In part due to changing economic conditions since its filed testimony,
22	Public Counsel's proposals based upon assumptions of a 3.8 percent nominal
23	growth rate are simply too tenuous to be persuasive. ²²²
24	In the same order, the Commission concluded that Mr. Garrett's recommendation
25	"would be a shock to Avista's financial integrity and impact its ability to attract capital on
26	reasonable terms," and that, "Ultimately, we find Public Counsel's analyses and

²²¹ Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Docket Nos. UE-220053, UG-220054, and UE-210854 (*Consolidated*), *Response Testimony of David J. Garrett* (Jul 29, 2022).

²²² Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Docket Nos. UE-220053, UG-220054, and UE-210854 (*Consolidated*), Final Order 10/04 (Dec. 12, 2022) at P 161.

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recommendations unconvincing and unpersuasive because they are too speculative and unreliable."²²³ Nothing has changed that would warrant a departure from these findings.

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Q. Mr. Garrett considers Avista's historical load growth and customer growth to support his contention that "the long-term growth rate input in a sustainable growth DCF Model should not exceed GDP."²²⁴ What is your response?

6 A. First, I note that Mr. Garrett's estimate of 3.8 percent long-term GDP growth 7 is not the *ceiling* growth rate in his "sustainable growth" version of the DCF model, it is the 8 only growth rate. Second, Avista's historical load growth and customer growth have nothing 9 to do with investors' forward-looking expectations for earnings growth in today's capital 10 markets. If Mr. Garrett thought that annual historical growth rates of -0.5 percent, 2.4 percent 11 and 1.3 percent were relevant to Avista's cost of equity, he could have used these values to 12 implement the DCF model, but he did not. Citation to these figures is nothing more than a 13 misguided attempt to justify the extreme 3.8 percent growth assumption within Mr. Garrett's 14 "sustainable growth" DCF model.

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0. Can you illustrate the folly inherent in Mr. Garrett's 3.8 percent "sustainable growth" assumption? 16

17 A. Yes. Of the firms included in Mr. Garrett's proxy group, Otter Tail Corp. has 18 the lowest dividend yield (2.1 percent) and the highest projected DPS growth rate (7.0 percent).²²⁵ Because Mr. Garrett's "sustainable growth" DCF approach assigns the same 3.8 19 20 percent growth rate to every firm in the industry, the implied cost of equity for Otter Tail

²²³ *Id.* at P 163.

²²⁴ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 24:7-14.

²²⁵ Garrett, Exh. DJG-7.

Corp. (6.0 percent) is the lowest estimate. In other words, the practical impact of Mr. Garrett's approach is that differences in ROE are explained only by differences in dividend yield.

3 This outcome violates basic tenets of securities valuation and the DCF model. 4 Expectations are presumed to be a major determinant of stock prices, with investors bidding 5 up the prices of firms with greater growth potential in anticipation of higher future cash flows. 6 In turn, higher stock prices result in lower dividend yields. But under the flawed paradigm of 7 Mr. Garrett's "sustainable growth" approach, such distinctions are completely ignored. This 8 is not realistic and highlights a severe weakness in Mr. Garrett's analysis.

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Q. Please summarize your objection to Mr. Garrett's reference to GDP growth rates in applying the DCF model.

11 A. Mr. Garrett presents no meaningful information to suggest that earnings 12 growth rates of utilities are limited to the growth rate in GDP. There is no link between Mr. 13 Garrett's growth rate ceiling and the actual expectations of investors in the capital markets, 14 which are the determining factor in any analysis of a fair ROE.

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0. Does Mr. Garrett's decision to include illogically low DCF results bias his DCF cost of equity? 16

17 A. Yes. As I explained earlier and in my direct testimony, DCF estimates that are 18 implausibly low or high should be eliminated when evaluating the results of this method, and such screens have been employed by regulators such as FERC.²²⁶ In his final DCF results, 19 20 Mr. Garrett includes DCF estimates as low as 5.7 percent, 6.0 percent, 6.2 percent (twice), 6.6 percent and 6.7 percent.²²⁷ Clearly, these values are far below any reasonable estimate of the 21

²²⁶ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-1T at 46.

²²⁷ Garrett, Exh. DJG-7.

1	cost of capital for Avista in today's capital markets, especially in light of the fact that Baa
2	utility bond yields averaged 5.83 percent in June 2024.
3	C. <u>Capital Asset Pricing Model</u>
4	Q. How does Mr. Garrett arrive at his CAPM ROE recommendation?
5	A. Mr. Garrett conducts a traditional CAPM analysis, which produces an ROE of
6	9.6 percent. He also conducts a "Hamada" variation of the CAPM model, which results in an
7	ROE of 9.2 percent. ²²⁸
8	Q. Does Mr. Garrett rely on the result of his traditional CAPM in formulating
9	his ultimate ROE recommendation of 8.5 percent for Avista?
10	A. No. Mr. Garrett says that "the unadjusted CAPM result of 9.6 percent is not
11	accurate without further adjustment" because Avista's equity ratio is higher than that of his
12	proxy group, and hence he claims that "Avista has less financial risk." ²²⁹ Accordingly, Mr.
13	Garrett excludes his 9.6 percent traditional CAPM result in arriving at his final
14	recommendation for Avista. ²³⁰ I discuss why Mr. Garrett's exclusion of his traditional CAPM
15	result is wrong in further detail below in the section pertaining to capital structure.
16	Q. What is the fundamental problem underlying both of Mr. Garrett's
17	applications of the CAPM?
18	A. Like Mr. Parcell, Mr. Garrett did not look directly at an equity risk premium
19	based on current expectations, which is what is required in order to properly apply the
20	CAPM. Rather, he subjectively selects three dated sources culled from the internet, giving

²²⁸ Mr. Garrett reports an adjusted CAPM result of 8.9 percent at page 36 of Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T, but this conflicts with the 9.2 percent value reported at page 56 and on Garrett, Exh. DJG-13 and DJG-16.
²²⁹ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 3:4-4:8.
²³⁰ Id.

1	them primary (75 percent) weight in his MRP estimation. Mr. Garrett based the MRP used to
2	apply the CAPM on a selected survey from the IESE Business School, a number cited in a
3	Kroll (formerly Duff & Phelps) report, a number selected from the website of a NYU finance
4	professor, as well as his own calculation. ²³¹
5	While there are many potential definitions of the MRP, the only relevant issue for
6	application of the CAPM in a regulatory context is what return investors currently expect to
7	earn on money invested today. In contrast to Mr. Garrett, my approach represents a
8	straightforward and direct approach to answer this question.
9	Q. What are the shortcomings with the IESE, Damodaran and Kroll sources
10	cited by Mr. Garrett?
10 11	cited by Mr. Garrett? A. Mr. Garrett cites a 5.5 percent MRP sourced from <i>Market Risk Premium and</i>
	·
11	A. Mr. Garrett cites a 5.5 percent MRP sourced from <i>Market Risk Premium and</i>
11 12	A. Mr. Garrett cites a 5.5 percent MRP sourced from <i>Market Risk Premium and</i> <i>Risk-Free Rate used for 96 countries in 2024</i> (IESE Bus. School 2024). ²³² This survey is the
11 12 13	A. Mr. Garrett cites a 5.5 percent MRP sourced from <i>Market Risk Premium and</i> <i>Risk-Free Rate used for 96 countries in 2024</i> (IESE Bus. School 2024). ²³² This survey is the result of a mass solicitation to more than 14,000 email addresses, out of which approximately
11 12 13 14	A. Mr. Garrett cites a 5.5 percent MRP sourced from <i>Market Risk Premium and</i> <i>Risk-Free Rate used for 96 countries in 2024</i> (IESE Bus. School 2024). ²³² This survey is the result of a mass solicitation to more than 14,000 email addresses, out of which approximately 1,600 responses were received. ²³³ While many of the responses were undoubtedly from
11 12 13 14 15	A. Mr. Garrett cites a 5.5 percent MRP sourced from <i>Market Risk Premium and</i> <i>Risk-Free Rate used for 96 countries in 2024</i> (IESE Bus. School 2024). ²³² This survey is the result of a mass solicitation to more than 14,000 email addresses, out of which approximately 1,600 responses were received. ²³³ While many of the responses were undoubtedly from informed professionals, there is no ability to verify the experience or familiarity of the

²³¹ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 35:13-14, Figure 5 and Garrett, Exh. DJG-11 (citing 5.5 percent CAPM equity risk premium from IESE Business School Survey, 5.5 percent CAPM equity risk premium from Kroll (formerly Duff & Phelps) Report, 4.5 percent from Dr. Aswath Damodaran, and 5.1 percent from his own calculation).

²³² Pablo Fernandez, et al., *Survey: Market Risk Premium and Risk-Free Rate used for 96 countries in 2024* (IESE Bus. School 2024), copy available at:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID4754347_code12696.pdf?abstractid=4754347&mirid= 1. ²³³ Id. at 2.

²³⁴ *Id.* at 13.

1	unclear. The respondent has no idea whether he or she is being queried for a risk premium
2	during 2024, or over some other time period; nor is the basis on which the risk premium is
3	calculated even specified.
4	While Mr. Garrett characterizes the IESE Business School publication as an "expert
5	survey,"235 published comments of respondents cast significant doubt on their credibility and
6	the reliability of the results. For example:
7 8 9	I do not use a MRP or a RF rate for three reasons: 1) I am retired. 2) I do not accept their validity. 3) The "new normal" makes no economic or financial sense.
10 11 12 13	"The subject how is truly loyal to the Chief Magistrate will neither advise nor submit to arbitrary measures." Junius
13 14 15 16	Interest rates are artificially well below historic levels. Thus, bonds and equities values are artificially inflated.
10 17 18 19	One hint: It might make sense to ask more precisely about the premium before/after personal income tax. For Germany the premium would differ and I am not sure how people would interpret the question. ²³⁶
20	These responses undermine any confidence in the veracity of the IESE survey and its
21	usefulness in this case.
22	Meanwhile, the Kroll publication relied on by Mr. Garrett does not provide any
23	specific guidance as to the basis of the 5.5 percent MRP it reports, but prior editions have
24	cited "financial literature and various empirical studies," ²³⁷ as well as listing "Historical Real
25	GDP Growth" and "Damodaran Implied ERP Model" as two of the factors it considered in its

²³⁵ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 32:12.

²³⁶ Pablo Fernandez, et al., *Survey: Market Risk Premium and Risk-Free Rate used for 96 countries in 2024* (IESE Bus. School 2024), copy available at:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN ID4754347 code12696.pdf?abstractid=4754347&mirid= 1. ²³⁷ Duff & Phelps, *Duff & Phelps Decreases U.S. Equity Risk Premium Recommendation to 5.0%, Effective February 28, 2013*, Client Alert (Mar. 20, 2013).

risk premium recommendation.²³⁸ This Kroll source is essentially a "black box", which offers no transparent indication as to how the MRP is calculated.

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3 Meanwhile, the approach used to derive the 4.5 percent MRP from the Damodaran 4 source cited by Mr. Garrett assumes that the return on the market as a whole is 8.48 percent,²³⁹ 5 which is significantly less than the allowed ROE on electric utility stocks. Given that utilities 6 are considered to be less risky than the market as a whole, this assumption makes no economic 7 sense. In addition, Damodaran forces the growth rate for every firm in the S&P 500 to a constant long-term rate after five years.²⁴⁰ In addition, Damodaran inexplicably assumes that 8 9 this long term rate of growth will equal the current yield on Treasury bonds, or 3.88 percent in the most recent rendition.²⁴¹ This is significantly lower than the current 4.65 percent 10 Treasury bond rate that Mr. Garrett cites in his own testimony,²⁴² and lower than his 11 12 "sustainable" growth rate of 4.2 percent. There is no logical link between investors' long-13 term growth expectations for common stocks and the 3.88 percent Treasury bond yield 14 underlying the 4.5 percent MRP cited by Mr. Garrett, and I know of no credible source of 15 investment guidance that is expecting growth for all companies in the economy to collapse to 16 less than 4.0 percent over the next five years.

²³⁹ Aswath Damodaran, Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation, and Implications—The 2024 Edition (Mar. 5, 2024) at 101,

²⁴² Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 28:19.

²³⁸ Duff & Phelps, *Duff & Phelps U.S. Equity Risk Premium Recommendation Decreased from 5.5% to 5.0%, Effective September 5, 2017*, Client Alert (Oct. 30, 2017).

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID4751941_code20838.pdf?abstractid=4751941&mirid=1 (last visited Jul. 28, 2024).

²⁴⁰ Id.

²⁴¹ Id.

1	Q. Mr. Garrett also develops his own implied MRP using a derivation of the
2	DCF model. ²⁴³ What is the primary difference between this analysis and the approach
3	you used?
4	A. The fundamental difference is that my analysis looks to the future return
5	expectations of investors in the capital markets, while Mr. Garrett's "implied equity risk
6	premium" methodology is based on historical data. As Mr. Garrett explained, the inputs to
7	his calculations are based on data "for the S&P 500 over the past six years." ²⁴⁴ In other words,
8	the actual return on the market is completely backward-looking.
9	As a result, Mr. Garrett's methodology is inconsistent with the assumptions of the
10	CAPM, which is predicated on investors' forward-looking expectations. As Mr. Garrett
11	granted, "what matters in the CAPM model is the current and forward-looking risk
12	premium." ²⁴⁵
13	Q. Are you aware of any reputable sources that suggest a much higher
14	market rate of return than those selected by Mr. Garrett?
15	A. Yes. Morningstar, which is a widely recognized source of current investment
16	information, reports a current dividend yield of 1.43 percent for the S&P 500, with an expected
17	long-term EPS growth rate of 11.82 percent. ²⁴⁶ This implies an expected rate of return for the
18	S&P 500 of 13.25 percent, versus the 9.85 percent used in Mr. Garrett's application of the
19	CAPM model. ²⁴⁷

²⁴³ *Id.* at 32:18-35:10.

²⁴⁴ *Id.* at 34:13.
²⁴⁵ *Id.* at 31:2-3.
²⁴⁶ Morningstar, *S&P 500 PR*, <u>https://www.morningstar.com/indexes/spi/spx/portfolio</u> (last visited Jul. 16, 1000)

 $^{^{247}}$ 4.65 percent risk-free rate + 5.20 percent MRP = 9.85 percent.

Q. Mr. Garrett takes issue with the MRP component of your CAPM analysis.²⁴⁸ Can you characterize the nature of his argument?

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3 A. Mr. Garrett presents no argument as to why my MRP calculation is 4 theoretically unsound. He merely contends that my estimates are "far out of line with other reasonable, objective estimates for the ERP,"²⁴⁹ where "reasonable, objective estimates" are 5 6 the three risk premiums he cites plus his own calculation, ranging from 4.5 percent to 5.5 percent, and averaging 5.2 percent.²⁵⁰ I have already discussed the problems associated with 7 8 each of Mr. Garrett's risk premiums. Beyond asserting that my equity risk premiums are "clearly not within the range of reasonableness,"²⁵¹ Mr. Garrett does not provide any further 9 10 explanation as to why my equity risk premiums should be disregarded.

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Q. Is the method you use to compute the CAPM equity risk premium supported by academic research?

- A. Yes. As I noted earlier in response to Mr. Parcell, regulators and recognized research studies reported in the financial literature support and adopt the exact same methodology to estimate the market rate of return underlying my CAPM result. For instance, *Harris and Marston* notes that "a 'market' required rate of return is calculated using each dividend paying stock in the S&P 500 index for which data are available."²⁵² In describing this process, the authors state:
- 19 20

This expectational approach employs the dividend growth model (hereafter referred to as the discounted cash flow or DCF model) in which a consensus

²⁴⁹ *Id.* at 39:1-2.

²⁴⁸ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 37:11-39:7.

²⁵⁰ *Id.* at 35:13-14, Figure 5.

²⁵¹ *Id.* at 39:6-7.

²⁵² Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, *Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts*, Fin. Mgmt. (Summer 1992) ("Harris and Marston").

1 2 3	measure of financial analysts' forecasts (FAF) of earnings is used as a proxy for investor expectations.
4 5 6	For each month, a "market" required rate of return is calculated using each dividend paying stock in the S&P 500 index for which data are available. The DCF model in Equation (2) is applied to each stock and the results weighted
7	by market value of equity to produce the market required return. ²⁵³
8	Consistent with my CAPM approach, a 1993 study published in the Financial Review noted
9	that, "[f]ollowing prior research," the authors evaluated the expected market rate of return by
10	applying the same constant growth DCF approach supporting my CAPM results.
11	Q. Are there other deficiencies associated with Mr. Garrett's CAPM
12	analyses?
13	A. Yes. Like Mr. Parcell, Mr. Garrett ignores the need to adjust for the
14	implications of firm size in applying the CAPM. The result of this key deficiency is a CAPM
15	estimate that is too low.
16	Q. Mr. Garrett claims a CAPM size adjustment is unwarranted because "the
17	size premium is a dead phenomenon." ²⁵⁴ Is he correct?
18	A. No. Mr. Garrett cites the book <i>Triumph of the Optimists</i> from 2002, which
19	suggested that the size effect is not present in each and every year. The seminal study by Banz
20	(1981) found a size effect over a forty-year period. It may be true that the size effect was not
21	present for several years, but this observation does not negate the fact that the investment
22	community still seriously considers the size effect within the CAPM model.
23	A 2018 article published in Business Valuation Review refuted similar criticisms raised

²⁵³ Id.

²⁵⁴ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 41:2-3.

2 contrast to Mr. Garrett's assertions, the Grabowski article noted that "none of the academic 3 papers throughout the last three decades have qualified the [size premium] as a statistical 4 error," and a 2019 publication available from the National Association of Certified Valuators 5 and Analysts documented the continued relevance of the size adjustment in applying the 6 CAPM: 7 [A] beta-adjusted size premium is also an indication of the relative market 8 performance of small-cap versus large-cap stocks, but is typically used for a 9 very specific purpose: as a "size" adjustment within the context of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) when developing cost of equity capital estimates. 10 11 A size adjustment is typically applied to the CAPM to make up for the fact that the betas of smaller companies do not fully explain their observed returns. 12 Because the CAPM already includes a beta input in its textbook specification, 13 14 the size premium is then "beta adjusted" to remove the portion of realized 15 excess return that is attributable to beta, thereby isolating the size effect's contribution to realized excess return and avoiding double counting the impact 16 17 of each factor. *** 18 19 Another way of saying this is that within the context of the CAPM, the betas 20 of small-cap companies do not fully account for (or explain) their actual 21 returns. Because the amount of this difference (what actually happened versus 22 what CAPM predicted) varies with "size" (in this case, as measured by market 23 capitalization) we call it a "size premium".²⁵⁶ 24 This article went on to conclude that "valuation professionals typically add a 'size premium'

by Mr. Garrett and concluded that "the size premium critique . . . is not warranted."²⁵⁵ In

- to the base CAPM equation. . ."²⁵⁷
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And while Mr. Garrett cites the Ibbotson SBBI Classic Yearbook from 2015 for the

²⁵⁵ Roger A. Grabowski, *The Size Effect Continues To Be Relevant When Estimating the Cost of Capital*, Business Valuation Review (Fall 2018) at 93-109.

 ²⁵⁶ Using a Non-Beta-Adjusted Size Premium in the Context of the CAPM Will Likely Overstate Risk and Understate Value (Jan. 30, 2019), http://quickreadbuzz.com/2019/01/30/business-valuation-grabowski-harringtonsing-a-non-beta-adjusted-size-premium/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2023).
 ²⁵⁷ Id

proposition that realized returns for large-cap stocks can exceed those of small-cap stocks,²⁵⁸ 1 2 this same publication includes empirical results that quantify the continued validity of the CAPM size adjustment.²⁵⁹ As this study noted, "The capital asset pricing model, or CAPM, 3 4 does not fully account for the higher returns of small-cap stocks," concluding that, "This size-5 related phenomenon has prompted a revision to the CAPM, which includes a size premium."²⁶⁰ Kroll (formerly Duff & Phelps) continues to publish the study of realized 6 7 returns first compiled by Ibbotson, and its most recent study for 2023 continues to show that 8 returns for smaller firms are higher than those estimated by the CAPM. Mr. Garrett's claim 9 that the size effect has disappeared is without merit.

10

Q. Mr. Garrett disagrees with your ECAPM results.²⁶¹ How do you respond?

First, Mr. Garrett asserts that using Value Line betas accounts for any tendency 11 A. 12 of the CAPM to underestimate the cost of equity for low-beta stocks. But as I noted in my direct testimony,²⁶² the ECAPM is simply a variant of the traditional CAPM approach that is 13 14 designed to correct for an observed bias in the CAPM result. The modification reflected in 15 the ECAPM is distinct from the Value Line adjustment of estimated betas for the demonstrated 16 tendency to regress toward the mean. The ECAPM reflects a refinement to adjust for a 17 systematic tendency of low beta portfolios to over-earn and high beta portfolios to under-earn 18 relative to the predictions of the CAPM capital market line. In other words, even if a firm's 19 beta value is estimated with perfect precision, the CAPM would still understate the return for

²⁵⁸ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 40, footnote 62.

²⁵⁹ Morningstar, 2015 Ibbotson SBBI Classic Yearbook, Morningstar, at 109.

²⁶⁰ *Id.* at 108.

²⁶¹ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 43:6-22.

²⁶² McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 20-22.

1	low-beta stocks and overstate the return for high-beta stocks. ²⁶³ The ECAPM and the use of
2	adjusted betas represent two separate and distinct issues in estimating returns, and both are
3	useful for improving the traditional CAPM results.
4	Second, Mr. Garrett suggests that the method Value Line uses to adjust beta for
5	regression to the mean may lead to overstated results for low-beta industries. ²⁶⁴ In fact,
6	however, the "Blume" adjustment adopted by Value Line is the predominant approach that
7	has been adopted by other recognized sources of beta values, such as Bloomberg. As one
8	recognized researcher has noted:
9 10 11	The most important difference of these services is the adjustment method used in the calculation of beta. Most services utilize the Blume methodology outlined earlier in this chapter. ²⁶⁵
12	Value Line is recognized as being the most widely available source of investment
13	information to investors, and there are many citations to textbooks and other sources
14	supporting its usefulness as a guide to investors' expectations. ²⁶⁶ Coupled with the
15	administrative benefits associated with reliance on beta values from Value Line, including a
16	consistent methodology by an independent third-party and immunity to selective changes in
17	assumptions, my evidence supports continued reference to Value Line's published beta values

²⁶³ Furthermore, there is academic support for the use of adjusted betas in alternative versions of the CAPM. For example, *On the CAPM Approach to the Estimation of A Public Utility's Cost of Equity Capital* noted that "[t]he assertion that risk premiums are proportional to NYSE betas is shown to result in downward (upwards) biased predictions of the cost of equity for a public utility having a NYSE beta that is less (greater) than unity," and concluded that adjusted betas, such as those published by Value Line, are "better predictors than are unadjusted betas." Robert Litzenberger, Krishna Ramaswamy, and Howard Sosin, *On the CAPM Approach to the Estimation of A Public Utility's Cost of Equity Capital*, 369-393 Journal of Finance (May 1980).

²⁶⁴ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 43:13-15.

²⁶⁵ Ibbotson Associates, 2005 Yearbook, Valuation Edition at 25.

²⁶⁶ See, e.g., Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 71 ("Value Line is the largest and most widely circulated independent investment advisory service, and influences the expectations of a large number of institutional and individual investors.").

in applying the CAPM approach. 1

2	Finally, Mr. Garrett also contends that my ECAPM analysis "suffers from the same
3	overestimated risk-free rate and ERP inputs" ²⁶⁷ as my CAPM model. As discussed earlier,
4	there is no merit to Mr. Garrett's contention regarding my equity risk premium. As for my
5	risk-free rate, Mr. Garrett did not previously take any issue with it, so it is unclear what he is
6	referring to here.
7	D. <u>Other ROE Issues</u>
8	Q. Mr. Garrett rejects your risk premium analysis, claiming that an
9	additional risk premium analysis is "unnecessary" in lieu of the CAPM, which he
10	characterizes as "a real risk premium model." ²⁶⁸ How do you respond?
11	A. Mr. Garrett is correct that the CAPM and the risk premium model are two
12	different types of a very broad category of risk premium models. However, each model
13	measures risk differently, each has its strengths and weaknesses, and neither is inherently
14	superior to the other. As I explain in my direct testimony, ²⁶⁹ risk premium models like the
15	one I employ are widely utilized for estimating the cost of equity, and they are routinely
16	referenced by the investment community and in academia and regulatory proceedings. In fact,
17	Mr. Parcell sponsors ROE estimates ranging from 9.8 percent to 10.8 percent from a risk
18	premium model that is akin to mine. ²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 43:19-20. ²⁶⁸ *Id.* at 42:9. ²⁶⁹ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 22-23.

²⁷⁰ Parcell , Exh. DCP-1T at 5:17.

1	Q. Does Mr. Garrett recognize the importance of using multiple models in
2	ROE analysis?
3	A. Yes. Mr. Garrett says:
4	It is preferable to use multiple models because the results of any one model
5	may contain a degree of imprecision, especially depending on the reliability of
6	the inputs used at the time of conducting the model. By using multiple models,
7 8	the analyst can compare the results of the models and look for outlying results and inconsistencies. Likewise, if multiple models produce a similar result, it
8 9	may indicate a narrower range for the cost of equity estimate. ²⁷¹
10	My reference to the risk premium approach is consistent with this guidance.
11	Q. Mr. Garrett claims that your risk premium model "is used to justify a cost
12	of equity that is much higher than one that would be dictated by market forces." ²⁷² Is
13	this a legitimate criticism of your risk premium method?
14	A. No. His claim that my risk premium approach is not market-based is incorrect.
15	In my approach, the cost of equity is estimated by first determining the additional return
16	investors require to forgo the relative safety of bonds and to bear the greater risks associated
17	with common stock, adjusting this risk premium to reflect current capital market conditions,
18	and then adding this equity risk premium to the current yield on bonds. By accounting for the
19	impact of current bond yields, my risk premium results are directly linked to market-based
20	data.
21	In fact, the risk premium method offers certain advantages to DCF and CAPM
22	techniques. Unlike DCF models, which indirectly impute the cost of equity, risk premium
23	methods directly estimate investors' required rate of return by adding an equity risk premium

Rebuttal Testimony of Adrien M. McKenzie Avista Corporation Dockets UE-240006 & UG-240007

²⁷¹ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 8:16-22.

²⁷² *Id.* at 42:21-22.

1	to observable bond yields. Compared to the CAPM, the risk premium approach is simpler
2	and less reliant on restrictive assumptions. For example, in describing the CAPM, Mr. Garrett
3	lists eight key requirements underpinning this model, including 1) investors have identical
4	time horizons, 2) there are no taxes, and 3) investors can borrow and lend unlimited amounts
5	at the risk-free rate. ²⁷³ None of these assumptions are met in the real world. So while DCF
6	and CAPM methods are valuable tools, the risk premium method is also helpful. It is tied
7	directly to observable capital market conditions and free from restrictive and unrealistic
8	assumptions.
9	I should also note that authorized returns, such as those analyzed within my and Mr.
10	Parcell's risk premium approaches, are typically based on expert witnesses' estimates of
11	investor-required returns at time periods contemporaneous to these various rate proceedings.
12	In other words, they incorporate substantial market data. Mr. Garrett's view that my risk
13	premium approach is not market-based is misplaced and should be ignored.
14	Contradicting Mr. Garrett's conclusion that risk premium methods "create an
15	inappropriate link between market-based factors with awarded returns on equity,"274 FERC
16	has concluded that "investors expect to earn a return on a stock investment that reflects a
17	premium above the return they expect to earn on a bond investment, and that the Risk Premium
18	model is a method of estimating the premium over bond yields that investors require to invest
19	in electric utility equities." ²⁷⁵

²⁷³ *Id.* at Appendix B, page 1. ²⁷⁴ *Id.* at 42:19-21.

²⁷⁵ Ass'n. of Bus. Advocating Tariff Equity, et al., Opinion No. 569-B, 173 FERC ¶ 61,159 at P 122 (2020).

- 1 Q. Mr. Garret claims that "Unlike the CAPM, which is found in almost every 2 comprehensive financial textbook, the types of risk premium models used by Mr. 3 McKenzie in this case are almost exclusively found in the texts and testimonies of utilities 4 witnesses."²⁷⁶ Do you agree? 5 No. Broadly speaking, risk premium models like the ones that Mr. Parcell and A. I employ are sometimes referenced as "build-up" methods, whereby the cost of equity is built 6 7 up from a risk-free rate by adding relevant risk premiums to arrive at a risk-adjusted cost of 8 equity specific to a particular business. Build-up methods for estimating the cost of equity are 9 widely referenced in finance and valuation texts, and are not the exclusive domain of utility 10 witnesses. For example, the seminal textbook Valuing a Business by Shannon P. Pratt references the build-up method,²⁷⁷ as do well-regarded finance textbooks.²⁷⁸ Mr. Garrett's 11 12 claim that risk premium models are rare outside regulatory proceedings is unfounded. 13 **Q**. Mr. Garrett contends that the expected earnings analysis you use is not a reasonable method for estimating a fair ROE for Avista.²⁷⁹ Do you agree? 14 15 No. As I discuss earlier and in my direct testimony,²⁸⁰ expected earned rates A. 16 of return for other utilities provide another useful benchmark of reasonableness. Indeed, Mr.
- 17

²⁷⁶ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 42:17-19.

Parcell explains the basis of the comparable earnings (CE) methodology, on which my

²⁷⁷ Shannon P. Pratt and ASA Educational Foundation, *Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies*, 6e, New York: McGraw Hill (2022). *See also*, Shannon P. Pratt, *Cost of Capital: Estimation and Applications*, New York: John Wiley & Sons (1998).

²⁷⁸ See, e.g., Eugene F. Brigham, Louis C. Gapenski, and Michael C. Ehrhardt, *Financial Management, Theory and Practice*, 9e, The Dryden Press at 131 (Describing the nominal interest rate as being composed of a risk-free rate of interest, plus several additional premiums that reflect risk, inflation, and liquidity).

²⁷⁹ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 46:8-47:7.

²⁸⁰ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 26-28.

1 expected earnings analysis is based:

2 The CE method is derived from the "corresponding risk" concept discussed in 3 the Bluefield and Hope cases. This method is thus based upon the economic concept of opportunity cost. As previously noted, the ROE is an opportunity 4 5 cost: the prospective return available to investors from alternative investments 6 of similar risk. The CE method is designed to measure the returns expected to 7 be earned on the original cost book value of similar risk enterprises. Thus, it provides a direct measure of the fair return, since it translates into practice the 8 competitive principle upon which regulation rests.²⁸¹ 9

10

Mr. Garrett objects to your non-utility DCF analysis.²⁸² How do you

11 respond?

0.

12 A. Mr. Garrett suggests that non-utility DCF analysis is not informative because "Non-utility companies are relatively incomparable to Avista."²⁸³ The simple observation 13 that a firm operates in non-utility businesses says nothing at all about the overall investment 14 15 risks perceived by investors, which is the basis for a fair ROE. As shown in Table 3 to my 16 direct testimony, objective credit ratings and Value Line risk measures indicate lower risk for my non-utility group than for either my proxy group or for Avista. This objective evidence 17 18 directly refutes Mr. Garrett's concern that "The risk profiles of competitive firms will tend to be higher than those of low-risk firms."²⁸⁴ 19

20

E. Capital Structure

21

What is Mr. Garrett's position with respect to Avista's capital structure? Q.

22

While Mr. Garrett does not recommend any adjustment to Avista's requested

23 capital structure, he proposes an adjustment to his CAPM results for the Company in order to

A.

²⁸¹ Parcell, Exh. DCP-1T at 47:20-48:6.

²⁸² Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 26:6-19.

²⁸³ *Id.* at 26:8-9.

²⁸⁴ *Id.* at 26:11-12.

"align Avista's capital structure to the proxy group's capital structure."²⁸⁵ Mr. Garrett suggests this can be accomplished with a "Hamada Model."286

3

4

Q. Does Avista's requested capital structure distinguish the Company's overall risks from others in the utility industry?

No. As documented in my direct testimony,²⁸⁷ the Company's proposed 48.5 5 A. percent common equity ratio is within the rate of 40.1 percent to 80.4 percent maintained by 6 7 comparable utility operating companies, and below the average of 50.6 percent. I note that 8 28 of these 45 operating companies have equity ratios equal to or greater than the 48.5 percent common equity ratio requested by Avista.²⁸⁸ Avista's common equity ratio falls well within 9 10 the 33.0 percent to 63.5 percent range of common equity ratios for my Utility Group, as well 11 as within the 27.0 percent to 59.5 percent range of common equity ratios projected by Value 12 Line for these same companies.

13 Is this conclusion confirmed by reference to recent findings in other **Q**. 14 regulatory proceedings?

15

A. Yes. The table below presents the common equity ratios approved for electric 16 and gas utilities over the past eight quarters, as reported by RRA Regulatory Focus:

²⁸⁵ *Id.* at 54:13.

²⁸⁶ *Id.* at 54:16-56:4.

²⁸⁷ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-1T at 38.

²⁸⁸ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-6, pages 2-3.

]	Electric			Gas	
	Low		High	Average	Low	High	Average
Q2-22	44.54%		52.00%	50.04%	48.00%	 60.59%	52.77%
Q3-22	48.29%		53.37%	51.19%	47.00%	 52.20%	50.52%
Q4-22	45.07%		58.22%	51.45%	45.00%	 58.22%	51.75%
Q1-23	42.50%		52.50%	50.90%	45.16%	 59.74%	53.89%
Q2-23	49.00%		52.50%	51.69%	50.00%	 62.20%	56.18%
Q3-23	48.00%		60.70%	51.89%	48.00%	 59.63%	52.88%
Q4-23	48.00%		56.06%	51.55%	48.00%	 56.06%	51.27%
Q1-24	41.25%		53.72%	50.14%	51.00%	 59.07%	53.86%
Average	46.49%		55.05%	51.24%	47.31%	 58.38%	52.75%

TABLE AMM-R6 ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY ALLOWED COMMON EQUITY RATIOS

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, Major Rate Case Decisions, RRA Regulatory Focus (Feb. 2023; Feb. 6 and Apr. 19, 2024). Excludes capital structures that include cost-free items.

4

3

1

2

As demonstrated in table above, the 48.5 percent common equity ratio requested by 5 Avista falls below the average equity ratios approved for electric and gas utilities in the last 6 eight quarters.

7

0. Mr. Garrett supports his CAPM model adjustment on the basis that the 8 Company's equity ratio is higher than the average for the proxy group. What is the 9 fundamental flaw in this argument?

10 A. Focusing exclusively on capital structure, and the relative risk associated with 11 debt leverage, ignores the fact that this is only one facet of a company's overall investment 12 risk. The fair ROE is not evaluated in a vacuum; it is predicated on analyses for a group of 13 comparable risk utilities, with the relative reliance on equity financing being only one factor 14 considered in this overall assessment. As a result, there is simply no basis for Mr. Garrett's 15 proposed CAPM adjustment based only on variations in equity ratios between individual

1 utilities.

2 0. Is capital structure already considered by the credit rating agencies in 3 their evaluation?

4 A. Absolutely. The ratings assigned to a utility are the result of a comprehensive 5 evaluation of the utility's overall business and financial risks. The evaluation of financial risk 6 involves an examination of financial data concerning earnings protection, capital structure, 7 cash flow adequacy, and financial flexibility. The degree of financial leverage is one 8 component that impacts investors' risk perceptions, with investors' current assessment of the 9 Company's risks—as embodied in Avista's credit ratings—being contingent on its actual 10 capitalization. Nevertheless, Mr. Garrett is operating under the misguided assumption that 11 the Company could somehow reduce its equity ratio significantly from present levels without 12 any ill effects on its credit standing or investors' risk perceptions.

13

Q. Is there any logical connection between this position and what takes place 14 in real-world capital markets?

15 No. This line of reasoning is totally disconnected from the financial realities A. 16 faced by utilities. Prudent management practices attempt to ameliorate higher business risk 17 with offsetting lower financial risk. It is illogical to presume that the Company's equity ratio 18 is "excessive" to maintain current credit ratings. If the financial parameters for Avista 19 exceeded those necessary for its present credit ratings, then the rating agencies would have 20 already upgraded the Company. In fact, S&P maintains a "Negative" outlook on Avista, 21 warning investors of the potential for a downgrade in the Company's credit rating, citing

"weak credit metrics," which are expected to "fall below our downgrade thresholds."²⁸⁹
Similarly, Moody's has noted that "weak credit metrics provide little cushion at the Baa2
rating level.²⁹⁰ Any suggestion that the Company's equity ratio can be further reduced without
regard to credit standing is simply not credible.

5

6

Q. Mr. Garrett offers a comparison of debt ratios for other industries in support of his insinuation that Avista's requested capital structure contains too much common equity.²⁹¹ Is this comparison probative?

7

A. No. Once again, Mr. Garrett's singular focus on the debt ratio ignores key considerations that influence a firm's use of debt leverage and investors' overall risk perceptions, which are paramount. There are many considerations in the capital structure decision. In general, the goal is to employ the mix of capital that minimizes the weighted average cost of capital, while ensuring the financial integrity of the firm and continuous access to capital, even during times of unfavorable market conditions.

Given the interplay between costs of debt and equity, the impact of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and the level of business risks (operating leverage), determining a firm's optimal capital structure is an imprecise exercise. In practice, capital structure decisions must be made by considering managements' judgment, numerical analysis, and investors' risk perceptions specific to each enterprise or industry. The fact that some industries may employ greater debt leverage than Avista while others use less is hardly surprising. As one recognized textbook in finance recognized, "As might be expected, wide variations in the use of financial leverage

²⁸⁹ S&P Global Ratings, Avista Corp., Ratings Score Snapshot (Dec. 8, 2023).

²⁹⁰ Moody's Investors Service, Avista Corp., Credit Opinion (Aug. 16, 2023).

²⁹¹ Garrett, Exh. DJG-1T at 53, Figure 9.

1	occur both across industries and among individual firms in each industry." ²⁹² For example,
2	debt ratios in the financial services industry reflect the fact that banks borrow large amounts
3	of money to facilitate loans, which has no relevant comparison to electric utilities. Moreover,
4	Mr. Garrett's Figure 9 does not provide the Commission with a complete picture of debt ratios
5	associated with other sectors of the economy. A review of his underlying data source reveals
6	that approximately one half of the industries covered have average book value debt ratios that
7	fall <i>below</i> the 51.5 percent requested by Avista in this case. ²⁹³
8	Finally, while book value has particular significance for regulated utilities, in the
9	competitive world the focus is on market value capital structures. Indeed, regulated utilities
10	have always been an exception to the general rule of financial theory and practice, in which
11	market values are the appropriate indicia of capital structure. To be able to raise capital,
12	competitive firms must pay returns that are competitive at the current market price of their
13	securities, not the embedded book value of the mix of stock and bonds. S&P highlighted the
14	problems associated with relying on book accounting data to assess financial leverage:
15 16 17 18	The popular total-debt-to-capital ratio has the inherent weakness of measuring a firm's "going concern" equity value based on historical accounting. Basing the denominator on a market measure, as the supplemental ratio does, helps to correct some of this distortion. ²⁹⁴
19	In Cost of Capital, Estimation and Applications, Shannon Pratt affirmed that market values
20	are the only correct basis for the cost of capital:

21The critical point is that the relative weightings of debt and equity or other22capital components are based on the market values of each component, not on

²⁹² Eugene F. Brigham and Louis C. Gapenski, *Financial Management Theory and Practice*, Dryden Press, Ninth ed. (1999) at 647.

²⁹³ <u>https://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/dbtfund.xls</u>.

²⁹⁴ Standard & Poor's, *CreditStats: Adjusted Key U.S. Industrial Financial Ratios*, RatingsDirect, p. 5 (Aug. 13, 2002).

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Reference to Mr. Garrett's source indicates that on a market value basis, the debt ratios
for the represented industry groups averaged 27.4 percent, implying a common equity ratio of
72.6 percent.²⁹⁶

5 Q. What other failings are associated with Mr. Garrett's comparative 6 analysis?

7 A. Mr. Garrett's simplistic comparison completely ignores the implications of 8 higher debt ratios on overall investment risk. Many of the firms included in the industry groups surveyed by Mr. Garrett have credit ratings that fall well below investment grade.²⁹⁷ 9 10 There is a fundamental disconnect between the equity layer that is required to support Avista's 11 existing credit standing and those that are associated with firms characterized by high-risk, 12 speculative grade debt ratings. The Commission should reject Mr. Garrett's baseless industry 13 comparison, as well as his CAPM capital structure adjustment, which substitutes his personal 14 judgement in place of the experienced professionals who raise and invest capital for utility 15 companies, the requirements of investors, and standard regulatory practice.

²⁹⁵ Shannon P. Pratt, *Cost of Capital, Estimation and Applications*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (1998) at 45 (emphasis in original).

²⁹⁶ https://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/dbtfund.xls.

²⁹⁷ For example, within Value Line's Air Transport industry group, Air Transport Services Group Inc. (BB+), Alaska Air Group (BB), Allegiant Travel (B+), American Airlines Inc. (B+), Delta Air Lines Inc. (BB+), JetBlue Airways Corp. (B), Spirit Airlines (CCC) and United Airlines Inc. (BB-) are all rated by S&P in the speculative grade category. Oil/Gas Distribution firms EnLink Midstream LLC (BB+) and Kinetik Holdings Inc. (BB+), as well as insurance firms Genworth Financial Inc. (BB-) and NMI Holdings Inc. (BB+) also fall in the junk bond category. Similarly, Lamar Advertising Co. (BB), OUTFRONT Media (B+) and Thryv Holdings (B), which are included in Value Line's Advertising sector, are also rated far below investment grade.

2

Q. Setting aside these realities, does the "Hamada" formula provide a meaningful basis on which to adjust the results of the traditional CAPM model?

3 A. No. Mr. Garrett's "Hamada" formula is the product of a purely theoretical 4 exercise that has little basis in reality. For example, the theory underlying his deleveraging 5 adjustment to beta is based on the market value capital structure. But Mr. Garrett ignores 6 market value capitalization entirely and applies the adjustment using book values. In addition, 7 the direct link between common equity ratios and beta values underlying Mr. Garrett's theoretical computations is not evident in the data for his proxy group companies.²⁹⁸ In fact. 8 9 the correlation coefficient between the beta values and debt ratios for Mr. Garrett's proxy utilities results is weak and statistically insignificant,²⁹⁹ which indicates that higher beta 10 11 values cannot be associated with higher debt ratios. This contrary result reinforces my earlier 12 point that a firm's investment risks are impacted by a myriad of factors other than its degree of financial leverage. 13

14

Q. What is your response to Mr. Garrett's capital structure comments?

A. I do not agree with his recommendation to adjust the results of his CAPM model in order to account for Avista's requested common equity ratio. As I stated in my direct testimony,³⁰⁰ the 48.5 percent common equity ratio requested by Avista is consistent with the Company's need to maintain its credit standing and financial flexibility, with the range of capitalizations for other operating utilities, and with the importance of an adequate equity

²⁹⁸ The Hamada formula assumes that a lower common equity ratio would lead to a lower observed beta value.
²⁹⁹ The resulting correlation coefficient is 0.027, which is indicative of a weak, positive relationship between beta and the debt ratio. Indeed, further regression analysis reveals that the relationship between the debt ratios and observed beta values for the firms in Mr. Garrett's proxy group lacks any degree of statistical significance.
³⁰⁰ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-1T at 38-41.

1	layer to accommodate the pressures of funding significant capital investments.
2	The importance of a healthy equity layer is even more critical in the face of the much
3	lower ROE recommendations from the Other Witnesses. If the Company is to maintain a
4	balanced risk position, increased operating risk (in this case, reflected in the reduced ROE
5	recommendations of the Other Witnesses) must be offset with decreased financial risk
6	(reflected in a higher common equity ratio). In other words, the ROE cannot be set in a
7	vacuum; the impact on the overall risk profile of the Company must be considered. It is simply
8	not reasonable to <u>compound</u> the harmful effects of a lower ROE with a lower equity level.
9	
10	IV. RESPONSE TO DR. KAUFMAN
10	IV. <u>RESPONSE TO DR. KAUFMAN</u>
10 11	IV.RESPONSE TO DR. KAUFMANQ.How does Dr. Kaufman arrive at his 9.25 percent recommended ROE for
11	Q. How does Dr. Kaufman arrive at his 9.25 percent recommended ROE for
11 12	Q. How does Dr. Kaufman arrive at his 9.25 percent recommended ROE for Avista?
11 12 13	 Q. How does Dr. Kaufman arrive at his 9.25 percent recommended ROE for Avista? A. It is not entirely clear. Dr. Kaufman conducts a multi-stage DCF analysis that
11 12 13 14	 Q. How does Dr. Kaufman arrive at his 9.25 percent recommended ROE for Avista? A. It is not entirely clear. Dr. Kaufman conducts a multi-stage DCF analysis that results in a range of 8.9 percent to 9.3 percent, as well as a constant growth DCF analysis that
 11 12 13 14 15 	 Q. How does Dr. Kaufman arrive at his 9.25 percent recommended ROE for Avista? A. It is not entirely clear. Dr. Kaufman conducts a multi-stage DCF analysis that results in a range of 8.9 percent to 9.3 percent, as well as a constant growth DCF analysis that generates a range of 8.5 percent to 9.0 percent.³⁰¹ Dr. Kaufman further implements CAPM
 11 12 13 14 15 16 	 Q. How does Dr. Kaufman arrive at his 9.25 percent recommended ROE for Avista? A. It is not entirely clear. Dr. Kaufman conducts a multi-stage DCF analysis that results in a range of 8.9 percent to 9.3 percent, as well as a constant growth DCF analysis that generates a range of 8.5 percent to 9.0 percent.³⁰¹ Dr. Kaufman further implements CAPM analyses supporting a range of 7.9 percent to 9.2 percent and ECAPM applications that

20 later in his testimony, Dr. Kaufman references his "cost of capital range of 8.5 percent to 9.5

³⁰¹ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 22:7-8, Table 12.

 $^{^{302}}$ Id.

³⁰³ *Id.* at 22:9-11.

percent."³⁰⁴ In any case, Dr. Kaufman concludes by stating "I recommend Avista's Cost of Capital be reduced from the current authorized amount of 9.4 to 9.25 percent."³⁰⁵

3

4

Q. As a threshold matter, does Dr. Kaufman's recommendation to reduce Avista's ROE from 9.40 percent to 9.25 percent make economic sense?

5 A. No. As I documented earlier in my rebuttal testimony, trends in bond yields 6 provide objective evidence that investors' required rate of return has increased significantly 7 since Avista's current 9.40 percent ROE was established. The fact that Dr. Kaufman is 8 proposing to decrease Avista's ROE when capital costs have demonstrably increased shows 9 that his recommendation is divorced from fundamental financial principles and should be 10 given no weight.

11

0. Dr. Kaufman says his ROE analysis represents a "conservative approach" 12 that includes "numerous conservative assumptions," as evidenced by a claim that his "range exceeds investor expectations for the market as a whole."³⁰⁶ Does this make 13 14 sense?

15 Not at all. Dr. Kaufman supports his reasoning with a claim that, "Investors A. currently expect the U.S. equity market to have total annual returns of 4 to 8 percent."³⁰⁷ It 16 17 makes no economic sense that investors could expect a 4 percent return on the market as a 18 whole, when they can invest in risk-free, 30-year Treasury bonds and earn a return of 4.4 19 percent. Similarly, an 8 percent expected return on the market is nonsensical in light of the 20 fact that allowed ROEs for electric and gas utilities, which are less risky than the market as a

³⁰⁴ *Id.* at 56:18. ³⁰⁵ *Id.* at 21:4-5. ³⁰⁶ *Id.* at 21:9-10. 307 Id.

1	whole, significantly exceed this threshold. Beyond that, Dr. Kaufman's own CAPM and
2	ECAPM applications assume a total market return in a range of 9.4 percent to 11.3 percent. ³⁰⁸
3	Dr. Kaufman's 4 percent to 8 percent market return range is meaningless, and it cannot be
4	used to make the case that his ROE recommendation for Avista is conservative in any way.

Later in his testimony, Dr. Kaufman claims that, "My recommended ROE of 9.25 percent is based on many conservative assumptions, such as the use of Avista's equity risk premium rather than Kroll's recommended cost of capital, and the use of Avista's size premium adjustments."³⁰⁹ But Table 12 to Dr. Kaufman's testimony, which summarizes the results of his analyses, does not consistently include the size-adjusted CAPM and ECAPM results; nor does Dr. Kaufman use my 7.3 percent equity risk premium anywhere in his ROE analysis.

12

A. Discounted Cash Flow Model

13

Q. Can you please summarize Dr. Kaufman's three-stage DCF approach?

A. Dr. Kaufman's three-stage DCF model adopts the analysts' growth projections of Value Line, IBES, and Zacks for the first five years, followed by a 25-year transition to a constant growth rate of 4.0 percent. Dr. Kaufman calculates expected annual cash flows under these assumed growth rates for a horizon of 200 years, and solves for the internal rate of return that equates this series of cash flows to the current stock price for each of the utilities in the proxy group.

³⁰⁸ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-5 at 9-12.

³⁰⁹ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 56:14-16.

1	Q. Dr. Kaufman asserts that his three-stage DCF model is "more reliable"
2	than a constant growth DCF model. ³¹⁰ Does he provide any support for this statement,
3	as it relates to evaluating investors' expectations for utilities?
4	A. No. Dr. Kaufman's only "support" is a general observation that a three-stage
5	DCF model "allows earnings growth to vary over time." ³¹¹ But as I discussed in detail earlier
6	in response to Mr. Garrett, there is no basis to assume that investors are currently expecting a
7	distinct transition in growth rates for utilities; much less the specific pattern adopted in Dr.
8	Kaufman's three-stage DCF approach.
9	Q. Dr. Kaufman cites the treatise, New Regulatory Finance, by Roger A.
10	Morin, in support of his chosen transition to long-term GDP growth. ³¹² Does Professor
11	Morin also point out the pitfalls associated with assuming a transition to long-term
12	growth in GDP?
13	A. Yes. In his most recent textbook on regulatory finance, Professor Morin
14	presents a lengthy critique of multi-stage DCF approaches, such as that relied on by Dr.
15	Kaufman. ³¹³ His most recent treatise notes that, "I am not aware of any financial literature
16	supporting the notion that that [sic] utility earnings per share are expected to grow at the
17	average growth of the economy; or GDP." ³¹⁴ Dr. Morin goes on to observe that:
18 19 20 21 22	Multi-stage DCF applications appear somewhat disconnected from the assumptions of the method and the consensus expectations of investors. The investment community does not look to GDP growth over the next several decades when evaluating an investment in utility stocks, nor does it anticipate a series of discrete multi-stage decennial stages. I am not aware of any

 $[\]begin{array}{c} \hline 3^{10} Id. \text{ at } 30:21-22. \\ 3^{11} Id. \text{ at } 30:23 \\ \hline 3^{12} Id. \text{ at } 30:11-13. \\ \hline 3^{12} Id. \\ \hline 3^{$

³¹³ Roger A. Morin, *Modern Regulatory Finance*, PUR Books LLC (2021) at 486-488. ³¹⁴ *Id.* at 486.

- evidence that investors evaluate the future based on the assumptions and data sources required to apply the two-stage or three-stage DCF model.³¹⁵
 Instead, Dr. Morin cites "the wealth of empirical and academic literature that supports
 the superiority of analysts' forecasts as measures of investor expectations" and concludes that
 "current earnings growth forecasts are the appropriate growth rates to use in a DCF
 analysis."³¹⁶ This is consistent with my testimony and refutes Dr. Kaufman's position on this
 issue.
- 8 Q. Dr. Kaufman suggests that "it is mathematically impossible for firms to 9 grow faster than GDP indefinitely."³¹⁷ Does this theoretical proposition overcome your 10 criticism of multi-stage DCF models?
- 11 A. No. Dr. Kaufman highlights an obvious fact that no company can grow forever 12 at a rate greater than the economy. True enough, companies cannot grow forever, just as trees 13 do not grow to the stratosphere. But this broad axiom does not justify the use of his three-14 stage DCF model. The objective of using the DCF model in an ROE analysis is to infer what 15 investors must have required as a rate of return to part with their money to buy a common 16 stock at the current market price. The theory of the DCF model is that investors calculate 17 their expected return from a common stock investment as the discounted stream of cash flows 18 they expect to receive by holding the stock, *i.e.*, the discounted value of dividends plus any 19 capital gain (or loss) at the end of their holding period. By making certain strict assumptions, 20 the DCF model can be reduced to the familiar constant growth formula, which represents the 21 cost of equity as the sum of the dividend yield expected in the coming year and the growth
 - ³¹⁵ *Id*.
 - ³¹⁶ Id.

³¹⁷ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 29:23-30:1

rate expected during the foreseeable future.³¹⁸

Just as companies do not grow forever, investors do not hold stocks forever and cannot see into the far distant future. In fact, investors realize that projections become increasingly tenuous as the forecast horizon expands. To estimate the growth rate investors must have had in mind when they agreed to purchase a common stock, we must look to information that investors use to make their decisions. The only relevant growth rate in applying the DCF model is what investors assumed when they purchased the stock at the prevailing market price.

8 To the extent that professional security analysts feel that trends in GDP affect a 9 company's growth expectations in the time frame relevant to investors, it is already 10 incorporated into their published EPS growth forecasts. In addition, companies differ in the 11 degree to which growth is impacted by the national economy. Utilities vary in their exposure 12 as some service territories are more sensitive to national economic conditions than others. 13 These inherent differences are obviously reflected in security analysts' growth projections for 14 individual companies, which are indicative of the expectations that underlie stock prices.

Moreover, the time necessary for any company to grow to the magnitude of the entire economy is so long that few if any investors would include this horizon in their decision to buy stock today. The present value of any cash flows so far in the future would also be so miniscule that it would not move the needle in stock valuation. For example, consider the 4.9 percent average Value Line EPS growth rate for the Utility Group, which has a total market capitalization of approximately \$460 billion. In 2023 GDP was \$27,360 billion.³¹⁹ Assuming

 ³¹⁸ The various assumptions behind the DCF model are presented at McKenzie, Exh. AMM-1T, footnote 38.
 ³¹⁹ <u>https://www.bea.gov/news/2024/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2023-second-estimate</u> (last visited Jul. 29, 2024).

Dr. Kaufman's GDP growth rate of 4.0 percent, the firms in the proxy group would not collectively overtake the value of the economy until the year 2499—over 475 years after the Value Line growth forecasts were published. The fact that such a time horizon is so far beyond the plausible consideration of investors' expectations provides another illustration of the wide gulf between the theoretical precepts underlying Dr. Kaufman's three-stage DCF analysis and practical application.

Q. Apart from the fact that the assumptions of Dr. Kaufman's multi-stage
DCF model are arbitrary and unsupported, are there also computational inaccuracies
that bias the cost of equity estimates downward?

10 A. Yes. Under his multi-stage DCF approach Dr. Kaufman predicted the cash 11 flows that would accrue to investors over the next 200 years.³²⁰ To arrive at his estimated cost 12 of equity, Dr. Kaufman used the internal rate of return ("XIRR") function available in 13 Microsoft's Excel spreadsheet program to determine the discount rate (*i.e.*, investors' required 14 rate of return) that would equate these cash flows with the current market price of the 15 stock. This XIRR calculation, however, assumes that annual cash flows are received at the 16 end of each year, which is inconsistent with the periodic dividend payments that investors 17 receive over the course of the year and results in a downward bias in the implied cost of 18 equity.

19

Q. Does Dr. Kaufman's "constant growth" DCF model differ materially from his three-stage approach?

21

20

A. No. While Dr. Kaufman's constant growth DCF approach abandons the

³²⁰ Kaufman-WP-Exh. LDK-5.xlsx at '3SDCF Vline' tab.

1	discreet pattern of growth underlying his three-stage model, as he notes it "is based on the
2	same growth rate assumptions" used in his three-stage DCF application. ³²¹ In other words,
3	the average 30-year growth rate underlying his constant growth DCF study is based on the
4	same misguided notion that investors expect growth for all utilities to converge to the CBO's
5	forecast of GDP growth. The same criticisms discussed earlier in response to Dr. Kaufman's
б	three-stage DCF model apply equally to his constant growth application.
7	B. <u>Capital Asset Pricing Model</u>
8	Q. How does Dr. Kaufman apply the CAPM and ECAPM models?
9	A. Dr. Kaufman utilizes two different MRP values-5.0 percent and 6.9
10	percent-along with a risk-free rate of 4.4 percent and his own calculated beta values to
11	produce CAPM ROEs for each of the utilities in the proxy group. After adjusting for impact
12	of firm size, Dr. Kaufman's average CAPM ROEs are 8.3 percent and 9.7 percent. ³²² Dr.
13	Kaufman also applies the ECAPM with these same inputs, which generates average ROEs of
14	8.7 percent and 10.2 percent after accounting for size. ³²³
15	Q. What is the primary flaw within Dr. Kaufman's CAPM and ECAPM
16	applications?
17	A. Instead of utilizing Value Line betas used in my testimony and accepted by
18	Mr. Parcell and Mr. Garrett, Dr. Kaufman constructs his own betas. Contrary to Value Line's
19	methodology, Dr. Kaufman calculates his own raw betas, and then adjusts them toward the
20	"industry average," where the "industry" is defined as his proxy group. ³²⁴

³²¹ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 31:13.
³²² Kaufman, Exh.LDK-5 at 9, 11.
³²³ *Id.* at 10, 12.

³²⁴ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 45:7-8, Kaufman-WP-Exh. LDK-5 at 'beta_estimates' tab.

1 **Q**. What is basis for Dr. Kaufman's decision to use his own betas in his CAPM 2 calculations? 3 A. Dr. Kaufman laments that "Avista uses betas that are overly influenced by 4 anomalous COVID stock market behavior and that have been adjusted closer to 1 using the 5 Bloom [sic] adjustment."³²⁵ 6 **Q**. Is there any merit to Dr. Kaufman's claim Value Line's current five-year 7 beta values has "are biased and grossly misrepresent reasonable forecasts for utility 8 stock betas"?326 9 A. No. Dr. Kaufman's subjective and unsupported arguments on this issue are 10 incorrect and should be given no weight. The relative price behavior of utility stocks versus 11 the broader market reflects the actual valuation decisions of investors and there is no reason 12 to ignore the implications of this data in applying the CAPM. Value Line believes that weekly 13 price movements over a five year lookback period is appropriate to capture investors' current 14 evaluation of risk vis-à-vis the beta coefficient, and all of the weekly price changes over the 15 five-year period referenced by Value Line are given equal weight in the regression analysis 16 that is used to calculate published beta values. Value Line's five-year beta value calculations 17 implicitly acknowledge that the capital market events of March 2020 are still recent enough 18 that they should inform investors' current risk perceptions within the CAPM model, and there 19 is no basis for Dr. Kaufman's contention that the use of these current five-year betas "overinflates utility cost of capital."³²⁷ 20

³²⁵ *Id.* at 32:10-11.

³²⁶ *Id.* at 31:17-18.

³²⁷ *Id.* at 41:17-18.

1	Similarly, the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic was not predicted or might not occur
2	frequently is irrelevant in the context of the CAPM. Setting aside the very real possibility that
3	investors might reasonably anticipate a recurrence of a similar health crisis, the relevance of
4	Value Line's published beta values is not dependent on the assumption that risks affecting
5	common stocks are predictable or commonplace. Rather, it is how investors incorporate
6	information into their valuation decisions and ultimately, stock prices that determines risk in
7	the context of modern capital market theory. Aswath Damodaran, a source cited by Dr.
8	Kaufman in applying the CAPM, ³²⁸ noted that:
9 10 11 12	When investing in equities, there is always the potential for catastrophic risk, i.e. events that occur infrequently but can cause dramatic drops in wealth While the possibility of catastrophic events may be low, they cannot be ruled out and the equity risk premium has to reflect this risk. ³²⁹
13	Contrary to Dr. Kaufman's claim that price movements in response to the coronavirus
14	pandemic somehow fall outside the paradigm of the CAPM or represent "outliers," ³³⁰ they
15	form the very foundation of this approach. The relative volatility of utility stock prices in
16	response to the catastrophic events precipitated by a world health crisis directly reflect the
17	actions of investors and there is no basis to ignore these price movements when estimating the
18	forward-looking risk perceptions reflected in beta.
19	Dr. Kaufman's judgement that investors' recent actions looking back over five years
20	can be ignored in favor of arbitrary time periods, selectively excluded data, or arbitrarily
21	substituting monthly returns for the weekly returns used by Value Line is equally misguided.

³²⁸ *Id.* at 32, footnote 40; 50, footnote 59; 52:3-54:1.

³²⁹ Aswath Damodaran, Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications-The 2020 *Edition* (Updated: March 2020) at 16-17. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3550293_code20838.pdf?abstractid=3550293&mirid=1.

³³⁰ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 33:11; 36:7.

Ultimately, such suggestions devolve into highly subjective arguments regarding what period might be considered "atypical" and what might be more representative. The reality is that the "true," forward-looking beta is unobservable, and it is impossible to ascertain how investors will react to future information when valuing utility common stocks. That said, recent price movements leading to an increase in utility beta values reflect actual valuation decisions in the market and there is no reason to conclude that this information would not be considered by investors when forming their future expectations.

8 It Is also worth emphasizing that Value Line has made a purposeful decision to use 9 five years of historical weekly stock returns to estimate beta. This choice confirms Value 10 Line's belief that events within this window provide sound guidance as to investors' current 11 risk perceptions. Certainly the impact of a significant event (*e.g.*, COVID-19) should not be 12 ignored by relying on arbitrary beta values that are not publicly available to investors. To 13 substitute Value Line's current beta values is to say that Dr. Kaufman knows better than Value 14 Line what specific events influence investors' current risk perceptions.

15 16 Q. Is there any indication that beta values for electric and gas utilities have begun to decline to pre-pandemic levels since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic?

A. No. In fact, electric and gas utility betas have remained elevated. The figure below illustrates the trajectory of the average beta for the firms in Value Line's electric utility and natural gas utility industry groups from February 2019 through February 2024:




FIGURE AMM-R7 ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY INDUSTRY BETAS

3 As shown above, the average beta value corresponding to these utility industry groups 4 has remained elevated since March 2020. The fact that these average beta values for Value 5 Line's electric and natural gas utility industry groups have remained elevated for four and a 6 half years since March 2020 undermines Dr. Kaufman's unsupported assertion that current 7 beta values are a skewed representation of investors' future expectations. Rising beta values 8 are also consistent with higher structural risks, as evidenced by S&P's decision to place a 9 "negative" outlook on the utility industry, citing declining credit ratings and ongoing potential for further downgrades.³³¹ 10

³³¹ S&P Global Ratings, *Rising Risks: Outlook For North American Investor-Owned Regulated Utilities Weakens*, Comments (Feb. 14, 2024).

1 0. Do Dr. Kaufman's betas calculations confirm that the electric utilities in 2 his proxy group are currently experiencing heightened risk, even after March 2020? 3 A. Yes. For example, Dr. Kaufman's various "Raw," "Adjust to Market" and 4 "Adjust to Industry" beta calculations show average beta values for his proxy group in a range of approximately 0.70 to 0.80, after the exclusion of "Covid months" and "outliers."³³² While 5 6 I do not support the use of his calculated betas in a CAPM analysis, Dr. Kaufman's analysis 7 confirms that electric and gas utilities are still experiencing heightened risk, as compared to 8 the five year period preceding the pandemic, when the average Blume-adjusted beta for the 9 proxy group stood at approximately 0.57.³³³ 10 Q. What does Dr. Kaufman's ultimate reliance on his own calculated betas in 11 this case indicate regarding his subjective judgement about how investors perceive risk 12 within the CAPM model? 13 As I have just discussed, Dr. Kaufman's own calculated betas demonstrate A. 14 heightened risk as compared to pre-pandemic levels. Dr. Kaufman apparently feels that some 15 recognition of higher risk is appropriate in the CAPM model, but that the level of risk that would be conveyed by five-year Value Line betas is "biased" and inappropriate according to 16 his current judgement. 17 18 Dr. Kaufman disagrees with Value Line's practice of adjusting betas **Q**. towards the market average.³³⁴ What is your response? 19 20 A. Dr. Kaufman makes a number of far-reaching and dubious conclusions in this

³³² Kaufman, Exh.LDK-5 at 6-8.

³³³ The Value Line Investment Survey, *Summary & Index* (Feb. 14, 2020).

³³⁴ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 36:9-42:8.

1 regard. For example, Dr. Kaufman argues that Value Line betas are "systematically higher than actual betas."³³⁵ Given that the "actual" beta reflects investors' forward-looking 2 3 expectations and cannot be observed, this statement is incorrect. Likewise, Dr. Kaufman 4 concludes that unadjusted betas provide "a very reasonable approximation of near-term future 5 beta,"³³⁶ but again, near-term future betas are not measurable. In fact, Mr. Kaufman's 6 examination of trends in his calculations of beta values for a small sample of utility stocks 7 over a 10-year historical time period provide no meaningful information regarding investors' 8 current expectations of the future price behavior of utility stocks relative to the market.

9 Dr. Kaufman suggests that a superior alternative to the Blume adjustment used by Value Line would be to adjust beta towards the industry average.³³⁷ In fact, adjustment 10 11 towards the industry average, which is generally referred to as the Vasicek method, is 12 primarily designed to account for unreliability in individual beta estimates by increasing the 13 adjustment in proportion to the standard error of the raw beta value. Adjusting raw beta values 14 with high standard errors towards an industry average does not account for the observed 15 tendency of beta to revert to the market average of 1.0. Meanwhile, the Blume adjustment 16 used by Value Line is also used by other leading sources of beta values, such as Bloomberg. 17 As one recognized researcher has noted:

18The most important difference of these services is the adjustment method used19in the calculation of beta. Most services utilize the Blume methodology20outlined earlier in this chapter.338

21

Value Line is recognized as being the most widely available source of investment

³³⁵ *Id.* at 41:4.

³³⁶ *Id.* at 40:12.

³³⁷ *Id.* at 41:6-7.

³³⁸ Ibbotson Associates, 2005 Yearbook, Valuation Edition at 25.

1	information to investors, and citations in many textbooks and other sources support its
2	usefulness as a guide to investors' expectations.is widely relied upon by investors. As noted
3	in New Regulatory Finance:
4 5 6 7 8	Value Line is the largest and most widely circulated independent investment advisory service, and influences the expectations of a large number of institutional and individual investors Value Line betas are computed on a theoretically sound basis using a broadly based market index, and they are adjusted for the regression tendency of betas to converge to 1.00. ³³⁹
9	In contrast to Dr. Kaufman's beta values, which are the product of his personal views, beta
10	values reported by Value Line are relied on by investors in evaluating expected returns for
11	utility common stocks. The administrative benefits associated with reliance on beta values
12	from Value Line, including a consistent methodology by an independent third-party and
13	immunity to selective changes in assumptions, support continued reference to Value Line
14	betas in applying the CAPM approach.
15	Q. Do you agree with the MRPs Dr. Kaufman uses to apply the CAPM and
16	ECAPM?
17	A. No. Dr. Kaufmann uses two MRPs—a 5.0 percent value sourced from Kroll
18	and a 6.9 percent MRP that Dr. Kaufman calculated by modifying the forward-looking
19	approach used in my direct testimony. I previously discussed the problems with the MRP
20	from Kroll in my response to Mr. Garrett.
21	Q. How did Dr. Kaufman arrive at his 6.9 percent MRP?
22	A. As described in my direct testimony, the MRP used in my application of the
23	CAPM was based on a forward-looking market return estimated by applying the DCF model

³³⁹ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 71.

7

Q. Dr. Kaufman describes your elimination of negative growth rates and values above 20 percent as "biased" and "asymmetric."³⁴¹ How do you respond?

A. I disagree with Dr. Kaufman's assertion. My analysis adopts the same growth rate screening criteria specified by FERC to develop a forward-looking market risk premium for purposes of applying the CAPM. Based on proposals made by FERC's Trial Staff, FERC found that excluding negative growth rates or values above 20 percent "is consistent with the elimination of outliers elsewhere in our ROE methodology," and noted that, "Evidence indicates that the use of this growth rate screen is appropriate in the CAPM analysis."³⁴²

14

15

Q. Is there any basis for Dr. Kaufman's suggestion that a more reasonable screening criteria for growth rates would be "symmetric around zero"?³⁴³

16

17

A. No. Dr. Kaufman's suggestion that a growth rate of zero should be the starting point for an evaluation of plausible growth rates for the firms in the S&P 500 makes no sense.

18 In the context of the DCF model, a negative growth rate implies a cost of equity below the

³⁴⁰ McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 17.

³⁴¹ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 46:17-47:1.

³⁴² Ass'n of Bus. Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Opinion No. 569, 169 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2019) at P 267-268, vacated & remanded sub nom. MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, No. 16-1325 (D.C. Cir. 2022); Ass'n of Bus. Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Opinion No. 569-A, 171 FERC ¶ 61,154 (2020) at P 77, vacated & remanded sub nom. MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, No. 16-1325 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

³⁴³ Kaufman, Exh. LDK-1T at 46:20.

2

company's dividend yield, which is a nonsensical result and Dr. Kaufman's contention that including negative growth rates would correct for potential "bias" is incorrect.

3

4

Q. Given the illogical nature of Dr. Kaufman's proposal, what else could be done to address his concern that FERC's growth rate limits are "arbitrary"?

A. While the growth rate screens adopted by FERC offer an accepted basis on which to evaluate potentially illogical growth rates, a more defensible approach to address Dr. Kaufman's concerns over potential "bias" would be to remove the screens altogether. Underlying FERC's practice of excluding growth rates that are negative or greater than 20 percent is the misguided notion that use of the DCF model to estimate the market return implies an assumption that growth rates for each firm in the S&P 500 will be constant. This is not correct.

Contrary to Dr. Kaufman's contention,³⁴⁴ applying the DCF model to the S&P 500 12 13 does not involve calculating the cost of equity for each individual firm under the assumption 14 that the current growth rate will be constant for perpetuity. This same understanding was 15 expressed in a widely-recognized financial research study, which noted that: 16 Importantly, however, the approach is applied to portfolios of stocks rather than to individual securities, since future growth patterns may be expected to have 17 drastic changes for some specific securities.³⁴⁵ 18 19 In other words, while growth rates for individual companies can be expected to change over

20 time (even dramatically), it is reasonable to expect that the weighted average of these

21 individual projections is representative of investors' expectations for the entire portfolio of

³⁴⁴ *Id.* at 49:4-9.

³⁴⁵ Robert S. Harris, *Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts to Estimate Shareholder Required Rates of Return*, Fin. Mgmt. (Spring 1986).

dividend-paying firms in the S&P 500. In the CAPM, that index serves as a proxy for
 investors' current expectations regarding the required rate of return for the market in common
 stock as a whole.

4 The growth rate underlying the market cost of equity represents a weighted average of 5 the expectations for the dividend paying firms in the S&P 500. Within this large group of 6 firms, growth expectations for some firms may be extremely anemic, while projections for 7 other firms are considerably more optimistic. In addition, growth rates for one company may 8 moderate over time, while for others they may increase. Finally, the composition of the S&P 9 500 is not static. As a result, formerly successful firms are supplanted by new firms with 10 potential for high growth (e.g., Sears is supplanted by Amazon, or Blockbuster is supplanted 11 by Netflix). On balance, however, the weighted growth rates of the individual firms in the 12 S&P 500 are representative of the consensus expectations for the dividend paying firms in the 13 S&P 500 Index as a whole.

Q. What market risk premium results when FERC's growth rate screens are removed?

A. Removing FERC's growth rate screens would result in an MRP of 9.7 percent,
which is considerably higher than the 7.3 percent value that I adopted in my direct testimony.

18

19

Q. Dr. Kaufman cites to a number of investor and finance professional surveys.³⁴⁶ Do the MRPs in these surveys provide useful guidance?

A. No. Dr. Kaufman says that, "Market surveys show that the average risk
 premium required by investors is materially lower than the forecast produced by Avista."³⁴⁷

³⁴⁶ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 50:13, Table 17.

³⁴⁷ *Id.* at 50:9-10.

1 But a closer look at the 12 survey-based MRPs presented by Dr. Kaufman shows that these surveys date back to February 2007, with the most recent one conducted in 2022.³⁴⁸ There is 2 3 nothing current about the surveys Dr. Kaufman cites, and the information contained within 4 them cannot reasonably be used to impugn my forward-looking MRP estimate. As Dr. 5 Kaufman says, "historic risk premiums are not forward looking."³⁴⁹

6

7

Q. Dr. Kaufman also cites to a number of "recent" equity risk premium estimates.³⁵⁰ Do these equity risk premiums capture investors' current expectations?

8 No. The only forward-looking MRP estimates contained in Dr. Kaufman's A. 9 exhibit are my own 7.3 percent MRP estimate and Dr. Kaufman's variation of my 10 calculation.³⁵¹ The remaining risk premiums are a mish-mash of stale historic and survey-11 based results that do not capture the expectations of investors in today's capital markets. For 12 example, the MRPs listed in Dr. Kaufman's Table 16 include results from surveys in 2018 13 and 2020 as well as historical estimates dating back to 1900 and 1928. References to 14 historical, backward-looking inputs like the most of the MRPs in Dr. Kaufman's Table 16 and 15 Table 17 are inconsistent with the forward-looking CAPM model. As I explain in my direct 16 testimony, to produce a meaningful estimate of investors' required rate of return, the CAPM 17 must be applied using estimates that reflect the expectations of actual investors in the market, not with backward-looking, historical data.³⁵²

18

³⁴⁸ The average age of the surveys that Dr. Kaufman cites to is over ten years.

³⁴⁹ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 52:4.

³⁵⁰ *Id.* at 48:1, Table 16.

³⁵¹ Oddly, Dr. Kaufman reports that his "Corrected PAC Method" produces an MRP of 7.1 percent in his Table 16, but he uses 6.9 percent in his CAPM and ECAPM calculations.

³⁵² McKenzie, Exh. AMM-3 at 16.

- 1
- 2

Q. Compared to your 7.3 percent MRP value, Dr. Kaufman says that "Nearly all third-party estimates of the equity risk premium indicate it is between 3 and 6 percent."³⁵³ Does this comparison indicate that your 7.3 percent estimate is inflated?

4 A. No. Earlier I discussed the fact that most of the values in Dr. Kaufman's Table 5 16 and Table 17 are stale, or otherwise tainted by historical back-ward looking data. But in 6 any case, a range of 3.0 percent to 6.0 percent does not make economic sense. This can be 7 illustrated by considering that the 4.5 percent midpoint of this range, when combined with Dr. 8 Kaufman's 4.4 percent risk-free rate, would result in a cost of equity for the market as a whole 9 of 8.9 percent. This implied cost of equity for the broader market is 35 basis points *below* the 10 ROE that Dr. Kaufman is recommending for Avista, and 50 basis points below Avista's 11 currently allowed ROE.

12

Q. Dr. Kaufman takes issue with your size premium. How do you respond?

A. I addressed criticisms of the size adjustment earlier in response to Mr. Parcell and Mr. Garrett. Additionally, I would note that Dr. Kaufman's suggestion that the size adjustment "is the same measure used to justify the ECAPM model" is incorrect.³⁵⁴ The size adjustment is based on an ongoing demonstration that beta values do not fully reflect the impact of risks related to firm size. Meanwhile, the ECAPM does not involve any adjustment to beta or otherwise account for differences between predicted and actual returns that are related to size.

³⁵³ Kaufman, Exh.LDK-1T at 46:13-14.

³⁵⁴ *Id.* at 54:9-10.

C. Other ROE Issues

2 0. Dr. Kaufman rejects your flotation cost adjustment. What is your 3 response?

4 A. I addressed the necessity of allowing for recovery of flotation costs earlier in 5 response to Mr. Parcell. Dr. Kaufman does not take issue with the reality that Avista incurred 6 flotation costs in order to raise common equity capital; rather, he suggests that Avista could 7 have reduced the amount of equity issuance costs by paying lower dividends. While Dr. 8 Kaufman is correct that retaining earnings within the firm is one way to increase common 9 equity, this simplistic argument ignores other important facets of a utility's financial policies. 10 Relatively high and steadily growing dividend payments are a key feature of utility stocks that 11 underly their attractiveness to investors, and Avista's dividend policies properly reflect these 12 realities. In addition, Dr. Kaufman's suggestion that Avista could reduce flotation costs through share buybacks is nonsensical.³⁵⁵ Share buybacks involve the Company's purchase 13 14 of its own common stock in the market, which would divert financial resources that could 15 otherwise be used to support Avista's utility operations.

16

0. Dr. Kaufman recommends the Commission give no weight to your Risk Premium and Expected Earnings models.³⁵⁶ How do you respond?

18

17

A. Dr. Kaufman claims that these two approaches are "not consistent with financial theory and are not grounded in market outcomes."³⁵⁷ I address the financial and 19 20 regulatory underpinnings of the expected earnings approach earlier.

³⁵⁵ *Id.* at 56:7-11.

³⁵⁶ *Id.* at 23:4-7.

³⁵⁷ Id.

1	The Risk Premium approach is based on the fundamental risk-return principle that is
2	central to finance. This method is routinely referenced by the investment community, by
3	academics, and in regulatory proceedings, and provides an important tool in estimating a fair
4	ROE. In the recognized treatise Principles of Public Utility Rates, Bonbright noted that "[t]he
5	risk premium approach is probably the second most popular approach to estimating the cost
6	of equity." ³⁵⁸ Similarly, the Risk Premium approach is cited as one of the preeminent cost of
7	capital methodologies by the primary reference text prepared for the Society of Utility and
8	Regulatory Financial Analysts, ³⁵⁹ as well as by <i>New Regulatory Finance</i> . ³⁶⁰ My application
9	of the risk premium approach also considers "market outcomes," because objective market
10	data is considered by regulators in evaluating the allowed ROEs on which my study was based.
11	V. <u>RESPONSE TO WALMART WITNESS PERRY</u>
12	Q. Does Ms. Perry conduct an independent evaluation of a fair ROE for
13	Avista?
14	A. No. Ms. Perry does not conduct any analyses of the cost of equity. Her
15	testimony is limited to a presentation of selected data concerning previously authorized ROEs,
16	and she also presents various calculations concerning a hypothetical customer impact and
17	revenue requirement. Based on this limited review, Ms. Perry expresses her concern about

³⁵⁸ James C. Bonbright, Albert L. Danielsen, and David R. Kamerschen, *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc. (1988) at 322.

³⁵⁹ David C. Parcell, *The Cost of Capital – A Practitioner's Guide*, Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts (2010) at 164.

³⁶⁰ Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance*, Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc. (2006) at 28, 107-130. FERC cited Professor Eugene Brigham, who also recognized that the Risk Premium method is typically used when estimating a company's cost of equity. *Ass'n of Bus. Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, Opinion No. 569, 169 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2019) at P 218, *vacated & remanded sub nom. MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC*, No. 16-1325 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

the reasonableness of the Company's proposed ROE.³⁶¹

2

3

Q. Do you agree with Ms. Perry that allowed ROEs provide one benchmark worthy of consideration in the commission's evaluation?

4 A. Yes, I do. Importantly, however, such comparisons of allowed ROEs are only 5 one consideration. While this data can be useful in the Commission's deliberations, it is not 6 a substitute for the detailed analyses presented in my direct testimony. Moreover, as discussed 7 earlier, historical average ROEs do not reflect current capital market conditions. In fact, once 8 adjusted for the recent increase in interest rates, ROEs approved by the Commission since 2021 imply a current cost of equity of 10.43 percent.³⁶² Absent the adjustments quantified in 9 10 my rebuttal testimony, these values do not provide a sound basis on which to assess a fair 11 ROE for Avista in this case.

1

Q. From your position as an expert regulatory financial analyst, what do you make of Ms. Perry's admonition³⁶³ to consider customer impacts when establishing a fair ROE?

A. First, it is important to note that the determination of the ROE is made by investors in the capital markets and is not predicated on any notion of costs or savings to customers. The Supreme Court's regulatory standards embodied in the *Hope* and *Bluefield* decisions represent a balance between the interests of customers and investors, by setting forth the guidelines as to a fair ROE. Meanwhile, Ms. Perry wrongly suggests that a lower ROE is *per se* to customers' benefit. This is not the case. While a downward-biased ROE may

³⁶¹ Perry, Exh. LVP-1T at 4-5.

³⁶² McKenzie, Exh. AMM-16..

³⁶³ Perry, Exh. LVP-1T at 12, 16, 17-18.

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provide the illusion of "savings" in the form of a lower revenue requirement in the short-term, the long-term impact of an inadequate ROE can work to the disadvantage of customers.

3 As discussed earlier, there is a very real connection between the ROE and the 4 availability of capital, and Ms. Perry ignores the negative impact that an inadequate ROE 5 would have on investment. The ROE is the primary signal to investors, not only with respect 6 to attracting new capital investment, but also in supporting existing utility operations. If the 7 utility is unable to offer a competitive ROE, existing shareholders will suffer a capital loss as 8 investors take advantage of other, more favorable opportunities, and the utility's stock price 9 would fall. Moreover, as investors' confidence is undermined, the ability of utilities to access 10 equity capital markets and expand investment will suffer. While the Company would 11 undoubtedly continue to meet its service obligations to customers, a downward-biased ROE 12 would send an unmistakable signal to the investment community as they consider whether to 13 commit capital in Washington, and at what cost.

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Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?

15 A. Yes.