Docket Nos. UE-090704 and UG-090705 Direct Testimony of Glenn A. Watkins Exhibit No. GAW-1T

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES & TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

Complainant,

v.

PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC.

Respondent.

DOCKET NOS. UE-090704 AND UG-090705

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF GLENN A. WATKINS (GAW-1T)

ON BEHALF OF

PUBLIC COUNSEL

November 17, 2009

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF GLENN A. WATKINS (GAW-1T) DOCKET NOS. UE-090704 AND UG-090705

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF GLENN A. WATKINS (GAW-1T) DOCKET NOS. UE-090704 AND UG-090705

EXHIBITS OF GLENN A. WATKINS (GAW-1T)

Exhibit No. GAW-2	Education and Employment History
Exhibit No. GAW-3	Puget Sound Energy Electric Cost of Service Summary (Income Taxes Calculated)
Exhibit No. GAW-4	Puget Sound Energy Electric Residential Customer Costs (Cost of Equity @ PSE Proposed)
Exhibit No. GAW-5	Puget Sound Energy Natural Gas Residential Customer Costs (Cost of Equity @ PSE Proposed)

1		I. INTRODUCTION
2	Q:	Please state your name and business address.
3	A:	My name is Glenn A. Watkins. My business address is James Center III, 1051 East Cary
4		Street, Suite 601, Richmond, VA 23219.
5	Q:	By whom are you employed and in what capacity?
6	A:	I am a Principal and Senior Economist with Technical Associates, Inc., which is an
7		economics and financial consulting firm with offices in Richmond, Virginia.
8	Q:	On whose behalf are you testifying?
9	A:	I am testifying on behalf of the Public Counsel Section of the Washington Attorney
10		General's Office (Public Counsel).
11	Q:	Please describe your professional qualifications.
12	A:	Except for a six month period during 1987 in which I was employed by Old Dominion
13		Electric Cooperative as its forecasting and rate economist, I have been employed by
14		Technical Associates continuously since 1980.
15		During my career at Technical Associates, I have conducted marginal and
16		embedded cost of service, rate design, cost of capital, and load forecasting studies
17		involving numerous electric, gas, water/wastewater, and telephone utilities, and have
18		provided expert testimony in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
19		Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
20		Vermont, Virginia, South Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia. I hold an M.B.A
21		and B.S. in economics from Virginia Commonwealth University. I am a member of
22		several professional organizations as well as a Certified Rate of Return Analyst. A more
23		complete description of my education and experience is provided in Exhibit No. GAW-2.

1	Q:	What is your regulatory experience before the Washington UTC?
2	A:	In addition to representing Public Counsel in PSE's last general rate case I have also
3		represented Public Counsel in the last two PacifiCorp rate cases as well as this year's
4		Avista general rate case.
5	Q:	What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?
6	A:	Technical Associates has been retained by Public Counsel to evaluate the accuracy and
7		reasonableness of Puget Sound Energy's ("PSE" or "Company") electric and natural gas
8		class cost of service studies (CCOSS), proposed distribution of revenues by class, and
9		residential rate designs. The purpose of my testimony, therefore, is to comment on PSE's
10		proposals on these issues and to present my findings and recommendations based on the
11		results of the studies I have undertaken on behalf of the Public Counsel.
12	Q:	Please explain how your direct testimony is structured.
13	A:	I have separated my direct testimony into three sections: Electric Operations; Natural
14		Gas Operations; and PSE Supplemental Filing. For each operational section, I have three
15		subsections entitled: Class Cost of Service; Class Revenue Distribution; and, Residential
16		Rate Design. My testimony concerning the first two sections (Electric Operations and
17		Natural Gas Operations) is based on the Company's initial filing dated May 8, 2009, for
18		electric operations and its supplemental filing dated August 3, 2009, for the Natural Gas
19		Operations. I discuss the rate design implications of PSE's September 28, 2009,
20		supplemental filing separately in the last section of my testimony.
21		///
22		///
23		///

II. ELECTRIC OPERATIONS

2 A. ELECTRIC COST OF SERVICE

3 Q: Please explain the concept of a class cost of service study (CCOSS).

A: There are two general types of cost of service studies used for public utility ratemaking:
marginal cost studies and embedded, fully allocated cost studies. PSE has utilized a
traditional embedded cost of service concept in this case for purposes of establishing its
overall retail revenue requirement, as well as for its CCOSS.

8 Embedded cost of service studies are often referred to as fully allocated cost 9 studies. This is because the vast majority of a public utility's plant investment serves all 10 customers, and the majority of expenses are incurred in a joint manner such that these costs cannot be specifically attributed to any individual customer or group of customers. 11 12 To the extent that certain costs can be specifically attributed to a particular customer (or 13 group of customers), these costs are directly assigned in a CCOSS. However, the vast 14 majority of PSE's Production, Transmission, and Distribution plant and expenses are 15 incurred jointly to serve all (or most) customers. These joint costs are then allocated to 16 rate classes.

It is generally recognized that to the extent possible, joint costs should be allocated to classes based on the concept of cost causation; i.e., costs are allocated based on specific factors that cause costs to be incurred by the utility. Although cost analysts generally strive to abide by the concept of cost causation to the greatest extent practical, some costs (particularly overhead costs), cannot be attributed to specific exogenous factors and must be subjectively assigned or allocated to rate classes. With regards to those costs that can be attributed to a specific factor, cost of service experts often disagree

as to what is the most cost causative factor; e.g., peak demand, energy usage, number of customers, etc.

3 Q: How should CCOSS results be used in the ratemaking process?

4 Although there are certain principles used by all cost of service analysts, there are often A: 5 significant disagreements on the specific factors that drive costs. These disagreements can and do arise as a result of the quality of data and the level of detail available from 6 7 financial records. Moreover, there are often fundamental differences in opinions 8 regarding cost causation factors that should be considered to properly allocate costs to 9 rate schedules or customer classes. Additionally, and as mentioned earlier, cost 10 causation factors cannot be realistically ascribed to some costs such that subjective 11 decisions are required.

In these regards, two different cost studies conducted for the same utility and time
period can, and often do, yield different results. As such, regulators should consider

14 CCOSS results as one of many tools in assigning revenue responsibility.

15 Q: Please explain how you proceeded with your analysis of PSE's electric CCOSS.

16 A: As indicated by witness David Hoff, the Company's electric CCOSS conducted for this 17 case is based on the same methodology and model used in PSE's last general rate case (Docket No. UE-072300). As such, the CCOSS sponsored by Mr. Hoff in this case 18 19 largely represents an update to last year's study. Docket No. UE-072300 was my first 20 case involving PSE and I conducted a rigorous examination of all aspects of PSE's 21 CCOSS. That examination enabled me to gain a thorough understanding of the structure 22 and organization of PSE's model, as well as the assumptions and methods used to 23 classify and allocate Production, Transmission, Distribution and General/Administrative

costs. Building upon my understanding of PSE's electric CCOSS model, I verified the
 accuracy and consistency of PSE's study filed in this case with that conducted in Docket
 No. UE-072300. I found that the current study is indeed an update with minor
 modifications to the study presented by Mr. Hoff in last year's general rate case.

5

6

Q: Please summarize your agreements and disagreements with the CCOSS sponsored by PSE witness Hoff.

7 A: With the exception of one issue, I found Mr. Hoff's current CCOSS to reasonably reflect 8 cost causation. This disagreement relates to Mr. Hoff's assignment of income tax 9 expenses to individual classes which results in a mathematical error in his calculated 10 class revenue requirements and attendant parity ratios. Although my disagreement with 11 PSE's treatment of class income tax responsibility is relatively small in this case, I 12 believe it is important that PSE's error be corrected going forward as it can have a 13 significant impact on class revenue responsibility.

14 As in PSE's last rate case, I continue to have a minor difference in opinion with 15 Mr. Hoff's classification of Production and Transmission plant. However, as a result of 16 PSE's updates in the current study, in large part, PSE's methods, approaches, and results 17 cannot be deemed unreasonable. As such, but for the treatment of income taxes, I have 18 accepted all other aspects of Mr. Hoff's electric CCOSS. In this regard, it should be 19 noted that Mr. Hoff did incorporate certain changes (other than updates) to this year's 20 CCOSS that were recommended by other experts in Docket No. UE-072300. I also 21 concur with these changes.

22

///

///

1 **Q**: Please provide a summary of Mr. Hoff's CCOSS results at current rates. 2 A: Mr. Hoff's CCOSS generates the following current revenue to cost and parity ratios. It 3 should be noted that Mr. Hoff's electric CCOSS reflects all accounting and proforma 4 adjustments proposed by the Company in its initial filing on May 8, 2009. 5 Table 1 **PSE As Filed Electric CCOSS At Current Rates** 6 Current Relative 7 Rate Revenue To Parity Ratio <u>b</u>/ Schedule Class Cost Ratio a/ 8 9 7 95% Residential 88% Secondary Voltage <50kw 24 99% 107% 10 25 Secondary Voltage >50kw <350kw 105% 112% 26 Secondary Voltage >350 98% 105% 11 31/35/43 Primary Voltage 109% 101% 12 40 Campus 83% 89% 46/49 High Voltage 91% 98% 13 4489/449 Retail Wheeling (Transportation) 94% 88% 50-59 109% 14 Lighting 102% 5 Firm Resale/Special Contract 82% 88% 15 **Total Company** 93% 100% a/ Current revenue to cost of service (revenue requirement) ratio. 16 b/ Indexed revenue to cost ratio. 17 18 1. **Income Taxes** 19 **Q**: Please explain your disagreements with Mr. Hoff relating to the treatment of income 20 taxes for purposes of PSE's CCOSS. 21 A: As is the case for virtually all investor owned public utilities, income taxes represent a 22 significant expense for PSE's electric operations. Although Mr. Hoff has incorporated PSE's total company electric income taxes in his CCOSS, his analysis at current rates 23 24 inappropriately assigns this expense to individual classes. Mr. Hoff's inappropriate 25 assignment of income taxes at current rates then results in a mathematical error in his 26 determination of class revenue requirements and attendant parity ratios.

1		It is well understood that income tax expense is based on before tax profits.
2		However, Mr. Hoff's CCOSS analysis at current rates ignores this concept and allocates
3		PSE's total electric income taxes to customer classes based on allocated rate base
4		(investment). In other words, Mr. Hoff's CCOSS analysis at current rates assigns income
5		tax expense based on the level of plant investment rather than profit contributions by
6		customer class. Mr. Hoff's determination of each class's income tax responsibility at
7		current rates, therefore, has nothing to do with the reality of this expenses' cost causation
8		(revenues minus expenses), but rather is based solely on investment. Mr. Hoff's
9		approach assigns the same level of income tax responsibility to individual classes
10		regardless of each class's revenues and expenses.
11		This allocation, or assignment, of total Company income taxes based on rate base
12		investment has the potential to significantly distort individual class profitability at current
13		rates and provide inaccurate information as to the adequacy, or inadequacy, of current
14		rates.
15	Q:	Are income taxes normally calculated or allocated for other types of financial or
16		profitability analysis?
17	A:	It is universally agreed that when the objective is to evaluate profitability, whether it be
18		for a firm, a specific business unit, or single project, income tax expenses are based on
19		the difference between revenue and deductible expenses. Indeed, for purposes of its
20		requested increases in overall electric and natural gas revenues in this case, PSE
21		calculates each operations' (electric and gas) tax responsibility based on their respective
22		revenues and expenses, and does not assign overall corporate taxes based on an allocation
23		of investment (rate base).

1	Q:	What is the effect of PSE's improper allocation of class income taxes?
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2	A:	First, it is most important to understand that with the rare exception, it is perfectly
3		acceptable to allocate income taxes on the basis of rate base if the exercise is to determine
4		class tax responsibilities at equal, and required rates of return; i.e., full cost of service. ¹
5		However, PSE has not determined class tax responsibility at full cost of service and as I
6		will explain, PSE's allocation of taxes at current rates results in an error in its
7		determination of each class's "full" cost of service (revenue requirement). PSE's
8		approach tends to overstate the tax expense at current rates (understate profitability) for
9		classes earning below the system average rate of return and understate the tax expenses
10		(overstate profitability) for those classes earning above the system-wide rate of return.
11		As such, PSE's inappropriate tax assignment tends to portray a wider disparity in class
12		rates of return than actually exists.
13	Q:	Please explain how and why PSE's allocation of income taxes at current rates then
14		results in an error in the determination of class revenue requirements and attendant
15		parity ratios.
16	A:	This error is a result of the approach PSE uses to determine class revenue requirements.
17		The following is PSE's approach to determine class revenue requirements:
18		(1) Revenues, less
19		(2) O&M Expenses, less,
20		(3) Depreciation Expenses, less
21		(4) Taxes Other Than Income, equals
22		(5) Before Tax Operating Income, less
23		(6) Allocated Income Taxes, equals

This is because required net income (after tax) is a direct and linear function of rate base.

1	
1	(7) Operating Income @ Current Rates, less
2	(8) Required After Tax Operating Income ² , equals
3	(9) Income Deficiency, less
4	(10) Revenue Conversion Factor ³ , equals
5	(11) Revenue Deficiency
6	(12) Revenue Requirement: equals $(1) + (11)$
7	(13) Parity Ratio: equals $(1)/(12)$
8	
9	PSE's approach to determine individual class revenue requirements is to first
10	determine operating income at current rates [Row (7)] and from there determine the
11	incremental (additional) revenue [Row (11)] required to bring each class to the required
12	system-wide rate of return [Row (12)]. This approach is perfectly acceptable and
13	accurate, if operating income at current rates [Row (7)] is properly determined. PSE's
14	method results in an error because current operating income is not appropriately
15	determined. Because PSE's application of this approach ignores the relationship between
16	revenues and expenses, current operating income is miscalculated. This error then flows
17	through all remaining calculations leading to the development of each class' revenue
18	requirement [Row (12)] and parity ratio [Row (13)].
19	An easier way to understand the error in PSE's approach is to consider a
20	hypothetical example. Assume we have a system comprised of two classes that are
21	identical in every respect (with the exception of revenues at current rates), with the
22	following rate base, revenues and expenses:
23	///

²

Rate Base x required ROR. Constant from revenue requirement. 3

1	Та	able 2		
2	Hypothet PSE's Improper Determinatio	ical Example n of Class Reve	nue Requireme	ents
3	i		Class D	Total
5	(1) Data Data	Class A	Class B	Company \$2,000
4	(1) Rate Base	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$2,000
F	(2) Revenues at Current Rates	\$800	\$1,000	\$1,800
5	(3) Expenses (O&M, Deprec., etc.)	\$800	\$800	\$1,600
C	(4) Income Tax \underline{a} /	\$30	\$30	\$60
0	(5) Operating Income	-\$30	\$170	\$140
7	(6) Income Requirement $\underline{b}/$	\$80	\$80	\$160
/	(7) Income Deficiency (Excess)			
0	(6) - (5)	\$110	-\$90	\$20
8	(8) Revenue Conversion Factor \underline{c} /	0.6	0.6	0.6
	(9) Revenue Deficiency (Excess)			
9	(7)/(8)	\$183.33	-\$150	\$33.33
	(10) Revenue Requirement: $(2) + (9)$	\$983.33	\$850	\$1,833.33
10	(11) Parity Ratio: (2)/(10)	81%	118%	98%
	a/ Allocated on rate base.			
11	\overline{b} / Assumed 50/50 capital structure, 5% c	ost of debt and 1	1% cost of equi	ity.
12	\underline{c} / Assumed tax rate of 40% with no gross	s receipts taxes o	r uncollectible	expense.
13	As can be seen above, even though the two c	lasses are identic	cal in terms of in	nvestment
14	(rate base) and costs, the approach utilized by	y PSE results in a	a revenue requi	rement of
15	\$983.33 for Class A and \$850.00 for Class B	As a result of t	his error, the "r	required"
16	increase for Class A is overstated, while Clas	ss B's required ir	crease is under	stated. This
17	error [from Row (7)] also flows through to the	ne parity ratio suc	ch that the class	ratio for
18	Class A is understated while that for Class B	is overstated.		
19	The error in the approach is evident v	vith a simple che	ck that demons	trates and
20	quantifies the overstatement of Class A's rev	enue requiremen	t and the under	statement of
21	Class B as shown below:			
22	///			
23	///			

TT	Table 3	0	
пур Ouantification o	f Error Under PS	e E's Approach	
(Incom	ne Taxes Calculat	(red)	
	Class A	Class B	Total
(1) Revenue at Cost of Service	\$983.33	\$850	\$1,833.33
(2) Expenses	\$800	\$800	\$1,600
(3) Interest Expense \underline{a} /	\$25	\$25	\$50
(4) Taxable Income:			
(1) - (2) - (3)	\$158.33	\$25	\$183.33
(5) Income Tax @ 40%	\$63.33	\$10	\$73.33
(6) Operating Income:			
(1) - (2) - (5)	\$120	\$40	\$160
(7) Rate Base	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$2,000
(8) Rate of Return	12.00%	4.00%	8.00%
requirement to yield the required	rate of return of 8 (00% Class A ge	enerates a 12
requirement to yield the required ROR under this flawed approach, noted that the RORs are based on	rate of return of 8.0 while Class B pro class calculated in	00%, Class A ge duces a 4.00% I come taxes. If	enerates a 12. ROR. It shou
requirement to yield the required ROR under this flawed approach, noted that the RORs are based on to "allocate" income taxes based of	rate of return of 8.0 while Class B pro class calculated in on ratebase, the dis	00%, Class A ge duces a 4.00% H come taxes. If e sparity is even g	enerates a 12. ROR. It shou one were to c reater, as sho
requirement to yield the required ROR under this flawed approach, noted that the RORs are based on to "allocate" income taxes based of below:	rate of return of 8.0 while Class B pro class calculated in on ratebase, the dis	00%, Class A ge duces a 4.00% H come taxes. If e sparity is even g	enerates a 12. ROR. It shou one were to c reater, as sho
requirement to yield the required ROR under this flawed approach, noted that the RORs are based on to "allocate" income taxes based of below:	rate of return of 8.0 while Class B pro class calculated in on ratebase, the dis Table 4	00%, Class A ge duces a 4.00% I come taxes. If e sparity is even g	enerates a 12. ROR. It shou one were to c reater, as sho
requirement to yield the required ROR under this flawed approach, noted that the RORs are based on to "allocate" income taxes based below: Hyp	rate of return of 8.0 while Class B pro class calculated in on ratebase, the dis Table 4 pothetical Exampl	00%, Class A ge duces a 4.00% I come taxes. If sparity is even g e	enerates a 12. ROR. It shou one were to c reater, as sho
requirement to yield the required ROR under this flawed approach, noted that the RORs are based on to "allocate" income taxes based below: Hyp Quantification of	rate of return of 8.0 while Class B pro class calculated in on ratebase, the dis Table 4 othetical Exampl f Error Under PS	00%, Class A ge duces a 4.00% I come taxes. If sparity is even g e E's Approach	enerates a 12. ROR. It shou one were to c reater, as sho
requirement to yield the required ROR under this flawed approach, noted that the RORs are based on to "allocate" income taxes based of below: Hyp Quantification of (Incom	rate of return of 8.0 while Class B pro class calculated in on ratebase, the dis Table 4 pothetical Exampl f Error Under PS <u>me Taxes Allocate</u> <u>Class A</u>	00%, Class A ge duces a 4.00% H come taxes. If e sparity is even g E's Approach <u>ed)</u> <u>Class B</u>	enerates a 12. ROR. It shou one were to c reater, as sho Total
requirement to yield the required ROR under this flawed approach, noted that the RORs are based on to "allocate" income taxes based of below: Hyp Quantification of (Income Tax	rate of return of 8.0 while Class B pro class calculated in on ratebase, the dis Table 4 pothetical Exampl f Error Under PS <u>me Taxes Allocate</u> <u>Class A</u> \$36 67	00%, Class A ge duces a 4.00% H come taxes. If e sparity is even g E's Approach ed) Class B \$36.67	enerates a 12. ROR. It shou one were to c reater, as sho Total \$73.33
requirement to yield the required ROR under this flawed approach, noted that the RORs are based on to "allocate" income taxes based of below: Hyp Quantification of (Income (1) Income Tax (2) Operating Income	rate of return of 8.0 while Class B pro class calculated in on ratebase, the dis Table 4 othetical Exampl f Error Under PS <u>me Taxes Allocate</u> <u>Class A</u> \$36.67 \$146.67	00%, Class A ge duces a 4.00% H come taxes. If e sparity is even g E's Approach ed) Class B \$36.67 \$13.33	enerates a 12. ROR. It shou one were to c reater, as sho Total \$73.33 \$160

1		As can be seen above, PSE's allocation of in	come taxes is ari	thmetically in e	error and
2		produces mathematically incorrect revenue r	equirements and	parity ratios.	
3	Q:	Is it possible to use PSE's overall approac	h to determine c	lass revenue r	equirements
4		and parity ratios, and at the same time, ge	nerate mathema	atically correct	t results?
5	A:	Yes. If class income taxes at current rates ar	e calculated base	d on the relatio	nship
6		between revenues and expenses, correct and	proper class reve	enue requiremer	nts and parity
7		ratios are produced. Using the same hypothe	etical example as	presented earlie	er, except
8		that income taxes are calculated, we can prov	ve mathematicall	y that proper re	sults are
9		achieved.			
10		Ta	able 5		
11		Hypothet Proper Determinations	ical Example of Revenue Rec	quirements	
12					Total
14			Class A	Class B	Company
13		(1) Rate Base	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$2,000
		(2) Revenues at Current Rates	\$800	\$1,000	\$1,800
14		(3) Expenses	\$800	\$800	\$1,600
		(4) Interest Expense \underline{a}	\$25	\$25	\$50
15		(5) Taxable Income: (2) - (3) - (4)	-\$25	\$175	\$150
		(6) Income Tax @ 40%	-\$10	\$70	\$60
16		(7) Operating Income: (2) - (3) - (6)	\$10	\$130	\$140
		(8) Income Requirement	\$80	\$80	\$160
17		(9) Income Deficiency	\$70	-\$50	\$20
10		(10) Revenue Conversion Factor	0.6	0.6	0.6
18		(11) Revenue Deficiency	\$116.67	-\$83.33	\$33.33
		(12) Revenue Requirement	\$916.67	\$916.67	\$1,833.33
19		(11) Parity Ratio	87%	109%	98%
20		\underline{a} / Allocated on rate base using weighted	cost of debt of 2.	5%.	
21		Note that the revenue requirement is identicated	ll for Class A and	B since rate ba	ase and all
22		costs are the same for each class. Under the	mathematically c	correct determin	nation in
23		Table 5 above, Class A would receive an inc	rease of \$116.67	[Row (11)] as a	compared to

1		a \$183.33 increase under PSE approach as shown on [Row (9)] of Table 2. Similarly,				
2		Class B's correct required revenue decrease is \$83.33 compared to PSE's approach of a				
3		\$150 decrease [Table 2, Row 9]. As a check	t on the proper de	etermination of	class revenue	
4		requirement and parity ratios, the following	is true at "cost of	service" reven	ues:	
5		Tal	ble 6			
6		Hypothetic Quantification of Class Rates of	cal Example Return Under (Correct Approa	ach	
_				11	Total	
7			Class A	Class B	Company	
		(1) Revenues at Proper Cost of Service	\$916.67	\$916.67	\$1.833.33	
8		(2) Expenses	\$800	\$800	\$1,600	
		(3) Interest	\$25	\$25	\$50	
9		(4) Taxable Income	\$91.67	\$91.67	\$183.33	
10		(5) Income Tax	\$36.67	\$36.67	\$73.33	
10		(6) Operating Income	\$80	\$80	\$160	
11		(7) Rate Base	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$2,000	
10		(7) Rate of Return	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	
13 14 15		While intuitively obvious because each class income taxes are properly calculated, correct generated.	s's costs and revent revenue requires	nues are identic	cal, when y ratios are	
16	Q:	Have you conducted a replication analysis	s of Mr. Hoff's C	CCOSS using a	proper	
17		determination of class income tax respons	ibility?			
18	A:	Yes.				
19	Q:	Please explain how you calculated electric	income taxes fo	r each class.		
20	A:	Income taxes were calculated for each class	by first determini	ing each class'	earnings	
21		before interest and income taxes (EBIT). Sy	nchronized inter	est expense was	s then	
22		determined for each class based on the allocation	ated level of rate	base. Subtracti	ng interest	
23		from EBIT results in each class's taxable inc	come. This taxab	le income amo	unt was then	

- 1 multiplied by the system effective income tax rate to arrive at each class' income tax
- 2 responsibility.
- 3 Q: What current revenue to cost and parity ratios result when Mr. Hoff's study is
- 4 adjusted for a proper calculation of income taxes?
- 5 A: A summary comparison of class current revenue to cost and parity ratios is provided
- 6 below, while the development of my ratios are provided in Exhibit No. GAW-3:

7		Table 7					
8	Electric Revenue To Cost & Parity Ratios						
	Current Revenue						
9		To Cost Ratio Parity			Ratio		
10		Corrected For	As Filed	Corrected For	As Filed		
11	Class	Income Taxes	By PSE	Income Taxes	By PSE		
12	Residential	90%	88%	97%	95%		
10	Secondary Sch. 24	97%	99%	104%	107%		
13	Secondary Sch. 25	100%	105%	107%	112%		
14	Secondary Sch. 26	96%	98%	103%	105%		
	Primary Sch. 31/35/43	98%	101%	105%	109%		
15	Campus Sch. 40	87%	83%	93%	89%		
16	High Voltage Sch 46/49	92%	91%	99%	98%		
10	Transportation Sch. 44	86%	88%	92%	94%		
17	Lighting	98%	102%	105%	109%		
10	Firm Resale/Special Contracts	85%	82%	91%	88%		
18	Total Electric	93%	93%	100%	100%		
19							
20	As can be seen above, the correct	ion to income tax	es produces	somewhat differe	ent		
21	results. As noted earlier, the corre	ection for income	taxes is not	dramatic in this c	case		
22	because all classes currently gene	rate reasonably si	milar rates of	of return; i.e., are	close to		

the system average rate of return. However, if not corrected, PSE's error can and will be

24 significant in the future for classes that earn significantly above or below the system

25 average rate of return.

1	Q:	Earlier in your testimony you indicated that you continue to have a minor difference
2		of opinion with Mr. Hoff's classification of Production and Transmission plant.
3		Please explain this difference.
4	A:	PSE has continued to utilize the Peak Credit Method to classify its Production and
5		Transmission plant between energy related and demand related plant investment. As
6		noted by Mr. Hoff, this method has a long history of being the accepted approach for PSE
7		as well as other Washington utilities to reasonably classify electric Production and
8		Transmission plant. Furthermore, Company witness Jon Piliaris discusses PSE's history
9		of using the Peak Credit Method and PSE's changes to the application of the method that
10		have evolved over time.
11		For this case, PSE classified Production and Transmission plant as 79% energy
12		related and 21% demand related. This current classification compares to a 74% energy
13		and 26% demand classification utilized by Mr. Hoff in PSE's last general rate case. In
14		that case, my studies and analysis indicated that a 85% energy and 15% demand
15		classification was more appropriate.
16		I have examined Mr. Piliaris' current Peak Credit analyses, and while I do not
17		agree with all aspects of his study, his current study results are much closer to my
18		findings and certainly fall within the range of reasonableness. Moreover, as
19		demonstrated by Mr. Piliaris, minor differences in the energy and demand classification
20		of Production and Transmission plant have an immaterial impact on cost of service
21		results. As such, my differences of opinion as to the various inputs and assumptions
22		required to conduct the Peak Credit classification are immaterial in terms of both the
23		energy and demand separation of Production and Transmission plant, and more

1		importantly, the end results of the CCOSS. For these reasons, I have accepted PSE's
2		classification of Production and Transmission plant.
3	Q:	Please explain Mr. Hoff's other changes to his CCOSS in which you also agree.
4	A:	In PSE's last rate case, ICNU witness Donald Schoenbeck and I disagreed with Mr.
5		Hoff's allocation of Washington excise (utility) taxes. In that case, Mr. Hoff allocated
6		this expense on the basis of Production, Transmission and Distribution plant. Because
7		these taxes are imposed based on revenue, I recommended that this expense is more
8		accurately assigned to classes on the basis of revenue. Mr. Hoff has made this
9		recommended change in this case.
10		In addition, during the last case Mr. Schoenbeck observed that PSE had assigned
11		a portion of two production related expense items (Account No. 557, Other Production
12		expense and Account No. 236.25, Montana Electric License Tax) to transportation
13		customers. Because transportation customers do not use PSE's production facilities, Mr.
14		Schoenbeck opined it is not proper to assign production related costs to the customers. In
15		this case, Mr. Hoff has not assigned any of these expenses to the Transportation class. I
16		also agree with this change.
17		B. ELECTRIC CLASS REVENUE DISTRIBUTION
18	Q:	How did Mr. Hoff develop his proposed distribution of the Company's requested
19		electric revenue increase to individual classes?
20	A:	Mr. Hoff sponsors PSE's proposed class distribution of the Company's originally
21		requested electric revenue increase of \$148.4 million. Mr. Hoff states that his proposed
22		revenue distribution to customer classes is based on a desire to move all classes towards
23		full parity (cost of service) in a gradual manner. Mr. Hoff's proposed class rate spread

1	assigns smaller percentage increases to those classes that currently produce a parity ratio						
2	in excess of 105%, and equal percentage increases to all remaining retail classes since						
3	they all achieve parity ratios within about 5% of unity (100%). Under Mr. Hoff's						
4	proposal, the Campus Rate 40 generates a somewhat	proposal, the Campus Rate 40 generates a somewhat higher percentage increase than the					
5	equal percentage classes because these rates reflect	customer spec	ific distributi	on charges			
6	according to previous agreements.						
7	A summary of PSE's proposed revenue incr	eases by custo	mer class is s	hown			
8	below:						
9							
10	Table 8 PSE-Proposed Electric Reven	ue Increase					
11	Class	Amount (\$000)	Percent Increase				
12	Residential (Schedule 7)	\$90,905	8.37%				
13	Secondary Voltage	¢15 500	C 0 00/				
	Schedule 24	\$15,782	6.28%				
14	Schedule 25	\$11,488	4.19%				
	Schedule 26	\$14,026	8.37%				
15	Primary Voltage	+					
	(Schedules 31/35/43)	\$7,540	6.28%				
16	Campus Rate (Schedule 40)	\$3,897	8.68%				
	High Voltage (Schedules 46/49)	\$2,959	8.37%				
17	Lighting (Schedules 50-59)	\$1,036	6.28%				
	Transportation (Schedules 448-449)	\$516	8.37%				
18	Total Jurisdictional (Retail)	\$148,148	7.40%				
19	Firm Resale/Special Contract (Schedule 5)	\$296	22.35%				
20	Total Company	\$148,444	7.41%				
21	///						
22	///						

Q: Are PSE's proposed customer class revenue increases reasonable for its electric operations?

3 A: Yes. As I indicated earlier in my testimony, all CCOSS studies require numerous 4 assumptions and subjective judgments. As such, results from these analyses should not 5 be viewed as surgically precise costs to serve, and therefore, should be used as a guide in 6 establishing class revenue responsibility. In this context, CCOSS results are most useful 7 in identifying classes or situations in which current revenues produce significantly higher 8 or lower contributions to profits than the system average profitability. Moreover, when 9 such situations exist, gradual movement toward system-wide profitability is an accepted 10 and prudent ratemaking principle.

I have evaluated Mr. Hoff's class revenue spread and have determined that his
 proposal reasonably and properly comports with the use of CCOSS results as a guide to
 evaluate required movements to system-wide profitability, and at the same time
 recognizes gradualism.

Q: Mr. Watkins, please provide your recommended scale back method to assign class
 electric revenue increases should the Commission authorize an overall revenue
 requirement increase less than that proposed by PSE.

A: I recommend that the Company's customer class revenue increase distribution be scaled
back in equal portions (i.e., equal percentages) should the Commission authorize an
overall electric revenue increase less than that requested by PSE. However, should the
Commission authorize an average increase substantially less than the 7.4% increase

requested; i.e., less than about 3.7%, an across the board (equal percentage) increase to

all retail classes would not be inappropriate. This is because when the overall percentage

1		increase is very small, the difference between the Company's proposed revenue spread		
2		and an across the board is not material. Given the reasonably similar profit contributions		
3		(parity ratios) of all classes, an equal percentage (across the board) increase to all classes		
4		is, therefore, appropriate if the overall percentage increase is small.		
5		C. ELECTRIC RESIDENTIAL RATE DESIGN		
6	Q:	Please describe PSE's current and proposed residential electric rate structure.		
7	A:	PSE's current residential electric rate structure consists of a fixed monthly customer		
8		charge (\$7.00) and an inverted, two-block energy rate. Mr. Hoff proposes to increase all		
9		three rate elements by an equal percentage (8.37%) such that his proposed customer		
10		charge is \$7.59. Under the Company's proposal, base rate residential energy charges		
11		would increase from 8.4233¢/kwh to 9.1275¢/kwh for the first 600 kwh of monthly usage		
12		and from 10.2042¢/kwh to 11.0584¢/kwh for all additional energy consumption.		
13	Q:	Do you agree with Mr. Hoff's proposed equal percentage increases to each of the		
14		Residential rate elements?		
15	A:	No.		
16	Q:	Please explain.		
17	A:	While Mr. Hoff's proposed equal percentage increase to all Residential rate elements		
18		may not appear to be unreasonable on its face, it should be recognized that the fixed		
19		monthly customer charge was just increased by 16% last year from \$6.02 to \$7.00. As		
20		such, PSE's current proposal to increase the Residential customer charge to \$7.59		
21		represents a 26% increase in this rate over a two-year period. In addition, I have		
22		conducted an analysis of the direct "customer costs" associated with maintaining a		
23		Residential customer's account that indicates a monthly cost of \$3.58 to \$3.61. Based on		

these quantitative factors as well as economic pricing principles and public policy, I
 recommend no increase to the current Residential fixed monthly electric customer charge
 of \$7.00.

4 Q: Please explain your Residential direct customer cost analysis.

5 My Residential customer cost analysis is provided in Exhibit No. GAW-4, which consists A: 6 of two pages. Page 1 of this Exhibit provides my analysis using PSE's required return on 7 equity of 10.8% and results in a monthly cost of \$3.61. Page 2 of this Exhibit is identical 8 to page 1 except that a recommended cost of equity of 9.5% is utilized which reflects the 9 recommendation of Public Counsel cost of capital witness Stephen Hill in this case. As 10 indicated in this Exhibit, my analysis includes the capital costs (return and taxes) 11 associated with meters investment as well as the monthly O&M costs required to 12 maintain a customer's account. These O&M costs include meters operating expenses, 13 meter reading expenses and customer records and collections expenses. Although direct 14 customer costs analyses often also include the capital costs associated with customer service lines, I have excluded these costs in my analyses because PSE's tariffs contain 15 provisions for these costs within its electric line extension policy and fees.⁴ 16 Please explain PSE's electric line extensions policy for residential customers. 17 **Q**: 18 A: Electric Tariff G, Schedule 85 contains PSE's policy regarding line extensions and 19 connection fees for new customers. In general, customers are charged a connection fee 20 based on the following formula: 21 + Primary Voltage Lines Extension Costs 22 + Secondary Voltage Lines Extension Costs + Exceptional Transmission & Substation Costs 23

⁴ Schedule 85 of PSE electric tariff.

1 2 3 4 5		- Margin Allowance = Line Extension Cost + Service Line Costs = Total Cost to Customer
5 6		These line extension costs include, at a minimum, the estimated cost to install conductors
7		(excluding service lines) and transformers. It should be noted that the margin allowance
8		does not include service lines, meaning that customers are responsible for the costs of
9		installing service lines to their meters. Customers are charged a non-refundable
10		connection charge for all service line costs, as well as the line extension costs above the
11		prescribed margin allowance. Estimated construction costs differ for underground and
12		overhead service while the margin allowance is constant for both underground and
13		overhead customer service.
14	Q:	What economic pricing principles relate to the determination of fixed monthly
15		customer charges?
15 16	A:	customer charges? The most basic tenet of competition is that prices ensure the most efficient allocation of
15 16 17	A:	customer charges? The most basic tenet of competition is that prices ensure the most efficient allocation of society's resources. Because public utilities are generally afforded monopoly status
15 16 17 18	A:	customer charges?The most basic tenet of competition is that prices ensure the most efficient allocation of society's resources. Because public utilities are generally afforded monopoly statusunder the belief that resources are better utilized without the duplication of the fixed
15 16 17 18 19	A:	 customer charges? The most basic tenet of competition is that prices ensure the most efficient allocation of society's resources. Because public utilities are generally afforded monopoly status under the belief that resources are better utilized without the duplication of the fixed facilities required to serve consumers, a fundamental goal of regulatory policy is that
15 16 17 18 19 20	A:	 customer charges? The most basic tenet of competition is that prices ensure the most efficient allocation of society's resources. Because public utilities are generally afforded monopoly status under the belief that resources are better utilized without the duplication of the fixed facilities required to serve consumers, a fundamental goal of regulatory policy is that regulation should serve as a surrogate for competition to the greatest extent practical. As
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 	A:	 customer charges? The most basic tenet of competition is that prices ensure the most efficient allocation of society's resources. Because public utilities are generally afforded monopoly status under the belief that resources are better utilized without the duplication of the fixed facilities required to serve consumers, a fundamental goal of regulatory policy is that regulation should serve as a surrogate for competition to the greatest extent practical. As such, the pricing policy for a regulated public utility should mirror those of competitive
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 	A:	 customer charges? The most basic tenet of competition is that prices ensure the most efficient allocation of society's resources. Because public utilities are generally afforded monopoly status under the belief that resources are better utilized without the duplication of the fixed facilities required to serve consumers, a fundamental goal of regulatory policy is that regulation should serve as a surrogate for competition to the greatest extent practical. As such, the pricing policy for a regulated public utility should mirror those of competitive firms to the greatest extent practical.
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	A: Q :	 customer charges? The most basic tenet of competition is that prices ensure the most efficient allocation of society's resources. Because public utilities are generally afforded monopoly status under the belief that resources are better utilized without the duplication of the fixed facilities required to serve consumers, a fundamental goal of regulatory policy is that regulation should serve as a surrogate for competition to the greatest extent practical. As such, the pricing policy for a regulated public utility should mirror those of competitive firms to the greatest extent practical. Please briefly discuss how prices are generally structured in competitive markets.
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	A: Q: A:	 customer charges? The most basic tenet of competition is that prices ensure the most efficient allocation of society's resources. Because public utilities are generally afforded monopoly status under the belief that resources are better utilized without the duplication of the fixed facilities required to serve consumers, a fundamental goal of regulatory policy is that regulation should serve as a surrogate for competition to the greatest extent practical. As such, the pricing policy for a regulated public utility should mirror those of competitive firms to the greatest extent practical. Please briefly discuss how prices are generally structured in competitive markets. Economic theory tells us that efficient price signals result when prices are equal to long-

hence, efficient pricing results from the incremental variability of costs even though a
 firm's short-run cost structure may include a high level of sunk or "fixed" costs. Indeed,
 competitive market-based prices are generally structured based on usage, i.e. variable,
 pricing.

5 Q:

6

transferred to that of a regulated public utility, such as PSE.

Please explain how this theory and application of competitive pricing should be

A: Due to PSE's investment in system infrastructure, there is no debate that many of PSE's
short-run costs are fixed in nature. As discussed above, efficient competitive prices are
established based on long-run costs, which are entirely variable in nature.

However, marginal cost pricing only relates to efficiency. This pricing does not 10 11 attempt to always address fairness or equity. From a perspective of fair and equitable 12 pricing of a regulated monopoly's products and services, it is generally agreed that 13 payments for a good or service should be in accordance with the benefits received. Those 14 who receive more benefits should pay more in total than those who receive fewer 15 benefits. With respect to electric or natural gas usage, the volume of consumption is the 16 most direct, and perhaps best, indicator of benefits received, such that volumetric pricing 17 promotes the fairest pricing mechanism to customers and to the utility.

18 The above philosophy is, and has been, the belief of economists, regulators, and 19 the marketplace for many years. As an illustration, consider utility industry pricing in its 20 infancy (1800s). In the beginning, customers paid a fixed monthly fee and consumed as 21 much of the utility service/commodity as they desired (usually water). It soon became 22 apparent that the fixed monthly fee rate schedule was inefficient and unfair. Utilities 23 soon began metering their commodity and charging only for the amount actually

1		consumed. In this way, consumers receiving more benefits from the utility than others
2		paid more in total for the utility service because they used more of the commodity.
3		Furthermore, virtually every capital intensive industry is faced with a high
4		percentage of fixed costs in the short-run. This includes the manufacturing and
5		transportation industries. Prices for competitive products and services in these industries
6		are invariably established on a volumetric basis, including those that were once regulated;
7		e.g., airline travel and rail service.
8	Q:	Why do customer charges exist at all for public utilities?
9	A:	The conventional wisdom in public utility pricing is that some revenues should be
10		collected from fixed monthly charges. Although revenue stability clearly results from
11		such pricing mechanisms, this stability in and of itself simply reduces the risk to
12		shareholders at the expense of efficient price signals. From a practical standpoint, rates
13		charged by public utilities are usually separated into a few classes. Within these classes,
14		there are some customers who consume relatively small amounts of electricity and others
15		that require much greater quantities of the public utility's service. Due to the incremental
16		costs of connecting and maintaining a customer's account, the general practice is to
17		charge a fixed monthly fee, such that small usage customers within a class provide
18		revenue contributions to the utility to compensate for the cost of connecting and
19		maintaining the customer's account, as well as contribute revenue based on the amount of
20		electricity or natural gas actually used.
21	Q:	How are PSE's line extension and new customer fees structured?
22	A:	New customers are generally charged a connection fee based on their expected level of

23 consumption. That is, customers that are expected to use less electricity or natural gas

1		must pay a higher connection fee than customers with expected higher levels of usage.
2		This pricing mechanism eliminates any claim that customer charges should include the
3		capital costs associated with connecting a new customer. As such, the purpose of this
4		discussion is to bring to the Commission's attention the fact that any claimed desire for
5		higher customer charges due to differences in intraclass consumption is largely already
6		reflected in the upfront fees that small volume residential customers pay in recognition of
7		their expected lower consumption. Therefore, higher monthly customer charges coupled
8		with upfront connection fees represent a clear, double counting of costs to connect such
9		customers.
10		III. NATURAL GAS OPERATIONS
11		A. NATURAL GAS CLASS COST OF SERVICE
12	Q:	Have you examined PSE's natural gas CCOSS sponsored by Ms. Janet Phelps in
13		this case?
14	A:	Yes. I conducted a thorough examination of Ms. Phelps' proposed CCOSS filed in this
15		case.
16	Q:	Did Ms. Phelps use the same methodology in this case as used by PSE in prior rate
17		cases?
18	A:	No.
19	Q:	Please explain the reasons for this departure from prior studies.
20	A:	As with most natural gas local distribution company (LDC) CCOSS, there has been
21		considerable disagreement and controversy centered around the assignment of
22		distribution Mains, plant and related costs to individual rate classes. These disagreements
23		and controversies have stemmed from the fact that with rare exception, the specific Mains

investment required to serve a particular customer or group of customers cannot be
isolated or specifically identified. As such, the vast majority of distribution Mains
represent joint costs in which PSE's investment in Mains serves the collective need of all
customers. Furthermore, there are definite economies of scale present in LDC systems
(including PSE's) such that all customers reap the benefits of system-wide costs; i.e., the
cost to serve any customer collectively in the system is less than to serve the customer on
a stand-alone basis.

8 As a result of various experts' opinions, whose views are often diametrically 9 opposed regarding the proper assignment of Mains costs, a study group of various 10 interests was formed earlier this year in an attempt to resolve various CCOSS issues, 11 most notably the allocations of Mains investment. While the group did not reach 12 agreement on a Mains allocation method or even a philosophical consensus as to cost 13 causation, each party's views were debated and clearly understood. In short, I believe it 14 is fair to say that there are at least some merits to the various positions and philosophies 15 of the various parties, yet no single answer can definitively be viewed as correct. In this 16 regard, it is clear to me that Ms. Phelps objectively considered the merits of the various 17 positions and attempted to develop a new allocation method that in her words is: "1) 18 consistent with cost of service principles; 2) acknowledges past Commission decisions; 19 3) is consistent with PSE's distribution system; 4) is fair; 5) is reasonable; and 6) 20 addresses concerns raised in PSE's 2007 GRC by parties on both ends of the spectrum." 21 Ms. Phelps addresses the various views concerning the allocation of Mains as well as her 22 proposed methodology in great detail on pages 21 through 31 of her direct testimony.

Q: What is your overall assessment of the new Mains allocation method proposed by Ms. Phelps?

3 A: While Ms. Phelps' proposed method relies on several subjective decisions, this is true for 4 many aspects of embedded cost studies in which joint cost responsibility must be 5 assigned individual classes of customers. While I do not agree with many aspects of 6 PSE's current methodology, and I am reluctant to endorse this new methodology, I can 7 inform the Commission that Ms. Phelps' study is not inherently biased against any 8 customer class. However, any endorsement or criticisms of the application of this new 9 methodology for purposes of this case are largely academic. This is because Ms. Phelps 10 also conducted CCOSS analyses utilizing alternative methods, including the method 11 proposed by PSE in its last rate case, a method similar to what I proposed in PSE's last 12 case, and a method based on the views generally supported by Industrial customers. A 13 summary of these alternative CCOSS are provided on page 33 of Ms. Phelps' testimony, 14 and show similar results, regardless of the method selected. 15 **O**: Did Ms. Phelps assign income taxes in a manner similar to that used by Mr. Hoff in

16 his electric CCOSS?

///

A: Yes. Ms. Phelps also allocated income tax expense at current rates based on rate base
instead of properly calculating this item based on the relationship between revenues and
expenses. The impact of this correction is not material in terms of CCOSS in this case.
However, I recommend that future natural gas studies more properly assign income tax
liability as was discussed earlier in my testimony.

22

1	Q:	What are your conclusions and recommendations concerning natural gas CCOSS			
2		for purposes of this case?			
3	A:	As shown on page 33 of Ms. Phelps' direct testimony, all stud	y methodologies provide		
4		similar results (at least in an ordinal sense). As such, Ms. Phe	lps' preferred (proposed)		
5		CCOSS serves as a reasonable basis for evaluating class reven	ue responsibility in this		
6		case.			
7	Q:	What parity ratios are produced under Ms. Phelps' recom	mended CCOSS?		
8	A:	Ms. Phelps' recommended CCOSS generates the following cla	ass parity ratios:		
9		Table 9			
10		PSE-Natural Gas Parity Ratios (PSE & CCOSS)			
		(15E & CC055)	Parity		
11		Class	Ratio		
1.0		Residential (Schedules 16/23/53)	99%		
12		Comm. and Ind. (Schedules 31,61)	97%		
10		Large Volume (Schedules 41,41T)	131%		
13		Interruptible (Schedules 85, 85T)	119%		
14		Limited Interruptible (Schedule 86)	161%		
14		Non-Exclusive Interruptible (Schedules 87,87T)	95%		
15		Special Contracts	80%		
15		Rentals (Schedules 71/72/74)	<u> </u>		
16		Total Company	100%		
17					
18		B. NATURAL GAS CLASS REVENUE DISTRIBUTI	ON		
19	Q:	How did Ms. Phelps develop her proposed distribution of l	PSE's requested natural		
20		gas revenue increase to individual customer classes?			
21	A:	In her May 8, 2009 filing, Ms. Phelps claims that her proposed	l class revenue spread		
22		emphasizes two factors: (1) customer class parity ratios; and (2	2), customer impacts.		
23		Specifically, Ms. Phelps recommends no increase to rate Sche	dule 86 (Limited		

1		Interruptible) due	e to its very high parity ratio which is in	excess of 160%.	Next, she		
2		proposes to increase rate Schedules 41 and 85 (Large Volume and Interruptible) at half					
3		(50%) of the system-wide percentage increase due to the relatively high parity ratios that					
4		exceed 100%. Next, Ms. Phelps proposes to increase the appliance rental class by the					
5		system average p	ercentage increase (including gas costs)	. All remaining	class margin		
6		revenues (Reside	ntial, Commercial & Industrial, and Nor	n-Exclusive Inter	rruptible) are		
7		then increased at	an equal percentage to generate PSE's p	proposed revenue	e requirement.		
8	Q:	Please provide a	summary of PSE's proposed class re	venue increases			
9	A:	The following ta	ole provides Ms. Phelps' proposed class	revenue increase	es at the		
10		Company's requ	ested revenue requirement as well as the	corresponding p	percentage		
11		increases in marg	in (non-gas) rates. These increases are	presented by Ms	. Phelps in her		
12		Supplemental Di	rect Testimony of August 3, 2009, Exhil	bit NO. JKP-24.			
13							
14			Table 10	In and a sec			
14			PSE Proposed Natural Gas	mcreases	Percentage		
15				Increase	Increase in		
			Class	\$(000)	Margin Rates		
16		Residential	(Schedules 16/23/53)	\$22,120	8.2%		
		Comm. and	Ind. (Schedules 31.61)	\$6,412	8.2%		
17		Large Volu	me (Schedules 41,41T)	\$738	4.1%		
		Interruptibl	e (Schedules 85, 85T)	\$356	4.1%		
18		Limited Int	erruptible (Schedule 86)	\$0	0.0%		
		Non-Exclus	sive Interruptible (Schedules 87.87T)	\$520	8.2%		
19		Special Con	ntracts	\$56	3.5%		
		Appliance]	Rentals (Schedule 71/72/74)	\$206	2.5%		
20		Other Reve	nue	\$0	0.0%		
		Total Com	pany	\$30,408	7.5%		
21							
22		///					
23		///					

Q: Is Ms. Phelps' proposed class revenue spread reasonable?

2 A: By and large, Ms. Phelps' proposed class revenue spread appropriately considers cost of 3 service and gradualism. As a result, and with one exception, I find Ms. Phelps' proposed 4 class revenue spread to be reasonable.

5 **Q**: Please explain your exception to Ms. Phelps' proposed class revenue increases.

6 A: Ms. Phelps claims that she increased the appliance rental class by the system average 7 percentage increase. While this is true if company (PSE) supplied gas costs are included, 8 Ms. Phelps proposed 2.5% increase to the applicable rentals is significantly lower than 9 PSE's requested 7.5% increase in margin (non-gas) revenues. Ms. Phelps' proposed 10 minimal increase to this competitive appliance rental service does not comport with her own CCOSS findings nor is it in the spirit of gradualism relative to other proposed 11 12 increases. Although the fact that appliance rentals currently generates the lowest parity 13 ratio on the PSE system, this metric does not adequately portray the true revenue 14 deficiency for this competitive service. As shown in Ms. Phelps' Exhibit No. JKP-5, the 15 rentals class currently operates at a loss of 4.51%. Indeed, this is the only class whose 16 current revenues produce negative operating income. Perhaps most troubling is the 17 magnitude of this class revenue deficiency relative to the revenue currently provided. 18 Under current rates, the appliance rentals class provides \$8.256 million in revenue. Ms. 19 Phelps has determined that the revenue deficiency associated with this class is \$2.896 20 million. As such, a 35.1% increase would be required to bring this competitive service 21 class up to system parity, yet Ms. Phelps proposes only a 2.5% increase for this class. 22 ///

1	Q:	What is your recommendation as to an appropriate and reasonable increase to the			
2		Appliance rentals class?			
3	A:	Given the severe revenue deficiency and negative income currently provided by the			
4		rentals class, I recommend that this class' rates be increased at 125% of the system			
5		average increase in margin (non-gas) revenues. At the company's requested increase of			
6		7.5% in non-gas revenue, this would equate to an 8.75% increase to the rentals class.			
7	Q:	If the Commission should authorize an overall natural gas increase less than the			
8		\$30.408 million originally requested by PSE, how should the ultimate authorized			
9		increase be spread to individual classes?			
10	A:	I recommend that Ms. Phelps' proposed increases, adjusted for my recommended rentals			
11		increase, be scaled back proportionally across all classes.			
12		C. NATURAL GAS RESIDENTIAL RATE DESIGN			
13	Q:	Please describe PSE's current and proposed residential natural gas rate structure.			
14	A:	Currently, PSE's residential natural gas base rates include a fixed monthly customer			
15		charge of \$10.00, a flat delivery (distribution charge) of \$0.33606/therm. In addition, a			
16		"new customer" delivery charge is applicable and rendered to certain new customers that			
17		range from \$0.11/therm to \$0.17/therm. Ms. Phelps proposes to increase the fixed			
18		monthly customer charge to 10.82 and increase the flat distribution charge to 0.36351 .			
19	Q:	Please explain PSE's natural gas line extension and new customer connection policy.			
20	A:	PSE's Natural Gas Schedule 7 (Facilities Extension Standards), coupled with its Natural			
21		Gas Rule No. 7 (Extension of Distribution Facilities-Other than the Kittitas County), sets			
22		forth the terms and pricing structure for new customer connections.			

1	PSE's connection pricing methodology is based on a philosophy that small
2	volume customers will utilize the Company's system less than similar, yet larger, usage
3	customers. The Company's connection pricing method recognizes that the volume of
4	natural gas used by small customers may not be sufficient to recover the investment
5	required to add these customers to the system. In other words, PSE must install a service
6	line, meter (and base) and regulator for every new customer. If a prospective customer is
7	only planning to use natural gas for example in a decorative fireplace, this customer will
8	not generate enough base rate (non-gas or margin) future revenue over time to justify the
9	Company's investment. Conversely, a prospective customer that will use natural gas for
10	space heating, hot water heating, and cooking will use substantially more gas and provide
11	significantly more base rate revenue to PSE, thereby justifying PSE's investment to add
12	this customer.

13 PSE's Rule 7 provides a formulistic cost/benefit method to evaluate whether each 14 new customer will or will not provide enough future revenue to recover the investment required to connect the perspective customer. If a new customer is not expected to 15 16 consume enough gas (and hence, generate revenue) to justify the incremental costs to add 17 this customer, this customer will be required to make an upfront cash contribution to 18 PSE. Furthermore, depending on the specific differences between the expected 19 connection costs and future revenues (i.e. benefits), the customer may pay an upfront cash contribution and agree to pay a "new customer" surcharge on gas used for a period 20 21 of up to five years.

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1	Q:	What criteria are used to evaluate whether a potential customer will or will not use
2		enough natural gas to justify the costs of connecting this customer?
3	A:	The cost/benefit method outlined in Natural Gas Schedule 7 provides various usage
4		allowances based on the number and type of natural gas appliances installed in a
5		customer's house. For customers who use natural gas for space heating, an allowance is
6		given based on the square footage of the customer's home. Specific usage allowances are
7		also given for water heaters, cooking ranges, clothes dryers, hot tubs, and fireplaces.
8		These allowances represent the "benefits" portion of this method. Natural Gas Schedule
9		7 also provides a schedule of specific incremental costs considered in PSE's cost/benefit
10		method. These costs include a flat amount per foot to extend any Mains, a fixed amount
11		to run a Service line, a fixed amount for a new meter, and a provision for annual
12		Operating and Maintenance expenses.
13	Q:	You mentioned a surcharge imposed on certain new customers. What is the current
14		structure and level of this surcharge?
15	A:	Depending on the expected level of revenue shortfall from PSE's cost/benefit analysis, as
16		well as the upfront cash contribution made by the customer, the monthly "new customer"
17		residential surcharge imposed is either \$0.115/therm or \$0.17/therm for all gas consumed
18		each month. This surcharge is in addition to the base rate distribution usage charge of
19		\$0.33606/therm and in addition to the monthly fixed customer charge of \$10.00.
20	Q:	What are the ratemaking implications of PSE's connection polices?
21	A:	First, it is obvious that PSE recognizes that customers do not connect to its gas
22		distribution system simply for the sake of being connected. Rather, customers join the
23		Company's system in order to consume gas. More importantly, PSE's cost/benefit and

1		cost reimbursement methodology recognizes that expected revenue is a function of a
2		customer's usage rather than of a customer simply being connected to the system. This
3		realistic understanding-that revenue contributions are, and should be, a function of
4		usage—dovetails with my earlier discussion that prices should reflect variability in usage
5		rather than fixed per customer amounts. Such a pricing structure is not only the most
6		efficient but also the most fair in that customers pay in relation to the level of gas
7		consumed.
8	Q:	If a customer is charged an upfront connection fee and/or a new customer
9		surcharge, will this customer be overcharged if fixed monthly customer charges are
10		increased?
11	A:	Yes. Connection fees and new customer surcharges represent a payment to PSE to
12		compensate the Company for the costs of installing services lines and costs associated
13		with metering and regulating equipment. If customer charges are increased or designed
14		to also recover the costs of Services, Meters and other expenses, the customer will be
15		double-charged: once for the connection and/or "new customer" surcharge and again for
16		the ongoing monthly customer charge that must be paid.
17	Q:	Is the proper solution to this double payment problem the abandonment of
18		connection fees?
19	A:	No. Although PSE's line extension and customer polices (Schedule 7 and Rule 7) are
20		admittedly complicated and even perhaps self-serving to the Company, they do provide
21		pricing and costing signals that are in the best interest of PSE and all of its customers. As
22		I explained earlier, there is no doubt that there are circumstances in which it is neither

1		beneficial to PSE nor its existing customers to extend service to a customer that will have
2		little or no gas consumption.
3		The more appropriate solution is to maintain a pricing policy for PSE's recurring
4		revenues that is volumetrically based and with a minimum level of customer charges.
5	Q:	Mr. Watkins, your discussion thus far has been limited to new customers on the
6		PSE system. Do these circumstances and concepts apply to existing customers as
7		well?
8	A:	Yes. First, it is well recognized that pricing should be forward looking. Therefore,
9		recognition of how new customers affect costs and revenue collection is an important
10		point to consider in establishing pricing policies for all customers.
11		Second, PSE is a relatively young and rapidly growing gas distribution company.
12		This growth has occurred for several years and will undoubtedly continue in the
13		foreseeable future.
14		Third, existing customers, like new customers, are not connected to the PSE
15		system simply for the sake of being connected, but rather because they desire to use gas
16		throughout the year. PSE's service lines and meters were not installed simply to enable
17		this connection, but rather to serve as the means of enabling customers the ability to
18		purchase or transport gas. As such, service lines are merely an extension of PSE's
19		Distribution Mains with the primary difference being one of accounting nomenclature
20		because service lines are typically located on customer owned property.
21		///
22		///
23		///

1	Q:	What ramifications do these factors have on determining a reasonable fixed		
2		monthly customer charge for PSE's residential rates?		
3	A:	Given PSE's new customer connection policies and pricing methodology, its level of		
4		growth, recognition that service lines represent an extension of distribution Mains, and		
5		most importantly, that efficient and fair pricing dictates volumetric based rates, PSE's		
6		natural gas fixed monthly customer charges should remain at their current levels		
7		regardless of any increase in overall revenue requirement authorized by this Commission.		
8	Q:	Have you conducted an analysis to determine if PSE's current residential customer		
9		charges are reasonable?		
10	A:	Yes. Similar to the direct customer cost analysis I conducted for PSE's electric		
11		operations, I have also conducted an analysis of the Company's residential gas customer		
12		costs that should be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of fixed monthly		
13		customer charges.		
14	Q:	Please explain your natural gas Residential customer cost analysis.		
15	A:	Exhibit No. GAW-5 presents the results of my residential natural gas customer cost		
16		analysis.		
17	Q:	Please explain your residential natural gas customer cost analysis.		
18	A:	The direct customer costs provided on page 1 of Exhibit No. GAW-5 include those rate		
19		base and expense items required for each customer connection as well as those required		
20		to maintain a customer's account. In recognition of PSE's connection fees and new		
21		customer surcharges and the concepts enumerated earlier, I have excluded Services		
22		investment from my analysis. The results of my analyses indicate a monthly customer		

cost of \$8.21 at PSE's requested 10.8% return on equity and \$8.03 under a 9.50% cost of
 equity.

3 Q: Have you conducted an analysis of the historical increases and trends to PSE

4

Residential natural gas customer charges?

5 A: Yes. Table 11 below provides a history of PSE's Residential natural gas customer

6 charges over the last decade, compared to the attendant cumulative change in inflation (as

7 measured by the consumer price index). This history and trend is provided graphically in

8 Figure 1.

9	Historical	Trends in PSE 1	Table 11 Residential Natural Gas	Customer Charge
10				Cumulative
	Effective	Customer	Percent Change	Inflation (CPI)
11	Date	Charge	From 1/1/99 Rate	From 1/1/99
10	1/1/99	\$4.46		
12	9/1/02	\$5.50	23.3%	9.9%
10	3/4/05	\$6.25	40.1%	18.2%
13	1/13/07	\$8.25	85.0%	24.4%
14	1/1/08	\$10.00	124.2%	28.5%



1		As indicated above, while general inflation has totaled about 28.5% over the last 10
2		years, PSE's Residential natural gas customer charge has increased by 124.2%.
3		Although the customer charges that the Commission has found to be appropriate
4		and reasonable have increased at more than four times the rate of inflation during the
5		most recent ten-year period, the trend in the disparity between inflation and customer
6		charge increases has been increasing, as clearly seen in Figure 1. Perhaps most troubling
7		is the fact that the LDC industry in general has seen significant cost savings over the last
8		ten years in metering costs and records and collection costs which constitute the vast
9		majority of "customer costs". ⁵
10	Q:	What is your recommendation regarding PSE's Residential natural gas customer
11		charge.
12	A:	Even though a reduction to PSE's residential natural gas customer charge is warranted, in
13		the interest of rate continuity, I recommend no change in the current customer charge of
14		\$10.00.
15		IV. PSE SUPPLEMENTAL FILING
16	Q:	Does PSE offer revised class revenue distribution proposals that incorporate the
17		Company's supplemental request for an overall revenue requirement increase
18		above those contained in its May 5, 2009 filing?
19	A:	Yes. Revised class revenue distribution proposals appear in David Hoff's prefiled
20		Supplemental Direct Testimony of September 28, 2009, relating to PSE's electric
21		operations, identified as Exhibit No. DWH-8, and in Janet Phelps's prefiled Supplemental

⁵ These cost savings have been primarily a result of automatic meter reading equipment, a drastic reduction in computer costs, and economies of scale realized by centralized customer call and billing centers.

1		Direct Testimony on August 3, 2009 concerning the Company's natural gas operations,
2		identified as Exhibit No. JKP-24.
3	Q:	Please explain Mr. Hoff's and Ms. Phelps's modified class revenue distribution
4		proposals that incorporate PSE's proposed additional overall changes in
5		requirement provided in the Supplemental testimony of John Story. ⁶
6	A:	Mr. Hoff and Ms. Phelps both utilized the same methodologies employed in their initial
7		filings to distribute the Company's latest proposed revenue requirement for its electric
8		and natural gas operations Mr. Hoff's and Ms. Phelps's class revenue distribution
9		methodologies were discussed earlier in my testimony.
10	Q:	Do Mr. Hoff's and Ms. Phelps's supplemental testimonies effect your class revenue
11		distribution proposals in any way?
12	A:	No. As discussed earlier, my proposals (for purposes of the dollar amounts provided and
13		discussed in revenue distribution) are based on the amounts PSE requested for its electric
14		operations in its initial filing (May 8, 2009) and for its natural gas operations in its
15		August 3, 2009 supplemental filing. In this regard, my proposals provide an "apples to
16		apples" comparison of the Company's and my proposals. Recognizing that the
17		Commission may ultimately authorize an overall revenue requirement different than that
18		proposed by PSE, I have provided a method by which my revenue distribution proposals
19		should be applied to a different overall change in revenues.
20	Q:	Does this complete your direct testimony?
21	A:	Yes.

⁶ Discussed at pages 2 and 5 of Exhibit No. JHS-9T of Supplemental Direct Testimony of Mr. Story filed September 28, 2009.