

## PILOT'S REPORT OF MARINE SAFETY OCCURRENCE



Board of Pilotage Commissioners 2901 Third Avenue, Ste 500; Seattle, Washington 98121 (206) 515-3904 FAX (206) 515-3906 Date: June 3, 2022

FILE WITH COMMISSION WITHIN 10 DAYS
ALONG WITH THE VESSEL CERTIFICATION FORM WHITE CARD.

Report of Marine Safety Occurrence – WAC 363-116-200 1 (b). A state licensed pilot and state licensed pilot trainee involved in a nearmiss occurrence shall complete the board required Report of Marine Safety Occurrence form and file it with the board as soon as possible after the near-miss occurrence, but in no event more than ten days afterwards. If a pilot trainee is involved, both the pilot trainee and the supervising pilot shall file a Report of Marine Safety Occurrence. A near-miss occurrence is where a pilot and pilot trainee successfully takes action of a non-routine nature to avoid a collision with another vessel, structure or aid to navigation, to avoid a grounding of the vessel or to avoid causing damages to the environment. Information relating to near-miss occurrences provided by a pilot and pilot trainee on this form shall not be used for imposing any sanctions or penalties against the pilot or pilot trainee involved in the occurrence. A state licensed pilot or pilot trainee may also use this form on a voluntary basis for reporting out of the ordinary occurrences or concerns for navigational safety encountered or observed during the course of piloting a vessel as well as safety issues encountered or observed on the vessel, the dock, or in the area around the vessel.

If you are reporting a near-miss occurrence, you are required by law to complete this form and send it to the Pilotage Commission.

Date of Occurrence: May 25, 20		0834 Near-Miss: or N	avigational Safety Concern:		
Vessel #1: USNS Brittin  Length: 949 ft	Registry: U.S.A.  106 ft	Vessel #2:			
Draft: FWD23.9 ft	AFT26.8 ft	Draft: FWD	AFT		
Other Description:	RoRo	Other Description:			
Navigation Status:underway Other Inside TSS Lanes: Yes No  Vessel #1 Location: Vessel #2 Location or Hazard Position:					
Wind:		Tide / Current:			
	Speed:<1 kt	. 1.1.	Height:		
Light Condition:day	Vis:Dist:	mi. Weather: high overcast	Other:		
Type of Occurrence (Select those that most apply. If more than one, please explain in your narrative)					
Close Aboard Associated With:	Shallow Water Associated With:	Near Allision Associated With:	Docking Difficulty Associated With:		
Rules of Road Rule	Avoidance Maneuver	Avoidance Maneuver	Tug use Difficulty		
Restricted Visibility	Unanticipated Wind / Current Effects	Unanticipated Wind / Current Effects	Unanticipated Wind / Current Effects		
Narrow Channel	Navigation Problem	Navigation Problem	Order Execution		
Traffic Density	Equipment Malfunction	Equipment Malfunction	Equipment Malfunction		
Other:	Other:	Other: Engine	Other:		
Completion of this form does not replace or relieve the individual of any other reporting requirements under federal, state, or local law.					
Name (type/print)Eric Klapperich		Contact Phone (_	206 949-7433		

Narrati	Ve	Descr	int	ion

Please describe the occurrence, including the chain of events leading to the occurrence and human performance considerations, and suggest items that you think could prevent recurrence of a similar situation. Fill out additional pages and include diagrams, if appropriate.

Launch in Seattle at 0625. on board in Manchester anchorage 0711. While heaving anchor, there was a Master/Pilot exchange.The Captain told me there would be two of four engines available and speed would be 12-15 knots. The two engines we couldn"t use (one on each shaft) had recently been rebuilt but had not been calibrated, and they were hoping to callibrate after they dropped me at the pilot station. Ancor aweigh at 0738. At West Point, at 0825 I noticed our speed was around 17 knots. At 0834 the Captain got a phone call from the engine room and was told there was a fire on one of the engines we were using, and we needed to stop both engines. This ship has controllable pitch propellers, there was no water flow over the rudder and the ship drifted at about a 45 degree angle to starboard and out of the lane. We were in deep water, and had a lot of sea room to drift. Approximately 10 minutes later, word from the engine room was some residual fuel/oil behind some exhaust lagging had caught fire (Captains words). Later the Captain would say that it wasn't a fire, only overheating. Around 0845 VTS called on my cell phone, and was concerned that we were slow and out of the lane. I explained to them what I knew, and about this time we got the ok from the engine room that it was safe to use two engines. However, the problem to the one engine was not residual fuel/oil but a crack in the exhaust manifold which had caused the exhaust lagging to get extremely hot, and that engine was no longer available. Now we were down to 3 engines and only 10-15% power. I hung up with VTS after relaying these details.

The Captain said we are going to run on one un-rebuilt engine and one rebuilt, uncalibrated engine and only at 10-15 percent power, which means 7 knots. I continued our transit north, and entered the TSS, and had more phone calls with the Coast Guard on what to do and how they wanted to treat this vessel. The Coast Guard eventually told me we could continue to the pilot station with a tug escort. I relayed this to the Captain as an option to going back to anchor at Manchester. The Captain was good waiting to for a tug and said he wants to try and keep his schedule. They had technicians on board and wanted to continue with their sea trials they had planned for their newly rebuilt engines, after the pilot station.

The CG gave us no further instructions except for continuing towards the Pilot Station with a tug escort. We did round turns keeping the engines running for steering and safety off of Edmonds and out of the lanes for about two hours waiting for a tug from Seattle. At 1105 we were underway with the Brynn Foss to the Pilot Station making 6-7 knots. The CG, out of concern for safety, finally made a decision to have the vessel go to anchor in Port Angeles and have a Class Inspection.

During many conversations with the Captain, and before the CG required the ship to go to anchor, stated he was concerned about his schedule, and staying on it. the Captain tried to defend the situation and remaining on schedule with the fact that they had three engines available which meant they had built in redundancy. I had to explain that three engines at only 10-15% power was not redundancy that accounted for problems or any issues that required maneuvering the vessel in a safe or prudent manner, and that is why the CG required a tug escort. In addition, allowing this ship to continue on after the Pilot Station or the CG allowing it to continue without an inspection would not be safe or in the best interest of the public or Washington State: Once the CG made the ship go to anchor, the Captain was actually relieved, knowing that there was no more pressure on him to stay on schedule and difficult choces didn't have to be made by him. We finaly had the anchor downin in Port Angeles at 1815. I believe they left the anchorage after inspection and any repairs two days later.

**Judgments** 

Actions or Inactions

## Narrative Topics to Consider How the Problem Arose How the Problem Discovered **Contributing Factors Corrective Actions** Perceptions Decisions Procedures Communications Ship Design Experience Language Difficulty Personal Alertness

Did you notify the vessel master of your intent	to file this report? Yes X No			
This form should be submitted as soon as possible, but no more than 10 days after the occurrence. Submit the completed form to the Washington State Board of Pilotage Commissioners.				
(Address on first page)	Vessel #1 Name: USNS Brittin			
Eric Klapperich Pilot Name:	Signature:			